



Leader Preparation to Support Rebuilding

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REBUILDING AMERICA'S ARMY after an extraordinarily difficult and extended commitment presents tough challenges. The Army is severely attrited from the extended commitment to the "long war"—exacerbated by the converging pressures of continuing transformation and reorganization for the future (a task once described by the director of the Army staff as "it's like designing an aircraft in flight"). Intense mission demands have now endured for well over a decade. To these we should now add national social stresses such as increased roles for women and open sexual relationships.

Yet America's Army responds well, innovating as it reorients and rebuilds. The modular brigade modifications to create security transition teams that support security force assistance are clear examples of institutional redesign to support stability operations and decisive action.¹ Now the Army must complement this organizational response with doctrine; tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs); and leader development. Relationships gained through sharing requisite skills, knowledge, and attitudes (SKA) characteristic of "soft power" are prerequisites for successful combined arms maneuver and wide-area security operations.

Modifications in Army governance processes may also be necessary to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of operating and generating forces. Similar to how changes were initiated after Vietnam, the most significant improvements in both approach and eventual execution are likely to come "bottom-up"—from young officers and noncommissioned officers who have again-and-again faced the full spectrum of operational environments. Today, Generation Y leaders who are accustomed to global access via "cloud

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PHOTO: Convoy guide 1st Lt. Justin Koper, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry (second from right), briefs 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry convoy leaders about trouble spots on their approach route to Forward Operating Base Wilson. The leaders are (from left) 1st Lt. John Ghee, Staff Sgt. Michael Beyers, and 1st Sgt. Jeff Gunter. (Staff Sgt. Raymond Drumstar)

computing” seek better practices using information management (IM) and knowledge management (KM) to cross organizational stovepipes to seek better practices. Frustrated by DOD collaboration restrictions, they expect to cross the boundaries of organization, function, level, or culture to collaborate as they did in combat—routinely sharing knowledge with appropriate security classifications displacing the previous garrison practices of guarding knowledge within organizational or functional stovepipes to protect turf.² The practices and tools necessary to support these expectations need to be available for rebuilding.

One way to generate the essential skills, knowledge, and characteristics of “soft power” is through Teams of Leaders (ToL) using high performing leader team building and intensive collaboration across borders. ToL development and current evolutions follow past “hard power” rebuilding development paths proven successful after Vietnam. Teams of Leaders also reflects the emerging outcomes-based training and education construct designed to develop adaptive and agile leaders. Task/condition/standard and SKA development process comparisons may be instructive.

The Personal Road to ToL

As director of the Army Training Study in 1978, I was charged with developing and justifying Army training requirements. I concluded that it was necessary to rationalize and focus Army training—to structure it. Fortunately, I was subsequently assigned, in 1979, as assistant division commander in the 8th Infantry Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Paul Gorman. Gorman, with Gen. William DePuy, was in a continuing process of creating the Army Training System. Due to Gorman’s extraordinary competence and brilliance in design as the trainer in the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), he was assigned to command what became the Army training troop tester in U.S. Army Europe, 8th ID.

In the early 1970s, TRADOC and the Army’s Research Institute for Behavioral Science (ARI) had demonstrated novel training techniques for maneuver units, termed tactical engagement system. The tactical engagement system-trained squads and platoons were demonstrably more lethal and more survivable after the training. Gorman conceptualized and then invested TRADOC funds in

the early development of the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES), a system that enabled companies and battalions to replicate force-on-force ground combat employing eye-safe lasers rather than bullets or other projectiles. In 1977, Gorman was sent to Europe to command the 8th ID (Mechanized), where he made the Tactical Engagement System the centerpiece of the division’s training for readiness. In 1979, MILES was ready for its operational test, and although Gorman had been reassigned, the 8th ID was chosen to conduct the test because the rigor of the latter mandated a holistic training “system” within which MILES could provide replicable improvements in collective training. In effect, the operational test had to show that MILES could perform as a realistic direct fire instrumentation system for powerfully instructive after action reviews (AARs).

As the 8th ID assistant division commander, I directed the MILES operational testing, supported by then-Maj. Larry Word from ARI. Together with superb officers and NCOs from the operational testing battalions, we created what became the Army’s structured collective training system employing opposing forces, observer controllers, and AARs fused to train to task/condition/standard. Subsequently assigned as the deputy chief of staff—training in TRADOC, I overwatched the implementation of the Tactical Engagement System to task/condition/standard not only in field maneuvers at the National Training Center, but also in command post exercises. Integrating the Tactical Engagement System into a structured learning program to task/condition/standard worked beyond our dreams. We generated serious “hard power” to support offensive and defensive operations.

Shortly thereafter, I was assigned to command the U.S. Army Armor Center responsible for fielding the improved Abrams tank (the M1A2). Aware of the effects of the use of computer-based simulation in training, we teamed with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency to develop a low-cost full-armored fighting vehicle simulation to support Abrams/Bradley training. The original product, Simulation Networking, was improved, renamed and fielded as the Close Combat Tactical Trainer. Now, due to the low operating costs of the simulation, we could increase the competency levels of the mounted force significantly by requiring frequent

training on tough mandatory armored fighting vehicle-structured gunnery and maneuver exercises.

Sensitized by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency to the importance of emerging information capabilities applied to training, we realized that timely flow of data and information among and between fighting vehicles could provide decisive battlefield advantage—seriously improving Battle Command. We established combat data linking and indirectly supported combat leader teaming with the Inter-Vehicular Information System later known as Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) then Blue Force Tracking. These were clear bottom-up improvements to existent Army Battle Command Systems. *Mission command* followed as we supported development of Field Manual 6.0, *Mission Command*, in 2003, most recently reinforced in 2012 by Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, *Mission Command*. The statement “The fundamental basis of mission command is creating trust and mutual understanding between superiors and subordinates” reflected

increasing personal focus on developing shared SKA “soft power” as well as TCS “hard power.”²³

We were backing into information technology and, as we began to exchange combat information, also into information management (IM). Reflecting concern that emerging broad Army IM systems, particularly Army Knowledge Online (AKO), were not sufficiently user friendly, I was asked to become the senior mentor for the IM extension. Subsequently various prototype user nets employed in Iraq demonstrated the likely tactical utility of IT/IM. Simultaneously, as it became more user friendly, AKO realized gradually its great potential.

But we all sensed that there could and should be more than IT/IM. Leaders act to make things happen. The technology was there to form groups of leaders collaborating to improve job performance in professional forums—today recognized *inter alia* as Facebook and expanding MilSuite on AKO. Influenced by the power of emerging collaboration among leaders demonstrated by the Companycommand.mil forum at West Point, I became the senior



(U.S. Marines)

Soldiers receive a patrol brief during the Warrior Leader Course, which focuses on developing Army NCO's, at Marine Corps Training Area Bellows, Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii, 30 January 2012.

mentor for Army KM developing what is now called the Battle Command Knowledge System (BCKS). CAVNET and Iron Horse Net and forums such as NCO Net and S1 Net flourished as social media grew. Army KM expanded, generating shared actionable knowledge. Actionable understanding was yet to come.

When I was asked to explain BCKS more broadly to Army leadership, I conducted workshops in every major TRADOC school and in all corps level commands, worldwide. Each BCKS workshop engaged the commander and his/her key subordinates. Explanation of BCKS was followed by a discussion of how it could be employed to solve command issues raised by subordinates. BCKS was to be shaped by *them* to be *their* tool created bottom-up, not imposed top-down. Then

The shared trust required for high performance broadens horizons.

the leaders adjourned for the day, returning later to describe to the commander how they proposed to employ BCKS. I was available to counsel both seniors and subordinates about alternatives for implementing BCKS.

About halfway through the BCKS workshop explanations, I realized that what we were doing was building actionable understanding to use BCKS in leader teams formed within organizations or units for that purpose. The IM and KM were necessary but not sufficient. Leaders working together to a common purpose and crossing various borders as required to develop positive relationships had to be the practical desired outcome for chains of command.⁴ We were quickly approaching the need to generate the shared consensus and relationships characteristic of “soft power,” and were now seriously into supporting mission command.

I found I really had to think through *what*, then develop *how*, to build leader teams to advantage

the IM and KM of the Battle Command Knowledge System for both teams of equals and for teams composed of leaders and subordinates. The central insight was that these workshops were essentially team building exercises—later described as leader team exercises (LTX). Proofs of principle preceded or took place concurrently at I Corps and in the 10th Mountain Division developing shared actionable understanding in leader teams preparing for service in Afghanistan.

The next step was to establish just what made leader teams really good. Fortunately 12 years of unit command combined with numerous observation visits to various combat training centers produced an experience-based hypothesis reconfirmed by continuing personal research for another 5 years. Leader team high performance is based on shared skills, knowledge, and attitudes of shared purpose, shared trust, shared competence, and resultant shared confidence by every member of the particular leader team be it composed of peers or seniors and subordinates. These results were documented in several contemporary documents.⁵

Influenced by the growing success of BCKS in the Army, Gen. John Craddock, commanding general, European Command (EUCOM), asked me to apply information and knowledge management to EUCOM—Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational (JIIM). We conducted multiple workshops in all directorates at EUCOM headquarters then at 10 offices of defense collaboration and with their country teams. By now, improving IM and KM had almost become secondary; the desired outcome was high performing teams of leaders across the many JIIM boundaries of organization, function, level, or culture. In 2007, I renamed the effort Teams of Leaders portraying it essentially as a Venn diagram existent at the intersection of information management, knowledge management, and the building of high performing leader teams.⁶ A ToL culture both within EUCOM and networked vertically from the joint staff through “front-line” organizations provided the freedom for intensive collaboration between existent and fully operational leader teams. These three ToL components, interacting, facilitate a continuous collaborative environment, team building, and shared trust, which enable JIIM operations to make and execute decisions while rapidly sharing

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significantly higher performing staff, increased horizontal and vertical communications, and shared priorities and focus of effort. This—ToL—is no silver bullet—not fairy dust—but rather the application of enlightened, thoughtful, effective procedures by talented professionals—commencing with a series of ‘ah-ha’s’ that quickly become self-generating. While buffeted by the growth of the command, thanks to ToL, based on the ToL precedent, I am increasingly enthusiastic about what this program

what they have learned. Included below are two views of the conceptual framework—top and side. The side view is perhaps more expressive of ToL because presentation as a stool accentuates that there is more to ToL than a Venn diagram portrays. The essence of value-added from ToL is the combination of legs that supports the seat of the stool portrayed in the side view. ToL is the entire stool; the seat of the stool becomes an abiding ToL purpose not just the legs. Building that seat well seems a key to successful ToL introduction and subsequent institutionalization.

The point of this lengthy explanation is that influenced by personal insights and recalling the processes involved in the development of the Army Training System, we have developed Teams of Leaders similarly—test, fix, test—over the past decade to address a current challenge of equivalent magnitude. That is, developing high performing leader teams possessing productive relationships employing IT/IM and KM to team across boundaries of organization, function, level, or culture in supporting national security policies and programs.⁷

One confirming “proof” was EUCOM ToL as acknowledged by Gen. Bantz J. Craddock, commander of EUCOM/SACEUR from 2007-2009. He wrote:

“During my tenure as EUCOM commander one of the two most significant ‘wins’ was the command’s embrace of the Teams of Leaders concept. Without question—ToL was and remains the enabler for a

offers to the U.S. whole of government and multinational organizations.”

Personally responsible for several parallel development paths of both the Army Training System—“hard power”—and generic Teams of Leaders—“soft power”—for the past thirty years, I believe the performance potential of ToL—IM x KM x high performing leader team building—is equal and perhaps greater than the improved performance achieved routinely by the OC x OPFOR x AAR x IS paradigm of the highly successful Army Training System. I equate the goodness of ToL developing high performing leader teams sharing skills, knowledge, and attitudes and advantaging both information and knowledge management for the Army supporting mission command and broader JIIM applications to the “goodness” of the Army Training System drawing particularly on the training benefits of interactions of Observer/Controllers and AARs training to TCS. Both appear to be breakthroughs benefitting then-emerging art and science to significantly improve human team performance. In combination, supporting the art of command and the science of control, they can be strategically decisive.

Mastery of task/condition/standard achieved by the Army Training System is highly effective “hard power” essential to successful offensive and defensive operations. Developing positive leader team relationships across borders through shared skills, knowledge, attitudes ensures dominant “soft



Figure 1
Teams of Leaders (top view)

power” required for successful stability and civil support operations.⁸ Vastly broader JIIM applications such as support to civilian law enforcement seem certain to follow.

Building the “Seat of the ToL Stool”

All of the essential goodness evident in sharing data and information developing knowledge and eventually actionable understanding to solve problems should make collaboration the evident cure-all for improved decision making. It isn’t. Sharing often is resisted, particularly across walls of stovepipes in bureaucratic organizations governed by those competing for power, position, and resources—no win-win collaboration, rather zero-sum contests of will.⁹ Win-win can come only after senior leader intervention to encourage informal collaboration across borders accompanied by institutionalization of ToL organizational practices.

Sharing supporting ToL requires some measure of skills, knowledge, and attitudes to be possessed and shared by all of the members of any leader team if the leader team is to be effective. Building this sharing isn’t rocket science. First, we need to work

together to develop shared purpose within the team. What exactly are we becoming a team to do? As you define the problem together, shared competence develops. You begin to think through the problem being addressed together by understanding each other’s competencies. With that, trust develops. To the degree that these shared SKA of purpose, trust, and competence expand, leader team performance improves. As improvement occurs, shared confidence develops. When SKA are fully shared among all members of the team, particularly across borders, escalating high performance occurs that sells itself. A high performing leader team—the leadership leg of ToL—has been generated, often stimulated through short rapid-thinking LTX. (Success breeds “champions” who, co-opted, then spread “their” ToL practices across borders. Seem simple? It is, just as a comparable AAR thinking process has been applied to generating “hard power.”

The rate of further ToL proliferation is influenced by the over-arching collaboration environment that is present in the organizational stovepipe of the “champion.” This is the seat of the stool, embedding ToL practices in the routine of organizations.

Easiest is presence in organizations encouraged to share data and information drawing on available IM and KM—all seen together as providing a win-win. In a closed, reactive, stovepipe sensing sharing as zero-sum, the “champion” needs senior support to “give informal collaboration a try.” Results will convince the “doubting Thomas.”

A central issue introducing ToL is demonstrating how best to blend current sharing practices in such a way as to advantage several important national strengths. These strengths are the shared culture of “Yankee initiative,” the ability to seek “workarounds,” and the increasing willingness of Generation Y participants to collaborate, drawing on multiple address books and social networking. Teams of leaders can obviously accelerate application of these strengths across borders.

The lubrication of decision making across borders that is enabled by the three legs of ToL interacting strongly in the ToL seat supports adaptive behavior. Seeking shared purpose, trust, and competence moves a leader “out of his or her box.” In fact, the most successful applications of

ToL can be when the sharing occurs across stove-piped organizations with previously impermeable boundaries. Modest improvements in decision making resulting from sharing information, and hopefully knowledge, can appear significant compared to previous absence of any collaboration. More becomes “better,” and through observing the effects of “better,” ToL “believers” are generated.

The shared trust required for high performance broadens horizons. When team members move across borders into new areas and are introduced to unsuspected considerations, they influence decisions across the border, whatever the border may have been.¹⁰ Interactions of the three legs of ToL building the seat contribute directly to broadening leaders’ horizons and perspectives and perhaps to the development of actionable understanding how to address and achieve the purpose for which that particular leader team was generated. A broadened leader is likely to be a more adaptive leader, practicing mission command when engaged in planning processes or when engaged practicing ToL across JIIM organizations.




Figure 2
Teams of Leaders (side view)

The shared SKA of high performance, particularly shared trust and shared competence, become performance multipliers as new mission purposes arise under uncertain and often unpredictable circumstances. Gen. Martin Dempsey, then—commanding general of TRADOC, observed the same in discussing mission command.¹¹ The leader team, already high performing due to the presence of shared SKA that brought success and the resulting shared confidence, can more rapidly respond to uncertainty. Shared trust and competence provide a robust cushion when new purposes appear.

The most effective sharing may be bottom-up, where and when both distance and time can be reduced to zero to support adaptation as operational concepts may direct. Sharing can be right, left, up, and down across boundaries of organization, function, level, and culture. The most

pronounced effectiveness benefits can be sharing across levels. The “top” seeks actual “ground truth” the bottom welcomes “heads-up,” what may be coming down within the organizational or functional stovepipe. Win-win! Exactly this was the stimulus for developing the IM/KM capabilities of FBCB2 supporting professional forums in the Battle Command Knowledge System.

The SKA of high performing leader teams in ToL can be generated across any combination of environments by structured exercises comparable to those situational training exercises developed to support task training for “hard power.” High performing leader team development can be structured drawing on suggested LTX or unstructured (self-guided) practices. It can be with or without coach or mentor; grouped or virtual.¹² In every case, ToL application generates some successful “champions” influenced positively by their ToL



Army Maj. Gen. Patrick Murphy, the adjutant general of the New York National Guard, briefs Army Gen. Frank Grass, the chief of the National Guard Bureau, during a visit to areas impacted by Hurricane Sandy in New Jersey and New York, 2 November 2012.

experiences. These “champions” then recommend the ToL they understand and have adapted in practice for their uses to their friends. So, co-opted to tell their grouped and virtual associates, they expand ToL application more broadly. They tell their friends about the benefits of sharing trust, sharing purpose, and shared competence all reinforced by the elixir of shared confidence—success stimulating greater successes! All occurs without direction “top-down” but with shared enthusiasm bottom-up. That is the magic of ToL.

By stimulating shared actionable understanding of challenges and solutions across every border of human associations, ToL applied to general leader preparation can and should stimulate significant improvements in both effectiveness and efficiency within and well beyond America’s Army. ToL draws on U.S. individual initiative “tell me what, not how to”—accelerating national IM and KM capabilities the sharing/teaming leadership characteristic of Generation Y, and crossing traditional borders to produce

often unexpected rewards as atypical leader teams share SKA. The more senior leaders “let go” and encourage informal collaboration bottom-up, the greater the performance levels achieved by their organizations. The more senior leaders add potential cross-border teaming and collaboration opportunities within their guidance and intent, the greater are opportunities for subordinates to broaden teaming possibilities advantaging IM and KM.

In sum, ToL included in leader preparation encourages novel perspectives and insights about the art of the possible in adapting to highly unpredictable uncertainty by combining the science of IT, IM, and KM with the art of developing and sustaining high performing leader teams. All are fueled by the power of crossing borders, enabling, if not stimulating, bottom-up, direct, immediate, responses to solve problems and to meet unexpected challenges developing relationships—the ultimate “soft power” supporting wide-area security and combined arms maneuver operations. **MR**

NOTES

1. Capt. Daniel Bolton, “The MBSFA,” *Armor* (May-June 2010).

2. The constraints of inviolable stovepipes can be devastating. An organization with talented leaders submerged within a nonsupportive climate underperforms despite individual leader competencies. “Yankee initiative” is driven underground to avoid an organizational culture that inhibits collaboration.

3. U.S. Army Field Manual 6.0, *Mission Command and Control of Army Forces* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003), 1-18. A Principle of Mission Command: “Build cohesive teams through mutual trust”, ADP 6.0. 2. Enabling TTPs are now in development at the MCCoE, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

4. Actionable knowledge is necessary but not sufficient. More than knowledge is required to prevail; actionable understanding is essential to be “ahead of, not behind, the curve.”

5. Frederic J. Brown, *Vertical Command Teams*, IDA D-2728, June 2002, 142; Frederic J. Brown, *Building High-Performing Commander Leader Teams: Intensive Collaboration Enabled by Information Technology and Knowledge Management*, IDA D-3348, December 2006, 187.

6. For additional discussion of the origins of ToL, see Zeb Bradford and Frederic Brown, *Teams of Leaders: The Next Multiplier*, AUSA ILW Landpower Essay 07-2, May 2007; “Teams of Leaders: An Implementation Force Multiplier” chap. 7 in *America’s Army, A Model for Interagency Effectiveness* (Westport CT: Praeger,

2008) and Frederic Brown, *Teams of Leaders in U.S. European Command: A Soft-power Multiplier*, AUSA ILW L andpower Essay 09-2, June 2009.

7. This has been a team effort with the significant support of Dr. Rick Morris, Dr. Mike Prevou, and Lt. Col. Brad Hilton.

8. Sharing and consensus building of “soft power” is equally important developing positive federal, state, and local relationships essential to effective domestic emergency management. See Christine Le Jeune, *Consequence Management: Steps in the Right Direction?* AUSA ILW National Security Watch NSW 10-2 8, September 2010. Think ToL.

9. For an excellent example of inability to collaborate in defense programs, see Bastian Giegerich, “Budget Crunch: Implications for European Defence,” *Survival* 52, August-September 2010, 87-98.

10. Shared trust receives additional emphasis in contemporary discussions of implementing nuclear weapon “dual key” practices to secure highly sensitive information—post Wikileaks (Manning and Snowden).

11. Martin E. Dempsey, “A Campaign of Learning: Avoiding the Failure of Imagination” (Kermit Roosevelt Lecture), *RUSI Journal* 155 (June-July 2010): 6-9. “Collaboration and trust are as important as command and control.”

12. For “a way” see the Mission Command Center of Excellence developed by “EUCOM Teams of Leaders Coaching Guide,” version 1.0., 3 March 2009.