THE ARMY MUST inform our political leaders and the national media what it means to be a member of the profession of arms. The Army is accountable to the American people who employ and finance it, and the people need to know about an institution and instrument of power with which few of them have direct experience.¹

When communicating this message as an institution, the Army must decide how and through whom to communicate, and most of all what to communicate. Because the institution must accomplish the task does not necessarily mean that this communication takes place solely or even mainly through conventional institutional mechanisms such as public affairs offices and the military’s traditional means of engaging the public, the media, and opinion leaders. Those tools might be efficient and effective in providing the public data such as Army demographics, engagements, and plans, but tired, obsolete, or marginally effective in transmitting “what it means to be a soldier.”² Still, to accomplish this ongoing task, the Army must unleash all elements, capabilities, and attributes of the force. The organs through which to communicate a message that is both impressionistic (“what it means” is in part a philosophical matter) and specific (this Army in the second decade of this century) must deliver that message—meaning that the message must drive the tactics.

The entire institution must participate in the communication. The “strategic corporal” (whether Abu Ghraib guard or Medal of Honor winner) can be as consequential to the public’s comprehension of the Army as the words and acts of generals and sergeants major.³ The entire Army is on the hook, for better or worse, formally or otherwise, to accomplish this communication. Their charge is not to persuade or to convince but to inform—a liberating task, because it reduces the specter of salesmanship and focuses on portraying a reality that is hard to grasp for those who have not lived it.

Colonel Lawrence J. Morris, J.D., U.S. Army, Retired
The Charge is to Inform

To inform credibly suggests persuading some politicians or journalists of the Army’s virtues and strengths, and being confident that the real merits of the Army’s story will be compelling. The institution ought to be confident while recognizing that American pluralism, freedom, and skepticism assure that not all will agree—regardless of the message’s accuracy, credibility, and neutrality.

We should do the informing not because it might make the Army look good but because it is the least we expect of an Army in a democracy. All public institutions owe accountability to the people and none more so than the nation’s primary instrument of war. The Army best reaches the people through the nation’s leaders and media—and those organizations cannot learn what it truly means to be a soldier from any source more reliable than the Army itself. Still, it is one thing to embrace the requirement to inform society about the Army’s composition, campaigns, and capabilities—and another to tell leaders what it means to be a professional soldier in this young, ambitious, rule-of-law-based democracy, in the 21st century, in an all-volunteer force deployed ceaselessly since crossing the Sava River at Christmas 1995.

We must do so as well because a meaningful bond with society’s civilians is essential to reducing the risk that the Army will drift away from the society it defends—due to that society’s comfort, ignorance, and complacent certitude in the Army’s competence.

The Audience

Political leaders and the national media often share that certitude or complacency. They are the Army’s key audiences because they are a primary source of the public’s information. In addition, the media are a major source of political leaders’ information, and political leaders, particularly those who focus on the military, affect the media’s perspective. The national media are especially influential because of their ubiquity, their efficiency in informing large numbers of people, and their increasing concentration.

The methods of informing these two broad entities with an awareness of the capabilities, biases, and backgrounds of the press and political leaders.

At the threshold, the Army should build its message and strategy on the assumption that political leaders are even busier and more distracted than they were in 1974, when a frequently cited study showed that political leaders read the mainstream media and political journals, as opposed to specialized publications. Feed them where they browse.

National Media

Communicating effectively a message of such subtlety and sophistication requires appreciating the attributes of the media in general and of the national media in particular. With the continued decline of the daily newspaper and the explosion of alternative media, there are fewer authoritative voices on national defense or military affairs, yet also an uncoordinated multiplicity of direct media, including in-theater military bloggers (and even uniformed bloggers) that can confound, confuse, or mislead a news consumer—and enrich a careful reader with unconventional perspectives, insight, and perhaps pathos or propinquity that is difficult for the mainstream to produce.

Because most political leaders consume leading dailies and mainstream news network outlet products, these should be the chief but not exclusive focus of the Army’s communications effort. There is no Earlybird for members of Congress, though they read their equivalent “trade publications” such as The Hill, Roll Call, CQ, and Politico. In reaching a national audience with this message, the Army would be wiser not to target particular media (the concept of “targeting” suggests a “campaign,” which connotes an aspect of manipulation that might undermine confidence in the message) but to “flood the zone” with an approach that communicates the reality of the profession.

While media are more diverse than ever due to a decline of “legacy” media and an explosion of new media, only a few experts in soldiers or soldiering have emerged as the opinion leaders and shapers of politicians’ and others’ perspectives on wars and the military. Thomas E. Ricks, previously of the Wall Street Journal and Washington Post, profiled Marine boot camp in Making the Corps in 1997 and skewered the civilian leadership nine years later in
Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, tracking the early stages of the Iraq war. Dexter Filkins and Michael R. Gordon have proved the “church-and-state” division between the news and editorial sides of a paper by their years’ worth of reporting on the Iraq and Afghanistan wars for a paper with little enthusiasm for either conflict, The New York Times.7,8,9 Rick Atkinson, who profiled the West Point class of 1966 in The Long Gray Line, gained considerable acclaim for his reporting as an embedded reporter early in the Iraq War and since.10

While “national media” generally implies news organs, both books and films also communicate what it means to be a soldier—as seen in recent years by the popularity of Band of Brothers and The Hurt Locker, which portray soldiering in a straightforward manner evoking deeper understanding of soldiers’ challenges, sacrifices, and joys. Fields of Fire, unusual for its Vietnam-era sympathy for the ground soldier, might be the quintessential “what it means” book of the last generation.11

The Army must have a noncynical, clear-eyed view of the characteristics of most national media, and know that their practitioners are—

* Truly interested in accuracy, but unfamiliar with the military and thus are prone to mistakes and assumptions.
* In search of a story, and therefore drawn to conflict and controversy.
* In search of a narrative, and thus prefer telling stories through people rather than data.
* Competitive, and thus, always looking for a “new angle” that might receive greater play because it is new rather than newsworthy.
* Reactive, tempted to “herd journalism” because of their heightened consciousness of what the competition featured in last night’s broadcast or this morning’s paper.

As it performs its communications mission, the Army should avoid defensiveness or undue solicitude—the tension with the media in our free society is healthy and intractable—while informing with candor, confidence, and imagination.12
Political Leaders

Competitive news outlets find ravenous customers in political leaders who have both a constitutional and operational impact on all facets of the profession of arms—from the size of the Army to its force structure, weapons systems, promotion policies, and disciplinary code. The American military is absolutely, unalterably subject to civilian control by the civilian commander in chief, the Defense and service secretaries, and the Congress that must approve all those nominees. This does not mean uniformed leaders unduly defer or capitulate when independent analysis and recommendations are called for, but it means recognizing that civilian leaders make the ultimate decisions.

The Army is communicating with a set of leaders whose declining military experience tracks that of their constituents. Only nine percent of them have served. In the current 112th Congress, 20 percent of the House and about 25 percent of the Senate have military experience, the lowest percentage since before World War II, and a dramatic decline from the peak at 74 percent for the House (in 1969) and 78 percent for the Senate (in 1977). This disparity does not necessarily translate to less appreciation for the military—in fact, sometimes the relative unfamiliarity elevates military service to an esteem born of incomprehension because it is so far outside their frames of reference. However, it obviously means that a shrinking minority of policy makers has a personal sense of what it means to be a member of the profession of arms and is more reliant on the media and other sources for that perspective.

Similarly, only two of the original 16 members of President Obama’s cabinet had military experience. There is also something of a geographical division among national leaders. About 47 percent of members of Congress from the southern states had military experience, compared to about nine percent from New England.

Such disparities should be in the Army’s mind when figuring out how best to communicate with these leaders—and such statistics might be less surprising when considering how far someone in New Hampshire or Vermont has to travel before encountering an Army installation of any size; by contrast, how far can you drive in Georgia or Florida without encountering an Army post, an air base, or a naval installation?

A Compendium of Traits and an Indisputable Fact

A million soldiers might have a million different ways of expressing it, but there are some essential features of the profession of arms that most contemporary soldiers share, and which are essential to politicians’ and media leaders’ appreciation of the Army.

At the threshold, bearing the risk of being killed in defense of one’s country is as old as the profession of arms, and the indispensable military experience. Volunteering to bear that risk is unique to a free society, and building the world’s most powerful and most expeditionary Army from volunteers is both America’s strength and the source of a conundrum: so few know what it truly means to serve in the profession because so few do. An Army of volunteers is all the more remarkable in today’s America, because the soldier is defending a document (the Constitution) not a leader. In fact, the soldier defends a way of life, a concept of liberty—and not infrequently restores the liberties of allies (World War II) or comes to the aid of people in need (in the Balkans, Vietnam, Somalia, Libya). Bearing that risk voluntarily in a dangerous world reveals a range of attributes, traits, and experiences that captivate and mystify non-soldiers. A
member of the profession of arms, then, has a mix of characteristics, nearly all of them present in one line of work or another (e.g., public safety, clergy, medicine). However, displaying them in combination while making the unique commitment to risk one’s life for our nation is unique to members of the profession of arms.

Communicating what it means to be a member of the profession of arms, then, means portraying these features credibly to journalists and leaders:

- **Mission first.** Today, almost every enterprise from a university to a print shop publishes a mission statement. Every soldier has fidelity to the mission instilled into him from the moment he first hoists a duffel bag. He learns the mission is not just an aspiration but a specific statement of a goal and how to achieve it.

- **Always planning.** The Army has memorialized the step-by-step process of mission analysis, course of action production, and recommendation and given it its own acronym—MDMP, the military decision-making process.\(^17\) While most any multi-tasking mother conducts her own MDMP without benefit of a staff, the MDMP process does reflect the rigor that the Army applies to out-preparing the enemy, as it analyzes everything from the weather to the soil to the personalities of opposing leaders.

- **No plan survives first contact with the enemy.** The desire to plan is coupled with a realistic understanding that you can’t plan everything and that war is a distinctly human endeavor. Plan hard and be prepared to adapt, confident that the planning itself introduced a rigor from which the best improvisation can spring.

- **Loyalty: speak up, then salute.** Civilians, including some with authority over the military, can have trouble comprehending that soldiers are expected to speak up and that, for example, a division staff planning meeting can be a raucous debate over the relative merits of a course of action. Leaders advocate their positions because those relying on them for their advice must have the benefit of unvarnished analysis; the vehemence of the debates sometimes surprises nonsoldiers because they are more familiar with the loyal salutes that follow them. It is not surprising then that many in the business world find former soldiers attractive for reasons such as their loyalty, work ethic, discipline, and teamwork.\(^18\)

- **Power down.** The mission is too big to micro-manage. Leaders define, subordinates execute, and systems exist to check and monitor. A soldier may not have celebrated his 18th birthday yet, but may be told to stand guard and confront intruders—and be trusted to do so.

- **Learn lessons.** It is inaccurate to say the military always fights the last war; sometimes politicians, newspapers, and the public do. The military does analyze the last war and the last battle and yesterday’s activities so that it can succeed. That rigor, reflected in the after action review process and institutions that gather, analyze, and publish “lessons learned,” requires planning, standards, and thick skin; it is one of the great areas of post-Vietnam improvement—and it all cycles back to mission.

- **Diversity.** Is there a more meritocratic, color-blind institution in the world than the U.S. Army? Drop in on any mess hall in any war zone and, you will hear regional accents and a variety of sports team loyalties, but you will find that soldiers know little about each other’s political views.

- **Sacrifice, self-denial, and discipline.** If mission drives everything, then it can’t be all about you. The profession of arms does not countenance self-seeking behavior and motivations (nor can it be blind to human shortcomings and the ability to channel and harness healthy ambition). Every soldier makes sacrifices, bears hardship, and takes risk for the mission—and his fellow soldier. Discipline in the little things (haircuts, accurate logs, and clean weapons) yields discipline in the big things (getting to a designated location at a designated time with the right people and equipment).

- **Teamwork.** All for one. You do not have to like him. You do have to work with him.

- **Risk and danger.** Public safety personnel charge into buildings or dark alleys aware that they might have to give their lives so that others can enjoy the blessings of liberty. However, uniquely, we ask soldiers to go to inherently dangerous places and bear sustained risks. It is no accident that firemen and police officers share a special bond with soldiers, and that many Reserve units are packed with individuals whose day jobs are in those professions.

- **Discomfort.** More often than not, and much more often than he would like, a soldier is too hot
or too cold, and muddy or greasy. Everybody is. You deal with it.

- **Boredom and constricted freedom.** It takes no time before a soldier learns the cry of “hurry up and wait,” whether staging for a truck to move to a range or queuing up for a phone call from a battle zone.\(^{20}\) Such laments, coupled with the curse of too much free time with too little freedom, gives license to what General Dwight David Eisenhower frequently called a “soldier’s right to grouse.”\(^{21}\) Soldiers do this often—and usually with enough humor to remind each other of the solidarity that is born of shared annoyances.

- **The soldier is a weapons system.** Mission trumps comfort and personal preference, but a leader cares for his people from clean socks to family tranquility—and serves those whom he is entrusted to lead.

- **Worldly, apolitical.** A soldier might have had a cloistered view of the world before donning a uniform, but he can find himself drinking tea with an Afghan village elder, negotiating the Seoul, Korea, subway, or paying more attention to Middle Eastern affairs than he ever imagined he would. All this changes how he views that world and what he takes back to civilian life.

- **Battle-hardened—human and resilient.** As the Afghan war concludes its 11th year, we are in the longest period of sustained conflict in our history. Society has commendably paid attention to the casualties of war, including mild traumatic brain injury (MTBI) and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Soldiers appreciate it, but they also recognize that some civilians assume or expect a war veteran to be scarred by war. Every soldier who deploys confronts his own mortality, but the great majority do not carry mental scars that limit their utility to society. Undue solicitude regarding PTSD or MTBI can undermine a soldier’s reintegration into society and sometimes harm his employment prospects and social well-being. The “support the troops” slogan of the past decade is far preferable to blaming soldiers for the policies they execute—but it can also lead to an empty empathy that might reflect a detached citizen’s good faith ignorance. Some soldiers need special care from the society that sent them to war, and all merit society’s gratitude, which it can better express in an enriched GI Bill than a sentiment rooted in unreality.

- **Ambitious, educated, and educable.** Soldiers are faithful to each other and to their country. Their nobility is not diminished by the enlightened self-interest that attracts many to the military, which offers the opportunity to learn skills and deepen character traits that the civilian world might not foster. Senator John Kerry drew much attention during the 2004 presidential campaign when he said, “Education, if you make the most of it, you study hard, you do your homework and you make an effort to be smart, you can do well. And if you don’t, you get stuck in Iraq.”\(^{22}\) While Kerry later explained it as a “botched joke,” the Army—and certainly politicians and the press—would do well to confront such a perspective candidly and address whether there is a so-called “backdoor draft,” which critics say makes the military appealing to the less educated and means they bear a disproportionate share of the burdens of military service.\(^{23}\) Few want to talk about redressing this phenomenon with measures such as the draft.

- **Good humor.** Another way to address Senator Kerry’s remark is with the inimitable humor of the troops, some of whom produced a hilarious banner in reply—“HALP US JON CARRY, WE R STUCK HEAR N IRAK”—thus, demonstrating that soldier humor sometimes is even printable.\(^{24}\)

- **Imperfect.** Soldiers make mistakes, and sometimes engage in misconduct, not unlike others in the
society from which they came. When such conduct warrants exclusion from the profession of arms, the services accomplish this in the world’s most durable system of military justice, a disciplinary system that soldiers consider essentially just.

- **Relentless.** Soldiers get up and go back to it the next day. To many current soldiers Lee Greenwood could just as well be Perry Como. Toby Keith, on the other hand, may have well channeled their reality, in his lines such as, “Can’t call in sick on Mondays/When the weekend’s been too strong.”

  Few soldiers consider themselves heroes; they do give themselves and their reliable teammates credit for steadiness and persistence.

- **It’s for real.** Soldiers love to be appreciated—but not mimicked. Recently a commercial outfit started a SEAL team experience for civilians, akin to the major league “fantasy camps” at which middle-aged men get to dress up, run the bases, and take batting practice. The SEAL camp involves similar dress-up and gentlemanly rigor (219 of 223 candidates completed the camp). At its essence, military life produces exhilarating stress and the recognition that on any given day a soldier can be tapped on the shoulder, told to ruck up and move out, sometimes without so much as a phone call or good-bye kiss.

### A Million Vignettes

Most of all, members of the profession meet society’s expectations. They exhibit what is most profound and edifying about the profession in activities any given moment on any given day in a force of more than a million active and Reserve soldiers:

A squad, still the most elemental military unit, is in mid-patrol on a steamy campaign season day in Afghan lowlands, steady pulls on the Camelback and steady grips on the ready, acutely attentive and confident in its equipment and leaders.

The soldiers pull garrison “motor stables” right after breakfast, setting the rhythm of a motor pool full of taxpayer-furnished trucks and tracks.

A Jewish chaplain holds the hand of a critically wounded Christian soldier, reciting Christian prayers in the soldier’s ear, over the din of the MEDEVAC helicopter.

A drill sergeant crouches next to a trainee, as dusk threatens, trying again to get past that day’s bolos to qualify on his weapon.

The new lieutenant rethinking everything from his handshake to his smile as he prepares to meet his cadre, senior in age and junior in rank.

The sixth grade teacher crawls out of bed in the dark to run five miles so that he can be ready to deploy in a few months.

### By All Means Available

The Army should not be so focused on the medium—the media—as to lose sight of the message it can transmit. It does not require a Pew study to state what almost any news consumer knows—we are reading fewer papers and getting more information from the Internet, YouTube, blogs, and the rest. The Army cannot live in a 20th-century cave surrounded by “old media,” nor need it be the grandparent in bell bottoms, whose strained hipness distracts his audience from the important messages he wants to communicate.

Use all media. Work the conventional media because they are still read by the political leaders and because they set the agenda for the rest of the media. It is not just the circulation of the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, or *Wall Street Journal*. These gentlemen do read each other’s mail, and react to each other’s agendas and scoops—and this drives the news cycle, story selection and placement, and ultimately some of what seeps into the public consciousness. Consider the Aberdeen Proving Ground sex scandals of the 1990s—outrageous conduct but not unique; they were amplified because of their proximity to Washington, D.C. A semi-local story became a national one.

The Army should fling open the doors, brief national security correspondents and bloggers, cooperate with the movie producer and not be riled by the imperfections he depicts, and, yes, grant unfettered access to a *Rolling Stone* reporter because a best-selling account of West Point’s warts and limitations that causes an Old Grad (or a cadet’s mom) to fume or blush will also display the essential goodness, patriotism, and near-naivety of the supposedly jaded and comfortable Millennials. The experience of embedded reporters shows not that they “go native” but that the unique charms and foibles—most of all the unvarnished honesty—of the rank and file is the best way to communicate what it truly means to be a member of the profession, a realization as old as Ernie Pyle.
and Bill Mauldin but as fresh as Michael Yon.28 And Bing West.29 General Eric Shinseki, as Chief of Staff of the Army, used to begin his speeches saying, “My name is Shinseki and I am a soldier” (he changed Army rules to require the capitalization of the term soldier in all correspondence).30 No one believes a too-good-to-be-true story, but the media can handle the truth and they can place the shortcomings of the military in context—especially when the context is one of breathtaking risk, heartwarming teamwork, steady resolve, and an unglamorous, imperturbable commitment to mission and each other.

Failure to communicate, or communicating defensively and predictably, carries the risk of a dangerous complacency and a clevage born of comfort and detachment. MR

NOTES


2. For example, press releases, formal briefings, open houses, air shows, flyovers, and advertising during sporting events.


4. Carol H. Weiss, “What America’s Leaders Read,” 38 Public Opinion Quarter 1 (1974). Weiss writes that American political leaders consider the mass media to be essential sources of information on national issues. This study draws comparisons with an earlier Quarterly article finding that leading politicians read political journals such as National Review and The New Republic, as opposed to specialized magazines about science and such topics.

5. Newspaper circulation has been declining for decades, but has been more precipitous in this century and in recent years, attributable to a host of factors, not the least being the availability of the Internet and the growth of cable television, see <http://www.thenewamerican.com/index.php/economy/sectors-mainmenu-46/3437-newspaper-circulation-continues-decline>(29 June 2011).

6. A daily compilation of news articles and commentary, focusing mainly on defense and national security issues, available to most military members at <http://librd.csd.mil/index.html>. Circulation figures of dead-tree newspapers are not the only or most accurate gauge of news consumption, however, as the Pew Center, among others, has noted in studying readership (which includes web views) as opposed to the number of papers bought and delivered. See Pew Center for People and the Press, showing a tempering if not a plateau in the decline in newspaper “readership” when measured in fairer media coverage of the military.” COL Barry E. Willey, “The Military-Media Tension,” Military Review 79(2), p. 15. Accord, <http://www.thenewamerican.com/index.php/economy/sectors-mainmenu-46/3437-newspaper-circulation-continues-decline>(29 June 2011).

7. Filkins wrote for The New York Times for several years, winning a Pulitzer Prize in 2009 for his Iraq reporting (his second nomination), and moved to The New Yorker in 2010. His best selling, The Forever War, (2008), depicted the Iraq and Afghanistan wars in a compelling manner that was neither romanticized nor jaded.


9. This is a common shorthand for the separation of news content and editors from those involved in producing opinion pages. “The editorial pages are an earlier immersive tradition,” the New Republic, quoted in National Review and The New Republic, as opposed to specialized magazines about science and such topics.

10. The term took on several meanings, of which the two main ones were (1) the “stop loss” policy that extended some soldiers’ enlistments was a form of a draft in that the extensions were involuntary, and (2) the military was an employer of last resort for certain sectors of society, making it similar to a draft in that some who did enlist did so because they had no other options.


14. Published in 1978, the best of several excellent books by James H. Webb, a Marine, former Navy Secretary and current Senator from Virginia.

15. A former head of public affairs for U.S. Special Operations Command makes the Congressional oversight point in observing that the “mutual immunity” between military and media “can create a trust and confidence between the two that results in fairer media coverage of the military.” COL Barry E. Willey, “The Military-Media Connection: For Better Or For Worse,” Military Review, December 1998-February 1999 issue, as quoted in LTC Michael J. Burbach, Public Affairs in the 21st Century (unpublished, submitted to Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1999), 9. “[The Army] accepts and fully endorses the healthy tension . . . between the normal desire of the media to inform the public . . . and the normal desire of commanders to control the information environment about those same operations . . .” FM 100-6, Information Operations, as quoted in Burbach, ibid., at 16.


18. Four of the administration’s 32 policy “czars” had military experience. Ibid.

19. See <http://www.army.mil/farewell/farewellremarks.htm> (29 June 2011), but also writes books and blog entries for conventional media such as National Review.