



# ***A More Flexible Army and a More Stable World***

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U.S. soldiers from Alpha Company, 1st Battalion, 111th Infantry Regiment, 56th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 28th Infantry Division, Pennsylvania National Guard, Multi-National Division-Baghdad conduct an essential services survey in various locations around Nadeem Village, Iraq, 9 April 2009. The soldiers are also delivering payments for several government-approved micro grants. (U.S. Army SGT Jacob H. Smith)

**T**HE NATION'S CURRENT obsession with budget austerity along with the redeployment of troops from Iraq and Afghanistan is leading us to a more fiscally constrained environment and a desire to dramatically cut the end-strength of our Army. In addition, the nation's policy of a "Pacific pivot" is facing constraints based on the reality of the situation in Africa. Recent journal articles have discussed the flexibility and cost-effectiveness of a cyclic-based as opposed to a tier-based deployment model for long-term commitments.

The cyclic model (known as the Army Force Generation, or ARFOR-GEN model) allows units recently returned from deployment to turn in their equipment to other units (so they can deploy more quickly) and saves the Army large amounts of money on equipment costs. The traditional tier-based deployment model, in which forces expected to deploy quicker receive more funding than other forces, relegates the Army National Guard fewer resources, and limits it to an unused strategic reserve force (as was the case throughout the Cold War and into the 1990s). Of these two models, the tier-based deployment model costs significantly less but is not able to effectively support long-term commitments.

Since 2001, the National Guard has made it known that it will not allow itself to return to being an underfunded strategic reserve force. Their lobbying efforts have recently gained a seat at the table of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The establishment of a National Guard position on the Joint Chiefs should eliminate any vestigial beliefs that the Army can significantly decrease National Guard funding.

Meanwhile, as the war in Iraq has ended and the war in Afghanistan is in its closing stages, the issue of what our Army should train for has arisen. Typically phrased as "fighting the last war," the question is whether or not the training of our forces and our doctrine should focus on counterinsurgency

or high-intensity conflicts. The Army’s budgetary limits are central to the debates on training strategy and the feasibility of the ARFORGEN model.

The advantages and disadvantages of both a purely tier-based and a purely cyclic-based deployment model have been addressed in other articles. I am proposing a third approach, dedicating all Army National Guard brigade combat teams (but not maneuver enhancement brigades) to an enduring cyclic-based deployment model focused solely on low-intensity conflict.<sup>1</sup> Such a move would entail splitting the Active Component’s brigades into a hybrid deployment model, blending principles of the tier- and cyclical-deployment philosophies. The Active Component would be comprised of two groups of brigade combat teams. One group would be 10 brigade combat teams focused solely on low-intensity conflict: three infantry brigade combat teams (IBCTs) and seven Stryker brigade combat teams (SBCTs). The other group of 26 IBCTs and armored brigade combat teams (ABCTs) would be devoted only to high-intensity conflicts.

The Active Component’s low-intensity conflict brigades (normally, the 1st BCT of each division)

would work on a tier-based model as expeditionary brigades immediately deploying, regardless of whether a conflict was high-intensity or low. (See below for their role in a high-intensity conflict). Once mobilization and movement of Army National Guard brigades was complete, the Army National Guard’s low-intensity conflict brigades would either relieve or supplement the Active Component brigades, based on the projected time-length and scope of the mission. For example, in situations such as humanitarian relief, the Active Component brigades would return to home station immediately, whereas in a situation such as Iraq after the opening stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom, they would remain in theater and continue operations until relieved by another brigade in a cyclical fashion. Finally, this plan allows for 9 brigades of the Active Component would be inactivated, leaving 36 brigade combat teams in the Active Component.

In this model, each of the Army’s ten deployable divisions would include one low-intensity conflict brigade and two high-intensity conflict brigades (with the exception of the 2d and the 25th Infantry Divisions). The 2d and 25th Infantry Divisions

<p><b>Regular Army:</b></p> <p>1st BCTs of 1st ID, 2d ID, 3d ID, 4th ID, 25th ID, 1st Cav, and 1st Armored Divisions—SBCT devoted to COIN, Low-Intensity Conflict; on a cyclic deployment model.</p> <p>Remainder of brigades—IBCT/HBCT brigades on a cyclic deployment model and trained for HIC; 4th BCT of most divisions inactivated (9 brigades inactivated total).</p> <p>1st Brigade of 10th Mountain Div, 82d Abn Div, and 101st Abn Div—Low intensity conflict and on rotation to react worldwide within 96 hours. Not equipped with Stryker vehicles.</p> <p>2d &amp; 3d Cavalry Regiments—Each designate squadrons to concentrate on HIC and on LIC on cyclic rotation as strategic reserve.</p>	<p><b>Army National Guard:</b></p> <p>BCTs and Infantry Divisions—mixture of SBCT and IBCTs trained specifically for low-intensity and COIN missions. All HBCT equipment (M1, M2, etc.) returned to the Active Component.</p> <p>Units on cycle to deploy for 1 full year in every 5 (but can additionally deploy up to 30 days a year overseas during 2 of the remaining 4 years).</p> <p>116th and 278th Cavalry Regiments—SBCT regiments, partnered with active duty cavalry regiments and on cyclic rotation as strategic reserve.</p>
<p align="center"><b>U.S. Reserve, Army Special Operations Forces 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment—remain unchanged</b></p>	

**Figure 1  
Concept of Organization**

would retain four brigades in a 1:3 setup of low-intensity conflict brigades to high-intensity conflict brigades). The Army's two Stryker-equipped Cavalry Regiments (2d and 3d Cavalry Regiments) would designate two of their squadrons each for high-intensity conflict and two squadrons for low-intensity conflict. The 2d Cavalry Regiment and 3d Cavalry Regiment would then become a part of the Army's strategic reserve, with one of the two regiments always ready to deploy within 96 hours (again, a cyclical rotation) to provide heavier, motorized support to the 82d Airborne Division. The special operations community, Army maneuver enhancement brigades, and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment would not be effected by these changes. This approach allows the Army greater flexibility by giving it the ability to quickly deploy properly trained forces for both high-intensity *and* low-intensity conflicts in every probable region of conflict in the world. In addition, it gives Army National Guard units a unique opportunity to conduct worldwide training year round and a significant, highly visible mission. It also enables the Army to embrace the use of cultural awareness training, rather than continuing to give haphazard training to a unit right before deployment.

Finally, and perhaps most pertinent in today's tight budgets, this model presents a strategy where the Army can remain relevant and increase its combat capability despite inactivating nine brigade combat teams.

## The Role of the Active Component

In this model (Figure 1), the 1st brigade combat team of every division in the Army is exclusively tasked with training for and conducting low-intensity conflict missions. These ten brigades, with the exception of the three assigned to the 10th Mountain Division, 82d Airborne Division, and 101st Airborne Division, would become SBCTs. Although all of these brigades could (and should) be deployed worldwide to support Army low-intensity conflict operations, each would receive tailored cultural and language training to a specific geographic area of responsibility where there is a strong likelihood of conflict (Figure 2). In time of low-intensity conflict or a need for humanitarian assistance, the brigade

with the cultural focus for that area will be the first to deploy.

In the event of high-intensity conflict, the role of providing the initial heavy forces would fall on the parent divisions of those low-intensity conflict brigades that have received in-depth cultural awareness training for that geographic area. For example, in case of high-intensity conflict on the Korean Peninsula, the 2d Infantry Division and 25th Infantry Division would be immediately committed; in case of a high-intensity conflict with Iran, the 1st Cavalry Division and 1st Armored Division would be the first heavy forces deployed.

We may expect warfare in the future to consist of a short-linear-high-intensity conflict followed by a longer, nonlinear, low-intensity conflict using a hybrid variety of modern, high technology weapons and simple, homemade explosives. In this model, the single low-intensity conflict brigade is vital to ensuring that the vacuum caused by the fall of the enemy and the forward movement of Army high-intensity conflict brigades does not result in chaos or an insurgency. In the areas where major enemy forces have been cleared (but remain in other areas of the country), the low-intensity conflict brigades would also be responsible for maintaining lines of communication, beginning the reconstruction process (handling humanitarian issues, restoring infrastructure, etc.), and fully securing an area once it has been cleared of organized enemy resistance.

## A Brigade in Guam?

On their own, the inactivation of nine brigades, the reconfiguration of 10 brigades, or a shift in focus away from Europe would cause monumental changes to the Army's force structure. Taken together, they represent the largest change in size and scope of the Army since it shrank from 18 divisions to 10.

To an Army veteran, perhaps the most striking of these changes is the movement of an infantry brigade from Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, to Guam. The movement of this brigade serves five purposes:

- A credible deterrent force is trained in high-intensity conflict to quickly react to any incident in the Spratley Islands, Indonesia, or the Indian

Ocean (thanks to its IBCT configuration and co-location with Air Force and Navy facilities).

- A flexible reserve is able to quickly augment forces in Korea without being vulnerable to a surprise first strike.

- Credible protection is provided of vital U.S. military assets that deploy on a regular basis to Guam, including U.S. Navy vessels and U.S. Air Force bombers.

- The ability to quickly augment and reinforce U.S. Marines moving from Okinawa to Guam is provided, should they be required to conduct a contingency operation elsewhere.

- Partnership between U.S. forces and Asian militaries, especially China is encouraged by making U.S. forces closer and more accessible to Asian militaries.

Although Guam would see increased crowding, especially with the increased number of Marines moving from Okinawa, the island is the only practical option. As the largest American territory in the Western Pacific, Guam does not require the same diplomatic preparations required in the improbable return of U.S. forces to Okinawa or the Philippines. As for maneuver training, locating a brigade in Guam is really no different than the current placement of the 173d Airborne Brigade Combat Team in Vicenza, Italy.

## A Redesigned SBCT

The Stryker is an excellent weapon for low-intensity conflicts, especially in urban areas or when there is a lower risk of mines or antitank weapons. As such, low-intensity conflict brigades in the Active Component that are not airborne, mountain, or air assault should be equipped with Strykers. The inherent modularity of the Stryker family allows commanders flexibility in terms of firepower and capabilities—ranging from the mobile gun system (MGS) to the chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear reconnaissance vehicle—that low-intensity conflict requires. In addition, the use of Strykers to outfit the majority of the Army National Guard brigades means that logistics and transportation are greatly simplified for prolonged low-intensity conflicts.

Once the Active Component's high-intensity conflict brigades have redeployed (assuming they deployed at all), all Army forces in an operation

would have the same types and quantities of vehicles. This is especially important because of the Army's habit of attaching brigades from multiple divisions to one single division headquarters and attaching battalions from multiple brigades to a single brigade without taking into consideration whether the brigade is equipped to support those units (i.e., assigning tank battalions to an IBCT).

However, the change in focus for the SBCT means that some changes would have to be made to the organization of the SBCT (Figure 2). Four changes are proposed:

- The addition of a five-company civil affairs battalion to the brigade, with each company in it permanently dedicated to support a specific battalion in the brigade.

- The removal of the Mobile Gun System platoons from the infantry companies to consolidate the nine M1128 MGS vehicles at the squadron level (in headquarters and headquarters company). This would allow the squadron commander better flexibility in using the vehicle's firepower and optics capabilities to cover areas that are not well covered by infantry units or to give the MGS platoon a larger battle space that takes advantage of the vehicle's capabilities (i.e., highways).

- Increase the number of M117 Guardian armored security vehicles in the brigade from 6 to 12.

- The addition of an Army National Guard field-grade liaison officer, branch immaterial, Active Guard and Reserve Title 10, at the brigade staff level to coordinate combined training between Active Component and Reserve Component Stryker units during peacetime.

Although current doctrine stipulates that individual Civil Affairs branch companies support individual brigades, reconfiguring the companies to support individual battalions instead would give battalion commanders, often operating in their own autonomous battle space, greater capabilities to stabilize their areas of operation. These Civil Affairs battalions would only be assigned to the Stryker brigade combat teams; the low-intensity conflict IBCTs of the 10th Mountain Division, 82d Airborne Division, and 101st Airborne Division would receive dedicated civil affairs augmentation from the 85th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.




Figure 2  
Current SBCT Organization

## The Role of the Army National Guard

As of 2013, the Army National Guard is comprised of 28 brigade combat teams, organized into 8 divisions and divided into one SBCT, 7 ABCTs, and 20 IBCTs. The ABCTs, with their parent divisions noted in parentheses, are:

- 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team (34th Infantry Division)-Minnesota. 30th Armored Brigade Combat Team-North Carolina.
- 55th Armored Brigade Combat Team (28th Infantry Division)-Pennsylvania.
- 81st Armored Brigade Combat Team-Washington/Oregon.
- 116th Cavalry Brigade Combat Team-Idaho.
- 155th Armored Brigade Combat Team-Mississippi.
- 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment-Tennessee.

In the proposed model, all of the Army National Guard's heavy brigades would transition to a Stryker brigade combat team configuration (although they

would lack the civil affairs battalion assigned to the Active Component). With the exception of the 116th Cavalry Brigade and the 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment, all of the Army National Guard's brigades would focus on low-intensity conflict and follow the current five-year deployment rotation, where the brigade deploys one year of every five. The current designations of the 116th Cavalry Brigade Combat Team and the 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment would change to the 116th Cavalry Regiment and the 278th Cavalry Regiment, respectively.

## The 5-Year Cycle of an Army National Guard Brigade

In an Army National Guard brigade's cycle, their annual trainings would be structured based on the number of years since the last deployment of the brigade. Annual training would be restricted for the first two years following a deployment to two weeks in the continental United States (deploying as a battalion to rebuild individual

**Figure 3**  
**Proposed Active Component Force Structure. Net Loss: 9 Active Component Brigades inactivated**

Unit	Action
2d Cavalry Regiment	No change in location, squadrons divide focus between high and low-intensity conflict
3d Cavalry Regiment	Becomes SBCT, personnel remain at Fort Knox, KY and brigade becomes 1st SBCT, 1st ID.
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	No change
170th ABCT	Inactivate
172d ABCT	Inactivate
173d Airborne BCT	No change
1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division	Equipment and personnel remain at Fort Riley, KS and brigade re-flagged as 3d ABCT, 1st ID.
2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division	Remains at Fort Riley as ABCT
3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division	Becomes SBCT, personnel remain at Fort Knox, KY and brigade becomes 1st SBCT, 1st ID.
4th Brigade, 1st Infantry Division	Inactivate
1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division	Reconfigures as SBCT
2d Brigade, 1st Armored Division	Remains ABCT
3d Brigade, 1st Armored Division	Reconfigures to ABCT formation
1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division	Reconfigures as SBCT
2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division	Remains ABCT
3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division	Remains ABCT
4th Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division	Inactivate
1st Brigade, 2d Infantry Division	Reflags as 2d ABCT, 2d Infantry Division and remains in Korea
2d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division	Reflags as 1st SBCT, 2d Infantry Division and remains at Fort Lewis
3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division	Becomes IBCT
4th Brigade, 2d Infantry Division	Becomes ABCT
1st Brigade, 3d Infantry Division	Converts to SBCT
2d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division	Remains ABCT
3d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division	Converts to IBCT, moves to Fort Stewart, GA
4th Brigade, 3d Infantry Division	Inactivate
1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division	Converts to SBCT
2d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division	Converts to IBCT
3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division	Converts to IBCT

(Figure 3 Continued)

4th Brigade, 4th Infantry Division	Inactivate
1st Brigade, 10th Mountain Division	Focuses training on low-intensity conflict and COIN
2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division	Remains IBCT
3d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division	Remains IBCT
4th Brigade 10th Mountain Division	Inactivate
1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division	Remains at Fort Wainwright, AK and focuses training on COIN and low-intensity conflict
2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division	Remains IBCT, moves to Andersen Air Force Base, Guam
3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division	Remains at Schofield Barracks with Division HQ
4th Brigade, 25th Infantry Division	Remains at Fort Richardson, Alaska
1st Brigade, 82d Airborne	Division Focuses training on low-intensity conflict and COIN
2d Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division	Remains IBCT
3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division	Remains IBCT
4th Brigade, 82d Airborne Division	Inactivate
1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division	Focuses training on low-intensity conflict and COIN
2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division	Remains IBCT
3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division	Remains IBCT
4th Brigade, 101st Airborne Division	Inactivate

and collective tasks). The annual trainings of years three and four would be brigade-level, month-long deployments for training outside of the United States. Deployments outside of the United States would function as miniature mission-readiness exercises, concentrating on partnership with coalition nations and various aspects of the spectrum of low-intensity conflict—counterinsurgency, stability operations, operations other than war. In addition, one or both of these two 30-day deployments could be to areas of the world where the U.S. military commonly participates in humanitarian projects and where the potential for a low-intensity conflict to erupt is the highest—Central America, Southeast Asia, and other strategically important loci for American interests.

Deploying Army National Guard brigades to potential flashpoints for month-long, real-world training and to Europe to train with coalition partners for low-intensity conflict operations would

successfully counter future low-intensity conflicts and sustain the Army's presence in Europe after the inactivation of the 170th and 172d Brigade Combat Teams.

During a brigade's fifth year of a cycle (i.e., the deployment year), it does not necessarily have to deploy for the entire year. During this year, a brigade would be available for a rotation in a long-term operation (i.e. Operation Enduring Freedom), and on first call (to deploy within three weeks) to join the Active Component's brigades in response to unforeseen low-intensity conflicts and emergency humanitarian situations (e.g., the 1994 intervention in Haiti, the 2011 Japanese earthquake, and the like). At this point in the deployment cycle, the 116th Cavalry Regiment and the 278th Cavalry Regiment differ from other Army National Guard brigades. The 116th and 278th would be task-organized similar to the 2d Cavalry

Regiment and the 3d Cavalry Regiment—i.e., with two squadrons devoted to high-intensity conflict and two to low-intensity conflict. In addition, as strategic reserve forces, the length and locations of these two regiments’ deployments would be more predictable. They could expect to spend the entire year of deployment forward near the projected future high-intensity conflict (e.g., Korea or the Middle East) or someplace that would allow quick movement to a low-intensity conflict (e.g., Germany or Guam).

Like Active Component brigades, each Army National Guard brigade would receive cultural training for a specific region of the world. However, the training would not be binding and would be a “best case scenario” situation. Thus, despite having trained on the cultures and languages of South America, a brigade could still deploy to Central Asia during its deployment year, if the situation dictated it.

The eight division headquarters currently in the Army National Guard would mirror the Active Component’s divisional headquarters in purpose and

organization with one difference: in states where both a division headquarters and a State Troop Command exist, the two headquarters would consolidate under the divisional headquarters.

### Fully Equipped Units

The author formerly served as a platoon leader in a MGS (M1127) platoon of a cavalry squadron. Doctrinally, the platoon was supposed to be equipped with three M1127 vehicles. In reality, the platoon had one M1126 Infantry Combat Vehicle and one M1127 MGS. None of the regiment’s mobile gun system platoons had more than one M1127. This disparity between doctrine and reality is the inevitable result of poor management of equipment at the strategic level and a reluctance to demand industrial capacity to meet requirements. Specifying that each division has only *one* Stryker brigade will ensure that these brigades receive their full and proper equipment, because division commanders will not be forced to distribute their Strykers as equally as possible. Only

ARNG Brigade Combat Teams (Current ABCTs are listed as SBCTs)	From States	Cultural Focus
28th ID (2d IBCT, 53d IBCT, 55th SBCT, and 56th SBCT) and 42d ID (27th IBCT, 50th IBCT, and 86th IBCT)	Florida, Maine, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Vermont	Central Asia and Middle East (tactical focus on mountain operations, taking the lead from the 86th IBCT, Vermont ARNG)
29th ID (30th SBCT and 116th IBCT), 34th ID (1st SBCT, 2d IBCT, 32d IBCT), and 35th ID (33d IBCT, 39th IBCT, 48th IBCT)	Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Carolina, Virginia,	North Africa
36th ID (45th IBCT, 56th IBCT, 72d IBCT, 155th SBCT, 256th BCT)	Oklahoma, Texas, Mississippi, Louisiana	Central/South America, Sub-Saharan Africa
38th ID (37th IBCT, and 76th IBCT)	Indiana, Michigan, Ohio	Sub-Saharan Africa
40th ID (29th IBCT, 41st IBCT, 79th IBCT, 81st SBCT)	California, Hawaii, Oregon, Washington	Pacific Rim (heavy emphasis on Korean peninsula)

**Figure 4**  
Cultural Focus of Army National Guard Brigades



having one Stryker brigade per division will also allow more visibility at the G-3 and G-4 level as to the readiness of Stryker brigades. The transfer of M1 Abrams tanks and M2 Bradleys from the Army National Guard to the Active Component and the cancellation of Foreign Military Sales of the M1 Abrams to Iraq will allow our ABCTs to be fully equipped as well, while ensuring adequate reserve stocks of vehicles both in forward areas and in the United States.

## Relevant Cultural Training

The tailoring of brigades to geographical areas means that the Army will be able to conduct appropriate cultural training, including a serious investment in language skills, ahead of time. Although unforeseen events will still happen, we will be better off than where we are now where units receive hastily prepared and conducted cultural training (if any, at all).

In this model, perhaps the best cultural training units will receive real-world experience. As Bernard Brodie wrote shortly after the end of World War II, "Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to prevent them."<sup>2</sup> Although he was writing about the importance of deterrence to prevent nuclear holocaust, these words are as appropriate today as they were in 1946. Unencumbered by heavy equipment, the low-intensity conflict brigades will be able to deploy to austere and previously unvisited locations to conduct multinational training and partnership exercises. These exercises would ensure that the U.S. Army is in a position to mentor other nation's militaries against violations of international law.

## Cost

Adopting this proposed model of organization, with the inherent inactivation of nine brigade combat teams, would actually make the Army's forces better equipped and stronger while reducing overall costs.

The most significant cost benefit that comes out of this model is the reduced training costs for the Army National Guard, while actually increasing the quality of training for those units. Currently, Army National Guard units with heavy equipment (Bradleys, Abrams, etc.) cannot actually conduct training with their equipment on normal drill weekends. To conduct maneuver or weapons training,

they must use four-day drill weekends to travel long distances (sometimes up to eight hours) to the nearest state or federal military reservation (where the equipment is stored and where land exists to train with). The large amount of resources required for even a company to conduct training therefore means that platoon and company-level training does not occur on a regular basis. Any training in a National Guard armored brigade combat team that involves the vehicles inevitably becomes a battalion or brigade-level training event. In addition, the impracticality of moving the vehicles for a two-week or even month-long training event means that Army National Guard heavy brigades are forced to train in the same location every year and do not enjoy the benefits that come from partnered training outside of the continental United States.

***The 48th Brigade Combat Team of the Georgia Army National Guard is a prime example of the benefits of converting Army National Guard heavy brigades to infantry brigades.***

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The 48th Brigade Combat Team of the Georgia Army National Guard is a prime example of the benefits of converting Army National Guard heavy brigades to infantry brigades. The 48th was a mechanized brigade from the early 1980s until 2006, with its equipment (M1 Abrams and M2 Bradley vehicles) permanently located at Fort Stewart, Georgia. During this time, the brigade's primary maneuver battalions never conducted an annual training exercise outside of the state of Georgia. In addition, because of the timetable required for the various gunnery tables and maintenance of their vehicles, annual training took place during the same six-week window every year. Following the brigade's deployment to Iraq in 2005-2006, the brigade transitioned from an armored brigade combat team to an infantry brigade combat team. The following year, the brigade sent each of its maneuver battalions to train concurrently

in separate states, allowing the brigade command element a unique command and control training opportunity. In 2008, the brigade sent a battalion to the Republic of Georgia to conduct training with a NATO partner nation and the U.S. Army's Southern European Task Force from Vicenza, Italy. In 2009, the brigade rotated units on annual training at various times throughout the year, this time to Germany and various locations in the United States. These annual training events allowed the brigade's soldiers exposure to working with NATO partners and to face the unique training challenges that simply do not occur when a unit trains at the same place, at the same time, every year for over 20 years. Unquestionably, the experiences the brigade gained from 2007-2009 facilitated the success of the brigade during its deployment to Afghanistan in 2009-2010.

### Consolidating Equipment

The reduction of armored brigade combat teams and consolidation of forces allows for a consolidation

of equipment that is or will be in storage. Based on cost estimates from the Army's Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, the author recommends that armored brigade combat team equipment sets not used to outfit specific brigades be stored at two installations to support U.S. Army armored brigade combat teams deployed in conflict. Those installations are Fort Hunter, Liggett, California, which is currently the largest U.S. Army Reserve post in the nation and Fort A.P. Hill, Virginia, which is an exceptionally large post that is not home to any permanently based maneuver units. These installations are both located near a plethora of suitable Naval ports for the movement of equipment by ship and U.S. Air Force installations large enough to accommodate larger cargo aircraft such as the C-5 *Galaxy* and Antonov AN-124. This consolidation would not be something new to the Army, as it occurred in Germany during the Cold War and in Qatar and Kuwait during the 1990s.

With support from the U.S. Army's Surface Distribution and Deployment Command, the following cost estimates for the movement of equipment between

Brigade Type	Storage Location/ CONUS Staging Site	Overseas Staging Site	Cost (Millions of Dollars)
SBCT	Hampton Roads, VA (CONUS Sea Port of Embarkation)	Rota Naval Station, Spain	\$10.3
ABCT	Fort Stewart, GA	Kuwait (Port Codes PN1, PN2, or PN4)	\$17.3
ABCT	Fort Hunter Liggett, CA	Korea (Port Codes UDC, UDM, or UD6)	\$10.4
ABCT	Yakima Training Center, WA	Korea (Port Codes UDC, UDM, or UD6)	\$12.1
ABCT	Fort A.P. Hill, VA	Kuwait (Port Codes PN1, PN2, or PN4)	\$17.2

**Figure 5**  
**Cost to Transfer Equipment from Storage to Staging Site**

the continental United States and overseas locations have been developed.<sup>3</sup> These estimates are based on the assumption that economy (frugality) is the most important factor in the movement of equipment, not speed. Vehicle types and quantities that were used to calculate these costs are based on FKSM 71-8, “Armor/Cavalry Reference Data: brigade combat teams” (May 2010, U.S. Army Armor Center), and may vary from the actual quantities and types of vehicles a brigade possesses. Due to a lack of published data, quantities for MRAP-type vehicles could not be determined. Figure 5 should be used only for general planning purposes, as actual costs vary.

## Drawbacks

Any informed reader will clearly identify that the cost of moving equipment and retraining personnel (in the case of Army National Guard personnel) are substantial hurdles to this plan. However, we must ask what is better. Spending a large sum now to ensure that our forces are properly equipped and prepared to conduct *likely* operations, or spending an even larger sum later (and in a rush), because our forces are *not* equipped or trained to conduct the operations the Army is already being called on to conduct?

With support from the U.S. Army’s Surface Distribution and Deployment Command, the following cost estimate for the movement of equipment between the continental United States and overseas locations have been developed.<sup>4</sup>

One fiscal drawback that might also be a benefit is the need for increased production of Stryker and MRAP vehicles. Due to the need of both the Active and Reserve Components to equip more brigades with Strykers, production would have to be increased on a phenomenal scale. At this time, all Strykers are produced for the Army in Ontario, Canada. Owing to the overall low number of Strykers that have been built, brigades scheduled to become SBCTs in this

proposed model would have to become IBCTs in the interim while awaiting their vehicles. Conversion to the IBCT configuration before becoming an SBCT will allow them to train for their wartime mission without interruption, because the Stryker (unlike a tank in an ABCT) is simply a platform to facilitate the mission.

Due to the nature of the Army National Guard, its existing unit structure, and the number of battalions required, it is impossible to assign Civil Affairs battalions permanently to every Army National Guard SBCT. As a solution to this, Army National Guard brigades should foster training relationships with Army Reserve civil affairs battalions so that Army National Guard brigades may gain competency at working with and employing Civil Affairs units. Army National Guard Stryker brigades would then receive the doctrinally mandated civil affairs battalions during mobilization, although infantry brigade combat teams would not necessarily receive formally attached civil affairs battalions.

## The Model

The proposed model is a strategy to accomplish the goals of repositioning U.S. Army forces toward post-Cold War hot spots, reducing the size of the Army, ensuring a continued forward presence, and remaining the most proficient Army in the world in both high-intensity and low-intensity conflicts. The model allows reserve units an opportunity to retain a one-in-five deployment schedule while also giving Active Component personnel a more stable dwell time because brigades focused on high-intensity conflict will deploy less often than those focused on low-intensity conflict. While it would be a great effort in terms of logistics and cost, it also presents the opportunities for great benefits—increased industrial capacity, a firm and consistent approach by the Army to partnership and low-intensity conflict, and a viable strategy to make good on the Army’s claim that it has total dominance on the battlefield. **MR**

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## NOTES

1. For the purposes of this article, low-intensity conflict operations include, but are not limited to antiterrorism operations, counterinsurgency, force protection, humanitarian assistance, advising and assistance to foreign militaries, stability operations, and other types of civil-military operations. High-intensity conflict operations include force-on-force activities against organized, well-equipped state and non-state actors (i.e., Hezbollah, North Korea, etc.) and are characterized by operations similar to the first two months of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

2. Bernard Brodie, editor, *The Absolute Weapon* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1946).

3. U.S. Army SDDC Business Integration Branch Cost estimate number 12347. Special thanks to the U.S. Army Surface Distribution and Deployment Command, especially the Business Integration Branch and Mr. Richard Cody, Ms. Dora Elias, Ms. Diana Johnson, Mr. Charles Morgan, Ms. Sharon Thomas, and Mr. Johnnie Woods III.

4. *Ibid.*