


MR BOOK REVIEWS



THE DEVIL'S CAUSEWAY: The True Story of America's First Prisoners of War in the Philippines, and the Heroic Expedition Sent to Their Rescue, Matthew Westfall, Lyons Press, Guilford, CT, 2012, 402 pages, \$26.95

FEATURED REVIEW

AS THE STUDY of insurgent-centric conflicts expands, scholars and military professionals have expressed a renewed interest in the U.S. experience in the Philippines at the turn of the 20th century. Often the discussions focus on tactics, the psychology of resistance, or the underlying motives of U.S. involvement in the Far East. Too often the human stories behind the events remain forgotten. Matthew Westfall's *The Devil's Causeway* helps to close the gap by resurrecting the fascinating story of how Spanish, Filipino, and American forces participated in one of the most widely celebrated prisoner rescue sagas of the time.

At the close of hostilities between Spain and the United States, a small Spanish garrison in the seaside town of Baler in the Philippines continued to hold out against a siege led by Filipino irregulars. Word of the conflict reached U.S. authorities, who dispatched the USS *Yorktown* to relieve the garrison. Met by hostility from the Filipinos, the Americans sent out a reconnaissance party to plan a route for a relief expedition. The commander of the scout boat and shore party, Lieutenant James Gillmore, moved further upriver and inland than he had been ordered. Surprised and outgunned by the guerrillas, Gillmore and his surviving crew surrendered.

Thus began an epic journey for both the prisoners and their captors—a tale of the hunter and the hunted. The plight of Gillmore and his crew captivated newspaper audiences across the world, and the U.S. government immediately ramped up efforts to locate

the group. Soldiers and sailors trekked across some of the most rugged Philippine terrain, trying to track down the elusive group. The prisoners suffered many deprivations; however, most of them clung to the hope that their countrymen had not forgotten them. For some in Gillmore's group, the story ended happily. For others, the mistaken assumptions and poor planning of their leaders would cost them their lives.

Westfall is a masterful storyteller, weaving together a narrative that is suspenseful and compelling. His work evinces thorough and painstaking research, a fact brought out by the extensive list of primary and secondary sources from three continents. While showing the human toll that the conflict in the Philippines brought, Westfall avoids the temptation to editorialize on the U.S. involvement and its corollary policies. Instead, he shows us that the common soldier and sailor, whether American, Filipino, or Spanish, were caught up in events much larger than they were. Yet their seemingly insignificant choices shaped the nature and extent of the conflict and helped influence the destiny of nations. While the story may be old, the message applies today in an era of low-intensity conflicts shaped by decisions made at the company level. For all these reasons, this book is a *must* read for both students of military history and observers of human nature.

Jonathan E. Newell, Hill, New Hampshire

COALITIONS OF CONVENIENCE: United States Interventions after the Cold War Sarah E. Kreps, Oxford University Press, New York, 2011, 240 pages, \$27.95

SARAH KREPS, ASSISTANT professor of Government at Cornell University and former Air Force officer, has written an insightful book about the considerations nations make when determining whether to respond multilaterally to a crisis requiring military action. The author's thesis is that even powerful nations such as the United States that having the capacity to act unilaterally, generally

prefer to act multilaterally in employing military force in order to operate within internationally accepted political and social norms. The implication is that, short of having to deal with a crisis requiring immediate action, nations prefer to have more legitimacy than less when taking military action. In addressing her assertion, the author systematically applies theoretical and empirical analysis to four U.S.-led post-Cold War interventions: the 1991 Gulf War, the multilateral 1994 Haiti intervention, 2001 Afghanistan conflict, and the 2003 Iraq conflict. She chose this U.S.-centric approach because U.S. power has remained robust throughout the post-Cold War period and the United States has intervened around the world more freely and often than other states. Furthermore, all of these operations have had significant military contributions by other states.

Kreps applies structural and normative theoretical arguments regarding state power projection. Her empirical analysis uses appropriate factors that measure coalition vigor, the directness of a threat and response time horizon, and the effect of time horizons and other operational commitments on cooperation. Her analysis soundly supports her contention.

Kreps points out supporting reasons for the use of a multilateral approach, including the burden sharing of military forces and operational costs (both power-conserving strategies). She further identifies some of the trade-offs of taking a multilateral approach such as slower operational response time and decision sharing. She also sheds light on the reasoning behind the specific selection of an intervening approach or combination of approaches and what they may indicate for future military interventions led by large and militarily powerful nations.

Kreps concludes that the United States acts primarily based on time-horizons and other operational commitments more so than an altruistic desire to intervene as part of a coalition. In general, “only because the U.S. military has developed accommodation strategies has it been willing to intervene multilaterally.” Finally, she suggests that in the future, the United States may more often than not want to employ a hybrid approach—starting with a unilateral, bilateral, or “minilateral” approach before gravitating to a multilateral approach when the operation lends itself to such a transition. By doing so, the United States would be able to take full

advantage of its military strength and rapid response capability followed by the benefits associated with being part of a multilateral effort.

The book is well crafted, articulate, and painstakingly researched. Arguably the only shortcoming of the book is the excessive detail provided in each of the operational case studies, much of which was unnecessary and detracted from the author’s thesis. Military professionals, military history scholars, and students of political science and international relations will best appreciate this book. It may also be appealing to a more general audience interested in how the post-Cold War U.S. decision process has worked in conducting military interventions around the world and what these experiences indicate for future operations.

**David A. Anderson, Ph.D., LtCol, USMC,
Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

THE RATIONAL BELIEVER
Choices and Decisions in the
Madrasas of Pakistan

Masooda Bano, Cornell University Press,
Ithaca, New York, 2012, 250 pages, \$39.95

FOR THOSE WHO believe the madrasas (Islamic schools) of Pakistan are the seeding grounds for the Taliban insurgency—awash with dissatisfied and impoverished youth—they would be wise to read Masooda Bano’s *The Rational Believer*. Although Bano rightly acknowledges that perhaps two of the 7 July 2005 London bombers received religious training in Pakistan’s madrasas—and no doubt other fundamentalists, as well as those who provided protection for Osama bin-Laden—the majority, she argues, are rational believers, keen to exploit the moral and practical benefits of a religious education. Bano contends that madrasas are not ideological training camps, actively or passively, for terrorists or international jihad. Neither are they simply a free education for the poor, downhearted, or unwanted.

Bano sets out her position logically, drawing on a wealth of interviews and impressive fieldwork, including discussions with students and religious teachers at Islamabad’s infamous Red Mosque. In so doing, she elaborates why and how religion

attracts followers, as well as why and how religion is shaped by the choices of its followers. Using investigative tools from the field of New Institutional Economics (NIE) (a means of inquiry gaining momentum across the social sciences) she uncovers the functionalist as well as the ideational forces at play, which encompass the so-called “local logic.” The results challenge many ill-informed, biased, and institutionalized beliefs. Bano articulates that the majority of madrasa students are forward-looking, strategizing, and utility-maximizing individuals.

The Rational Believer is divided into three parts: Institutional Change and Stability, Determinants of Demand for Informal Institutions, and Informal Institutions and Collective Outcomes. Readers will find historical comparisons between learning at Oxford University, England, and the madrasas of South Asia instructive and thought provoking. But it is the chapter that deals with the popular appeal of militant resistance that stands out and will be of particular interest to political and military leaders. Here, Bano explains in detail the decision-making processes of leaders, jihadists, supporters, and sympathizers, uncovering that the pursuit of ideal rewards is not irrespective of the context and that actions that draw on more than one source of ideal utility demonstrate higher commitment.

While by no means an easy read—complex academic papers converted into books rarely are—*The Rational Believer* is certainly educational and stimulating. Bano notes there are 16,000 official madrasas, registered with 5 regulatory boards, in Pakistan alone—and many more unofficial ones scattered across the country. She also exposes the five levels of madrasas—from level one (which focuses on memorizing the Koran and basic Islamic education) to ultimately elite schools (which include options for doctoral-level research) and explains the attraction for families who commit their child to a madrasa education. Bano notes the draw of a religious education does not reside just with the poor; middle and upper class children are surprisingly well represented in the better madrasas. The study also uncovers the exponential growth in female madrasas and explains why centuries-old sharia law is increasingly popular among Pakistan’s youth, despite its daily precincts. Equally, the study gives an explanation as to why attempts to modernize madrasas

with contemporary subjects such as mathematics, English, and social sciences have failed. In 2002, the U.S. government committed \$225 million to madrasa reform. By early 2009, the modernization program was closed; \$71 million provided by the U.S. government went unused.

If Bano’s findings are to be believed, and there is no reason not to, Pakistan’s religious schools are an institution for good and not a wasp’s nest of latent insurgency. By using aspects of NIE—a method worthy of military examination—Bano dispels the myths surrounding Pakistan’s madrasas and uncovers a cultural and values-based lens to reassess their utility, motivation, and *raison d’être*. For those with an interest in politics, social science, or simply an interest in Pakistan’s madrasas, *The Rational Believer* will not disappoint. Indeed, it is an insightful and balanced study worthy of reflection. Those who wade through the theory, scholastic signposting, and taxing language will undoubtedly be better informed. Perseverance is key to getting the gems out of this first-rate study.

**Lt. Col. Andrew M. Roe, Ph.D.,
British Army, Episkopi Garrison, Cyprus**

THE BUSINESS OF WAR

**Military Enterprise and Military
Revolution in Early Modern Europe**

David Parrott, Cambridge University Press,
New York, 2012, 430 pages, \$27.99

ONE OF THE legacies of our unhappy experience in Iraq is an ongoing debate about the role of contractors on the battlefield. Should we continue to rely on “private military companies,” as they are called, or should we heed the words of Machiavelli who warned that, “if one holds his state on the basis of mercenary arms, he will never be firm or secure; because they are disunited, ambitious, without discipline, unfaithful; gallant among friends, vile among enemies; no fear of God, no faith with men . . .” (*The Prince*)?

Whatever one thinks of Blackwater or Halliburton, historian David Parrott believes that Machiavelli and his contemporaries have given the “military enterprisers” of the early modern period a bad rap. Parrott demonstrates that, for monarchs strapped for

cash, military contractors were a rational and effective response to wars that dragged on for decades. Mercenary colonels often used their own funds to raise regiments recruited around a core of battle-hardened veterans and equipped by a sophisticated network of financiers, arms producers, and transporters. The rewards for the “enterpriser-colonel” were potentially great. He could maintain his force with “contributions” levied on the territories where their troops were billeted. And, if the war went well, he and his merchant allies would receive enhanced social and political status and perhaps the title to a piece of land expropriated from the enemy.

In examining the mercenary “industry,” the author, an Oxford history professor, suggests a rethinking of the much-debated “military revolution” of early modern Europe. According to exponents of that revolution, the demands of war in the 16th and 17th centuries forced monarchs to create new agencies for centralizing power. These agencies, in turn, would serve as the basis for the modern European state. But, if there was a revolution, Parrott believes that it was not based on the articulated tactical formations of generals like Maurice and Gustavus, or the expensive bastions and *ravelins* that surrounded cities like Breda and Freiburg (as previous explanations would have us believe). Instead, the real “revolution” was set in motion by the increased duration of European wars.

Beginning in the mid-16th century, power struggles like those between Habsburg Spain and Holland, Habsburg Austria, and the Ottomans, or French Huguenots and French Catholics, dragged on for decades. Such wars demanded a mobilization of resources that overmatched the feeble and inadequate revenue-gathering capabilities of early modern governments. The resulting mismatch between political objectives and resources forced a public-private alliance that allowed monarchs to tap into the wealth of European elites. Year after year, “military enterprisers,” whether they were mercenary colonels or merchant financiers, enabled the great houses of Europe to keep armies in the field while fighting their wars on credit.

The Business of War is an impressive work of scholarship that refers to sources in English, German, and French (as well as a handful in Italian, Spanish, and Dutch). More importantly, the book demands a rethinking of both what we think we know about the mercenaries of the early modern period and their role

in the creation of the modern state.

Scott Stephenson, Ph.D., LTC, USA, Retired,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE GHOSTS OF CANNAE
Hannibal and the Darkest Hour
of the Roman Republic

Robert L. O’Connell, Random House,
New York, 2011, 310 pages, \$17.00

THE FIRST QUESTION a reviewer should ask when reading this book is: Why another book about Cannae? The battle of Cannae (216 B.C.E.) between the Romans and the Carthaginians has been and continues to be the ideal example of the “Battle of Annihilation”—the epitome of the “Decisive Battle.” Thus, there is a plethora of books and articles that purport to explain Hannibal’s tactical masterpiece and sing the praises of the great captain who engineered such a gigantic killing field—that is, if the butchery of nearly 70,000 human beings could ever be considered a subject worthy of praise. In addition, the primary sources for this period have long been identified, analyzed from the widest variety of scholarly perspectives, and intensely commented in their most minute details.

Given these facts: Why another book on Cannae? The answer is that Robert O’Connell not only provides the nonspecialist reader a well-written interpretation of this classic battle, but also its historical context, its immediate consequences, and its ultimate meaning. O’Connell’s narrative encompasses the entire scope of the Second Punic War and explains why it can also be regarded as “Hannibal’s War.” He weaves his narrative around Hannibal’s personality and those of his primary Roman opponents. Central to the story is the role of the survivors of the battle—the “Ghosts of Cannae”—which were disgraced by the Roman Senate for allegedly fleeing the battlefield and who, O’Connell argues, eventually formed the core of veterans in the victorious army, which went on to defeat Hannibal on his home turf under Scipio Africanus—himself a survivor of Cannae.

The author writes with verve, and the book is filled with thoughtful asides that sometimes draw parallels with situations familiar to contemporary readers. *The Ghosts of Cannae* ranks among the best available

critical narrative histories of the conflict between the “superpowers” of the day—Rome and Carthage. It will provide military officers and students of warfare with material for deep thought about the nature of war, the relationship between tactics, operational art, and strategy, the relationship between civil and military power, strategic geography, alliances, the human element in warfare, discipline, morale, training, and many other timeless factors that affect warfare. It is a remarkable illustration of why strategy trumps tactics. O’Connell surely hits the mark in his judgment of Hannibal’s achievement “nobody was better at winning battles, but not wars, which is what counts.” For this reason, and because it is a good story, well told, *The Ghosts of Cannae* is highly recommended.
**LTC Prisco R. Hernández, Ph.D., USAR,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

KEVLAR LEGIONS
The Transformation of the
U.S. Army, 1989-2005

John Sloan Brown,
U.S. Army Center of Military History,
Washington, DC, 2011, 558 pages, \$50.00

THE LAST DECADE of war has forced the U.S. Army to adjust and “transform” itself seemingly on the fly—creating both ad hoc and permanent solutions to address today’s problems. However, the Army’s ability to meet these challenges and modernize for threats in the future did not begin with the destruction of the World Trade Center. Where we stand today has root in the decisions our senior leaders made in the recent past.

In *Kevlar Legions*, John Sloan Brown details how the Army transformed institutionally from the end of the Cold War to today’s conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. For Brown, the basis of recent transformation efforts were that they were “centrally directed and institutionally driven,” primarily by the chief of staff of the Army, and affected all aspects of the Army—doctrine, force structure, training, administrative and logistical policies, and the culture of the service itself. Finally, Brown contends that transformation efforts from 1989 to the outbreak of war in Afghanistan and Iraq were instrumental in creating the Army that quickly overthrew two oppressive governments and

was able to adapt to fight an unconventional conflict in each country.

To support this case, Brown ably and succinctly describes the efforts of Generals Vuono, Sullivan, Reimer, and Shinseki to evolve the Army for the future—detailing the continuity of strategy, technological acquisition, doctrinal thought, and training focus of each Army chief of staff that ultimately led to a modular force that was equipped with “the Big 5” weapons systems and had the doctrinal and training underpinnings to defeat any threat. Brown also does an admirable job describing the break between Generals Shinseki and Schoomaker, as well as the effect two wars had on shifting the focus of the Army from long-range planning to fighting “today’s fight.”

Kevlar Legions is exceedingly pertinent to today’s soldiers and leaders—as the vision, purpose, and force structure of the Army are driven by constrained resources and the conclusions of operations in Iraq and, eventually, Afghanistan, the lessons and solutions to similar problems in the recent past described by Brown are eminently useful.

**CPT Nathan K. Finney, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

FREEDOM’S FORGE
How American Business
Produced Victory in World War II

Arthur Herman, Random House, New York,
2012, 413 pages, \$28.00

RATHER THAN A straightforward history, Arthur Herman’s *Freedom’s Forge* is more a dual biography. It focuses on Henry J. Kaiser and William Knudsen to tell a tale of American business. While the rest of the world went about its isolationist business in the years between the wars, Herman contends Knudsen and Kaiser learned to work around balky government, particularly New Deal bureaucracies, and gained experience in building major works: Knudsen made both Ford and General Motors efficient car makers while Henry Kaiser built Boulder and the Grand Coulee dams. With their experience building large-scale, but highly efficient projects, the two free enterprise entrepreneurs created the almost miraculous armaments industry that won World War II.

Like Herman's earlier work, *Freedom's Forge* is popular history; it should be more popular with the conservatives than with liberals because Herman downplays the role of government, emphasizing instead government obstructionism and backwardness in the years between the wars. His view of the military is largely negative as well. His interpretation might have more nuance had he considered scholarly works such as Eric Hammel's 2009 book *How America Saved the World: The Untold Story of U.S. Preparedness Between the World Wars*. Unlike Herman, Hammel finds virtue in government and contends that military efforts during the 1930s rather than rugged antigovernment individualism laid the groundwork for the rapid mobilization at the onset of the war.

Herman does acknowledge that the war industrialists made good profits from their cost-plus contracts and that government eventually got out of the way, taking an attitude of hang the expense that allowed failure at no financial risk in developing the war machines. And he does nod in the direction of Curtis LeMay, George Marshall, and other political and military figures. Overall the tone is celebratory of the American free enterprise system and condemnatory of the governmental supports that made American industry successful.

Herman is a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, and his interpretation is consistent with the flag-waving free enterprise that think tank is noted for. For those seeking a fuller understanding of the recovery of the U.S. military from a woeful state of unpreparedness because of rapid demobilization, budget cuts, and American withdrawal from world involvement after World War, I might start with *Freedom's Forge*, but to balance this work, reading at least *How America Saved the World* is in order.

John H. Barnhill, Ph.D., Houston, TX

GOING TO TEHRAN

Why the United States Must Come to Terms with the Islamic Republic of Iran

Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett,
Metropolitan Books, New York,
2012, 389 pages, \$28.00

WHAT IS THE United States going to do about Iran? In *Going to Tehran: Why the United States Must Come to Terms with the Islamic*

Republic of Iran, Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett put forth their unconventional thoughts in a history about international relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States.

The book's main argument is that the U.S. posture and thinking toward the Islamic Republic of Iran must change in order to pursue U.S. interests in the Middle East. The authors are critical of five U.S. administrations' approaches to Iran and assert that diplomacy, cooperation, and top-down leadership starting with the president of the United States will be the only way to avoid another conflict and preserve U.S. interests in the region.

The Leveretts have extensive experience on this subject, which strengthens the credibility of their arguments. Flynt Leverett (Ph.D.) has worked at the U.S. State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency, and is a founding faculty member of the School of International Affairs at Pennsylvania State University. Hillary Mann Leverett (J.D.) has worked with the U.S. State Department and National Security Council in Middle Eastern Affairs for the two Bush and the Clinton administrations. The book is well documented and noted with several outside sources and personal experiences to support their assertions.

Readers in the defense community will find several things attractive about the book. The authors contradict and challenge the conventional wisdom about the U.S. strategic approach to Iran and bring to light new and seldom-heard information on America's dealings with Iran. The authors' observations of Iran's use of "soft power" are instructive as is their candid view of how the Islamic Republic of Iran sees itself and the rest of the world. The authors also provide a historic reference to Nixon's 1970 engagement with China as an example to break through diplomatic barriers of the past to facilitate normal relations with Iran. This information causes readers to challenge their own understanding of the U.S.-Iran relationship.

The book lacks in a few areas. The Leveretts' alarmist tone and singular approach to the problem detracts from their argument. Additionally, they imply the United States was partially to blame for the Iran Hostage crisis. The crisis, mentioned only briefly in the book, was quickly and conveniently set aside, while other historical events were discussed at length.

Going to Tehran is relevant mostly to defense officials who work in the Middle East and the U.S. Central Command area of operations at the Combatant Command, and Defense Attaché level. Military members at the unit level who serve in the Middle East may also find the information useful to understand regional interests. The book is also beneficial to help Westerners better understand the Islamic Republic of Iran and how potential future Islamic Republics may form and model their governments.
MAJ Jacob A. Mong, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

HITLER

A.N. Wilson, Basic Books, New York,
2012, 200 pages, \$24.99

A.N. WILSON'S *HITLER* is a nonscholarly account about Adolf Hitler and how Hitler, who lacked any interest in politics, could coerce a country and later become chancellor of Germany. Hitler freewheeled through life without much responsibility until age 25 when he was denied a promotion in World War I because of his lack of leadership skills. This draft-dodging individual was awarded the Iron Cross, First Class, not for having any direct combat involvement but because of the officers he knew as a regimental message runner.

Hitler's failed beer hall putsch of 1923 inspired supporters for national socialism and earned Hitler prison time where he was able to write *Mein Kampf* (*My Struggle or My Fight*). Subject to misinterpretation, the book, which reeked with self-indulgence, became a best seller throughout Germany. Wilson argues that *Mein Kampf* was not the struggle of Hitler's life, but the fight yet to come. It was the fight for Germany's future and the world itself.

Hitler captured his audience with oral and visual stimuli (the Roman salute, which became the Nazi salute) and mass rallies. Wilson claims, "Hitler was the first and most hypnotic artist of post-literacy," elevating himself as a maestro of political manipulation. However, Hitler was also an incurable liar who lacked any sense of propriety. His Machiavellian exploitation skills, along with his flair for violence, propelled him to unprecedented levels within the National Socialist movement, but only after assuming control from men unlike himself who

excelled at leadership and organizational abilities.

Hitler despised Catholicism, yet copied many of its programs, such as duplicating its educational programs to instruct the Hitler Youth. Wilson psychoanalyzes that, as Hitler prepared for war, his mental instability became more pronounced; he threw temper tantrums when he lacked rational decision-making skills or feared the intellect of others. Devoid of a rational sense of perspective, Hitler was unable to portray the same affection to humans as he did canines. Through his final years, he became more withdrawn from reality. Given the portrait Wilson makes of Hitler, it is amazing how he ever became a national leader.

Hitler is poorly documented, consists of secondary research material, and lacks any new information, but it is an easy read, one that absorbs the reader's attention until the end. Military and non-military historians alike will gain a greater insight into Hitler, albeit from a journalistic perspective.
Scott J. Gaitley, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

PACIFIC CRUCIBLE**War at Sea in the Pacific, 1941-1942**

Ian W. Toll, W.W. Norton & Co.,
New York, 2011, 597 pages, \$35.00

THE TITLE, *PACIFIC Crucible: War at Sea in the Pacific, 1941-1942*, implies that Ian W. Toll wrote an analytic narrative of the first 14 months of the naval war in the Pacific, beginning with the Pearl Harbor attack and ending with the Japanese evacuating Guadalcanal. Instead, this book is a narrative of the Pacific War's first six months, from Pearl Harbor to Midway.

Toll describes how Alfred Thayer Mahan's concepts of sea control, concentration, and decisive battle governed the prewar plans of the Japanese and American navies. Toll explains the battleship's domination in naval warfare, the beginnings of naval aviation, the ways both navies trained naval aviators, and introduces the reader to the primary Japanese and American naval personalities, most of whom have faded from popular memory.

The author details the initial American carrier raids in the Central and Southwest Pacific in February 1942

and gives an account of the Doolittle Raid on Tokyo. After dealing with the expanding list of Allied tragedies—the Japanese conquest of American and British island possessions in the Central Pacific, the fall of the Philippines, Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, and Burma—he proceeds to deal with the Japanese strategic moves against Australia and Hawaii, which resulted in the Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway.

However, Toll dwells on narrative set pieces already told too many times (for example apocryphal tales of the first Roosevelt-Churchill wartime conference) and neglects the context of the Pacific War—the struggle for dominion in Eastern Asia. The protagonists included the United States, Japan, Russia, China, and the European colonial powers (Britain, France, and the Netherlands). While dealing cursorily with Russian activities he ignores the role of Chinese nationalism and Japanese militarism in starting the war. In a rush to narrate the history of battles, he deemphasizes the role of the Imperial Navy in Japan by presenting Admiral Yamamoto as a semi-reluctant warrior.

Despite Toll's over-reliance on secondary material and retelling oft-told tales, *Pacific Crucible* is a useful, engaging account of the beginning of the Pacific War. While telling a story well known to specialists, but existing as an adjunct to the war against Germany and Italy in the popular mind, he brings the Pacific War to the fore and injects material by including accounts from oral history compilations. Unfortunately he does not demonstrate any knowledge of newly released collections of original source material or mine underused collections, like those in the British National Archives or the Japanese archives, or newly opened collections in the United States, even though he thanks several archivists in his acknowledgements. Although a tale well-told, this work lacks the thrill of discovery one has when doing research in primary sources and communicating this information to the reader. However, his book is designed for a general audience that does not have "the scrupulous ear of a well flogged critic" and it will enlighten the reader unfamiliar with the beginning of the Pacific War.

Lewis Bernstein, Ph.D., Seoul, Korea

**INVENTING THE ENEMY
Denunciation and Terror
in Stalin's Russia**

Wendy Z. Goldman, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, UK,
2011, 336 pages, \$29.99

WENDY Z. GOLDMAN has a reputation as an authority on family and gender issues as well as labor history in Stalin's pre-World War II Soviet Union. She has produced four previous books centered on the Great Terror and its impact on Soviet citizenry. Her latest book, *Inventing the Enemy: Denunciation and Terror in Stalin's Russia*, specifically looks at the impact of the Great Terror in five large Moscow factories. To do so, Goldman has researched the stenographic records of Communist Party meetings held in those factories between 1934 and 1939.

The Great Terror (1936-1938) began as the state's attack on alleged saboteurs and wreckers and the hunt for supporters of Stalin's former rivals, Bukharin and Trotsky. It turned into a national mania of spy hunting; denunciation of coworkers, friends, and family; and the arrests of millions of people for real and imagined political and nonpolitical crimes. The Soviets admitted to convicting 1.3 million people and executing 638,000. Western historians such as Robert Conquest and Michael Ellman have put the actual figures at least three times higher. Russian historian General Dmitri Volkogonov, working with previously classified records, found that in 1937 and 1938 agricultural collectivization took 8.5-9 million lives; 4.5-5.5 million people were arrested; and 800,000-900,000 were sentenced to death. At the end of the 1940s, between 5.5 and 6.5 million prisoners were held in forced labor camps. Volkogonov estimates that the Stalin era claimed between 19 and 22 million lives in addition to the war casualties. Whatever the scale of the tragedy, the Communist Party was gutted, industrial production was badly curtailed, and the population was demoralized. Stalin finally reined in the mass hysteria but the damage was done and it made resistance to the upcoming Nazi juggernaut just that much more difficult.

Inventing the Enemy is not a good first book about the Great Terror. Robert Conquest's *The Great*

Terror: A Reassessment remains the best available introduction. Goldman assumes a base knowledge of the subject that the average reader may lack. She does not really hit her stride until page 81. In fact, getting as far as page 80 is a struggle. Then, she drops from dealing with the fates of millions to the fates of a handful of factory personnel caught up in the hysteria of hunting spies and wreckers in their midst. This is her forte and makes the book.

I recommend the book for historians and students of the Soviet era.

**LTC Lester W. Grau, Ph.D., USA, Retired,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

BAILOUT OVER NORMANDY
A Flyboy's Adventures with the French
Resistance and Other Escapades
in Occupied France

Ted Fahrenwald, Casemate Publishers,
Havertown, PA, 2012, 286 pages, \$29.95

A WORLD WAR II USAAF fighter pilot is shot down on his 100th mission while supporting the D-Day invasion. He survives to link up with the French Resistance, is ultimately captured by the *Wehrmacht*, interrogated, and interred in a POW camp. On the eve of his relocation to a *Luftstalg* deep inside Nazi Germany, he escapes and ultimately makes his way to Allied lines, only to be eyed with suspicion by his liberators. While this may sound like the latest Spielberg blockbuster, it was actually real life, and the basis of Ted Fahrenwald's thoroughly enjoyable memoir.

Following the end of the war, 24-year-old Fahrenwald documented his adventures in a manuscript, then put it away, and simply closed this chapter of his life and began another—as a business owner and family man. Following Fahrenwald's death in 2004, his daughter discovered the manuscript and had it published. The result is an account that simultaneously engages and entertains the reader.

Fahrenwald began his flying career in P-47 Thunderbolts and transitioned to the P-51 Mustang. On 8 June 1944, his squadron was interdicting German supply lines leading to the Normandy area, when the ammunition truck he attacked exploded as he flew over. Heavily damaged, Fahrenwald's Mustang

became more and more unstable, and the pilot decided to bail out. After escaping a German patrol, he was discovered by members of the local French Resistance, the *Maquis*, who successfully hid him from German search parties. Fahrenwald's passable French helped him blend in with the local population. In his desire to rejoin his unit he continued his quest to reach the advancing Allied lines. His subsequent capture by the *Wehrmacht* and escape the day prior to his scheduled relocation to a *Luftstalg* deep in Germany only served to reinforce his drive to find his way back to England.

Fahrenwald's memoir is a nerve-wracking three-month journey. His wit and humor come through in his writings. He is at once ribald and evocative. According to Fahrenwald's daughter, he had dreamed of one day becoming a journalist. Instead, he and his brother inherited the family steel mill. He may have been a successful business owner, but if this book is any indication, he would have made a heck of a journalist.

Robert Leonard, Ed.D., Fort Gordon, Georgia

VETERANS ON TRIAL
The Coming Court Battles Over PTSD
Barry R. Schaller, Potomac Books,
Washington, DC, 2012, 288 pages, \$29.95

BARRY R. SCHALLER'S *Veterans on Trial* uses court cases from the Vietnam War to predict the legal costs of America's wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The book's focus of the legal aspects of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is useful for officers to properly administer the Uniform Code of Military Justice, but the book's greatest contribution is its estimates relating to the total cost of war on our society. Schaller cites Army studies that show how more soldiers have taken their own lives than have died in combat in Afghanistan. How different would these numbers be if high-risk behaviors linked to PTSD, such as drunk driving deaths were also included?

Schaller's figures are much higher than one might expect with estimates of between 400,000 to 700,000 total cases of PTSD and 400,000 to 500,000 potential legal cases—if today's veterans commit crimes at equal rates with Vietnam veterans. This increase of

criminal behavior is impressive because members of the military are selectively screened for criminal tendencies.

Although a judge and legal scholar, Schaller has impressive psychological and historical insights. His definition of PTSD is a combination of scientific and cultural theories. Schaller argues that combat PTSD is the result of a medical condition that affects identity, and the indoctrination that comes with military training and the higher rate of exposure to trauma make combat PTSD a more difficult paradoxical problem. Schaller states, "The view that the Vietnam War was unique and that Vietnam veterans were exceptional among all American veterans does not hold up under close scrutiny." Schaller challenges the recentness of PTSD by describing research on "shell shock," Civil War era "nostalgia," and "soldiers heart." The chapter "Across the Ages" is among the best historical syntheses about PTSD to date.

Schaller's work is a pragmatic look at a complicated topic. He posits there is no panacea for PTSD, yet he offers substantive solutions, and he captures the paradoxes of a complex problem. *Veterans on Trial's* best assertion is that PTSD is much more widespread and serious than many care to admit. He argues that although there have been key steps forward, the "present measures are not yet as effective as they should be."

Joseph Miller, Old Town, Maine

THE TWILIGHT WAR

**The Secret History of America's
Thirty-Year Conflict with Iran**

David Crist, The Penguin Press,
New York, 2012, 623 pages, \$36.00

THE TWILIGHT WAR is a detailed history of the relationship between the United States and Iran from the time of the overthrow of the Shah in 1979 through the spring of 2012. In the 1980s, the CIA built a network of spies to help subvert the Iranian regime to prevent them from becoming a Soviet client. What the United States and the CIA failed to realize was that the Soviet Union was not the greatest threat to the region. Iran and its tacit support to the Shi'a in Lebanon had become the greatest threat

to stability. It took the United States many years to realize this and refocus its clandestine operations from preventing Soviet influence on Iran to preventing Iranian influence throughout the region.

Author David Crist, who served in the Persian Gulf during Operation Iraqi Freedom, details the complex relationships between Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. The United States was never able to develop a holistic long-term engagement strategy for the Middle East because of the constantly changing dynamics in the region. Much of *The Twilight War* centers on the Reagan years and America's role in playing both sides of the Iran-Iraq conflict. The author discusses secret efforts and deals the first Bush administration made to secure the release of the Western hostages in Lebanon. Crist explains how Iranian President Rafsanjani took a huge political risk and negotiated the hostage release only to be told afterward by National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft that since the prisoners were released, the United States had no plans to honor their end of the deal. Crist explains the threats, challenges, and missed opportunities in each of the subsequent administrations and how divisive the key members of the second Bush administration were in invading Iraq in 2003. The book provides the implications of the loss of the CIA's RQ-170 Sentinel drone over Iraq and the recent challenges faced by the Obama administration.

The Twilight War is a current look at the history of U.S.-Iranian relations and reveals the frightening truth about our lack of a comprehensive Middle East strategy. The book is a must read for military leaders and politicians alike.

**LTC George Hodge, USA, Retired,
Lansing, Kansas**

**AFGHANISTAN DECLASSIFIED
A Guide to America's Longest War**

Brian Glyn Williams,
University of Pennsylvania Press,
Philadelphia, 2012, 248 pages, \$34.95

BRIAN GLYN WILLIAMS of Dartmouth University, author of the Army's field guide

to Afghanistan in 2007, has translated the field guide into civilian language. *Afghanistan Declassified: A Guide to America's Longest War* retains the organization, takeaways and lessons, and tone of the Army's field guide but adds a variety of the author's personal experiences and analysis. Williams has interacted with the Afghans and brings knowledge and experience to his work. He gives a nuanced, hopeful view of Afghanistan and its people.

Williams describes Afghanistan's ethnic and geographic makeup while weaving in events of historical and cultural significance. The sections on ethnography and geography are useful, but the book's historical sections are its true strength. Williams uses a chronological approach, but follows the thread of a topic, person, or event to the present day. A treatment of Ahmed Shah Durrani turns into a discussion on centralization within Afghanistan through the present day, and the section on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan leads into a section on Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, which transitions naturally to his continued leadership of the Hezb I Islam Gulbuddin. The topical approach makes the book a useful reference—it uses historical events to teach important lessons on Afghan

character, expectations, and culture. This approach also mirrors the sometimes nonchronological historical analysis of many Middle Easterners.

Suicide bombing, first introduced in 2001, has proven alien to the Afghan's culture and their sense of honor. Afghan suicide bombers have a remarkably low-kill ratio (particularly when compared to Iraqi bombers), which combines their emphasis on military targets over civilians along with their general ineptitude. Williams' discussion of the Predator and Reaper drones and their impact on Pakistani politics is excellent. Despite frequent protestations and demonstrations against suicide bombing, Williams argues there is tacit Pakistani government support. Further, surveys in the FATA suggest that local tribesmen see suicide bombing as highly effective.

Afghanistan Classified is an excellent reference that will prove useful to soldiers preparing for deployment as well as their family members. The book is as current as possible. It is a good scholarly primer on the abuses of the Taliban and a reminder of the significant NATO successes in the region.

John E. Fahey, Lafayette, Indiana

MR LETTERS

TOXIC LEADERS


MSgt Hikmat Hanna, II, Chief, Host Aviation Resource Management (CHARM)—Thank you for your article on toxic leaders (Doty and Fenlason, Jan-Feb 2013). It was well written and insightful. It's important because raising awareness can prevent those of us in the profession of arms from developing toxic attitudes.

I'd like to point something out. If an E-3 is toxic, we recognize the role their supervisor plays and

their responsibility to remedy the problem. Somewhere between E-1 and O-10 this thinking process stops. Leaders at every level are also subordinates. I believe formally changing the term of reference from "Toxic Leader" to "Toxic Subordinate" puts the issue in proper perspective. We don't usually ask, "Whose leader is that?" We ask, "Whose subordinate is that?" I believe this change will help foster a change in mindset in military culture.

MR WE RECOMMEND

Masters of the Battlefield: Great Commanders From the Classical Age to the Napoleonic Era,



*Paul K. Davis, Oxford University Press, New York, 2013,
624 pages, \$34.95*


Hailing from the earliest days of Greek warfare to France at the turn of the 19th century, these men stand out for their tactical abilities—generals who made a difference in combat, grasping the way an enemy would think or move and reacting not just to ensure victory, but do so in the face of superior forces.

Davis briefly explores the biography of each commander, considering how his upbringing, early experiences, and social and cultural background might have translated into his leadership abilities. Relying on vast research, Davis describes the nature of armies and warfare of the time, from the phalanx battle of Ancient Greece to the artillery-heavy Swedish army under Gustavus Adolphus. He also examines the course of the wars in which each general fought as a background to the particular battles that best illustrates their abilities, and discusses each battle in detail, aided extensively by detailed battlefield maps. Davis concludes each section with an analysis of the tactical skills and principles at which each general excelled.

Masters of the Battlefield tells the stories of men who defined eras, reshaped nations, and who, through the introduction of new weapons and tactics, revolutionized the nature of warfare. *From the publisher.*

Generals of the Army: Marshall, MacArthur, Eisenhower, Arnold, Bradley

*James. H. Willbanks, The University Press of Kentucky, 2013,
264 pages, \$27.84*



FORMALLY TITLED “GENERAL of the Army,” the five-star general is the highest possible rank awarded in the U.S. Army in modern times and has been awarded to only five men in the nation’s history: George C. Marshall, Douglas MacArthur, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Henry H. Arnold, and Omar N. Bradley. In addition to their rank, these distinguished soldiers all shared the experience of serving or studying at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, where they gained the knowledge that would prepare them for command during World War II and the Korean War. In *Generals of the Army*, James H. Willbanks assembles top military historians to examine the connection between the institution and the success of these exceptional men. Historically known as the “intellectual center of the Army,” Fort Leavenworth is the oldest active Army post west of Washington, D.C., and one of the most important military installations in the United States. Though there are many biographies of the five-star generals, this innovative study offers a fresh perspective by illuminating the ways in which these legendary figures influenced and were influenced by Leavenworth. Coinciding with the U.S. Mint’s release of a series of special commemorative coins honoring these soldiers and the fort where they were based, this concise volume offers an intriguing look at the lives of these remarkable men and the contributions they made to the defense of the nation. *From the publisher.*



SPC Joseph Gonzalez, a member of the Farah Provincial Reconstruction Team security force, provides security outside the Farah provincial governor's compound in Farah City, Farah Province, Afghanistan, 6 February 2013, during a visit from U.S. Ambassador Hugo Llorens, the assistant chief of mission for the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. (U.S. Navy)

Announcing the 2013 General William E. DePuy Combined Arms Center Writing Competition

“What can the Army do to improve the combined effects of training, education, and experience to best develop leaders to apply Mission Command in order to execute Unified Land Operations?”

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1st Place	\$1,000 and publication in <i>Military Review</i>
2nd Place	\$750 and consideration for publication in <i>Military Review</i>
3rd Place	\$500 and consideration for publication in <i>Military Review</i>

For information on how to submit an entry, go to <http://militaryreview.army.mil>