The Tao is the way of humanity and justice; laws are regulations and institutions. Those who excel in war first cultivate their own humanity and justice and maintain their laws and institutions. By these means they make their government invincible.

-Tu Mu, commentary on Sun Tzu’s The Art of War
FEATURED ARTICLES

2 The Right Way: A Proposal for an Army Ethic
Lieutenant Colonel Clark C. Barrett, Ph.D., Michigan Army National Guard
A prize-winning author offers his proposal for an Army Ethic to serve the profession of arms.

13 Preventing Mass Atrocities in Sub-Saharan Africa through Strategic Engagement
Major Chris R. Henry and Major Nathan K. Finney, U.S. Army
An East African Staff College will help the African Union prevent mass atrocities in Sub-Saharan Africa.

22 Policy, COIN Doctrine, and Political Legitimacy
Major Stanley J. Wiechnik, U.S. Army
The Army needs a greater understanding of political legitimacy to conduct COIN and stability operations.

31 The Afghan National Army: Has Capacity Building Become Culture Building?
Sergeant First Class, Keith W. Norris, U.S. Army
The best outcomes will stem from optimizing the Afghan National Army to fit Afghanistan’s undeniably resilient social system.

41 Public Understanding of the Profession of Arms
Brandon Roberts
The Army should establish new points of domestic cultural understanding to supplant those lost during its increasing professionalization in recent decades.

48 Africa’s Brain Drain: Its Impacts on Security and Stability
Lieutenant Colonel Robert Feldman, U.S. Army Reserve
The emigration of educated Africans affects the continent’s security and stability, but the phenomenon has both negative and positive aspects.

57 Smooth is Fast: Managing Security Transitions for Enduring Freedom
Lieutenant Colonel Troy D. Busby, U.S. Army, Retired
A longer-term U.S. presence in Afghanistan will promote a more enduring stability, and a bilateral-security arrangement with Iraq should support some reintroduction of U.S. forces in a security cooperation posture.
68 Reframing Army Doctrine: Operational Art, the Science of Control, and Critical Thinking

Major Steven T. Brackin, Texas Army National Guard

Army doctrine frames planning actions along a continuum ranging from “conceptual” on one end to “detailed” on the other.

73 Spectrum of What?

Paul Scharre

We must revise and expand the lexicon of the spectrum of military operations to cover counterinsurgency, anti-access/area denial (A2/AD), and “hybrid” warfare.

80 Seven Design Theory Considerations: An Approach to Ill-Structured Problems

Major Ben Zweibelson, U.S. Army

Seven interrelated phenomena occur regularly when design theory interfaces with military decision making.

91 BOOK REVIEWS: Contemporary Readings for the Military Professional

102 LETTERS

106 2012 INDEX
THE RIGHT WAY

A PROPOSAL FOR AN ARMY ETHIC

The Tao is the way of humanity and justice; ‘laws’ are regulations and institutions. Those who excel in war first cultivate their own humanity and justice and maintain their laws and institutions. By these means they make their governments invincible.¹

— Sun Tzu as interpreted by Tu Mu

Lieutenant Colonel Clark C. Barrett, Ph.D., Michigan Army National Guard

I

N TU MU’S 800 CE commentary on Sun Tzu, the critical word Tao, literally “the right way,” translates variously. But the pertinent translation is “moral influence.” Sun Tzu recognized the importance of morality so he placed moral influence first in order of war priorities. Since his The Art of War focused on war strategy, one can infer that “those skilled in war” refers to generals and strategic leaders charged with “cultivat[ing] their own humanity and justice and maintain[ing] their laws and institutions,” thereby, “mak[ing] their governments invincible.”²

So how does it happen 1,200 years later, though aware of Sun Tzu’s significant ideas, the U.S. Army lacks the proper moral foundations upon which to operate? Despite high-profile moral blunders of the last decade, the Army still has not focused its efforts to prevent war crimes.³ These crimes are distressing symptoms of an even greater cultural shortcoming. The Army profession lacks a formal institutional ethic and a means of peer-to-peer self-governance. Textual artifacts, such as the Army Values and formal operational law, imply but do not dictate an institutional ethic. Ultimately, the Army’s leadership must champion such an ethic—both to protect institutional and individual honor and to further mission success.

Unethical conduct can frustrate efforts to win a war. It can also kill chances to win the peace. War crimes also erode the public’s trust in the Army. Morally wrong actions call the Army profession into question. In the end, to achieve war aims the Army must act in accordance with a set of moral principles as much as it must respect the “principles of war.” The war machine as a whole must meet public expectations.

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PHOTO: Chinese terracotta warriors and horses, a collection of 8,099 life-size figures located near the Mausoleum of the First Qin Emperor, Xian, China (Wikipedia, Maros Mraz.)
Efficacy and Expectations: The Moral Battlefield

The ultimate goal of war is to achieve a better peace. War waged in an immoral manner rarely ends well. Victims of injustice often refuse to seek an accord with their enemy, preferring to die on the battlefield than to suffer injustice off the field. Philosophers and politicians have formulated laws of war in the hope of avoiding unending war and chaos perpetuated by immoral conduct.

The Just War Tradition is part of Army professional military education, so this article addresses only the details most pertinent to an institutional ethic. Generally, the ethics of Just War theory consist of two parts, the justice in declaring war, *jus ad bellum*, and the justice in waging war, *jus in bello*. Because *jus ad bellum* is the responsibility of political leaders (the National Command Authority), it falls outside the scope of this article. On the other hand, *jus in bello* pertains primarily to the military, whose ways and means must achieve the political ends. According to Professors Joseph Nye and David Welch, “the principles of *jus in bello* are (1) observe the laws of war, (2) maintain proportionality, and (3) observe the principle of noncombatant immunity.”

In 1863, the *Lieber Code* became the Union’s Civil War conduct guide, and the precursor to the Geneva and Hague Conventions. The Army trains soldiers on these conventions, expects compliance, and punishes violations of the conventions. Furthermore, soldiers must disobey orders that countermand these laws and conventions. One Department of Defense document, *Armed Forces Officer*, reinforces this point: “You . . . must follow superior direction or rules unless faced with a clear operational, legal, or moral reason to refuse or deviate.” For loyal soldiers, disobeying even an illegal, immoral, or unethical order is difficult but nonetheless required.

Atrocities only perpetuate war. In *On War*, Carl von Clausewitz noted:

> It had ceased to be in harmony with the spirit of the times to plunder and lay waste the enemy’s land . . . . It was rightly held to be unnecessarily barbarous, an invitation to reprisals, and a practice that hurt the enemy’s subjects rather than their government—[it] was ineffective.

The signing of the *First Geneva Convention* by some of the major European powers in 1864, Charles Edouard Armand-Dumasq (1826–1895), oil on canvas, American Red Cross Museum Collection.
Noted strategist B.H. Liddell Hart also appealed to reason remarking:

The more brutal your methods the more bitter you will make your opponents, with the natural result of hardening the resistance you are trying to overcome. . . .[it is wise] to avoid extremes of violence which tend to consolidate the enemy’s troops and people behind their leaders.8

Today, the narratives of Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo motivate America’s foes to fight. Enemies recall offenses against their culture, people, and ideology in the same way Americans remember Pearl Harbor and 9-11. Ethical battlefield conduct enables achievement of the ends of war. Respect for moral conduct keeps faith with the American public and represents their interests.

The Army operates on behalf of the American people, and the public typically holds confidence in the military. Americans also have a relatively high tolerance for military missteps. However, Stjepan Mestrovic, a specialist on the subject of war crimes, suggests that recent war crimes are less accepted because they are misattributed to “aberrations perpetrated by a derelict few, rather than the inevitable results of institutional failures.”9 Public support for the military depends on the military’s good faith efforts to maintain that trust.

Morality and the Profession

Beyond the ends of wartime efficacy and retention of public trust, the Army needs an institutional ethic to safeguard the Army profession. Sociology Professor Magali Larson suggests that a profession requires the following characteristics: “professional association, cognitive base, institutionalized training, licensing, work autonomy, colleague control . . . and a code of ethics.”10 The autonomy America’s political leadership and public grants to the Army depends on having an explicit ethic, living by it, and enforcing it by means of self-policing.

What does it mean if the Army does not have those things? Not having an ethic constitutes an institutional and individual crisis for the profession. In 2010, the Army launched the Army Profession Campaign to reevaluate the profession of arms after ten years of war. Senior leadership recognized that sustaining the Army’s professional character is critical to maintain its moral legitimacy, its public trust, and support for its global missions. Early on, the campaign team identified the tenets of the Army Profession as:

- Trust.
- Trustworthiness.
- Honorable Service.
- Esprit de Corps.
- Military Expertise.
- Stewardship.11

The concept of “stewardship” may encompass the notion of self-policing, but only if there is a clear and coherent ethic to police and a method by which to police it. Currently, neither exists.

Relevance of ethics. The best known explicit professional ethic is the medical profession’s Hippocratic Oath, which speaks to the specialized knowledge doctors have, their relationship with their client-patients, and the self-governing obligations of the medical community. This ancient oath has been modernized, so medical professionals still adhere to a relevant code.12

The professions of law and divinity are strengthened by similar codes. Many other occupations that aspire to be professions have codes of ethics and means of self-government. Many other nations also field military forces bound by detailed professional ethics. The Army should benchmark these other organizations and military forces to create their own.

While it may seem obvious that a code of ethics would benefit any organization, there are objections to adopting such a code. Some skeptics suggest that professional codes are “pointless, unnecessary, and possibly pernicious.”13 One critic suggests that no special delineation is required for professionals because all people have the same rights and duties as moral persons.14 Another argues that codes are so infrequently used or so poorly constructed that they are detrimental.15

Andrew Olson of the Center for the Study of Ethics in the Professions affirms that formulating a proper code of ethics is difficult. The code’s drafters must create a philosophically sufficient and comprehensive ethic while leaving it open-ended...
enough to account for unforeseen situations. The ethic must also be appropriate and understandable. Part of the Army’s problem is poor moral education. Although it claims to be a profession, it currently fails to prioritize ethical education and governance. It therefore lacks one of the basic criteria of professionals.

Artifacts like the Constitution, the Declaration of Independence, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the Soldier’s Creed, Soldiers’ Rules, the aforementioned Army Values, and the Joint Ethics Regulation (JER) imply but do not dictate a concrete professional military ethic. Only the little-known JER contains a “Code of Ethics for Government Service.”

Individually, these artifacts are often confusing, contradictory, and insufficient. Even in the aggregate, current doctrinal materials say little about ethical issues, or they issue mixed signals. For example, the Soldier’s Creed overemphasizes kinetic battle and is counterproductive in the current operating environment. With the exception of the 2007 late arrival of the Soldier’s Rules, the Army provides few guidelines for soldiers interacting with noncombatants. This shortcoming is critical given the nature of the last ten years of conflict. None of these documents are properly nested within an institutional ethic, nor do they complement one another.

An Army Profession Campaign product, the Army: Profession of Arms pamphlet, validates the importance of an “Army Ethic,” but admits such an ethic “has not been fully codified.” The pamphlet further highlights the proliferation of disparate ideas, filling eight pages with competing textual artifacts.

Review of the Army’s current training reveals the meager ethical education offered to our soldiers. This training is often outsourced to lawyers and chaplains, but commanders would lend greater authority to this training. The training content is minimal and dependent on each instructor’s knowledge, proficiency, and authority. After soldiers reach their field units they rarely receive annual ethical training. If soldiers are to deploy, they receive only superficial check-the-block refresher classes. Considering the importance of ethical conduct in the current war, these shortfalls should cause concern.

Recent Army-wide efforts provide some evidence of progress in training. The Center for the Army Profession and Ethic (CAPE), founded in late 2007, now acts as the proponent on matters related to the profession and military ethics. Further, CAPE trains Profession and Ethic Trainers. While CAPE leads the Army Profession Campaign and increases awareness of ethical issues in the force, it remains a small and marginal effort.

**Importance of peer-to-peer self-governance.**

Even if the Army had a comprehensive Army Ethic, and ensured every soldier understood it, there would still be transgressions, and there would still be bad actors in the ranks. Navy captain and philosophy professor Dick Couch remarks that troops inculcated in the schoolhouse remain susceptible in garrisons to the influences of the “moral pirates,” who subvert others by their proximity and power.

The investigation into the 5-2 Stryker Brigade atrocities cited “weak leaders” as the factor in the unit’s discipline failure. The leaders certainly failed, but what about the soldiers? Some platoon members disapproved of the ongoing crimes, some even tried to report the wrongdoing, but some also perpetrated similar crimes later. Why did none of the soldiers prevent or report the atrocities?

Without an Army Ethic, and a self-policing force, one should not be surprised when indiscretions are overlooked. Nontoleration for unacceptable behavior and self-policing are critical to the Army’s status as a profession. The institution requires a code of ethics focused on self-policing. Indeed, self-governance should become a defining characteristic of not just the code, but of the Army as a whole.

The U.S. Military Academy (USMA) Honor System serves as an exemplar for the construction, promulgation, and enforcement of an Army ethic. The famous Honor Code—“A Cadet will not lie, cheat or steal, or tolerate those who do”—is a long-standing, defining characteristic of the academy. Briefly, the strength of the USMA code resides in five principles that underpin its credibility.

**Why did none of the soldiers prevent or report the atrocities?**

First, the Honor Code remains a cadet-created work-in-progress. The Code’s “practices of implementation became established, and only later were those practices to be codified in officially written form.” Second, the code applies to all cadets from the moment they enter the system. USMA recognizes that cadets, like the Army’s soldiers, come from diverse backgrounds. USMA also understands that new cadets are still young enough to learn and internalize a sense of honor. Third, cadets are everyday guardians of the code. Cadets learn and grow within the system; they frequently confront the difficulties of ethical decision making. Fourth, the nontoleration clause, “or tolerate those who do,” challenges cadets to maintain their personal honor and police their peers. Cadets must subordinate loyalty to one another in favor of loyalty to higher principles. In keeping with this impartial outlook, any cadet will report any other cadet, or even himself, for a violation of honor.” Historian Lewis Sorley notes that professions demand such high standards:

Every pursuit worthy of being considered a profession understands the necessity for its members to establish admirable standards of conduct...and to uphold those standards, both as individuals and corporately. With such aspirations come obligations, very demanding ones.

The nontoleration clause is the demand on that aspiration; the clause remains “integral to the spirit of the Code and essential to its viability.”

The final lesson from the USMA Honor Code is simple; cadets who violate the code usually face expulsion. There is little sympathy for misconduct: “It is no part of the function of West Point to become a reformatory of morals.”

Couch reinforces the necessity of “passionate intolerance;” ignoring immoral conduct is a moral abandonment, no different from physical abandonment of the soldier on the battlefield. Couch suggests a powerful “Righteous Rule” whereby service members who “deviate from the standards of moral conduct will be summarily removed from the unit ... in shame.”

For an Army ethic to be effective, it must be backed by an organizational commitment to nontoleration for violations. Such nontoleration demands omni-directional governance beyond chain-of-command enforcement. Akin to the USMA Honor System, an Army ethic—as a system—must support, not supplant, regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

An Army ethic must affirm the organizational effort to self-police, but such an ethic also requires enablers, like day-to-day reinforcers and tools for ethical decision making. Any rubric will do, but soldiers deserve some test or aid in resolving ethical dilemmas. This type of internal questioning is expected of knowledgeable professionals, endeavoring to live by a code.

Excerpts from the Proposed Army Ethic

The following working draft for a proposed “Army Ethic” aims to buttress Army professionalism. This proposal stems from a compilation of sources; many are reproduced here nearly verbatim. I have omitted quotation marks, and sources are paraphrased for simplicity and clarity. Endnotes reflect the sources.

Purpose. The purpose of the Army Ethic is to codify the moral context within which the Army defines its mission and derives its motivation. The Army Ethic contextualizes the institution and its purpose: To serve the nation and remain fully responsive to the needs of the people.
Membership. The membership of the Army Profession subject to this ethic consists of officers, enlisted soldiers, government service and contract employees and, to the extent possible, retired nonacting professionals. The Army Profession is comprised of soldier and civilian experts skilled in the ethical design, generation, support, and application of land combat power, serving under civilian authority, entrusted to defend the Constitution and the rights and interests of the American people.

Who we are. The authors of the Declaration of Independence rooted the fledgling United States in moral ideals. These ideals became the moral foundation of the nation and its principles, laws, and institutions. The values in the Constitution later became prerequisites to securing domestic welfare, tranquility, and the common defense. The national purpose necessitates elements of individual freedom, as set forth in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, conditions under which a free and democratic system can thrive. The Constitution affirms our determination to fight if necessary to defend our way of life.

The people of the United States expect their country to serve as an exemplar of freedom, fairness, equality, and dignity in the world. This expectation requires its security to emanate from the justness of our cause, the force of our example, and the tempering qualities of humility and restraint. The U.S. military must operate within this moral context. Means connect to ends.

Why we fight. The origins of the Army predate formation of the United States. Citizen-soldiers established the militia in 1636 to defend the colonial settlements in case of attack. The nation assumed command of the Troops of the United Provinces of North America on 14 June 1775. The Army today defends the nation’s political sovereignty, territorial integrity, and way of life, including its basic values and institutions. The role of military power is to deter an attack on the nation. When deterrence fails, the military must win a lasting, sustainable peace without destroying the institutions of our civilization in the process. We fight, when necessary, to defend the integrity and vitality of our free society.
How we fight. The military profession possesses an ethical purpose, and its actions must remain consistent with the ethical outcomes it seeks. The American way of war has been typically more humane than the way of our enemies, and history has demonstrated American willingness to show kindness, humane conduct, and acts of chivalry in even the bitterest struggles.\textsuperscript{42} The nation’s founders were determined not only to win their wars, but also to do so in a way consistent with their moral principles and their core belief in human rights.

How we train. A code of military ethics goes hand in hand with education and training in the development of military virtues in producing an ethical soldier.\textsuperscript{43} There is a proposed publication that describes and details the Army Ethic and the Army’s ethical training program. At the heart of this publication is the proposition that the Army incorporates ethics into all training as a primary, rather than a secondary, concern.

How we decide. If we expect a moral military, we must have a thinking military. The following rubric can help soldiers to choose the harder right:

- What are the relevant facts of the situation?
- What are the alternatives available?
- Who will be affected?
- What moral and ethical principles of the Army Ethic are involved?
- How would these principles be advanced or violated by each alternative action?\textsuperscript{44}
- How would I feel if I, or someone I cared about, were on the receiving end of this action?\textsuperscript{45}

How we maintain. Ethical violations of standards of conduct impair the trust and confidence placed in officers by superiors and subordinates, and undermine the public’s respect for the Army.\textsuperscript{46} All violations of the laws of war and the Army Ethic must be reported to the appropriate authorities. \textit{No one should be allowed to remain in the profession who cannot support the Army Ethic or who cannot comprehend the reasons for it.}\textsuperscript{47}

Keeping the promise. There is a special relationship of loyalty and trust between the Army and the nation. The American people desire and expect dedication from the members of the U.S. armed forces. Putting the needs of the nation and the Army before their own, soldiers forego some of the rights enjoyed by those outside the armed forces. In return, soldiers must always be able to expect fair treatment and to be respected as individuals. They should also expect that their families will be sustained and rewarded by commensurate terms and conditions of service.\textsuperscript{48}

This mutual obligation forms the military covenant between the nation and the Army’s soldiers. It establishes an unbreakable common bond of identity, loyalty, and responsibility that sustains the Army.\textsuperscript{39} The promise is the basis of a code that determines what society expects of its military professionals, a \textit{sacred trust.}

Principles of the Proposed Army Ethic

Presented here are principles supporting the concepts under the previous subhead. Principles are at the core of all moral action.

Principles of honor.

- I always render honorable service to the United States and the Army. I will obey and support lawful and moral authority, and reject and report illegal or immoral orders.\textsuperscript{50}
- I recognize that honor requires ethical conduct, moral behavior, honesty, integrity, and trust. I understand that ends, no matter how worthy, never justify unethical means.\textsuperscript{51} I do not bring shame to my country and Army through unethical or illegal actions.
- I do not lie, cheat, or steal, nor tolerate those who do. I pursue honor and truth regardless of personal consequences. I am dedicated to fairness and justice.\textsuperscript{52}
- I accept full responsibility for my actions and the actions of those in my charge.\textsuperscript{53} I train them and expect them to be honorable.
- I always remember and honor the brave men and women who have served before and who have paid the ultimate price for our freedom and the honor and integrity of our Army.\textsuperscript{54}

Principles of duty.

- I always place duty, service, and allegiance to nation before self.
- I am duty-bound to support and defend the Constitution; I uphold the laws and regulations of the United States.\textsuperscript{55} I always adhere to the principle that subordinates the military to civilian authority.\textsuperscript{56} I am nonpartisan and avoid conflicts of interest in my professional life.\textsuperscript{57}
- I am prepared to do my duty and, if necessary, to make sacrifices or to risk my life to protect the security and people of the United States.\textsuperscript{58}
I am a steward of the Army profession. I display dedication, initiative, and discipline while fulfilling my mission. I develop and maintain my professional knowledge and skill. I do my utmost to ensure that my fellow soldiers and I are trained and equipped to carry out our duties. I am a good steward of U.S. resources.

I am a defender of those who cannot defend themselves. I am committed to putting the lives of my fellow Americans and all noncombatants on the battlefield before my own.

**Principles of courage.**

- I always demonstrate physical, mental, and moral courage in the face of adversity.
- I am courageous, but not reckless. I endanger myself and my comrades only to the extent required to carry out the mission.
- I share risk, endure hardships, and face danger with my comrades.
- I show courage in restraint, even when doing so involves personal danger.
- I persevere with courage, determination, and strength of character. I condition myself to act correctly in the presence of danger and fear. I do not quit.
- I demonstrate moral courage, even at the risk of ridicule or danger. I insist on maintaining the highest standards of decency and behavior at all times.

**Principles of commitment.**

- I am committed to defending the United States of America. I serve whenever and wherever I am needed, whatever the difficulties or dangers may be.
- I am committed to the U.S. military. I understand that loyalty is a commitment not only to a cause but also to those who share that cause. I recognize that loyalty is reciprocal, based on mutual trust and respect.
- I am committed to my unit. I take pride in our unit, our discipline, our military expertise, and our training.
- I am committed to the welfare of my fellow soldiers, based on common purpose, equality, trust, tolerance, and friendship. I will never leave a fallen comrade. I will not fail those with whom I serve.
- I recognize when loyalty and honor are in competition, wrong-doing cannot be condoned or covered up. I am committed to honor as my highest military principle.

**Principles of respect.**

- I always respect the dignity of all persons. I treat others with respect for their core human rights and according to the laws of war.
- I recognize the supreme value of human beings regardless of their origin, religion, nationality, gender, status, or position.
- I demonstrate tolerance and esprit de corps and, by my conduct, win the respect of others.
- I uphold the international laws, conventions, and regulations of armed conflict. I use force only to the extent necessary and only in a way that will maintain my humanity.
- I do not harm human beings who are noncombatants or detainees, and I do all in my power to avoid causing harm to their lives, dignity, and property.
- I do not tolerate unethical or illegal conduct. I do my best to prevent violations of either the Law of War or the Army Ethic and report all violations to the appropriate authority.
- I always remember that I am an American, a defender of the republic, a member of a time-honored profession, responsible for my actions, and dedicated to the virtues of honor, duty, courage, commitment, and respect.

**Breaking the Cycle of Moral Cynicism**

The Army decried the 5-2 Stryker crimes as “repugnant to us as human beings.” But it is not enough to condemn those actions. The Army must prevent future crimes by providing soldiers
with the right tools and processes. To correct this problem, the Army, or the Department of Defense as a whole, should adopt some version of this ethic or prepare an alternative. Past efforts to construct an Army code of ethics failed; perhaps there was no pressing need. Given the events of the last ten years, the current need is clear.

Iraq exemplifies the lasting impact of these indiscretions. In late 2011, the U.S. still desired to maintain “advise and assist” forces in Iraq. Unfortunately, Iraqi leaders agreed to allow U.S. soldiers to remain but declared that those troops should not be granted immunity from Iraqi law. This was unacceptable for the U.S., and necessitated an immediate departure. So what caused this change? The Iraqi government cited dissatisfaction with U.S. adjudication of war crimes cases, including atrocities at Abu Ghraib. Old crimes create new complications.

Instead of being “invincible” in Sun Tzu’s tradition, the nation is vulnerable. Strategic efforts, like staying in Iraq to maintain the peace, were derailed because of tactical failures like Abu Ghraib. Moral influence, as Sun Tzu saw it, is absolutely required to ensure victory.

The Army’s strategic leaders must recognize the danger of an amoral organization and rebalance the force from an ethical perspective. One soldier spoke of the 2006 rape-murders at Mahmudiyah:

If people continue to treat this like a mysterious event that came out of nowhere, and we don’t change how we lead soldiers and we don’t honestly look at what caused this to happen, it’s going to happen again. I mean, this isn’t the only time. It’s just the most notorious time.

Sadly, his prediction was correct. The 5-2 Stryker killings followed Mahmudiyah and the list of crimes grows longer. Marines urinating on corpses. Afghanistan leaders claiming U.S. abuse of prisoners. A drunken sergeant allegedly murdering 17 civilians. Predictably, senior officials condemned the “bad apples . . . those few who do stupid things.” The cycle continues unabated.

Until the Army changes course, U.S. forces will continue to risk winning the battle but losing the war. There can be no “better peace” of grand strategy when friends, foes and noncombatants, embittered by war crimes, remain. The American people lose faith when military actions are not in line with their expectations. Our soldiers deserve better. General Creighton Abrams noted:

The Army is and always will be people. Our people are really good. It is a rare man who wants to be bad, but a lot of men are not strong enough to be good all by themselves, and a little help is enough.

The people are really good. Nevertheless, they must be armed with strength of character. Soldiers must “know what is right, and have the courage to do what is right.”

A new Army Ethic is not a panacea. In fact, an ethic alone offers little potential beyond the current ill-founded bumper sticker neologisms. But an explicit ethic, in conjunction with appropriate training, renewed focus on ethical conduct, committed nontoleration, and enforcement would create moral progress. The Army Ethic can provide the motivation to fight and the means to fight morally.

The American people deserve an Army refined under a moral institutional framework that best serves public interests. American fighting forces...
deserve the knowledge and moral influence to “cultivate their own humanity and justice and maintain their laws and institutions [and] make their government invincible.”87 Sun Tzu’s lessons remain true. The stakes for the profession and those who serve it are high. With resolve, the U.S. Army will learn the lesson and pursue “the right way.”

PROFESSIONAL ETHICS

NOTES

2. LTC Peter Fromm et al., also used this quote to frame an argument in Peter D. Fromm, Douglas A. Pryer, and Kevin R. Cuthright, “War is a Moral Force: Designing a More Viable Strategy for the Information Age,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 64 (1st Quarter 2012): 42.
17. Ibid., 29-37.
20. Mogelison.
22. Ibid., 23.
23. Ibid., 48.
24. Ibid., 76.
25. Ibid., 79.
26. Ibid., 35.
27. Couch, 8.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.10.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
59. Chief of Defence Staff, Duty with Honour, 32.
67. FM 100-1, 26, quoted in Hugh A. Kelley, “A Proposal for the United States
Army Ethic” (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1984), 23.
68. British Army, Values and Standards of the British Army, 10.
69. Ibid., 8.
70. Lew. 125.
73. U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Ethics Regulation 1-6, 5500.7, 153, and British Army, Values and Standards of the British Army, 14.
75. Israeli Defense Forces, “Doctrine.”
76. Lew. 125.
82. Mogelson, 349.
83. Frederick, 349.
85. Brinsfield, 72.
86. Sorley, 157.
87. Sun Tzu, 88.
Preventing Mass Atrocities in Sub-Saharan Africa through Strategic Engagement

Major Chris R. Henry and Major Nathan K. Finney, U.S. Army

THE 2010 NATIONAL Security Strategy established the principle of “responsibility to protect” (R2P) as one of the keystones of national policy. The concept of R2P is to protect populations from genocide and other atrocities, and it recognizes, first and foremost, that it is the responsibility of sovereign governments to protect the populations located within their borders. Under the principle of responsibility to protect, members of the international community should only intervene when the sovereign government in question proves unable or unwilling to protect members of a persecuted population. When either the sovereign government or the international community offers protection, prevention of atrocities is emphasized over crisis response.¹ NATO’s intervention in Libya was a recent example of internationally implementing a national policy involving the responsibility to protect.

The challenges of an R2P policy, as seen in Libya and the on-going debate over an intervention in Syria, are deciding in which conflict to commit the United States and in operationalizing R2P to prevent or, if necessary, respond to atrocities that occur across the globe.

We assert that prevention of atrocities is the preferred and only viable option. We must develop creative solutions to prevent atrocities. This is the only way to responsibly protect populations. We offer a cost-effective solution for a complex geographic area that can prevent mass atrocities and help lead to democratic development for long-term security. We believe the U.S. military is in a good position to overcome the challenges inherent of R2P in this effort by harnessing the skills our soldiers, marines, sailors, and airmen have gained during a decade of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Chief of Staff of the Army General Raymond Odierno has recognized the value of soldiers experienced in combat and issued guidance to harness their potential. He notes in his recent “Marching Orders” that the Army is focusing on three interconnected roles: prevention, shaping, and winning. He states that Army forces will prevent conflict by building relationships with partner nations and enhancing their capacity.² Preventing the atrocities that lead to R2P interventions requires the increased capacity and professionalism of local security forces.
Developing capacity and professionalism is a long-term process and should begin with education. This is evident in the military forces that support the African Union who are striving to handle crises across the continent and require support to further their professionalism. Developing an educational institution under the aegis of the African Union is a possible way to address this. This institution would focus on key leaders of African militaries—the mid-grade officer.

The Case for Prevention

While the United States can respond to mass atrocities, we believe that the damage will already be done by the time U.S. forces arrive in sufficient numbers to make a difference. We base this belief on a study conducted on the conflict in Somalia and the U.S. response time. The U.S. Army planned on delivering and supplying 13,400 personnel to Somalia during Operation Restore Hope. The actual number deployed was a little over 10,000. Initial planning for the operation started in November 1992 when President George H.W. Bush directed the Secretary of State to work through the UN to stop the famine in Somalia. The execution order came on 5 December 1992. Within 30 days, 82 percent of U.S. personnel and over half of U.S. equipment had been delivered. The initial equipment goal was reached by using prepositioned stocks located in the Indian Ocean and Europe. The military did not deliver all material shipped from the United States until mid-February. The limited infrastructure in Somalia was the “bottleneck” in the operation. Only one ship could offload at the port in Mogadishu, and no ship carried a full capacity load because of the shallow draft in the port, further complicating the efforts to fully deploy the task force. Air Mobility Command did not start regular sustainment flights until 27 December 1992 (the initial “push” was mainly used for personnel), three weeks after President Bush gave the execution order.

The deployment occurred when the environment permitted it and the threat was low. Planners were given weeks of lead-time to prepare for the operation, and although it was limited, maritime access was available. Nevertheless, even with all of these favorable factors, it took almost 100 days to complete the full deployment of U.S. forces into Somalia.3

The United Nations reports that during the same length of time it took to complete the full deployment of forces into Somalia, approximately 800,000 individuals were killed in Rwanda.4 While the numbers reported by the UN are sobering, other sources note that the killing was even more efficient. Hintjens states that within five weeks of the Rwandan conflict erupting, 5 to 10 percent of the national population had been eradicated.5 While U.S. forces could have deployed into Rwanda in the required numbers, the amount of air support needed would have been immense. In addition, given the rushed nature of the operation, the risk to U.S. forces would have been far greater than it had been in Somalia. Vice President Gore pointed out these logistical difficulties when he spoke with then-UN Secretary General Butros Butros-Ghali.6 This principle is likely to repeat itself since many of the world’s locations where atrocities are likely to occur, such as Darfur, South Sudan, and inland regions of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, are landlocked or difficult to access.

Building Capacity for Prevention

An educational institution for mid-grade officers, an East African Staff College (EASC), would provide a step toward a more professional, interoperable African Union (AU) through an education in basic military skills such as leadership, tactics, sustainment, and humanitarian support. As in the United States, such an institution would build personal contacts between militaries that could last for decades. Partner nations could leverage these contacts to help each other work through future conflicts.

Perhaps the best justification for an EASC is that it provides a way to help the African Standby Forces (Figure 1) achieve the goals African chiefs of defense and security envisioned while also fulfilling the security interests of the United States and allied nations. There are six scenarios that the standby brigades may face:

- AU/regional military advice to a political mission.
- AU/regional observation mission co-deployed with a UN mission.
- Stand-alone AU/regional observer mission.
- AU/regional peacekeeping force for [UN Charter] Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions.
○ AU peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional peacekeeping mission low-level spoilers (a feature of many current conflicts).
○ AU intervention in genocide situations where the international community fails to act promptly.7

All but the last of the above scenarios converge with the U.S. desire to prevent atrocities.

Peer-to-peer military contact that occurs in an educational setting is a proven method to produce lasting results. A 2006 study conducted that examined over 165 countries from 1972 to 2000 found that security relationships such as education exchanges and a troop presence on foreign soil increased the chances that the host nation would adopt a more liberal worldview, while security cooperation activities such as military sales did not have a noticeable effect on changing political identities because those activities did not involve a significant amount of peer-to-peer interaction.8

Alternatives such as an expanded International Military Education and Training program are not desirable because they force African nations to rely upon foreign educational institutions. There is no guarantee that we can get officers in sufficient numbers from all of the nations participating in the standby brigade program.

Why East Africa?

President Barack Obama said that becoming “the security partner of choice” was a key goal for the United States in the security cooperation arena. He sees the United States fulfilling this role by using limited, relatively inexpensive approaches that focus on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities.9 We believe that establishing an educational institution on the African continent focused on developing officers to support the African Union Security Forces can achieve this goal by means of its location and its limited focus.

Ideally, the EASC would be in East Africa near the standing joint task force in Djibouti. Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), formed in 2002 to target terrorist cells in East Africa, could be augmented to initially operate the institution and provide oversight. In 2006, CJTF-HOA’s expanded mission included regional stability, capacity building,
and humanitarian missions. In 2009, CJTF-HOA added to its responsibilities by including Japanese Self-Defense Forces into its organization. The Japanese play a key role in anti-piracy efforts throughout the region. The standing joint task force is a vibrant organization that has taken on many roles over its 10-year existence. While we must augment CJTF-HOA to manage the EASC effectively, there is no reason to believe that it could not successfully take on this role with sufficient resource allocation and planning.

As to the future, if the EASC is successful and if the African Union wishes to fully participate in the program, CJTF-HOA could expand to handle mid-grade officers from across the continent. If our foreign partners desire, this expanded institution could be built in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the political capitol of the African Union, which inaugurated a new $200 million facility in January 2012. In addition to its political importance, the Headquarters for the East Africa Standby Force (EASF) is located in Addis Ababa. A CJTF-HOA-sponsored program (leveraging the resources and capabilities of organizations such as the EU and NATO) to build a university for the continent’s mid-grade officers would be a natural fit for a city of such high strategic value. Eventually, as the institutional capabilities of the regional militaries grow, member nations will transfer responsibility for teaching and administration in such a university to the African Union.

Another reason to use East Africa as a pilot is the fact that it is one of the most unstable regions in the world and it is possible that a mass atrocity will occur there in the near future. The Failed States Index lists all nations in or near the region as either being critical or in danger of becoming failed states. (Table 1 provides individual country rankings.) If we can stabilize this precarious area of East Africa, we will greatly reduce the chance of a mass atrocity and provide a foundation to expand to other areas of the continent. From 1956 to 2001, this region experienced 188 military coups (108 failed while 80 were successful). The institution we propose complements the effort to prevent mass atrocities and could help establish a secure environment that fosters the development of democracy across Sub-Saharan Africa.

As envisioned, the EASC could support requirements for the EASF across the entire East African region, but the crisis in Somalia deserves special mention. As part of a broader effort, the EASC can do much to reinvigorate regional efforts to establish stability there. While Somalia had a bumper harvest owing to heavy rainfalls that occurred in late 2011, the situation remains precarious. The United Nations estimates that tens of thousands, mostly children, died last year in the war-torn nation because of drought.

Both the Ethiopian and Kenyan armies are fighting across Somalia while African Union troops battle Al-Shabab in the outskirts of Mogadishu. While the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>World Ranking</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1
Instability Rankings (of 193 in UN)
United States has been a stalwart ally of Kenya for many decades, there was an apparent lack of communication between Kenya and the United States about Kenya’s invasion of Somalia. The New York Times reports that many U.S. Kenyan specialists were not aware of the invasion. Analysts are left wondering how Kenya can hope to succeed where other powers such as the United States, Ethiopia, the African Union, and the United Nations have failed.¹⁵  

We believe that the world can avoid situations such as this in the future with enhanced situational awareness, communication, and interoperability that will come from member nations’ participation in the EASC.

**Structuring the EASC**

Development of a leader development institution must begin by understanding the throughput such a program would require. We can determine a total student population for the EASC by estimating the total military strength of EASF militaries. We estimate this population by basing it on the percentage of majors in the U.S. military since these figures are easily accessible. The approximate percentage of majors in the United States military is three percent.¹⁶ Finally, we reach our final tally by allocating five percent of this total for school slots.

In addition, there will be minimum standards for entrance to the academy, and we forecast that not all of the available population will meet these standards. Based on this formula, the EASC should be prepared to educate approximately 900 to 1,000 officers per year.¹⁷ Table 2 also lists the official national languages, a significant factor in educating officers from different countries with different language capabilities. Based on the diversity of languages in the EASF nations, EASC should be a two-year program with one year devoted exclusively to language training. The two languages to teach are French and English because almost every nation in the region uses one

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Armed Forces Totals (Active components and reserves, paramilitary forces excluded.)</th>
<th>Major National Languages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>109,300</td>
<td>Arabic/English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>138,000</td>
<td>Amharic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>201,000</td>
<td>Semitic/Cushitic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>10,450</td>
<td>French/Arabic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Somali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>24,120</td>
<td>English/Swahili</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>English/Swahili</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>33,000</td>
<td>Kinyarwanda, French,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>Kirundi/French</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Kiswahili/English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>Shikomoro/Arabic/French</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>13,500</td>
<td>Creole/English/French</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>2,000 (paramilitary only)</td>
<td>Malagasy/French/English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>624,570</td>
<td>Creole/English/French</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Estimated Mid-Grade Officer Population (3%)</th>
<th>Estimated Mid-Grade Officers for Schools (5%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18,737</td>
<td>936</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2

**EASF Military Populations and National Languages**
of these languages, sometimes both, as an official language. The training will provide a common basis for learning across the institution at the beginning of the second year. There are other benefits to this dual track as well. French and English are the official languages of NATO, and this will help facilitate communication between all members of the African community and many of their instructors. In addition, this structure will also increase interoperability with other African standby brigades in Western Africa where French is more common.

After the first year of language training, the focus of the EASC should be on four core areas—leadership, tactics, sustainment, and humanitarian relief. The educational blocks on leadership are the foundation for military professionalism. These courses include instruction on ethics and moral decision making, the military’s place in society, tenets of leadership, and the basics of management. How to overcome cultural and linguistic differences for service in a multinational brigade will be important to graduates working on the EASF staff and in command positions.

Instructors will support leadership and management instruction blocks by training basic military tactics. This instruction will include discussions on current tactics, military history and theory, and practical application to the contemporary environment. In addition, the curriculum will feature military science and technology and the basics of planning. Instruction will create an in-depth understanding of force capabilities and how to array these in an area of operations. It will also teach basic techniques for establishing security and interacting with populations in civil conflict.

Studying sustainment will be crucial to officers who have dealt very little with logistics, maintenance, and other sustainment functions. We believe that limiting motorized transportation and concentrating on rugged transport aircraft that can operate in austere environments will harness EASF’s capabilities. There are two main reasons for this.

The first reason is that the African Union has mandated that the standby forces will primarily concentrate on atrocity, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief as primary missions. To alleviate suffering, time is critical in such missions.

Therefore, the second challenge is simply “getting there.” Air transport would be the best way. In many instances, road networks are limited or non-existent, which complicates ground transport efforts. For example, there are only 31 kilometers (km) of road density per 100 square km of arable land in sub-Saharan Africa compared with 134 km of road density per 100 square km of arable land in other low-income countries. Moreover, many nations where disasters are likely to occur are landlocked and hundreds of miles from established port facilities. This limits or even precludes the effectiveness of water transport.

Finally, the EASC should teach skills to provide humanitarian relief and maintain essential services while in the field, including basic engineer and medical training that supports disease alleviation, promotes sanitation, and helps build roads and host nation medical capabilities.

The United States and partner nations that have signed up to support the EASC will create and initially teach all of these blocks of instruction. Instructors at the EASC can be provided by modifying a recent model that was developed for our Afghan allies. As part of its efforts to bolster Afghan security forces, the Army is taking elements from multiple brigade combat teams and various other units and forming an ad hoc unit of 1,460 soldiers. This unit is comprised of senior non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and officers who will form 18-person teams to mentor the Afghans.

In addition to the soldiers, the unit will be augmented with 300 Department of the Army civilian workers. We forecast that instructor demand will be only approximately 10 percent of that needed for Afghanistan. A total instructor cadre of approximately 150 individuals will provide quality instruction at the EASC. One hundred of these instructors will be officers and NCOs who will teach subjects in the second year of the course, while 50 of the instructors will concentrate on language instruction. One hundred instructors will

A lower student-teacher ratio is desirable in the EASC setting to overcome anticipated problems that will arise because of the diversity of the students in attendance.
provide a 1:10 teacher to student ratio for the second year. A lower student-teacher ratio is desirable in the EASC setting to overcome anticipated problems that will arise because of the diversity of the students in attendance. Another 50 NATO military personnel will be needed for security missions and 50 local contractors for support activities. We estimate an annual cost of $240,000 for each individual (an average for NATO members and contractors). In total, this endeavor will cost $60,000,000 in annual operating expenses and another $10,000,000 to house and feed the student population.

There will also be an initial cost to build the training compound in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. We estimate this cost by examining the cost of the Afghan National Security University Project. The total cost of this facility was $230 million. However, it was much larger and was designed to accommodate seven different schools and have 6,000 students at any given time. Since we only intend to have 900 to 1,000 students on hand at any given time and will only develop one training institution, we believe that 20 percent of the National Defense University total, or $46,000,000, is a reasonable estimate of the cost to build the institution. Therefore, first-year costs will amount to approximately $116,000,000 with approximately $70,000,000 for each subsequent year. This figure will decrease sharply as we transition to our African partners. While the figures may seem high, compare them to the cost of operating a single Arleigh Burke Class destroyer off the coast of Somalia to counter the efforts of the Somali pirates. The annual operating cost of one such destroyer is $20,000,000. So, for the cost of keeping four destroyers on patrol off the Horn of Africa to temporarily relieve the symptoms of a problem, we can build an institution that can potentially eradicate the problem itself.

This type of mission will also facilitate Army and Marine Corps training as they move toward a new force structure. As the Army and Marine Corps end strength decreases, they will retain more mid-level NCOs and officers to develop a group of experienced leaders who can rapidly expand the force if future conflicts require ground forces. Instruction opportunities at institutions like the EASC will help build the expertise of these groups by increasing cultural knowledge and language expertise. Army forces are already conducting missions similar to this.
A Model for Comparison

Establishing an educational institution to develop partner capacity is not a far-fetched concept. Today men and women from the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan continue to develop a robust education system, from entry to retirement, for the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). This institution, the Afghan National Security University (ANSU), is a contemporary example of how international forces support non-Western partners in military education. It incorporates many disparate pieces of military education, from the Afghan Sergeants Major Academy to a Command and Staff College, and from a Foreign Language Institute to the National Military Academy of Afghanistan (NMMA).

Each year NMMA graduates approximately 600 new lieutenants for the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan Air Force. Most of these new officers take positions in the field commanding troops. Each year a lottery fills ANA requirements around the country to prevent political influence on the process and enable Afghanistan’s most capable young officers to fill the most needed positions.

The National Military Academy of Afghanistan is also an example of local leaders taking responsibility and control of their educational institutions. While the Afghan military leadership runs most of the ANSU (and will run future expansions), NMMA is the best example of an institution developed by Western forces and transitioned to local control. Today the Afghan Ministry of Defense and the ANA plan and execute all aspects of NMMA, and ANSU, and the NMMA commanders manage, develop, and approve the program of instruction and strategic direction. Afghan instructors are the lead for all the courses, which focus on basic education like math, science, and literacy; military leadership and character; military principles; and physical development. Like the EASC’s proposed curriculum, these courses increase soldier professionalism and provide the necessary skills to lead troops. While this institution only produces about 600 Afghan officers per year, its development of a higher caliber officer corps has shown its value to the ANSF accession system.

One area of concern that must be examined is the role of coalition militaries partnering with foreign militaries. The lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan clearly show there is a danger in partnering with developing foreign militaries. The close proximity affords insurgents the opportunity to target coalition soldiers who are training host nations soldiers to become more professional. For example, the Long War Journal reports that as of 29 August 2012, there have been 29 green-on-blue attacks for the year that have resulted in 45 coalition casualties. These 45 casualties account for 14 percent of total coalition casualty figures. It is difficult to ascertain the causes for these attacks, but the journal notes cultural differences played a role. It is also likely that there were mistakes made in vetting the individuals who committed the attacks. This is highly possible considering the rapid expansion of the Afghan military over the last few years.24

To help combat this disturbing trend, over 300 counterintelligence specialists have been appointed by the Afghan Army to root out potential saboteurs and assassins. The chief of the Afghan Army has also ordered that 150,000 Afghan soldiers, approximately three quarters of the army, be revetted and enrolled in a biometrics database. Hundreds of Afghan soldiers have received discharges due to this increased security posture.25

Conclusion

Regardless of whether the United States Army is ready for R2P, it is clear our forces will be required to undertake operations in support of R2P in the future. As the 2010 National Security Strategy and CSA’s “Marching Orders” state, our best option is to prevent mass atrocities that lead to R2P operations through military-military engagement. This has happened in the recent past, when the Egyptian forces refused to murder their people during the revolutions in early 2011.26 Decades of developing a relationship between Egypt and the United States through peer-to-peer training and education, as well as military funding, played a role in preventing a massacre.

Any efforts to support professionalization in the officer corps of African militaries, as well as their capabilities to prevent mass atrocities, will take years to pay off. An educational institution like the EASC for mid-grade officers will require significant planning and “buy-in” by the African Union, the African nations of EASF, and the nations supporting its establishment. However, years from now, as members of the EASC graduating classes assume important roles as their nations’ military and civilian leaders, the effectiveness and interoperability of African militaries will lead to increased regional cooperation and a decrease in mass atrocities. MR
NOTES

3. David Kassing, Transporting the Army for Operation Restore Hope (Santa Monica, CA: Arroyo Center [produced for RAND], 1994).
19. Michelle Tan, “SCT Shuffle, Thousands will be forced to PCS as Army slashes, reorganizes,” Army Times, 27 February 2012.
20. We forecast costs by basing our cost estimates on defining the typical instructor as being a lieutenant colonel with 18 years of service. This individual has an average income potential of $137,593.88 in 2012 (includes base pay, basic allowance for subsistence, housing allowance, and tax benefit; additional pay such as hazardous duty pay was not calculated). Income information was derived from: Chuck Vinch, “2012 Pay Book,” Army Times, 16 January 2012. We round this figure to $140,000 for ease of calculation and add $100,000 for life support activities.
In a recent interview, Dr. John Nagl was asked what he would change in the rewrite of the Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency. He responded—

The biggest question that we have to come to terms with as we rewrite the FM is whether its foundation on the promotion of host nation government legitimacy should be preserved. The manual was written at a particular point in time when democracy promotion was a key tenet of American foreign policy. And the two most important counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns that we faced in Iraq and Afghanistan were campaigns in which newly created democratic governments were struggling. I am unconvinced that that is the right model, that the only way to achieve legitimacy is through democracy promotion early on in a counterinsurgency campaign. I think that this is the most fundamental question we have to come to terms with.1

Nagl’s comments highlight three points. First, political legitimacy is still a key problem in COIN operations and something we did not get right the first time around. Second, the manual was written in the shadow of a specific political policy; spreading liberal democracy must be part of the goal of COIN and stability operations. Third, pushing for democracy too early may not always be feasible or even advisable.

Recent policy statements may have opened the door to review how we prioritize COIN operations in the future. This article will look at what the old policy was and how it affected doctrine, then look at a recent shift in policy and try to divine what ramifications this shift should have on COIN and stability operations with regard to how the military looks at political legitimacy. I will discuss a more expansive approach to political legitimacy than our doctrine currently embraces and make some suggestions on how future doctrine should look at legitimacy.
Prior U.S. Policy

Previous administrations have made spreading democracy and liberal ideals a foreign policy objective. Democracy promotion has been part of U.S. policy since the end of World War II, but, with the end to the cold war, the policy did not require extensive Defense Department participation. The George W. Bush administration made the idea a central component of its anti-terrorism campaign and its defense policy, particularly in the Middle East. The policy relies on the idea that terrorists are not able to thrive where democratic values and freedoms exist.

The method chosen to spread democracy was a variation of democratization theory based on the idea that if one creates democratic institutions, the population’s values will change to embrace these institutions. If one creates democratic systems, including legislatures and executives filled by elected representatives, the population will embrace democracy. In addition to the government structure, one must build an open, educated, and economically strong civil society. This would require schools and other socioeconomic systems that support democracy. This was the Field of Dreams philosophy: if you build it, they will come. In locations like Afghanistan, this means a massive nationbuilding effort along with a strong security presence.

The policy required that when we decided it was in our national security interests to intervene in a situation where there was either a failed state or we had effected regime change, it did not matter what form of government the local population saw as legitimate. When we departed, the only form of government that would be acceptable was one that supported democratic institutions, and not just any democratic institution, but one that promoted individual freedom and had a liberal form of political legitimacy.

Current Doctrine and Legitimacy

According to FM 3-24, legitimacy is the “main objective” in a political insurgency. Whichever side the population regards as legitimate, government or insurgent, has a distinct advantage in the conflict. Yet FM 3-24 spends less than a paragraph on a discussion of types of legitimacy and no time at all on which type the population accepts. Instead, the manual assumes that the population will accept the form of legitimacy the COIN force offers via elections and essential services. FM 3-24 offers no guidance on how to determine which value set the local population is using or which form of legitimacy it is likely to accept. The sole method of gaining legitimacy discussed is the provision of benefits to the society. The only form of legitimacy offered is constitutional governance via elections. No other alternatives are given. In fact, commonly taught types of legitimacy such as sociologist Max Weber’s three archetypes, are listed in the manual as types of authority, not types of legitimacy. Other than the comparison between theocracies and Western liberalism the FM makes no mention of any form of legitimacy normally associated with nonliberal governments.

Stability operations can be a large part of a COIN mission (depending on the nature of the operation). The new FM 3-07, Stability Operations, fills a void in COIN doctrine: what to do when you are dealing with a state that is failed or failing and military intervention is required to restore order and support or even create a functioning government. Stability doctrine is even more prescriptive when it comes to legitimacy. One finds little or no discussion of whether a lack of legitimacy contributed to the state’s current condition. Worse, it limits a commander’s choice of legitimacy. A section under the heading of governance and participation discusses strengthening civil participation to achieve a positive lasting change by developing social, gender, ethnic, and racial equity and equality and promoting individual civil rights. The ideals associated with liberal value systems are all laudable goals, but they may not fit neatly with the traditional norms and values of the host nation population.

Current Policy

In January of this year, the White House and Defense Department released “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century
Defense.” The document outlined our new defense policy, reflecting the limitations of our present and future fiscal reality. Included in the changes was guidance on future stability and counterinsurgency operations:

In the aftermath of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States will emphasize non-military means and military-to-military cooperation to address instability and reduce the demand for significant U.S. force commitments to stability operations. U.S. forces will nevertheless be ready to conduct limited counterinsurgency and other stability operations if required, operating alongside coalition forces wherever possible. Accordingly, U.S. forces will retain and continue to refine the lessons learned from the past ten years of counterinsurgency and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. **However, U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.** [emphasis in original]

The paragraph clearly portends a smaller military unable to dedicate forces to long-term stability operations, but it also includes the subtler message; that our goals in stability and counterinsurgency operations will need to be much more limited. We will not be able to conduct long-term operations to create social structures in our own image. We will not be able to shape political legitimacy. We will be required to determine the form of legitimacy acceptable to the current population and work within that structure.

**Effect on Doctrine**

FM 3-07 and FM 3-24 are both restricted by the old policy that limits the options of political legitimacy with which military commanders can work. FM 3-24 implicitly advocates liberal democracy as the main source of political legitimacy. By liberal democracy I mean what most Westerners think of when they use the term “democracy”—a government built on the ideals of human rights that has universal adult suffrage and holds free and fair elections between candidates from multiple parties not built on ethnicity, religion, or a government-endorsed nationalist ideology. This is opposed to functional or illiberal democracies that hold elections but limit the franchise or have a single party system.

The doctrine uses the “if you build it they will come” philosophy that depends on a two-part approach. Part one is creating democratic political institutions. This involves creating a government
that includes a legislature, executive, and judiciary, as well as the laws to support them, along with scheduled elections to fill the various positions. The second part is constructing a modern infrastructure that supports these institutions. These transpire sequentially with some form of election held as soon as practical while much of the physical and economic infrastructure is still being built. In essence, the doctrine describes how to create a political structure in the host nation that mimics the Western concepts of modern liberal democracy.

Political legitimacy has ties to a society’s value system. Old doctrine states that if one changes the social structures and institutions to democratic ones, the population adopts more liberal values. But changing a society’s value system, even with a massive influx of development projects, has proved more difficult than some had thought. This is demonstrated by the lack of real change in women’s rights in Afghanistan due to a traditional value system that limits women’s freedoms. If one cannot easily change a society’s values, changing the forms of legitimacy that society finds acceptable will also be difficult. If extensive modernization programs are no longer practicable, then determining acceptable alternative forms of political legitimacy will be a primary objective.

**Political Legitimacy from a Military Perspective**

Legitimacy matters for two reasons. The first has to do with the amount of effort required by political leaders to enforce their will among the people. Generally the citizenry willingly obey the orders and directions of a government seen as legitimate. On the other hand when a government lacks legitimacy it must use coercion to obtain compliance. Coercion can either take the form of bribery to entice the population to comply or violence or threat of violence to force compliance. Legitimacy can be seen as an internal motivator. People comply because they believe that it is the right thing to do. Coercion, or power as it is sometimes referred to, is an external motivator. Coercion must be significant enough to overcome the population’s natural tendencies. Maintaining that amount of coercion is expensive, which is why even dictators attempt to find some way to legitimate their government. From a military perspective, maintaining a government that the population sees as illegitimate takes more troops and funding than maintaining a legitimate government.

The second reason legitimacy matters to the military has to do with who the population feels has the authority to use force. When a government seen as legitimate empowers one of its agents, like a police officer, to use force, even deadly force, the citizenry accepts this force as morally right. A soldier commits no crime when he kills an enemy of the state under orders. His connection to the state’s rightful authority legitimizes his actions. Similarly, the citizenry can view agents of a nonlegitimate government who use force as criminals. In fact, legitimacy does more than simply grant authority to use force. Legitimacy can make the use of force a morally laudable act. The population often views soldiers as heroes. If a segment of the population sees an insurgency as politically legitimate, it grants the members of the insurgency the authority to use force. This means that, while the government may view the insurgents’ actions as criminal, the believers in the insurgency do not share this view. The population may see as morally praiseworthy what the government sees as murderous criminal activity. In fact, every person who sees the insurgency as politically legitimate is now free to become a soldier for that cause. They view themselves as legal combatants. As long as the insurgency maintains political legitimacy in a segment of the population, it has a potential pool of fighters ready to take up arms.

**Sources of Political Legitimacy**

According to Jean-Marc Coicaud and David Ames Curtis, political legitimacy arises from three sources: the law, the population’s norms, and the population’s consent. The government gains legitimacy through adherence to the law that the population accepts. This can be trickier than it might...
seem at first. There are a number of different sources of law. Law is based on religious beliefs, natural law (considered the basis of human rights), and positive law (manmade laws based on rational principles). This multiplicity of sources can make determining which type of law the population accepts difficult, but doing so is critical to isolating which type of legitimacy a population will find acceptable.

Another source of legitimacy is the population’s norms. Norms are the social rules that the population embraces. Norms are important because they are a reflection of the population’s values. Sharing a value system allows individuals to work together. For example, the U.S. Army has core values that it endorses as part of the effort to create a cohesive element. Everyone knows what to expect and can plan their actions accordingly. Norms provide a way to manage uncertainty by setting down the rules that people will follow in a given social situation. They help create predictability in an otherwise unpredictable world. A common set of norms allows a society to function as a group.

A third source of legitimacy is the consent of the people. In many ways, the consent of the people is at the heart of legitimacy. The consent of the people involves an implicit duty to obey the government; to recognize its right to rule. Rights, by their nature, involve an agreement of what one person owes to another. A single person living on a desert island has no need for rights since he has no one on whom to enforce them. Rights distinguish what is due to each person based on his situation and place in the structure of society. In almost all systems, the ruler has the right to use violence to enforce the laws of the community. In most systems, the people have the right to demand certain goods, services, and protections. This unwritten agreement forms the basis of the consent to be governed.

Each of the three sources of political legitimacy rests upon a foundation, the values of the people. A shared value system is the basis of the law. For the people to willingly obey the law, it must conform to the fundamental values of the society. Laws that violate a person’s values will often be disregarded. Norms amount to activities that are in concert with society’s values. A government must adhere to the values and norms of the society if it expects to have the population to consent to its rule. A society will not willingly consent long to rule by a government that espouses a different value system than the one it believes in.

The key to understanding what government a population will accept as legitimate is to understand a society’s values systems. Broadly speaking, there are two types of value systems, individual and communal.

**Individual.** In individualistic cultures there is an “I” consciousness.
- Identity is an individual matter, often the more individualistic, the better.
- Emphasis is on individual achievement.
- Everyone has a right to his or her own opinion and privacy.
- People feel guilt if they violate a social norm and are viewed by others as personally responsible for their actions.
- Friends are chosen individually.
- All people are treated the same.16

These value systems can be associated with liberal democratic systems or with political systems that are only functionally democratic or not democratic at all. Societies with individualistic value systems prefer liberal democratic governance built on the idea that the government gains its power to rule directly from the citizenry.17 The rights of each person are upheld over collective rights. Sayings like “it is better to let ten guilty men go free than to imprison one innocent man” express the idea that the individual is more important than the group. Legitimacy in these types of government is based on liberalism or the primacy of individual human rights.

**Communal.** The reverse is true in societies with communal value systems. In the communal value system, a common identity is the most important thing.
- The members of society who have a communal system have a “we” consciousness; the organization dictates private life.
- Personal actions are considered praiseworthy when they increase the status or honor of the group.
- Social status determines one’s friends.
- People feel shame when they violate social norms and are viewed by others in society as dishonoring the group.
- Opinions are predetermined by what is best for the group.
- There is a clear difference between how members of the in-group and people outside of the in-group are treated.
These societies tend toward functional or non-democratic governments.\textsuperscript{18} The individual’s desires are subordinate to the community’s needs. The motto of the \textit{Three Musketeers}, “All for one, and one for all!” referred to the idea that the people supported and protected the king and the king ruled for the good of all. Personal identity within the group defines the obligations of the individual and those of the group. Common identity, based on ethnic or tribal affiliation, religion, or nationalistic ideology, is central to these societies. Legitimacy in these types of governments relies on the nonliberal ideal of the honor and the survival of the group over any single individual’s rights.

Types of Political Legitimacy

Based on the above systems, there are two broad categories of political legitimacy: liberal and communal or communitarian legitimacy. Liberalism, or some variation of liberalism, is the most common form of legitimacy in western Europe and North America. Liberalism is built on natural law and individual rights. All people have inalienable rights that the government cannot restrict. These rights vary with each nation, but the basic idea is the same: the people have rights that the government cannot violate. The political system we most commonly associate with liberalism is democracy. Democracy and liberalism have close ties, but they are not the same thing. Liberalism is the form of legitimacy in which democracy is a system of government.

The alternative is nondemocratic legitimacy. The most common form is communal legitimacy. It is not based exclusively on rights but on a combination of privileges and duties, which limit rights. Members have duties either to other individuals or to the society as a whole, and they grant to government the power to enforce these duties. For example, societies such as Thailand that have communal forms of legitimacy sometimes willingly restrict free speech. Thailand has laws that punish any citizen for besmirching the name of the king. Depending on the type of legitimacy, duties may have their origin in an ethnic or tribal group, a religion, or an ideology like communism. Societies with communal forms of legitimacy may
still have functionally democratic institutions, but Westerners regard them as less than democratic because of the limited number of political parties or restrictions on voting or holding office.  

Traditional societies appear to prefer nonliberal, communal political legitimacy. Their values arise from the community as a whole. They value group honor, identity, and survival above individual identity. The three most common identifiers are religion, ethnicity, and ideology.  

Religion is often a basis for political legitimacy in nondemocratic states. Like Iran, many states use religion as the basis for their legitimacy. Others use religion to help bolster their legitimacy, usually in the form of a connection with a religious figure such as the Prophet Mohammed. For example, the kings of both Jordan and Morocco present themselves as direct descendants of the Prophet.  

Ethnicity can also form the basis of legitimacy in a communal system. Being a member of the right clan, tribe, or ethnic group may be a prerequisite for leadership. Iraqi Kurds essentially run an independent country and are unwilling to accept the legitimacy of rule from the non-Kurdish Iraqi central government. Legitimacy based on ethnicity is often built on a form of gerontocracy, or rule by the oldest members of the group. Elders are revered and their counsel is sought after in most matters of importance.  

Nondemocratic governments can also use collectivist ideologies as a basis for legitimacy. These ideologies usually take the form of an extreme version of nationalism like fascism or communism. They can sometimes be hybrid regimes where the façade of elections supports regime legitimacy. Often these regimes are supported by a common identity and a charismatic personality. Examples would include Nazi Germany built on Hitler’s charisma and imaginary Aryan identity or Nasser’s presidency in Egypt, built on the combination of his personality and Arab nationalism.  

Application—Afghanistan  

Afghanistan is an example of how considering cultural norms and values can lead to seeing other forms of legitimacy as viable solutions. We first try to determine which value systems are common  

A young Afghan boy from a Pashtun tribe poses for a photograph near his home in Kabul, Afghanistan, 16 July 2002.
among the population. Liberalism has never taken root in Afghanistan outside a limited portion of the urban population. There is no national ideology. The Russians attempted to establish one and failed. There does appear to be enough of a national identity to keep the country from splintering. There have been civil wars in the past but not a realistic attempt at a separatist movement.

The two most prominent value systems are the tribal or ethnic system and the religious system. Ethnic or tribal value systems offer an alternative, but the country is not homogeneous. It contains at least seven major ethnic groups of which the Pashtuns are the largest. The Pashtuns have a history of political leadership in Afghanistan since at least 1747. They have a common identity and shared value system that provides a foundation for political legitimacy. But due to the existence of so many tribal groups, ethnic divisions have caused civil wars in the past, the most recent after the fall of the Soviet-backed government.

Still, we must take into account the legitimacy ethnic values systems provide as a way to build a united citizenry and design a future government; the dynamics of the government system must allow for the amount of local autonomy tribal values expect.

Religion is the basis for the second value system. For example, it is the basis of legitimacy the Taliban claim. As a value system and a basis of legitimacy, religion has a broader base than tribal identity and has proven to be a justification for the general population to take up arms. It will be one that the current government cannot confront directly, but instead must co-opt and incorporate into its own system.

Let me make a few suggestions based on these observations. If we are no longer in a position to conduct long-term nationbuilding to change the value system of the population, then we must conduct stability operations based on the sources of legitimacy we find. Building on the two forms of legitimacy that exist and the inherent strengths and weakness in each, perhaps a solution might be a loose parliamentary system based on local representation chosen or nominated by the local population. Perhaps, a party-based system built along ethnic lines will encourage the building of coalitions with common aims. While minority ethnic parties are a divisive element, in reality they only reflect underlying ethnic realities and offer methods to expose ethnic concerns without the need for violence. The central government, with a prime minister, relies on Islamic principles to garner universal support. Finally, wherever practical, we should build human rights protections into the constitution to the level acceptable to the population but not threatening to the government.

This may not be the preferred solution for many Western powers, but it is probably a realistic one. In stability operations planners can examine the costs of more palatable options. We can look at the problem as a continuum that stretches from the system described above to a fully liberal democracy. The farther away from the base system one moves along that continuum, the more difficult the mission becomes. There is a price to pay in time and treasure for every cultural norm and value system one changes. In a COIN situation maintaining governments that seek to change the social-value system will require maintaining a coercive presence to enforce the cultural changes until they take root on their own, if they ever do. Discussions on the desired end-state and the costs of achieving that end-state, along with the probabilities of success, must occur before the operation commences. Planners should have these discussions when they have a better understanding of the relationship between cultural norms, values, and political legitimacy, not when they can only consider one form of political legitimacy—where only a liberal form of legitimacy equals success.

**Determining Legitimacy**

Which form of legitimacy the people will embrace is a relevant question in counterinsurgency and stability operations. It was a question we were not previously required to ask because U.S. policy had always dictated the answer. If that restriction is no longer in place, we have an opportunity to make changes. Planners must understand the various types of political legitimacy. They should learn how to identify the form of legitimacy the population prefers. If there is an insurgency, we must determine which form(s) of legitimacy the insurgency is using. Different sectors of the population may well adhere to different types of legitimacy.

In a COIN operation, we also need to determine which form of political legitimacy the insurgents are advocating. Are they looking to change the
form of legitimacy altogether (as from a traditional legitimacy built on an ethnic identity to a legitimacy built on a religious identity) or are they simply trying to change the regime (trading one ethnic group for another)? The United States should develop a deep understanding of a society’s culture and value systems to understand how to target insurgent legitimacy by co-opting it through political concessions or other policy changes while the military concentrates on reducing the insurgency’s key leaders and sources of support.

Why does this fall to the military? Mostly because there is no one else who is going to enter a failed state or fight a counterinsurgency. But it is also our duty from another perspective. While it is our mission to promote policy, it is also our job to let the policymakers know when they are asking too much of the military. Our current doctrine assumes away much of the problem of creating a liberal democracy where a traditional society now exists. We need to be able to tell policymakers what the realistic expectations are for the cost of the operations, the length of the operations, and the probability of success. This will require a better understanding of political legitimacy. Much of this is actually sociology, psychology, and political science, but that does not mean that we can easily pin the rose on another agency. The political and economic climate has changed. The military must be prepared to deal with these changes, which require a greater understanding of the effects of political legitimacy on COIN and stability operations. MR

NOTES

5. Epstein, Serafino, and Miko.
6. Ibid., 1-21. The manual gives an example of a comparison between Western liberal legitimacy and theocratic legitimacy that it associates with medieval monarchies and ancient China as well as modern Iran. Rather than describing the types of legitimacy or discussing them, it gives six possible indicators of legitimacy.
9. The manual says that social capital development activities are founded on pillars that include “human rights by promoting and protecting social, economic, cultural, political, civil, and other basic human rights and equality by advancing equity and equality of opportunity among citizens in terms of gender, social and economic resources, political representation, ethnicity, and race.” FM 3-07, Stability Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, October 2008).
11. If this is even possible.
15. Coicaud and Curtis.
19. For example, in 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections, Hamas won a resounding victory that many Westerners could not understand since it did not fit with their understanding of democracy.
21. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
27. Barfield, 54-65.
29. The Soviets tried for generations to eliminate the cultural norms and values that were part and parcel to the Catholic Church with little success. They could suppress the open practice of religion but could not change the underlying value system that supported it.
The Afghan National Army
Has capacity building become culture building?

Sergeant First Class Keith W. Norris, U.S. Army

The past decade has been a period of tremendous growth for the U.S. Army. In addition to a modest increase in manpower—a trend which will soon be reversed—the Army has become more agile, more adaptive, and more technologically sophisticated. However, perhaps the greatest advances made are doctrinal. Eleven years of experience on the counter-insurgency (COIN) battlefield and the 2006 publication of a field manual (FM) on the subject have codified hard-earned lessons regarding, among other things, the importance of culture in a COIN environment.

America’s war in Afghanistan has given its army no shortage of painful and sometimes embarrassing lessons regarding culture. A recent unclassified study of green-on-blue incidents—instances in which Afghan security forces have committed acts of violence against their NATO partners—found that many of these acts may have been motivated by anger over what Afghans perceived as culturally offensive behavior. These included such things as lack of respect toward elders, disregard for the “privacy” of Afghan women, and urinating in public. Experience has also shown that a failure to understand local culture has in the past made the U.S. military less effective at COIN. Consequently, deploying military personnel today receive instruction on appropriate behavior and cultural norms in the areas to which they are deploying.

However, these efforts betray a lack of understanding of culture beyond a presumed “baccalaureate” level. FM 3-24, the Army’s doctrinal publication on COIN, begins with the statement, “Counterinsurgency is not just thinking man’s warfare—it is the graduate level of war.” The United States has grudgingly admitted that the war in Afghanistan has become an exercise in nation building. Insofar as a key element of U.S. strategy has become the development of a competent Afghan National Army (ANA), it appears that it has also become an exercise in culture building.

Several years ago, the author had the privilege of attending a talk by Roshan Saki, the Command Sergeant Major of the Afghan National Army. He had come to the U.S. Army’s National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, to observe training that U.S. units underwent before they deployed to his

PHOTO: Afghan National Army soldiers with the 205th Corps stand in formation in preparation for the arrival of General Qsime, vice commander of the Afghan National Army. 205th Corps, 4 March 2010. (U.S. Air Force SrA Kenny Holston)
country. At a gathering of senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs), he laid out the progress made by the Afghan National Army and discussed the partnership between NATO forces and the Afghan security forces. He said, “We can learn from you, but we will never be you.” Safi understood the importance of what he said, but almost certainly it was lost on those of us in his audience.

For those who have trained, partnered with, and mentored the Afghan National Army, the experience has been both rewarding and frustrating. Progress has occurred in some areas, but in other areas, basic problems we seemingly ought to have solved years ago persist. The same study that addressed green-on-blue incidents also gathered data about the perception of the ANA among U.S. personnel. The results were not surprising: American soldiers consistently view their Afghan counterparts as untrustworthy, unmotivated, and inept.

Despite these perceptions, we have placed an ever-greater focus on developing a large, professional Afghan National Army. The United States has pumped billions of dollars into training and equipping the ANA, employed various embedded training and partnership schemes, and steadily increased the number of advisors assigned to ANA units. While expectations have tempered somewhat (with the catchphrase “Afghan good enough” currently in vogue), conventional wisdom seems to hold that, with patience and training, the ANA will reach a level of competence and strength that enables it to be a truly professional force. To that end, partner units have sought to strengthen the NCO corps through education and professional development programs, to raise morale with quality-of-life programs, and to transform the ANA into an organization capable of planning and conducting complex security operations independently.

This article examines three areas of ANA performance that consistently garner criticism from U.S. partners and mentors—

• The weakness of the ANA NCO corps.
• Drug abuse among ANA soldiers.
• The Afghan Army’s high AWOL rate.

I suggest these are cultural phenomena rather than training and organizational shortcomings. From this premise, I offer some inferences about developing a large, professional Afghan National Army and offer some broad recommendations on how to accomplish our stated goals.

The Afghan NCO Corps

One source of concern among U.S. partners is the Afghan National Army NCO corps, which they see as ineffective. U.S. soldiers consistently complain that Afghan NCOs have little authority or initiative and that officers exclusively exercise leadership, if it exists at all. One is tempted to write this phenomenon off to the influence of Soviet-trained officers who occupy many senior leadership positions, but this argument breaks down when given that the same practices predominate among young officers and NCOs who are not old enough to remember the Soviet occupation, much less to have served in the communist regime’s military. Moreover, many senior and mid-grade Afghan officers were mujahedeen who fought against the Soviets. Little evidence supports the notion that an officer-dominated Afghan military is a throwback to Soviet days and that we can train this propensity out of them. Nevertheless, U.S. mentors and partners believe they can persuade Afghan officers to empower noncommissioned officers and that, with enough patience and training, an effective NCO corps will emerge. However, if one considers cultural factors, it seems that these hopes are unfounded.

At first glance, explaining why this is the case is difficult. One would expect that in a class-based society sharp social distinctions might exist between an upper (officer) class and a lower (enlisted) class. Yet social class does not exist in Afghanistan in the same way that it does in, say, India. In the 1970s, Afghan communists lamented their inability to create the class-consciousness so essential to revolution. Even generous estimates suggest that the Afghan “working class” has never comprised more than six percent of the population. Even so, it seems that Afghanistan’s social structure remains a strong impediment to the development of an effective NCO corps.

Afghanistan lacks any formal class structure, but it is nevertheless a highly stratified society. The sharpest distinction between groups is that which divides the sexes. Because women play no overt, active role in most of Afghan society this is not a factor in the current discussion. Tribe and ethnicity are more critical factors, and these are the next-greatest divides of Afghan society. The tribal system affects about two-thirds of the Afghan population, and Pashtuns, who comprise nearly half of that population, are the world’s largest tribal society. Glatzer notes, “Although the tribal principle is clear and unambiguous, it by no means forms ‘real’ social groups. Instead, it is one of the recruiting principles of corporate and of conflicting groups, though never the only one.”

Tribes do not always form effective organizations for action, but tribal membership is an important factor in determining who comprises these groups. Inasmuch as patron-client relationships often form the basis for officer advancement and commissioning in the Afghan National Army, and the formation of such relationships is partially a function of tribal affiliation, it is certain that tribalism is one factor influencing the formation of an officer “class.”

Socio-economic factors also play a part. Afghan society is divided not just into tribes, but into urban and rural populations. While the Soviet occupation saw the displacement of huge segments of the Afghan population to cities and to refugee camps abroad, Afghanistan remains an overwhelmingly rural society; today, approximately 80 percent of the population resides in rural areas. In those areas, wealth is divided in one of two ways: in the southern and eastern Pashtun tribal areas, wealth resides predominantly with tribal leaders. In the north, where agriculture is essential and tribalism is less a feature, wealth is concentrated in the hands of a relatively small group of landowners. Urban elites comprise a third body of wealth-holders. ANA officers come principally from these three groups.

This helps to explain the formation of an officer “class” within the Afghan National Army (and defines the gulf between officers and enlisted), but it does little to illuminate the reasons for the failure of an effective NCO corps to develop or the reluctance
The perception of many that Afghan NCOs are really just “better-paid privates” is a difficult one to shake, in large part because it is true.

of Afghan officers to relinquish any of their leadership to noncommissioned officers. The perception of many that Afghan NCOs are really just “better-paid privates” is a difficult one to shake, in large part because it is true. Afghan officers are reluctant to either trust or empower NCOs. This, too, can be explained by cultural factors, especially those related to tribal social structure.

Even since the establishment of the modern Afghan state, Afghan society always featured a power structure “limited to social microcosms . . . characterized by a plethora of overlapping loyalties: villages, valley communities, clans, tribes, and religious groups as the most important frames of political reference for identity and action.” In tribal cultures, “society is understood as a dense web of reciprocal obligations established by individuals in the course of their lifetime.” Power comes from patron-client relationships. Consequently, Afghans perceive individual power and status as the ability to “get things done” and deliver results for those up, down, and across the social system. This tendency has strengthened rather than diminished since the fall of the Taliban in 2001.

In Western societies, “money is power”; like most clichés, this one is based largely on truth. However, in tribal societies—particularly Pashtun tribal society—power is the sort of influence described above and “more cherished than money.” It is actually the currency of Afghan culture. When an Afghan leader delegates authority or empowers a subordinate to accomplish something, he thinks he is engaging in a zero-sum transaction, surrendering some of his own power in a way that a Westerner cannot easily comprehend. Therefore, asking an Afghan officer to delegate and empower is like asking an American officer to pay his subordinates out of his own pocket; it is an undertaking doomed to failure.

A Drug-Addicted Army?

Another criticism U.S. partners and mentors of the Afghan Army frequently voice is the prevalence of drug use among Afghan soldiers. Nearly anyone who has worked closely with the ANA has smelled hashish smoke wafting from a guard shack or seen a glassy-eyed, obviously intoxicated soldier on duty. There have been reports from U.S. personnel in some areas that heroin use among ANA soldiers is very high. Estimates of the number of ANA soldiers who use drugs vary considerably: One ANA leader estimates that 74 percent of soldiers use hashish. Other reckonings place the number as high as 85 percent. The ANA acknowledges that, despite drug testing, many of the soldiers it recruits are drug addicts.

In some respects this is hardly surprising. Afghan society has seen an enormous upswing in drug use in recent decades. The United Nations estimates that as of 2009, one in 12 Afghans were drug users. This number is expected to continue rising due to increases in domestic heroin production and to the return of drug-addicted refugees from abroad. Afghanistan’s proximity to Iran, where many Afghans fled during the Soviet occupation and the subsequent civil war, is also problematic. Iran has the highest rate of opium addiction in the world, with 2 percent of the population believed to be regular users.

That this translates into a higher rate of drug use in the ANA than is seen in Afghan society is only natural. Afghan soldiers are recruited most heavily from economically and socially disadvantaged areas where the structural factors that influence drug use are most prevalent.

And drug problems in Afghanistan are partly the result of structural factors. Poverty, a major factor in drug use, is endemic in Afghanistan. In nearly every indicator of poverty and social development—infant and maternal mortality, life expectancy, education and literacy, nutrition, and gender equality—Afghanistan ranks very poorly. Public health services such as drug treatment are virtually nonexistent, and where they do exist, they are frequently inaccessible. Over a third of the Afghan population is without access to basic healthcare facilities, and only nine percent of the rural population report clinics in their villages. The absence of effective law enforcement in many areas
means that growers, sellers, and users are unlikely to face any serious consequences.

Yet, if structural factors help explain the high incidence of drug use in Afghan society—and in the Afghan National Army—longstanding cultural factors need to be taken into consideration as well. Afghans did not become drug users overnight: “[D]rug use in Afghanistan is certainly not a recent phenomenon and neither is the prevalence of drug use . . . an unprecedented social problem.”19 Opium has been produced in Afghanistan since at least the 12th century, when Arab traders who brought it from Europe introduced it into the region. The Taliban pronounced narcotics production and use “un-Islamic” and banned them, yet Afghanistan has been a major drug producer for decades. Since 1991, it has been the world’s primary source of opium poppy and today it is the world’s largest producer of hashish as well. In what some call the “Coca Cola effect,” the ready and cheap supply of illicit drugs not only feeds demand but also creates it.20 It is difficult to conceive that, in a country where 14 percent of households are involved in the opium trade, drug use would be anything less than astronomical.21

An Army Absent

Yet another frequently voiced complaint regarding the ANA is its astronomical absent without leave (AWOL) rate. Although the number of ANA soldiers absent at any given time varies considerably among units, present for duty rates in the Afghan Army are between 69 and 75 percent.22 Many U.S. partners and mentors complain that high absenteeism is a serious impediment to training and to the overall development of the Afghan Army. Consequently, Afghan commanders frequently find themselves under pressure from coalition counterparts to take measures such as dropping absent soldiers from the roles as a means of reducing AWOLs. However, ANA leaders are often reluctant to take steps such
as these. While many lament the great numbers of personnel who are absent from their ranks, nearly all nevertheless recognize that these numbers reflect the realities of Afghan society rather than any moral failing in their soldiers.

Most of these realities relate to Afghan family structure. “The Afghan individual is surrounded ... by concentric rings consisting of family, extended family, clan, tribe, confederacy, and major cultural-linguistic group. The hierarchy of loyalties corresponds to these circles and becomes more intense as the circle gets smaller.”

Family—both immediate and extended—is the fundamental building block of Afghan society, and this fact places obligations on the individual that are difficult for a Westerner to appreciate but of which the Afghan leadership are painfully aware.

Afghan families are endogamous. Afghans typically marry within the extended family, with marriages between cousins preferred. This is critical in maintaining the patrilineal tribal and clan-based alliances so essential to the Afghan social structure. Marrying within the family prevents the “watering down” of these relationships and strengthens the web of reciprocal obligations that characterize Afghan life. This structure extends beyond the mere maintenance of social power and affects the economic well being of Afghans as well:

The extended family, the major economic and social unit in the society, replaces government because of the absence of an adequate nation-wide service infrastructure. Child socialization takes place within the family because of deficiencies in the education system. Thus, individual social, economic, and political rights and obligations are found within the family which guarantees security to each man and woman, from birth to death.

While it is doubtful that this arrangement has much to do with a lack of government social services, it points to an important truth: Afghans rely on the extended family for many of their economic needs.

In practice, this manifests itself in the physical living arrangements of Afghan families, who often live together in extended family groups. Where living in the same house is impractical, extended family members frequently comprise all or part of a village. When a husband is away, the husband’s extended family—father, uncles, brothers, or other male family members—assume responsibility for the security and welfare of the wife and children. Deep cultural roots sustain this practice as evinced not only by the persistence of such living arrangements in Afghanistan, but also by the continuation of such practices by the Afghan diaspora in places like the United States.

For the foreseeable future, the Afghan National Army is, for all intents and purposes, deployed to its own country. Even where the security situation might permit servicemembers to relocate their immediate families to places near their duty stations—and such conditions are rare in Afghanistan—doing so would remove their families from the social and economic support system upon which they rely. Afghan soldiers and officers face a difficult choice: They can continue their service with little prospect of seeing their families on any but the most sporadic basis, or they can resign from the military.

There are other important considerations. Afghan men—the ANA is overwhelmingly male—have family responsibilities that extend beyond mere financial support. As members of the tribe and clan, men are expected to participate in important decisions regarding the family. To fail in this duty may amount to surrendering one’s position in the group. Moreover, in a patriarchal system, eldest sons are expected to assume leadership duties when their fathers die: “[H]e may have to take over the family’s responsibilities and resign from the army. Of course, he is entitled to do that.”

It is small wonder, then, that Afghan soldiers often choose the middle road by simply “extending” their leave, doing without the pay they forfeit as a consequence, and returning to duty when their family situation permits. The average soldier is entitled to two weeks of leave per year, and even this is subject to the whims of their officers. By
contrast, U.S. personnel deployed to Afghanistan receive fifteen days of leave during their one-year deployments and a similar period before and after deploying. Yet despite this and comparatively long periods of stabilization between deployments, operational tempo is cited as a major cause of family stress among U.S. servicemembers. This suggests that U.S. expectations of Afghan Army present-for-duty rates even approximating those of U.S. units are probably unrealistic. As Afghan General Zahir Azimi points out, “We have to distinguish carefully between deserting and going AWOL.”

ANA Shortcomings in Perspective

The problems faced by the ANA present serious challenges, but they are not without precedent in recent history. Many otherwise functional militaries have faced similar difficulties and remained effective. Some have even been superior fighting forces.

Most Western militaries rely heavily on their professional NCO corps; both Britain and the United States regard their NCOs as the “backbone” of their respective armies. Yet, other militaries have managed to serve as both credible deterrents and effective fighting formations without the benefit of NCO leadership. “The backbone of the Soviet army [was] the officer. Simple aircraft refueling and rearming [was] done by an officer. All tanks and APCs [armored personnel carriers] [were] commanded by officers and routine jobs about the ship [were] done by officers.” Soviet NCOs were, by and large, technicians. They filled roles that required specialized training rather than exercising leadership. Perhaps because of this, NCOs comprised about a third of the Soviet Army ground forces. China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is similarly lacking in NCO leadership. While professional military education in the PLA has undergone significant improvements in recent years, NCO schooling continues to place little emphasis on
leadership and initiative. Perhaps more surprisingly, military historian and retired Command Sergeant Major Robert S. Rush notes:

[U]se of U.S. Army NCOs in 1907, even though some had long service, could be equated with the utilization of noncommissioned officers under the old Soviet system after 1945. The noncommissioned officers were there to maintain good order and discipline on and off duty, but if a task or training needed to be done, then it was best supervised by an officer.28

While it is unlikely that anyone would argue that the Soviet Army, the PLA, or the U.S. Army were better off without a strong NCO corps, it is difficult to deny that all three services were capable of ensuring the security of their countries.

Epidemic drug use is never a desirable phenomenon, whether in a society as a whole or in the army that serves it. Nevertheless, armies have been effective fighting forces while facing high rates of drug use in their ranks. Even though marijuana use among U.S. enlisted men remained consistently high throughout the Vietnam War, [it] was mostly a problem because it conflicted with American civilian and military values. Use of marijuana did not constitute an operational problem. Smoking in rear areas did not impact operations. Use among combat personnel came when units stood down rather when in the field. The Commanding General of the 3d Marine Division noted “there is no drug problem out in the hinterlands, because there was a self-policing by the troops themselves.” Life for combat soldiers depended on their being clear-headed.29

A study of U.S. personnel returning from Vietnam in 1971 found that as many as 45 percent admitted to having used illicit opiates, barbiturates, or amphetamines at least occasionally during their combat tours.30 Even if such numbers appear suspiciously high, they nevertheless illustrate an important point: Drug use did occur among U.S. servicemembers in Vietnam at a rate that is difficult to imagine in today’s military. Yet most analysts argue that the loss of the Vietnam War was political rather than military; U.S. fighting forces performed superbly there. Again, nobody would argue that a drug-using army is optimal, but history has shown that it is possible to make such an organization function.

Nor is the ANA’s astronomical AWOL rate without precedent, even among professional armies. During the American Civil War, some states’ AWOL rates averaged as high as 30 percent, a statistic which seems to correlate closely both with the size of the states’ manpower contributions and with their respective casualty rates.31 The U.S. Army’s AWOL rate during the Korean War spiked to over 18 percent in 1952.32 In 1969, the rate was 11.2 percent, and AWOLs accounted for approximately 80 percent of military personnel in confinement.33 Manpower shortages are never a desirable constraint for a commander, but history has shown that it is possible for militaries to function at substantially less than full strength.

The Art of the Possible

None of this suggests that the United States cannot achieve its long-term aims in Afghanistan. It does suggest that the U.S. and its NATO allies may face some difficult choices. One option is to redefine the notion of long term. The problems discussed here have deep cultural roots. Culture, says anthropologist Carole Nagengast,

is not a thing, but rather an historically and socially situated set of practices, never inert or static, but an always fragmented and changing product of negotiation and struggle. As such, those practices are subject to renegotiation as a result of new struggles.34

Culture does change, then, but it must be understood that it is unlikely to be a quick process. Any assumption that the United States can create a new culture in the Afghan Army without changing the larger social norms that underpin it is unfounded. Development of a professional Afghan National Army on a model that Afghan culture simply doesn’t support is a long-term proposition. It is certainly something that we cannot achieve by the projected U.S. withdrawal date in 2014; it is doubtful that it is something the current generation will see in its lifetime.

A more sensible approach would be to help develop an Afghan Army that functions within the constraints its parent society places upon it. This would entail more than simply attempting to plug
Afghan soldiers into an American-style formation. Rather, it would mean tailoring the way we train and organize the ANA to minimize the negative effects of those constraints.

The lack of NCO leadership in the Afghan Army may, in time, correct itself; we should remember that both the U.S. and British NCO corps developed along with American and British society. In the meantime, we must develop a system to identify current Afghan NCOs who display genuine leadership potential and place them in positions where they can exercise leadership. This will likely mean training and commissioning them as officers. The remainder—those who by virtue of education and literacy are well suited to fill the middle ranks—could fill specialist or technical positions.

ANA Tashkils—the documents that outline manning and equipping of Afghan Army units—appear to have been written by Western military leaders who, in their own formations, can rely on conducting operations with nearly 100 percent of their assigned manpower. A more realistic approach for Afghan forces might be to man ANA units with enough personnel to allow them to operate effectively at two-thirds their assigned strength. The expense of doing so would not be significantly greater: current equipping levels need not be increased. A leave policy that allowed one-third of a unit’s personnel to be absent wouldn’t necessarily cost more, either. Afghan soldiers are already forfeiting pay for unauthorized absences; it seems unlikely that they would object to a more generous—but unpaid—leave policy which permitted them to serve while allowing them to fulfill family responsibilities.

Drug use in the Afghan army is unlikely to be corrected in the short term. Treatment options are limited, and the simple expedient of eliminating drug users would probably result in a force too small to be effective. The structural problems in Afghan society that have led to widespread drug use will only slowly, if ever, be eliminated. Over time, economic development, a stronger central government, and rising educational levels may displace the opium economy in Afghanistan and lift the Afghan people out of poverty. Only then will substantial reductions in drug use be possible.

Reconciling ourselves to the realities of Afghan culture does not mean settling—it means innovating. Perhaps we ought to replace “Afghan good enough” with the far more pragmatic goal of “Afghan excellent.” The Afghan National Army is an organization with enormous potential. The personnel in it are often tough, intelligent, and display tremendous determination in the face of difficult odds. Rather than view the cultural characteristics of Afghan society as limiting factors to overcome, a more practical approach would focus on optimizing the Afghan National Army to fit a social system that is archaic but undeniably resilient.

NOTES
17. World Bank, 16-19.
18. Ibid., 141, 142.


26. Quoted in Zaliq, “We have to distinguish between deserting and going AWOL.”


33. Hartnagel, 205.

IN SEPTEMBER 2010, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates delivered an address to the students and faculty of Duke University on the nature of our modern all-volunteer military. During his hour-long speech he repeatedly returned to the theme of the growing disconnect between today’s professional soldiers and the civilian society they serve. Not only, he said, are our military organizations becoming more professional, but they are drawing from an ever-decreasing segment of the American public. A 2009 study undertaken for the Directorate of Accession Policy and cited by Secretary Gates during his address at Duke found that, in 1988, approximately 40 percent of 18-year olds had at least one veteran parent. By 2000, that figure had fallen to 18 percent, and by 2018, only about 8 percent of 18-year olds will have a veteran parent and the exposure to and familiarity with military life that comes from being part of a military family.

Secretary Gates is not alone in his concerns among senior government officials. In his 2010 farewell speech, outgoing chair of the House Armed Services Committee, Congressman Ike Skelton, warned of what he perceived to be a “civil-military gap, a lack of understanding between civilians and the military that has grown in the era of an all-volunteer force.” This “civil-military gap” is very real and poses a number of substantial challenges to leaders in both the executive and legislative branches of our government.

The existence and importance of a “civil-military” gap has been exhaustively debated in the academic literature and popular media. I suggest that it exists, but that it is natural and unavoidable. Our focus should not be on “closing the...
gap,” but on mitigating its negative effects. To accomplish this, I suggest a broad program of “interface.” Personal relationship building is the key to cultural understanding, and cultural understanding leads to good relations. Cultural understanding is the goal, not cultural homogeneity.

Today’s Army has a number of programs and regulations it could adapt to promote interface without greatly disrupting their existing functions. As of now, no unifying or coordinating structure links these programs, and in most cases, individual regulations contain a variety of material weakness when viewed from the perspective of cultural outreach promotion. This article proposes a framework for analyzing existing programs for interface promotion potential. Then, using the Army Congressional Fellowship Program as an example, it illustrates how the process could work and proposes some changes that can have an immediate, significant, and lasting impact on the relationships between our modern professional Army, our political leaders, and the public they both serve.7

The core task is one of targeted outreach. As an organization, the Army must establish new points of cultural interface to supplant those lost during the professionalization of American military forces in recent decades. To do this, the entire military organization must work to communicate to political leaders and the civilian population what it truly means to be a member of the profession of arms.

The Cultural Divide

Military organizations are unlike any other social institutions in contemporary American society. Virtually all modern military sociologists have come to view modern militaries as highly professionalized social institutions.8 In their 2000 commentary on American military culture, Edwin Dorn, Walter Ulmer, and Thomas Jacobs noted that “[g]iven the military’s unique role of managing violence on behalf of society, a strong and incorruptible culture is not only important but essential.”9 We have long publically recognized, not only in our popular culture but also in the pronouncements of our political institutions, that the demands of military life require social dynamics that are in many ways distinct from those in civilian society. For example, in its findings in section 571 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Congress declared, “Military life is fundamentally different from civilian life,” and that “the military society is characterized by its own laws, rules, customs, and traditions, including numerous restrictions on personal behavior that would not be acceptable in civilian society.”10

According to organizational psychologist Edgar Schein, “Culture is what a group learns over a period of time as that group solves its problems of survival in an external environment and its problems of internal integration.”11 The culture that has grown up within the Army, and our other military institutions, derives from the unique demands of war fighting and combat survival.12 Both the survival and integration challenges our military organizations face are fundamentally different from those faced in most corners of civil society. Unless we intend to fundamentally alter the role of the military in American society, it makes little sense to push our military organizations to reform an aspect of their identity that derives from and contributes to their battlefield success.

Even if it were desirable to attempt to move the cultural norms of our military organizations closer to those of American civil society, it is unclear which norms we would choose. The United States is a nation of wide cultural diversity. While many modern sociologists and cultural anthropologists note broad trends towards assimilation and multiculturalism, ours is also a society of many distinct and self-sustaining subcultures.13 The key point is
that there is no one “civilian culture” in America. If anything, the unifying aspect of the various civilian cultures as compared to our military organizations is simply that they are not military.

Whatever the predominant civilian culture, it springs from a very different set of needs than those that shaped the culture of the Army. That the cultures are different is not the problem. Rather, the lack of cultural awareness and social understanding should be of primary concern. In short, the military culture derives from the imperatives of combat survival and so should not be changed to more closely conform to civilian society. Civilian culture in the United States varies widely by locale, and even its universally shared elements are in no need of adjustment. The cultures need not conform to each other, they only need be exposed to each other so that a relationship of mutual trust and understanding can develop.

**Military Participation Rates and Civil-Military Relations**

Frank Hoffman described civil-military relations as the set of relationships between four sectors of society: military elites, the military writ large, American political elites, and the American civil society. This is a useful paradigm. It allows us to conceptualize relationships based on their primary participants and discuss policy options to address challenges in relationship categories. For example, poor relations between military and political elites may stem from dramatically different factors than those between rank-and-file military members and the American civil society.

The military has long enjoyed favorable public opinion, and it ranks above other national institutions in public perception surveys. Taken at face value these surveys could indicate a healthy relationship between the military writ large and American civil society. However, a favorable view of an organization does not necessarily indicate understanding of the organization’s culture. Views not based upon a personal understanding of an institution are much more susceptible to change with the political winds.

As of 2009, only 7.55 percent of the nation’s population had served in the military. Of these veterans, 65.2 percent were 55 or older. One hundred twenty members of the 111th Congress have served in the military. While this is greater than the proportion among the general population, it has been declining. (There were 126 in the 110th Congress.) As veterans move into retirement, the percentage of congressional representatives with military experience will continue to decline.

The level of understanding of the modern military culture may not be as high as it might appear at first blush even within our veteran population. The military culture that exists today is not the military culture that existed 40 years ago. Perceptions of what life in the military is like that come from service that concluded decades ago may not be entirely in line with the realities of modern service.

Declining public and political military participation rates have a complementary affect on one another in congressional and popular attitudes toward military issues and affairs. Many factors shape legislative vote decisions, not the least of which is constituent demands. To the extent that any congressional district contains a dwindling number of citizens with direct military experience, the policy preferences of that district may be disconnected from the realities of military life. Similarly, as the number of representatives with military experience declines, the tendency to promote and discuss military issues with their constituencies is likely to decline.

Meanwhile, the operational tempo of our armed forces, especially our land forces, has increased dramatically. Since the invasion of Iraq in 2003 slightly more than 2 million soldiers and marines have been deployed into combat zones. Of these, more than 790,000 have served two or more combat tours.

The War on Terrorism is now the longest conflict in American history, yet in almost 10 years less than one percent of the U.S. population has served in either Iraq or Afghanistan. This intense operational tempo has helped solidify cultural distinctions between civilian and military societies within a small segment of the total U.S. population.
**Interface**

The core problem is one of interface. The more interaction a person has with individuals from another culture, the more positive his or her attitudes will be towards people from that culture. However the general public has little opportunity to build direct relationships with our military organizations and so has little opportunity to interact with the military culture.

For most Americans, despite fond sentiments for our men and women at arms, “the war remains an abstraction, a distant and unpleasant series of news items that does not affect them personally.” To truly understand military culture requires a point of interface with military organizations. Interface between the civilian sector and the military comes in two forms, direct military service and contact with current or separated service members. Given the general decline in military participation rates, military organizations must actively develop positive points of interface between current service members and the civilian population and leadership. To do this the military must engage a portion of its considerable resources in outreach and promotion efforts apart from its established recruiting functions.

Personal relationship building is especially important for military organizations. Under normal circumstances, members of the public have no opportunity to directly access the services of military organizations, to assess the value of the organizations’ services, or to interact with their members. Much of the current favorable view of the military derives from public perceptions of members of the armed services as protectors of the public good and perceptions that military members are personally admirable and worthy of respect. Much of the public perception of the military may come from the notion that the military is culturally unique in a way that deserves respect or admiration. However, absent direct contact with the military (through service or contact with active or separated members), the popular image of military culture derives largely from portrayals by media and entertainment organizations. In recent years, media treatment of military life has been largely salutary, although this need not always be the case and could easily shift with political temperaments.

The current favorable view is a fickle one based on feelings of patriotism and positive treatment in the media rather than true understanding. By establishing points of personal interface with the public, a military organization can give individuals an opportunity to form first-hand opinions that are much more likely to endure. Contrast the current popular support the military enjoys with the generally poor public perception in the 1960s and 1970s during the Vietnam War. The current “favorability” of military organizations is linked to contemporary policy preference rather than to identification with the organizations themselves.

Most public sector organizations attempt to establish and maintain a level of familiarity with external stakeholders through traditional promotional activities such as the issuance of annual reports, maintaining engaging and informative web sites, publishing newsletters, and purchasing print, television, radio and web media exposure. In this regard, the Army as an organization is typical and already does an adequate job of communicating its core capabilities. However, because the Army does not provide a tangible good or service in the way that most public sector organizations do, establishing the type of external stakeholder relationships that scholars believe are essential to promotion is difficult. Under normal circumstances, a member of the public is not a user of military services in the traditional sense. No point of interface exists where a typical member of the public contacts the Army for goods or services and so they have no opportunity to directly develop relationships.

Contrast the role of the military organization with those of other major public health and safety organizations. The core purpose of the Public Health Service or a local law enforcement agency may be similar to that of the military (the establishment and sustainment of public safety and security), but the functional roles are very different. A member of the public may access the service of a law enforcement agency when reporting a crime or observing police patrolling their neighborhood. At this point of interface, they have the opportunity to assess the value and quality of the service provided and build a relationship with the organization and its representative. Similarly, users of public health services interface directly
with the agency (through the use of community health services) and indirectly (through the adoption of specific health recommendations in their own lives). They establish a relationship with and understand the organization based on personal experience.

The lack of interface between the military and civilian communities is the primary impediment to developing a cross-cultural understanding between the groups. It should be a command priority to establish positive points of interface as quickly and efficiently as possible with civilian political leaders and the public at large.

**Using the Army’s Established Framework to Improve External Relations**

Today’s Army has a large, capable cadre of public affairs professionals who could be engaged to design and manage a program of interface development using tools that already exist within the organization. Rather than attempting to do this from scratch, the Army should work to develop positive interface points by interweaving this goal with existing program functions. Public relations personnel should coordinate and design the program. The chief of public affairs should analyze existing programs to identify those the Army can use for interface development. The Army should integrate interface goals with existing program goals wherever it will not significantly detract from a program’s primary function.

The process should begin by identifying programs in which interface either already occurs or can be readily developed. For example, the Army Congressional Fellowship Program places Army officers in staff positions in congressional offices where they work with civilian congressional staff within their area of expertise. Besides its primary function of educating selected Army officers in congressional activities, the program provides a point of interface between rank-and-file military members and political elites.

Once identified, we should characterize potential points of interface according to the nature of the relationships they can develop. Every program will fall into one of four categories: military elite to political elite, military elite to civil society, military writ large to political elite, and military writ large to civil society.

After identifying interface-promoting programs, the public affairs community must do two things—incorporate interface promotion into each program’s purpose as a secondary goal and then analyze programs with an eye toward identifying areas to modify to promote interface without significantly detracting from the primary goal. The extent, if any, to which we should allow primary goals to be subordinate to interface promotion is a policy decision for the chief of public affairs and the command responsible for the program.

Finally, once we modify existing programs to maximize interface in ways consistent with their primary purposes, the public affairs community must identify categories of relationships for which significant interface gaps remain. Then, to the extent that resources allow, the Army should develop programs from scratch to promote positive interactions in these areas, a longer and more resource intensive process than modifying an existing program.

**Developing Relationships with Political Leaders**

As used in this work, political leaders are defined as those elected officials outside of the military chain of command. The most visible group of political leaders are the 535 members of the federal legislature.

The Army interacts with members of Congress in two primary ways: directly and through constituents. Direct relations occur on two primary levels: interaction between the military leadership and members of Congress and their staffs, and interaction between rank-and-file military members and members of Congress and their staffs.

...to the extent that resources allow, the Army should develop programs from scratch to promote positive interactions...
Organizational and political factors constrain direct relationships between members of Congress and military leaders to a narrow set of stakeholders. Staff interactions are more important because they are both more widespread and less formal. The Army Congressional Fellowship Program provides a unique opportunity for rank-and-file members of the military to closely interact and form relationships with members of Congress and their staffs, a military writ large to political elite interface opportunity. AR 1-202 prescribes policy and procedures relating to the Army Congressional Fellowship Program. The program educates selected Army officers on the importance of the strategic relationship between the Army and the Congress. It is a three-year program that includes pursuit of a master’s degree in legislative affairs at George Washington University, service on the staff of a member of Congress, and an assignment to the Army or Joint Staff in a legislative liaison duty position.

From the perspective of interface development, the time that service members spend working with congressional staff is most important. Though the program’s total duration is three years, the time spent working on Capitol Hill is usually less than one year.

As it currently exists, the program primarily educates Army officers. That is, it aims to benefit the individual officer and increase his or her value to the Army rather than to forward the broader goal of improving Army-congressional relations. However, because of the high level of personal interaction between participants and political elites, the interface benefits to the Army may actually outweigh the benefits of officer professional development. By integrating interface into the program’s purpose and making several changes to the program structure, we can maximize the interface benefits without detracting from its existing purpose. I recommend the following changes:

● In addition to searching for individual members of Congress to sponsor Army officers, the Army should work with Congress to set up permanent positions on professional committee staffs that Army officers can fill. This will allow a larger number of officers to work with congressional staff each year. In 2011, only 24 Army officers received
congressional fellowships. We should greatly expand this number.

- The program should expand to include an option for a Capitol Hill rotation without the accompanying degree program and legislative affairs assignments. The Army officer corps includes a great many individuals superbly qualified to assist civilian congressional staff members without the benefit of formal legislative affairs education. The Army could adjust eligibility criteria to include expertise in areas related to the work of assigned offices.

- We should open the program to a wider group of Army officers by amending the utilization policy. AR 1-202, Chapter 5 5-1(d) requires that officers not be assigned to a congressional detail as their last assignment before separation. This policy makes sense only if the primary concern is providing skills to officers to benefit the Army in their later assignments. If we amended the program’s goals to include improving relations and sharing expertise, an officer’s separation immediately following an assignment to Capitol Hill would be of little concern.

- There are several major Army installations in the Washington D.C. area. The Army should be routinely inviting congressional members and staff to on-base events with congressional fellows. This should include not only tours and reviews, but also social events. As this is an outreach effort aimed at improving personal relationships, the events should be informal and structured to maximize face-to-face interaction between congressional staff members and members of the military.

**Army Programs**

I suggest that we create an office within the Army Office of the Chief of Staff of Public Affairs to analyze existing Army programs for interface promotion potential. This office would characterize existing points of interface, make recommendations as to how to modify existing programs to improve their interface effects, and develop strategies to improve interface in areas where existing programs fall short. I also suggest the Army Congressional Fellowship Program can be altered to promote interface without significantly detracting from its original purpose.

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**NOTES**

13. See Mary Beth Ledman and Bradley E. Wiggins, “Developing a Paradigm for Describing Diversity and Multiculturalism in Modern America,” Social Science (October 2009).
20. Ibid.
25. For example, DefenseLINK provides access to a great deal of information to Congress, other executive branch agencies, and the general public. As set out in the DefenseLINK The Principles of Information, “It is Department of Defense policy to make available timely and accurate information so that the public, the Congress, and the news media may assess and understand the facts about national security and defense strategy. Requests for information from organizations and private citizens shall be answered quickly.” (Enclosure (2) to Department of Defense Directive 5122.5 of September 27, 2000.)
AFRICA IS BLEEDING. Much of its lifeblood, composed of well-educated individuals who could help tackle its toughest problems, is flowing away. This hemorrhaging of engineers, doctors, teachers, nurses, businesspersons, scientists, and others with extensive training constitutes Africa’s brain drain. In a continent where relatively few attend elementary school, let alone college, these individuals on whom society has often spent a disproportionate amount of its resources to educate are taking their precious skills elsewhere.

The impact has been enormous. Many hospitals and health centers cannot function because the African doctors and nurses have gone to Europe or America. Schools often lack qualified teachers. The list of projects and programs deferred because capable individuals are not available seems endless.

African militaries are not immune to the problem. From the upper echelons of the services where strategic decisions are made, to the lower echelons where technical equipment must be maintained, the lack of qualified individuals in many armies, navies, and air forces is being felt. Loss of educated individuals on the civilian side also affects military capabilities. Fewer businesspersons generate taxable revenue, fewer engineers design roads and other critical infrastructure, and perhaps most damning of all, fewer educated people are available to serve in government jobs and provide, among other functions, important civilian oversight of the armed services.

Despite the loss of educated citizens who could help build a better Africa, there are some benefits for the continent due to the brain drain. Most significant of these are the billions of dollars in remittances sent home.
African Security

every year to support not only families, but also the economies of entire countries. One must consider this cash flow when examining the impact the brain drain has on the stability of nations and, from a military perspective, the nations’ ability to recruit, train, and sustain military personnel and purchase new weapons. This article will discuss both the benefits of the brain drain and its adverse impacts, and leave the final decision as to whether the brain drain is a benefit or loss for Africa to the reader.

Why the Brain Drain?

There are numerous reasons why well-educated individuals are leaving Africa. The overarching one appears to be the much higher income they can make in Europe and elsewhere compared to in their homelands. By international standards, salaries in many African countries are quite low, especially for professionals such as engineers, doctors, and nurses. They realize their economic worth is much greater outside the continent and are leaving in droves, enticed by the greater economic opportunities elsewhere.

To think all of these individuals selfish for leaving a continent that desperately needs their expertise for the chance to earn far greater salaries would be a mistake. Estimates are that many of these people send nearly 60 percent of their salaries back home so that relatives and others can purchase food, pay school dues, care for aging parents, buy medicines, establish income-generating projects, and support a myriad of other worthwhile causes that would go unfunded if individuals did not journey to foreign lands in search of higher incomes.

Commonly, African countries with smaller populations and limited opportunities for economic diversification have a disproportionate amount of migration compared to countries with larger populations. The reason behind this appears to be the limited capability for economic diversification in a nation with a small population, especially if it has not entered into a regional economic alliance, such as the Economic Community of West African States.

It is not just the chance for a higher income that entices educated Africans to leave their homeland. In many African nations there are often no jobs for university graduates in their chosen major at any salary. After years of studying engineering they may find themselves selling newspapers; after years of studying medicine, perhaps they are driving a taxi. With ready access to foreign media advertising the need for people with their skills, it’s understandable why they often choose to leave. Upon arriving in new lands they often find that not only are their skills in demand, but also they have access to technologies their native countries could only dream of acquiring.

Wars, both internal and external to nations, and political persecution have also contributed to the brain drain. Repressive regimes sometimes target highly educated individuals because of their outspoken candor; it is safer to criticize a crazed dictator from the streets of London than from the streets of their homeland.

Extent of the Brain Drain

Poor record keeping, inconsistent use of definitions, and other factors make it difficult to gauge the exact extent of the brain drain, with many claiming that the official estimates are too low. The World Bank calculates that in 2010 approximately 30.6 million Africans left their nations of origin. Most of these went to other African countries, although this pattern did not hold for all of Africa; 90 percent of North Africa’s emigrants moved to nations outside the continent.

The two most popular destinations for intra-continental migration are Cote d’Ivoire and South Africa, which receive, respectively, 8 percent and 6 percent of the intra-continental emigrants. France, the destination of choice for those leaving Africa, receives 9 percent of all emigrants. Saudi Arabia receives 5 percent. The United States and United Kingdom each receive 4 percent.

The World Bank calculates that in 2010 approximately 30.6 million Africans left their nations of origin.
In 2004, 7.2 million Africans, 3.8 million from North Africa and 3.4 million from sub-Saharan Africa, were living in countries who were members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, a group of developed nations attempting to improve the economies of less developed countries. Some believe that one out of every eight Africans with a university degree is living in a nation that is a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. This is ironic, given that the organization is supposed to be fostering development in less-developed countries.  

Impact on Military Resources

It costs $40,000 to $70,000 to train an air force pilot in Ghana, a sum that is a huge investment for a poor country. However, with an estimated 20 to 30 percent of these officers leaving the service to fly elsewhere, training them is a chronic drain on scarce military resources. Moreover, it’s not just the Ghana Air Force losing personnel. The country’s military hospitals are losing doctors and nurses. Commanders report many other units from the military are suffering deleterious effects from the loss of well-trained individuals. Though Ghana has been particularly open with the press regarding the impact the brain drain has had on its military, many other African nations share the same fate.

Besides the readiness implications and the financial impact of losing trained soldiers, the brain drain impacts the African militaries in numerous other ways. Probably the most devastating loss is that of present and future leaders. With fewer experienced soldiers to command, teach, or provide foresight, the services must turn to less qualified individuals, with possibly less than optimal military outcomes being the result.
The more training a service member has, especially in technical fields, the more desirable and marketable he or she becomes to other countries. As the previous example has shown, pilots with their extended technical training are particularly susceptible to foreign recruiters, potentially leaving some African air forces in the position of having planes but no one to fly them.

With the loss of engineers and technicians, some African militaries will have difficulty modifying foreign-made military hardware to meet the needs of their own services. Equipment repairs will be deferred or undone. With the requirement that purchasers understand the technical specifications and capabilities of various weapons, even the acquisition of equipment will be impaired.

The loss of military medical personnel will also be acutely felt. These individuals are uniquely qualified to implement disease prevention programs as well as to treat the sick. Malaria, tuberculosis, and many other infectious diseases are endemic in parts of Africa, but through preventive measures and treatment, their impact on troops can often be mitigated.

HIV/AIDS presents a particular challenge to many African militaries because they are frequently composed of young men away from home for their first time, a high-risk group. As a result, African armed forces have an HIV/AIDS rate two to five times higher than the corresponding civilian populations. HIV/AIDS rates in some African militaries are high enough to affect military readiness. Units find they are undermanned and/or have to divert considerable resources to caring for sick soldiers. African nations with particularly high HIV/AIDS rates, such as South Africa and Nigeria, traditionally have contributed a significant number of troops to peacekeeping operations, a role in jeopardy.

As one South African general stated regarding his country’s armed forces HIV/AIDS prevalence rate of 23 percent, “From the military health perspective we are fighting a war, a human war.” Unfortunately it takes troops to fight a war, troops such as doctors and nurses, the very type of people emigrating from Africa, leaving behind the South African, Nigerian, and other militaries to do battle against HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and other deadly diseases without medical personnel.

Flow of Ideas
There is a two-way flow of ideas between Africa and its citizens living abroad. The flow from Africa to its expatriate community is beyond the scope of this article, which will, instead, examine the flow of ideas in the other direction, from the expatriate community back to Africa.

This flow of information to Africa, facilitated in recent times by social media such as Facebook, can influence security and stability in African nations through casual conversations with family and friends, agitating for positive change, or by agitating for negative change.

Casual conversations. An informal survey by the author of web browser histories in African internet cafes supports the premise that the majority of information sent back to Africa has no impact on security and stability. Updates on work and health, talk of the food and weather, and other noncontroversial subjects likely fill many conversations with friends and relatives back home. It is noteworthy to mention the popular culture conversations on websites where expatriate Africans discuss the latest Western music, movies, dress, and sports with their friends and relatives back home who, based on their comments, appear eager to hear such news. Western culture has a profound influence on many Africans, as a trip to that continent will often reveal, and such influences can help forge strong ties between the West and Africa.
Agitating for positive change. The category “agitation for positive change” includes conversations related to the benefits of democracy, a free press, the protection of human and property rights, and religious tolerance. Africans living abroad might report back to their homelands the benefits of such principles and practices. They also might establish groups that encourage the national governments of their adopted homelands, such as Britain and France, as well as international organizations, such as the United Nations, to push African governments toward better governance. The web is full of sites, created by the African diaspora, reflecting this interest. This author has noticed in particular three nations as having a large number of websites created by their expatriate communities agitating for positive change in their native lands: Somalia, Egypt, and Nigeria.

Agitating for negative change. The last category of ideas the expatriate community sends back to Africa are those that agitate for negative change. Although encountering foreign cultures might lead expatriate Africans to adopt certain aspects of their new homes, it could also lead some, especially those with a more conservative viewpoint, to decry the perceived debauchery rampant in Europe and America. Numerous sites exist on the web condemning Western culture and its influence on the African community. Although such commentary per se is not a problem, and indeed may be a healthy sign of a free society, extremists call for a violent reaction to the encroachment of Western culture. One Nigerian terrorist organization even has this anti-Western stance enshrined in its name. Officially it’s Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad, but the people in the town where it was formed, Maiduguri, dubbed it Boko Haram in their native Hausa language, a name which stuck, and roughly translated means “Western education is forbidden.”

Some individuals who left nations that oppressed them for what the Western world would consider extremist religious views found the freedom of Europe and America the perfect place to incubate their radical and sometimes violent beliefs. Free to associate with like-minded individuals and use social media without restrictions, they advocate movements such as the introduction of sharia or attacks on Western-backed governments in their native lands. Ironically, they use the freedom they now enjoy in Europe and America to undermine the possible transition to more democratic and tolerant nations in Africa. Egypt is an excellent example of this situation. Although Mubarak was removed, his regime was replaced by the Muslim Brotherhood, a group that might be less tolerant of the Coptic Christians present in the predominantly Muslim nation.

Remittances

If the brain drain is Africa hemorrhaging, remittances are the infusions that keep much of the continent alive. Nearly $40 billion flowed into the continent in 2010, a fourfold increase since 1990 and representing 2.6 percent of Africa’s gross domestic product. After direct foreign investments, these remittances are the continent’s largest source of net foreign funds, although it should be noted that the actual amount of remittances is probably underestimated. Of the sub-Saharan nations, only about half of them collect remittance data with any regularity, making approximations of the total flow quite difficult.

A significant portion of the remittances are sent using a fund transfer system known as hawala, which is based on trust, and, with few written records, makes it even more difficult to determine the extent of remittances. By combining the ancient system of hawala with modern day telecommunications, such as the Internet and satellite phones, remittances can easily be sent from outside the continent and received the same day.

Much of the remittances pay for food, clothes, rent, school dues, and medicine. Some use the remittances to invest in businesses. However, some remittances go to nefarious activities, including narco-trafficking and terrorism. Unfortunately, the
structure of hawala sometimes makes it difficult for investigators to separate the flow of funds used for legitimate purposes from that used for illegal activities.\textsuperscript{15}

Though the total amount of remittances each year is quite large, the individual sums sent are relatively small. Based on interviews, these appear for the most part to be quickly spent in local venues such as markets as opposed to being saved or spent significant distances from the recipients’ homes. Thus, there is a hometown multiplier effect, as the community where a recipient lives benefits from the repeated circulation of many of these dollars in the local economy.

That the remittances make a considerable difference in the lives of Africans is undeniable. In countries where the per capita income is quite low, even a few dollars regularly sent from a relative working abroad enables a poor family to put more food on the table. In travels through Africa, the author often came across families where sometimes it was even more than money sent home; radios, television sets, and other “luxury items” were sometimes conspicuously present in homes many would describe as huts. Occupants of these dwellings would share stories of how a brother working in France, a father working in England, or some other relative working someplace else sent enough money home to buy the electronic item now tied into the local electrical grid with some very questionable-looking wiring.

Occasionally there are also some large investments from African expatriates who have done quite well in areas such as entertainment or sports. Luxury resorts catering to foreign tourists seem to be favorite ventures for these wealthy Africans living abroad. As they create numerous jobs in Africa, bring in foreign currency through tourism, and help project a positive image of the continent to those who visit, they can be quite beneficial to Africa in general and the region they’re located in particular.

From a security standpoint, these remittances have several positive attributes:
- They provide money to poor people, helping quell, through processes such as job creation and the alleviation of hunger, the social unrest that results from extreme poverty.
● They create a healthier, better-educated pool of potential applicants for military service by providing money for food, shelter, medicine, and education.

● They increase tax revenue, providing funding for defense as well as infrastructure development, such as roads critical to security.

● They give the citizens the opportunity to connect with the outside world through the purchase of radios, televisions, and time in internet cafes, although there can be both positive and negative aspects to this connection. An example of the former would be the propagation of messages, via electronic social media during the Arab Spring uprisings, to agitate for democracy. An example of the latter would be Al-Qaeda websites radicalizing young people.

Safety Valve
The brain drain is a sort of safety valve, allowing disgruntled individuals to migrate rather than foment dissent in their native lands. Of course, if one feels that certain countries are in need of more dissent, and possibly even a revolution, an exodus of educated individuals is a negative.

Individuals who might have agitated for change in their native African countries, but moved to Paris, London, or New York, can still have influence in their homelands, but their voices and actions will be somewhat muted. While the repression and corruption that led to the Arab Spring were long in development, often a local event suddenly triggered the actual uprising. Thus, it appears that leaders must be nearby to capitalize on such events. For example, in Tunisia, as soon as Mohamed Bouazizi, a street vendor whose wares were confiscated by the police, set himself on fire, local protests erupted. Those Tunisians who were in France, England, or the United States were obviously too far away to be a part of the initial uprisings.

By leaving Africa, agitators for change for the most part put themselves out of reach of the repressive governments they are agitating against. Their influence and ability to spontaneously capitalize on local events is markedly diminished.

Adverse Environmental Impact
Although the migration from Africa reduces the population pressures on the African environment, the loss of engineers and technicians, especially civil engineers and water technicians, means there are fewer people with the requisite skills to tackle the numerous environmental problems facing the continent. Many of these problems have a direct bearing on national security. As an example, water shortages can lead to conflict, as happened in Darfur, Sudan, where herders in the northern part of that region, unable to feed their flocks because of drought and overgrazing, migrated into southern Darfur, encountering people who were traditionally agriculturalists. The northerners’ animals grazing in southern farmlands helped precipitate a conflict that displaced thousands of people. Many observers called it a genocide when northerners, who are Arabs, in conjunction with the Sudanese government, turned to ethnic cleansing of the southern people of Darfur, who are black Africans. Had there been more environmental scientists, civil engineers, and well-educated politicians in Sudan to explain how to use the resources in Darfur in a sustainable manner, the conflict might never have occurred.

South Africa provides an interesting twist to the often-intertwined stories of environment, democracy, and the brain drain. In many African countries, the lack of political freedom is a driving force for many of the educated to leave, including civil engineers who are vital to maintaining dams and other waterworks. However, the fall of apartheid and the arrival of democracy in South Africa coincided with the loss of many of these valuable, well-educated individuals. Aggressive affirmative action policies put into place by the post-apartheid South African governments caused numerous young, white civil engineers to migrate elsewhere for work, leaving behind a country with deteriorating water quality in many large reservoirs.

Conclusion
Although the initial perception of Africa’s brain drain may appear to have adversely affected the armed forces and security of many of that continent’s nations, scrutiny reveals that the situation is more complicated. For example, the loss of pilots is an adverse impact, but an increase in total remittances from additional emigration results in a positive outcome. The diminished population relieves stress on natural resources, but
A loss of engineers and scientists who could tackle pressing environmental problems has negative consequences.

To reduce Africa’s loss of trained professionals, European nations and the United States might consider blocking the immigration of African nationals with skills critical to their native countries. Such a policy, however, would run counter to modern-day ideals. To begin with, it would punish individuals for bettering themselves. It would also create a situation where those who are less educated would have preferential entrance to a Western country, something not necessarily favorable for the Western world. Finally, it would ask a government, as opposed to the free market, to decide which skills are critical.

There has been movement toward restrictions on recruiting healthcare workers from less developed countries. In 2010, the World Health Organization’s World Health Assembly adopted the Global Code of Practice on the International Recruitment of Health Personnel. However, the code is nonbinding, requesting only voluntary compliance to the ethical standards of recruitment by the nations involved.

An alternative to requesting Western nations to block immigration is to have African nations place obstacles in the path to emigration of their well-educated citizens, a policy already enacted in several places. Some physician education and similar types of programs require the graduates to serve a certain number of years in-country before being allowed to go elsewhere. These appear to have had mixed success, perhaps because many well-trained individuals often come from politically well-connected families.

Many African nations could probably go a long way in stemming the flow of educated citizens through certain pro-business actions. Creating additional regional economic alliances, similar to the Economic Community of West African States, is one such step. Adopting sensible tax structures, making foreign investments welcome, decreasing corruption, and ensuring property rights are secure are others. Unfortunately entrenched and powerful constituencies make change difficult.

One way both Western and African nations can begin to address the problem is to perform cost-benefit analyses of prospective educational
programs in Africa, with realistic expectations of the percentage of individuals likely to emigrate built into the cost side of the equation. Thus, a Western military organization working to enhance the capabilities of an African nation’s air force should consider what percentage of pilots, based on experiences in similar African countries, would leave for Europe or the United States after training. It might be that these nations could obtain “more bang for the buck” by purchasing artillery pieces rather than training pilots.

Along these lines, it is important to rethink policies that emphasize long-term schooling based on Western models of education. It might be more appropriate to train a large number of people to perform simple medical care than to train a few individuals as physicians who may emigrate. Thus, a military humanitarian assistance program that trains village-level practitioners, similar to the well-known Chinese “barefoot doctors,” would save more lives than a program, perhaps sponsored by a different branch of the U.S. government, which invests in educating individuals for eight years in technology transfers. It might be more appropriate to train a large number of people to perform simple medical care than to train a few physicians who may emigrate. Thus, a military humanitarian assistance program that trains village-level practitioners, similar to the well-known Chinese “barefoot doctors,” would save more lives than a program, perhaps sponsored by a different branch of the U.S. government, which invests in educating individuals for eight years in technologies readily available in Western nations but not in many African countries outside large teaching hospitals.

Performing cost-benefit analyses, while helpful in ensuring Africans use Western funds in the most efficient ways possible, will probably make only a small dent on the brain drain. Much of the training goes without foreign funds and thus without foreign oversight. Besides, no matter the race or ethnicity, people tend to seek a better life, even if it might mean moving far away. For educated Africans to look for the best opportunities to use their skills is quite understandable. This flight of human capital is due to a push-pull situation, with factors such as domestic unrest and low pay pushing educated individuals out of Africa, and stability and high pay pulling them to Europe and the United States.

The report Leveraging Migration for Africa: Remittances, Skills, and Investments presents data from new surveys finding evidence that migration and remittances reduce poverty in the communities of origin. Remittances lead to increased investments in health, education, and housing in Africa. Diasporas provide capital, trade, knowledge, and technology transfers. Thus, acknowledging that much is lost when people migrate to developed countries, the report noted that the same migration creates “opportunities.”

Maybe if we called the “brain drain” a “remittance generator,” many of the negative connotations associated with educated individuals leaving Africa would go away, although such a new title might sway opinion too far in the opposite direction, with images of positive cash flows replacing those of engineers leaving. So it is with the emigration of educated Africans impacting Africa’s security and stability; one must get past any initial adverse impressions the phrase “brain drain” creates to realize the phenomenon has both negative and positive aspects. With proper policies in place, it might be possible to take advantage of opportunities that arise in order to minimize those negative aspects and maximize the positive ones.

NOTES

2. Ibid., 16.
3. Ibid., 2.
4. Ibid., 10.
EVALUATION OF THE ongoing security transition in Afghanistan highlights several leadership and management strengths that will yield to an Afghan-led responsibility by 2014. Control measures that provide assessment and feedback are critical to ensure the effort is on track and that we can make refinements to sustain momentum. Study of previous security transitions and the ongoing operations in Afghanistan provide insight for optimizing Enduring Freedom levels. To promote greater unit and personnel stability, trust, and continuity, tour lengths in Afghanistan should remain at one year, and we should incentivize key leaders, selected staff, and soldiers with specialized skill sets to extend tours to even longer lengths of two or more years. We should increase readiness levels, random access measures, and patrols during the transition period as enemy activity will most likely increase to try to interrupt the process and undermine the Afghan government.

An important constant for successful transitions in Germany, Japan, Korea, and Kuwait is the presence of enduring bilateral strategic security framework agreements that contribute greatly to increased security and stability in selected successful case studies. This article recommends a longer-term U.S. presence in Afghanistan to best promote a stable democracy, and the finalization of a bilateral security arrangement with Iraq that supports some reintroduction of U.S. forces in a defense security cooperation posture.

In light of ongoing significant transitions in U.S. force structure while leading the security transition effort in Afghanistan, we should emphasize that an enduring freedom is a product of an enduring commitment. The recommendations reflect historical U.S. military training and operations principles in Field Manual (FM) 1: “Warfighting is complex, but the historical lessons of the military art…boil down to several rules of thumb applicable at every level of war…These…require commanders to master transitions…Mastering transitions is key to the conditions for winning decisively.”
Long-term Commitment

Evaluation of the ongoing security transition in Afghanistan highlights several leadership and management strengths including a detailed plan for methodical transition phases leading to complete transition to an Afghan responsibility by 2014. Management control measures that provide assessment and feedback are important to the security transition to ensure the plan’s successful implementation and refinements to sustain its momentum. Study of previous security transitions and the ongoing operations in Afghanistan provide tactical, operational, and strategic level security management recommendations for optimizing enduring freedom levels. From a personnel management standpoint, tour lengths should remain at one year to promote greater unit and personnel stability, trust, and continuity during the important transition period for the next several years in Afghanistan, and we should incentivize key leaders, selected staff, and soldiers with specialized skill sets to extend tours to even longer lengths of two or more years. Readiness levels, random access measures, and patrols should increase during the transition period because enemy activity levels will most likely increase during the transition to interrupt the process and undermine the Afghan government.

The presence of enduring bilateral strategic security framework agreements that contribute greatly to increased security and stability in the selected successful case studies was an important constant for transitions in Germany, Japan, Korea, and Kuwait. This article strongly recommends a longer-term U.S. presence in Afghanistan to best promote enduring freedom, and the finalization of a bilateral security arrangement with Iraq that supports some reintroduction of U.S. forces in a defense security cooperation posture. In light of ongoing significant transitions in U.S. force structure while leading the security transition effort in Afghanistan, policy makers should emphasize the task of preserving enduring freedom as a product of enduring commitment. To summarize, successful management of security transitions should reflect historical training and operations principles: Stand to. Stay the course. Slow is smooth; smooth is fast.

Historical Context

In 1757, in preparation for combat operations in the French and Indian War, Major Robert Rogers and his executive officer, John Stark of colonial New Hampshire, were charged with recruiting companies of colonists to prepare for war. As part of preparing these forces, Rogers established several rules of thumb. These rules, commonly known today as Roger’s Rules, are still used and emphasized at the U.S. Army Ranger School at Fort Benning, Georgia. One of the rules alludes to an Army term called “stand to,” or period of an increased state of readiness. The rule directed that the entire unit needed to be up at dawn because dawn was the time that the French and Indians attacked. Rogers wanted all his forces to be ready for an attack during the transition period between night and day. By ensuring his entire force was alert and ready for battle during this vulnerable time, he ensured a better chance of tactical mission success and a greater level of protection for his soldiers. As the NATO coalition goes through a vulnerable time during the security transition in Afghanistan, leaders need to take appropriate measures to effect a strategic and operational “stand to” in order to protect the force and enable the transition to go as smoothly as possible. Good leaders ensure their units are prepared. They do everything possible to protect and defend their units based on an accurate assessment of conditions on the battlefield. Like Major Rogers and his New Hampshire rangers, during transitions leaders at all levels should take actions to ensure unit success, create a winning mindset, and guard against complacency. For a successful security transition in Afghanistan, leaders at all levels will need to conduct combat and stabilization and reconstruction operations effectively as a product of long-term strategic vision and planning.
Transitioning to Afghan Responsibility by 2014

The security transition from coalition to Afghan responsibility scheduled for 2014 is an important objective of the international community and an important step for Afghanistan. High complexity makes this a difficult task. The objective of any successful transition is for the host nation or indigenous security forces to have capability, capacity, competency, commitment, and the confidence of the people they serve and to adequately ensure an environment of stability and security with shrinking outside assistance. NATO has outlined specific criteria for transitions for a particular area. The four transition criteria for Afghanistan are as follows:

- Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) capable of shouldering security tasks with less assistance from the International Security Forces (ISAF).
- Security sufficient to allow the population to pursue routine daily activities.
- Local governance developed well enough that security will not be undermined as ISAF assistance is reduced.
- ISAF postured to thin out as ANSF capabilities increase and threats diminish.

Management and leadership of this process will be a challenge for the coalition and Afghanistan. An efficient system of assessment and control will be paramount to success. To protect the force and be successful, coalition and ANSF leaders must mitigate the friction of war and erosion of trusting relationships that result from executing the transition with constantly rotating units and high personnel turnover. The recent rise in rogue or insider attacks on coalition forces also erodes relationships at a critical time in the transition.
With very public announcements and media commentary about the security transition from policymakers and the NATO coalition leadership to ANSF leadership, a positive and what should be encouraging message has generated fears that actually work against the planned leadership transition in 2014.

Expectations among the Afghans indicate disconnects between the hopes and aspirations of the Afghans and the international community on the prospects for long-term stabilization of Afghanistan. Many Afghans perceive the [Bonn II] conference as a venue to hurriedly transfer authority to complete the transition process by 2014, not taking cognizance of the fragile conditions on the ground.

Couple this with current events and an announced withdrawal, and one sees trust in the 10 year-old partnership waning.

Leaders need to balance personnel turnover and the corresponding short-term mission perspective with daily operational requirements while maintaining a focus on long-term objectives. Recently, a senior NATO officer was relieved from duty for candid remarks about the Afghan government. Because of similar reliefs or rotations, the ISAF command at one point had four different commanders during a span of 24 months. This high turnover in leadership impairs mission accomplishment and weakens relationships with the ANSF and senior political leaders. Usually, it takes months to bridge cultural differences and develop trust in mentoring relationships with the Afghans. Given the volatile, changing environment in Afghanistan, can we make an effective security transition and is a successful model available?

Korea as a Model for Transition

The U.S. experience in Korea provides a positive model for conducting effective stability operations leading to the eventual transition of security responsibilities. On 17 April 2012, the United States and South Korea transferred wartime command of ROK military forces from the U.S. military to the South Korean government “ending 60 years of American control.” The additional examples of post-World War II Europe in Germany and the eventual transition of security responsibilities in Japan also provide successful models. The recent transition in Iraq provides a contemporary example, but it is probably too soon to judge if it is a successful model. Other tangential issues to the question of managing security transitions include balancing the need for transparency with the need for a certain level of information protection and balancing conditions-based decision making with timeline-driven milestones.

The security transition in strategically located Afghanistan is taking place at a time when the nation is also making political and economic transitions in a very dynamic, contentious environment where “the enemy gets a vote.” Important for the transition will be maintaining Afghan trust with strategic communications, ensuring that “a calendar driven, unconditional, publicly announced drawdown schedule” alleviate Afghan fears of U.S. abandonment. As some researchers note, “Since the United States handed the war over to NATO in 2003, many Afghan officials and local powerbrokers have feared abandonment and the subsequent fall of the government. Afghans (and Pakistanis) widely expect the United States to leave in response to domestic, political, and related economic pressures and to do so regardless of Afghan choices or conditions.”

Slow is Smooth: Smooth is Fast

Transitions should not be rushed. An Afghan proverb reminds us that the way to eat an elephant is one bite at a time. The same could be said for leading, planning, and executing security transition. U.S. soldiers use a training proverb similar to the Afghan proverb. It states, “Slow is smooth. Smooth is fast.” I stress this training adage, used by forces training for the U.S. Army Infantry Battle Drill 6A, “Enter Building, Clear Room,” because soldiers entering the doorway or fatal funnel of a room are at high risk and need to be smooth in the execution of their tasks to ensure safe entry. Smooth execution requires at first seemingly slow methodical learning and repetition, then as proficiency and skills develop, it becomes mistake-free, fluid motion. If the process is not smooth, moving through the fatal funnel of the doorway actually takes longer than it should and can cause soldier casualties from enemy or friendly fires. As forces execute the much more complex task of entering a security transition period in Afghanistan, leaders need to ensure that the process is as smooth as possible to minimize threats to both forces and ensure Afghans are set up for success in the decades
to come. We should not rush the process or trivialize the effort.

Historical examples such as U.S. experiences in Germany and Korea over the past several decades demonstrate that transitions that are a product of long-term commitment and shared interests can be highly successful. U.S. leaders must address operations and personnel and unit turnovers during the critical transition as well as achieve unity of effort and manage the 40-plus member coalition force transitions.

**Security Transition Management in Afghanistan**

Endorsed in 2010 by both NATO and ISAF, the Joint Afghanistan-NATO Integral Board demonstrates commitment to the transition process and oversees the transition effort. Transition involves the “posturing and thinning out” of ISAF personnel as the Afghan security forces develop capability and threat levels stabilize or diminish. Conducting a security transition to an Afghan force with constantly changing and rotating NATO and ISAF forces presents a dangerous, difficult, and complex problem for military and diplomatic leaders and planners. The Taliban’s constant harassing attacks present additional danger. United States and NATO forces are already conducting the lead security responsibility transition to the ANSF. A large percentage of NATO soldiers and leaders in Afghanistan serve an average of six to nine months, and some coalition and non-U.S. NATO forces serve shorter tour lengths of four months. Even within U.S. forces, tour lengths vary by service. Currently, U.S. active duty soldiers serve 12-month tours on average, while reservists serve 9-month tours. In 2012, the length of tours for U.S. soldiers declined to nine months. Longer force stabilizing tours would better support the transition in Afghanistan, and permanently stationing a division there (as the Second Infantry Division is in Korea) would produce better continuity for the transition.

Leaders at all levels need to take steps to reduce the friction of war during security transitions. Groundwork done now will contribute to ultimate success in the future. Shaping the battlefield and setting the conditions for success are marks of good leadership. Good leaders manage expectations effectively by steering their units through difficult periods of transition to position them to succeed in an undeveloped future environment. Historical models and program evaluation of the ongoing transition plan will provide insights and lessons for improving the transition.

**Strategic Framework and Partnership Prospects**

Strategic leaders must define in advance the long-term strategic relationship. Policymakers, political, military, and organizational leaders, as well as the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) will benefit from long-term planning considerations and partnership effects. As these important leaders press on with the security transition, it is prudent to examine successful and generally peaceful stability and security operations in countries like Korea, Germany, and Japan. Difficult security transition experiences in Somalia and Vietnam provide additional historical perspective. As leaders establish time-lines and benchmarks with assessments and analysis, they should consider unit and personnel turnover issues as well as the already diminishing troop levels available for the security lead transition.

Is there an optimum tour length for U.S. soldiers that will contribute to greater success? What steps can leaders take to manage personnel and unit turnover effectively while conducting a security transition? What conditions can leaders at all levels create to ensure a successful transition in Afghanistan? Historian Ali Jalali states, “Although Afghan and international leaders face innumerable obstacles to success, leaders will be particularly challenged by the need to balance the rebuilding of the security forces with the demands of fighting an ongoing insurgency.” Regarding security arrangements in Korea, Geun-hye Park notes, “to ensure stability, trust-politik should be applied consistently from issue to issue based on verifiable actions, and steps should not be taken for mere political expediency.” Organizations collectively benefit when leaders at all levels manage transitions effectively in an environment of personnel turnover. Successful management and organizational effectiveness during a transition can translate to military and civilian lives saved, dollars better invested, and groundwork completed for regional stability and security. In the greater long-term strategic context, is a “Miracle on the Kabul River” in Afghanistan conceivable?
Theoretical Framework for Achieving an Effective Transition in Afghanistan

Figure 1 depicts RAND Corporation researcher James Dobbins’ discussion of aspects of achieving change in nationbuilding efforts. His discussion identifies time, money and manpower as important inputs to the level of security. The leader and management issue in Afghanistan is employing the right mix of these variables for U.S. and host-nation security forces. Dobbins’ study demonstrates that increasing time with U.S. presence in the host nation correlates historically to increased and sustained levels of enduring freedom. As leaders contemplate yet another reduction in forces while endeavoring to maintain the “right mix” of forces, capability, and cost, it will be important to consider the perseverance required. Long-term commitment in the face of shortsighted and often emotional arguments for a quick exit will contribute to enduring freedom in Afghanistan.

Stability and Security Doctrine

Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations, states that success is a function of “patient, resolute, and persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives.” The JP highlights the important principle of perseverance: “The purpose of perseverance is to ensure the commitment necessary to attain the national strategic end state,” and “involves preparation for measured, protracted, military operations in pursuit of the national strategic end state” due to the fact that “decisive resolution” of conflict in the short-term is often “difficult to achieve” and “elusive.” Failure to provide a managed smooth security transition can cause a “loss of momentum” or impede national objective achievement.

Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, further discusses joint plans and designs that manage uncertainty by “providing options, aligning resources, and mitigating risks” and stresses the importance of assessment, learning, and adapting during transitional stability and security operational environments. JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations, and JP 3-07.3,

A Theoretical Framework for Achieving Change—Restoring Balance

“Nation-building can be measured in terms of inputs (such as manpower, money, and time) and outputs (such as casualties, peace, economic growth, and democratization.) Success depends not just on the inputs, of course, but also on the wisdom with which the resources are employed and on the susceptibility of the society in question to the changes being fostered. Nevertheless, success depends in some measure on the quantity of international military and police personnel, the quantity of external economic assistance and the time over which they are applied.”

James Dobbins, RAND Corporation

Figure 1
Theoretical Framework for Achieving Change—Restoring Balance
Peace Operations, provide additional emphasis on security transitions as a product of interagency and multinational cooperation to “shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding” and facilitate the transition to legitimate host-nation governance.18 JP 3-24 highlights relationships as critically important, but with a tendency to “break down” during transitions.

Field Manual 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance, discusses the importance of developing rapport and its components, understanding, respect, and trust linked to effectiveness:19 “Building up the foreign security forces and alleviating the root causes of the current situation over time” and “solving problems in a broader political, military, social and economic context” are important aspects of security assistance and internal defense operations.20

“In COIN, the side that learns faster and adapts more rapidly—the better learning organization—usually wins. Counterinsurgencies have been called learning competitions.” Hence, FM 3-24 identifies “learn and adapt” as a modern COIN imperative for U.S. forces. “Perceived inconsistency reduces credibility and weakens the COIN effort.”21 Enemies of the ongoing transition will look for ways to erode trust in the coalition and the Afghan government during the years leading up to the 2014 transition.

Biannual DOD Report on Progress

An important resource for a current assessment of ongoing security transition operations is the DOD “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan and the United States Plan for Sustaining Afghanistan National Security Forces.” Required by Congress every six months, the report provides specific updates on transition information such as advisory programs to both the Afghan National Police and the Afghan National Army, trainer and mentor strengths, literacy efforts, and ANSF capacity and growth rates. Statements and assessments on leader development are also important resources that provide not only statistical data but also comments on the effectiveness of partnering efforts. Current assessments of ratings of the various Afghan National Army headquarters and battalion level units provide additional insights.22

During the 5 December 2011 International Afghanistan Conference in Bonn (Bonn II), the international community and the GIROA resolved to “renew our mutual commitment to a stable, democratic and prosperous future for the Afghan people.”23 The conference acknowledged the ongoing security transition efforts and reinforced the importance of continuing progress along broad lines of effort, including governance and economic development as well as sustainable security force growth. An important aspect of the Bonn II Conference was the “strategic consensus” between the international community and Afghanistan to recognize that security and Afghan “well-being” will affect the entire region and to build on the previous ten years of engagement. As the transition progresses, a shift to partnership in a “Transformation Decade” will occur.24 Sustaining momentum and ensuring resource availability are of the utmost importance in Afghanistan. The most difficult and important resources to develop are the Afghan personnel resources to execute and sustain the effects of the lead security transition.

Sustaining momentum and ensuring resource availability are of the utmost importance in Afghanistan.

Staying the Course

Change requires time and often the expected benefits “lag behind” the actions taken to implement the change. One of the important reasons given for manager shortcomings in this area is that leaders often fail to “anticipate the decline in performance, productivity, or satisfaction as change is implemented.”25 “Effectiveness declines before it gets better” is an adage for managers to consider as they experience “short-term” performance declines while negotiating periods of transition. Patience and “trust” are required of managers and leaders as they shepherd their organizations through transitions.26 Possessing a long-term “staying-the-course” mindset, and acknowledging turbulence associated with change...
while cultivating trust are aspects of successful transition management.

“Like all strategy, transitions require an appropriate balance among objectives, concepts, and resources.”27 As both Dobbins and Harry R. Yarger discuss, the right mix of forces is a necessary ingredient to a successful transition. While regional, cultural, and religious differences in Afghanistan are significant in comparison to Korea in the 1950s and 1960s, the task of conducting a successful security transition associated with both Korea and Afghanistan make the model a very relevant study. Joseph Pak writes on post-conflict transition in Korea, outlining issues and challenges U.S. Forces-Korea faced assisting the emerging Republic on the Korean Peninsula. Pak provides troop strength levels over time and concludes that the transition in Korea was successful due to shared U.S. and host-nation interests, desire on the part of the host nation to make the transition, the security established by the United States, and the proper allocation of time for the transition.28 Pak discusses specific steps U.S. commanders took to encourage and assist their South Korean military counterparts, providing a basis of comparison to ongoing transition operations in Afghanistan. Dr. Tim Kane’s research on U.S. troop deployment levels from 1950 to 2005 provides data on the impact of troop deployments on geopolitics. Similar research will assist leaders managing the transition of focus from ongoing efforts to emerging threats and priorities.29

**Security Assistance and Presence Beyond 2014**

U.S. Army (retired) Lieutenant General David Barno and his colleagues with the Center for a New American Security propose several options for U.S. policy, including maintaining the status quo, delaying the transition, continuing the transition with a mission change to “security assistance” and accelerated transition and withdrawal.30 This discussion
supports the Center for a New American Security option three: a continuance of the transition mission with a change to a security assistance mission maintaining U.S. presence in Afghanistan beyond 2014 to promote regional stability and enduring freedom. The U.S. experiences in Korea, Japan, and Germany demonstrate the value of “staying the course” and a longer security transition. Historical models demonstrate that short-term personnel can successfully implement security transitions if one implements steps to mitigate the loss of momentum that occurs with personnel turnover.

Recommended Model for Successful Transitions

One should not discount the successful security transition models of Germany, Japan, Korea, and Kuwait in favor of shortsighted, less expensive alternatives. The Vietnam security transition model and the Soviet Union’s complete withdrawal from Afghanistan resulted in continued fighting with millions of lives lost and host-nation societies enslaved in economic and political systems of poverty that lingered for many years after conflict termination. We should not repeat these unsuccessful models in Afghanistan.

Successful transition models recommend a gradual force drawdown, coupled with an enduring U.S. presence to optimize enduring freedom in Afghanistan, as well as a reintroduction of a mutually agreed on level of forces in Iraq under an established security framework in a security cooperation role. The United States and Afghanistan should cement a long-term partnership that will ensure a more stable and secure environment far beyond 2014. The long-term presence of U.S. forces has been a constant for successful security transitions. The end-strength levels vary, but a presence in larger or smaller numbers correlates favorably with greater freedom levels. All of the selected operations made use of rotational forces and experienced varying degrees of personnel turnover that

![Models for U.S.-led security transitions in Iraq and Afghanistan over time.](image)

Measuring Perseverance

Figure 3

Recommended Security Transition Model for Enduring Freedom - Long Term U.S. Presence in Iraq
affected momentum and performance levels in the short-term. However, the security arrangements and demonstrated long-term commitment partly mitigated the impacts of the turmoil of personnel and unit turnover. In addition to successful transition management, Germany, Korea, Kuwait, and Japan experienced significant economic growth in part due to the security enhancing presence of the United States and reconstruction efforts.32

Probably the strongest contributor to enduring freedom will be the negotiation of a strategic framework providing some level of U.S. troop presence contributing to stabilization and security partnership efforts in Afghanistan. As Figure 2 proposes, the Korea model of a sustained U.S. presence coupled with a gradual drawdown of forces would contribute greatly to enduring freedom as a product of a smooth security transition. Despite U.S. withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, the United States is in the process of negotiating a security cooperation agreement including a program of exercises, training, and “other forms of cooperation.”33 The effort to establish a long-term security agreement with Afghanistan should not be underwhelmed. A strategic framework will be an important confidence-building measure for the future.

Successful transition efforts demonstrate that reentry of U.S. forces into Iraq in an advisory and long-term presence would afford an increased opportunity for enduring freedom in Iraq. As depicted in Figure 3, the trajectory, for a long-term U.S. presence, if implemented, would be beneficial for Iraq and the region, especially given the instability and rising potential nuclear threat in Iran. Large troop concentrations are not necessarily the solution, as the United States has used a much smaller footprint effectively in Kuwait to provide a satisfactory security transition in contrast to larger troop levels for the sustained U.S. presence in Germany, Japan, and Korea.

Winning Mindset and Strategic Leadership

George Washington’s long-term vision of a people “achieving almost anything” prescribed a recipe for a successful free nation.34 As U.S. Army FM 1 notes, a winning organizational mindset is a critical component to successful progress. The successful security transitions in Germany, Japan, Korea, and Kuwait represent incredible leadership and human capital management invested for long-term strategic gains that produce high levels of enduring freedom and economic prosperity for the host nations. The security transitions were also products of an optimistic vision and belief that difficult does not mean impossible. The ongoing security transition efforts in Afghanistan promise greater regional stability and levels of enduring freedom if they reflect U.S. troop employment and personnel strength security transition management experiences in Germany, Japan, Korea, and Kuwait. If Iraq, Afghanistan, and the greater international community desire similar results, they must persevere and develop a winning mindset. “Sound planning based on a well-developed strategy is critical to ensure lessons learned over the years from Iraq are incorporated in Afghanistan and that competing resources [especially human resources] are prioritized effectively.”35 Strategic leadership cultivates perseverance by creating long-term vision with a winning mindset.

Running the Gauntlet

Is it worth it? In terms of lives, time, and money, this is a research question that soldiers and leaders in Afghanistan have asked at one point or another during their service in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.

In 1777, in Bennington, Vermont, New Hampshire’s General John Stark returned to the front to support the patriot cause with his colonial rangers. Armed with Roger’s Rules of Ranging and historical lessons from revolutionary engagements at Bunker Hill and Trenton and experience 20 years earlier fighting with the French and Indians, he returned to the battlefield to led a successful attack on enemy positions. He was memorialized later for his efforts and “live free or die” charge to colonists making the security transition from colony to independent nation.36 He understood 235 years ago what research and security transition management experience demonstrates today. Enduring freedom is worth it and is a product of enduring commitment. Stand to. Stay the course. Slow is smooth; smooth is fast. MR
TRANSITIONING AFGHANISTAN

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17. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (Washington DC: GPO, 2011), X.
20. Ibid.
24. Ibid, 8.
26. Ibid.
28. Ibid, 175.
ARMY DOCTRINE FRAMES planning actions along a continuum ranging from “conceptual” on one end to “detailed” on the other. One end is the domain of conceptual planning where ends, objectives, concepts of operations, and commanders’ intents are developed; the other end is the domain of detailed planning where units work out the particulars of execution such as movement tables, target lists, and control measures. While plans begin in the conceptual domain, Army doctrine acknowledges a dynamic relationship: planning must respond to detailed constraints. FM 5-0 provides the only graphic representation of the Army’s conception of this relationship (Figure 1).

Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, Unified Land Operations, the Army’s revised capstone doctrine, reaffirms FM 5-0’s conception of the relationship between conceptual and detailed planning and acknowledges that successful planning requires integration of the two components. Army Doctrine Publication 3-0 seems to regard conceptual planning as an art and detailed planning as a science. ADP 3-0 associates conceptual planning with the Army design methodology and detailed planning with the military decision making process and troop-leading procedures.

Army doctrine associates “critical thinking” with conceptual planning, operational art, and operational adaptability. ADP 3-0 describes Army design methodology as the application of critical and creative thinking in order to understand, visualize, and describe unfamiliar problems and approaches to solving them. Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0, The Army in Unified Land Operations, cites critical thinking four times—once in defining operational art, once in characterizing design methodology, and twice in reference to operational adaptability. Field Manual 6-0, Mission Command, describes critical thinking as an essential characteristic of operational adaptability—the ability to shape conditions and respond effectively to changing threats and situations with appropriate, flexible, and timely actions.
In Chapter 1, FM 6-0 defines critical thinking as “a deliberate process of thought whose purpose is to discern” and “involves determining whether adequate justification exists to accept conclusions as true based on a given inference or argument.”

Interestingly, critical thinking is not mentioned in the same sentence with the methodologies of detailed planning—the military decision making process or troop-leading procedures.

Consistent with emerging Army design techniques—procedures derived from cognitive psychology and closely associated with critical thinking—the argument for reframing will start with a graphic model that attempts to depict the relationship among planning, execution, and critical thinking.

The model (Figure 2) “bends” the existing linear concept into a circle. The circle becomes directional, following a clockwise path. A dashed line divides it, demarcating the “detailed” domain and the “conceptual” domain. Next, the concepts associated with each domain are added. The science
of control and rational analysis is in the domain above the dashed line. Intuitive decision making and conceptual planning are added to the domain of “operational art” below the dashed line.

While not well articulated in Army doctrine, conceptual planning exploits the power of intuitive decision making through critical thinking by leveraging analogs as well as the experience and judgment of the commander. This frames the problem and develops a broad operational approach.

Components of design fall within the conceptual planning domain: environmental framing, problem framing, and development of an operational approach. In this domain, planners depict the environment graphically as it currently exists, visualizing the system and its subcomponents to illustrate the relationships among actors within it. Planners also develop a graphic representation of the “desired” end state. Through this process, the commander gains situational awareness and an understanding of the end state he must achieve to be successful (Figure 3).

The design methodology also calls for a narrative to describe the graphic. The narrative must take into account the perspectives of the relevant actors in order to convey interests, threats, and vulnerabilities.

With problem framing complete, the commander develops an operational approach derived from environmental framing, the broad concepts that will accomplish the end state. While not limited to the conceptual realm, he can leverage Red Teams to contribute to the development and validation of conceptual plans. As a bridge to detailed planning, the commander articulates his approach through his intent and concept of operations. With the exception of the explicitly stated concept of “intuitive decision making,” the model depicted is consistent with current Army doctrine.

In the domain of detailed planning, the model adds components of the military decision making process and orders production and the elements of detailed planning and the science of control. Again, the model is consistent with existing Army doctrine.

The model now begins to include concepts that are not consistent with current Army doctrine: execution and its subcomponents of task organization, rehearsals, H-hour, enemy contact,
and battle drills and execution of branches and sequels. Task organization and rehearsals fall within the domain of detailed planning and the science of control. During activities conducted after H-hour—after contact with the enemy—behavior reverts to the conceptual domain, the domain of intuitive decision making as articulated in Gary Klein’s concept of “recognition-primed decision making.”

This model seeks to depict the reality that execution becomes reactive—not in the sense of lost initiative—but rather, reactive in the sense that commanders on the ground make quick decisions based on their experience, training, and expert judgment in response to what they perceive happening in their environment. Commanders in contact must make quick decisions based on mental simulations—a decision making process that is not necessarily “logical” given the time constraints and the limitations of the human mind—yet one that is nonetheless “reasonable” and capable of achieving probable success.

This decision making process is unquestionably intuitive and within the conceptual domain.

The model (Figure 4) adds “Feedback and Reframing” between “Execution,” and “Design,” to graphically convey the iterative nature of military operations. The concept of “critical thinking” is at the center of the model—to represent the notion that critical thinking encompasses all domains of planning and execution. Army doctrine notes the iterative nature of each decision making method, and here, the model attempts to show that feedback and reframing bridge execution and design (conceptual planning) and represent the link between implementation and planning. Planners and ground commanders understand the importance of establishing evaluation frameworks and formal feedback mechanisms.

Critical thinking occupies the center of the circle—the center of gravity for both operational art and the science of control—to convey its importance and its connection to each aspect of planning and execution. While the Army’s current
definition of critical thinking is not incorrect, it may be inadequate. Although critical thinking is indeed “a deliberate process of thought whose purpose is to discern” and “involves determining whether adequate justification exists to accept conclusions as true based on a given inference or argument,” the concept transcends deconstruction. Critical thinking is the deliberate, methodical process of thinking about thinking, or meta-decision making. As such, it applies to the detailed construction and execution of plans as well as the development of a theoretical operational approach in the conceptual domain. Doctrine therefore ought to explicitly state that critical thinking is important in the domain of detailed planning, the science of control, and the execution of plans.

Like iterative motion and the energy of a wave moving an object through time and space, the motion and energy of iterative planning and execution accomplish military objectives. Each cycle of waves that passes is an iteration of the process: first, planning—conceptual and detailed—then, execution, followed by feedback and reframing. Iteration by iteration, we move closer to achieving our desired end state and fulfilling our strategic military objectives, through the accomplishment of decisive points along lines of operation and effort. MR

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5. Richards J. Heuer, Jr., Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Langley, VA: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999), 27. In Chapter 3, “Memory: How Do We Remember What We Know?” Heuer recommends “externalizing” the problem by “getting it out of one’s head” as a graphic that simplifies the complexity of the relationships within a system. These simple models facilitate assimilation of new information into long-term memory and provide a structure to which one can relate information.
6. The concept of “bending” the linear spectrum was first introduced to the author by Dr. Mark Graber, then professor of government at The University of Texas at Austin, now a professor of law at the University of Maryland, Baltimore. The concept was used to illustrate the relationship between partisans and moderates, with the partisan extremes occupying each “end” of the “bent” spectrum. Conceived in this way, extreme partisans could be understood as occupying the opposite end of the spectrum relative to moderates, thereby explaining not only the possibility, but the frequency of legislative coalitions between partisan opposites.
A DECADE OF CONFLICT has refined and expanded our understanding of war. Our lexicon must change as well. Operations to stabilize under-governed regions and manage internal instability, once thought to be “operations other than war” or “low-intensity conflict,” are now understood as wars that may include intense combat. At the same time, sophisticated nation-state adversaries have expanded the spectrum of military operations by investing in advanced technologies designed to blunt U.S. power projection and thwart traditional U.S. advantages. Precision long-range ballistic missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles, integrated air defense systems, anti-satellite weapons, and cyber weapons have the potential to complicate U.S. concepts of operation against adversaries who possess these technologies. Meanwhile, nonstate actors, not content with merely terrorism and insurgency as methods of warfare, seek more sophisticated weapons to enable them to impose new costs and risks on Western militaries and frustrate their attempts to seize terrain. These weapons, traditionally available only to state actors, include precision-guided anti-tank missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, sophisticated man-portable air defense systems, anti-ship cruise missiles, and precision-guided rockets, artillery, and mortars. U.S. defense planners refer to these new threats and U.S. concepts for countering them as counterinsurgency (COIN), anti-access/area denial (A2/AD), and “hybrid” warfare, respectively.1

We must revise and expand the spectrum of operations or range of military operations to cover these new threats, with irregular operations like COIN, counterterrorism, and stability operations on the “low end” of this spectrum and counter-A2/AD concepts of operation on the “high end.” Conventional maneuver warfare, often labeled major combat operations, is now only a relatively small slice of the spectrum of operations. Conventional war is also not at the highest end of this spectrum of conflict, but rather in the middle. The high end features sophisticated A2/AD threats that require new U.S. capabilities and concepts of operation to counter. (One could plausibly extend this range even further to encompass nuclear exchange.) This new,
revised spectrum of operations varies not in level of effort or intensity of violence (COIN operations can exhaust immense resources and be extremely violent at times), but rather in scale and sophistication of adversary capabilities.

The Lexicon Today

Existing DOD joint lexicon fails to cover this new, expanded spectrum of operations in a meaningful and interesting way. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations, describes the range of military operations as varying from “crisis response and limited contingency operations” to “major operations and campaigns.”

The range of military operations in JP 3-0 delineates military operations along the dimension of level of effort, which is not very useful. Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan and the stabilization of Iraq are both “major operations.” These campaigns have swallowed the efforts of, at times, 100,000 troops or more in each nation, lasted for years of sustained conflict, cost hundreds of billions of dollars, and resulted in thousands of U.S. service members killed and tens of thousands wounded. By any reasonable measure, the Iraq and Afghanistan wars are major operations. In fact, the stabilization phases of the Iraq and Afghan wars turned out to require a significantly greater level of effort and duration than the invasions to topple those nations, both of which lasted only weeks, not years.

Stability operations and conventional force-on-force conflict differ significantly in terms of forces required and training and equipment. For example, the force that invaded Iraq in 2003 was superbly trained and equipped to defeat Saddam’s army, but less prepared (initially) for the stabilization and counterinsurgency challenges that followed. The range of military operations presented in JP 3-0 does not draw this distinction. In JP 3-0, both the initial invasion of Iraq and the lengthier, bloodier, costlier stabilization campaign fall to the right edge of this spectrum. Assessed by level of effort, it is arguable whether the initial invasion of Afghanistan (accomplished by a limited number special operations forces and CIA ground personnel plus air power) rose to the level of a “major” operation in terms of level of effort. Because the range of military operations described in JP 3-0 focuses on level of effort, it fails to capture critical qualitative differences among COIN, “hybrid” conflicts, conventional military operations, and operations against A2/AD threats. All these operations require different capabilities, methods, and concepts of operations. A spectrum defined by level of effort alone fails to capture these crucial distinctions between operations and, as a result, is only marginally useful.
The High and Low End of What?

Military operations vary by level of effort, duration, type of conflict, type of adversary, or many other variables. Placing them along a one-dimensional spectrum is overly simplistic and problematic in many ways. Nevertheless, a “spectrum of operations” remains a useful heuristic or shorthand tool. Although the terms “high-intensity” and “low-intensity” no longer exist in formal DOD joint lexicon, many military servicemembers and civilian defense professionals continue to use the terms “high” and “low” to refer to edges of a notional military operations spectrum. At the “low end” of this spectrum are activities like COIN, counterterrorism, and stability operations. At the “high end” are operations to counter A2/AD threats, which are among the most sophisticated challenges U.S. forces may face.

Explicitly or implicitly, “intensity” is often the variable by which operations purportedly vary along the spectrum of conflict. Depending on who is speaking, “intensity” may mean level of effort, as outlined in JP 3-0, or level of violence. Either way, “intensity” is a misnomer. Irregular operations like COIN, counterterrorism, or stability operations can require significant levels of effort, in some cases markedly more so than conventional force-on-force operations against a state for the same territory. COIN, counterterrorism, and stability operations can be extremely violent. To the service member on the ground facing a complex ambush from machine-gun fire, IEDs or mines, and RPGs, it hardly matters whether the enemy is wearing a uniform or not. The actions one takes on the ground are the same. In Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. troops have been in bloody and intense fighting at the squad, platoon, and company level. To characterize this fighting as “low intensity” defies logic.

Military operations do fall along a spectrum that varies by the scale and sophistication of one’s adversary. At the “low end” of this spectrum are COIN, counterterrorism, and stability operations. At the “high end” are counter-A2/AD operations. As one moves from the “low” toward the “high” end of the spectrum, the adversary’s capabilities increase in technological sophistication, training, and the ability to scale up operations into larger organized coherent fighting formations.

Interestingly, what was once the high-end of the spectrum is now the middle. Traditional maneuver warfare against conventional militaries is not the most sophisticated challenge U.S. forces may face. The most sophisticated challenges are threats from adversaries possessing advanced A2/AD capabilities.

This spectrum is meaningful and useful because different methods, capabilities, and concepts of operation are necessary to counter adversaries who fall at various points along the spectrum. The capabilities and approaches useful against conventional adversaries generally fall short in A2/AD environments, where new adversary approaches aim to frustrate traditional U.S. modes of power projection. While existing U.S. tanks, helicopters, fighting vehicles, fighters, bombers, ships, aircraft carriers, and satellites are generally qualitatively proficient for operations against conventional militaries, counter-A2/AD operations require new U.S. weapons, like long-range strike weapons, and new concepts of operations, like dispersed and hardened bases to increase resilience against missile attack.
While conventional enemy militaries can be considered “lesser includeds” of advanced nation-state militaries with A2/AD capabilities, this is not true of enemies engaging in irregular warfare. As we move to the lower end of the spectrum, where adversaries lack the technologically advanced weapons, training, drilling, and organization to stand toe-to-toe with conventional militaries, they respond by using the “weapons of the weak”—insurgency and terrorism. Instead of direct military confrontation, they rely on support from civilian populations and mask their movement within those populations. DOD characterizes this mode of conflict as irregular warfare, defined in DOD Directive 3000.07, Irregular Warfare, as—

A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.3

DOD Directive 3000.07 juxtaposes irregular warfare and “traditional warfare,” with traditional warfare defined as—

A form of warfare between the regulated militaries of states, or alliances of states, in which the objective is to defeat an adversary’s armed forces, destroy an adversary’s war-making capacity, or seize or retain territory in order to force a change in an adversary’s government or policies.4

Irregular warfare and traditional warfare are both modes of war. Traditional warfare directly opposes an adversary’s military forces through force-on-force conflict. Irregular warfare relies on influencing populations to achieve one’s political aims, including fostering insurgency, terrorizing key population groups, or sapping an enemy’s political will to fight.

Because the types of operations presented above vary in degree of scale and technological sophistication, operations to the middle and right of the spectrum generally meet the definition of traditional warfare, since they oppose adversaries who possess organized military forces. Operations on the left end of this spectrum are more irregular in nature, as adversaries turn to population-centric approaches to make up for their lack of sophistication in traditional military means. In turn, population-centric approaches like COIN are necessary to defeat them.

Somewhere between insurgency and conventional warfare, “hybrid warfare” is a blend of irregular and traditional approaches to war. The term “hybrid warfare” has been debated in many forums.5 For the purposes of the revised spectrum presented above, “hybrid” warfare is operations conducted by state or nonstate actors that blend irregular and traditional approaches. One example is nonstate actors possessing sophisticated weaponry usually reserved for the militaries of nation-states. These technologies may include precision-guided anti-tank missiles, sophisticated man-portable air defense systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, anti-ship cruise missiles, and precision-guided rockets, artillery, and mortars. These capabilities may allow hybrid actors to resist organized military forces in force-on-force engagements. At the same time, strategic communications to influence relevant populations are key aspects of hybrid warfare. Defeating an enemy’s forces on the field of battle is not, alone, enough to secure victory.

Impact of the Revised Spectrum

Any given operation may move through multiple phases and through several or even all parts of the conflict spectrum. The Iraq war, for example, began as a traditional military campaign against organized nation-state forces, then evolved into counterinsurgency, then into a peace-enforcement operation aimed at tamping down a growing Sunni-Shi’ite civil war, and finally shifted to a security force assistance mission aimed at building the security capacity of Iraqi government forces. Some adversaries may even employ tactics and methods of warfare from multiple points along the spectrum simultaneously.

U.S. forces must be prepared for operations to shift, sometimes suddenly and unexpectedly, along the spectrum as adversaries seek the mode of conflict most advantageous to their aims. Actors, state and nonstate alike, seek to modernize their military equipment and tactics and move their capabilities further to the right of this spectrum. The U.S. military’s historical advantages in technological superiority mean that both state and nonstate adversaries will also seek to employ irregular, population-centric approaches to attempt to resolve conflicts on
their terms, turning populations against the United States and sapping the U.S. will to fight.

The United States has historically been strong in the middle part of the conflict spectrum, in conventional warfare. The high end of the spectrum, counter-A2/AD operations, is new and has developed as adversaries have modernized their militaries and designed clever approaches to counter U.S. forces. The low end of the spectrum has existed for millennia, but has recently become more relevant for U.S. forces as U.S. superiority in conventional war drives adversaries to employ irregular approaches like insurgency and terrorism. Most U.S. capabilities occupy the middle part of the spectrum, and because these middle-weight capabilities do not necessarily translate up or down the spectrum to A2/AD or COIN, the capacity and proficiency of U.S. forces at both the high and low ends are not satisfactory.

Recent U.S. military adaptations and investments, from riverine and civil affairs units to the new long-range bomber, have focused on the ends of this spectrum. When seeking savings, the DOD has recently looked to conventional capabilities in the middle part of the spectrum. For example, in the past several years the Army has reduced armor and artillery capacity to make space for COIN-centric capabilities like civil affairs or information support teams. Crucial gaps on both the high and low end remain, however. As budget pressures tighten, the process of rebalancing capabilities by pushing resources out to both the high and low ends of the spectrum will continue, not just in the Army but in the other services as well.

**Not a Case of “Lesser Includeds”**

Overcoming the challenges posed by adversaries fighting at different places along the spectrum requires different capabilities. The challenges posed by adversaries employing less sophisticated capabilities, and therefore irregular approaches, are not “lesser includeds” of the challenges posed by more sophisticated conventional or A2/AD adversaries. The mode of warfare qualitatively changes as one moves further to the “lower” end of the spectrum. U.S. armed forces must be able to cover the entire spectrum, but the spectrum affects the military services differently.

A2/AD approaches challenge traditional U.S. air and maritime power projection concepts, and thus, the Navy and Air Force must focus the bulk of their efforts on operations in A2/AD environments. Traditional warfare against less sophisticated conventional adversaries is largely a lesser included of counter-A2/AD operations. Fifth-generation fighters can perform the same missions as fourth-generation fighters, for example. Fifth-generation
Employing a destroyer in a counterpiracy or maritime security mission where a cutter or frigate would be an acceptable solution is an overly costly approach. A high-low mix of capabilities would be a more effective way of providing the high-quality assets needed for the small number of the most challenging high-end missions and the quantity necessary for a wide range of possible contingencies.

Some truly “low end” air and maritime capabilities to conduct COIN, CT, and stability operations and support ground forces in these types of conflicts are still required, however, and are not necessarily “lesser includeds” of higher-end operations. Assets like riverine forces, maritime civil affairs, Predator and Reaper unmanned aircraft, and light attack aircraft are qualitatively different from destroyers, fifth generation fighters, and bombers. While the primary focus of the Air Force and Navy should be A2/AD threats, some resources must remain dedicated to irregular warfare missions.

The Army and Marine Corps face different challenges. Unlike air and maritime forces challenged by A2/AD concepts that aim to thwart traditional U.S. modes of power projection, U.S. ground forces retain significant advantages over any adversary land army. The main challenges they face come from lower-end irregular warfare operations, which are not a “lesser included” of traditional warfare, as we learned in Iraq and Afghanistan. A Marine Corps and Army geared primarily toward traditional warfare against nation-state militaries will not be sufficiently competent at COIN and stability operations to counter adversaries employing irregular tactics.

Both the Army and Marine Corps must possess the ability to conduct population-centric operations to stabilize under-governed regions and build the security capacity of partner nations, while still remaining proficient at combined arms maneuver to destroy organized military forces in force-on-force conflict. That stability and counterinsurgency operations may last for years or decades further challenges ground forces by requiring a rotational base of forces. U.S. proficiency in conventional ground-seizing operations, on the other hand, allows the U.S. to complete conventional operations in months, if not weeks or days. Thus, if conventional operations and COIN/stability operations are to have equal weight (because conventional campaigns can rapidly transition to COIN), we must train, equip, and design most ground forces for COIN and stability operations.

We have yet to see whether we can achieve a dual proficiency in conventional war and COIN by aiming for the “sweet spot” between those two types of warfare or by orienting segments of the force toward each type of conflict. If there is a mid-point between conventional war and COIN, it is “hybrid” war against nonstate actors armed with sophisticated weaponry, operating among civilian populations, and simultaneously engaged in both irregular and traditional modes of warfare. Training and equipping for combat against conventional militaries alone is not sufficient, as stability operations and COIN are not “lesser includeds” of these operations. However, because hybrid threats employ both traditional and irregular means, countering these threats requires simultaneous population-centric approaches and direct force-on-force engagement. A hybrid-focused ground force that could both destroy enemy forces and influence populations might be able to fight both up and down on the spectrum of conflict by performing both conventional and COIN operations.

Clarifying the Lexicon

For uniformed and civilian defense professionals to communicate meaningfully with each another, we must say what we mean and mean what we say. Terms like “high-intensity” are misleading and confusing, and we should abandon them. Calling the prolonged, bloody, and costly counterinsurgency phases of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars “low-intensity,” either in level of effort or degree of violence, is simply senseless.
A spectrum of military operations that varies only in level of effort is not useful, because it does not highlight key qualitative differences between COIN, hybrid war, conventional war, and counter-A2/AD operations.

A spectrum that varies in scale and sophistication of adversary capabilities is more reasonable and useful in describing how various kinds of conflict, from COIN to hybrid war to A2/AD environments, affect U.S. forces. These operations require different capabilities, methods, and concepts of operation. The U.S. military has historically been strong in conventional warfare in the middle of the spectrum, but these capabilities do not translate well up or down the spectrum, so the DOD is flattening the capabilities curve. The department has been increasing investments at the high (A2/AD) and low (COIN) ends of the spectrum, and to the extent that resource constraints require offsets, taking risks in the middle.

Mounting budget pressures are shrinking resources, all while potential adversaries continue to modernize their A2/AD capabilities and instability in under-governed regions continues to threaten U.S. interests. Faced with these conditions, rebalancing the force must continue. MR

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2. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations (22 March 2010), 1-8, available at <http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_0.pdf>
4. Ibid., 11.
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PHOTO: U.S. Army 1LT Spencer Tadken, right, reviews aiming techniques with an Afghan soldier during training at Forward Operating Base Shank, Logar Province, Afghanistan, 13 March 2012. (U.S. Army, SPC Tia Sokimson)

Military and government leaders at the strategic, operational, and tactical level often struggle to fuse design theory with military planning procedures and doctrine.¹

In the field, the office, and the classroom, Western military institutions use “conceptual planning” that often proves problematic to integrate into traditional military decision making, doctrine, and professional military education.² Although this advanced sense-making and conceptual planning approach receives a variety of labels from nations and their defense forces, many include the term “design” to distinguish the approach from traditional military decision making and planning. This article intentionally uses the more generic and unaffiliated term “design theory” instead of another institution-specific phrase from the lexicon.³

Design theory is challenging for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is inspiring military professionals to reflect on how their organization thinks. Design theory also encourages us to reflect on how our organization does not think, and why this tends to occur.

In this article, I present seven interrelated design theory phenomena that seem to occur regularly when fusing design theory with military decision making in complex environments. Military leaders at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels may find some or all of these phenomena useful as they contemplate military operations in complex, uncertain future environments. These observations reflect my own experiences applying design theory with military planning in Afghanistan from 2011 to 2012 in a variety of joint planning activities while assigned to NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan at the operational level.⁴ These considerations apply to military organizations as well as governmental and business management disciplines where planning efforts confront complex, uncertain environments. Design theory seeks to avoid set procedures and sequences. However, to begin with the concept of a “problem” is useful in conversing about design theory applications.
1. To Appreciate the Game of Chess, Stop Thinking So Much About the Pieces

Leaders attempting to fuse design theory with military planning efforts should distinguish between the logics that various groups and organizations prefer to employ, and the vocabulary and concepts associated with them.5 Military organizations will benefit from considering what a “problem” means, what it does not mean, and why this is. Are all military problems definable, explainable, and solvable? Does a problem have to be tangible for us to apply military tools to “attack” it? What happens to the planned solution to a problem when the problem changes over time? If you identify something as a problem, target it, and achieve your objective only to find that the problem became something different, are you focused on the problem or merely on the symptoms of something larger?6

When we chase tactical problems and discover larger core issues beyond them, we usually associate uncertainty with these concepts. Design theorists use the helpful term “meta-problem” to address complex issues that go beyond tactical and linear problem sets. By tacking the prefix “meta” onto concepts like “problem,” “question,” and “narrative,” we change the meaning of the words from something specific into something broad, holistic, and often answered with yet deeper questions.7 Did you notice that many of the questions posed on “problems” in the previous paragraph led to more questions instead of answers? With design theory, that is actually a good thing! I prefer to use the term “phenomenon” instead of “problem” to differentiate between tactical, tangible elements easily labeled as problems, and the more elusive, self-organizing meta-issues or core tensions that endure and evolve over time within a complex environment, but regardless of the terms one uses, as long as there is sound logic underpinning an organization’s common language, it can communicate effectively.8 Words are important; they reveal more about how an organization prefers to seek understanding, and what it refuses to see.9 This becomes critical when an organization commences planning. Miss the meta-problem or core issues, and you may commit blood and treasure towards the wrong objectives.10

Tactical problems are attractive to military organizations because they can integrate them readily with quantifiable metrics, bell-curves, and mathematical analysis and reduce uncertainty in an environment.11 However, the more complex and adaptive an environment is, the more some of these planning approaches fail to explain or reduce uncertainty.12 This is where military and government institutions prefer to seek short-term successes and codify them into general procedures, often in doctrinal form.13 Hence, problem solving leads to “proceduralization.” Powerful forces within the military institution canonize lessons learned into doctrine and universal application.14

While problem solving through traditional military decision making often leads to proceduralization, design theory appreciates how deeper phenomena often lead to emergent processes within a complex, adaptive system.15 Emergent processes are different from procedures. Design theory resists the rigid “paint-by-numbers” methodology that procedure-based logic enforces. Consider two opponents in a chess game. The staff of an organization that prefers to think with procedure-based logic will likely develop procedures that focus entirely on the chess pieces. The procedures can resemble sports-team playbooks with intricate turn-based moves and elaborate linear methodologies for winning. Enemy chess pieces may feature “jackpot” targeting. These approaches are useful in subsequent detailed planning and execution, but usually fail to support much subsequent action. Considering only the chessboard, the chess pieces, and the rules of the game prevents an organization from realizing what lies beyond the chessboard. This approach may lock your staff into an endless loop of description and categorization that never recognizes the actual phenomena at work.16

To lead your staff to consider deeper phenomena and emergent processes, you must get them to stop thinking about the chessboard. Meta-processes and emergent phenomena exist above the chessboard. Movements of the chess pieces are indications of larger forces in motion. Reductionist and tactical thinking focuses on particular opponent chess pieces or spaces, while design theory encourages the staff to contemplate the phenomenon of “skill” (Figure 1). It asks us to consider how the opponent’s chess skill is an emergent tension that affects the
entire environment. Such thinking can lead the staff to improvise and adapt to overcome skill disadvantages to influence transforming the system to a future state more advantageous to the organization. Ultimately, the goal may not even be to win a particular chess game, but something beyond that. Yet, tactical problem solving and proceduralization will lock a staff’s energies and outputs into chess-piece-centric approaches. Getting the staff’s focus off the chess pieces and onto the area above the board is often critical to transforming design thinking into military planning.

2. Know How to Wash Babies Before Throwing Out the Bathwater

Some worry that design tends to disregard doctrine and “throw the baby out with the bathwater.” I find most doctrine rather inhibiting for critical and creative thinking, but doctrine’s utility is undeniable. Perhaps one of the bigger hurdles for military organizations to clear is the stranglehold that doctrine has upon military professionals. (Many businesses model their planning and decision making along similar lines.) Military organizations self-identify as groups that can consistently produce universal results in diverse conditions. To do this, Western military institutions produce narratives that become the bedrock of doctrine, policy, procedures, and language. However, this comes at a cost.

To properly apply design theory, a leader must appreciate that doctrine influences how our military prefer to think. Doctrine’s primary weaknesses are inflexibility, the inability to improvise, and resistance to any change that threatens the relevance of the organization that is the proponent for the doctrine.

Leaders should understand doctrine by understanding not only its content, but also its context, the military institution’s approach in conflict environments. This includes critical and contrary thinking.
that explores contradictory perspectives. Only then can leaders collaborate to use design theory to safely disregard doctrine (when necessary) and substitute knowledge from various other fields, concepts, or theories.

Design practitioners often use the term “bricolage” to convey this concept. To bricolage within a hybrid planning effort, a leader may infuse elements of swarm theory, post-modern philosophy, inter-service conceptual planning, and business-modeled scenario planning into war game sessions while still using many doctrine-centric military terms, concepts, and processes. If a discipline or field adds value regardless of its origin, it deserves legitimate consideration. To disregard a concept or methodology and maintain intellectual honesty, one must understand what the concept or methodology does or does not contribute to solving the problem at hand. Ultimately, some doctrine may help, and we should put some of it back on the shelf for another time.

3. In Complex Environments, Nosebleed Seats Often Trump the 50-Yard Line

Design theory seeks holistic appreciation of complex dynamic environments through abstraction. Leaders face significant challenges when trying to change the staff’s perspective from one that isolates, reduces, and categorizes to one that takes a broad and often ambiguous position. Getting your staff to shift gears is not easy. How many targeting processes and working groups within a brigade combat team occur weekly? Is the staff predisposed to further isolate and reduce information through iterative planning and targeting sessions? The proclivity for “stove-piping” information is unquestionably present.

For leaders, one useful approach for guiding a staff toward abstract thinking involves “what” versus “why” questions. When a product, narrative, or output appears to seek to answer “what-centric” questions, the staff is likely employing reductionist logic that continues to isolate and categorize information into smaller and seemingly more controllable chunks. We do this routinely with virtually all aspects of detailed planning from special operations jackpots to left-handed Afghan female police officers in the Wardak province. “What-centric” questions lead to reductionist answers, or further analysis that isolates and fragments complex systems.

On the other hand, “why-centric” questions generate different outcomes. “Why” questions often lead to abstraction and holistic appreciation and produce more questions (and fewer answers), which makes military organizations uncomfortable due to an increase in uncertainty. “Why” questions tend to push the staff away from reductionist logic to appreciation of a system’s dynamic actors and phenomena, leading a deep understanding of complexity without any misconceptions about how uncontrollable it is.

To integrate design in military planning, operate as a synthesist not an analyst. “Synergy” is distinct from what-centric analysis in that while an analyst might produce volumes of data on individual bicycle parts, the synthesist will instead assemble them into a bicycle and address why someone seeks to ride it. Synergy occurs when the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. Synthesists question why over what, and view complex systems holistically instead of attempting to isolate and reduce them into measurable entities for categorization. The analyst collects neat piles of bike parts. The design synthesist runs a bicycle repair shop.

4. When Your Organization Wants to Kill You, It Is Not Always A Bad Thing

We frequently use the term “critical thinking” in the military, but do we really know how far to take it? Philosopher Michel Foucault provided an explanation of how critical thinking denotes risk with his term “problematization.” Foucault used the example of an ancient philosopher summoned by an emperor as a metaphor for his problematizer. The emperor summons fools and jesters to him for their wit, but he seeks out philosophers for wisdom, insight, and critical thinking.

While the fool risks his future employment, and at times his life on whether he entertains, the philosopher risks failing and offering faulty advice to the emperor. Both the philosopher and the fool also reap benefits when they supply entertainment or advice that benefits the emperor. The military
professional becomes the problematizer when he provides the emperor (the senior leader) valid and useful advice that displeases him due to its critical nature. Sometimes our organization’s senior leaders may not want to hear the truth because it hurts. The emperor might still kill the philosopher even when he provides sound advice if it threatens the institution’s core tenets or values.

The problematizer faces yet another risk, which comes from not the emperor, but the institution at large. If the problematizer critically addresses something within the institution and this threatens to destroy or marginalizes something deeply cherished, it may not matter if the advice benefits the institution in the long-term. Collectively, the institution may lash out and silence or destroy the problematizer as an act of self-preservation. Many reformers in history met this fate. The fool has only to entertain and win applause to make his living, but the problematizer risks death at the hands of the institutional forces that shape our collective logic and group dynamics. Being wrong will kill you, and being right can do so as well!

In modern times, an institution “kills” a military professional through marginalization, obstructionism, or even employment termination. Leaders who employ design theory face similar risks, in that the institution would rather continue to do things a certain way and fail instead of transforming into a more successful but less familiar form.

5. Flawed Concepts in Military Planning are Like Uninvited Relatives at Thanksgiving

Design theory benefits strategic, operational, and tactical leaders despite their inability to always influence complex environments. Strategic-level leaders may gain deep understanding of a wicked problem that forces them to appreciate national, political, and even international phenomena that the military organization is unable to influence directly. Operational and tactical-level leaders in the same organization may learn to appreciate the same phenomena, and others within the military organization may come to similar awareness. Our military really struggles with things it cannot fully understand and struggles to predict future action or change. A design practitioner cannot influence many things, yet by simply appreciating the many phenomena within a complex system, he gives the leader the opportunity to influence his organization more effectively. “Thinking about how your organization thinks” is a process of critical reflection that offers great potential.

For instance, Operation Enduring Freedom has spanned over a decade for the U.S. military, yet given unit deployment and redeployment cycles, one might consider that instead of a single decade-long conflict, our military has actually fought 11 separate one-year conflicts in the same region. Nearly every organization that enters the cycle inherits the plan and associated concepts that the outgoing unit and its predecessors advanced earlier. A tactical or operational commander might, within any of the yearly cycles of forces entering and leaving Afghanistan, come to see that the concept for securing the Afghan civilian population and establishing nationally cohesive security is a faulty concept. Even if absolutely correct, how successful would a brigade or division commander be in any attempt to upset the apple cart on long-term coalition counterinsurgency planning? The military hierarchy generally does not respond well to “reframing” the entire operational logic for a military campaign, regardless of how persuasive the logic may be to do so. If design application potentially puts a leader into that situation, what options are there?

As a planner, I was unimpressed with centers of gravity in the joint military planning discipline known as “operational design.” I found that I disagreed with the logic of it, yet I could not disregard it in our final design deliverable. It felt like having unwelcome family houseguests. Sometimes you are stuck with shortcomings that design thinking has helped highlight for you, but the organization is
unwilling to let go of them. When your crazy uncle tends to drop by for Thanksgiving, you have to plan the day with him factored in. If your organization demands planning concepts that do not fit your understanding of the problem, or tries to employ procedures that lack utility, it is always better to appreciate why and how your organization uses them so that you may develop ways to take action within the system despite their presence.

6. Orchestra Sheet Music is Linear; Improvisational Jazz is Nonlinear

The nonlinear versus linear planning debate has confused the current generation of military professionals while explaining very little about how “nonlinear” functions within military decision making. Army doctrine describes ill-structured problems as “the most interactive; they are also complex, nonlinear, and dynamic—and therefore the most challenging to solve.” Yet neither our doctrine nor our professional military education system really explains what nonlinear means as opposed to traditional linear planning. Few buzzwords have gained similar status in the modern military lexicon as the words “nonlinear,” yet as an institution we routinely fail to understand or describe what nonlinear is, especially at the operational and strategic levels.

To humans, linear processes are instinctual. They correspond to a time and place where one event leads to another. U.S. Army Field Manual 5-0, The Operations Process, warns of the pitfalls of linear thinking with respect to complex adaptive systems. “The first pitfall is attempting to forecast and dictate events too far into the future. This may result from believing a plan can control the future. People tend to plan based on assumptions that the future will be a linear continuation of the present.” This is sound advice, but our doctrine never effectively distinguishes between linear and nonlinear planning, leaving leaders high and dry.

Consider a large orchestra, with its wide variety of instruments and musicians. The composer is similar to the planning team, and the conductor is the commander. Like the orchestra’s sheet music, the military organization’s linear planning efforts routinely follow a similar pattern where the team works out in advance the complicated interactions of its instruments over time, and reduces it to written notes distributed to the players. Over multiple rehearsals, the orchestra, led by the conductor, learns to work together to produce music instead of chaotic noise. This works for simple and closed systems such as a symphony hall where clearly defined objectives are achievable through linear planning.

However today’s military institution tends to substitute “nonlinear” with this linear thinking and attempts to do so while confronting ill-structured problems. Instead of acknowledging complexity’s adaptive, emergent nature, we use linear causality logic and reverse-engineered planning concepts to construct intricate campaign plans that flow backward from predetermined end states and cement them with preconceived actions set along lines of efforts. An orchestra does not play music backward, yet we usually plan backward.

Design theory considers true nonlinear approaches to be free of the shackles of the linear planning construct. “A” does not lead to “B,” nor should a branch plan “C” occur when the organization reaches “B.” Unlike an orchestra tied to predetermined sheet music, a group of jazz musicians without any sheet music improvises along to the beat of the drummer and plays off each other’s adaptations and riffs. Their music emerges in a linear form over time, but follows no rigid path and relies instead upon sense-making and intuitive decisions as the complex environment transforms. The audience of the orchestra does not influence its music, but the crowd around a jazz band likely influences the band’s improvisations. The jazz band will adjust course, yet still follow no set script, to allow creativity and exploration to discover even more effective improvisations that please the crowd. Trial and error drive this process, and so does divergent thinking. Yet military operations are not jazz concerts, and we will not solve ill-structured military problems through actions that follow no set plan.

When your crazy uncle tends to drop by for Thanksgiving, you have to plan the day with him factored in.
Design theory should not subscribe to linear planning, yet design deliverables must become linear constructs to aid the force in detailed planning and execution. What becomes critical is striking the right balance and having a tailored approach for each environment.32

When leaders establish their design teams and consider approaches to planning, they need to remember that planners tend to think and explore using traditional linear constructs, and encourage deviation instead. Appreciating a complex system requires a planning team to invest far more time in exploring the system instead of trying to “solve it.” Instead of considering the desired end state and attempting to force the complex system into obedience by structuring their plan in reverse fashion, design practitioners ought to investigate why the system behaves as observed, and how they can influence it as it transforms over time.

Instead of rigidly applying a future state that a planned line of effort must follow, planners might explore a wide range of future states that acknowledge the high degree of uncertainty inherent in ill-structured problems. This needs to go beyond branch plans and sequels and consider military action that improvises over time as the system’s emergent state becomes clearer and observed phenomena transform as they interact and adapt to our actions. Although military organizations cannot conduct detailed planning “off-script,” we can think critically about how we understand time and space, and explore ways of envisioning conceptual planning that break free of the simplistic linear causality associated with traditional campaign planning. When it is time to transform design deliverables into products for linear detailed planning, a final critical planning hurdle occurs.

7. Emergent Drawings and Collaborations are Not Design Results

Perhaps one of the most damaging things that design practitioners do to harm design theory is to present emergent products as the result of design work. I use the term “emergent products” to describe the many complex, often engrossing drawings, whiteboard sessions, and PowerPoint slides that planning teams build during their journey to understand and appreciate a complex problem. These design products usually contain language, concepts, and graphics that resonate for the planning team, but they also come with a price. The products are also often impossible for the larger audience and the decision maker to understand when a planning team has only 15 to 30 minutes to brief the decision maker. This is where we confuse the role of emergent products with design deliverables. They are interrelated, but not interchangeable.

Design deliverables require a higher level of sophistication in that they should eventually become simplistic, not complex. Design deliverables should achieve a fine balance between a deep understanding and the ability to explain it in the organization’s preferred language. The deliverable must be compatible with detailed planning and tactical execution.

Leaders should view such products as explorations in learning, not intended for briefing to an audience beyond the planning team. As planning teams break through barriers to deeper understanding, they will gain affinity toward those products they create, especially if they invest time and significant effort into them. The great artist Michelangelo once said, “Every block of stone has a statue inside it and it is the task of the sculptor to discover it.” Military planning teams should not attempt to show their intellectual journey of discovery by presenting their in-house
conceptual products; it should focus on the statue (deliverable) instead. Design deliverables must stand alone and make sense to the audience. Furthermore, “brevity is beauty.” To reduce a design deliverable to a simple five-bullet PowerPoint slide is a challenge, but a design team that deeply understands a problem can learn to do this. Dazzling an organization with overly complex presentations and highly intricate graphics only demonstrates the presenter never got past admiring the problem and never gained the cognitive synergy to explain it to his unit.

**There are no Steps—Even When We Swear There are Steps**

Fusing design with military planning confronts homogeneity and heterogeneity on many levels, and it is difficult to do when facing unfamiliar problems. Therefore, leaders must balance two completely dissimilar disciplines that feature often contradictory organizing logics, language, and values under the most difficult and uncertain circumstances. No wonder Armed Forces professionals are perplexed! Military planning values uniformity, repetition, and the utility of hierarchical structures: our doctrine implies procedures that worked in one conflict environment should work in others, with minor alterations.

Design’s approach is more heterogeneous. It is a holistic appreciation of adaptive systems, discredits repetition, and considers improvisation and adaptation far more useful for complex problem solving. One logic revels in chaos, while the other constantly tries to either prevent chaos or control it. Military leaders must fuse these almost alien disciplines in some constantly fluctuating relationship while facing ill-structured problems. Perhaps this is one reason why our military struggles with learning how to “do this,” and our professional military education system struggles with how to “teach this.”

Part of how we learn is understanding how we think and how we think about our thinking. I have intentionally titled this article “Seven Design Theory..."
Considerations for Military Planning” because many military leaders take comfort in metrics and tangible procedures that appear to reduce uncertainty. When we ask for examples of design theory fused with military decision making, we are usually asking for a step-by-step checklist we can refer to when we face an ill-structured problem. Sequential steps on how to perform anything difficult is deceptively attractive to us. Unfortunately, complex systems refuse to play by those rules. There really are no steps in design, just as no seven design theory considerations are more useful than thousands of other ones out there. Although I consider the seven discussed here rather valuable for fusing design into the military decision making process, they represent the tip of an iceberg that continues to change its size and composition. In the end, leaders can only rely on their wits, experience, and ability to think critically to be creative.

Creativity is mostly about discovering novel or emergent concepts that possess value for an organization. Yet we often do not realize whether something is valuable until after we implement it. Trial and error will not go away with increased technology or refinements in doctrine, and the next conflict will likely be something our current military is not prepared for or even looking for. For leaders to equip their staffs with the necessary guidance to fuse design with military planning, they must take risks and immerse themselves in the uncertainty of an ill-structured problem while remembering how their own organization thinks about problems.

Divergent and creative thinking flourish in the right environments. Leaders must foster this through their guidance in their planning approach. Our own refusal to think critically about ourselves and our organizations often prevents us from even recognizing what that guidance ought to be. This may be why we spend too much time attempting to solve a problem and not enough time trying to understand what the problem actually is. Military organizations hunger for progress and have a significant fear of failure, or “starting over” on something, including conceptual planning efforts. We are certain there are seven days in the week, just as there are seven steps in the military decision making process—but can we practice design without knowing how many steps to take?

NOTES

1. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, Unified Land Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office [GPO], October 2011), 11. Army Doctrine Publication 3-0 states that when the U.S. Army faces unfamiliar problems, finding “executable solutions typically requires integrating the design methodology and the MDMP (military decision making process).

2. Refer to the following Joint and U.S. Army planning doctrine for additional information on traditional military decision making: Field Manual 5-0, The Operations Process (Washington, DC-GPO, 2010); See also: Department of Defense, Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (26 December 2006).

3. The U.S. Army recently changed their term from simply “Design” to “Army Design Methodology” while the Israeli Defense Force experimented with “Systemic Operational Design” leading up to the 2005 Hezbollah War. The Australian military coined the term “Adaptive Campaigning” while the British prefer “Decision Making and Problem Solving” in their most recent conceptual planning doctrine. Other organizations use terms such as “Conceptual Planning,” “Complex System Planning,” and “Military Design” as well to identify a generally similar discipline.

4. In several planning events, we not only used Joint Planning doctrine and methodologies, but our planning teams were composed of a variety of coalition and inter-service military and law enforcement professionals.


6. Qiao Liang, Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing: People’s Liberation Army Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999), 120. “What all those military people and politicians harboring wild ambitions of victory must do is expand their field of vision, judge the hour and size up the situation, rely upon adapting the major warfare method, and clear away the miasma of the traditional view of war—Go to the mountain and welcome the sunrise.”

7. Gerald M. Weinberg, Rethinking Systems Analysis and Design (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982), 65. “One of the most effective anthropological techniques that I’ve observed is the meta-question. A meta-question is a question that directly or indirectly produces a question for an answer.”

8. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003). Lakoff and Johnson explore the importance of how culture and human values influence language and the learning process through metaphorical content.

9. On the concepts of narratives, history, and language, see: Paul Ricoeur, Translated by Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer. Time and Narrative, vol. 3 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985); See also Peter Novick, That Noble Dream (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988); See also Hayden White, The Content of the Form (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1987). How human societies construct language and consider history becomes critical in understanding why two societies perceive the same event as completely different in meaning and context.
10. Azeem Ibrahim, Afghanistan’s Way Forward Must Include the Taliban (Los Angeles Times Opinion Online, 9 December 2009), <http://articles.latimes.com/2009/ dec/09/opinion/la-oe-ibrahim09-2009dec09> (February 2011). Ibrahim quotes GEN McChrystal's opinion on how the American military had spent the last decade fighting in Afghanistan, “looking at the war in simplistic Manichean terms—save as many good guys as possible while taking out as many bad guys as possible—was a mistake.”

11. Fritjof Capra, The Web of Life (New York: Anchor Books, 1996) 29. “In the analytic, or reductionist approach, the parts themselves cannot be analyzed any further, except by reducing them to still smaller parts. Indeed, Western science has been progressing in that way.”


13. Shimon Naveh, Jim Schneider, Timothy Challans, The Structure of Operational Revolution; A Protégomea (Booz, Allen, Hamilton, 2009). 72. Military planners are “confined to the shackles” of inferiority determined by institutional paradigm, doctrine, and jargon. . . . [they] are cognitively prevented, by the very convenience of institutional interiority. . . . because the “shackles” of ritual hold them in place.

14. Jeff Conklin, Unrestricted Warfare, 2008), <http://cognexus.org/wpf/wickedproblems.pdf> (5 January 2011) 4-5. “This is the pattern of thinking that everyone attempts to follow when they are faced with a problem . . . this linear pattern as being enshrined in policy manuals, textbooks, internal standards for project management, and even the most advanced tools and methods being used and taught in the organization.”


16. Liang and Xiangsu, Unrestricted Warfare, 19. Liang and Xiangsu take an eastern perspective on Western warfare. “We still cannot indulge in romantic fantasies like an electronic game.”


21. Laszlo, The Systems View of the World; a Holistic Vision for Our Time. 2. Laszlo states knowledge is useless “pursuing depth in isolation. Rather than getting a continuous and coherent picture, we are getting fragments—remarkably detailed but isolated patterns.” See also Gary Jason, Critical Thinking; Developing an Effective System Logic (San Diego State University: Wadsworth Thomson Learning 2001), 337. “People tend to compartmentalize: they divide aspects of their lives into compartments and then make decisions about things in one compartment without taking into account the implications for things in another compartment.”

22. A typical Brigade Combat Team range sizes from 3,000 to 5,000 personnel or greater. In multiple combat deployments and evaluations of over 12 brigades at the Joint Readiness Training Center, this author witnessed at various staff levels an overwhelming frequency of targeting meetings, working groups and other compartmentalized planning efforts that generated tremendous staff work, yet often seemed to isolate and fracture unit cohesion in the process.

23. To “stove-pipe” is military jargon for developing a plan without collaborating or seeking input from the rest of the organization or those directly impacted by the plan. An Air Force pilot flying an F15, for instance, is given no complete isolation and emerges at the top in a manner akin to an organization getting surprised by a leader’s decision on a concept or plan that only a few ever knew about.


25. Gerald M. Weinberg, Rethinking Systems Analysis and Design (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982), 12. “If our previous experience with systems analysis proves anything, it proves that anyone who tries to use all the information—even about the simple systems existing today—will be drowned in paper and never accomplish anything. . . . The synthesis is someone who makes up specific plans for action, and more often than not stays around during the execution of those plans to adjust them to ongoing reality.”


27. Michel Foucault, Discourse and Truth: The Problematization of Paranoia (originally covered in six lectures given by Michel Foucault at the University of California, Berkeley in October-November, 1983, published online at <http://foucault.info/documents/paranthesi> (22 February 2012).

28. John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons From Malaya and Vietnam (Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 2002), 9. “Military organizations often demonstrate remarkable resistance to doctrinal change as a result of their organizational cultures. Organizational learning, when it does occur, tends to happen only in the wake of a particularly unpleasant or unproductive event.”

29. Field Manual (FM) 5-0, The Operations Process (Washington, DC: GPO, 2010), 2-23. Out of over 111,000 words in this doctrine, the word “nonlinear” appears three times, with very limited context and explanation.

30. FM 5-0, 2-82. Army doctrine attempts to mitigate these concerns by recommending further linear planning in the form of branch plans and sequels associated with the main plan; all are linear concepts and devoid of nonlinear form.

31. Military planning doctrine at the Joint and Service level all feature linear campaign planning along reverse-engineered lines of effort. See: FM 5-0, The Operations Process (Washington, DC: GPO, 2010); See also: Department of Defense, Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (26 December 2006); see also: Jack Kem, Campaign Planning: Tools of the Trade (Department of Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Operations, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2009); see also: Jeffrey Reilly, Operational Design: Shaping Decision Analysis through Cognitive Vision (Department of Joint Warfare Studies, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, AL, 2009). These sources feature excellent examples of linear planning, but do not explain nonlinear planning.


33. Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, 11.

34. U.S. Marine Corps, Department of the Navy, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 5, Planning, (Washington, DC: GPO, July 1997). “It is an intrinsically chaotic phenomenon that denies precise, positive control over events. . . . within the context of the complex environment of war we fully recognize it as one of the most challenging intellectual activities in which we can engage.”


36. Liang and Xiangsu, Unrestricted Warfare, 90. “It is not so much that war follows the fixed race course of rivalry of technology and weaponry as it is a game field with continually changing direction and many irregular factors.”


38. Ahl and Allen, Hierarchy Theory: A Vision, Vocabulary, and Epistemology. 1. “Contemporary society has ambitions of solving complex problems through technical understanding… the first strategy is to reduce complex problems by gaining tight control over behavior. It is a mechanical solution in the style of differential equations and Newtonian calculus.”

39. Paul Ricœur, trans. by Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer, Time and Narrative, vol. 3 (Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1988). He would not have been able to make any sense of the idea of a new event that breaks with a previous era, inaugurating a course of events wholly different from what preceded it.”
Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-90, Offense and Defense, and Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-90, Offense and Defense, were published on 31 August 2012. These two publications discuss the doctrinal fundamentals of these two elements of decisive action. They were developed in support of the Training and Doctrine Command’s Doctrine 2015 effort to produce relevant, timely, and accessible doctrine.

ADRP 3-90 is the introductory reference for all Army students of tactical art and science. ADRP 3-90 maintains the traditional tactical taxonomy upon which its two subordinate publications (FM 3-90 Volume 1, Offense and Defense, and FM 3-90 Volume 2, Reconnaissance, Security, and Tactical Enabling Tasks) will be built. ADRP 3-90 is also the source document for almost a hundred offensive and defensive tactical terms from actions on contact to zone reconnaissance. ADRP 3-90 is an executive summary of the information contained in ADRP 3-90.

To find these documents refer to the Army Publishing Directorate webpage https://armypubs.us.army.mil/index.html

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GUERRILLA LEADER: T.E. Lawrence and the Arab Revolt
James J. Schneider
Bantam Books, 2011, 368 pages, $28.00

Guerrilla Leader is a fascinating character study of Thomas Edward (T.E.) Lawrence, a.k.a. Lawrence of Arabia. The book examines Lawrence’s crucial role in transforming the Middle East while leading an Arab revolt against the Turkish Empire.

James J. Schneider, who earned his Ph.D. in history at the University of Kansas, is a military theorist and a founding faculty member of the United States Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies where he served as Professor Emeritus of Military Theory until his retirement. One of the world’s foremost experts on T.E. Lawrence, Schneider is responsible for introducing the study of Lawrence to the U.S. Army and is the author of numerous articles on Lawrence. During his research for his book, Schneider examined Lawrence’s private papers, drawing extensively from them in his writing and quoting Lawrence throughout the book with appropriate citations in the endnotes. Although Schneider’s style is easy to follow, his book is best read in pieces so the reader has time to reflect on the author’s many conclusions.

Schneider traces Lawrence’s early development as a leader. Lawrence was formally educated at Oxford where he experienced the “Oxford method” of instruction based on a course of study solidly grounded in the liberal arts but tailored to meet the needs and goals of each student. The personal relationship between student and teacher facilitated guiding the student along an intellectual journey and encouraging dialogue and debate to instill intellectual curiosity.

Lawrence’s curiosity was about “new Asia.” He immersed himself in the culture and language of the Middle East, wandering the Middle East studying the architecture of Crusader castles. He entered the British military as an intelligence officer shortly after the beginning of World War I.

Schneider describes the geopolitical situation of the period and the conditions in which Lawrence emerged as a guerrilla leader. The Ottoman Empire still existed at the beginning of World War I, and the Turks ruled over an empire united by a common religion, Islam. Schneider also briefly describes the political objectives of Great Britain, Germany, Turkey, and the Arabs. Great Britain saw the collapse of the Ottoman Empire as an opportunity to extend the British sphere of influence throughout the Middle East. German interests were to ensure regional stability by supporting the Turks. The Turkish objective was to hold Mecca, the spiritual center of gravity of the Muslim world, at all costs. Most important was the Arab objective—to establish an independent “Arab nation.”

Lawrence’s first assignment was in Cairo where he was serving when the Arab Revolt began in June 1916. It was during his time in Cairo that two tragic deaths occurred. In the span of four months, two of his younger brothers, Frank and Will, were killed in combat. Their deaths had a significant psychological effect on Lawrence, triggering what Schneider terms a “survivor’s guilt” that would haunt him for the rest of his life.

Lawrence’s involvement in the Arab Revolt began in October 1916. For the next two years, Lawrence developed into a guerrilla leader. Schneider characterizes this period as not only a period of learning for Lawrence but also a period of teaching. During this time, Lawrence matured as a leader, particularly as a leader of Arabs. He understood the leadership style required, but the period eventually took a huge physical and emotional toll on him.

Schneider describes Lawrence as a heretic. His intellectual curiosity led to his questioning accepted answers and challenging conventional thinking. For Lawrence, the Arab Revolt was a puzzle, ultimately solved by developing a novel and revolutionary solution. He concluded that “perhaps the virtue of irregulars lay in depth, not in face” and
“the smaller the unit, the better its performance.” Lawrence firmly grasped Clausewitz’s dictum to understand that nature of the war upon which you are about to embark.

Schneider’s description of the relationship among ends, ways, means, and risk in warfare is concise. He characterizes the ways in warfare as “the most creative factor as well as the most elusive” aspect of military art. Lawrence combined learning and creativity in this realm to develop a method of irregular guerrilla war perfectly suited for the situation and conditions of the desert, an asymmetric approach that leveraged the strength of the Arabs against the weakness of the Turks, foregoing the paradigm of annihilation to pursue a strategy of attrition, exhausting the opponent using lesser means. Lawrence formulated a plan to let the Turks occupy Medina and Mecca while the Arabs controlled, but did not occupy, the other 99 percent of the terrain. Essentially Lawrence’s strategy was to exhaust the Turks into submission by denying them decisive set-piece battles. Lawrence focused on constantly interdicting the Hejaz railway that linked Damascus to Medina. This strategy frustrated the Turks.

Lawrence was not only a brilliant tactician but also an operational artist and strategist. His operations with the Arab guerrillas set the conditions for General Edmund Allenby, British commander in chief in Palestine, to conduct conventional operations against the Turks. Lawrence’s greatest challenge was to lead the Arabs into accepting the strategy he designed, a strategy for which the nomadic Arabs were ideally suited. Lawrence not only framed the enemy but also the friendly forces and terrain that defined the theater of operations.

For Lawrence, the desert resembled a sea and the camel became a ship on the sea, providing the mobility for Lawrence’s revolutionary strategy to succeed. He believed that the guerrilla’s physical advantage over the conventional soldier lay in the realm of logistics. The conventional soldier connects inextricably to the requirements of logistical support. He believed logistics is not only a critical requirement for the conventional soldier but also a critical vulnerability for the guerrilla to exploit. The success of the guerrilla in irregular warfare stems from his force’s asymmetric nature, which Schneider explains in a metaphor as akin to a box of Lego toys. The guerrilla, like Legos, can be reorganized and reinvented according to the imagination and desires of its architect.

Lawrence was an advisor and confidant without the ability to directly lead and command Arab forces, but he exercised indirect leadership to achieve British political objectives. Although Lawrence did not have the authority to issue orders to the Arabs, he used his superb powers of persuasion to negotiate with Arab tribes to obtain their support and build an alliance. Lawrence’s success was due to his understanding of the Arab-Bedouin culture and his ability to earn their respect. The importance of “honor” in the Arab sense was an aspect of culture that Lawrence thoroughly understood. To the Arab, honor is everything.

Schneider characterizes Lawrence as an autonomous leader who divorced himself from personal passion and desire through self-reflection and intellectual preparation. Schneider asserts that autonomous leaders are more prone to emotional stress, which leads to depression and grief. Lawrence was frequently a victim of depression, which caused him to question his ability.

One of the challenges of an advisor is to manage personalities. Lawrence recognized that one of his most important responsibilities as a leader was to maintain the oftentimes-contentious alliance of Arab tribes. This led him to execute a Moor for the murder of a member of another tribe, a defining moment that changed him forever and marked the beginning of his emotional descent. Another event that took a significant emotional toll on Lawrence occurred when he dispatched one of his mortally wounded bodyguards. Schneider also describes how Lawrence agonized over deceiving Arabs into believing the British supported the creation of an Arab nation. Schneider terms this as the “relentless burden of leader’s grief.” Near the end of the campaign, Lawrence personally gave the order to “take no prisoners” after the battle of Tafas, south of Damascus. After two years in the desert, the demands on his leadership left him physically and emotionally spent, Lawrence was morally bankrupt.

Schneider is a gifted storyteller. The reader will appreciate his spellbinding descriptions of Lawrence’s actions. Schneider paints so vivid a picture that the reader feels like an actual observer within the story, suffering through the heat
of the desert, struggling to cross the rocky terrain, but appreciating its unique beauty. Critics will cite Schneider’s lack of explanatory footnotes as a fault in the book. However, Guerrilla Leader represents Schneider’s personal interpretation and analysis of Lawrence’s leadership during the Arab Revolt. If there is one drawback to the book, it is its lack of maps, which would have provided a useful reference for the reader.

Nevertheless, Schneider has produced a new and refreshing analysis that paints a dramatic picture of one of history’s most complex personalities. Military historians and students of leadership will find Guerrilla Leader a complement to the many other works on Lawrence and a welcome addition to their personal library.

COL Bruce J. Reider, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE INVISIBLE WOUNDS OF WAR: Coming Home from Iraq and Afghanistan,
Marguerite Guzmán Bouvard, Prometheus Books, New York, 2012, 254 pages, $18.00

With a background in political science and healing work, author Marguerite Guzmán Bouvard offers an evocative examination of Iraq and Afghanistan combat veterans and their families. Not a dry academic book, The Invisible Wounds of War comes from the author’s ongoing personal engagement with combat veterans as part of a growing network of health professionals dedicated to healing. The book is accessible, written with a wide audience in mind as it speaks to the physical and psychological damages that linger for combat veterans. Alcoholism, destructive behavior, wrecked marriages, and suicides often amplify these problems, which take a high toll not only on veterans, but also on “entire families, parents, spouses, children, and siblings.” Hence, Guzmán Bouvard dedicates a chapter on the long, arduous process of mourning and grief and how they work when anger and physical and mental injuries accompany the process.

Bouvard begins her book with a review of the political and military scene in Iraq and Afghanistan, and how the countries’ disintegration drew Americans deeper into combat in regions with harsh physical environments and atavistic tribal and religious blood feuds. One of the most puzzling aspects of the wars is the historical lack of mental health care available to combat veterans. The wars’ mental health cost in lives, more than financial resources, has been tremendous. Many returning vets feel shame over killing the innocent and losing fellow soldiers; some feel like murderers and suffer from the stress of having witnessed so much destruction while maintaining an extremely high degree of situational awareness from the threat of snipers and IEDs, the latter creating thousands of multiple amputees. Moreover, many veterans were already suffering from combat stress when they deployed due to previous lengthy deployments. To cope, thousands of vets in the war zones took anti-depressants and sleeping pills.

Bouvard reviews studies by other mental health professionals, and integrates her assessments into the testimonies of several veterans, as well as family members. Families also suffer stress, not only through notification of a loss of a spouse, son, or daughter in combat, but because their loved ones face danger. She highlights several projects that have emerged to help veterans, such as Military Families Speak Out, Gold Star Mothers, Veterans for Common Sense, and Strong Bonds. Many mothers and fathers have been instrumental in bringing awareness to Congress and Americans at large of the vast need for mental health counseling and treatment for the veterans. Bouvard devotes a chapter to the topic that suicide rates among the Army have increased six-fold since the wars began, chronicling the tragic endings of several combat veterans and citing the cases of Noah Charles Piece and Jeff Lucey.

The book closes with a chapter that explores how creative expression, particularly photography, theater, and poetry, can be part of the healing process, giving “an important voice to memory and culture” for veterans and family members. Bouvard includes some of her own poetry in the chapter, as well as that of war veteran Brian Turner.

A comprehensive and eye-opening work, The Invisible Wounds of War is more than just informative and caring; it is urgent.

Jeffrey C. Alfer, USAF, Retired, Torrance, California

WILLIAM MURRAY, Richard Hart Sinnreich, James Lacey, and other noted scholars have written a fascinating book detailing the complexities and risks of developing and executing grand strategy. The authors present historical case studies of renowned leaders’ experiences and strategic events that shaped grand strategy. The book begins with King Louis XIV of France, followed by the Seven Years’ War, Otto von Bismarck, British strategic transformation, and Neville Chamberlain. It ends with a look at U.S. presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman.

A theme that resonates in the book is that grand strategy is rarely well conceived or successful. In only two of the seven cases presented, Franklin D. Roosevelt (World War II strategy) and Harry S. Truman (containment strategy), did grand strategy achieve its end state or long-term goal. The authors attribute Roosevelt and Truman’s success to their willingness to adapt to constantly changing environments, their ability to see things as they were and not as they wished them to be, their understanding of the finiteness of national resources, and their desire not to fall victim to ambition. They understood their nation’s enemies and explicitly used their militaries as a political tool of deterrence or last resort.

On the other hand, King Louis XIV exhausted the resources of France with an overly ambitious grand strategy to make France the preeminent power of Europe by military coercion and war. Louis XIV greatly miscalculated the resolve of France’s neighbors to rally against him. Worse, he remained defiant and unwilling to adjust his grand strategy. In essence, this led to the bankrupting of France, and in the end, left it in a significantly weaker strategic position.

British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain also made monumental miscalculations leading up to World War II. Chamberlain was convinced that Hitler could be reasoned with, that the British should not panic over Hitler’s perceived ambitions by needlessly shoring up its defense posture, and that Hitler was not looking to acquire territory beyond that with historical ethnic ties to Germany. Chamberlain’s miscalculation cost Britain an opportunity to adequately prepare for its eventual war with Germany.

Events such as these and others described in the book lead the reader to conclude that the U.S. post-Cold War approach to statecraft is eerily similar to that which led to the demise of past great powers and should be a cautionary tale for the designers of future U.S. grand strategy.

The authors’ comprehensive research and in-depth analysis of events are riveting. Each of the book’s chapters can be read independent of the others; however, they are best read together. This book is a must read for government and military historians, political science and international relations students and scholars, and those who develop and execute statecraft.

David A. Anderson, Ph.D., LtCol, USMC, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


ISRAEL’S PALESTINIANS REVEALS that the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is both simple to understand and deeply complex. At the center, the Israelis believe they are entitled to the land known as Israel, while the Palestinians believe they are entitled to the land they call Palestine. Unfortunately, both sides claim the same land, and religious Jewish Israelis and religious Muslim Palestinians believe that God gave them the land, and that to give it up to another people is an insult to God and a sin.

The crux of the book Israel’s Palestinians centers on this quote: “[The Palestinians] suffer from numerous inequities, tacit discrimination, government neglect, and social prejudice. They are largely excluded from the country’s public life, they have not been integrated socially or economically, and they are generally treated with suspicion by the state and by Israeli Jewish society. As such, collectively, Arabs are very much second-class citizens in Israel.”
Ilan Peleg and Dov Waxman provide large amounts of information, with a great deal of detail, primarily about the period from 1948 to 2010. The focus of their argument is that the Jewishness of Israel has been maintained more forcefully than its democratic character. They go on to suggest policies that will allow Israel to maintain much of its Jewish culture within the government, but be more protective of all citizens’ rights, not just the Jewish citizens. In Chapter 7, the authors disclose 10 policies to enhance the rights of Palestinians in Israel and freely admit how difficult many would be to implement. Some of these policies may seem impossible to implement, but unless the Israelis and Palestinians are equal citizens of Israel, the conflict will continue forever.

These policies or recommendations are excellent. Some significant examples: nominating Palestinian citizens to positions of responsibility in all parts of the government bureaucracy, especially in areas directly connected to the lives of the Palestinian community; adopting an aggressive anti-discriminatory policy to protect Palestinian citizens against official or unofficial mistreatment by public or private entities; resolving the problems of land or housing that are a constant source of friction with the state authorities; and protecting and strengthening the equal citizenship of Palestinians in Israel through the introduction of Basic Law that guarantees the citizenship of all Israelis as inalienable and inviolable.

Ultimately, this book is both interesting and educational. Readers will learn about the history of the creation of the state of Israel, movements that support the state of Israel, and the impact on the Arabs in the region. More important, readers will see these issues through the eyes of those who stand on both sides of the debate: Jewish and Muslim, Israeli and Palestinian. If you, like so many others, want to learn more in order to comprehend what is going on but simply do not know where to start, this is the place.

*Michael J. Berry, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas*
African prosperity than it was an attempt to counter China’s growing presence while securing access to African energy resources. For example, having U.S. forces training African police and doing economic development work seems to be a contradiction when America does not permit its own military forces to do so at home. Lastly, some contributors contend that AFRICOM should not be a Combatant Command since terrorism and civil conflict are dependent variables deriving from issues of impaired social development, limited democracy, and poor governance, and these challenges are all nonmilitary in nature.

_African Security and the African Command_ is already slightly dated due to the rapidity of change in Africa, Libya, and Southern Sudan, but it still provides a wide-ranging overview of African security and AFRICOM. Hence, I recommend it to academics, policymakers, and military and interagency professionals with a focus on African security, politics, and development.

*LTC Kevin D. Stringer, Ph.D., USAR Zurich, Switzerland*

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**THE GOOD WAR: NATO and the Liberal Conscience in Afghanistan**

M.J. Williams, Palgrave Macmillan
New York, 2011, 188 pages, $32.00

One of the most frustrating aspects of the war in Afghanistan is that our allies have divergent priorities as well as divergent missions, rules of engagement, and mission capabilities, which makes coordinating the efforts of NATO troops difficult at best.

M.J. Williams’ _The Good War: NATO and the Liberal Conscience in Afghanistan_ examines the discrepancy between the “European” and “American” outlooks on security, the War on Terrorism, and the form proactive defense should take.

While both Americans and Europeans are liberal—in the sense of viewing liberal democracy as a universally beneficial and stable form of government—they differ on how willing they are to reshape nonliberal countries. While Europeans generally complain about American adventurism and willingness to topple nonliberal governments, they have generally proven ready (and effective) at postwar reconstruction in places like Bosnia and Afghanistan. Williams argues that the major difference between U.S. and European foreign policies is Americans have faith in the efficacy of military force to create liberal results, while Europeans have a broader, intuition-based focus when trying to reshape a country.

Much of _The Good War_ is a review of post-Cold War NATO and U.S. foreign policies. Through the 1990s, NATO shifted its mission from reacting defensively to a potential Warsaw Pact incursion toward the aggressive promotion of peace and stability. As both Europeans and Americans saw liberal democracy as the best way to achieve world peace, NATO expanded and actively promoted democratic movements in Central and Eastern Europe. September 11 greatly expanded America’s obsession with managing or eliminating risk, which led quickly to intervention in Afghanistan. Europeans, who felt pressured to act against terrorism, saw involvement in Afghanistan as a way to support the Americans in the War on Terrorism, but avoid the much less popular Iraq war. Williams argues that NATO entered Afghanistan in 2003 as part of a global effort by Europeans to promote good government and the rule of law.

The war in Afghanistan has greatly shaped the structure, capabilities, and doctrine of NATO. It illustrates the problems of bringing a multinational coalition to a multiethnic semi-state. Due to a simple lack of military resources, Europeans generally are not nearly as committed to Afghanistan financially, militarily or politically, and there is a general Western aversion to casualties and minimal support for overseas conflict among the voting public.

_The Good War_ is not a history of NATO involvement in Afghanistan; its discussion of the actual war is minimal. Williams interestingly places Afghanistan’s well-known lack of national identity within the context of the European nation-state and the Westphalian tradition. The book is most useful in illustrating the philosophical differences between the foreign and military policy of the United States and her European allies. Williams himself is skeptical of the wisdom of NATO involvement in Afghanistan and the creation of a liberal democracy there, and his is an increasingly prevalent viewpoint.

*John E. Fahey, Lafayette, Indiana*
Author Patrick Dunleavy, a former police investigator and deputy inspector general in the New York State Department of Correctional Services, promises to explain how the U.S. prison system breeds terrorism based on radical Islamic ideologies. Dunleavy focuses on a specific inmate of the New York State prison system, Abdel Nasser Zaben, a Palestinian immigrant who drifted into criminal activity and eventually landed in the New York prison system.

Dunleavy builds a complex narrative linking Zaben to members of al-Fatah and Hamas in Palestine, radical Islamic preachers in Brooklyn, opportunistic Afro-American inmates of New York’s prisons, Black Muslim radicals, and imprisoned leaders of the Weathermen Underground, among others. Dunleavy writes well; The Fertile Soil of Jihad reads like a mystery thriller, or a conspiracy theorist’s handbook. However, it is apparent, that Dunleavy is neither a student of Islam nor of Arabic: his misinterpretation of the term haj as “journey” rather than as “pilgrimage” makes that clear. A reader might forgive this error by rationalizing that someone else misinformed the author, or that the difference is insignificant, but the implication of such a basic misunderstanding calls into question the validity of his work as a serious study of jihad as it relates to terrorism.

Much of the book’s evidence is based on coincidence and conjecture. Neither of these recommends the book as a coherently presented study. Some of the evidence to support Dunleavy’s thesis is based on faulty logic: if Zaben was in prison at the same time and same facility as inmate “B,” then Zaben must have influenced “B’s” subsequent behavior. This is guilt by association. Other evidence Dunleavy cites is footnoted as “information from a confidential source.” Information presented in this manner may well be true, but we cannot substantiate the evidence, so it does not make for a compelling argument.

A recurring theme in the book is that the U.S. prison system does a poor job of rehabilitating individuals for eventual reintroduction into the community and that the American prison system—at least the New York State version thereof—provides inmates with a graduate level education in criminal behavior and in manipulating a bureaucracy rather than providing skills and incentive to prevent recidivism.

Dunleavy illustrates how a prison inmate copes with the dangers inherent in a society of violence-prone individuals where belonging to a group is the best hope for survival. A valid insight, perhaps, and even novel when the ideas were first developed in the early years of the 20th century, but hardly revolutionary or novel now.

On the other hand, Dunleavy is not attempting to provide a coherent and convincing academic argument about “how the prison subculture fosters terrorism.” He is a true believer whose intent is to alert the reading public to the threat of radicalization within the prison system and touting the success of the interagency task force (“Operation Hades”) of which he was a part.

If one is looking for information to support the idea that Islam is at war with America, this book provides an ample supply of it. If, conversely, the reader is looking for proof that the United States is at war with Islam, this book supports that perspective as well. To quote from the Preface: “Jihad is a cultural and religious war that has no end.” Readers who are looking for a critical analysis of radical Islamic recruiting or an understanding of motivations toward terrorism will need to find another source.

There are nuggets of gold within the book’s pages. However, the reader has to sift through a lot of sand and rock to find them.

Gary R. Hobin, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

CASTRO’S SECRETS: The CIA and Cuba’s Intelligence Machine
Brian Latell, Palgrave McMillan
St. Martin’s Press, New York
2012, 247 pages, $27.00

CASTRO’S SECRETS is an account of the covert battle of intelligence communities in Castro’s Cuba and the Kennedy administration’s
BOOK REVIEWS

CIA. The author provides interviews with high-ranking Cuban defectors and former CIA officials, and compares them to interviews, public records, and declassified documents from the CIA files. His main points are that the Kennedy administration grossly underestimated the Cuban intelligence community and Castro’s power in the region, which led to confrontation in the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961. The other main point is Castro’s alleged connection to the Kennedy assassination.

One of the main subjects of the book is the highest-ranking Cuban intelligence official to ever defect. In 1987, Florentino “Tiny” Aspilliga Lombard and his wife defected to the U.S. Embassy in Vienna, Austria. Aspilliga exposes the strategies, and methods the Cuban intelligence community had been using to fool the CIA for years. He had become greatly disillusioned with the way Castro was ruining his country. Instead of being a revolutionary for democracy, Castro had become an agent of Communism, led the country into economic dependence on other nations, and ruled with an iron fist against anyone who dared to speak against him. Aspilliga explains that Castro’s greatest enemies were President John F. Kennedy and his brother, Attorney General Robert F Kennedy. Castro believed (with good reason) that the Kennedys were attempting to overthrow him and install a government friendly to the United States.

In response, Castro’s greatest weapon became agents and double agents that could infiltrate the United States as well as into U.S. governmental agencies as “moles.” Aspilliga tells in detail the games of “cat-and-mouse” the Cuban intelligence community played against the United States, exposing many of the weaknesses in the U.S. agents, and how they exploited them to stay ahead of the United States for years.

Brian Latell makes the highly plausible connection that Castro knew of Lee Harvey Oswald’s intent to assassinate President Kennedy in Dallas, but did nothing to intervene. He provides his analysis and conclusion that the assassination idea originated with Oswald, and Castro found out about it only after Oswald attempted to make contact with Cuba through their embassy in Mexico City. Oswald wanted to show his discontent for American policy and support to Cuba’s cause, but Cuba’s embassy in Mexico turned him away. There in the embassy office in front of several embassy employees, Oswald allegedly proclaimed he was going to shoot President Kennedy. The author goes on to provide testimony from a key Cuban intelligence operative that Castro ordered him to tune his intercept equipment away from Miami and listen in on Dallas traffic for anything unusual several hours before the shooting.

Aspilliga also provides insight into the mind of Fidel Castro and his mixture of obsession and paranoia about the United States. The book reveals some great insight into the strategy of the small Caribbean nation and how it has managed to remain a thorn in the side of the United States for over 50 years. A must read for those that are interested in foreign policy, especially Latin America.

LTC George Hodge, LTC, USA, Retired
Lansing, Kansas

McNAMARA, CLIFFORD, AND THE BURDENS OF VIETNAM, 1965-1969
Secretaries of Defense Historical Series
Vol. VI, Edward J. Drea, Historical Office
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Washington, DC, 2011, 694 pages, $68.00

As SECRETARY OF defense from 1961 to 1968, Robert S. McNamara completely reorganized the defense budgetary process, created the Defense Intelligence Agency and Defense Logistics Agency, and helped define the strategy of mutually assured destruction based on the nuclear triad. Yet, as Edward Drea concludes in this magnificent volume, “for all his luminous achievements, his choices that led to the Vietnam disaster will forever remain McNamara’s enduring legacy.”

Vietnam is, in fact, the major focus of this study. McNamara’s unusual combination of intellectual assurance and total loyalty to President Johnson led the secretary to a series of fatal errors. McNamara’s business instincts for efficiency, when combined with Johnson’s tendency to delay key decisions, meant the United States used military force in a series of halting, inadequate steps that continuously raised the level of stalemate in Southeast Asia without offering any opportunity for victory or settlement. For similar reasons, McNamara repeatedly deferred weapons development and
under-budgeted the costs of the war until, by 1968, U.S. defense capabilities had been stretched and degraded throughout the world. At the same time, McNamara’s analytical mind was incapable of seeing a situation from the viewpoint of anyone other than himself, whether he was attempting to dissuade the North Vietnamese government, disagreeing with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or pressuring West Germany to purchase more American-made weapons. This book explains these issues without descending to personal attacks or oversimplification of complex issues.

Indeed, the author is at pains to show how McNamara’s strengths and weaknesses reached beyond Vietnam to influence subjects as varied as the Six Day Arab-Israeli War, the renewed tensions on the Korean Peninsula, or the restructuring of American military assistance. The result is official history at its best, providing sufficient detail to understand how the Department of Defense functioned, but never losing sight of the personalities who presided over that department during one of its most controversial periods. Drea has given us a superb history that is highly readable, balanced, and of great value to the public as well as to soldiers and historians.

COL Jonathan M. House, USA, Retired
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

FATAL CROSSROADS
The Untold Story of the Malmedy Massacre at the Battle of the Bulge

FATAL CROSSROADS: THE Untold Story of the Malmedy Massacre at the Battle of the Bulge reconstructs one of the most hideous crimes against American POWs in World War II. A leading expert on the Ardennes Offensive, Danny S. Parker describes in vivid detail the events surrounding a cold December day in 1944 when the 285th Field Artillery Observation Battalion was intercepted at a crossroads near Malmedy, Belgium. The American troops, lacking adequate weaponry, quickly surrendered to an SS tank column commanded by Jochen Peiper. The prisoners were herded into a nearby field where SS soldiers savagely opened fire with machine guns. Miraculously, over 40 of the American soldiers survived.

Parker provides a unique perspective using eyewitness accounts of the American survivors, the SS soldiers, and local civilian descriptions of the horrific events of Malmedy. The book opens with a graphic depiction of the massacre as experienced by Staff Sergeant William Hite Merriken. He describes the bitter agony he endured laying upon the frozen ground attempting to appear dead while suffering from two severe bullet wounds to the back. He uttered not a sound as an SS soldier shot the man lying atop of him, and the bullet pierced through into his own knee. As he lay helpless, convinced that he was dying, Merriken reflected upon his life and loved ones.

Parker brings new evidence to life—the autopsy reports of the 285th. For months, the bodies lay frozen in the field at Malmedy. The icy conditions worked to preserve the corpses. Several had multiple gunshot wounds while others had powder burns indicating they were shot at close range. Vehicles had crushed some of them, while others died of severe head injuries. The most disturbing were the cringing positions of the bodies of the deceased and their haunting facial expressions.

Parker’s discussion reveals that U.S. investigators used debatable methods during the war crime trials of the SS soldiers at Malmedy, resulting in the erroneous arrest and sentencing of many. The author reveals what life after prison was like for some of the alleged shooters. Jochen Peiper was eventually murdered in a house fire in May 1976 after several death threats. Several of the convicted SS continued to deny their involvement in the massacre for the remainder of their lives. One former soldier expressed the deep regret he lived with daily because of his participation at Malmedy. He believed forgiveness was not attainable for such a horrendous act.

Writing in a spirited style, Parker reconstructs the events of the Malmedy Massacre to appeal to an expansive audience. Readers of the DOD community will appreciate his thoroughness in relation to strategy and military jargon. The amount of research is evident throughout the book from start to finish. Fatal Crossroads provides a valuable analysis of the Malmedy Massacre through firsthand accounts of its victims, perpetrators, and observers. It provides a unique, realistic awareness of wartime atrocities.

Siobhan E. Ausberry, Washington, DC
HERE ARE FEW characters in history who help shape entire eras. There are even fewer who we remember for doing so. George C. Marshall was such a man. He utilized his strategic prowess as much as his personal humility to organize the Allies for victory in World War II and to establish the Cold War world afterward. In George C. Marshall: Servant of the American Nation, Charles F. Brower has compiled key essays from a symposium held at the Virginia Military Institute, the general’s alma mater, on the 50th anniversary of Marshall’s death. This is a significant work because it provides a balanced assessment of the general’s notable achievements, offers multi-faceted insight into his personality, and suggests that his life remains a model for public service.

The editor has gathered top authors from diverse fields to address myriad aspects of Marshall’s public life. The field of experts includes historians noted for their depth of knowledge and candor. Williamson Murray and Paul Miles profile the soldier and the essence of his followership. Scholars Nicolaus Mills and Barry Machado assess Marshall’s role as a statesman and peacemaker during the tumultuous early years of the Cold War. Stewart W. Husted and Gerald M. Pops bring a unique perspective from the business and public administration world when analyzing Marshall as a leader and manager. No one essay stands out over the others. The book’s organization allows the reader to appreciate the broad context of this great life.

In addition, the book presents a keen insight into Marshall’s personality. Brower achieves this by presenting Marshall’s responses, rather than others’ interpretations of them, and allows readers to determine the implications for themselves.

There are both admirable and imperfect features of this complicated persona. For example, Mills describes Marshall’s extensive role in orchestrating the long-term economic recovery of post-war Europe in a creative plan named after him—and for which he would receive the Nobel Peace Prize in 1953. Yet, James I. Matray explains how Secretary Marshall’s passive demeanor and his blind trust in the field commanders helped to extend the Korean conflict. This candid editorial approach is rather refreshing, considering that the material emanates from a conference of Marshall aficionados held at his school in his honor. By reading this book, one can sympathize with a great American—who faced great challenges with fortitude, optimism, and remarkable but fallible judgment.

Finally, Marshall’s life is a paragon of public service and strategic leadership, and it is in this light that he offers the clearest illustration of selfless service for today’s generations. More than most of his colleagues, George Marshall understood the undeniable and critical relationship between policy and strategy. Perhaps his greatest gift to the present generation was his public choices informed by a lifelong pursuit of learning. Josiah Bunting, III, notes the general was apt to quote Pericles when issuing guidance to his staff. It is no wonder that contemporary readers, surrounded by leaders who readily make decisions with little concern for long-term repercussions, are still attracted to George Marshall. He is the epitome of an American who is not afraid to advocate his principles on the world stage.

Readers who enjoy reading about the intricacies of a public life infused with challenges on a scale never before experienced will find tremendous value in Servant of the American Nation. Brower rightly cites Churchill’s exhortation, “Succeeding generations must not be allowed to forget his achievement and his example.”

LTC David T. Culkin, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

FATAL COLOURS: Towton 1461
England’s Most Brutal Battle

THE BATTLE OF Towton during the War of the Roses may pale in comparison to other larger-scale conflicts in terms of tactics, weapons used, or casualty figures, but in close hand-to-hand exchange, few can match its ferocity. The combatants on both sides were of the same heritage and culture, spoke the same language, and fought in the same way in small-scale battles. During this time, there were well-established modes of conduct in
diplomacy, chivalry, and displays of mercy on the battlefield. However, what happens when this system breaks down?

It is 15th Century England and little more than a decade has passed since the territories in France (save for Calais) were lost to England for all time. Riffs in government, inability to gain an audience with the king (Henry VI who displayed symptoms such as mania, irrational outbursts, and an inability to socialize in court), and his advisors corruption has prompted one of the largest-scale confrontations of the time. Nearly 10 percent of the population (around 750,000 eligible participants) took part in the action. Each side fielded numbers that superseded any to date and included thousands of “naked men” (those who lacked armor or proper armament). On one side (Lancasters) were allied powers from the north, Scots and French cohorts who supported the current king, Henry VI. On the Yorkish side were mostly southerners led by the newly identified King Edward IV (not anointed, but more or less “appointed” until the contest was decided). The complexity of the sides and the differing roles and benefits or each contingent lay within a very complicated framework of history, family heritage, ambition, and wealthy merchant influences.

Among several key concepts requiring discussion, bastard feudalism and the Commissions of Array are the most relevant. Bastard feudalism was a medium to supply kings with labor for conflicts at home and abroad, which the nobles managed. Many nobles were able to influence campaigns, the tactical nature of battles and political outcomes for future governing decisions. It also allowed the country to be more effectively “governed.” An allegiance, if violated, could mean annihilation for a lord or duke.

The other important concept was that of Commissions of Array, a precursor to the modern “draft.” This mobilization element was capable of putting many more thousands onto a battlefield in support of the king as a representative of divine right to rule. The challenge at Towton is that both sides claimed these commissions. The resulting massacres and terrible carnage were merely another side effect of these often-simplistic concepts.

The Battle of Towton was the high-water mark of the War of the Roses. It reset the kind of warfare kings, nobility, and common soldiery could expect thereafter; disrupted the royal line of ascension to the crown of England; and effectively eliminated the divine protection of the king in the event he failed to live up to the expectations of his office. The norms of chivalry and diplomacy waned with the battlefield examples of Agincourt, Northampton, and Ferrybridge. With Towton came the final chapter and the advent of a new system of governing and a new definition of the right to rule.

COL Thomas S. Bundt, Ph.D., Tacoma, Washington

UNITED STATES CAVALRY PEACEKEEPERS IN BOSNIA: An Inside Account of Operation Joint Endeavor, 1996

UNITED STATES CAVALRY Peacekeepers in Bosnia is a surprisingly captivating and informative read, firmly grounded at the tactical level, but with operational and strategic insights.

The study recounts the actions of the officers and soldiers of 1st Squadron, 4th U.S. Cavalry (Quarterhorse) and its attached units during operations in Bosnia in the mid-1990s in support of NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR) mission—the first ever ground operation supported by NATO. The account of the yearlong mission in one of the most challenging areas of the American sector reveals the bravery, perseverance, and agility of U.S. forces against a complex and fast-paced political backdrop still heated from three and a half years of ethnically motivated civil war.

Although there have been many broad-brush accounts of Operation Joint Endeavor, Mark A. Viney’s book skillfully uncovers all aspects of the operation—including predeployment training, continuation training in theater, and post-operation recovery—from a battalion perspective. Key personalities become familiar to the reader and the insights of commanders and soldiers alike are enlightening. The book also highlights the realities and challenges of those left behind. Above all, United States Cavalry Peacekeepers in Bosnia reveals the human face of “stability operations”—a term rarely in use today—the realities, dangers, and frustrations of those tasked with the difficult duty of upholding peace in a faraway country.
cavalrymen received the Soldiers Medal; to drive the mission forward in a land of ubiquitous mines and the sporadic threat of attack, acts of courage were commonplace.

*United States Cavalry Peacekeepers in Bosnia* is a well-researched, balanced account of one of the first combat units to enter Bosnia in early 1996. Viney’s style is candid, straightforward, and easygoing. He recounts the battalion’s story clearly, logically, and without fuss. Numerous pictures and detailed mapping illuminate the account and are genuinely beneficial to the lay reader. The study closes with a useful and perceptive conclusion discussing domestic support, force protection (minimizing casualties as a measure of success), decentralized execution, alcohol consumption, logistic support, and leadership. He also touches on the problematic subject of low morale in the late 1990s and the exodus of quality individuals at the dawn of the new millennium.

In sum, *United States Cavalry Peacekeepers in Bosnia* is enjoyable, informative, and captivating. It will appeal to historians, students of the region, and serving cavalrymen. The book is also broadly relevant to the ongoing Global War on Terrorism; the doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures of many of today’s contemporary operations have their origins in the stability operations of the 1990s. As Viney posits, “The lessons learned, or more correctly in some instances rediscovered, by our peacekeepers in Bosnia surely resonate with deployed soldiers today.” Not an obvious bedside book, but one certainly very worthy of consideration.

Lt Col Andrew M. Roe, Ph.D., British Army
Episkopi Garrison, Cyprus

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**An Army Outgunned—A Response**

Mr. Matt Walker and Mr. Rob Harbison, Lethality Branch, Soldier Requirement Division, MCO—In Dr. Joseph P. Avery’s article “An Army Outgunned” (*Military Review*, July-August 2012) he poses some excellent hypotheses about improving U.S. Army small arms and ammunition. Unfortunately, he also makes a few factually inaccurate statements about the M855A1 Enhanced Performance Round (EPR) and unsubstantiated remarks about the suitability and effectiveness of the M4 series carbine rifle.

Dr. Avery argues that our current weapon and ammunition is inadequate. Although formal Army analysis has also identified gaps in squad lethality, the difference in the conclusions is that the formal analysis includes all of the contributors to target effect, including training and soldier skills. In 2008, the Department of the Army approved the Infantry Center (now Maneuver Center of Excellence, or MCoE) Small Arms Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA). That document lays the foundation for mitigating capability gaps including but not limited to materiel acquisitions. The Army’s own published analysis refutes Dr. Avery’s claim that the American military is not willing to criticize our current systems.

Dr. Avery’s focus on the weapons and ammunition to improve soldier effectiveness overlooks important factors including target identification, marksmanship skills, ranging error, and other factors not directly related to weapon or ammunition. Dr. Avery suggests that by simply changing weapon and caliber, soldiers would gain an operational advantage over existing systems. The Army must take a critical approach to potential solutions before making conclusions about operational effectiveness. Government acquisition programs cannot be based on anecdotal analysis or hearsay. An example is Dr. Avery’s suggestion that other weapons are more reliable than the M16/M4 series weapons in use by the Army today. While every instance of weapon failure is tragic and warrants investigation, there are also field reports that the M4 is performing well. When the MCoE surveys
soldiers after deployments, only a minority of them describe the M4 as ineffective, although those comments are noteworthy nonetheless.

Is there room for improvement? Absolutely, and Dr. Avery is quite correct in a broad sense. Contrary to Dr. Avery’s claim that, “The M16 appears to have taken on the mantle of the ‘Holy Grail’ of the American military,” the Army has several ongoing efforts to improve the M4. There is an ongoing test of alternative weapons provided by industry to potentially replace the M4. This test will be one of the first robust side-by-side studies of how the M4 stacks up against other weapons. The previous testing conducted to date on the M4 indicates the opposite of Dr. Avery’s claims, and suggests that the M4 is in fact a durable, reliable weapon.

Dr. Avery’s comment that “every serious comparative assessment by a broad range of national and international weapons experts has concluded that our current BCW is operationally timeworn,” ignores the fact that for Army acquisition, the U.S. Army must follow federal guidelines for testing. The Army, by the direction of the Congress, cannot base acquisition decisions on external tests, regardless of their findings or how compelling the results may seem.

Throughout the article, Dr. Avery refers to metrics such as stopping power, transfer of energy, knockdown power, and kill capability. Despite the prolific use of these terms in the civilian firearms enthusiast community, they are not used by the Army to assess terminal performance because they are not easily tested and are not good indicators of terminal effect. The aforementioned Small Arms CBA uses metrics for quantifying lethality gaps that are testable. During the early stages of development of the M855A1 EPR, an ad hoc committee of experts from Army laboratories, TRADOC, materiel developers, and other subject-matter-experts tackled the issue of terminal performance metrics. The committee established a rigorous protocol for assessing terminal performance. Results of the protocol became classified, so the process does not lend itself to adoption by civilian or commercial entities. To summarize this complicated issue, terminal effects are difficult to measure, but the Army has a rigorous methodology that is testable, measurable, and operationally relevant.

Dr. Avery claims that, “It is not certain what additional range the 5.56mm Enhanced Performance Round will realize in a mountainous environment, nor what its terminal effectiveness is at any range.” The answers to both of these questions are well known to the Army. M855A1 EPR was not designed to increase the range of the M4, but rather to make the terminal performance of the ammunition more consistent within the effective range of the weapon. M855A1 EPR is the most-tested round the Army has every fielded, with over 1,000,000 rounds fired in developmental testing. Admittedly, the terminal effects may not be well known to those outside of the agencies involved, but all of the government agencies with a role in the testing and fielding of M855A1 have access to the terminal effects of the round. A noteworthy feature of the fielding of M855A1 is the inclusion of the terminal effects protocol for testing soft target performance during lot acceptance testing to ensure Soldiers are getting consistent ammunition. The M855A1 is the first round to undergo such a rigorous test during lot acceptance.

Dr. Avery’s suggestions that an alternate caliber and alternative weapons could provide soldiers with better performance are excellent hypotheses. However, they are hypotheses, not conclusions. The U.S. Army is continuously examining our current capability and researching ways to provide soldiers the best equipment in the world, which is nothing less than they deserve.

65th Infantry Regiment

LTC Baltazar Soto, U.S. Army Reserve, Retired—I want to discuss some points about COL Thomas Graves’ article “General Richard Cavazos and the Korean War, 1953” (July-August 2012 Military Review). In the article he states that the 65th Infantry Regiment was part of the “Puerto Rican National Guard.” In 1953, the 65th Infantry Regiment was part of the Regular Army. The regiment was first created on 2 March 1899 by act of Congress as “Porto Rico Battalion of Volunteer Infantry.” On 30 June 1908, it became part of the Regular Army and called “Porto Rico Regiment of Infantry, United States Army.” On 14 September 1920, it was designated as the 65th Infantry Regiment. The 65th stayed in the Regular Army until it was inactivated on 10 April 1956. It was not until 6 February 1959 that this regiment was allotted to the Puerto Rico National Guard.
believe the 65th is possibly the only U.S. Army unit to transition from the Regular Army into the National Guard. The 1st Battalion, 65th Infantry is still part of the Puerto Rico National Guard today.

Another point is that he says there was a wholesale “panic” on 26 October 1952. This is completely wrong. There were three battles of Jackson Heights in which the 65th Infantry participated, one heroically and two not so well. The first battle occurred between 25-28 October 1952 in which G Company, 2nd Battalion, 65th Infantry held the position in a heroic battle for three days and four nights fighting off an estimated Chinese Battalion. On the last night of 27-28 October, G Company was ordered to retreat, when the Chinese surrounded G Company and penetrated their position. Captain Jackson succeeded in leading his company in a fighting advance to the rear, back to the main line. For this, the position was named after Jackson, “Jackson Heights.” Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Jackson finally received the Silver Star 50 years later after I researched the battle and requested that the US Army formally decorate him. The ceremony was held at Fort McPherson, Georgia, on 6 December 2002.

The second battle was on the morning of 28 October 1952 when F Company, followed by A Company, counterattacked to retake the heights. The battle lasted all day, until the vast majority of enlisted men “bugged out.” This incident may be the battle Colonel Graves is talking about in his article about the 65th and General Cavazos, but it occurred on 28 October, not 26 October.

The third and last battle occurred on 29 October 1952, when C Company counterattacked. The unit retreated when they conquered the heights, observed all the dead bodies, and discovered Jackson Heights was solid rock and they could not dig in. The soldiers refused orders to stay, believing it to be a suicide mission.

There are many reasons for the failure of the 65th Infantry at Jackson Heights. Most of the Puerto Rican soldiers who bugged out as a result of the battles were rounded up and court-martialed. Not one continental white officer, platoon leader, company commander, or battalion commander in any leadership position in the 65th was punished, except perhaps Jackson who had to wait 50 years for his medal. Continental leaders were promoted or given medals. All the soldiers and officers who were punished as a result of these battles, including a company executive officer and the a battalion commander, were Puerto Rican, another example of the discrimination and bigotry that existed in those days.

COL Graves responds—I appreciate LTC Soto taking the time to help set the record straight on the 65th’s actions in Korea. His comments show that these are important events in our military history and deserve more research and study. They have much to teach us about leadership, combat, and equality.

**Just War Theory and Democratization by Force**

Joseph P. Avery, Ph.D., National Security and Foreign Policy—Dr. Cora Sol Goldstein’s article “Just War Theory and Democratization by Force: Two Incompatible Agendas” (September-October 2012, Military Review) is an excellent and thought-provoking article with a number of prominent points backed by historical facts, and I agree with her presentation of the overall theory.

There are additional factors that make the task of democratization difficult in that part of the world during time of war and peace. In addition to the excellent analysis by Dr. Goldstein, you can fold in other aggravating issues raised by Samuel P. Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations, where popular cultural and religious conflicts often have priority over governments and their policies, and can lead to widespread conflicts and difficulty in instituting stable, democratic institutions and regimes.

In the middle of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, you can also factor in the propositions outlined in the seminal work Political Order in Changing Societies, which posits that the process of social and societal modernization that we are attempting to institute itself causes instability (and backlash) if not combined with a program of political and institutional modernization—little which have occurred in these areas. These regimes are basically corrupt, and that makes the task of democratization almost impossible under these circumstances as described by Dr. Goldstein.

On the other hand, democracy is not always the right answer, and often causes great instability...
when undesired. When the Soviet Union collapsed, creating new nuclear states like Ukraine, the United States was hammering Ukraine to both relinquish its nuclear weapons and form a democratic government at a time when the country was extremely unstable, close to civil war, and when Ukrainian leaders were trying to form any type of government at all while forestalling total collapse. America often fails to see the big picture and rarely travels outside its ideologically driven preconceived notions of government, world order, and the proper application of military force. I applaud this Just War article.

The Next Time We Reinvent Someone Else’s Country...

William Thayer, San Diego CA—In Major General Michael Symanski’s excellent article, “The Next Time We Reinvent Someone’s Else’s Country . . .” (September-October 2012, Military Review), his “scar tissue learning” integrates the theories of political science, social and cultural science, military science, historical precedence, and a huge dose of practical experience and common sense propositions that leads the reader to the startling revelation that we should focus on our past mistakes, lessons learned, and experiences prior to future military commitments. To accomplish this, his outstanding assessment requires our sophisticated national security institutions to think, plan, and integrate all of the above.

Obviously, we have not been successful. If this was done, our strategy in Afghanistan would be quite different, and less expensive. General Symanski’s recommendations pass the common sense sniff test: work within the confines of the Afghan social structure, do things the Afghan way rather than making them do it our way, play to the native strengths and not waste our resources in a forlorn hope of replacing its deeply ingrained cultural and institutional traditions, and analyze the conditions of the campaign before defining its objectives. Like people everywhere, Afghan’s seek stability, security, leadership (even at tribal level), some semblance of certainty, and prosperity. Prosperity can lead to security and stability, but you also need security and stability to generate prosperity. That’s where tribal leaders can help. As the general asks, “Who will pay for Afghan political stability after we leave?” Equally important, who or what will be providing it, if anyone?

The United States has still not understood that our international war on terrorism is primarily a war of culture, religion, and propaganda—not guns and bullets. How can we win such a conflict when after ten years of war in Afghanistan, most Afghans don’t even know why we are fighting there, according to one survey. Democratic government is not the solution to everything. It may prove more useful to shift our focus on supporting and establishing good relations with tribal leaders and warlords rather than propping up an unpopular central government with a low probability of survival.

After we leave, the Taliban would have a more difficult time reestablishing their iron grip on the country under such circumstances. If the author’s conclusions are correct, and I believe history has confirmed that they are, we may need to establish a “Joint Strategic Engagement Directorate” within the DOD composed of State Department, DOD, and academic and intelligence agency representatives to prepare now for future conflicts and contingencies by actually thinking about and integrating the aforementioned factors into our political and military planning for future contingencies.

We also need to change gears on our international war on terrorism from solely guns, bullets, and drones to establishment of a large special operations campaign of “counter-propaganda” on how the black flag of Al-Qaeda is little more than a flag of black death for Muslims and a stain on their honorable religion. Al-Qaeda has probably caused the death of more Muslims than individuals from any other religious sect.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TITLE INDEX</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“A Failure to Engage: Current Negotiation Strategies and Approaches,” MAJ Aram Donigian, USA, and Professor Jeff Weiss (May-Jun): 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“A Leader’s Grief: T.E. Lawrence, Leadership, and PTSD,” James J. Schneider, Ph.D. (Jan-Feb): 75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“A New Doctrine Framework for the Land Component Forces,” MAJ Christopher Henry, USA (Jan-Feb): 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“A Strategic-Level Intelligence Advisor’s Lessons Learned,” Welton Chang (Jul-Aug): 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“An Asset Out of You and Me: Communicating What It Truly Means to be a Soldier,” COL Lawrence J. Morris, J.D., USA, Retired (Sep-Oct): 42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The Afghan National Army: Has Capacity Building Become Culture Building?” SFC Keith W. Norris, USA (Nov-Dec): 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Army Leader Development and Leadership: Views from the Field,” Ryan M. Hinds and John P. Steel, Ph.D. (Jan-Feb): 39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Battered Spouse Syndrome: How to Better Understand Afghan Behavior,” COL Erik W. Goepner, USAF (Jan-Feb): 59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“CGSC: Developing Leaders to Adapt and Dominate for the Army of Today and Tomorrow,” BG (P) Gordon B. “Skip” Davis, Jr., USA, and LTC James B. Martin, USA, Retired, Ph.D. (Sep-Oct): 63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Command Responsibility and Accountability,” LTC Joe Doty, Ph.D., USA, Retired, and CPT Chuck Doty, USN, Retired (Jan-Feb): 35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Counter-IED Strategy in Modern War,” CPT David F. Eisler, USA (Jan-Feb): 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Customary Law and Its Challenges to Afghan Statehood,” Kathleen Reedy, Ph.D. (Sep-Oct): 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Developing an Effective Command Philosophy,” LTC Harry C. Garner, USA, Retired (Sep-Oct): 75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Female Engagement Teams: The Need to Standardize Training and Employment,” LTC Janet R. Holloway, USA (Mar-Apr): 90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Fulfilling the Promise: A Joint Corps for a Joint Military,” LTC Paul Darling, Alaska ARNG, and LT Justin Lawlor, USNR (May-Jun): 82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“General Richard Cavazos and the Korean War, 1953: A Study in Combat Leadership,” COL Thomas C. Graves, USA (Jul-Aug): 65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Harnessing Initiative and Innovation: A Process for Mission Command,” LTC Chip Daniels, USA, MAJ Mark Huhtanen, USA, and MAJ John Poole, USA (Sep-Oct): 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The Individual Ready Reserve: Reforming the Army’s Hidden Legions,” Garri Benjamin Hendell (Jul-Aug): 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“In Search of the Good War: Just War and Realpolitik in Our Time,” COL Thomas W. McShane, J.D., USA, Retired (Sep-Oct): 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Integrating Intelligence and Information: Ten Points for the Commander,” LTG Michael T. Flynn, USA, and BG Charles A. Flynn, USA (Jan-Feb): 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The Joy of Officership,” CPT Mark Adamshick, Ph.D., USA, Retired (Jul-Aug): 73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The Lessons of Libya,” Amitai Etzioni (Jan-Feb): 45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Leaving the Service as a Form of Dissent,” MAJ Daniel J. Sennott, USA (Mar-Apr): 64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The Lessons of Libya,” Amitai Etzioni (Jan-Feb): 45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Lost in Transmission: How the Army has Garbled the Message about the Nature of Its Profession,” ILT Anthony M. Formica, USA (Mar-Apr): 44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The Next Time We Reinvent Someone Else’s Country . . .” MG Michael W. Symanski, USA, Retired (Sep-Oct): 82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Nothing is Simple in Afghanistan: The Principles of Sustainment and Logistics in Alexander’s Shadow,” CPT Andrew P. Betson, USA (Sep-Oct): 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Operational Contract Support: Five Things Every Field Grade Officer Should Know,” LTC William C. Latham, Jr., USA, Retired (May-Jun): 16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AUTHOR INDEX

A

B
Barrett, LTC Clark C., Ph.D., Michigan ARNG, “The Right Way: A Proposal for an Army Ethic” (Nov-Dec): 2
Betson, CPT Andrew P., USA, “Nothing is Simple in Afghanistan: The Principles of Sustainment and Logistics in Alexander’s Shadow” (Sep-Oct): 50
Brackin, MAJ Steven T., Texas ARNG, “Reframing Army Doctrine: Operational Art, the Science of Control, and Critical Thinking” (Nov-Dec): 68

C
Chang, Welton, “A Strategic-Level Intelligence Advisor’s Lessons Learned” (Jul-Aug): 18
Clark, COL Chadwick, Ed.D., USA, and LTC Richard L. Kiper, Ph.D., USA, Retired, “Strategic Thinking in an Era of Persistent Conflict” (May-Jun): 25

D
Daniels,” LTC Chip, USA; MAJ Mark Huhtanen, USA; and MAJ John Poole, USA, “Harnessing Initiative and Innovation: A Process for Mission Command” (Sep-Oct): 18
Darling, LTC Paul T., Alaska ARNG, and LT Justin Lawlor, USNR, “Uncomfortable Questions” (Mar-Apr): 21
Davis, BG (P) Gordon B. “Skip”, Jr., USA, and LTC James B. Martin, Ph.D., USA, Retired, “CGSC: Developing Leaders to Adapt and Dominate for the Army of Today and Tomorrow” (Sep-Oct): 63
Donigian, MAJ Aram, USA, and Professor Jeff Weiss, “A Failure to Engage: Current Negotiation Strategies and Approaches” (May-Jun): 47
Huhtanen, MAJ Mark, USA; LTC Chip Daniels, USA; and MAJ John Holliday, LTC Janet R., USA, “Female Engagement Teams: The Need for Command Responsibility and Accountability” (Jan-Feb): 35

Fenlason, MSG Jeffrey E., USA, and LTC Joe Doty, Ph.D., USA, Retired, “Real Lessons Learned for Leaders after Years of War” (Mar-Apr): 81

Finney, CPT Nathan K., USA, and CPT Nathan K. Finney, USA, “Preventing Mass Atrocities in Sub-Saharan Africa through Strategic Engagement” (Nov-Dec): 24

Flynn, LTG Michael T., USA, and LTG Michael T. Flynn, USA, “Integrating Intelligence and Information: Ten Points for the Commander” (Jan-Feb): 4


Flynn, LTG Michael T., USA, and BG Charles A. Flynn, USA, “Integrating Intelligence and Information: Ten Points for the Commander” (Jan-Feb): 4

Formica, 1LT Anthony M., USA, “Lost in Transmission: How the Army has Garbled the Message about the Nature of Its Profession” (Mar-Apr): 44

Garner, LTC Harry C., USA, Retired “Developing an Effective Command Philosophy” (Sep-Oct): 75

Ghazala, Ala’a, “Thank You, American Soldier” (Mar-Apr): 95

Goepner, COL Erik W., USAF, “Battered Spouse Syndrome: How to Better Understand Afghan Behavior” (Jan-Feb): 59

Goldstein, Cora Sol, Ph.D., “Just War Theory and Democratization by Force: Two Incompatible Agendas” (Sep-Oct): 2


Graves, COL Thomas C., USA, “General Richard Cavazos and the Korean War, 1953: A Study in Combat Leadership” (Jul-Aug): 65

Halter, LTC Scott M., USA, “What is an Army but the Soldiers? A Critical Assessment of the Army’s Human Capital Management System” (Jan-Feb): 16

Hendell, Garri Benjamin, “The Individual Ready Reserve: Reforming the Army’s Hidden Legions” (Jul-Aug): 53

Henry, MAJ Chris R., USA, and CPT Nathan K. Finney, USA, “Preventing Mass Atrocities in Sub-Saharan Africa through Strategic Engagement” (Nov-Dec): 13

Henry, MAJ Christopher, USA, “A New Doctrine Framework for the Land Component Forces” (Jan-Feb): 68

Hinds, Ryan M., and John P. Steel, Ph.D., “Army Leader Development and Leadership: Views from the Field” (Jan-Feb): 39

Holliday, LTC Janet R., USA, “Female Engagement Teams: The Need to Standardize Training and Employment” (Mar-Apr): 90

Huhtanen, MAJ Mark, USA; LTC Chip Daniels, USA; and MAJ John Poole, USA, “Harnessing Initiative and Innovation: A Process for Mission Command” (Sep-Oct): 18

K

Kaya, Karen, “Turkey and the Arab Spring” (Jul-Aug): 26

Kemp, Robert, Department of State, “Development and COIN in Regional Command-East, 2004-2008” (May-Jun): 2

Kiper, LTC Richard L., Ph.D., USA, Retired, and COL Chadwick Clark, Ed.D., USA, “Strategic Thinking in an Era of Persistent Conflict” (May-Jun): 25

L

Latham, LTC William C., Jr., USA, Retired, “Operational Contract Support: Five Things Every Field Grade Officer Should Know” (May-Jun): 16

Lawlor, LT Justin, USNR, and LTC Paul Darling, Alaska ARNG, “Fulfilling the Promise: A Joint Corps for a Joint Military” (May-Jun): 82

Lawlor, LT Justin, USNR, and LTC Paul T. Darling, Alaska NG, “Uncomfortable Questions” (Mar-Apr): 21


Marrero, LTC José M., USA, and LTC Lee A. Rials, USA, Retired, “WHINSEC: Forging International Relationships, Strengthening Regional Democracies” (Jan-Feb): 55

Martin, LTC James B., Ph.D., USA, Retired, and BG (P) Gordon B. “Skip” Davis, Jr., USA, “CGSC: Developing Leaders to Adapt and Dominate for the Army of Today and Tomorrow” (Sep-Oct): 63

Martinez, MAJ Christopher, USA, “Transnational Criminal Organizations: Mexico’s Commercial Insurgency” (Sep-Oct): 58

McCreary, MAJ Matthew M., USA, “Putting the Cart Before the Horse: Strategy and the U.S. Budgetary Process” (Mar-Apr): 13

McShane, COL Thomas W., J.D., USA, Retired, “In Search of the Good War: Just War and Realpolitik in Our Time” (Sep-Oct): 9


Morris, COL Lawrence J., J.D., USA, Retired, “An Asset Out of You and Me: Communicating What It Truly Means to be a Soldier” (Sep-Oct): 42

N


Poole, MAJ John, USA; LTC Chip Daniels, USA; and MAJ Mark Huhtanen, USA, “Harnessing Initiative and Innovation: A Process for Mission Command” (Sep-Oct): 18

Prayer, LTC Douglas A., USA, “Steering America’s Warship toward Moral Communication (and Real Success) in the 21st Century” (Jan-Feb): 24

R


Reedy, Kathleen, Ph.D., “Customary Law and Its Challenges to Afghan Statehood” (Sep-Oct): 27


Rials, LTC Lee A., USA, Retired, and LTC José M. Marrero, USA, “WHINSEC: Forging International Relationships, Strengthening Regional Democracies” (Jan-Feb): 55

Roberts, Brandon, “Public Understanding of the Profession of Arms” (Nov-Dec): 41

Schneider, James J., Ph.D., “A Leader’s Grief: T.E. Lawrence, Leadership, and PTSD” (Jan-Feb): 75
Sennott, MAJ Daniel J., USA, “Leaving the Service as a Form of Dissent” (Mar-Apr): 64
Sieck, Winston R., Ph.D. and Louise J. Rasmussen, Ph.D., and “Strategies for Developing and Practicing Cross-Cultural Expertise in the Military” (Mar-Apr): 71
Steel, John P., Ph.D., and Ryan M. Hinds, “Army Leader Development and Leadership: Views from the Field” (Jan-Feb): 39
Stein, Matthew, “Uzbekistan’s View of Security in Afghanistan After 2014” (May-Jun): 75
Symanski, MG Michael W., USAR, Retired, “The Next Time We Reinvent Someone Else’s Country…” (Sep-Oct): 82

Valeski, LTC Steven, USAR, “ANA Logistics System: Getting to Afghan Right” (May-Jun): 19

Wass de Czege, BG Huba, USA, Retired, “Difficult Missions: What Logic to Apply and What Action to Take” (May-Jun): 55
Weeks, Gregory, Ph.D., and Erin Fiorey, “Policy Options for a Cuban Spring” (May-Jun): 88
Weiss, Professor Jeff, and MAJ Aram Donigian, USA, “A Failure to Engage: Current Negotiation Strategies and Approaches” (May-Jun): 47
Wiercinski, MAJ Stanley J., USA, “Policy, COIN Doctrine, and Political Legitimacy” (Nov-Dec): 22

Zweibelson, MAJ Ben, USA, “Seven Design Theory Considerations: An Approach to Ill-Structured Problems” (Nov-Dec): 80

SUBJECT INDEX

Afghanistan
“The Afghan National Army: Has Capacity Building Become Culture Building?” SFC Keith W. Norris, USA (Nov-Dec): 31
“ANA Logistics System: Getting to Afghan Right,” LTC Steven Valeski, USAR (May-Jun): 19
“Battered Spouse Syndrome: How to Better Understand Afghan Behavior,” COL Erik W. Goepner, USAF (Jan-Feb): 59
“Counter-IED Strategy in Modern War,” CPT David F. Eisler, USA (Jan-Feb): 9
“Customary Law and Its Challenges to Afghan Statehood,” Kathleen Reedy, Ph.D. (Sep-Oct): 27
“The Next Time We Reinvent Someone Else’s Country…” MG Michael W. Symanski, UARNG, Retired, (Sep-Oct): 82
“Nothing is Simple in Afghanistan: The Principles of Sustainment and Logistics in Alexander’s Shadow,” CPT Andrew P. Betson, USA (Sep-Oct): 50
“Uncomfortable Questions,” LTC Paul T. Darling, Alaska ARNG, and LT Justin Lawlor, USNR (Mar-Apr): 21

Africa

Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN)
“A New Doctrine Framework for the Land Component Forces,” MAJ Christopher Henry, USA (Jan-Feb): 68

“A Fulfilling the Promise: A Joint Corps for a Joint Military,” LTC Paul Darling, Alaska ARNG, and LT Justin Lawlor, USNR (May-Jun): 82
“The Individual Ready Reserve: Reforming the Army’s Hidden Legions,” Garri Benjamin Hendell (Jul-Aug): 53
“What is an Army but the Soldiers? A Critical Assessment of the Army’s Human Capital Management System,” LTC Scott M. Halter, USA (Jan-Feb): 16

Budget
“Putting the Cart Before the Horse: Strategy and the U.S. Budgetary Process,” MAJ Matthew M. McCreary, USA (Mar-Apr): 13

Chaplaincy
“Comprehensive Soldier Fitness: A Leader’s Grief: T.E. Lawrence, Leadership, and PTSD,” James J. Schneider, Ph.D. (Jan-Feb): 75

Contracting
“Operational Contract Support: Five Things Every Field Grade Officer Should Know,” LTC William C. Latham, Jr., USA, Retired (May-Jun): 16

Corruption and Organized Crime
“Transnational Criminal Organizations: Mexico’s Commercial Insurgency,” MAJ Christopher Martinez, USA (Sep-Oct): 58

Counterinsurgency (COIN)
“Battered Spouse Syndrome: How to Better Understand Afghan Behavior,” COL Erik W. Goepner, USAF (Jan-Feb): 59
“Counter-IED Strategy in Modern War,” CPT David F. Eisler, USA (Jan-Feb): 9
“The Next Time We Reinvent Someone Else’s Country…” MG Michael W. Symanski, USAR, Retired, (Sep-Oct): 82
“Policy, COIN Doctrine, and Political Legitimacy,” MAJ Stanley J. Wiechnik, USA (Nov-Dec): 22

“Transnational Criminal Organizations: Mexico’s Commercial Insurgency,” MAJ Christopher Martinez, USA (Sep-Oct): 58


Cuba

“Policy Options for a Cuban Spring,” Gregory Weeks, Ph.D., and Erin Fiorey (May-Jun): 88

D

Design and Military Decision Making Process


“Integrating Intelligence and Information: Ten Points for the Commander,” LTG Michael T. Flynn, USA, and BG Charles A. Flynn, USA (Jan-Feb): 4


“Observations of a Strategic Corporate,” CPL Scott R. Mitchell, USA (Jul-Aug): 58

“Policy Options for a Cuban Spring,” Gregory Weeks, Ph.D., and Erin Fiorey (May-Jun): 88

“Reframing Army Doctrine: Operational Art, the Science of Control, and Critical Thinking,” MAJ Steven T. Brackin, Texas ARNG (Nov-Dec): 68

“Seven Design Theory Considerations: An Approach to Ill-Structured Problems,” MAJ Ben Zwiebelson, USA (Nov-Dec): 80

Doctrine

“Fulfilling the Promise: A Joint Corps for a Joint Military,” LTC Paul Darling, Alaska ARNG, and LT Justin Lawlor, USNR (May-Jun): 82


“A New Doctrine Framework for the Land Component Forces,” MAJ Christopher Henry, USA (Jan-Feb): 68

“Reframing Army Doctrine: Operational Art, the Science of Control, and Critical Thinking,” MAJ Steven T. Brackin, Texas ARNG (Nov-Dec): 68

“Spectrum of What?” Paul Scharre (Nov-Dec): 73

“Steering America’s Warship toward Moral Communication (and Real Success) in the 21st Century,” LTC Douglas A. Pryer, USA (Jan-Feb): 24

Ethics; Just War Theory

“Customary Law and Its Challenges to Afghan Statehood,” Kathleen Reedy, Ph.D. (Sep-Oct): 27


“In Search of the Good War: Just War and Realpolitik in Our Time,” COL Thomas W. McShane, J.D., USA, Retired (Sep-Oct): 9


“Observations of a Strategic Corporate,” CPL Scott R. Mitchell, USA (Jul-Aug): 58

“Policy Options for a Cuban Spring,” Gregory Weeks, Ph.D., and Erin Fiorey (May-Jun): 88

“Right Way: A Proposal for an Army Ethic,” LTC Clark C. Barrett, Ph.D., Michigan ARNG (Nov-Dec): 2

“Steering America’s Warship toward Moral Communication (and Real Success) in the 21st Century,” LTC Douglas A. Pryer, USA (Jan-Feb): 24

F

Future Wars

“Fulfilling the Promise: A Joint Corps for a Joint Military,” LTC Paul Darling, Alaska ARNG, and LT Justin Lawlor, USNR (May-Jun): 82


“The Next Time We Reinvent Someone Else’s Country…” MG Michael W. Symanski, ARNG, Retired (Sep-Oct): 82

“Spectrum of What?” Paul Scharre (Nov-Dec): 73

H

Human Terrain; Culture and Language

“Battered Spouse Syndrome: How to Better Understand Afghan Behavior,” COL Erik W. Goepper, USAF (Jan-Feb): 59


“Customary Law and Its Challenges to Afghan Statehood,” Kathleen Reedy, Ph.D. (Sep-Oct): 27

“Female Engagement Teams: The Need to Standardize Training and Employment,” LTC Janet R. Holliday, USA (Mar-Apr): 90

“Observations of a Strategic Corporate,” CPL Scott R. Mitchell, USA (Jul-Aug): 58


“The Next Time We Reinvent Someone Else’s Country…” MG Michael W. Symanski, ARNG, Retired (Sep-Oct): 82

“Uncomfortable Questions,” LTC Paul T. Darling, Alaska ARNG, and LT Justin Lawlor, USNR (Mar-Apr): 21

I

Internment, Interrogation, Intelligence

“Integrating Intelligence and Information: Ten Points for the Commander,” LTG Michael T. Flynn, USA, and BG Charles A. Flynn, USA (Jan-Feb): 4

“A Strategic-Level Intelligence Advisor’s Lessons Learned,” Welton Chang (Jul-Aug): 18

Iraq

“A Strategic-Level Intelligence Advisor’s Lessons Learned,” Welton Chang (Jul-Aug): 18

“Thank You, American Soldier,” Ala’a Ghazala (Mar-Apr): 95

Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, Multinational (JIIM)

“Fulfilling the Promise: A Joint Corps for a Joint Military,” LTC Paul Darling, Alaska ARNG, and LT Justin Lawlor, USNR (May-Jun): 82

“WHINSEC: Forgiving International Relationships, Strengthening Regional Democracies,” LTC Joél M. Marrero, USA, and LTC Lee A. Rials, USA, Retired (Jan-Feb): 55

K

Korea

“General Richard Cavazos and the Korean War, 1953: A Study in Combat Leadership,” COL Thomas C. Graves, USA (Jul-Aug): 65

Latin America

“Policy Options for a Cuban Spring,” Gregory Weeks, Ph.D., and Erin Fiorey (May-Jun): 88
“Transnational Criminal Organizations: Mexico’s Commercial Insurgency,” MAJ Christopher Martinez, USA (Sep-Oct): 58
“WHINSEC: Forging International Relationships, Strengthening Regional Democracies,” LTC José M. Marrero, USA, and LTC Lee A. Rials, USA, Retired (Jan-Feb): 55

Leadership
“A Leader’s Grief: T.E. Lawrence, Leadership, and PTSD,” James J. Schneider, Ph.D. (Jan-Feb): 75
“Army Leader Development and Leadership: Views from the Field,” Ryan M. Hinds and John P. Steel, Ph.D. (Jan-Feb): 39
“CGSC: Developing Leaders to Adapt and Dominate for the Army of Today and Tomorrow,” BG (P) Gordon B. “Skip” Davis, Jr., USA, and LTC James B. Martin, Ph.D., USA, Retired (Sep-Oct): 63
“Command Responsibility and Accountability,” LTC Joe Doty, Ph.D., USA, Retired, and CPT Chuck Doty, USN, Retired (Jan-Feb): 35
“Developing an Effective Command Philosophy,” LTC Harry C. Garner, USA, Retired (Sep-Oct): 75
“General Richard Cavazos and the Korean War, 1953: A Study in Combat Leadership,” COL Thomas C. Graves, USA (Jul-Aug): 65
“Leaving the Service as a Form of Dissent, MAJ Daniel J. Sennott,” USA (Mar-Apr): 64
“Lost in Transmission: How the Army has Garbled the Message about the Nature of Its Profession,” 1LT Anthony M. Formica, USA (Mar-Apr): 44
“Public Understanding of the Profession of Arms,” Brandon Robers (Nov-Dec): 41
“Real Lessons Learned for Leaders after Years of War,” LTC Joe Doty, Ph.D., USA, Retired, and MSG Jeffrey E. Fenlason, USA (Mar-Apr): 81
“The Right Way: A Proposal for an Army Ethic,” LTC Clark C. Barrett, Ph.D., Michigan ARNG (Nov-Dec): 2
“Steering America’s Warship toward Moral Communication (and Real Success) in the 21st Century,” LTC Douglas A. Pryer, USA (Jan-Feb): 24

Logistics
“Nothing is Simple in Afghanistan: The Principles of Sustainment and Logistics in Alexander’s Shadow,” CPT Andrew P. Betson, USA (Sep-Oct): 50
“Operational Contract Support: Five Things Every Field Grade Ofﬁcer Should Know,” LTC William C. Latham, Jr., USA, Retired (May-Jun): 16

Libya
“The Lessons of Libya,” Amitai Etzioni (Jan-Feb): 45

Mission Command
“Harnessing Initiative and Innovation: A Process for Mission Command,” LTC Chip Daniels, USA; MAJ Mark Hukthan, USA; and MAJ John Poole, USA (Sep-Oct): 18
“Reframing Army Doctrine: Operational Art, the Science of Control, and Critical Thinking,” MAJ Steven T. Brackin, Texas ARNG (Nov-Dec): 68

Negotiations
“A Failure to Engage: Current Negotiation Strategies and Approaches,” MAJ Aram Donigian, USA, and Professor Jeff Weiss (May-Jun): 47

Personnel Policies
“Female Engagement Teams: The Need to Standardize Training and Employment,” LTC Janet R. Holliday, USA (Mar-Apr): 90
“The Individual Ready Reserve: Reforming the Army’s Hidden Legions,” Garri Benjamin Hendell (Jul-Aug): 53

“Leaving the Service as a Form of Dissent, MAJ Daniel J. Sennott,” USA (Mar-Apr): 64
“What is an Army but the Soldiers? A Critical Assessment of the Army’s Human Capital Management System,” LTC Scott M. Halter, USA (Jan-Feb): 16

Profession of Arms
“An Asset Out of You and Me: Communicating What It Truly Means to be a Soldier,” COL Lawrence J. Morris, J.D., USA, Retired (Sep-Oct): 42
“CGSC: Developing Leaders to Adapt and Dominate for the Army of Today and Tomorrow,” BG (P) Gordon B. “Skip” Davis, Jr., USA, and LTC James B. Martin, Ph.D., USA, Retired (Sep-Oct): 63
“Command Responsibility and Accountability,” LTC Joe Doty, Ph.D., USA, Retired, and CPT Chuck Doty, USN, Retired (Jan-Feb): 35
“Leaving the Service as a Form of Dissent,” MAJ Daniel J. Sennott, USA (Mar-Apr): 64
“Lost in Transmission: How the Army has Garbled the Message about the Nature of Its Profession,” 1LT Anthony M. Formica, USA (Mar-Apr): 44
“Public Understanding of the Profession of Arms,” Brandon Robers (Nov-Dec): 41
“Real Lessons Learned for Leaders after Years of War,” LTC Joe Doty, Ph.D., USA, Retired, and MSG Jeffrey E. Fenlason, USA (Mar-Apr): 81
“The Right Way: A Proposal for an Army Ethic,” LTC Clark C. Barrett, Ph.D., Michigan ARNG (Nov-Dec): 2
“Steering America’s Warship toward Moral Communication (and Real Success) in the 21st Century,” LTC Douglas A. Pryer, USA (Jan-Feb): 24

R
Reserve Components
“The Individual Ready Reserve: Reforming the Army’s Hidden Legions,” Garri Benjamin Hendell (Jul-Aug): 53

S
Strategy
“Counter-IED Strategy in Modern War,” CPT David F. Eiserle, USA (Jan-Feb): 9
“Policy Options for a Cuban Spring,” Gregory Weeks, Ph.D., and Erin Fiorey (May-Jun): 88
“Putting the Cart Before the Horse: Strategy and the U.S. Budgetary Process,” MAJ Matthew M. McCready, USA (Mar-Apr): 13
“Strategic Thinking in an Era of Persistent Conﬂict,” COL Chadwick Clark, Ed.D., USA, and LTC Richard L. Kiper, Ph.D., USA, Retired (May-Jun): 25
“The Next Time We Reinvent Someone Else’s Country…,” MG Michael W. Symanski, USA, Retired (Sep-Oct): 82

Training & Education
“A Failure to Engage: Current Negotiation Strategies and Approaches,” MAJ Aram Donigian, USA, and Professor Jeff Weiss (May-Jun): 47
“Army Leader Development and Leadership: Views from the Field,” Ryan M. Hinds and John P. Steel, Ph.D. (Jan-Feb): 39
“CGSC: Developing Leaders to Adapt and Dominate for the Army of Today and Tomorrow,” BG (P) Gordon B. “Skip” Davis, Jr., USA, and LTC James B. Martin, Ph.D., USA, Retired, (Sep-Oct): 63
“Cultural Training for Military Personnel: Revisiting the Vietnam Era,“
CALL FOR PAPERS

“What is the Greatest Challenge to the Army Profession for the Army of 2020 and Beyond?”

The Army has a dual nature—it is both a military department (a part of the Armed Forces) and a military profession. As one of the Nation's armed services, we carry out the missions assigned by the Commander in Chief in accordance with the law and intent of Congress. As a military profession, the Army is built upon an ethic of trust that buttresses the other four essential characteristics of our profession: military expertise, honorable service, esprit de corps, and stewardship. (refer to Army Doctrine Publication 1, The Army, Chapter 2) http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/adp1.pdf

The Army will only be and perform as a military profession when these five essential characteristics are present in its culture, in its professionals and their units that exhibit competence, character and commitment, and in its external relationships. Together, they represent more than official statements. They embody our shared values that reflect our American approach to warfighting. The Army functions as a military profession when its leaders, and all who support it, remain committed to maintaining these five essential characteristics.

Examining one or a combination of the five essential characteristics of the Army profession, “What is the greatest challenge to the Army Profession for the Army of 2020 and beyond?”

WHO: OPEN TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE ARMY PROFESSION - Soldiers, NCOs, and officers of the Profession of Arms, Department of the Army Civilians, and retired Army professionals

WHAT: Papers by up to three authors, approximately 5000 words, to be judged for publication in an upcoming Military Review Special Edition as part of the Calendar Year 2013 America’s Army, Our Profession education and training program

WHEN: Deadline: 28 February 2013, for publication Summer 2013

WHERE: Send submissions to CAPE@usma.edu
In Memoriam

Major David Youngdoff
U.S. Army Aviation
Executive Officer, Military Review
AUG 2011- SEP 2012

“High Flight”

Oh! I have slipped the surly bonds of Earth
And danced the skies on laughter-silvered wings;
Sunward I’ve climbed, and joined the tumbling mirth
Of sun-split clouds, — and done a hundred things
You have not dreamed of — wheeled and soared and swung
High in the sunlit silence. Hov’ring there,
I’ve chased the shouting wind along, and flung
My eager craft through footless halls of air....

Up, up the long, delirious, burning blue
I’ve topped the wind-swept heights with easy grace.
Where never lark, or even eagle flew —
And, while with silent, lifting mind I’ve trod
The high untrespassed sanctity of space,
Put out my hand, and touched the face of God.

Pilot Officer John Gillespie Magee, Jr.
Royal Canadian Air Force
9 JUN 1922 – 11 DEC 1941