GUERRILLA LEADER:
T.E. Lawrence and the Arab Revolt
James J. Schneider
Bantam Books, 2011, 368 pages, $28.00

Guerrilla Leader is a fascinating character study of Thomas Edward (T.E.) Lawrence, a.k.a. Lawrence of Arabia. The book examines Lawrence’s crucial role in transforming the Middle East while leading an Arab revolt against the Turkish Empire.

James J. Schneider, who earned his Ph.D. in history at the University of Kansas, is a military theorist and a founding faculty member of the United States Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies where he served as Professor Emeritus of Military Theory until his retirement. One of the world’s foremost experts on T.E. Lawrence, Schneider is responsible for introducing the study of Lawrence to the U.S. Army and is the author of numerous articles on Lawrence. During his research for his book, Schneider examined Lawrence’s private papers, drawing extensively from them in his writing and quoting Lawrence throughout the book with appropriate citations in the endnotes. Although Schneider’s style is easy to follow, his book is best read in pieces so the reader has time to reflect on the author’s many conclusions.

Schneider traces Lawrence’s early development as a leader. Lawrence was formally educated at Oxford where he experienced the “Oxford method” of instruction based on a course of study solidly grounded in the liberal arts but tailored to meet the needs and goals of each student. The personal relationship between student and teacher facilitated guiding the student along an intellectual journey and encouraging dialogue and debate to instill intellectual curiosity.

Lawrence’s curiosity was about “new Asia.” He immersed himself in the culture and language of the Middle East, wandering the Middle East studying the architecture of Crusader castles. He entered the British military as an intelligence officer shortly after the beginning of World War I.

Schneider describes the geopolitical situation of the period and the conditions in which Lawrence emerged as a guerrilla leader. The Ottoman Empire still existed at the beginning of World War I, and the Turks ruled over an empire united by a common religion, Islam. Schneider also briefly describes the political objectives of Great Britain, Germany, Turkey, and the Arabs. Great Britain saw the collapse of the Ottoman Empire as an opportunity to extend the British sphere of influence throughout the Middle East. German interests were to ensure regional stability by supporting the Turks. The Turkish objective was to hold Mecca, the spiritual center of gravity of the Muslim world, at all costs. Most important was the Arab objective—to establish an independent “Arab nation.”

Lawrence’s first assignment was in Cairo where he was serving when the Arab Revolt began in June 1916. It was during his time in Cairo that two tragic deaths occurred. In the span of four months, two of his younger brothers, Frank and Will, were killed in combat. Their deaths had a significant psychological effect on Lawrence, triggering what Schneider terms a “survivor’s guilt” that would haunt him for the rest of his life.

Lawrence’s involvement in the Arab Revolt began in October 1916. For the next two years, Lawrence developed into a guerrilla leader. Schneider characterizes this period as not only a period of learning for Lawrence but also a period of teaching. During this time, Lawrence matured as a leader, particularly as a leader of Arabs. He understood the leadership style required, but the period eventually took a huge physical and emotional toll on him.

Schneider describes Lawrence as a heretic. His intellectual curiosity led to his questioning accepted answers and challenging conventional thinking. For Lawrence, the Arab Revolt was a puzzle, ultimately solved by developing a novel and revolutionary solution. He concluded that “perhaps the virtue of irregulars lay in depth, not in face” and
“the smaller the unit, the better its performance.” Lawrence firmly grasped Clausewitz’s dictum to understand that nature of the war upon which you are about to embark.

Schneider’s description of the relationship among ends, ways, means, and risk in warfare is concise. He characterizes the ways in warfare as “the most creative factor as well as the most elusive” aspect of military art. Lawrence combined learning and creativity in this realm to develop a method of irregular guerrilla war perfectly suited for the situation and conditions of the desert, an asymmetric approach that leveraged the strength of the Arabs against the weakness of the Turks, foregoing the paradigm of annihilation to pursue a strategy of attrition, exhausting the opponent using lesser means. Lawrence formulated a plan to let the Turks occupy Medina and Mecca while the Arabs controlled, but did not occupy, the other 99 percent of the terrain. Essentially Lawrence’s strategy was to exhaust the Turks into submission by denying them decisive set-piece battles. Lawrence focused on constantly interdicting the Hejaz railway that linked Damascus to Medina. This strategy frustrated the Turks.

Lawrence was not only a brilliant tactician but also an operational artist and strategist. His operations with the Arab guerrillas set the conditions for General Edmund Allenby, British commander in chief in Palestine, to conduct conventional operations against the Turks. Lawrence’s greatest challenge was to lead the Arabs into accepting the strategy he designed, a strategy for which the nomadic Arabs were ideally suited. Lawrence not only framed the enemy but also the friendly forces and terrain that defined the theater of operations.

For Lawrence, the desert resembled a sea and the camel became a ship on the sea, providing the mobility for Lawrence’s revolutionary strategy to succeed. He believed that the guerrilla’s physical advantage over the conventional soldier lay in the realm of logistics. The conventional soldier connects inextricably to the requirements of logistical support. He believed logistics is not only a critical requirement for the conventional soldier but also a critical vulnerability for the guerrilla to exploit. The success of the guerrilla in irregular warfare stems from his force’s asymmetric nature, which Schneider explains in a metaphor as akin to a box of Lego toys. The guerrilla, like Legos, can be reorganized and reinvented according to the imagination and desires of its architect.

Lawrence was an advisor and confidant without the ability to directly lead and command Arab forces, but he exercised indirect leadership to achieve British political objectives. Although Lawrence did not have the authority to issue orders to the Arabs, he used his superb powers of persuasion to negotiate with Arab tribes to obtain their support and build an alliance. Lawrence’s success was due to his understanding of the Arab-Bedouin culture and his ability to earn their respect. The importance of “honor” in the Arab sense was an aspect of culture that Lawrence thoroughly understood. To the Arab, honor is everything.

Schneider characterizes Lawrence as an autonomous leader who divorced himself from personal passion and desire through self-reflection and intellectual preparation. Schneider asserts that autonomous leaders are more prone to emotional stress, which leads to depression and grief. Lawrence was frequently a victim of depression, which caused him to question his ability.

One of the challenges of an advisor is to manage personalities. Lawrence recognized that one of his most important responsibilities as a leader was to maintain the oftentimes-contentious alliance of Arab tribes. This led him to execute a Moor for the murder of a member of another tribe, a defining moment that changed him forever and marked the beginning of his emotional descent. Another event that took a significant emotional toll on Lawrence occurred when he dispatched one of his mortally wounded bodyguards. Schneider also describes how Lawrence agonized over deceiving Arabs into believing the British supported the creation of an Arab nation. Schneider terms this as the “relentless burden of leader’s grief.” Near the end of the campaign, Lawrence personally gave the order to “take no prisoners” after the battle of Tafas, south of Damascus. After two years in the desert, the demands on his leadership left him physically and emotionally spent, Lawrence was morally bankrupt.

Schneider is a gifted storyteller. The reader will appreciate his spellbinding descriptions of Lawrence’s actions. Schneider paints so vivid a picture that the reader feels like an actual observer within the story, suffering through the heat
of the desert, struggling to cross the rocky terrain, but appreciating its unique beauty. Critics will cite Schneider’s lack of explanatory footnotes as a fault in the book. However, Guerrilla Leader represents Schneider’s personal interpretation and analysis of Lawrence’s leadership during the Arab Revolt. If there is one drawback to the book, it is its lack of maps, which would have provided a useful reference for the reader.

Nevertheless, Schneider has produced a new and refreshing analysis that paints a dramatic picture of one of history’s most complex personalities. Military historians and students of leadership will find Guerrilla Leader a complement to the many other works on Lawrence and a welcome addition to their personal library.

COL Bruce J. Reider, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


With a background in political science and healing work, author Marguerite Guzmán Bouvard offers an evocative examination of Iraq and Afghanistan combat veterans and their families. Not a dry academic book, The Invisible Wounds of War comes from the author’s ongoing personal engagement with combat veterans as part of a growing network of health professionals dedicated to healing. The book is accessible, written with a wide audience in mind as it speaks to the physical and psychological damages that linger for combat veterans. Alcoholism, destructive behavior, wrecked marriages, and suicides often amplify these problems, which take a high toll not only on veterans, but also on “entire families, parents, spouses, children, and siblings.” Hence, Guzmán Bouvard dedicates a chapter on the long, arduous process of mourning and grief and how they work when anger and physical and mental injuries accompany the process.

Bouvard begins her book with a review of the political and military scene in Iraq and Afghanistan, and how the countries’ disintegration drew Americans deeper into combat in regions with harsh physical environments and atavistic tribal and religious blood feuds. One of the most puzzling aspects of the wars is the historical lack of mental health care available to combat veterans. The wars’ mental health cost in lives, more than financial resources, has been tremendous. Many returning vets feel shame over killing the innocent and losing fellow soldiers; some feel like murderers and suffer from the stress of having witnessed so much destruction while maintaining an extremely high degree of situational awareness from the threat of snipers and IEDs, the latter creating thousands of multiple amputees. Moreover, many veterans were already suffering from combat stress when they deployed due to previous lengthy deployments. To cope, thousands of vets in the war zones took anti-depressants and sleeping pills.

Bouvard reviews studies by other mental health professionals, and integrates her assessments into the testimonies of several veterans, as well as family members. Families also suffer stress, not only through notification of a loss of a spouse, son, or daughter in combat, but because their loved ones face danger. She highlights several projects that have emerged to help veterans, such as Military Families Speak Out, Gold Star Mothers, Veterans for Common Sense, and Strong Bonds. Many mothers and fathers have been instrumental in bringing awareness to Congress and Americans at large of the vast need for mental health counseling and treatment for the veterans. Bouvard devotes a chapter to the topic that suicide rates among the Army have increased six-fold since the wars began, chronicling the tragic endings of several combat veterans and citing the cases of Noah Charles Piece and Jeff Lucey.

The book closes with a chapter that explores how creative expression, particularly photography, theater, and poetry, can be part of the healing process, giving “an important voice to memory and culture” for veterans and family members. Bouvard includes some of her own poetry in the chapter, as well as that of war veteran Brian Turner.

A comprehensive and eye-opening work, The Invisible Wounds of War is more than just informative and caring; it is urgent.

Jeffrey C. Alfer, USAF, Retired, Torrance, California

WILLIAM MURRAY, Richard Hart Sinnreich, James Lacey, and other noted scholars have written a fascinating book detailing the complexities and risks of developing and executing grand strategy. The authors present historical case studies of renowned leaders’ experiences and strategic events that shaped grand strategy. The book begins with King Louis XIV of France, followed by the Seven Years’ War, Otto von Bismarck, British strategic transformation, and Neville Chamberlain. It ends with a look at U.S. presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman.

A theme that resonates in the book is that grand strategy is rarely well conceived or successful. In only two of the seven cases presented, Franklin D. Roosevelt (World War II strategy) and Harry S. Truman (containment strategy), did grand strategy achieve its end state or long-term goal. The authors attribute Roosevelt and Truman’s success to their willingness to adapt to constantly changing environments, their ability to see things as they were and not as they wished them to be, their understanding of the finiteness of national resources, and their desire not to fall victim to ambition. They understood their nation’s enemies and explicitly used their militaries as a political tool of deterrence or last resort.

On the other hand, King Louis XIV exhausted the resources of France with an overly ambitious grand strategy to make France the preeminent power of Europe by military coercion and war. Louis XIV greatly miscalculated the resolve of France’s neighbors to rally against him. Worse, he remained defiant and unwilling to adjust his grand strategy. In essence, this led to the bankrupting of France, and in the end, left it in a significantly weaker strategic position.

British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain also made monumental miscalculations leading up to World War II. Chamberlain was convinced that Hitler could be reasoned with, that the British should not panic over Hitler’s perceived ambitions by needlessly shoring up its defense posture, and that Hitler was not looking to acquire territory beyond that with historical ethnic ties to Germany. Chamberlain’s miscalculation cost Britain an opportunity to adequately prepare for its eventual war with Germany.

Events such as these and others described in the book lead the reader to conclude that the U.S. post-Cold War approach to statecraft is eerily similar to that which led to the demise of past great powers and should be a cautionary tale for the designers of future U.S. grand strategy.

The authors’ comprehensive research and in-depth analysis of events are riveting. Each of the book’s chapters can be read independent of the others; however, they are best read together. This book is a must read for government and military historians, political science and international relations students and scholars, and those who develop and execute statecraft.

David A. Anderson, Ph.D., LtCol, USMC, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


ISRAEL’S PALESTINIANS REVEALS that the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is both simple to understand and deeply complex. At the center, the Israelis believe they are entitled to the land known as Israel, while the Palestinians believe they are entitled to the land they call Palestine. Unfortunately, both sides claim the same land, and religious Jewish Israelis and religious Muslim Palestinians believe that God gave them the land, and that to give it up to another people is an insult to God and a sin.

The crux of the book Israel’s Palestinians centers on this quote: “[The Palestinians] suffer from numerous inequities, tacit discrimination, government neglect, and social prejudice. They are largely excluded from the country’s public life, they have not been integrated socially or economically, and they are generally treated with suspicion by the state and by Israeli Jewish society. As such, collectively, Arabs are very much second-class citizens in Israel.”
Ilan Peleg and Dov Waxman provide large amounts of information, with a great deal of detail, primarily about the period from 1948 to 2010. The focus of their argument is that the Jewishness of Israel has been maintained more forcefully than its democratic character. They go on to suggest policies that will allow Israel to maintain much of its Jewish culture within the government, but be more protective of all citizens’ rights, not just the Jewish citizens. In Chapter 7, the authors disclose 10 policies to enhance the rights of Palestinians in Israel and freely admit how difficult many would be to implement. Some of these policies may seem impossible to implement, but unless the Israelis and Palestinians are equal citizens of Israel, the conflict will continue forever.

These policies or recommendations are excellent. Some significant examples: nominating Palestinian citizens to positions of responsibility in all parts of the government bureaucracy, especially in areas directly connected to the lives of the Palestinian community; adopting an aggressive anti-discriminatory policy to protect Palestinian citizens against official or unofficial mistreatment by public or private entities; resolving the problems of land or housing that are a constant source of friction with the state authorities; and protecting and strengthening the equal citizenship of Palestinians in Israel through the introduction of Basic Law that guarantees the citizenship of all Israelis as inalienable and inviolable.

Ultimately, this book is both interesting and educational. Readers will learn about the history of the creation of the state of Israel, movements that support the state of Israel, and the impact on the Arabs in the region. More important, readers will see these issues through the eyes of those who stand on both sides of the debate: Jewish and Muslim, Israeli and Palestinian. If you, like so many others, want to learn more in order to comprehend what is going on but simply do not know where to start, this is the place.

Michael J. Berry, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
African prosperity than it was an attempt to counter China’s growing presence while securing access to African energy resources. For example, having U.S. forces training African police and doing economic development work seems to be a contradiction when America does not permit its own military forces to do so at home. Lastly, some contributors contend that AFRICOM should not be a Combatant Command since terrorism and civil conflict are dependent variables deriving from issues of impaired social development, limited democracy, and poor governance, and these challenges are all nonmilitary in nature.

_African Security and the African Command_ is already slightly dated due to the rapidity of change in Africa, Libya, and Southern Sudan, but it still provides a wide-ranging overview of African security and AFRICOM. Hence, I recommend it to academics, policymakers, and military and interagency professionals with a focus on African security, politics, and development.

*LTC Kevin D. Stringer, Ph.D., USAR Zurich, Switzerland*

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**THE GOOD WAR: NATO and the Liberal Conscience in Afghanistan**
M.J. Williams, Palgrave Macmillan
New York, 2011, 188 pages, $32.00

ONE OF THE most frustrating aspects of the war in Afghanistan is that our allies have divergent priorities as well as divergent missions, rules of engagement, and mission capabilities, which makes coordinating the efforts of NATO troops difficult at best.

M.J. Williams’ _The Good War: NATO and the Liberal Conscience in Afghanistan_ examines the discrepancy between the “European” and “American” outlooks on security, the War on Terrorism, and the form proactive defense should take.

While both Americans and Europeans are liberal—in the sense of viewing liberal democracy as a universally beneficial and stable form of government—they differ on how willing they are to reshape nonliberal countries. While Europeans generally complain about American adventurism and willingness to topple nonliberal governments, they have generally proven ready (and effective) at postwar reconstruction in places like Bosnia and Afghanistan. Williams argues that the major difference between U.S. and European foreign policies is Americans have faith in the efficacy of military force to create liberal results, while Europeans have a broader, intuition-based focus when trying to reshape a country.

Much of _The Good War_ is a review of post-Cold War NATO and U.S. foreign policies. Through the 1990s, NATO shifted its mission from reacting defensively to a potential Warsaw Pact incursion toward the aggressive promotion of peace and stability. As both Europeans and Americans saw liberal democracy as the best way to achieve world peace, NATO expanded and actively promoted democratic movements in Central and Eastern Europe. September 11 greatly expanded America’s obsession with managing or eliminating risk, which led quickly to intervention in Afghanistan. Europeans, who felt pressured to act against terrorism, saw involvement in Afghanistan as a way to support the Americans in the War on Terrorism, but avoid the much less popular Iraq war. Williams argues that NATO entered Afghanistan in 2003 as part of a global effort by Europeans to promote good government and the rule of law.

The war in Afghanistan has greatly shaped the structure, capabilities, and doctrine of NATO. It illustrates the problems of bringing a multinational coalition to a multiethnic semi-state. Due to a simple lack of military resources, Europeans generally are not nearly as committed to Afghanistan financially, militarily or politically, and there is a general Western aversion to casualties and minimal support for overseas conflict among the voting public.

_The Good War_ is not a history of NATO involvement in Afghanistan; its discussion of the actual war is minimal. Williams interestingly places Afghanistan’s well-known lack of national identity within the context of the European nation-state and the Westphalian tradition. The book is most useful in illustrating the philosophical differences between the foreign and military policy of the United States and her European allies. Williams himself is skeptical of the wisdom of NATO involvement in Afghanistan and the creation of a liberal democracy there, and his is an increasingly prevalent viewpoint.

*John E. Fahey, Lafayette, Indiana*
A recurring theme in the book is that the U.S. prison system does a poor job of rehabilitating individuals for eventual reintroduction into the community and that the American prison system—at least the New York State version thereof—provides inmates with a graduate level education in criminal behavior and in manipulating a bureaucracy rather than providing skills and incentive to prevent recidivism.

Dunleavy illustrates how a prison inmate copes with the dangers inherent in a society of violence-prone individuals where belonging to a group is the best hope for survival. A valid insight, perhaps, and even novel when the ideas were first developed in the early years of the 20th century, but hardly revolutionary or novel now.

On the other hand, Dunleavy is not attempting to provide a coherent and convincing academic argument about “how the prison subculture fosters terrorism.” He is a true believer whose intent is to alert the reading public to the threat of radicalization within the prison system and touting the success of the interagency task force (“Operation Hades”) of which he was a part.

If one is looking for information to support the idea that Islam is at war with America, this book provides an ample supply of it. If, conversely, the reader is looking for proof that the United States is at war with Islam, this book supports that perspective as well. To quote from the Preface: “Jihad is a cultural and religious war that has no end.” Readers who are looking for a critical analysis of radical Islamic recruiting or an understanding of motivations toward terrorism will need to find another source.

There are nuggets of gold within the book’s pages. However, the reader has to sift through a lot of sand and rock to find them.

Gary R. Hobin, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

CASTRO’S SECRETS: The CIA and Cuba’s Intelligence Machine
Brian Latell, Palgrave McMillan
St. Martin’s Press, New York
2012, 247 pages, $27.00

CASTRO’S SECRETS is an account of the covert battle of intelligence communities in Castro’s Cuba and the Kennedy administration’s
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CIA. The author provides interviews with high-ranking Cuban defectors and former CIA officials, and compares them to interviews, public records, and declassified documents from the CIA files. His main points are that the Kennedy administration grossly underestimated the Cuban intelligence community and Castro’s power in the region, which led to confrontation in the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961. The other main point is Castro’s alleged connection to the Kennedy assassination.

One of the main subjects of the book is the highest-ranking Cuban intelligence official to ever defect. In 1987, Florentino “Tiny” Aspilliga Lombard and his wife defected to the U.S. Embassy in Vienna, Austria. Aspilliga exposes the strategies, and methods the Cuban intelligence community had been using to fool the CIA for years. He had become greatly disillusioned with the way Castro was ruining his country. Instead of being a revolutionist for democracy, Castro had become an agent of Communism, led the country into economic dependence on other nations, and ruled with an iron fist against anyone who dared to speak against him. Aspilliga explains that Castro’s greatest enemies were President John F. Kennedy and his brother, Attorney General Robert F Kennedy. Castro believed (with good reason) that the Kennedys were attempting to overthrow him and install a government friendly to the United States.

In response, Castro’s greatest weapon became agents and double agents that could infiltrate the United States as well as into U.S. governmental agencies as “moles.” Aspilliga tells in detail the games of “cat-and-mouse” the Cuban intelligence community played against the United States, exposing many of the weaknesses in the U.S. agents, and how they exploited them to stay ahead of the United States for years.

Brian Latell makes the highly plausible connection that Castro knew of Lee Harvey Oswald’s intent to assassinate President Kennedy in Dallas, but did nothing to intervene. He provides his analysis and conclusion that the assassination idea originated with Oswald, and Castro found out about it only after Oswald attempted to make contact with Cuba through their embassy in Mexico City. Oswald wanted to show his discontent for American policy and support to Cuba’s cause, but Cuba’s embassy in Mexico turned him away. There in the embassy office in front of several embassy employees, Oswald allegedly proclaimed he was going to shoot President Kennedy. The author goes on to provide testimony from a key Cuban intelligence operative that Castro ordered him to tune his intercept equipment away from Miami and listen in on Dallas traffic for anything unusual several hours before the shooting.

Aspilliga also provides insight into the mind of Fidel Castro and his mixture of obsession and paranoia about the United States. The book reveals some great insight into the strategy of the small Caribbean nation and how it has managed to remain a thorn in the side of the United States for over 50 years. A must read for those that are interested in foreign policy, especially Latin America.

LTC George Hodge, LTC, USA, Retired
Lansing, Kansas

McNAMARA, CLIFFORD, AND THE BURDENS OF VIETNAM, 1965-1969
Secretaries of Defense Historical Series
Vol. VI, Edward J. Drea, Historical Office
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Washington, DC, 2011, 694 pages, $68.00

As SECRETARY OF defense from 1961 to 1968, Robert S. McNamara completely reorganized the defense budgetary process, created the Defense Intelligence Agency and Defense Logistics Agency, and helped define the strategy of mutually assured destruction based on the nuclear triad. Yet, as Edward Drea concludes in this magnificent volume, “for all his luminous achievements, his choices that led to the Vietnam disaster will forever remain McNamara’s enduring legacy.”

Vietnam is, in fact, the major focus of this study. McNamara’s unusual combination of intellectual assurance and total loyalty to President Johnson led the secretary to a series of fatal errors. McNamara’s business instincts for efficiency, when combined with Johnson’s tendency to delay key decisions, meant the United States used military force in a series of halting, inadequate steps that continuously raised the level of stalemate in Southeast Asia without offering any opportunity for victory or settlement. For similar reasons, McNamara repeatedly deferred weapons development and
under-budgeted the costs of the war until, by 1968, U.S. defense capabilities had been stretched and degraded throughout the world. At the same time, McNamara’s analytical mind was incapable of seeing a situation from the viewpoint of anyone other than himself, whether he was attempting to dissuade the North Vietnamese government, disagreeing with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or pressuring West Germany to purchase more American-made weapons. This book explains these issues without descending to personal attacks or oversimplification of complex issues.

Indeed, the author is at pains to show how McNamara’s strengths and weaknesses reached beyond Vietnam to influence subjects as varied as the Six Day Arab-Israeli War, the renewed tensions on the Korean Peninsula, or the restructuring of American military assistance. The result is official history at its best, providing sufficient detail to understand how the Department of Defense functioned, but never losing sight of the personalities who presided over that department during one of its most controversial periods. Drea has given us a superb history that is highly readable, balanced, and of great value to the public as well as to soldiers and historians.

COL Jonathan M. House, USA, Retired
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

FATAL CROSSROADS
The Untold Story of the Malmedy Massacre at the Battle of the Bulge

FATAL CROSSROADS: THE Untold Story of the Malmedy Massacre at the Battle of the Bulge reconstructs one of the most hideous crimes against American POWs in World War II. A leading expert on the Ardennes Offensive, Danny S. Parker describes in vivid detail the events surrounding a cold December day in 1944 when the 285th Field Artillery Observation Battalion was intercepted at a crossroads near Malmedy, Belgium. The American troops, lacking adequate weaponry, quickly surrendered to an SS tank column commanded by Jochen Peiper. The prisoners were herded into a nearby field where SS soldiers savagely opened fire with machine guns. Miraculously, over 40 of the American soldiers survived.

Parker provides a unique perspective using eyewitness accounts of the American survivors, the SS soldiers, and local civilian descriptions of the horrific events of Malmedy. The book opens with a graphic depiction of the massacre as experienced by Staff Sergeant William Hite Merriken. He describes the bitter agony he endured laying upon the frozen ground attempting to appear dead while suffering from two severe bullet wounds to the back. He uttered not a sound as an SS soldier shot the man lying atop of him, and the bullet pierced through into his own knee. As he lay helpless, convinced that he was dying, Merriken reflected upon his life and loved ones.

Parker brings new evidence to life—the autopsy reports of the 285th. For months, the bodies lay frozen in the field at Malmedy. The icy conditions worked to preserve the corpses. Several had multiple gunshot wounds while others had powder burns indicating they were shot at close range. Vehicles had crushed some of them, while others died of severe head injuries. The most disturbing were the cringing positions of the bodies of the deceased and their haunting facial expressions.

Parker’s discussion reveals that U.S. investigators used debatable methods during the war crime trials of the SS soldiers at Malmedy, resulting in the erroneous arrest and sentencing of many. The author reveals what life after prison was like for some of the alleged shooters. Jochen Peiper was eventually murdered in a house fire in May 1976 after several death threats. Several of the convicted SS continued to deny their involvement in the massacre for the remainder of their lives. One former soldier expressed the deep regret he lived with daily because of his participation at Malmedy. He believed forgiveness was not attainable for such a horrendous act.

Writing in a spirited style, Parker reconstructs the events of the Malmedy Massacre to appeal to an expansive audience. Readers of the DOD community will appreciate his thoroughness in relation to strategy and military jargon. The amount of research is evident throughout the book from start to finish. Fatal Crossroads provides a valuable analysis of the Malmedy Massacre through firsthand accounts of its victims, perpetrators, and observers. It provides a unique, realistic awareness of wartime atrocities.

Siobhan E. Ausberry, Washington, DC
THERE ARE FEW characters in history who help shape entire eras. There are even fewer who we remember for doing so. George C. Marshall was such a man. He utilized his strategic prowess as much as his personal humility to organize the Allies for victory in World War II and to establish the Cold War world afterward. In *George C. Marshall: Servant of the American Nation*, Charles F. Brower has compiled key essays from a symposium held at the Virginia Military Institute, the general’s alma mater, on the 50th anniversary of Marshall’s death. This is a significant work because it provides a balanced assessment of the general’s notable achievements, offers multi-faceted insight into his personality, and suggests that his life remains a model for public service.

The editor has gathered top authors from diverse fields to address myriad aspects of Marshall’s public life. The field of experts includes historians noted for their depth of knowledge and candor. Williamson Murray and Paul Miles profile the soldier and the essence of his followership. Scholars Nicolaus Mills and Barry Machado assess Marshall’s role as a statesman and peacemaker during the tumultuous early years of the Cold War. Stewart W. Husted and Gerald M. Pops bring a unique perspective from the business and public administration world when analyzing Marshall as a leader and manager. No one essay stands out over the others. The book’s organization allows the reader to appreciate the broad context of this great life.

In addition, the book presents a keen insight into Marshall’s personality. Brower achieves this by presenting Marshall’s responses, rather than others’ interpretations of them, and allows readers to determine the implications for themselves.

There are both admirable and imperfect features of this complicated persona. For example, Mills describes Marshall’s extensive role in orchestrating the long-term economic recovery of post-war Europe in a creative plan named after him—and for which he would receive the Nobel Peace Prize in 1953. Yet, James I. Matray explains how Secretary Marshall’s passive demeanor and his blind trust in the field commanders helped to extend the Korean conflict. This candid editorial approach is rather refreshing, considering that the material emanates from a conference of Marshall aficionados held at his school in his honor. By reading this book, one can sympathize with a great American—who faced great challenges with fortitude, optimism, and remarkable but fallible judgment.

Finally, Marshall’s life is a paragon of public service and strategic leadership, and it is in this light that he offers the clearest illustration of selfless service for today’s generations. More than most of his colleagues, George Marshall understood the undeniable and critical relationship between policy and strategy. Perhaps his greatest gift to the present generation was his public choices informed by a lifelong pursuit of learning. Josiah Bunting, III, notes the general was apt to quote Pericles when issuing guidance to his staff. It is no wonder that contemporary readers, surrounded by leaders who readily make decisions with little concern for long-term repercussions, are still attracted to George Marshall. He is the epitome of an American who is not afraid to advocate his principles on the world stage.

Readers who enjoy reading about the intricacies of a public life infused with challenges on a scale never before experienced will find tremendous value in *Servant of the American Nation*. Brower rightly cites Churchill’s exhortation, “Succeeding generations must not be allowed to forget his achievement and his example.”

LTC David T. Culkin, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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THE BATTLE OF Towton during the War of the Roses may pale in comparison to other larger-scale conflicts in terms of tactics, weapons used, or casualty figures, but in close hand-to-hand exchange, few can match its ferocity. The combatants on both sides were of the same heritage and culture, spoke the same language, and fought in the same way in small-scale battles. During this time, there were well-established modes of conduct in

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FATAL COLOURS: Towton 1461

England’s Most Brutal Battle

diplomacy, chivalry, and displays of mercy on the battlefield. However, what happens when this system breaks down?

It is 15th Century England and little more than a decade has passed since the territories in France (save for Calais) were lost to England for all time. Rifts in government, inability to gain an audience with the king (Henry VI who displayed symptoms such as mania, irrational outbursts, and an inability to socialize in court), and his advisors corruption has prompted one of the largest-scale confrontations of the time. Nearly 10 percent of the population (around 750,000 eligible participants) took part in the action. Each side fielded numbers that superseded any to date and included thousands of “naked men” (those who lacked armor or proper armament). On one side (Lancasters) were allied powers from the north, Scots and French cohorts who supported the current king, Henry VI. On the Yorkish side were mostly southerners led by the newly identified King Edward IV (not anointed, but more or less “appointed” until the contest was decided). The complexity of the sides and the differing roles and benefits or each contingent lay within a very complicated framework of history, family heritage, ambition, and wealthy merchant influences.

Among several key concepts requiring discussion, bastard feudalism and the Commissions of Array are the most relevant. Bastard feudalism was a medium to supply kings with labor for conflicts at home and abroad, which the nobles managed. Many nobles were able to influence campaigns, the tactical nature of battles and political outcomes for future governing decisions. It also allowed the country to be more effectively “governed.” An allegiance, if violated, could mean annihilation for a lord or duke.

The other important concept was that of Commissions of Array, a precursor to the modern “draft.” This mobilization element was capable of putting many more thousands onto a battlefield in support of the king as a representative of divine right to rule. The challenge at Towton is that both sides claimed these commissions. The resulting massacres and terrible carnage were merely another side effect of these often-simplistic concepts.

The Battle of Towton was the high-water mark of the War of the Roses. It reset the kind of warfare kings, nobility, and common soldiery could expect thereafter; disrupted the royal line of ascension to the crown of England; and effectively eliminated the divine protection of the king in the event he failed to live up to the expectations of his office. The norms of chivalry and diplomacy waned with the battlefield examples of Agincourt, Northampton, and Ferrybridge. With Towton came the final chapter and the advent of a new system of governing and a new definition of the right to rule.

COL Thomas S. Bundt, Ph.D., Tacoma, Washington

UNITED STATES CAVALRY PEACEKEEPERS IN BOSNIA: An Inside Account of Operation Joint Endeavor, 1996

UNITED STATES CAVALRY Peacekeepers in Bosnia is a surprisingly captivating and informative read, firmly grounded at the tactical level, but with operational and strategic insights.

The study recounts the actions of the officers and soldiers of 1st Squadron, 4th U.S. Cavalry (Quarterhorse) and its attached units during operations in Bosnia in the mid-1990s in support of NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR) mission—the first ever ground operation supported by NATO. The account of the yearlong mission in one of the most challenging areas of the American sector reveals the bravery, perseverance, and agility of U.S. forces against a complex and fast-paced political backdrop still heated from three and a half years of ethnically motivated civil war.

Although there have been many broad-brush accounts of Operation Joint Endeavor, Mark A. Viney’s book skillfully uncovers all aspects of the operation—including predeployment training, continuation training in theater, and post-operation recovery—from a battalion perspective. Key personalities become familiar to the reader and the insights of commanders and soldiers alike are enlightening. The book also highlights the realities and challenges of those left behind. Above all, United States Cavalry Peacekeepers in Bosnia reveals the human face of “stability operations”—a term rarely in use today—the realities, dangers, and frustrations of those tasked with the difficult duty of upholding peace in a faraway country. At the end of the deployment, five Quarterhorse
In sum, *United States Cavalry Peacekeepers in Bosnia* is enjoyable, informative, and captivating. It will appeal to historians, students of the region, and serving cavalrymen. The book is also broadly relevant to the ongoing Global War on Terrorism; the doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures of many of today’s contemporary operations have their origins in the stability operations of the 1990s. As Viney posits, “The lessons learned, or more correctly in some instances rediscovered, by our peacekeepers in Bosnia surely resonate with deployed soldiers today.” Not an obvious bedside book, but one certainly very worthy of consideration.

*Lt Col Andrew M. Roe, Ph.D., British Army Episkopi Garrison, Cyprus*

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**An Army Outgunned—A Response**

Mr. Matt Walker and Mr. Rob Harbison, Lethality Branch, Soldier Requirement Division, MCO—In Dr. Joseph P. Avery’s article “An Army Outgunned” (*Military Review*, July-August 2012) he poses some excellent hypotheses about improving U.S. Army small arms and ammunition. Unfortunately, he also makes a few factually inaccurate statements about the M855A1 Enhanced Performance Round (EPR) and unsubstantiated remarks about the suitability and effectiveness of the M4 series carbine rifle.

Dr. Avery argues that our current weapon and ammunition is inadequate. Although formal Army analysis has also identified gaps in squad lethality, the difference in the conclusions is that the formal analysis includes all of the contributors to target effect, including training and soldier skills. In 2008, the Department of the Army approved the Infantry Center (now Maneuver Center of Excellence, or MCoE) Small Arms Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA). That document lays the foundation for mitigating capability gaps including but not limited to materiel acquisitions. The Army’s own published analysis refutes Dr. Avery’s claim that the American military is not willing to criticize our current systems.

Dr. Avery’s focus on the weapons and ammunition to improve soldier effectiveness overlooks important factors including target identification, marksmanship skills, ranging error, and other factors not directly related to weapon or ammunition. Dr. Avery suggests that by simply changing weapon and caliber, soldiers would gain an operational advantage over existing systems. The Army must take a critical approach to potential solutions before making conclusions about operational effectiveness. Government acquisition programs cannot be based on anecdotal analysis or hearsay. An example is Dr. Avery’s suggestion that other weapons are more reliable than the M16/M4 series weapons in use by the Army today. While every instance of weapon failure is tragic and warrants investigation, there are also field reports that the M4 is performing well. When the MCoE surveys
soldiers after deployments, only a minority of them describe the M4 as ineffective, although those comments are noteworthy nonetheless.

Is there room for improvement? Absolutely, and Dr. Avery is quite correct in a broad sense. Contrary to Dr. Avery’s claim that, “The M16 appears to have taken on the mantle of the ‘Holy Grail’ of the American military,” the Army has several ongoing efforts to improve the M4. There is an ongoing test of alternative weapons provided by industry to potentially replace the M4. This test will be one of the first robust side-by-side studies of how the M4 stacks up against other weapons. The previous testing conducted to date on the M4 indicates the opposite of Dr. Avery’s claims, and suggests that the M4 is in fact a durable, reliable weapon.

Dr. Avery’s comment that “every serious comparative assessment by a broad range of national and international weapons experts has concluded that our current BCW is operationally timeworn,” ignores the fact that for Army acquisition, the U.S. Army must follow federal guidelines for testing. The Army, by the direction of the Congress, cannot base acquisition decisions on external tests, regardless of their findings or how compelling the results may seem.

Throughout the article, Dr. Avery refers to metrics such as stopping power, transfer of energy, knockdown power, and kill capability. Despite the prolific use of these terms in the civilian firearms enthusiast community, they are not used by the Army to assess terminal performance because they are not easily tested and are not good indicators of terminal effect. The aforementioned Small Arms CBA uses metrics for quantifying lethality gaps that are testable. During the early stages of development of the M855A1 EPR, an ad hoc committee of experts from Army laboratories, TRADOC, materiel developers, and other subject-matter-experts tackled the issue of terminal performance metrics. The committee established a rigorous protocol for assessing terminal performance. Results of the protocol became classified, so the process does not lend itself to adoption by civilian or commercial entities. To summarize this complicated issue, terminal effects are difficult to measure, but the Army has a rigorous methodology that is testable, measurable, and operationally relevant.

Dr. Avery claims that, “It is not certain what additional range the 5.56mm Enhanced Performance Round will realize in a mountainous environment, nor what its terminal effectiveness is at any range.” The answers to both of these questions are well known to the Army. M855A1 EPR was not designed to increase the range of the M4, but rather to make the terminal performance of the ammunition more consistent within the effective range of the weapon. M855A1 EPR is the most-tested round the Army has ever fielded, with over 1,000,000 rounds fired in developmental testing. Admittedly, the terminal effects may not be well known to those outside of the agencies involved, but all of the government agencies with a role in the testing and fielding of M855A1 have access to the terminal effects of the round. A noteworthy feature of the fielding of M855A1 is the inclusion of the terminal effects protocol for testing soft target performance during lot acceptance testing to ensure soldiers are getting consistent ammunition. The M855A1 is the first round to undergo such a rigorous test during lot acceptance.

Dr. Avery’s suggestions that an alternate caliber and alternative weapons could provide soldiers with better performance are excellent hypotheses. However, they are hypotheses, not conclusions. The U.S. Army is continuously examining our current capability and researching ways to provide soldiers the best equipment in the world, which is nothing less than they deserve.

65th Infantry Regiment

LTC Baltazar Soto, U.S. Army Reserve, Retired—

I want to discuss some points about COL Thomas Graves’ article “General Richard Cavazos and the Korean War, 1953” (July-August 2012 Military Review). In the article he states that the 65th Infantry Regiment was part of the “Puerto Rican National Guard.” In 1953, the 65th Infantry Regiment was part of the Regular Army. The regiment was first created on 2 March 1899 by act of Congress as “Porto Rico Battalion of Volunteer Infantry.” On 30 June 1908, it became part of the Regular Army and called “Porto Rico Regiment of Infantry, United States Army.” On 14 September 1920, it was designated as the 65th Infantry Regiment. The 65th stayed in the Regular Army until it was inactivated on 10 April 1956. It was not until 6 February 1959 that this regiment was allotted to the Puerto Rico National Guard. I
believe the 65th is possibly the only U.S. Army unit to transition from the Regular Army into the National Guard. The 1st Battalion, 65th Infantry is still part of the Puerto Rico National Guard today.

Another point is that he says there was a wholesale “panic” on 26 October 1952. This is completely wrong. There were three battles of Jackson Heights in which the 65th Infantry participated, one heroically and two not so well. The first battle occurred between 25-28 October 1952 in which G Company, 2nd Battalion, 65th Infantry held the position in a heroic battle for three days and four nights fighting off an estimated Chinese Battalion. On the last night of 27-28 October, G Company was ordered to retreat, when the Chinese surrounded G Company and penetrated their position. Captain Jackson succeeded in leading his company in a fighting advance to the rear, back to the main line. For this, the position was named after Jackson, “Jackson Heights.” Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Jackson finally received the Silver Star 50 years later after I researched the battle and requested that the US Army formally decorate him. The ceremony was held at Fort McPherson, Georgia, on 6 December 2002.

The second battle was on the morning of 28 October 1952 when F Company, followed by A Company, counterattacked to retake the heights. The battle lasted all day, until the vast majority of enlisted men “bugged out.” This incident may be the battle Colonel Graves is talking about in his article about the 65th and General Cavazos, but it occurred on 28 October, not 26 October.

The third and last battle occurred on 29 October 1952, when C Company counterattacked. The unit retreated when they conquered the heights, observed all the dead bodies, and discovered Jackson Heights was solid rock and they could not dig in. The soldiers refused orders to stay, believing it to be a suicide mission.

There are many reasons for the failure of the 65th Infantry at Jackson Heights. Most of the Puerto Rican soldiers who bugged out as a result of the battles were rounded up and court-martialed. Not one continental white officer, platoon leader, company commander, or battalion commander in any leadership position in the 65th was punished, except perhaps Jackson who had to wait 50 years for his medal. Continental leaders were promoted or given medals. All the soldiers and officers who were punished as a result of these battles, including a company executive officer and the a battalion commander, were Puerto Rican, another example of the discrimination and bigotry that existed in those days.

**COL Graves responds**—I appreciate LTC Soto taking the time to help set the record straight on the 65th’s actions in Korea. His comments show that these are important events in our military history and deserve more research and study. They have much to teach us about leadership, combat, and equality.

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### Just War Theory and Democratization by Force

Joseph P. Avery, Ph.D., *National Security and Foreign Policy*—Dr. Cora Sol Goldstein’s article “Just War Theory and Democratization by Force: Two Incompatible Agendas” (September-October 2012, *Military Review*) is an excellent and thought-provoking article with a number of prominent points backed by historical facts, and I agree with her presentation of the overall theory.

There are additional factors that make the task of democratization difficult in that part of the world during time of war and peace. In addition to the excellent analysis by Dr. Goldstein, you can fold in other aggravating issues raised by Samuel P. Huntington’s *Clash of Civilizations*, where popular cultural and religious conflicts often have priority over governments and their policies, and can lead to widespread conflicts and difficulty in instituting stable, democratic institutions and regimes.

In the middle of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, you can also factor in the propositions outlined in the seminal work *Political Order in Changing Societies*, which posits that the process of social and societal modernization that we are attempting to institute itself causes instability (and backlash) if not combined with a program of political and institutional modernization—little which have occurred in these areas. These regimes are basically corrupt, and that makes the task of democratization almost impossible under these circumstances as described by Dr. Goldstein.

On the other hand, democracy is not always the right answer, and often causes great instability...
when undesired. When the Soviet Union collapsed, creating new nuclear states like Ukraine, the United States was hammering Ukraine to both relinquish its nuclear weapons and form a democratic government at a time when the country was extremely unstable, close to civil war, and when Ukrainian leaders were trying to form any type of government at all while forestalling total collapse. America often fails to see the big picture and rarely travels outside its ideologically driven preconceived notions of government, world order, and the proper application of military force. I applaud this Just War article.

The Next Time We Reinvent Someone Else’s Country...

William Thayer, San Diego CA—In Major General Michael Symanski’s excellent article, “The Next Time We Reinvent Someone’s Else’s Country . . . ” (September-October 2012, Military Review), his “scar tissue learning” integrates the theories of political science, social and cultural science, military science, historical precedence, and a huge dose of practical experience and common sense propositions that leads the reader to the startling revelation that we should focus on our past mistakes, lessons learned, and experiences prior to future military commitments. To accomplish this, his outstanding assessment requires our sophisticated national security institutions to think, plan, and integrate all of the above.

Obviously, we have not been successful. If this was done, our strategy in Afghanistan would be quite different, and less expensive. General Symanski’s recommendations pass the common sense sniff test: work within the confines of the Afghan social structure, do things the Afghan way rather than making them do it our way, play to the native strengths and not waste our resources in a forlorn hope of replacing its deeply ingrained cultural and institutional traditions, and analyze the conditions of the campaign before defining its objectives. Like people everywhere, Afghan’s seek stability, security, leadership (even at tribal level), some semblance of certainty, and prosperity. Prosperity can lead to security and stability, but you also need security and stability to generate prosperity. That’s where tribal leaders can help. As the general asks, “Who will pay for Afghan political stability after we leave?” Equally important, who or what will be providing it, if anyone?

The United States has still not understood that our international war on terrorism is primarily a war of culture, religion, and propaganda—not guns and bullets. How can we win such a conflict when after ten years of war in Afghanistan, most Afghans don’t even know why we are fighting there, according to one survey. Democratic government is not the solution to everything. It may prove more useful to shift our focus on supporting and establishing good relations with tribal leaders and warlords rather than propping up an unpopular central government with a low probability of survival.

After we leave, the Taliban would have a more difficult time reestablishing their iron grip on the country under such circumstances. If the author’s conclusions are correct, and I believe history has confirmed that they are, we may need to establish a “Joint Strategic Engagement Directorate” within the DOD composed of State Department, DOD, and academic and intelligence agency representatives to prepare now for future conflicts and contingencies by actually thinking about and integrating the aforementioned factors into our political and military planning for future contingencies.

We also need to change gears on our international war on terrorism from solely guns, bullets, and drones to establishment of a large special operations campaign of “counter-propaganda” on how the black flag of Al-Qaeda is little more than a flag of black death for Muslims and a stain on their honorable religion. Al-Qaeda has probably caused the death of more Muslims than individuals from any other religious sect.