
How Japan’s defense policies have developed and where those policies are headed has been a frequent topic of discussion among Japan specialists for decades, with realists claiming it was only a matter of time before Japan converted a portion of its vast wealth into military power. Japan became the third wealthiest country in the world in 1968, behind only the United States and the Soviet Union, and it is third again this year. (China’s GDP has edged past Japan’s.)

As the decades rolled on and Japan did not emerge as a military superpower, other observers aside from the realists made their voices heard, saying that Japan had developed anti-militarist norms and was therefore unlikely to march to the sound of guns anytime soon.

Even so, Japan does have impressive military capabilities in its Self-Defense Forces. The most convincing and recent constructivist take on this seeming dilemma is from Andrew Oros, who discusses Japan’s security identity, which he describes as “domestic antimalitari-...” in his book, Normalizing Japan. While Oros’ thesis is convincing as a description of the attitudes of Japanese society as a whole, other authors, like Mike Green and Richard Samuels, have convincingly traced the realist policies of many important Japanese policymakers.

So Japan’s defense policy, like perhaps most such policies, is a mixture of realistic pragmatism within norms-based constraints. Authors Saadia Pekkanen and Paul Kallender-Umezu have added nuance to this picture in their excellent case study on Japan’s space policy. The authors are especially effective in demonstrating the impact corporate interests have in shaping Japan’s defense policy. They trace what they describe as Japan’s “market to the military” trend in space policy.

While I think the authors skillfully trace many of the formal and informal limiting factors on Japan’s defense policy, I disagree with their characterization of Charles Kades as “principally” responsible for the drafting of Article 9, the Renunciation of War article in Japan’s postwar constitution. When directing his staff to draft a constitution, he saw that a note MacArthur gave to them as guidance specified that Japan should renounce war and armed forces, “even for its own self-defense.” What Kades did was to remove the phrase “even for its own self-defense” but add the phrase “other war potential” in after “armed forces.” The modifications to MacArthur’s original note have been the source of much of the debate on Japan’s defense policy limits. The book could also use a bibliography. Finally, I was surprised the authors did not cite Michael Chinworth’s Inside Japan’s Defense which covered some of the same material.

Japan is a space power, and its recent announcement that it will form a Space Strategy Office is further evidence of its intention to consolidate its position as such. This book is a readable, cogent examination of the interaction of corporate interests with national security interests, and adds needed nuance to the emerging understanding of Japan as an important player in the field of international security.

COL David Hunter-Chester, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


An insider’s tour of the many aspects of the U.S. government’s response to terrorist activities over the past ten years, Counterstrike: The Untold Story Of America’s Secret Campaign Against Al Qaeda describes the evolution of the U.S. approach to confront an adaptive enemy and the complexity of the struggle.

Authors Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker interviewed numerous insiders worldwide. The interviews underscore the variety of missions the U.S. military and government have undertaken, initially in the absence of a clear understanding of how to proceed and then in the presence of more mature and incisive information.

Under the watch of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the way to victory was to eliminate the terrorist’s leadership, but terrorists were continually replacing slain leaders. It soon became clear this was not the way to end the conflict. The authors argue that one roadblock to forming a new deterrence strategy was the staff’s reluctance to confront the secretary because of Rumsfeld’s focus on eliminating terrorist leaders.

However, a new strategy came from an unlikely source—a summer intern at the Pentagon. The intern made a two-pronged recommendation: to capitalize on the terrorist’s search for glory in order to catch or kill him and to discourage ideological fence sitters and young men from becoming terrorists by intervening with imams and others. The strategy was later expanded to include warning anyone against supporting terrorists in their efforts to obtain weapons of mass destruction. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates

MR Book Reviews

Featured Review!
underscored this in 2008, saying that “any state, terrorist group, or other non-state actor or individual” would be held fully accountable for such support.

The authors of Counterstrike describe several uses of the deterrence strategy and key incidents that provided the momentum to keep it on track. One method was to impose the strategy through the use of cyber activities such as “overloading,” “mimicking watermarks,” and “web-spoofing” and through operations that included the National Security Agency to create doubts in terrorists through the use of cell phone hacking and the planting of false information. Some may think the authors reveal too many techniques here, making this one of the most interesting, yet controversial, aspects of the book.

Counterstrike emphasizes how timely intelligence sustained the momentum of the strategy. The authors offer three troves of information: the U.S. capture of a terrorist courier, a special operations strike on a terrorist compound in Sinjar, and material discovered in Osama bin-Laden’s hideaway. These operations uncovered suicide bomber identities and operations, improvised explosive devices manufacturing ingredients, and other such activities. Some of the credit for these successes goes to the sharing of information by different intelligence agencies. The work of the Central Intelligence Agency and the U.S. military (to include the Defense Intelligence Agency) receive special attention. Another “momentum sustainer” was the effort to win over the trust and confidence of people in the region instead of their “hearts and minds.”

The authors believe the opposition is not something the United States can defeat but “something that is going to have to implode on itself.” Americans will need to develop a culture of reliance to fight through times of intimidation and return to normal if foreign or homegrown terrorists attack us on our soil.

The book also emphasizes the efforts of service members who perform their duties while waiting for Washington to catch up. Counterstrike reminds policymakers of the complexity of dealing with a nonstate enemy who picks battles on his terms.

Tim Thomas,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Father of Money: Buying Peace in Baghdad is a junior officer’s view of how reconstruction money used wisely can lead to reduced violence between factions, protection for U.S. soldiers, and an overall environment acceptable for the beginning of governance at the lower levels. The narrative tells how Jason Whiteley, then a U.S. Army captain in a tank battalion, served as the governance officer in the mixed Sunni-Shi’a southern Baghdad district of Dora in 2004.

Whiteley provides a riveting account of what it was like to serve at that time, approximately a year after the ground war when the Iraqis—and Americans—realized this would be a lengthy, complicated reconstruction effort. Whitely was on the scene when the military first realized how important money was to stimulate local employment and improve infrastructure in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Crossing into a realm that many military leaders might not consider permissible and with little guidance, training, or previous experience, Whiteley, who was called Abu Floos (father of money) by the local Iraqi leaders, found a way to create a fragile system in southern Baghdad that empowered traditional tribal and U.S.-established local government leaders.

Greed, jealousy, and the arrival of Al-Qaeda made Whiteley’s plan unsustainable. Having served with Whiteley in Dora for the first four months of his tour, I can tell you this book contains lessons learned that are relevant for today’s officers, some of whom could find themselves facing problems similar to the ones Whiteley faced.

I highly recommend Father of Money to Defense and State Department officers and civilians who could be working abroad in fragile countries. Operation Iraqi Freedom veterans will be enraptured by the book and likely finish reading it the same day they buy it.

LTC David T. Seigel, USA, Retired,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


The Politics of Security in Modern Russia brings together quality academic research and sound assessments on security and security services in Russian policy development. Editor Mark Gaelotti argues that security is interwoven throughout Russia’s history and remains a key part of how Russian governments see themselves.

Even though the relationship between the United States and Russia has been “reset,” many aspects of the new rapport are still security-related. Since January 2009, there have been significant agreements and treaties between the two countries, including the ratification of START II by both the United States and Russia, expansion of the Northern Distribution Network, and talk of renewing the Conventional Forces Europe treaty. Terrorist attacks in Russia have underscored the need for greater cooperation on security between the West and Moscow.

Gaelotti’s compendium addresses the role of security and security services in the development of Russian policy. In regard to the security services, the authors provide clearly articulated, well-researched positions on their current status and potential paths that they may follow in light of uncertain political futures, unclear defense budget priorities, and the pending decline of Russian population and economic capacity.

Three articles will appeal to the Military Review audience, Bettina Renz’s “Civil-Military Relations and the Security Apparatus,”

Renz and Baev’s articles complement each other with Renz laying out the friction points of Russian security reform by demonstrating its inability to delineate the responsibilities and authorities of the minister of defense, the chief of the general staff, and the heads of various security state organs. Renz concludes that Russia’s security apparatus is a byzantine collection of fiefdoms with conflicting agendas, generating a corrosive atmosphere and impeding change.

Baev’s piece on the military’s failure to reform argues that the lack of strategic foresight to enact true reform and maintain vintage Soviet military doctrine and equipment are factors in the failure. Baev points out three critical areas that continue to impede modernization: failing demographics, obsolete equipment, and inability to grasp the impact of technology as a revolution in military affairs.

Blandy uses Chechnya’s conflict to explain the role security plays in developing and executing Russian policy. He concludes that although Russia has been conducting counterterror operations in the Caucasus off and on since 1991, it never developed a policy of regional security that extends beyond the use of violence and military action.

*The Politics of Security in Modern Russia* has great value for readers looking to gain a better understanding of Russia’s security policies and how they are developed.

**MAJ Marco Ciliberti, Baumholder, Germany**

**COUNTERINSURGENCY IN PAKISTAN**, Seth G. Jones and C. Christine Fair, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2010, 206 pages, $23.00.

*Counterinsurgency in Pakistan* is an ideal country study for units deploying to the region and classic literature for those interested in national policy. Focusing on counterinsurgency capability and current progress in Pakistan, this book addresses current challenges in Operation Enduring Freedom and highlights relevant topics to consider for policy application at operational levels.

Authors G. Jones and C. Christine Fair tell us that Pakistan is a mysterious place with a value system tied to past myths and symbols that have created its present approach to terrorism. Pakistan is the key to success in combating terrorism in the region, and therefore, the world. Pakistan has a long history of recruiting and training insurgent forces, specifically anti-Shia groups. During the 1980s, Pakistan provided covert aid to Afghan Islamist groups and Pashtun Sunni factions. After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate shifted the focus of the mujahedeen to the Kashmir Front and located training camps within Pakistan and Afghanistan. The long-standing Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan regularly resulted in India’s conventional military victories, prompting Pakistan to sponsor these insurgent groups in asymmetric combat against Indian forces. This began to shift Pakistan support to the Taliban (mostly madrassa students) in southern Afghanistan.

After 9/11, this mindset changed. Pakistan supported the overthrow of the Taliban. But by 2006, Pakistan had become increasingly concerned about India’s presence in Afghanistan and resumed supporting the Taliban, at least at the tribal levels. Retired Lieutenant General David Barno felt then that Pakistan took this new position based on U.S. plans to downsize its forces in Afghanistan—a topic of current relevance.

American and Pakistan government authorities continue to be at odds over the conflict. Should the reader review these elements with the intent to apply some of the lessons to current policy, he will increase his overall effectiveness in this theater of operations.

**LTC(P) Thomas S. Bundt, Ph.D., Vilseck, Germany**


Marketing director of the USS *Midway* Museum and a former journalist and author of *Midway Magic* and *Midway Memories*, Scott McGaugh brings 24 years of experience in marketing communications into a historical overview of military medicine from the U.S. Revolutionary War to the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. Although focusing on military medicine as experienced in U.S. forces, McGaugh provides insights and perspectives from other times and cultures.

McGaugh’s book is well researched from transcribed oral histories, first-hand accounts of events, official reports, and news items, and his research comes together in a lively blend of personal stories, facts, historical accounts, and overviews of medicine. His engaging narratives sometimes read like historical fiction, which might be distracting or confusing for some people. While much of the information used in the narratives can be checked through a selective bibliography, some facts presented are difficult to verify.

*Battlefield Angels* emphasizes the experiences of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps corpsman and medics from the U.S. Army—part soldiers and part healers—on the frontline of the medical process in war. The book also provides graphic accounts of the horrors of war and provides critical insight into the problems and stresses of providing medical care to injured soldiers. As McGaugh tells us, “The real story of military medicine begins with those who breathe life into others alongside a road, deep within a jungle, or at the bottom of a foxhole.” This is where readers will find the most important insights of *Battlefield Angels*, the revelations of character defined by courage, duty, optimism, focus, and ingenuity.

McGaugh identifies three themes in military medicine. First, medical
problems can be far more devastating to a military force than combat. For example, McGaugh estimates that in the Revolutionary War, 8,000 soldiers were killed in combat, but 17,000 died of disease. Second, advances in warfare technology, particularly technology related to killing and destruction, usually outpace peacetime advances of medicine. Thus, when war breaks out, militaries are usually behind in their capabilities to treat the wounded. Finally, although killing’s intensity and effectiveness increases from one war to the next, even delayed advances in military medicine significantly improve the chances of soldiers surviving in war.

Less emphasized is the controversial subject of whether survivability is always desirable, especially with the increased physical and mental wounds carried by soldiers and civilians.

Many accounts of military medicine focus on the failure to adequately care for soldiers both on and off the battlefield as well as questionable practices such as medical experimentation. McGaugh takes readers into the trenches with on-the-ground corpsmen and medics throughout U.S. military history, to show us the good of military medicine and the heroic actions of medical personnel.

Kevin M. Bond, Ph.D.,
Los Angeles, California


The name Patton will always be connected to World War II. General George S. Patton’s wartime exploits continue to fascinate authors and historians. Three new books bring a fresh perspective to the history of famous general and his progeny.

John Nelson Rickard’s Advance and Destroy examines Patton’s leadership in the Battle of the Bulge. The book follows Patton’s preparations for the German offensive, his relief of the besieged town of Bastogne, and the closure of the Bulge. However, Patton, at times, almost disappears from the book as Rickard describes battalion-sized battles, as well as the German point of view of the campaign.

While Patton’s main mission focused on Bastogne, he also wanted to close the Bulge, but his ideas met resistance from Lieutenant General Omar Bradley, Patton’s superior. Bradley wanted Patton to take the most direct route north to link up with Lieutenant General Courtney Hodges, who was pushing south. Patton wanted to cut the Bulge at its base, farther east of Bastogne, but Bradley’s orders hemmed Patton in and reduced his options, making for a slower offensive than Patton wanted. Rickard does an excellent job explaining Patton’s plans and Bradley’s decisions.

Rickard’s great contribution to history is his chapter on the Verdun meeting of Eisenhower and his generals on 19 December 1944 in which Patton famously said he could relieve Bastogne in a matter of days; Rickard pieces together the whole meeting, providing a coherent story. Rickard’s book, much like his earlier Patton at Bay, is a detailed operational history better suited to the professional soldier than the casual reader.

While Rickard focuses on Patton in the Bulge, in Fighting Patton: George S. Patton Jr. Through the Eyes of His Enemies, Harry Yeide examines Patton’s battlefield adversaries from the Mexican Punitive Expedition through World Wars I and II. Yeide reveals that Patton’s enemies were not in awe of him, particularly in World War II.

Patton’s early engagements, which he fought as a lieutenant in Mexico and as a colonel in France, may have impressed his opponents, but they had no idea who they were facing. The same could be said for his opponents in North Africa and Sicily and in France’s Normandy campaign. It was not until the Lorraine campaign that the Germans took notice of their adversary. While Patton’s relief of Bastogne during the Battle of the Bulge is considered his seminal moment, the German high command was more focused on their own attacks west. The Germans were able to capture one of Patton’s memorandums on his battle philosophy, but as Yeide relates, “practically everyone who mattered on the Western front probably already knew it.”

Patton’s Enemies quotes from the German records and discovers that Patton is hardly mentioned in dispatches, and when he is, he is judged as a competent, not superior, general. The book’s structure, however, is a bit confusing. Instead of just focusing on Patton and his enemies on the battlefield, the author devotes entire chapters to the Germans between wars, the invasions of the West and Russia and the battle of Kursk, making it hard to remember individual Germans before they actually duel with Patton.

While Yeide clearly points out that German World War II unit reports, officer accounts, and telephone transcripts all but ignored Patton, he may have missed one source: German radio propaganda. Joseph Goebbels, the Third Reich’s propaganda minister, referred to Patton in war broadcasts in 1945. German generals might have left Patton’s name out of their reports, but German soldiers and civilians certainly knew that Patton was on the battlefield.

This is a good book for anyone who wants a deeper understanding of Patton’s battles. Yeide has grounded many of the lofty myths surrounding Patton, particularly in World War II, where his impact may not have been as effective as previous historians and biographers believed.

Ben Patton’s Growing Up Patton brings the Patton family up to the present by reflecting on the men
and women who contributed to the family’s legacy. After a brief family history focusing on the relationship between Patton, Jr., and his son, George S. Patton, IV, the book delves into their correspondence during World War II, revealing the father and son’s interest in history and their experiences at the U.S. Military Academy. Patton, Jr., was actually Patton, II, but changed it to junior after the death of his father, making his son Patton, IV. Portraits of people who touched the Patton family follow, particularly Vera Duss (Mother Benedict), who survived World War II to open an abbey in the United States that Margaret Patton (Patton, IV’s, daughter) joined in 1982. Other chapters are dedicated to soldiers who served with Patton, IV, explaining their wartime exploits and leadership.

While George Patton, IV, may never completely escape the shadow of his famous father, the book brings him into his own, relating stories of his courage, leadership, and fighting spirit on the battlefield. As the commander of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment in Vietnam, he constantly flew over the battlefield, drawing enemy fire, and once even led a platoon-sized attack after his helicopter crashed. One of the book’s funniest scenes is of Patton, IV, grabbing a “gaga-eyed” Willie Nelson out of his tour van to perform for his division, telling the singer, “You get your goddamn ass out there right now!”

Kevin M. Hymel, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Few authors capture the essence of the human dimension of war as well as John C. McManus. Combining an engaging, highly descriptive writing style with exhaustive research, McManus provides readers with a true “foxhole” perspective. It is a perspective that has enabled previous efforts such as The Deadly Brotherhood and The Americans at D-Day to garner praise from critics and readers alike and a perspective clearly present throughout the pages of his latest volume, Grunts: Inside the American Infantry Combat Experience World War II through Iraq.

As the title aptly suggests, Grunts pays tribute to the American infantryman (Army and Marine Corps) fighting in 10 superbly chronicled battles and operations conducted since World War II. They range from the marines on the island of Peleliu to the air cavalry soldier in the jungles of Vietnam to the mechanized infantryman in the deserts of Iraq and Kuwait to the grunt in the streets of Fallujah.

Using the same formula that has made him so successful, vivid writing and meticulous research, McManus honors the accomplishments of the American infantryman, emphasizes his indispensability on the battlefield, and dismisses the notion that technology will make the infantryman obsolete.

McManus’s writing style conveys the emotions, sights, and smells of battle well. He places his reader in the middle of the infantryman’s environment and into the thoughts and feelings of the soldier on the ground during combat, enabling readers to grasp the human dimension of war.

Often underplayed in any discussion of books of this genre is the criticality of research. Readers will find McManus has interwoven quality research throughout his volume. This research comes principally from newly discovered official documents, after-action reviews, letters, diaries, journals received by the author, and personal interviews. McManus’s years of research contributed significantly in crafting an engaging volume.

Those expecting a vanilla book, devoid of controversial opinion, will be surprised. McManus opines on a variety of topics related to the infantry. The author is especially critical of military and civilian leaders who he believes negatively affect the ability of the infantry to fight on the ground. He particularly focuses on decisions made in the areas of rules of engagement, troop strength, logistical support, political strategy, and operational and tactical decision making. This discussion adds significantly to the book’s readability and provides ample ground for reflection.

In his introduction, McManus says, “The most powerful, effective weapon in modern war is a well-trained, well-armed, and well-led infantry soldier.” McManus supports this premise throughout the remainder of Grunts. He provides outstanding examples from the past and the present on the essential role of the infantryman and a persuasive argument that technological advances will not diminish his importance on future battlefields.

Rick Baillergeon, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Eisenhower thought General Walter “Beetle” Smith indispensable to the Allied victory in Europe, yet Smith remains a little known figure. In this definitive biography, Crosswell shows Smith as Eisenhower’s necessary junior partner and offers a view of World War II in the Mediterranean and Western Europe from the highest operational level. Crosswell addresses controversial topics in coalition warfare, discusses wartime staff organization and manpower problems, and connects command decisions to the limitations imposed on them by logistics.

Crosswell’s account of Smith’s postwar career as Truman’s ambassador to the Soviet Union and CIA director and Eisenhower’s under secretary of state leads one to understand why neither Marshall nor Eisenhower considered Smith a viable candidate for independent command; he was an operator and fixer, but not a strategic thinker. The book also highlights the Army’s
emphasis on institutionalized education, its shortcomings, its role in Smith’s career, and his relationship with George Marshall.

As one of Marshall’s inner staff, Smith was an efficient administrator, shielding his boss from unnecessary interruption and mundane affairs; he proved indispensable, emerging as Marshall’s principal apprentice and troubleshooter. Eisenhower recognized Smith’s ability after he joined the General Staff in December 1941 and requested Smith’s services when he became commander of the European Theater in June 1942.

In Crosswell’s view, Smith “was much more than advertised,” as Eisenhower’s chief of staff. Crosswell concludes that Eisenhower was “considerably less,” an indecisive leader who “proved decisive only when the decision was not to do something” and who “failed to confront the perpetual problems historically faced by the U.S. Army in war: manpower, supply of forces in the field, and civil affairs.” These judgments appear too harsh in demonstrating Crosswell’s admiration for Smith over Eisenhower. The responsibility for civil affairs lay with Marshall himself.

The Eisenhower-Smith team’s first test was Operation Torch. The invasion succeeded, but problems rapidly increased. The most serious was supplying the invaders, which Smith tried to reorganize. Eisenhower let Smith handle the press, political, and diplomatic relations. Smith’s job as SHAEF chief of staff put him at the center of a political-military maelstrom of warring egos. While Eisenhower emerged as the Western Allied coalition’s astute manager, Smith worked behind the scenes to set up the successes. He worked well with the British and produced teamwork among the various staff elements better than anyone else, something Eisenhower recognized.

Crosswell’s account of Smith’s life and of supreme command in Europe is detailed and well written, with about one third devoted to logistical and personnel problems, which have never received the attention they deserve. The book gives us greater knowledge of and insight into the politics and problems of coalition warfare.

**Lewis Bernstein, Ph.D., Seoul, Korea**

**COMMAND CULTURE: Officer Education in the U.S. Army and the German Armed Forces, 1901-1940, and the Consequences for World War II, Jörg Muth, University of North Texas Press, Denton, 2011, 366 pages, $29.95.**

At a recent scholarly conference, a number of prominent military historians confessed to being “recovering Wehrmacht-oholics.” That is, they were working to get over an unhealthy fascination with the armed forces of the Third Reich. In his new book *Command Culture*, Jörg Muth argues that, starting in the 19th century, the U.S. Army has been obsessed with the German military. However, while recognizing that professional military education was a key element of German battlefield performance, the U.S. Army could never replicate the best German practices in its own institutions. This, Muth believes, was especially true in the years prior to World War II. The dysfunction began at West Point, with its backward curriculum and sadistic plebe system yielding rigid conformists unable to think creatively on the battlefield. Worse, the interwar Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth possessed a mediocre faculty that stressed the “school solution” over independent and creative thought.

The only exception to this dismal picture was George C. Marshall’s Infantry School (where the curriculum was shaped by a German liaison officer). In Muth’s view, the result of the U.S. Army’s dreadful education system was a timid and lackluster performance by U.S. Army commanders in World War II.

Muth makes important points, but his argument has the effect of a sawed-off shotgun fired at close range: it achieves considerable target effect but it also inflicts significant collateral damage. His presentation is marred by imprecise language (he calls von Schlieffen “the moronic count”), syntax errors (a more attentive editor was needed), and hasty conclusions drawn from anecdotal evidence. (A handful of memoir entries leads Muth to conclude that, in contrast to German officers, American officers are routinely late to meetings. The author makes pronouncements that beg for a rejoinder (e.g., “There is no place in war for doctrine because it harnesses the mind of an officer”). He also never satisfactorily explains how the German officer education system (which purportedly stressed independence, character, and personal responsibility) could produce senior leaders so willing to serve as accomplices to the monstrous designs of Adolf Hitler.

Nevertheless, this book deserves a wide readership among military historians and active officers. Muth raises issues that must be addressed in preparing the U.S. military for the challenges of the 21st century. Thus, not only should the book be read, but it should be widely debated as well. Those who think that CGSC today fosters a “culture of mediocrity” will find that Muth offers a historical basis for their views. Those who believe our professional military education is on the right track are likely to be outraged. Let the controversy begin.

**Scott Stephenson, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

**THE IRON WAY: Railroads, the Civil War, and the Making of Modern America, William G. Thomas, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 2011, 296 pages, $30.00.**

William G. Thomas’s *The Iron Way* is a conceptually ambitious and methodologically innovative book about the role of the railroad before and after the Civil War. Drawing on a wealth of sources at the University of Nebraska’s Digital History Project (http://railroads.unl.edu), Thomas casts the railroad as the antebellum era’s “most visible indicator of modernity.” Its emergence as a symbol of modernity, for southern slaveholders and...
northern abolitionists alike, rivaled its significance in revolutionizing industry, geography, and economic relationships.

The railroad’s swift expansion between the 1840s and the 1850s deepened the sectional schism over slavery. Thomas’s impressive statistical compilation shows that southern railroad construction and investment skyrocketed in the 1850s. The railroad’s expansion, made possible by slave labor, perpetuated the plantation system by increasing the price of slaves, opening up interior lands for cultivation, and expanding cotton markets. All of these forces—economic growth, increased mobility, the synchronization of slave trading, and the linking of commercial hubs—convinced southerners that their region, despite its anachronistic economic system, merited recognition as a “modern” nation.

Northern thought of the railroad on different terms. Decrying the incompatibility of modernity and slavery, they equated technological advancement with moral progress and slavery’s inevitable obsolescence. Thomas shows that Midwestern railroad construction produced a class of laborers sympathetic to the new Republican Party. Workers flooded onto western prairies to build railroads such as the Illinois Central, which in 1850 received the nation’s first federal land grant of 2.6 million acres. By the late 1850s, each new mile of railroad drew 32 Germans, 19 Irish, 7 British, and 200 mostly northern Americans onto the fertile prairies and sparked an agricultural revolution. Thomas argues that the collective work experiences of these men fostered unity and a commitment to northern free labor principles. Abraham Lincoln, himself a former railroad attorney, benefitted from this emergent voting bloc in 1860.

Thomas’s sweeping chapters on Civil War railroad strategy will prove useful for Army officers. He contends that Union generals pioneered a tactical and strategic form of “railroad generalship” that emphasized controlling, destroying, and using southern railroads and other communication networks. Thomas demonstrates that Union General William T. Sherman’s correspondence during the 1864 Atlanta campaign emphasized the destruction of southern railroads. In doing so, Sherman intended to isolate the South from the world, limit southerners’ mobility, and undermine the very symbol of their self-professed “modernity” and claim to nationhood: an intricate railroad system.

After the war, railroads became a “nexus” for political battles over the meaning of black labor, citizenship, and portability. Thomas follows several legal cases, including the 1868 contest between Virginia’s Catherine Brown, a black woman, against the Alexandria and Washington Railroad for expelling her from a car reserved for white women. Once hailed as the slaves’ gateway to freedom, railroads ironically became the battleground in defining emancipation’s extent and purpose.

Lavishly illustrated, brilliantly argued, and impeccably researched, The Iron Way deserves serious attention by military and nonmilitary historians alike.

Anthony E. Carlson, Ph.D.,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

ATATURK: Lessons in Leadership from the Greatest General of the Ottoman Empire, Austin Bay, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2011, $23.00.

Kemal Atatürk’s place in history is little known in the West, and few military professionals study his campaigns. This volume does what it can to address this deficiency.

Born Mustafa within the borders of an Ottoman Empire that was already shrinking, he later named himself Mustafa Kemal, or “Mustafa the Perfect” when he began his studies. It would not be the last time he would change his identity to fit the times. He became an Ottoman officer, served in the army in a variety of roles, and made a reputation for himself as a military leader. Having served in a variety of assignments, from conventional warfare during the Balkan Wars to diplomatic missions, to insurgency efforts against the Italian invaders of Libya, he received a command in the strategic spit of land known as Gallipoli when the Ottoman Empire entered World War I on the side of the Central Powers.

His Ottoman division held off a powerful Allied invasion force. It is probably no exaggeration to say Atatürk saved the Ottoman Empire—or at least bought it some time. Through personal courage, astute understanding of the terrain, and sure knowledge of his own capabilities and those of the enemy, he was able to stop the invaders and force them into a stalemate, which only ended when the British withdrew their force from Gallipoli and the Allies gave up their idea of capturing Constantinople and knocking the Ottomans out of the war with one stroke.

After the defeat of the Central Powers, Kemal reinvented himself again, this time as a Turkish nationalist, eventually adopting the name Ataturk (“Father of the Turks”). Turks sought to establish a Turkish republic, free of nationalities who wanted nothing more to do with Turkey and free of Allies intent on redrawing the map of the Middle East in their favor.

Ataturk fought the War of Independence with no money, few weapons, and a strategic situation that looked bleak. His experience as a diplomat and as a communicator served him well, helping him strengthen Turkish leadership while exploiting disharmony among the erstwhile Allies. Alone among the Central Powers, Turkey was able to renegotiate the terms of its treaty ending World War I.

This is a readable book. However, at 167 pages it only scratches the surface of Atatürk’s military career. The subtitle, “Lessons in Leadership,” is in fact not very accurate. At no point does Austin Bay actually identify leadership lessons, although they can be extrapolated from the text. Still, Atatürk is a good book for learning the military art from a different perspective.

Lt. Col. James D. Crabtree,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Jeremy Black’s latest book, *Beyond the Military Revolution*, attempts to consider events and developments of Western military history from a global and multicultural frame of reference. Black is a prolific author—some would say too prolific—who has a tendency to revisit well-worn paths and to wander about without a clear focus. Although focusing on a discrete “period”—the 17th century—Black does not add anything new to his well-known calls for a multicultural approach to military history. He favors an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary explanation for the series of events often described as “the military revolution” of the 16th and 17th centuries.

Readers should not expect a detailed chronological narrative of the period. Rather, Black defends his ideas on the significance of technological innovation, organization, and the relationships between war and the state and war and society during the “Western Military Revolution.” He warns about the dangers of assuming “teleology in history” and calls for a multifaceted, interdisciplinary, and multicultural approach.

Contrary to the majority of Western historians, Black does not privilege the “West” over “the rest”—even in matters pertaining to military technology and organization—with the possible exception of conceding to Western powers an advantage in naval capacity to sail and deploy around the globe. Perhaps his greatest contribution to scholarly debate is the argument that various cultural styles of warfare may represent the best possible adaptations to particular situations and may be functionally superior to more technologically advanced systems.

Given its ambitious aims and its limited success in achieving them, *Beyond the Military Revolution* is ultimately disappointing. Those who want a good overview of warfare in the 17th century would do well to consult specialized histories dealing with specific regions or topics. A satisfactory, comprehensive history of the period from a global perspective remains to be written.

Nonetheless, the book is worth reading for those who already possess a good general understanding of the period and who have followed the intricate controversies surrounding the twin concepts of “military revolution” and “revolution in military affairs.” Scholars in various sub-disciplines will find many areas that cry out for further study and detailed analysis.

LTC Prisco R. Hernández, USAR, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Townshend’s work is a masterful retelling of the British imperial experience in Iraq. Believing a Mesopotamia controlled by the German allied Ottoman Empire to be a threat to British India, the Indian government “went to war with the army it had,” sending out an ill-prepared and poorly equipped expeditionary force to protect British interests. Enticed by the quick victory in Basra, the generals set their sights on locations farther up the Tigris River—Kut and Baghdad. In the absence of clear policy directives from civilian leadership, field commanders combined professional ambitions and muddled strategic thinking in ever riskier operations. Failing to seize Baghdad, the beleaguered British force retreated to Kut only to fall into a brutal Ottoman captivity. While British forces eventually drove the Turks from Mesopotamia, public outcry prompted government inquiries.

The book also describes how political intrigues increased as the military actions dwindled. Political factions in London, Cairo, and Delhi competed for dominance in the new Arab policy. In addition, the British struggled with the regional interests of the French, Arab nationalism, and the Sunni versus Shi’a rivalry. The northern Kurds also staged a revolt, hoping to form an independent Kurdistan, but a British punitive expedition quashed them. Thus Britain maintained an oppressive grip on the newly formed nation for strategic and financial reasons, giving rise to a country simmering with political, ethnic, and religious tensions, ripe for totalitarian leadership.

Townshend shows that U.S. involvement is the latest chapter in a century of Western involvement in the region. He does this, not by politicizing the historical narrative with editorializations and directly addressing U.S. involvement, but by explaining Britain’s first intervention in the country and allowing the readers to interpret the U.S. experience through the British imperial lens. Townshend unsparring criticizes ambitious senior generals who duplicitously took advantage of political uncertainties to increase military operations. The resulting logistical nightmares, inadequate medical care, financial hardships, and political dithering mired the British in the Middle East and drained the Empire’s strength.

The book’s first half moves quickly as Townshend describes events in vivid detail through the diaries, letters, and dispatches of the enlisted men and officers. He brings to life the harshness of the conditions and the immense physical suffering involved in the campaign, making the narrative superbly readable. The second half, however, slows down as he focuses on political issues at the national and international level. Readers without a strong background in British imperial history may find this section more challenging to follow.

While well written, Townshend’s book, like the British campaign, suffers from a lack of maps. The three maps provided are inadequate in view of the work’s scope, and readers should have another resource such as the online USMA atlas close by. An order of battle for the British and Ottoman forces would aid the reader as well. Despite these few shortcomings, this work will appeal to readers from both political and military professions as a superb introduction to understanding the Western military experience in Iraq.

Jonathan E. Newell, Nashua, New Hampshire

Discover the epic naval story of the war that threatened to undo our nation in 1812. Riveting firsthand accounts enliven this official sea-level view of the conflict that proved American naval prowess a force to be reckoned with. Explore historic documents, letters, ephemera, and artifacts, including fascinating finds from the Navy’s most recent underwater excavation of the war’s lost ships. Featuring a colorful, diverse cast of characters—from sailors, spies, and ship’s surgeons to commodores, Navy wives, and privateersmen—and incorporating hundreds of photographs, period illustrations, and contemporary and original maps, The War of 1812 and the Rise of the U.S. Navy is a sweeping panorama of a defining moment in U.S. history and a must-read for maritime aficionados and general history buffs alike.

From the publisher.


U.S. Army Captain Kimberly N. Hampton was living her dream: flying armed helicopters in combat and commanding D Troop, 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry, the armed reconnaissance aviation squadron of the 82nd Airborne Division. In 1998 she was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Army. Then, driven by determination and ambition, Kimberly rapidly rose through the ranks in the almost all-male bastion of military aviation to command a combat aviation troop.

On January 2, 2004, Captain Hampton was flying an OH-58D Kiowa Warrior helicopter above Fallujah, Iraq, in support of a raid on an illicit weapons marketplace, searching for an elusive sniper on the rooftops of the city. A little past noon her helicopter was wracked by an explosion. A heat-seeking surface-to-air missile had gone into the exhaust and knocked off the helicopter’s tail boom. The helicopter crashed, killing Kimberly.

Kimberly’s Flight is the story of Captain Hampton’s exemplary life. This story is told through nearly 50 interviews and her own emails to family and friends, and is entwined with Ann Hampton’s narrative of loving and losing a child.

From the publisher.

THE SWORD OF ST. MICHAEL: The 82nd Airborne Division in World War II, Guy LoFaro, Da Capo Press, New York, 784 pages, $40.00.

The 82nd Airborne Division spent more time in combat than any other American airborne unit of World War II, and its fierce battlefield tenacity earned it the reputation of one of the finest divisions in the world. Yet no comprehensive history of the 82nd during World War II exists today. The Sword of St. Michael corrects this significant gap in the literature, offering a lively narrative and thoroughly researched history of the famous division. Author Guy LoFaro, himself a distinguished officer of the division, interweaves the voices of soldiers at both ends of the chain of command, from Eisenhower to the lowest private. Making extensive use of primary sources, LoFaro offers a work of insightful analysis, situating the division’s exploits in a strategic and operational context.

From the publisher.
The Reserve Component Trained and Ready? Lessons of History

LTC Ralph Ribas, NG, Brigade Executive Officer, 53rd IBCT, Pinellas Park, Florida—I recently read Major General Mark MacCarley’s article “The Reserve Component Trained and Ready? Lessons of History” (Military Review, May-June 2012) and did a double take after reading the sub-head Observations from History. Historically, it was very interesting and informative, particularly as it might serve as a basic historical timeline for those who are not familiar with Reserve Components in general and their mobilization up through the current conflicts.

I principally enjoyed his discussion of how the AC/RC [Active Component and Reserve Component] relationship changed through time and the efforts the AC applied to increasing Reserve readiness up to and through the Cold War and later Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm controversy regarding the 48th Infantry Brigade, and the Bold Shift initiative, working with some really good AC officers between and during IDT weekends. Having deployed twice, I appreciated his reference to military historian Roger Thompson in describing the difference in pre-deployment training between the AC and RC “that with the proper equipment and enough time, reserve forces can fight on the same level as the regulars.”

General MacCarley’s comments in his Observations from History mentioning general unit readiness and his reference to the Government Accountability Office report dated 5 May 1992 interestingly note the difficulty of quickly deploying large RC combat units due to their readiness as it relates to the number of days available for training vs. proficiency. However, as a professional, and someone who takes great pride in being a soldier, I disagree with the “broad brush” assertion regarding the need for external assessment following extended training periods. Not that external assessments do not add value; they do. What’s more, as RC trainers spend precious time researching and planning training, more often than not AAR’s are based on actual doctrine or performance measures than TTP or SOPs from units that do it all the time.

Is there goodness in potentially partnering or working with a “like” AC unit? Yes, but the implication that RCs in general do not already synchronize and judiciously employ our scarce resources unless there is fear of a bad assessment, respectfully, is not correct. While some may need outside motivation, I would argue that most do not need the outside pressure to succeed. We strive for success because we are professionals—it’s our responsibility to our Soldiers, ourselves, and to the Nation.