

**THE INSURGENTS:
David Petraeus and the
Plot to Change the Amer-
ican Way of War,**

Fred Kaplan, New York,
Simon and Schuster, 2013.
432 pages \$28.00

AS *The Insurgents* demonstrates, Fred Kaplan is a journalist and not a historian. The title has the ring of a sensa-

tional headline meant to captivate, perhaps, and to titillate. However, it mostly fails to illuminate. The title conveys little about the substance of its implied argument that General David Petraeus was some kind of institutional revolutionary. Kaplan's suggestion that a handful of really smart men and women—including John Nagl, David Killcullen, Montgomery McFate, Sarah Sewall, and Michelle Flournoy—successfully plotted to change the Army's wartime culture in the face of hardened resistance just doesn't hold water. Kaplan instead demonstrates that these so-called "insurgents" succeeded because, in fact, Army leadership supported them. Any resistance they encountered proved ineffective, irrelevant, or powerless.

The insurgents' supporters included the chief of staff of the Army. Their main supporter, "The Insurgent in the Pentagon," was the vice chief of staff General Peter Chiarelli. Using the "insurgent" metaphor for the vice chief of staff says all the reader needs to know about its value. If General Chiarelli is on their side, one wonders who the "counterinsurgents" are. So who stands in the way of the insurgents?

Fortunately for his thesis, Kagan was able to find one general who did have issues with the development of FM 3-24. That general was Major General Barbara Fast. She objected to FM 3-24 from her vantage point as the Chief of the Military Intelligence. While no mention is made of the commanding general at the Training and Doctrine Command, one wonders if he did not object too. Who really

stood in the way of FM 3-24? The answer is no one who could stop it.

So what is the real story here; what drives the drama in the title of the book? In the style of a Malcolm Gladwell or an Ori Brafmann, Kaplan makes the case that connections and networks matter in institutions. Petraeus is no insurgent, and he never has been. Petraeus' career trajectory, starting at West Point (USMA), has been that of an enabled and adroit insider. Star man at the Military Academy, Airborne and Ranger School graduate, instructor in the Department of Social Sciences at West Point (called "the master race" by other USMA departments), and aide de camp are the expected highlights of the Petraeus' patrician pedigree. To describe Petraeus as an "insurgent" is, to say the least, suspect.

One service Kaplan does the Army in this book is in illustrating that the old saw about anti-intellectualism in the institution is not as clear cut as many believe. Teaching at West Point and graduating from elite universities with doctoral degrees did not hold Petraeus or any of the other "insurgents" back. Some of his insurgent cohorts had similar if not as formidable resumes as did Petraeus. All of them also networked with others like them. This is a good story about a group of officers and academics most of whom shared similar experiences in elite institutions and who came together to adapt the Army to fight in Iraq, all with the support of Army leadership

Kaplan really doesn't ask whether the solutions they reached as embodied in FM 3-24 were or are sound. The story he recounts is more about how these folks coalesced and how their thinking evolved. The result is interesting and worth taking the time to read about, but Kaplan's notion of an insurgency is simply not borne out by what he reports. The insurgents never really had a fight on their hands, or at least they never had that they had a chance of losing.

Tangentially, Kaplan's report of the way Petraeus and these FM 3-24 so-called "insurgents" dealt with their opposition makes them look unattractive at best. The insurgents had little patience with those

who disagreed. People who did not see things their way were not dismissed out of hand, but the insurgents resorted to *ad hominem* arguments to try to intimidate or silence some. Kaplan reports on an argument between one of the insurgents and the writer Ralph Peters, a retired Army officer and gadfly who wrote a critical piece about FM 3-24. Kaplan observed that Peters had never “fought in battle” whereas the insurgent in question had. The implication is that Peters’ objections therefore cannot be valid. Yet the opinions of Michel Flournoy or Montgomery McFate are valid although like Peters they lack combat experience. Peters, like Barb Fast, had no real power to preclude the insurgents from winning their argument. His opposition was never a threat to the insurgents, merely a raising of points that call for rational answers.

The reader is left with the question about why Kaplan would recount this vignette at all. Opposition, however impotent, is required to make the case for Kaplan’s heroes as “insurgents.” Developing this tension in the book appears to be the only good reason for raising this opposition from a writer, one who had no real influence on policy.

In his acknowledgements, Kaplan expresses his gratitude to General Petraeus for giving freely of his time given that Petraeus understood that this book would be “not in the business of hagiography.” Perhaps Kaplan is not in the business of hagiography, but *The Insurgents* is not illustrative of that contention.

**COL Greg Fontenot, USA, Retired,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

**GLOBAL DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
MILITARY POWER**

Martin C. Libicki, Howard J. Shatz,
and Julie E. Taylor
RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA
2011, 170 pages, \$32.00

NOTED RAND RESEARCH scientists Martin C. Libicki, Howard J. Shatz, and Julie E. Taylor have written an intriguing U.S. Air Force-sponsored study on how demographics influence war and military power projection and the implications of this influence for the Air Force and the United States through 2050. The authors accomplish this study’s

mandate by first forecasting global demographic shifts among nations and then assessing these shifts in relation to a nation’s ability to carry out military missions, either in line with, or against, U.S. national security interests. In developing these forecasts, the authors analyze population trends and their impacts on human capital (working-age people) and state income and expenditures. The resulting analysis allows the authors to predict a country’s vulnerability to crisis and conflict.

This work is concise, well researched, and well articulated. The authors derive their data from an eclectic array of credible sources. Their analysis is substantive and their conclusions sound. The authors weigh and ask “what if” of a multitude of factors and the dynamic influences they have on demographic movement, and they produce several key findings.

Their research indicates that by 2050, many of the world’s most populated countries will be in Africa. India’s population will surpass China’s by 2030. With the exception of the United States, high-income countries will experience an aging of their populations along with lower birthrates. Birthrate differentials between high-birthrate developing countries and low-birthrate developed countries will not lead to conflict because few low-birthrate countries border high-birthrate countries. Existing bulges in unemployed male populations between ages 15 and 25 will shrink before they become unstable conflict drivers.

Muslim populations in countries such as France and Germany will not exceed 15 percent by 2050, but in Russia, they may reach 30 percent. Muslim populations are not growing as fast as first thought and when they do, this does not necessarily equate to instability. Aging populations around the world will become an economic burden on states. Demographics and social issues within China suggest that if China’s economy does not surpass the U.S. economy by 2050, it probably never will. The U.S. will likely have the economic resources, birth rates, and migration numbers to continue to be the indispensable global leader beyond 2050. Warfare will increasingly be driven by money, technology, and skilled manpower more so than by the size of military forces. Finally, the U.S. Air Force should not let the shrinking zone of global instability and the current focus on counterinsurgency operations detract from its long-term future and its need to enhance interoperability with partner states.

The book is packed full of interesting statistics, insightful information, and trend analysis. My only qualm is that most of the diagrams used to illustrate, compare, and contrast country data are exceedingly difficult to read. There is entirely too much data packed into these diagrams, making them very difficult to digest. That aside, the book is an interesting read that will appeal to a wide array of readers, from military and government agency professionals to academic scholars and graduate students in such fields as economics, political science, and international relations.

**David A. Anderson, Ph.D., LtCol, USMC,
Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

**INTELLIGENCE AND U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY: Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform**

Paul R. Pillar, Columbia University Press
New York, 2011, 355 pages, \$29.50

DURING THE 11 October 2012 vice presidential debates, Vice President Joe Biden stated that the Obama administration's initial responses to the 11 September 2012 attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi were based on the U.S. intelligence community's immediate assessments of what occurred. For two weeks after the attacks, the administration placed most of the blame for the consulate attacks on a U.S. citizen-made video that purportedly insulted the Prophet Mohammed. Unfortunately, the day prior to Biden's remarks, U.S. State Department personnel involved with the incident, before the House Committee of Oversight and Government Reform, had contradicted the administration's initial response to the incident. Many immediate reactions to Biden's remarks were that he had thrown the intelligence community "under the bus."

In Paul Pillar's book, *Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy: Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform*, the primary theme is that U.S. political leaders selectively use intelligence to achieve policy goals. In some cases (as in the claim that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction [WMD], which precipitated the Iraq War of 2003), Pillar accuses the George W. Bush administration of making up its own intelligence and then blaming the intelligence community

for getting it wrong. Although Pillar discusses the run-up to the Iraq War of 2003 and WMDs, he also touches on more distant examples of intelligence politicization (Korean War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and Vietnam), and spends a large portion of the book on 9/11 and the subsequent reform of the intelligence community, as recommended by the 9/11 Commission.

Pillar not only takes the Bush administration to task, but he also gives his perspective of the role of the U.S. Congress in politicization of intelligence. For example, he asks if Congress sufficiently questioned the Bush administration's evidence for the 2003 Iraq invasion. Pillar's assertion is that neither the Republicans nor the Democrats did. The larger and probably more relevant part of the book is spent on 9/11 and the subsequent 9/11 Commission, whose subsequent report brought about the creation of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the resulting subordination of the CIA to the DNI. Pillar's view is that the entire 9/11 Commission report was biased and its reforms misguided and ineffective.

Pillar's book is extremely detailed and informative, providing a better understanding of just how hard it is to be an intelligence professional in a world where all that matters is being wrong . . . once.

James M. Burcalow, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

**LIBERATING KOSOVO:
Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention**

David Phillips, The MIT Press, 2012
Cambridge, MA, 234 pages, \$27.00

DAVID PHILLIPS HAS produced a great diplomatic history about the U.S. intervention in the Balkans and the subsequent independence of Kosovo. He captured unique political insights from his interviews and personal experience as a humanitarian deeply involved in the crisis. Like Dean Acheson and George Kennan in earlier times, he evaluates a State Department leadership that expanded its mission in Europe with renewed activism.

Richard Holbrooke becomes a heroic figure in this book as he wrestles with Slobodan Milosevic during a series of intense negotiations. Phillips details Kosovo Albanian difficulties with the

peaceful leadership of Ibrahim Rugova and the ascendance of violence through the Kosovo Liberation Army. Too often, the United States rewarded the Kosovo Albanians after they behaved badly and used intimidation tactics on Kosovo Serbs. The author is sympathetic to the plight of the Kosovo Albanians but honest about their deficiencies, which has not endeared him to Kosovo leadership since independence.

The book's strength is its depth of understanding concerning the interplay between U.S. government officials and the Albanians, including their Diaspora. Congressman Eliot Engel and Senator Robert Dole figure prominently as they help develop support for a new U.S. approach against European misgivings.

The book's weakness is an absence of discussion about how, despite Secretary William Cohen's misgivings, the Defense Department leadership reluctantly interacted with the State Department on coercive diplomacy. It was a difficult relationship as Secretary Madeleine Albright and Ambassador Richard Holbrooke advocated the use of military force to bring Milosevic to the bargaining table. General Wesley Clark was out of step with Cohen and Pentagon generals. Clark's later dismissal should be a cautionary tale for other commanders navigating through confusing guidance from Washington.

Phillips sees this humanitarian intervention as controversial but a "multilateral success" in the national interest. A lesson from Kosovo is that the United States "cannot intervene everywhere, but that does not mean it cannot intervene anywhere." Intervention involves risks like the longer-term implications of the accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy—embarrassing China and Russia diplomatically does have costs. Russian President Vladimir Putin still exploits this grievance when it suits his purposes.

It is uncertain if the further fragmenting of Yugoslavia to form Kosovo, one of the poorest countries in Europe, was worth it. The cultural divisions between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs since the war have exacerbated with even greater physical division as more Serbs have moved north of the Ibar River.

David Phillips' account is worth reading by military officers examining past applications of American military power in pursuit of diplomatic objectives.

Phillips' perspective is especially important since Holbrooke can no longer help us to fill in the missing pieces. The humanitarian impulse within foreign policy circles, which he aptly describes, will continue to be significant as the United States struggles with the responsibility of other nations to protect their people.

James Cricks, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

**WAR, WILL, AND WARLORDS:
Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, 2001–2011**

Robert M. Cassidy, Marine Corps University Press
Quantico, VA, 2012, 271 pages, \$29.95

ROBERT CASSIDY PROVIDES a unique view of past and present challenges in countering the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan. While many authors intend to examine these challenges as a whole, most actually weight their analysis on one side of the Durand Line. However, Cassidy has succeeded in examining these separate but related insurgencies. He has a unique perspective as a U.S. Army colonel who served as a special assistant to the commander of the coalition operational-level headquarters for Afghanistan.

The overarching point of *War, Will, and Warlords* is that there is hope for Afghanistan but not for Pakistan. Cassidy frames his analysis through three fundamentals of counterinsurgency: legitimacy of the host nation government, use of credible force to protect the population, and information operations integrated with other activities. He sets the stage by illustrating how Afghan history includes periods of stability when the methods of governance and security were truly Afghan, demonstrating that foreign methods do not last. Cassidy also explains Pakistan's long-standing habit of using unconventional warfare to achieve its policy goals and how this affects Afghanistan.

Cassidy argues the first eight years in Afghanistan were a strategic economy of force. Consequently, the effort was unlikely to succeed due to a fundamental mismatch of ends, ways, and means; there simply were not enough resources to achieve the desired ends. Cassidy shows how this led to lack of legitimacy, inability to protect the population, and ineffective information operations. The situation in Afghanistan led to the insurgency

growing in Pakistan, which heavy-handed Pakistani counterinsurgency methods exacerbated. Moreover, the Pakistani government continued its dual game: on one hand, encouraging the insurgents as proxies who protect Pakistan's regional interests. and on the other hand, conducting operations against the insurgents to protect its internal control of the country and placate the U.S. government.

Counterinsurgency efforts in both Afghanistan and Pakistan changed dramatically between 2009 and 2011. In Afghanistan, the coalition provided additional resources and the Afghan National Security Forces increased in size and capability, allowing larger counterinsurgency efforts. While guarded in his optimism for Afghanistan, Cassidy paints a much bleaker picture of counterinsurgency in Pakistan. While Pakistani security forces prosecuted less punitive military operations against insurgent groups after 2009, Pakistani operations were still largely conventional in nature. Nevertheless, Pakistan will continue its duplicitous game due to internal politics and its perception of India.

War, Will, and Warlords provides insight into recent counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan and thought-provoking insights and recommendations for the future. While essential reading for those deploying to the area, Cassidy's work will prove informative for any student of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and irregular warfare. This book is an excellent read for those who wish to understand the strategic and operational challenges of conducting counterinsurgency in the region.

LTC Jon Klug, Fort Leavenworth Kansas

SIMULATING WAR:

Studying Conflict through Simulation Games

Philip Sabin, Continuum International
Publishing Group, New York
2012, 416 pages, \$34.95

THE USE OF war games and simulations as an aid to military education and training has a long history. Therefore, it is somewhat surprising that there is so little written about how to use war games in the classroom. This is particularly so given the prodigious amounts of paper that are often devoted to the latest fads of thinking or teaching. Massive computer simulations

sometimes take days to run and often focus more on the process of doing something than on the lessons learned from the study of a campaign. Philip Sabin, a professor in the War Studies Department of King's College in London, has written a book explaining the theory and mechanics of designing and running simulations that actually aids the student in understanding the study of a conflict—no mean feat.

Sabin points out that the main problem with computer simulations (despite the potential for immense levels of detail and the use of sophisticated tools for the user) is that the user often does not need to understand the system the designers have created, whereas with a board or tabletop game, the user has to. The latter “obviously requires a lot more intellectual effort from the user.” In a classroom setting, it is the critical thinking that occurs during the interaction between humans (something that cannot happen with a computer) that is most important for us as we try to create future leaders who need to be adaptive, critical thinkers.

The act of playing the simulation with others is the key to this learning. A simulation includes a set of guidelines that first must be understood by the players (which requires critical thinking) to determine if the guidelines make sense in the context of the scenario being simulated. When done well, this is an excellent method of getting students to think about the implications of their ideas.

The book has three parts. The first part explains the basic theory behind the design of war gaming simulations. Sabin covers the modeling of war, the nature of abstraction and accuracy, the educational utility of the idea, and how to conduct research for constructing a simulation project. The second part covers the mechanics of designing the actual simulation, providing the reader with the tools to design and construct a simulation. The last part contains several actual simulations to aid the user in understanding how the concept works. Particularly helpful is a download from King's College of actual simulation components used in Sabin's masters' classes.

For those thinking of using or who are already playing simulations as a training or teaching aid, I highly recommended *Simulating War*.

Nicholas Murray, D.Phil.,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

WARLORDS:**Strong-Arm Brokers in Weak States**

Kimberly Marten, Cornell University Press
Ithaca and London, 2012, 262 pages, \$29.11

WHENEVER A COUNTRY'S government or ruling entity is weak or has trouble controlling portions of its land or population, there likely has been a warlord power-broker to fill the void. In *Warlords: Strong-Arm Brokers in Weak States*, Kimberly Marten uses current examples to demonstrate how outsourcing security to tribal or ethnic leaders (who play by their own rules) leads to short-term success for a state, but in the end leads to long-term state failure. Marten defines *warlords* as individuals who control small pieces of territory through a combination of force and patronage. The warlords rule in defiance of genuine state sovereignty, but also exist due to the complicity of the state's leaders.

Marten puts together a lucid discussion that has two goals: to answer why state leaders allow warlords and their followers to coexist alongside or even in lieu of a legitimate state government and to explain the relationship among warlords, sovereign states, stability, security, and peace. Whether it is because of the fear of increased casualties by the sovereign state or the lack of funds required to pacify lawless areas, the author shows how many countries have opted to empower local power-brokers. They provide a skewed stability and security in their own areas of influence. However, once the genie is out of the bottle, there are significant long-term ramifications.

Although she could have used numerous examples throughout the world (e.g., Africa and Central or South America), Marten chose four contemporary examples to make her case about the problem of sovereign leaders choosing their own short-term political survival at the expense of the long-term interest of their nation.

The author's first example is an in-depth analysis of Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the history of how the British Empire and post-colonial and current Pakistani government supported a system where tribal leaders (warlords) are appointed by the government and have *de facto* control.

Marten's second and third examples involve

Russia and the fragmentation of the Soviet empire. Her analysis of Georgia shows how President Saakashvili's failure to remove an anti-Russian warlord led to the disastrous August 2008 war. This is a reminder that compromise with a powerful external actor is sometimes prudent. The second post-Soviet era example is the breakaway Republic of Chechnya. Ramzan Kadyrov was cultivated and later empowered by Vladimir Putin to manage Chechnya in a manner acceptable to Russia. This is a unique example in that Russia *sought* this relationship (rather than merely accepting it like other examples) as a way to outsource domestic security for the sake of convenience.

In the last example, Marten uses the 2005-2006 Sahwa (awakening) movement by the Sunni tribes when they turned on Al-Qaeda in Iraq and supported coalition efforts to truly turn the tide in that war. Marten points out that the movement known as the Sons of Iraq was highly successful at the operational level, but due to the Sunni-Shi'a divide in Iraq, it could never truly lead to strategic reconciliation.

Marten concludes her book with 11 hypotheses on the advantages and disadvantages of empowering or allowing a warlord situation to develop. She argues that warlords can indeed serve important roles in maintaining the peace, but they come at the cost of state building and development, an economy skewed to patronage networks and criminality, and will likely lead to long-term state failure.

I highly recommend *Warlords: Strong-Arm Brokers in Weak States* for anyone studying international relations or those working in foreign policy positions in the Department of State when faced with a developing or already entrenched warlord situation. The book is relevant considering today's worldwide economic concerns and weak states' limited capacity to control their own people and territory.

**LTC David T. Seigel, USA, Retired,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

**DONUT DOLLY: An American
Red Cross Girl's War in Vietnam**

Joann Puffer Kotcher
University of North Texas Press, Denton
2011, 384 pages, \$24.95

DONUTDOLLY: *AN American Red Cross Girl's War in Vietnam* is the riveting first-hand account of Joann Puffer Kotcher's experiences as a program director for the American Red Cross in the early years of the Vietnam War. Military Assistance Command-Vietnam granted the Red Cross permission to provide recreation for troops anywhere in the combat zone, thus officially permitting women in the battle zone for the first time. The Donut Dollies' primary mission was to serve as a reminder of home and form a sisterly or girl-next-door-type bond with soldiers. The women greeted military personnel, distributed donuts, coffee, or other provisions, and entertained troops with a variety of recreational games. Kotcher details her daily life as a Donut Dolly and describes the importance of her wartime role.

Kotcher relates the dangers she faced while in Vietnam and the extraordinary fear that became a way of life. She quickly became aware that the light blue uniforms worn by Donut Dollies made them easy targets.

Kotcher also brings to life the specifics of her daily life in Vietnam. While the Red Cross women were instructed to strictly follow rules of modesty and to remain aware of their image, they received an immense amount of attention. It was not unlikely for soldiers to profess their feelings toward the beautiful young women stationed in Vietnam.

Kotcher credits these Red Cross "girls" as being pioneers. They opened doors previously closed to women and their efforts helped the military realize women could be beneficial in a combat zone. At the end of the Vietnam War, women were not sent back into the home as they had been in prior wars. The sacrifices and hard work of the Donut Dollies depicted women as assets in the workforce. I recommend *Donut Dolly* to those interested in the advancements of the role of women in the armed forces.

Ms. Siobhan E. Ausberry, Washington, D.C.

**SAVING BIG BEN: The USS
Franklin and Father Joseph T. O'Callahan**
John R. Satterfield, Naval Institute Press
Annapolis, MD, 2011, 175 pages, \$23.00

THIS JOURNALISTIC, WELL-RESEARCHED book details the story of a

World War II Medal of Honor (MOH) recipient. The simple, honorable, quiet heroism of Father Joseph O'Callahan, the first military chaplain to receive the Medal of Honor, is John Satterfield's subject. However, *Saving Big Ben* lacks the historical details that history enthusiasts might wish for in a story involving the USS *Franklin*. The author's intent clearly is to tell Father O'Callahan's story.

Satterfield first describes O'Callahan's personal life from his Irish family background in Boston to his priesthood and then proceeds to his Navy service. Satterfield researched the rancorous dispute over O'Callahan's receipt of the Medal of Honor. Some argued that O'Callahan's award was more politically motivated rather than given for a selfless and valorous action meeting the standards for the MOH. The author describes how the Jesuits, the media, and politics of the war movement pushed the Department of the Navy for the MOH instead of the originally recommended Navy Cross. However, Satterfield offers both sides of the argument, leaving readers to make up their own minds.

Satterfield also briefly describes the 19 March 1945 attack on the USS *Franklin*, the death on the ship due to inferno, and the valorous actions of the ship's crew, especially those of O'Callahan.

Not intended for military historians but for a wider audience, I highly recommend the book for those interested in Medal of Honor history and World War II in the Pacific.

LTC Paul Berg, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

**WORLD IN THE BALANCE:
The Perilous Months of June-October 1940**

Brooke C. Stoddard, Potomac Books
Washington, DC, 2011, 255 pages, \$29.95

THERE ARE FEW times in modern history as dramatic as the Battle of Britain. For months, Great Britain was poised on the edge of disaster against the greatest villain of the 20th century. Brook Stoddard's *World in the Balance* captures the feeling of peril in his retelling of Britain's finest hour. He weaves together technological and diplomatic developments that directly affected the evacuation at Dunkirk, the Battle of Britain, and Italy's invasion of Egypt.

World in the Balance starts with the massacre of

British and French soldiers in the French town of Wormhoudt. Stoddard argues that the massacre was part of a Nazi policy of ruthlessness that the Germans used during their invasion of Poland. (The SS committed most of the massacres that Stoddard mentions, but the *Wehrmacht* has recently been shown to have been equally bloodthirsty.)

Stoddard begins his description of the Battle of Britain straightforwardly with the Miracle at Dunkirk and follows the struggles of the British for the next five months. Churchill and the Royal Air Force (RAF) are the clear heroes and protagonists. Hugh Dowding, the head of RAF fighter command, and his subordinates, Trafford Leigh-Mallory and Keith Park, who commanded the fighter groups that took the brunt of the fighting, also play large roles. Stoddard also provides some oral histories and experiences of the RAF fighters who fought off Göring's *Luftwaffe*.

The book's organization is perhaps its best feature. Narrative chapters of battles alternate with discussions of technological and diplomatic developments. These chapters focus on Bletchley Park's race to break the Enigma code, the development of radar, propaganda efforts by both Britain and Germany, and Churchill's efforts to secure foreign assistance from the United States. These chapters give excellent overviews of technological development and work. The diplomatic chapter gives a sense of Churchill's broad perspective and foresighted efforts to fight fascist aggression on a global scale. For example, despite the desperate need to defend the British mainland, Churchill dispatched large numbers of tanks to defend Egypt. The British had barely arrived when the Italians launched their ill-fated invasion.

One major quibble with Stoddard's book is that when discussing the Nazis' rise to power and ideology, he depends mostly on William Shrier's *Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*—an excellent book but one that is rather dated. Despite this, Stoddard does an admirable job of showing the Battle of Britain for what it was—a struggle between liberal democracy and fascism, which would determine the fate of Europe and the world. This is a fine retelling of one of history's great turning points.

John E. Fahey, Lafayette, Indiana

HITLER

A.N. Wilson, Basic Books

New York, 2012, 200 pages, \$24.99

HITLER BY A.N. WILSON is a nonscholarly account of Adolf Hitler that explores how such an indolent man, lacking any interest in politics, could coerce a country and later become chancellor of Germany. He is described as a man who not only freewheeled through life without much responsibility until almost 25, but also was denied a promotion in World War I due to his lack of leadership skills. He was awarded the Iron Cross 1st Class because of the officers he knew as a regimental message runner, not for having any direct combat involvement.

His failed beer hall putsch of 1923 inspired supporters for National Socialism and earned Hitler prison time, where he wrote *Mein Kampf*. Hitler's book—reeking with self-indulgence—became a best seller throughout Germany. Wilson argues that *Mein Kampf* was not necessarily the struggle of Hitler's life, but the struggle or fight yet to come. It was the fight for Germany's future and the world itself.

A gifted and passionate orator, Hitler captured his audience with oral and visual stimuli such as the Roman salute and mass rallies. Wilson claims that "Hitler was the first and most hypnotic artist of post-literacy, escalating himself as a maestro of political manipulation." However, Hitler was also an incurable liar who lacked any personality traits of kindness or decency. His Machiavellian exploitation skills, along with his flair for violence, propelled him to wrest control of Germany from men unlike himself, those who excelled at leadership and organizational abilities.

Hitler despised Catholicism, yet copied many of its programs. For instance, he duplicated its educational programs to instruct the Hitler Youth. As Hitler prepared for war and his mental instability became more pronounced, Wilson psychoanalyzes that Hitler threw temper tantrums when he lacked rational decision-making skills or feared the intellect of others. A man devoid of rational emotions, Hitler was unable to portray the same affection to humans as he did to canines. Through his final years, he became more withdrawn from reality and rationality. With Wilson's rendition of Hitler, one wonders how it was possible that he ever became a national leader.

The text is poorly cited and consists of secondary research material, but it is an easy read and keeps

the reader's attention until the end.

Scott J. Gaitley, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

**NORMANDY CRUCIBLE:
The Decisive Battle That Shaped
World War II in Europe**

John Prados, Penguin Books LTD
Essex, UK, 2011, 353 pages, \$25.95

JOHN PRADOS' *NORMANDY Crucible* brings to light new perspectives about the epic battle of Normandy and the impact it had on Allied and German operations throughout the remainder of World War II.

Prados incorporates two perspectives that have not been considered in much depth before. First, he introduces the Allied intelligence feed from ULTRA (the code word for deciphered German high-level communications) into Allied decision making and situational awareness. Second, Prados considers recent analysis of German casualty estimates, which may have been previously overstated. Prados argues that even after decades, German casualty numbers remain unchanged from the estimates given in reports immediately after the battle. It would seem unprecedented for the initial casualty estimates to remain unchanged after incorporating prisoner counts, burials, and German reports. Perhaps more German soldiers escaped from France than was originally thought.

Prados casts the Normandy campaign as a test for both Allied and German tactics, techniques, and even logistics. Lessons learned from this campaign shaped future outcomes: for the Allies, it brought new tensions among the multinational leadership and perhaps an overconfidence and failure to appreciate German capabilities. For the Germans, it brought a greater reliance on night operations to avoid the effects of Allied air superiority as well as the concept for a massive offensive operation directed at American forces (later known as the Battle of the Bulge).

Prados' primary focus in *Normandy Crucible* is on the operational level of war. The book talks about specific tactical operations and engagements and relates these to operational objectives and decisions made by Allied and German leaders. The perspectives, combined with a new consid-

eration of intelligence gained from ULTRA and a new view of losses suffered by the *Wehrmacht*, provide a different framework from which to understand this epic battle. The author sees a cauldron from which new and improved tactics and even faulty assumptions were formed. These assumptions, no doubt, shaped future events of the war.

The book is well written and informative. I recommend *Normandy Crucible* to anyone interested in World War II history.

LTC Thomas G. Meara, USA, Retired,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

**VOICES OF THE BULGE: Untold
Stories from Veterans of the Battle of the Bulge**

Michael Collins and Martin King
Zenith Press, Minneapolis, MN, 2011
320 pages, \$29.00

VOICES OF THE *Bulge* relates battlefield accounts of soldiers and civilians who were on the ground in the Ardennes and Schnee Eifel in December 1944. The personal accounts come not only from U.S. soldiers but also from German combatants and civilians.

Authors Michael Collins and Martin King set the stage from the German perspective and then overlay it with the state of the Allied forces in Belgium, Luxembourg, and France. This prepares the reader for the events that begin on 16 December 1944 and last into January 1945.

Each chapter reads as a new day with a situational update and follows with firsthand accounts of soldiers, many never told before. For this reason, the book is a worthy companion to the many accounts on the Battle of the Bulge. Some of the most intriguing stories are of the horrible atrocities committed against U.S. soldiers held as German prisoners of war.

There are thousands of stories from these events that have gone untold over the last 60-plus years. Many of them have been in the thoughts and nightmares of those who were there and have never spoken of them. Collins and King go to considerable lengths to ensure some of these stories are told—captured now on paper for posterity. The authors help capture

the experiences of a generation rapidly fading away.
MAJ Daniel Rempfer, USA, Fort Leavenworth, KS

GALLIPOLI

Peter Hart, Oxford University Press
New York, 2011, 544 pages, \$34.95

PPETER HART CLAIMS in the first sentence of his preface that his verdict of the entire operation in the Gallipoli campaign was “lunacy.” He discusses the 1915 British campaign that was to seize the Dardanelles straits and knock the Ottoman Empire out of the war. The focus of *Gallipoli* is on individual soldiers’ actions in the campaign as recounted from their diaries, letters, and personal memoirs. The book has three interwoven themes: the British War Cabinet was guilty of a gross error in strategy; the British Army failed completely in planning and carrying out the campaign; and the soldiers who fought in the campaign struggled valiantly under terrible conditions to achieve the impossible.

The 1915 campaign was an attempted turning movement on a grand scale. The *Entente* (Britain, France, and Russia) navies were to force the Dardanelles straits and enter the Black Sea. This would open sea lines of communications with Russia, knock the Ottoman Empire out of the war, entice the Balkan states to join the *Entente* powers, and open a new front against the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, and Bulgaria). Germany would be forced to move reinforcements from France to meet this new threat. Hart argues instead that the war could only be won on the Western Front; diverting naval assets weakened the Home Fleet and forced Britain’s military to operate at the end of a long line of communications.

After a combined British/French fleet failed to force its way past the shore batteries and minefields in the straits, it was decided that a ground force would have to seize the Gallipoli peninsula on the north side of the straits to permit the fleet to pass. Amphibious landings were conducted by British and French forces to gain control of the peninsula. The landings put troops on the ground but without the combat power to defeat the Turkish defenders. Hart condemns the British Army for poor planning and leadership, particularly the commander, General Ian Hamilton. The newly raised divisions employed

in the campaign were poorly trained and badly equipped, especially in artillery.

Hart’s book makes plain the dangers of committing inexperienced soldiers and untried leaders to battle. The debilitating effect on the soldiers of the harsh terrain, weather, disease, and poor supplies is also made clear.

The author may be correct in calling the Gallipoli campaign an act of “lunacy,” but he offers no evidence that the employment of the British Army divisions on the Western Front in 1915 would have accomplished anything. After all, if they were unable to defeat the Turkish Army, what would they have done against a veteran, highly professional Imperial German Army?

LTC David Bryan, USA, Louisville, Kentucky

**THE LONG ROAD TO ANTIETAM:
How the Civil War Became a Revolution**

Richard Slotkin, Liveright Publishing Corporation
New York, 2012, 478 pages, \$32.95

BYOND THE STRATEGIC premises surrounding the Battle of Antietam on 17 September 1862, eminent historian Richard Slotkin has given us an outstanding operational and tactical chronicle of warfare in the Virginia and Maryland campaigns of the American Civil War. The campaigns immediately led up to Antietam, whose significance lies not in the battle itself, “but in the campaign that produced it.” Slotkin’s narratives of maneuver and combat are enthralling and make up most of the book. This is no dry academic narrative. Slotkin bolsters his book with concise explanations of battlefield tactics and the pre-Antietam strategy that had been at an impasse for the Union, due in part to the vehemence of the Confederacy in their commitment to secession.

Why another book on a battle covered comprehensively by other historians an untold number of times in the past? As Slotkin explains, his new study shows clearly how the Civil War was “a genuinely revolutionary crisis in American history.” This was because of two monumental actions in the history of the United States: President Lincoln settled the question of civil over military authority, and the post-Antietam Eman-

cipation Proclamation. The U.S. government went from a war of compromise and appeasement of the Confederacy to one of total victory through a strategic offensive against the South. Undeniably, “the Union could not be saved unless [Lincoln] . . . put slavery on the path to ultimate extinction.” The changes wrought by the Proclamation would indeed be revolutionary, for Lincoln had “negated the fundamental law of slavery,” augmenting the Proclamation through a nationwide suspension of *habeas corpus* that put even civilian dissenters at risk of arrest for fomenting anti-Proclamation sentiment. The effects of the Proclamation did not simply hold civil implications but national military ones as well, for it “undermined the Southern economy and social order by drawing large numbers of slaves away from their plantations.” Black men were recruited into Union military forces.

Integral to Slotkin’s thesis is the contention between Lincoln and his top field commander, George McClellan—a political general *par excellence* who’d take no risks in battle if it might have adversely affected his own anti-Lincoln political goals. As vacillation and indecisiveness plagued McClellan’s overcautious approach to embarking on a decisive battle, the Confederacy would seize the strategic initiative and invade the North.

The Lincoln-McClellan conflict was no simple matter of a difference of opinions among national leadership, for a Napoleonic-type seizure of the Federal government was a real option in McClellan’s mind and those of his close supporters. He doubted Lincoln’s strategy, as did many others in Washington, and he would openly offer political opinions to the Lincoln administration that sound treasonous to the modern military ear, and did as well to many contemporaries. But McClellan was a commander whose popularity among all ranks was nearly unanimous, causing Lincoln, in short, to maneuver the vanity and stubbornness of his field generals. Fortunately, for the Union and America’s future, throughout the Antietam-McClellan crisis “Lincoln had maintained his focus on the strategic essentials.”

At the risk of splitting the War Democrats, Lincoln fired McClellan on 7 November 1862, after the general refused to take the offensive against Confederate forces resurging in Virginia. McClellan’s refusal was the last straw. Lincoln

ended McClellan’s threat of “crippling internal divisions at the highest level of strategy” in a crisis that had witnessed much fast and loose talk among generals of the need for a military dictatorship to seize the government.

Slotkin’s work has always been eminently readable to this reviewer, and in the current work he does not disappoint. However, what he has given us is not simply an accessible version of a popular subject—the American Civil War—but an incisive study of a monumental event in the history of Western democracy. *The Long Road to Antietam* is recommended not solely for the professional political and military historian but a much wider American audience, a perfect primer for anyone wanting to look into a pivotal crisis in American history.

Jeffrey C. Alfier, Torrance, California.

THE ARTILLERY SERVICE IN THE WAR OF THE REBELLION

1861-65: John C. Tidball

edited by Lawrence M. Kaplan

Westholme Publishing, LLC, Yardley, PA

2011, 416 pages, \$30.00

AUTHOR JOHN C. Tidball was a U.S. artillery officer who served in many of the major eastern campaigns throughout the Civil War. When the war ended, Tidball was a brevet major general and later served as the superintendent of artillery instruction at the Artillery School.

The Artillery Service in the War of the Rebellion, 1861-65, edited by Lawrence Kaplan, is a series of previously published articles by Tidball tracing the evolution of the management and application of artillery in campaigns of the Civil War. As way of a stage setter for the reader, the first chapter gives the reader an overview of artillery organization, materiel, and personnel at the beginning and throughout the war, and defines some concepts that may be foreign to today’s artillerists. As way of reinforcement, Kaplan includes an edited extract from Henry J. Hunt (chief of artillery in the Army of the Potomac), which describes the organization and administration of U.S. artillery prior to and early in the war with discussions

of efforts he made to more effectively manage field artillery within the Army of the Potomac.

Tidball discusses the eastern campaigns of the Peninsula Campaign, Antietam, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, and Petersburg. While the author's personal experience was with the Army of the Potomac in many of these campaigns, for balance, editor Kaplan has included a previously unpublished manuscript by Tidball that discusses three western actions—Stones River, Chickamauga, and Shiloh. With each campaign, Tidball discusses changes in artillery management since the last campaign, the employment of artillery in the action, and its impact, as well as noting possible corrective action to make improvements.


Between 1861 and 1865, there was no artillery branch in the U.S. Army. Field artillery was primarily employed as a crew-served direct fire weapon or mortar; and command and control structure above battery level was marginal at

best. Batteries were armed with multiple types and calibers of cannons. Sustainment issues were substantial. Batteries were employed piecemeal early in the war. Brigade or division commanders employed artillery if the terrain in their zone of action adequately supported its use. If the terrain did not, the batteries were sent to the rear and were out of the action. At times, significant amounts of combat power (artillery batteries) were not employed, to the detriment of the overall campaign. More effective artillery organization may have overcome this challenge.

The Artillery Service in the War of the Rebellion, 1861-65, is well written, follows logical paths, is relatively free of difficult military language and detail, and does not require the reader to be an expert in Civil War history. The book is easy to read and quickly gains the reader's attention. I recommend the book for Civil War enthusiasts, novices or scholars alike, as well as U.S. military professionals, fire support or maneuver.

**LtCol Terrance M. Portman, USMC, Retired,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

MR WE RECOMMEND



THE SAVIOR GENERALS: *How Five Great Commanders Saved Wars That Were Lost: From Ancient Greece to Iraq*


Victor Davis Hanson, 2013, Bloomsbury Press, New York, 256 pages, \$28.00

LEADING MILITARY HISTORIAN Victor Davis Hanson returns to nonfiction in *The Savior Generals*, a set of brilliantly executed pocket biographies of five generals who single-handedly saved their nations from defeat in war. War is rarely a predictable enterprise—it is a mess of luck, chance, and incalculable variables. Today's sure winner can easily become tomorrow's doomed loser. Sudden, sharp changes in fortune can reverse the course of war.

These intractable circumstances are sometimes mastered by leaders of genius—asked at the eleventh hour to save a hopeless conflict, created by others, often unpopular with politics and the public. These savior generals often come from outside the established power structure, employ radical strategies, and flame out quickly. Their careers often end in controversy. But their dramatic feats of leadership are vital slices of history—not merely as stirring military narrative, but as lessons on the dynamic nature of consensus, leadership, and destiny. *From the publisher.*

HANNIBAL AND ME: *What History's Greatest Military Strategist Can Teach Us About Success and Failure*

Andreas Kluth, Riverhead Trade, Penguin Putnam Inc., New York, 2013, 336 pages, \$16.00



THE LIFE OF Hannibal, the Carthaginian general who crossed the Alps with his army in 218 BCE, is the stuff of legend. And the epic choices he and his Roman enemies made on the battlefield and in life offer timeless lessons to us today about how we should respond to our own victories and defeats.

Inspired by ancient history, *Hannibal and Me* explores the triumphs and disasters in our lives by examining the decisions made by Hannibal and others, including Albert Einstein, Eleanor Roosevelt, Steve Jobs, Ernest Shackleton, and Paul Cézanne. Kluth shows why some overcome failure and others succumb to it, and why some fall victim to success while others thrive on it. The result is a page-turning adventure tale, a compelling human drama, and an insightful guide to understanding behavior. *From the publisher.*

Education for Critical Thinking

Lieutenant Colonel Dave J. Banks, Retired, *Canadian Army*—The purpose of this note is to offer some comments on Colonel Thomas Williams' excellent article, "Education for Critical Thinking" (*Military Review*, January-February 2013). I would also request that you pass my comments to the author. I am a retired Canadian Army Infantry officer, currently employed as a contractor in support of the training of headquarters and staffs for operations. My final military assignments were as a member of the Directing Staff of the Canadian Army Command and Staff College (both the Regular and the Reserve Courses). During my Regular Army career I was a Distinguished Graduate of USMC C&SC Quantico residency, and I had the good fortune to serve in a US CJTF HQ in Afghanistan.

I am in complete agreement with Colonel Williams' argument, and I share similar concerns about our own PME up here. While we are quite good at teaching process and doctrine, we do not always do as well at educating our students to be critical thinkers. In my current job, when involved in the exercise of a formation HQ, I too often see the results: staff officers who can bang together a mean set of Powerpoint slides in a heartbeat, but whose depth of understanding or analysis of the operational issues is superficial to say the least.

As an example, when we teach the Operational Planning Process (very similar to your MDMP), we stress the importance of Step 2: Orientation. Or, at least, we say we do. Orientation is the step in the process during which the commander and staff develop a shared understanding of the nature and scope of the problem confronting them, and identify the shape of a possible solution (end state). What actually happens all too often (sadly, too frequently with the complicity or even the urging

of the Directing Staff) is that the students rush to crank out a Mission Analysis slide deck as fast as they can. Sometimes I have worried that we do too good a job of engendering "check-list thinking," or "doctrine playback," instead of real thinking and analysis.

From my own observations, U.S. forces may have similar issues to our own Army. A nice tangible briefing deck is a simple "measure of effectiveness" that everybody can grasp. The depth and quality of the thinking behind it are things that some people may find a bit too "fuzzy" or "squishy" to worry much about. The ultimate result of this type of thinking, in my opinion, is the tendency to fixate on measures of effectiveness that are easy to quantify (and brief well), as opposed to those that are harder to quantify but may actually be much more relevant. I certainly lived this when I was in uniform: counting AK47s confiscated, or number of mines lifted, or number of kilometers of road opened, are all just "measures of performance" masquerading as real "measures of effectiveness." What (if anything) they actually mean is something that sometimes never gets talked about.

A final complicating factor that the colonel did not address in his article is that our young officers (in both our militaries) are products of societies in which critical thinking is an almost extinct art. The most outrageous nonsense is instantly propagated by digital means, by the media, by politicians of all stripes, etc., all with the spurious air of authority that "being on the 'Net'" gives it. Some people might be surprised to discover that Twitter is really not a substitute for critical thinking about factual evidence. Teaching people to actually stop and think about something can be a big challenge.