Virtual Influence: Leveraging Social Media as a Leadership Tool

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GREETINGS! IT IS A NEW YEAR and a fresh start in many respects. At Military Review, we approach every edition as a fresh start to see how we can provide an even better product than the one before. We saw some great changes in the journal this past year with the revamp of the online version, increased information available on our social media sites, shorter articles, and a more appealing front and back cover. We are still working diligently to bring our readers more promised changes. Our focus in the coming months is to transition the journal to themed editions beginning in late summer. The topics listed are those we feel are relevant to the Army now and in the future, topics that would spur debate, introduce new ideas, or explain concepts that many may otherwise overlook. You can find the six-month topic forecast in each edition. This allows our seasoned and budding authors enough time to select a topic and submit their work for publication.

Of course, Military Review accepts articles on all subjects as well, that is why we are introducing a new program on Facebook and our website called MR Spotlight. MR Spotlight highlights articles on a bi-weekly basis. The intent is to increase the amount of information reaching our readers, as well as stimulate thought and feedback in a more consistent and timely manner. Military Review receives a great number of submissions each year; only a fraction of these articles are published. In addition, it could be several months from the time we approve an article to publishing that article in a future issue of the journal. Subject matter, relevancy, feedback, and timing all have an impact on when, or if an article is published. MR Spotlight serves as an outlet for recognition of many authors, potentially much sooner than our bi-monthly publication. It is highly encouraged for authors to send submissions specifically for MR Spotlight. We also receive numerous articles that although were not necessarily ideal for Military Review, would be excellent candidates for MR Spotlight. Those authors may also choose to shift their piece to the bi-weekly feature.

Another event we look forward to is unveiling the new website in January. You will find it will be easier to use with quicker access to the information you need. It was redesigned to be more contemporary and move Military Review forward.

This edition of Military Review contains many informative articles on a variety of subjects. One of note is titled “Preferring Copies with No Originals: Does the Army Training Strategy Train to Fail?” on page 15. It discusses how the Army potentially trains in an approach that is in conflict with what we expect our training to accomplish. The author even uses analogies from the movie The Matrix to strengthen the argument.

This edition also lists the new topic for the General William E. DePuy writing competition on page 116. The inside back cover has been dedicated to the latest Medal of Honor recipient Capt. William D. Swenson.

I feel this edition is another outstanding effort by Military Review to provide our readers the latest in informative debate and discourse on the most current issues relevant to the Army.

Please visit us at http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/militaryreview/index.asp or like us on Facebook to see the new face of Military Review!
Themes for Future Editions

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Sep/Oct   Soldier and Noncommissioned Officer Development and Leadership.
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Harmony in Battle: Training the Brigade Combat Team for Combined Arms Maneuver


Two senior commanders offer a training plan to build proficiency from the bottom up.

Creeping Death: Clausewitz and Comprehensive Counterinsurgency

Capt. Brett Friedman, U.S. Marine Corps

A Marine officer calls for the U.S. military to move beyond the simplistic population-versus-enemy dichotomy regarding counterinsurgency.

Managing Risk in Today’s Army

Maj. Brendan Gallagher, U.S. Army

The author discusses the importance of sensible risk taking.

The Lessons of "The Surge"


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LETTERS

Front cover: Soldiers assigned to the U.S. Army 2nd Cavalry Regiment Task Force patrol at Multinational Base Tirin Kot, Uruzgan Province, Afghanistan, 6 November 2013. (Cpl. Mark Doran, Australian Defense Force)
There are over 7 billion people in the world today, and over 1.2 billion of them have a Facebook account, more than 550 million subscribe to Twitter, and over 1 billion visit YouTube each month. These sites belong to the category of social media, or a “collection of online platforms and tools used to share content, profiles, opinions, insights, experiences, perspectives, and media itself, facilitating conversations and interactions online between individuals or groups of people.” People often use social networking interchangeably with social media, but social networking is the act of using platforms of social media. Although their definitions are rapidly evolving, both involve collaboration, interactive dialogue, and making connections. Social networking is not a new concept or term; people have done it in person for centuries. However, social networking using social media is not much older than a decade, especially in the Army.

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The Army and Social Media

Army social media pioneers Col. Tony Burgess and Col. Nate Allen had the foresight and motivation in February 2000 to transfer their after-hours, front-porch conversations about their company commands into a virtual front-porch community that evolved into the Company Command Forum. The Army created many other forums modeled after this one, which serve as collaborative sites where personnel can seek help, learn, share, and make connections.

The U.S. Army’s Office of the Chief of Public Affairs formed an Online and Social Media Division in January 2009. The division focuses on the effective use of social media to provide relevant and timely information to vast audiences as news and content delivery becomes portable, personalized, and participatory.

As evidenced by membership numbers, many uniformed and other personnel have embraced these collaborative tools, but significant numbers avoid or ignore their possibilities. Although there is no substitute for face-to-face communication, social media is a powerful tool Army leaders should leverage and integrate to extend and enhance their leadership influence. This essay examines concepts of leadership and the phenomenon of social media and how leaders can leverage and integrate the social tools available across the modern human landscape.

Whats and Hows of Leaders and Leadership

There are countless definitions of leadership and descriptions of what leaders must do, but most agree that leaders should be able to influence others to take action by using a variety of measures. Organizational-culture professor Dr. Edgar Schein argues the function of leadership is to perceive functional and dysfunctional elements of an existing culture and manage evolution and change so the group can survive in a dynamic environment.

Harvard professor and cognitive psychologist Dr. Howard Gardner defines leaders as individuals who significantly influence the thoughts, behaviors, and/or feelings of others. In the book In Extremis Leadership: Leading as if Your Life Depended On It, retired Brig. Gen. Thomas Kolditz stated that leaders can profoundly influence followers in life-threatening contexts. These small samplings of definitions all suggest influence is critical to leadership, and this point appears valid. Now consider what leaders do with this influence.

The Leadership Institute’s founding chairman, Dr. Warren Bennis, proclaims leaders provide direction and meaning, generate trust, create a sense of hope, optimism, and investment in the future, and act to get results. Combine these ideas with previous concepts of leader influence and compare them to the Army’s definition. According to recently published Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-22, Army Leadership (August 2012), leadership is the process of “influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization.” This gives one an idea of what leaders do with their influence, but there is more to explore in the how.

Some argue power is the key ingredient for a leader to influence others. In 1959, sociologists John French and Bertram Raven claimed that the five sources of power in organizations included coercive, referent, legitimate, expert, and reward power. Coercive power comes from influencing others via threats, punishments, or sanctions. Referent power comes from interpersonal relationships cultivated with others in the organization, and is...
the most influential form of power. Legitimate or positional power comes from a rank or status in an organization’s hierarchy, like a squad leader or company commander. Expert power comes from possessing knowledge or expertise, and is also powerful in influencing others. Lastly, reward power comes from influencing through incentives like bonuses or positive evaluations. Leaders use these different types of power to influence others, but there are guidelines for how to do so properly.

In the Army’s doctrinal publication 6-22, *Army Leadership* (August 2012), the Leadership Requirements Model discusses the attributes and competencies leaders need to be effective in a reciprocal influence process between leaders and followers. The Center for Army Leadership extensively researched and developed this model with an expert panel over several years, undergoing the scrutiny of scientific validation, multiple senior leader reviews, Army-wide staffing, and it continues to undergo empirical validation.

The Leadership Requirements Model competency of “Leads” includes building trust, extending influence beyond the chain of command, leading by example, and communicates, while the competency of “Develops” includes creating a positive environment/fosters esprit de corps, and develops others. Leaders should maximize their influence in each of these competencies to be influential and effective, and tools like social media can assist in this effort.

### The Phenomenon of Social Media

The availability and usage of social media has exploded in the past decade, shortening cultural divides and giving people unprecedented access to information and each other. Since Facebook’s founding in 2004, membership numbers have skyrocketed to more than 1.2 billion across the world. These membership numbers are more meaningful considering countries such as China,
Iran, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan intermittently block their citizens from using Facebook. This means that almost a quarter of the world’s population is not regularly allowed to access the site, yet membership numbers continue to climb.

In 2005, only 8 percent of American Internet-using adults admitted to using social networking sites, but that proportion jumped to 72 percent by August 2013. Geography is now less of a communication obstacle than bandwidth. In less than a decade, social media created a world that is indeed flat, yet thickly connected.

Twitter, a micro-blogging social networking site founded in 2006, now has more than 115 million active monthly users. Twitter members’ 140-character blog updates or “Tweets” inform, collaborate, and influence others across the world. YouTube, a video-sharing website founded in February 2005, currently boasts 1 billion unique user visits each month, 100 hours of video uploaded worldwide every minute, with millions of new subscriptions daily.

Sites like these allow messages to traverse the globe as fast as the Internet can take them, potentially influencing people and populations quicker than a virus. In fact, “going viral” is a term used for a post or update shared rapidly and to a great number of people because of its content. Examples include the “Gangnam Style” video, the “Harlem Shake” series, or the “What Does the Fox Say?” video. If these sound familiar, that illustrates the point and power of social media. If not, “Google” those to demonstrate the ease of information access for today’s generations.

Current Leadership Needs

Given the explosion and reach of media sites available, Army leaders can and should creatively leverage and integrate social networking as a leadership tool. The Center for Army Leadership’s Annual Survey of Army Leadership reports published in May 2012 and April 2013 noted a need for leaders to improve in the areas of communication, extending influence beyond the chain of command, developing others, and fostering esprit de corps or building teams. These constructs are linked, where attention to any of them will most likely impact others. In today’s Army, many operations are decentralized and require a great deal of trust and understanding between leaders and their followers. This has lent itself to a larger focus on the German Auftragstaktik philosophy, which has evolved into Mission Command in the U.S. Army. With the Army’s shift to Mission Command, leaders should leverage all organizational enablers at their disposal, such as social networking.

Social media can facilitate and enable communicating and extending influence if done correctly. Two principles of the mission command philosophy are to build cohesive teams through mutual trust and to create shared understanding. Social networking can enhance both trust and understanding exponentially.

Trust and Social Media

Trust is the feeling that members of a team can depend on one another and their contributions are valued. Army Doctrine Publication 6-0 states trust is gained and lost through everyday actions, and it comes from successful shared experiences and training. The interaction of the commander, subordinates, and soldiers through two-way communication reinforces trust. If there is more than one level of rank between a soldier and leader, chances are the soldier may not physically observe the daily actions of that leader. As an example, when in company command, I only truly spoke with my brigade commander on four occasions. Based on the limited contact we had, I could not determine the nuances of his leadership style, and it is doubtful he could assess mine. I trusted him as a member of the profession, but that trust was based on the legitimacy initially inherent in Army leaders until proven otherwise. This trust only went so far, and did not allow me to share an understanding of his actions or leadership.

Referent Power through Social Media

The reach, power, and influence of social media are profound. Recalling the bases of power, leaders can build referent power through social media. If leaders engage members in conversation, no matter how seemingly inconsequential, they begin to build referent power by association. Consider if a leader walked by and told you “good job” for something you did or said. The Facebook “Like” function for posts virtually translates to the same gesture, but amplifies because every member of the page can see it.
Competence and the Expert Base of Power

Retired Col. Pat Sweeney, one of the leading theorists and researchers of trust and leadership in dangerous contexts, conducted a study with soldiers across Iraq that indicated leader competence was the most important attribute for influencing trust in combat.\(^3^4\) Army competency is akin to French and Raven’s expert base of power, where followers choose to follow leaders who demonstrate expertise or proficiency in a field. If soldiers do not see leaders often, leaders can demonstrate proficiency or expertise through photos, video, or dialogue on social media. If leaders actively participate in the social media community and submit high quality or original content, members may see the leader as an expert in their particular field over time.\(^3^5\) A few photos or remarks cannot prove competence in a virtual world, but can definitely augment it if that competence is authentic, especially in geographically decentralized operations. If leaders cannot be with their soldiers in all locations at all times, this is an alternative. Face-to-face communication and observation are preferable, but leaders can enhance and promote the climate of trust and the competency of their command by using social media. Connections made between leaders and followers are what make these tools so potentially powerful.

Enhancing Communication

A network is a group of people or things interconnected for a purpose. Social and technical networks enable leaders to communicate info, create connections with others, control forces, strengthen those connections, encourage more participation, and help lead to successful operations.\(^3^6\) In *Taking the Guidon: Exceptional Leadership at the Company Level*, authors Tony Burgess and Nate Allen declare, “Excellent communication—up, down, and sideways—is fundamental to a motivated and effective unit.”\(^3^7\) Social media can enhance communication not only within a unit, but also across networks of their families, future members, departed members, and anyone else interested.

Leaders can develop and leverage various social networks to exchange information and ideas, build teams, and promote unity of effort.\(^3^8\) The “social” part of “social networking” implies two-way communication as the minimum. To engage people and reinforce the team concept, leaders should cultivate social dialogue and prepare for it. Social networking facilitates nearly instant feedback from all levels, and not all feedback will be positive. However, that might make it more valuable. Members can voice opinions, and leaders can solicit ideas for the betterment of the organization. The conversation alone serves to increase member participation, engagement, and buy-in, no matter what decisions may result from the dialogue.

For example, when I had the privilege of working for the 72nd and 73rd Commandants of Cadets at the U.S. Military Academy, each made it a regular practice to post cadet and academy photos on their professional Facebook pages. The commandants commented on events occurring at the academy, explained some of their command decisions, and lauded members of the Corps of Cadets for their many varied accomplishments. Graduates and parents thanked them daily for the information, and that resulted in more photos and information sharing. Both commandants stayed less than two years; however, the combined total of their site members in that short time was over 9,000. While many of the 9,000 followers were undoubtedly duplicates, the numbers clearly demonstrate social media’s communication reach and its potential influence on others.

On 1 March 2013, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Martin Dempsey posted a two-minute message on YouTube about sequestration.\(^3^9\) In just a few days, his message reached over 9,500 viewers, and the comments posted under his video were overwhelmingly positive and appreciative that he took the time to transmit his message. Additionally, hundreds of the viewers reposted his video on their personal pages, and others also reposted the message. There is no telling how many received his message, but his reach was considerable. Incidentally, over 39,000 people currently follow his Facebook page, which means 39,000 people can see what he does daily, read his thoughts on emergent issues, and unknowingly build trust in someone they will probably never meet.\(^4^0\)
In May 2013, 89 percent of all Internet users ages 18-29 reported using social networking sites. Moreover, social networking sites were used by 78 percent of Internet users aged 30-49, 60 percent for those aged 50-64, and 43 percent for those aged 65 years and older. As of late November 2013, 98.6 percent of the active duty Army ranged from ages 18-49, with slightly more than 1 percent at the ages of 50 and beyond.

To give some Army perspective, general officers typically range from 50 and beyond and colonels from the early 40s and beyond. If one makes the broad-based assumption that Army personnel reflect the general population in social networking habits, then over 83 percent, or 439,000 active duty members between 18-49 years of age use social networking accounts in some form. However, only 60 percent of the most senior leaders do, so they do not have a substantial, far-reaching communication element in their arsenal to employ.

As social media is a significant and growing part of today’s society … leaders should seriously contemplate leveraging its benefits and connecting with the culture they lead, if for no other reason than shared understanding of how subordinates are communicating.

Another leadership study discovered one of the most critical factors to effective, influential leadership was that followers viewed their leaders as highly representative of their group. Given a choice, group members often prefer leaders who display prototypical characteristics of their group above those who display positive qualities that separate them from the group. As social media is a significant and growing part of today’s society and used by more than 444,000 total active duty members in the Army, leaders should seriously contemplate leveraging its benefits and connecting with the culture they lead, if for no other reason than shared understanding of how subordinates are communicating. Besides the simple knowledge of how to use such sites and the language associated, leaders have the opportunity to show subordinates how “human” they really are. The humanness in leaders oftentimes endears them to their followers, and social sites can help paint the authentic picture for them, resulting in higher identification with followers and increased influence with those they lead. Failing to use these tools, however, can result in informational and social isolation.

Several years ago, I worked for a gentleman we will call Lt. Col. William James. James came from a particularly secretive operational community and adamantly refused to consider opening or leveraging social media sites for professional or personal use. As a result, he was unaware of many organizational changes not advertised elsewhere and restricted in social awareness. He was largely unmindful of social media’s general benefit to organizations and the limitless ways it could enhance information sharing, communication, or connections. By not availing himself of the media, his intelligence, competence, abilities, and influence were underutilized. While he was an incredible leader, this is comparable to refusing to use a cellular phone or email in modern functioning. Although the most competent and inspirational leaders across time never had or needed such things, many of those leaders accessed the best weapons or technologies available in their times to enhance desired effects. Today, James is the garrison commander of a post whose Facebook site has over 159,000 subscribers, or “Likes.” It is difficult to dispute the reach and potential impact of such a site, even for a non-user.

Maximizing Tools in a Resource-Constrained Environment

Leaders can leverage social networking tools to train, develop, and mentor subordinates, especially in a resource-constrained environment. Sequestration is official, and the federal government shut down for 16 days in October 2013 because of fiscal legislation disputes. As deployment operating tempo slows and units return to
home station, competition for limited resources will continue to rise. Leaders must overcome and maximize dwindling resources to maintain readiness. Organizations can increase their competitive edges by tapping into knowledge inventory, creating ways to increase access to knowledge stores, and promoting and rewarding knowledge sharing. Continuously sharing information, lessons learned, institutional knowledge, and expertise is more important than ever, and social media can enhance these practices. For example, Xerox developed a collaborative social media site in 2010 that allowed repair technicians to share insights and observations with each other. This collaborative portal, named Eureka, resulted in a 5-10 percent parts and labor cost reduction, which translated to an annual cost savings of $30 million.

Training and Collaboration

There are tools available leaders can utilize to enhance training and collaboration. For example, viewing videos can be educational and instructive for various tasks. The Iron Major Crossfit website out of Fort Leavenworth posts daily workouts with YouTube links so members can watch how to do exercises properly, or define a DU, HSPU, T2B, or KB. Similarly, milTube is a secure, Department of Defense (DOD) version of YouTube, where users post military-related videos intended for training personnel in various skills. The DOD’s milSuite website is a collection of online tools such as milTube, milBook, milWire, milWiki, and Eureka. Many of these sites are similar to commercial counterparts, but most are secure and full of communities of professionals waiting to share, connect, and receive information.
Oftentimes, peer-to-peer, grass roots knowledge sharing is extremely influential. Forums such as Company Command Net, S3-XO Net, Platoon Leader Net, FRG Leader, and NCO Corps allow members to pose questions and share insights, videos, and other resources. Topics range from taking command to managing funds in family readiness groups and myriad other topics. These forums allow members to contribute to the group, connect with others with similar experiences or interests, and develop personally through these interactions.

A lack of close interpersonal relationships through virtual space has shown not to be an issue when the community that its online members belong to has a strong identity, such as Company Command Net. Consider viewing customer ratings online for a product one plans to purchase. One may not know any of the product reviewers, but the shared interest in the same product helps personnel overcome trust issues arising from the lack of strength in participant ties. In fact, virtual relationships have sometimes proven more useful, preferred, and executed than other relationships.

**Mentorship and Social Media**

Mentorship is the voluntary and reciprocal developmental relationship existing between a person of greater experience and a person of lesser experience, characterized by mutual trust and respect.

A study comparing face-to-face mentoring against online mentoring found that, although the participants (both mentors and mentees) desired the mentorship, dedicating time to the face-to-face endeavor was a barrier because they lacked the motivation to conduct frequent mentorship engagements.

The study concluded a community approach to mentoring using open social networking tools spread the mentoring load, allowed mentees to have more than one perspective on an issue, and increased access to knowledge and networking opportunities.

As a second lieutenant, I unknowingly met my future mentor at the Joint Readiness Training Center while she commanded a battalion my unit supported. I was drawn to her expertise, knowledge, and presence—the fact that she was a female transportation officer graduate of West Point and being from Hawaii, just as I was, probably did not hurt either. She humored me by giving me her perspectives on everything from the profession to family, and still does today. However, since the Army does not PCS mentors and mentees to the same locations, deploys personnel on different cycles to different theaters, and scatters personnel to different time zones, most of the mentoring I receive is online through media such as Facebook. A mentoring relationship that began face-to-face continues through social media for more than a decade now, and I am eternally grateful.

Virtual mentoring also provides a platform for demonstrating appropriate online behavior, just as inviting junior leaders over for dinner helps model appropriate social behavior. While working as a tactical officer at West Point, I mentored a young cadet who had posted inappropriate photos of herself on Facebook and struggled with the balance of dressing appropriately without sacrificing femininity. During our mentoring, I allowed her to “lurk” on my Facebook page where she could see pictures of what many other professional female officers wore, how they conducted themselves in their off-duty time, and on-line. Years later, I lurked on her page and she is the epitome of professionalism, at least from what I can see in the virtual world. If you compound the time required for mentoring with the wide geographic dispersion of uniformed personnel and consider the benefits of virtual mentorship, social networking as a mentorship tool increases in usefulness.

**Developing and Displaying Unit Culture**

Social networking can be a simple but powerful tool for building teams and fostering esprit de corps. An important part of leadership is developing the culture of a unit. One level of culture includes the artifacts in a unit, or visible products of the group. Several examples are its language, technology, published lists of values, rituals and ceremonies, and physical architecture of its environment.

During the PCS process, a common question soldiers have is what their future unit will be like. This is an inquiry regarding the unit’s culture. Methods of answering this question historically included asking colleagues for insights or knowledge of the unit, “Googling” the unit, going to the unit’s official...
website, or other largely rudimentary methods. If one is lucky enough to find a social media site, the richness of the information, character, and realness of the unit increases exponentially.

For example, I discovered I would be joining the 16th Combat Aviation Brigade four months from writing this essay. Upon receiving my assignment, I did the usual inquiries, and then found their unit Facebook site. Because pictures are worth a thousand words, I viewed a streaming book of what the unit had already accomplished, indicators of its morale, and the priorities for the organization. In one week, I discovered the unit was the largest combat aviation brigade in the Army, had just fielded the Army’s newest Apache aircraft, had completed a mission command systems integration exercise, and addressed community complaints of aircraft noise. Through this site, one can scroll through the unit’s historical photos, familiarize with the people and facilities of the unit, and get a sense of its climate. Whether cognizant of it or not, the unit is already bringing future members into their team months ahead of arrival. Whether I knew it or not, I was also learning the unit’s culture through its visual/virtual artifacts and preparing a foundation for transitioning.

Enhancing Esprit de Corps and Building Teams

Esprit de corps is the common spirit existing in the members of a group and inspiring enthusiasm, devotion, and strong regard for the honor of the group. We often think of it in terms of morale and climate, and its presence or absence affects motivation and trust. Leaders who set the conditions for a positive climate are much more effective at maintaining a high level of esprit de corps. One way to do this is by establishing an inclusive climate, or one that integrates everyone, regardless of differences. Another is by encouraging open and candid communications. A social media archive or collaboration site provides a space that captures shared experiences and memories, which can be key for building and maintaining esprit de corps. By availing such social sites to the public, leaders maximize inclusivity. By managing the conversations on social networking sites and reinforcing professionalism in conjunction with psychological safety, leaders can encourage open and candid social dialogue that may never initiate in person. Sometimes the best ideas come through the safety of the network.

Where to Begin in the Virtual World

Assuming a leader wants to enhance influence by using social media, there are several ways to begin. The optimal starting point is to review The United States Army Social Media Handbook. The U.S. Army Office of the Chief of Public Affairs published version 3.1 in January 2013 and is set to publish an update in early 2014. It appears to be a one-stop shop for all questions regarding the U.S. Army and social media use.

Contents include discussions why leaders or units should establish a social media presence and what different sites are available, an example disclaimer and rules of engagement for posting on sites, operations security considerations, guides for using social media for crisis communications, tips for populating a site, quick reference guides and checklists for how to initiate a site.

The handbook also consolidates various and current Army policies in enclosures to ensure unit success and regulatory compliance.

The United States Army Social Media Handbook.
The next logical step is to determine the goal for this presence, and the strategy for reaching it. This helps define what type of site one is trying to create. Strategy for building trust and extending influence looks quite different from merely providing information. Both can be useful, but it depends on the needs of the particular organization. For example, the Travis Air Force Base Passenger Terminal has a Facebook page dedicated to Space-A travel.65

Every time there is an available flight, they post the information. They are not necessarily trying to build esprit de corps (although inherent in Space-A travel), not trying to increase buy in or share a vision, and not trying to increase trust. The site provides a cheap, timely means of communicating information for anyone interested and for resolving public questions. It has over 31,000 followers, which demonstrates that useful media can be purely information-based, but again, it depends on the organization. Other considerations in social media planning include second- and third-order effects of the proposed social media presence, such as flattening the hierarchical structure, violations of operations security, or potentially undermining the chain of command. Leaders should war-game different scenarios, as with any other plan, to determine courses of action, ways to address issues, or ways to prevent issues before they surface.

If lacking in one’s own social media site development skills, a number of readily accessible individuals are probably familiar enough with the chosen site to initiate it. Scatter plots on social media usage from a Naval officer perceptions study indicated that the younger the service member, the more prolific their use of electronic social networks.66 The translation here is to consider asking someone younger for help, but ensure they have the basic guidelines for creating a site as per the handbook noted above. The incoming commandant of cadets knew what a powerful tool a professional Facebook site could be at the U.S. Military Academy from his predecessor, but the general was not sure how to create it. “Make me one that models his” was all he had to say, and ten minutes later, he had one and a quick tutorial on how to use it. However, in researching for this article, I discovered I failed to register his professional Facebook account with the U.S. Army (which now boasts 2,000 officially registered sites).67 That additional process would only have taken about two minutes to complete. As a result, the Online and Social Media Division would have reviewed the site to ensure it abided by regulations, added it to the U.S. Army Social Media directory, and contacted Facebook to let them know it was an official site. Facebook then would have removed all the ads and banners from the page.

After establishing a site, regardless of the type, it requires thoughtful, continuous, and creative management to be effective. Most of these sites are free to use, but good sites require someone’s time and energy to maintain. To be a worthwhile tool, keep posts interactive, provide useful information to the audience, engage that audience by soliciting feedback, and respond to questions. If there is an environment of candor and psychological safety within a site, members may answer each other’s questions without leader or unit involvement, and this type of dialogue and sharing of information can translate positive effects into the unit’s nonvirtual climate and culture.

At the end of the day, social media and networking sites are just tools leaders can use to build trust, communicate with others, develop others, and extend their influence—all enablers with the power to enhance and augment leadership in conjunction with traditional communication techniques. Social media will not make a bad leader good, just like email or cell phones will not make bad leaders good, but social media can improve and enhance a leader’s influence and provide additional tools to leverage in a geographically dispersed, rapidly changing, and resource-constrained environment.68 The Army has valuable and collaborative stories, information, opinions, and ideas to share, with limitless force-multiplying reasons for doing so. However, it is critical that leaders at all echelons leverage the tools available for maximizing the potential of their units, their soldiers, and themselves. MR
Preferring Copies with No Originals

Does the Army Training Strategy Train to Fail?

Maj. Ben E. Zweibelson, U.S. Army

“You know, I know this steak doesn’t exist. I know that when I put it in my mouth, the Matrix is telling my brain that it is juicy and delicious. After nine years, you know what I realize? Ignorance is bliss.”

—Cypher
(From the motion picture The Matrix)

The U.S. ARMY spends a vast amount of energy, resources, and time on training, perpetually seeking improvements to forge a better force. The latest Army Training Strategy (October 2012) tasks our Army to “hold commanders responsible for training units and developing leaders through the development and execution of progressive, challenging, and realistic training.” This implies a shared understanding of what training is realistic, and what is not. Although our training strategy employs the terms “training realism,” “replication,” “operational relevant training,” and “adaptive” throughout the short document, it never defines or differentiates this lexicon. Without any contextual depth in these myriad concepts, is it possible that due to fundamental flaws in our training strategy we are unaware when we conduct unrealistic training instead? In other words, do we train to fail?

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This article does not suggest failure with respect to military trainers, tactics, operational or strategic level training objectives; one must look at an even bigger picture above all of these things.⁴

Our training centers are full of dynamic, dedicated military professionals who might take offense at the notion of “training to fail”; however if our overarching training philosophy is faulty, even the best efforts will not matter. To contemplate our training philosophy, can we consider on a holistic and ontological level how the Army approaches training, and how we “think about thinking” with respect to training?⁴

To bring some context to this abstract proposal, I introduce in this article several design concepts that draw from post-modern philosophical and sociological fields that help us consider whether our Army may inadvertently train to fail, and how it has effectively insulated itself from even questioning these institutionalisms.⁵

“Design” as it relates to military applications has a broad range of conceptual, holistic applications for dealing with complexity, although most services attempt to brand their own design approach for self-relevant concerns.⁶ Army design methodology does not include any of these concepts in U.S. Army doctrine nor does our training strategy specifically reference design theory. However, critical reflection and holistic, systemic approaches might illustrate our training shortfalls.⁷

To conduct this inquiry, we draw from philosopher Jean Baudrillard’s concept of simulation and simulacra. We also reference sociologists Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann’s collaborative concept of “social knowledge construction,” to demonstrate how the Army potentially trains in an approach that is in conflict with what we expect our training to accomplish.⁸ Are we spending our energies, resources, and time in training approaches that are detrimental to our overarching goals because they train us in the wrong ways? To return to the plot of the science fiction movie quoted at the beginning, shall we swallow the red pill and face uncomfortable truths, or swallow the blue pill and continue enjoying the false realities we create for ourselves through training the force toward national policy goals?⁹

The writers behind The Matrix were heavily influenced by Baudrillard’s work on simulacra, which emphasizes a stark contrast between false “realities” that we as a society often prefer over the painful, bleak, and more challenging “real world” we tend to avoid. This proves useful in that while Baudrillard’s work is relatively unknown, the Matrix movies are extremely popular in Western society and address the same existential concept. This article’s introductory quote features a conversation between a treacherous character and an agent of the Matrix where the conspirator acknowledges his shared understanding that the steak he is eating within the Matrix is imaginary; it is “fake steak.” The virtual program called the Matrix stimulates his brain, but there is no actual steak in his mouth. Yet despite knowing this, he wants to return to the Matrix and have his memory erased, so he can live an imaginary life full of delicious fake steak in complete bliss.

This article employs the “fake steak” metaphor as a vehicle to illustrate the differences between simulation and simulacra concerning our military training philosophy—one that encompasses our strategic, operational, and tactical applications. Again, this criticism is not directed at any military unit, organization, or strategic concepts in exclusion; rather this is a critical reflection upon the overarching core training philosophy we use daily. We all are dining on fake steak together.

Does our military prefer to train in blissful ignorance of the detrimental actions we perform at the expense of our overarching military strategies? We need to first frame what Baudrillard terms simulation, and how his concept of simulacra represents the fake steak that institutions crave instead of less enjoyable “real” meals.

### Defining Simulacra for Military Planning Considerations

Suppose a couple took a vacation to Las Vegas and stayed in a particular casino hotel that specialized in replicating Venice, complete with canals, gondolas, and many of the familiar visual cues associated with the great Italian city. The couple has such a good time that they decide to take their next vacation in actual Venice, Italy. However, upon their arrival to Venice the moldy smell of the real canals, the crowds of tourists, the formidable language barrier, and the lack of slot machines and readily available American food at every turn disappoints them. They crave the artificial Venetian
experience that the casino offers them over the real thing. Instead of enjoying the “real” Venice, the couple decides to return to Las Vegas to the artificial version for their next vacation. This is an example of how simulacra trumps reality.¹⁰

The casino version of Venice is not just a weak imitation of the real Italian city, but reflects an abstract fusion of Western societal values such as American entertainment concepts, buffet meals, opulent service, and localized aspects of “Sin City.” This creates something entirely unlike Venice, despite superficial similarities. According to Baudrillard, a simulation pretends to have what one does not possess, whereas the progression of simulacra is to create a copy with no original; something entirely false, yet commonly misunderstood by a society or institution as “real.”¹¹ This is the critical aspect of simulacra; that the society or organization accepts the false reality without critically questioning or realizing it. Thus, Cypher in The Matrix realizes his steak is imaginary while others around him remain blissfully unaware.

Sociologists Berger and Luckmann suggest that skepticism and innovation threaten the status quo of an institution’s taken-for-granted reality, in that our organizations actively resist breaking this illusion.¹²

I propose that our military faces two significant hurdles with respect to our training philosophy—we may have created an entire false training reality that we refer to as realistic training that is actually a simulacra, and our own well-established institutionalisms prevent us from ever confronting this and changing them.¹³

We continue the cycle by engaging with actual rivals in conflicts where we have questionable success, and then return to training to prepare again for future employment. Let us explore some accepted Army training components and processes and determine whether they simulate, or are simulacra with little to do with reality.
Do We Fight a Simulated Enemy, or Merely Simulacra of Ourselves?

Consider the enemy we describe within our training doctrine and what it is supposed to represent. The new “hybrid threat” is a complex blend of guerrilla, insurgent, criminal, and near-peer conventional actors “woven into one dynamic environment.”

While the past decade of counterinsurgency scenarios at Army national training centers focused exclusively on scenario-specific irregular threats reflecting the various factions within each theater, the recent shift to “decisive action training environment” focuses on a hybrid enemy threat with a blend of conventional forces, criminal actors, and irregular insurgent forces. On the surface, our opposing forces (OPFOR) are highly capable at making a visual replication of these myriad threats, whether conventional nation-state forces, irregulars, terrorists, or criminals. However, a deeper investigation will illustrate a significant case of simulacra in our opposing force application. We do not train to fight our enemies as much as we train to fight ourselves.

Our opposing forces operate entirely as a conventional U.S. Army element once one moves beyond the symbolic costumes, antagonistic mission objectives, and enemy equipment. Our OPFOR don enemy symbols to create the illusion within our training whereas their motives and methodologies remain the same. Their leadership functions within the same organizational patterns as any other Army unit, with a hierarchical chain of command that employs the same military decision-making process to produce operational orders and plans that are identical to conventional Army forces. Despite having the props and key phrases that present an enemy force, there is little difference between opposing force and friendly conventional planning products or plans other than antagonistic mission statements and objectives. They forge their plans in precisely the same manner. Do our actual rivals operate identically to our own methodologies, or are we casting a reflection of ourselves in our training draped in symbols we associate with our enemies?

From the small unit tactics to many of the simulated weapon systems and communication processes, the opposing forces imitation of the enemy is merely skin-deep. Under the costumes and props, conventional U.S. trained forces use the same language, planning methodology, values, and motives to fight the friendly force in the training scenario—thus we end up fighting a mirror image of ourselves yet pretend that we are fighting a realistic representation of our enemy. This is simulacra, and we as a military prefer to dine on imaginary steak instead of a real meal that tastes less enjoyable.

Again, I do not direct criticism at our opposing forces, rather at our overarching training philosophy that tolerates simulacra and rewards units with succeeding against a mirror image force of itself in training. We are not successful against realistic rivals; rather we succeed in beating ourselves. As a military force, we live within the fantasy and perpetuate it continuously, potentially to our detriment when actual enemies demonstrate entirely different actions and adaptations than our opposing forces. Does this prepare us for success, or are we perhaps training to fail?

We are not successful against realistic rivals; rather we succeed in beating ourselves.

The Soviet model, still prevalent in many rival nations that developed under the influence of Moscow during the Cold War, remains dominant in today’s myriad hostile or potentially hostile forces across the world. Centralized and highly dependent upon key leader decisions, they do not use a military decision-making methodology like ours. The Chinese share similarities with Soviet approaches, yet they also consider many non-Western perspectives and fuse Eastern thought with a decidedly non-Western style of planning and execution that remains distrustful of an over-reliance on technology. Although some rivals do use elements of our military methodology because we likely trained them in the past, their unique cultures, values, and worldviews transform...
their actual decision making into something different from the original.22

Terrorist elements with ideological motives are further divorced from our Western planning and control methodologies, as their overarching worldviews offer an incompatible position that is often categorized by us as “illogical” or “crazy.” We base our sense of logical and illogical on the position that our Western world view is the logical or sane one against all others. The further away from our preferred perspective, the more apt we are to label something illogical because it makes no sense when filtered through our lens. However, there are other perspectives that build foundations in non-Western logics.23

What are some other world views that differ from the accepted Western one?24 Games theorist Anatol Rapoport uses the term “divine messianic eschatological” for explaining non-Western conflict philosophies that disregard Carl Von Clausewitz and his position that human societies function through an endless cycle of politics and violence.25 To paraphrase Rapoport, “eschatological” reflects a world view where a final, climactic battle occurs with a predetermined outcome versus Clausewitz’s theory where either opponent might win and there is no “final” battle. Those with a “judgment day” ideology feature a divine or “God-chosen” position, with “messianic” implying that the chosen army is already here, fighting evil in a very non-Clausewitzian world. Rapoport introduces several other non-Western conflict theories, which might explain radical eco-terrorists, international and global conglomerates, totalitarian regimes, and international criminal enterprises differently than Clausewitz. All of these rivals feature prominently in the U.S. Army’s new “decisive action” hybrid enemy threat.26 Yet our decisive action concept shackles all of these actors under the preferred Western theory on conflict and motive.27

While one might argue that the wide spectrum of rivals, whether conventional state armies, criminal
cartels, or nonstate terrorist actors, remains decisively non-Western in how they conceptualize, plan, and execute operations, a larger question remains. Should our opposing forces in training abandon our planning methodologies and utilize select aspects of rival ones to achieve greater training realism? Could our opposing forces become better replicas if they adapt different philosophical structures, non-Western concepts, and other-nation military methodologies for executing all training exercises? Can literate operators develop illiterate planning processes to avoid simulacra and produce results that align with illiterate rivals in a conflict? If not, what is preventing this?

I do not suggest our opposing forces become criminals or convert to a radical ideology; however, they could implement many different processes that demonstrate at a philosophical level a new military training goal to abandon overt aspects of training simulacra in favor of improved simulation. Many actors in the entertainment industry spend months living with the person or environment to attain a better understanding for theatrical value, which illustrates a similar principle.

While opposing forces cannot join Al-Qaeda training camps, we can immerse them in the information, motives, and values that generate enemy thought processes and make precise adjustments to how our opposing forces train. We also can remove many of the non-Al-Qaeda processes out of their methodologies for the training event, which stimulates further critical thinking and reflection on our military institutions. For an Iranian modeled threat, we would tailor their methodologies and structure yet again. Each rival threat requirement necessitates a tailored, appropriate approach to avoid training simulacra. Army units need to train against threats that do not think the same. This stimulates our units to adapt, innovate, and reflect.

For example, U.S. Army soldiers role-playing narco-criminals should not view moving drug material the same as moving ammunition or supplies. Instead, we must motivate them in some way by profit and competition where the commanding headquarters rewards successful “criminals” in the training event. These personnel would approach training problems more like criminals and less like soldiers dressed as criminals. This takes time and requires delicate, thoughtful approaches to trigger decentralized, adaptive behavior where the criminals have the freedom to innovate and act in ways that soldiers tied to traditional military units would never consider. With training, the usually negative term “going native” inverts to a positive—we want our opposing forces to move away from how we perform and think instead of thinking like American soldiers in costume. This requires an iterative, innovative process to avoid the pitfalls of sliding back into training simulacra.

Other soldiers role-playing a conventional non-Western force could adapt Chinese- or Iranian-style decision-making, command structures, and planning approaches instead of doing precisely what friendly forces do. Their “going native” would differ from criminals or other rival actors, and the native aspects need to be genuine, not simulacra.

U.S. Army soldiers of the 525th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade and Ukrainian army soldiers fend off role-playing rioters during a Kosovo force mission rehearsal exercise at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany, 3 May 2013. (U.S. Army)
We do not want them building the “Las Vegas per-
version” of Venice, rather to build smaller aspects
of Venice within the training environment. This
requires critical and creative thinking to recognize
and then replace decidedly Western methodologies
with appropriate rival ones for training. It requires
an institutional change generated from the top of the
military hierarchy, systemically applied across our
entire training program. This also requires a highly
professional, experienced training force instead of
one featuring first-term recruits.

The following examples demonstrate several
options where the U.S. Army’s training philoso-
phy could adapt an anti-simulacra approach for
execution in national training centers, staff train-
ing events, simulations, home-station training, and
professional military education at all levels.

• Opposing forces avoid the military decision-
making process in favor of a methodology that the
simulated rival prefers. Instead of merely using
buzzwords in our own planning styles, they would
adapt the foreign approach.

• Terrorist simulation operates independent of
the conventional enemy force in all respects versus
the traditional military command structure control-
ing all simulated actors.

• Criminal actors treat illegal commodity as a
simulation—they are rewarded by successfully
producing and smuggling it in training scenarios.

• Missions, objectives, and decision making of
rivals with eschatological worldviews reflect this
rather than extending Western methodologies into
simulacra. The actors view the world differently
and frame their decisions to match this. This takes
mature, experienced professionals—not raw recruits.

• Scenarios with multiple rivals feature competi-
tion, cooperation, and distinct command and control
functions to emphasize reality versus simulacra.

• OPFOR personnel undergo extensive prepara-
tory training designed to deemphasize institutional
preferences of the Western military and introduce
rival concepts, language, methodologies, and sym-
bols that break with how we operate as a force.

• Shift large-scale training events away from a
highly centralized, top-down simulacrum toward a
decentralized, adaptive simulation with competitive,
nonaligned rival actors. To become more realistic,
we must abdicate more control. This violates our
military culture.

• All professional military education venues
frame the Western approach, and commit class
time and instruction on non-Western approaches in
a fair, balanced process. Challenge our cherished
views and values.

The sample options outlined above require a
significant, potentially disruptive shift away from
how the U.S. Army understands training at an
ontological and philosophical level and will likely
be met with significant resistance.30 Challenging
our institutionalisms, particularly deeply held ones,
requires a level of critical reflection and disruptive
creativity that our military often lashes out against
to silence.31 A significant factor in this resistance
to substantial adaptation lies in our paradoxical
stance on how to be adaptive while also obeying
our doctrine.32 As our doctrine is a driving force
behind all training including virtual systems, how
we approach virtual training scenarios requires a
discussion on simulacra.

Reliance on Virtual Systems:
Generating Further Simulacra
Two-Fold

From the highest strategic guidance and down,
our military places a strong emphasis on virtual
systems for training.33 Virtual systems provide
the opportunity for a highly sophisticated training
environment while downsizing costs, resource
requirements, and time. However, both the current
Army training strategy and our tendency to create
simulacra actually compounds when relying on
virtual systems in training. Our simulacra creates
another layer of simulacra; or—the fake Venice
casino located in Las Vegas builds a virtual casino
that maintains all of the same simulacra within the
virtual system while adding yet another layer of
virtual simulacra. The major tension present here
is a matter of explanation and training context.
Consider the following virtual and “live” training
event in the physical world.

A criminal smuggling network, if placed into
a virtual training environment, has the capacity
to act digitally according to preconfigured rules
where the physical actions such as movement,
weapons effects, personnel, and equipment are
observable to the Army unit. Digitally, a criminal
icon may attack a checkpoint and cause virtual
damage, with information pushed to the unit for
their analysis and reaction. All of this information, whether virtual or provided by a trainer, carries the explanation of simulacra because military professionals or closely related contractors create and manage all of the virtual systems and scenarios. We encounter the same problem as the opposing forces problem in that identical planning methodologies, concepts, language, and values drive the virtual enemies. Within both, their explanation reflects our own institutionalisms. Thus, virtual criminals do what opposing forces criminals do in “live” training because we explain them as such. In other words, building a virtual casino that imitates Venice will still maintain the same simulacra that the actual Venice casino in Las Vegas has. Neither reflects the real thing, and both are copies with no original. However, virtual training simulacrum encounters yet another problem with context.

Contextually, virtual systems can only create a narrow spectrum of simulation that orient largely on physical and quantifiable aspects. A virtual enemy tank can move at the appropriate speed over accurate virtual terrain and fire weapons at a rate, range, and damage that quantifiably simulate a real enemy tank. Beyond the superficial layer that modern entertainment video games also achieve, our military trainers and contractors inject all other motives, information, and relationships. Thus, the simulated criminal elements in the virtual game are entirely symbolic and divorced from any real criminal action or process. While a virtual enemy tank is relatively simplistic, a virtual suicide bomber or explosives smuggling network is not. Quantification works with bullets far better than human behavior, particularly when different societies interact.

Most analysis or conclusions that the Army unit derives from the virtual system are entirely out of context, other than the quantifiable aspects of casualties and damaged equipment. The virtual suicide bomber attacks because we say he does. Unfortunately, our military has a strong preference for seeking understanding of complexity through metrics, categorization, and reductionism where descriptive statistics trump explanation. This is why virtual systems are appealing to the military and how the two-fold training simulacra occurs without us realizing it.

All of the recommendations postulated earlier for the opposing forces also applies to virtual systems, in that the military professionals and contractors who build the virtual scenarios could adapt many of the non-Western concepts and thus depict simulated context in the virtual system. Their awareness of their own institutional preferences and the empowerment to shift to alternate methodologies, concepts, and approaches will require critical followed by creative thinking. A criminal element, while digitally presented, would operate based upon motives and decisions that are foreign to how our Army prefers to think and act. This would require extensive preparation so that as the virtual criminals move and act, the contextual information would feed into the Army unit appropriately. While the metrics within the virtual system would remain the same, it would also be largely irrelevant to the Army unit seeking deeper understanding of a complex environment. Ultimately, it is simple to track suicide bomber statistics, but difficult to explain emergent trends and phenomenon on why the environment is transforming as observed.

Ultimately, it is simple to track suicide bomber statistics, but difficult to explain emergent trends and phenomenon on why the environment is transforming as observed.

Since we exploit virtual systems for their ability to generate descriptive metrics and quantification that nourishes our institutionalisms at the expense of enabling our deep understanding, we need not change the hardware of our virtual training centers. To transform our Army training strategy, we again need to change our training philosophy and critically think about the simulacra we produce. At best, virtual systems remain a cost- and time-effective
approach with several potentially dangerous limitations. If we maintain a mirrored approach where those who input the virtual scenario use the exact methodologies, doctrine, and concepts as our Army, we will continue to fight copies of ourselves both in virtual and actual simulacra.

Conclusions: Systemic Change Versus Systematic Adjustments

We do not need to start over. All of our existing training centers, resources, and many of our training products are flexible and require systemic adjustment. By “systemic,” I mean that the overarching Army training philosophy must transform to reject training simulacra and embrace simulation where plausible. By changing the overarching philosophy, this generates systemic transformation across the entire training environment. This is the opposite of a systematic approach, in which individual branches or sections make localized changes while the overarching logic that governs system behavior remains unchanged.

Currently, our military professional education and training institution relies on systematic change, which cannot cure us of our simulacra. Thus, individual adjustments in doctrine, modifications in one school, or adjustments by one training center will not affect the overarching simulacra of our current training approach. We will continue to fight copies of ourselves conducting actions that are divorced from actual rival motives, behaviors, and methodologies. Systemic transformation requires the dismantlement of many deeply cherished structures, tenets, and concepts that maintain an illusion of identity and relevance for the U.S. Army. Upsetting so many apple carts means that unless senior Army leadership implement systemic change starting with our training philosophy, the mob of angry apple vendors will overwhelm any localized or individual systematic attempts to reduce simulacra.

I expect some contention over this article’s thesis if one misconstrues the relationship between effects and motives. As stressed throughout this piece, our trainers, opposing forces, and support personnel perform an outstanding job, although at the expense of our flawed training philosophy. For instance, an enemy suicide bomber within any training center today demonstrates accepted symbolic signatures when they attack our Army units. They dress in appropriate costumes, use realistic props, and inflict replicated casualties upon the Army unit. This is not the point—the distinction between training simulacra and training simulation lies in the motives behind the opposing force suicide bomber, why he produced the effect in training, and how the Army unit might influence transforming the environment.

I directed countless opposing force suicide attacks in training environments where my soldiers successfully created the physical effect of a suicide bomber attack. However, if the Army unit attempted to investigate the attack or perform predictive analysis to attempt to mitigate future attacks, they encountered simulacra. Bombers conducted attacks based on opposing force plans tied to rigid training objectives, and reflect none of the true motives behind actual suicide bombers or the complex nuances within the conflict environment.

Even if an Army unit gains understanding of the phenomenon driving suicidal attacks, they cannot ever actually influence the training environment without the training center web of command and control artificially directing the opposing forces to stop or reduce attacks.

Until the scenario is over, the opposing force will insert suicide bombers at a rate directed by the training center headquarters instead of reflecting the linkages within a conflict environment that motivates such behavior. These training actors become puppets tied to strings and are simulacra of actual adaptive, innovative rival actors in conflict.

Opposing force soldiers do not halt their actions due to successful actions of the Army unit, nor does the centralized control of how we train allow any system adaptation. In other words, the Army unit cannot sway my opposing force soldier to join the legitimate government because that soldier follows my orders to fight as a “bad guy.” If he surrenders, he does so only on the orders of a superior in the opposing forces. He acts regardless of whether the Army unit successfully creates the conditions for enemy to surrender or not, although training observers may artificially drive this process by coordinating with the enemy unit.

All actions remain centralized within the Western decision-making models and hierarchical control where both the suicide bomber and the individual Army unit soldier are identical and follow orders within mirror organizations. Their only difference is
the costume, objectives, and equipment. In reality, the soldier and the suicide bomber are worlds apart; they think and behave based on entirely different processes and adapt in different ways. If we train our forces with the simulacra where opposing forces have identical motives to their own, how can we expect them to deploy to conflict environments and appreciate true rival adaptation?45

For decades, our training strategy created copies without originals for training our military. We inevitably fight ourselves without realizing it, interpreting all aspects of training through our preferred frame.46 Our frame uses the philosophies, methodologies, doctrine, and values that most of our rivals do not use. We subsequently deploy trained units into dynamic conflict environments with the expectation that their training prepares them for complex, adaptive rivals.

Yet when our organizations fail to accomplish objectives or the environment changes faster and in unexpected, novel directions, our own institutionalisms and adherence to our Western military paradigm sends those same military professionals back into training where once again, simulacra reigns. To shatter this paradigm, we require senior leadership discourse, critical reflection by military professionals, and subsequent creative transformation to a different training philosophy that avoids the perils of simulacra. MR

NOTES

1. Larry and Andy Wachowski, The Matrix (the Internet Movie Script Database. <http://www.imdb.com/script/script.php?script_id=1352524> (29 December 2012). This scene features Cypher and Agent Smith eating a meal inside the virtual world called “the Matrix” while discussing Cypher’s betrayal of his crew. The computer program represented by Agent Smith will return Cypher’s physical body to where he is permanently plugged into the virtual world and erase his memories of the harsher outside reality.


3. Meta-theoretical stances so as to identify, articulate, and challenge central assumptions underlying existing literature in a way that opens up new areas of inquiry.

4. By ontology, I seek in this article to apply a meta-question of how we understand the nature of “training”—and how all of our training endeavors might be understood within what we validate as training, and what we might intend to do as training but misapply in practice. For more on meta-questions, see Gerald M. Weinberg, Rethinking Systems Analysis and Design (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982), 65. “A meta-question is a question that directly or indirectly produces a question for an answer.” Weinberg’s meta-question continues with “why” instead of “what” processes of query.

5. Oni Braffman and Rod Beckstrom, The Starfish and the Spider (The Penguin Group, New York, 2006), 84-89. Braffman and Beckstrom discuss the differences between centralized and decentralized organizations. The U.S. Army clearly operates as a centralized or “spider” organization. Braffman and Beckstrom provide an example with General Mals in 1943. “Gen’s response was: Why should we change? We have something that works. Look, we’re at the top of our industry—how dare you come in and make suggestions.”

6. Design introduces a challenging series of concepts to incorporate into military fields; this article cites a variety of post-modern philosophy and other sources that serve as a good starting point for those interested in how design differs from traditional military planning and decision-making doctrine.

7. This article uses “design theory” to avoid institutional pitfalls of service-unique terms such as Army Design Methodology. See, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Field Manual (FM) 5-0, The Operations Process (Washington, DC: GPO, 2010), chap. 3, “Design.” For examples of U.S. Army design doctrinal approaches, see also, TRADOC FM-Interim 5-2: Design (Draft) (draft under development-Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2009).


9. In the Matrix, the protagonist Neo is offered a symbolic choice between two pills on a table to remain trapped inside the Matrix or to leave and discover the real world. See also Michel Foucault, Discourse and Truth: The Problematization of Pantheia (originally covered in six lectures given by Michel Foucault at the University of Berkeley, October-November 1983, online at <http://foucault.info/documents/partheia/> (20 November 2012).

10. Baudrillard, 152-53. “We will live in this world, which for us has all the disquieting strangeness of the desert and of the simulacrum . . . only the veriginous seduction of a dying system remains . . .” ibid., 3.

23. I postulate that the West embraces a world view that uses Clausewitz, Jo- 
miniani and other theorists who do not espouse an end of the world or other ideological 
conflicts. Time is uneven, in that human society continues forward in cycles of 
politics and violence, where several general principles appear to resonate across 
all applications of violence regardless of technology, location, or time. See: John 
L. Romine, American Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold War (Fort Monroe: Military 
History Office, TRADOC. 1997) p. 11.

24. John Shy, Jomini, Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy; From Ma-
chiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988) 184-
85.

25. "By isolating strategy from its political and social context, Jomini helped to foster 
a mode of thinking about war that continues to haunt us... central to Jomini’s 
argument that there are immutable "principles" of war... is his emphasis on "lines 
of operations." See also Francis Julien, trans. Janet Lloy, A Treatise on Efficacy 
Between Western and Chinese Thinking (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 
1996) 11. "Clausewitz set about thinking through warfare... according to a "model" 
form, as an ideal and pure essence, "absolute warfare"... "limitless use of force." 
"beca. 25, Anatol Rapoport ed., Editor’s Introduction to On War, Carl Von Clausewitz, 
decidedly non-Western approach by framing Clausewitzian logic as a political 
threat, whereas the UN's position on general human conflict is associated with 
the "global cataclysmic." 

26. Ibid. I interpret Rapoport's eschatological approach breaks into human 
(messianic), natural, and/or divine, which can adapt to explain radical ideological 
groups, environmental terrorists, or "end of the world" global or anti-human extrem-
ists. He introduces "cataclysmic" for another variation of the "end of the world" 
through conflict, breaking those into ethno-centric and global cataclysmic. Rapoport 
offers the Soviet world view as ethno-centric, which today translates to the Chinese 
threat, whereas the UN's position on general human conflict is associated with the 
"global cataclysmic."

27. "The总会 Review Action Training Environment Version 2.0 (TRADOC G2, 
Contemporary Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate, Fort 
Leavenworth, KS, December 2011).

28. Berger and Luckmann, 120-30. Berger and Luckmann offer the process of 
how rival definitions or reality might translate, modify, or battle with the dominant 
national social construction. Some are integrated; others form deviant subuniverses 
with counter-definitions, counter-language, and counter-societies.

29. A centralization of how during a paradigm shift we can come to a new 
understanding of things in another compartment. "This inability to question prevents genuine innovation."

30. Alvesson and Sandberg, 25. Alvesson and Sandberg identify "field as-
sumptions" and "root metaphors" as unquestionable theoretical concepts within 
an organization's preferred manner of viewing the world that are "difficult to identify 
and impossible to question" and thus "are not seen as an object of research." This inability to question prevents genuine innovation.

31. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd ed. (Illinois: 
University of Chicago Press, 1996). Kuhn offers the concept of how during a paradigm shift within a field, those who cling to the old system will either strike out against the new transformation or attempt to continue in old methods. See also Foucault.

32. Berger and Luckmann, 123. Although they use religious organizations as an example of doctrine-centric institutions, the military shares similar issues of being conservative "once they have succeeded in establishing their monopoly... ruling groups with a stake in the maintenance of the political status quo are... suspicious of all innovations."

33. U.S. Army, The Army Training Strategy; Training in a Time of Transition: 
Uncertainty, Complexity, and Austerity (Washington, DC, 3 October 2012).

34. Many of the available contracted and civilian employment opportunities to 
support Army training require security clearances, prior military experience, and 
military-specific education that limit many of the employment opportunities for 
former military personnel.

35. James J. Schneider, Theoretical Implications of Operational Art; On Op-
erational Art (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1994) 25-29. "The future of operational art depends on today's officer corps understanding the historical and theoretical basis of the concept. Only by knowing what has gone before can we hope to build a doctrine for the future, which takes full advantage of the fruits of technology." See also Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing: People's Liberation Army Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 
1999) 10. "We still cannot indulge in romantic fantasies about technology, believing that from this point on war will become a confrontation like an electronic game, and even simulated warfare in a computer room similarly must be premised upon a country's actual overall capabilities..."

36. Shimon Naveh, Jim Schneider, and Timothy Challans, The Structure 
of Operational Revolution: A Protogena (Leavenworth, KS: Booz, Allen, 
Hamilton, 2008). 30. Naveh distinguishes between physical paradigms and 
social organization and stresses that here the extreme differentiation. The virtual system relies on the physical paradigm built upon mathematics, the scientific method, and regimented procedures. See also Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan (New York: Random House, 2007). 16. "Categorizing always produces reduction in true complexity." See also Frifol Capra, The Web of Life (New York: Double-
day, 1996). 29. "In the analytic, or reductionist approach, the parts themselves 
cannot be analyzed any further, except by reducing them to still smaller parts." 

37. Gerald M. Weinberg, Re-Imagining: A Systems Analysis and Design (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1982), 121. "Reduction is but one approach to 
understanding, one among many. As soon as we stop trying to examine one tiny 
part of a system, we end up with the whole thing."

38. Alvesson, Sandberg, 256. "Problematization cannot be reduced to a 
mechanical or even strictly analytical procedure, since it always involves some 
kind of creative act." To problematize requires significant critical thinking—one 
that challenges core institutionalisms.

39. Naveh, Schneider, and Challans, 88. Naveh postulates that military of-
ficials "can produce the operational utility of potential opportunities into a new theoretical discussion." By "potential opposition," he refers to enemy course of action in planning and decision making.

40. John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Les-
sons From Malaya and Vietnam (Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 
2002). 9. "Military organizations often demonstrate remarkable resistance to 
decision change... to give any results from operational learning, when it does occur, tends to happen only in the wake of a particularly unpleasant or unproductive event." See also Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).

41. Berger and Luckmann, 118. "This means that institutions may persist 
even when, to an outsider observer, they have lost their original functionality or 
practicality. One does certain things not because they work, but because they 
are right." The experts in power define what is right instead of reality.

42. Virtual systems used in training scenarios use "insects" that help drive 
the digital process and augment some of the limitations of the digital system. 
These insects are scripted by scenario writers and methodically implemented to 
move the training event forward and accomplish predetermined objectives.

43. Berger and Luckmann, 147. "Every viable society must develop procedures of 
reality—maintenance to safeguard a measure of symmetry between objective and 
subjective reality."
A Tale of Two Districts
Beating the Taliban at Their Own Game
Lt. Cmdr. Daniel R. Green, Ph.D., U.S. Navy

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not represent the U.S. Department of Defense.

IN A STRATEGIC district in a nonstrategic province, the fate of the war in Afghanistan is being decided. Far from where congressional delegations or generals visit, a small revolution in how the United States fights the Taliban in Afghanistan is taking place, a change that suggests the war can be won if the right resourcing and approach is adopted. This new method of war is changing the terms of the conflict with the Taliban all across Afghanistan in favor of the population and the government of Afghanistan and may be a sustainable strategy for the future. In the southern Afghanistan province of Uruzgan, the district of Shahid-e-Hasas was all but lost in 2006, when the Taliban resurgence across Afghanistan began, but thanks to the development of a new and innovative program, which fights the Taliban on its own terms, the district is recovering. The program aims to defeat the Taliban (as much a fighting force as a political movement) by organizing itself along similar lines—village-based, long-term, decentralized—blending civil-military approaches seamlessly, while enlisting the population in its own defense. Called Afghan Local Police (ALP), the program is an attempt to provide a bottom-up approach to stability in Afghanistan by hiring local villagers—vetted by tribal elders, district police officials, and the Ministry of Interior—and organizing them into defensively oriented forces to protect their own homes and tribal areas from Taliban intimidation. The ALP program is an outgrowth of Village Stability Operations, which is a holistic initiative to understand the sources of grievance villages have that separate them from the government of Afghanistan and prompt them to enlist with, or at least tolerate, the Taliban. Due to the successes of ALP in districts like Shahid-e-Hasas, the Taliban are struggling to field a force capable of defeating the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). This struggle suggests that an enduring presence in the country that is village based, light, lean, and long term is a successful and possibly enduring strategy to defeating the Islamist movement.

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Overview of the District

The district of Shahid-e-Hasas is located along the Helmand River in northwestern Uruzgan Province in southern Afghanistan. It has approximately 20,000 to 25,000 residents. The district is divided by two large rivers that flow northeast to southwest and meet in the center as they flow south together, dividing it into three large sections. These areas are very mountainous as the whole region is on the edge of the Hindu Kush range, and the people there eke out a subsistence living where their farms hug the banks of the rivers. Unlike other districts of Uruzgan Province, it is the only one that is predominantly Ghilzai in tribal orientation, with its Noorzai subtribe the strongest in the area. The provincial government has historically neglected the district, which is dominated by the Durrani tribal confederation and its Populzai sub-tribe. The district has traditionally been politically and economically isolated, due to a lack of both tribal connections in the provincial capital and bridges and passable roads. While local farmers benefit from access to water from the rivers, their main source of revenue is poppy production, which is the central ingredient of heroin.


U.S. military forces did not create an enduring presence in the district of Shahid-e-Hasas until 8 September 2004, when they established Forward Operating Base (FOB) Kaufman. While U.S. forces had conducted occasional raids in the area before the base’s construction, U.S. military personnel were largely concentrated in either the provincial capital of Tarin Kowt, which is southeast of the district, or at FOB Tyler in the district to the south of it called Deh Rawud. Villagers in the area rarely saw U.S. troops from 2001 to 2004, and local security, for what it was, was administered by local militia forces, which had become official police forces. The Afghan National Police (ANP) in the area were either imported from outside the district or came from one local faction that was loyal to the provincial government, dominated at that time by a local warlord and Populzai strongman named Jan Mohammed Khan. Governor Jan Mohammed Khan’s strategy for securing Uruzgan during his tenure as governor (2002-2006) was to place trusted friends and tribal and familial members at the head of ANP forces in each of the province’s five districts. He had an additional force of Afghan highway police, which had also formerly been his militia, to conduct raids against Taliban forces alongside U.S. troops and as a means of maintaining his position in the province. The predatory behavior of many of these forces on the local population generated a significant amount of resentment against the government and alienated the population. Conventional and U.S. Special Forces units operated out of FOB Kaufman, conducting raids, presence patrols, and clearing operations in the district to keep the Taliban at bay and partnering with the local ANP to build their capacity. Since nearby Helmand Province was not well secured until 2011, insurgent forces were always able to replenish their numbers in the district even though U.S. forces were successful in their operations. Despite these successes, absent a strategy that enlisted the community in its own defense that also pacified the surrounding provinces, Coalition and Afghan efforts were not enduring.

When conventional forces pulled out of Uruzgan Province in 2005, leaving the whole area, including Shahid-e-Hasas, under Special Forces control, the Taliban movement prepared to reassert itself in the area. With the arrival of NATO forces to southern Afghanistan in 2005 and 2006, the Taliban prepared an offensive across the region that sought not just to diminish the will of U.S. and NATO forces to succeed but to actually seize territory and fight in conventional battles. The Taliban took advantage of NATO’s inexperience with counterinsurgency, soft
political support for the Afghan mission at home, and risk-averse behavior to make the war in Afghanistan decidedly more kinetic. The district center of Chora, just east of Shahid-e-Hasas, fell to the Taliban in 2006, was retaken, and almost fell again in 2007. While the numbers of Taliban increased throughout the province, their tactics, techniques, and procedures also went through a small revolution. Taliban forces became more disciplined, and the Taliban increased their partnership with foreign fighters, who brought special skills such as sniping, bomb making, and leadership to the conflict as well as extra funding. The first suicide vest and car bomb attack took place in the provincial capital of Tarin Kowt in 2006. The people of Shahid-e-Hasas felt these changes. Since FOB Kaufman was manned with a small Special Forces team and Afghan National Army soldiers, it had enough men to have a presence in the district but not enough to pacify it. With no security in the surrounding provinces and no local force to collaborate with, the Special Forces team could not establish an enduring security presence that would last beyond their rotation or exist beyond sight of their base—the team had to focus on fighting and survival. Afghan National Police forces were largely from outside the district, and the local population considered them as being almost as foreign as U.S. troops. With no enduring local security or an ability to resist the Taliban, local villagers tolerated the presence of the Islamists or enlisted with them as a means of avoiding the predatory behavior of Durrani government officials. One Special Forces rotation in Shahid-e-Hasas in 2006, for example, had 22 casualties and 7 men killed in action. While they made great gains in degrading the insurgency, they were unable to defeat it. A new approach was needed, but its form and substance was still unknown.

Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police

The idea of creating local protective forces answerable to community councils and nested within a burgeoning official security structure had many antecedents within Afghanistan, but it was the Iraq War that proved its success. The Anbar Awakening in western Iraq came about for several reasons—some domestic, others international. Regardless, the result of creating enduring local security through tribal groups trained by coalition forces, but focused exclusively on defensive operations in their own villages, proved decisive in reducing instability and improving security in the area. The Awakening forces worked because they were vetted by community leaders (e.g., sheiks). They operated in their own villages (no concerns about leaving their families unprotected or working in an unfamiliar area), were considered legitimate and were paid well (they were viewed as more honorable and less abusive than the insurgency), and they were trained by U.S. forces (this improved their capability and their professionalism). This valuable experience with recruiting, vetting, training, deploying, and sustaining Iraqi tribal forces answerable to local communities and the Iraqi government informed the Afghan Local Police initiative. However, other attempts at creating such a force in Afghanistan in the past met with less than ideal results.

Initial efforts to collaborate with local forces against the Taliban began by working with warlords and their militias that were supportive of GIRoA. These forces were unaccountable to the people, abusive of the population, and not representative of community groups. Early efforts to build the ANP mirrored this initial strategy, but the forces were poorly trained, and with a restriction on the number of ANP allowed, there were never enough to secure local communities. The next step in the evolution of providing local security was the creation of Afghan National Auxiliary Police in 2006, but it too suffered from the lack of local character in its forces (it was a national program), an absence of community and
Ministry of Interior vetting, infiltration by insurgents, and its monopolization by local powerbrokers. The next version of local police, called Afghan Public Protection Program, began in Wardak Province in 2009, and although it added governance and community vetting to its program, the commander of the force at the time disregarded local sentiment and never emphasized governance. Neither of these programs utilized U.S. Special Operations Forces in the recruiting, vetting, or training of these forces or in the administration of the program, which limited its overall effectiveness. While success was elusive, many lessons were learned that proved vital to the later success of the Village Stability Operations program as well as Afghan Local Police. The next step in the evolution of the program was the creation of a Community Defense Initiative, later renamed the Local Defense Initiative. Approved in July 2009, the programs emphasized the defensively oriented nature of the local protective force, sought to reduce the influence of powerbrokers through community engagement, and nested its forces with GIRoA by making them answerable to the Afghan National Police. Renamed the Afghan Local Police program, Afghan President Hamid Karzai signed an official decree formally authorizing the program on 16 August 2010, allowing for an initial force of 20,000. This initial cap increased as the program’s successes against the Taliban demonstrated its utility.

The Village Stability Operations initiative began in 2009 and represented the accumulated wisdom, learned from both mistakes and successes, garnered from raising local security forces accountable to the people, answerable to the government, and effective at fighting the insurgency. Before recruiting a single member of the Afghan Local Police, a process of
community engagement takes place as well as an assessment of the area by U.S. Special Operations Forces in partnership with GIRoA and Afghan National Security Forces. The point of this endeavor is twofold: it determines the sources of community instability the insurgency feeds off to buttress its efforts, and it identifies areas to establish local stability. In this program, village elders nominate Afghan Local Police recruits, and the district chief of police vets them and forwards their names to the Ministry of Interior for a final check. A village elder vouches for each recruit’s character, and each recruit agrees to abstain from taking drugs and to participate in a training regimen administered by U.S. Special Operations Forces. The recruit is photographed, the particulars of his family are chronicled, and he is biometrically enrolled by having his iris scanned. He then begins several weeks of training involving weapons familiarization and safety, physical endurance, small unit tactics, ethics, checkpoint construction, and the duties that come from being a member of a local protective force. Once trained, the new local policeman reports to the Afghan Local Police commander for the district. He receives his assignment to a checkpoint in his community where he uses his government-issued and recorded weapon to prevent insurgent intimidation of the community. In addition to uniforms, the force members receive a limited number of trucks and motorcycles for mobility and to man checkpoints, and are sometimes issued PKM machine guns if they are in areas more likely to receive Taliban contact. Each checkpoint has a dedicated commander who reports to the Afghan Local Police commander, and they use coalition-provided radios to maintain contact. Each police officer receives his regular salary, a smaller portion of a regular Afghan National Police paycheck, and logistical and security support from the district chief of police to ensure a basic level of government control of these forces.

Shahid-e-Hasas: 2012

By the end of 2006, the insurgency surrounded FOB Kaufman. Insurgent fighters mined the main roads leading from the base to the surrounding district and were emboldened by greater numbers and greater discipline, as well by the skills foreign fighters brought to the battlefield. Local villagers fled the area, enlisted with the Taliban, or were coerced to work for the insurgency. Beginning in 2010, there was a concerted effort by U.S. and Afghan forces to push out beyond FOB Kaufman, to engage with local leaders, and to raise an Afghan Local Police force. It began by increasing the number of Special Forces teams in the area from one to four and establishing small
operating bases throughout the district’s valleys and mountain passes. These men operated as the forward edge of FOB Kaufman, engaging local communities and establishing an enduring presence in areas that had never known it. Having created constant contact with village elders, the recruiting process began for the Afghan Local Police, and regular shuras were convened with area villages to explain the initiative and to identify sources of tribal, economic, and village grievances that alienated the people from their government. As the work progressed, what began in fits and starts became a deluge as area villagers joined the Afghan Local Police program, accepting a regular paycheck, embracing the pride of wearing the uniform of a respected force, and using their local knowledge to protect their own community. As the police established checkpoints at bridge crossings, valley choke points, bazaar shop entrances, and in key villages, the Taliban were slowly squeezed out of the area. The district chief of police, a local from the area who had worked in Tarin Kowt as a police officer, led the Afghan National Police and was in charge of the local Afghan Local Police program. He visited local shuras to promote the program, and area elders respected him because he was one of their own. Unlike in the past, the police chief had resources, the Afghan Local Police went to him for pay, weapons, and other support, as well as the respect of the community that comes from having the resources to help the people in a direct and positive manner. As the program simultaneously grew in surrounding districts, roads that had been impassable due to the insurgency opened up, commerce grew, and the resurgent signs of a community wresting off insurgent oppression abounded. As much as the Afghan Local Police program removed the freedom of movement for insurgent fighters through constructing and operating a network of checkpoints, it also enlisted the population in its own defense, robbing the insurgency of a ready-made recruiting pool of poor and unemployed military-age males. Additionally, the creation of the Village Stability Operations framework and the development of a system of military political and cultural advisors from the village to the province to the capital complemented a village approach to security by knitting together a holistic and vertically integrated system of exercising political influence.

**Future Strategy**

Large Afghan army and police forces will play a crucial role in any long-term strategy to provide stability to Afghanistan. However, conventional Afghan forces are very expensive and, while they are capable, they cannot provide sustained rural security to Afghanistan’s countryside without an adequate local partner force. The creation of the Afghan Local Police program in the last few years provides a possible way forward for an Afghan war strategy that defeats the Taliban and is financially sustainable. The central purpose of the program is to provide a persistent presence of locally recruited, Special Operation Forces-trained, and community-vetted security forces that are defensively oriented. The Afghan Local Police report to the Afghan National Police in the district and have proved to be effective and cheaper than conventional Afghan forces. Sustaining a robust Afghan National Army in the tight budgetary conditions of the federal government in Washington, D.C. is fiscally difficult. An Afghan war strategy for the future should drastically expand the Afghan Local Police program as part of a light, lean, and long-term military presence in the central Asian country. Sustainability issues and force resiliency will persist as enduring factors, especially as the U.S. military drawdown continues and the Taliban attempt to reassert their control over Afghanistan. Additionally, as discussions continue between the U.S. government and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan over the nature of the U.S. troop presence and size, the Village Stability Operations approach is under increased pressure as members of the Karzai government seem inclined to remove Special Operations forces from Afghanistan’s villages as part of a comprehensive drawdown. The U.S. should continue to insist on working with the Afghan government to grow this locally based program to defeat the Taliban with a strategy based upon its structure—village-based, decentralized, long-term, blending civil-military strategies seamlessly that enlists the Afghans in their own defense. *MR*

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1. The name of the base was changed for operational security reasons.
2. The name of this forward operating base was also changed.
Rajiv Chandrasekaran’s *Little America: The War Within the War for Afghanistan*, is about NATO’s counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan since 2009. Published in 2012, it is one of the few works that links high-level policy to on-the-ground realities of a far away war. As the United States determines a role for its military after 2014, it is worth looking back. Many have focused on the book’s portrayal of personal infighting, bureaucratic sclerosis, and parochialism.¹ Perhaps more interesting is that he shows how Western ideas about state-society relations led NATO to conduct a campaign that has cost trillions of dollars, has had at best limited successes, and may have simply armed an array of factions for civil war when NATO leaves.²

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“We’re bringing the government of Afghanistan back here,” Lt. Col. Cal Worth explained to a resident of Marja in Afghanistan’s Helmand Province. He was explaining not just his immediate objective, but also the underlying logic of NATO’s counter-insurgency campaign. This logic is found in U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, which was written as the U.S. military fought insurgencies in Iraq. The logic holds that insurgencies require support from the population, and if the state reaches the people, popular support for the insurgency withers away. While insurgencies require support from populations because insurgents cannot draw on state resources, the idea that “more government” will attenuate this support is not necessarily true. This idea is based on a Western-centric definition of the state as a sovereign, autonomous entity that determines social relations throughout its territory.

Yet, this Western-ideal type of state has never existed in Afghanistan. Those who have tried to build such a state have incited violent resistance and either chose an alternative model of governance or were deposed. When the U.S. military and civilian agencies endorsed the Western-ideal type of state, they too encountered violence. This was not because the insurgency felt threatened by the state, but because Afghan society rejected the Western-ideal-type model of state-society relations. As a result, the U.S. national security apparatus—from the White House to civilian and military organizations in the field—could not develop an effective stabilization strategy. This is not to say that Afghanistan has never been stable; rather, that stability has been closely associated with a minimalist state that is distinct from the Western model.

Going forward, this means that NATO should be prepared to accept, if not encourage, the government of Afghanistan to seek a political solution that decentralizes political authority. This would center around reducing responsibilities of the central Afghan state and enforcing particular “redlines” for its subnational components, such as prohibiting threats to the state or launching attacks on other countries. Peripheral governing authorities would determine other issues for themselves. This could leave room for a Taliban-affiliated political party to assume some authority, the promise of which could be part of a negotiated settlement to the conflict.

This analysis is also relevant for Syria, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, and elsewhere. In these unstable places, the time and resources required to build a Western-type state are simply not available and the appropriateness of the Western model varies widely. The U.S. national security apparatus will need to deal directly with nonstate actors, tribal leaders, religious figures, warlords, militias, etc.—not only as conduits of information and temporary leaders, but as primary actors in a complex but stable political tapestry. This approach is not without risks, but after more than ten years, trillions of dollars, and thousands of lives, the United States cannot afford to approach the rest of the world like it has Afghanistan.

Understanding the Western-Ideal-type State

The Western-ideal-type state is a product of a specific political and intellectual history, and for many people around the world, its benevolence is not self-evident.

Starting with Hobbes’ conception of the state as a “leviathan” that provided individuals security from “a war of all against all” in exchange for submission, the Western intellectual tradition has conceived of the state as the single dominant social actor within its territory and the primary agent of social organization. More specifically, the state has been assumed to have a monopoly over violence in its territory, be autonomous from other social actors, have differentiated components to enable specialization in specific tasks, and coordinate among its components. Today, although Western states may seem drastically different to those who live within their territories, they all—North America to Scandinavia to continental Europe—conform to this model.

International norms and institutions have reinforced this ideal. The Treaty of Westphalia codified the supremacy of the state within its internationally recognized borders. Three hundred years later the founding charter of the United Nations, as an organization comprised of states, institutionalized state sovereignty and articulated a set of expectations for state-driven economic and social change. In this conception, outside the realm of the state lay disorder, barbarism, and danger: unacceptable conditions that required redress. Throughout the 1950s
and 1960s people believed, especially in the United States, that states, as uniquely powerful entities, would be able to bring development and modernity to backward populations through policy and planning processes. As such, the Western-ideal-type state not only had a particular set of characteristics, it also had a specific economic development agenda. Yet, states of this type are not universal, nor do they necessarily represent a stable, peaceful equilibrium. A critical examination of states shows that their functions, structures, and relationships with the societies vary greatly. J.P. Nettl describes the state as a “conceptual variable” by identifying four variables with which to compare states: sovereignty, or the ability of the state to impose its will; recognition in international affairs; autonomy, or the existence of a sphere of state affairs distinct from other social activity; and national sociopolitical consciousness, or popular ascent to the state as a legitimate social actor.6 Douglass North, John Wallis, and Barry Weingast compliment Nettl.7 They describe “limited access orders,” in which the state is an arena for elite competition over rents. Because elites depend on their social networks to compete with others, states in limited access orders are an extension of, not autonomous from, society. When political and economic power align, such states may nevertheless be stable and peaceful.8 Moreover, limited access orders historically far outnumber “open access orders,” which are roughly analogous to Western liberal democracies. In other words, the Western-ideal-type sovereign, autonomous, complex, and internationally recognized state is an exception.

Joel Migdal describes state capacity in terms of “capacities to penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources, and appropriate or use resources in determined ways.”9 The idealized state monopolizes these functions, rendering it the sole agent of social control. For Migdal, social control is a byproduct of coercion-induced compliance, voluntary participation, and legitimate or internalized belief in the “rightness” of state authority. Although the Western-ideal-type state...
monopolizes these functions, in many places other social organizations perform them as well. Migdal suggests a model of a “mélange of social organizations” as opposed to a “dichotomous structure” of a state ruling over the people in its territory. In the mélange model, the state is one of a variety of potentially autonomous groups, including families, religious structures, or tribes, that exercises social control. The exact characteristics of social control in turn depend on the group exerting it.10 In what we now call developing countries, this is common: a “strong society” performs many of the functions Westerners associate with the state, while a “weak state” is one of a number of agents of social control.

The point is not to identify a model that precisely reflects Afghanistan’s political and social landscape, but rather to show that “the state is,” in Nettl’s terms, “a conceptual variable.” As such, the form and function of a state is a question to be studied: it is not a given and deviations from the Western-ideal type may not be deficiencies.

**FM 3-24: State Building and Counterinsurgency**

The counterinsurgency field manual advances the Western-ideal type. The manual explains that insurgents do not need to control territory, as in a conventional war. Instead, insurgents need support from the population, which is easiest to obtain in the absence of state authority. The task for the counterinsurgent is to reduce support for the insurgency and increase support for itself. Counterinsurgents therefore face a state-building imperative in which success is reached when “the government secures its citizens continuously, sustains and builds legitimacy through effective governance, has effectively isolated the insurgency, and can manage and meet the expectations of the nation’s entire population.”11 This concept of the state is distinctly Western: sovereign, autonomous, and responsible for regulating social relationships and resources. Because the Western state is responsible for economic and social development, service delivery is also an essential characteristic of a successful end state and a technique to win popular support.12

In the clear phase, the counterinsurgent removes insurgents from an area. Then in the hold phase, the counterinsurgent establishes state presence and security. In the build phase, the counterinsurgent develops popular support through providing services. This process usually begins in population centers and is repeated in adjacent areas, and thus, like an “ink blot,” the state becomes dominant throughout its territory.

The “logical lines of operation” concept groups the types of operations that comprise this process. The concept model shows the state expanding its authority and subjecting the population to its rule, which includes service delivery and economic growth—explicit missions of the Western state. In turn, the population’s support for insurgents decreases, and its support for the state increases. Field Manual 3-24 concludes that, “in the end, victory comes in large measure by convincing the populace their life will be better under the host nation government than under an insurgent regime.”14

The “clear-hold-build” operational sequence and the logical lines of operation framework require the state to be the single dominant actor in the environment, and neither leaves room for nonstate social actors. These frameworks assume a binary conflict between the counterinsurgent state-builders and insurgents. They do not recognize local interests as sources of conflict, nor do they permit nonstate actors to manage social relations and resources, as, for example, Migdal’s mélange model does. Field Manual 3-24 only fleetingly mentions “community leaders.” While they may be good sources of intelligence, conduits for spreading information to the public, or even worth empowering temporarily, ultimately, “increasing the number of people who feel they have a stake in the success of the state and its government is a key to successful COIN operations.”15 Consistent with this approach, FM 3-24 defines legitimacy in terms of state approval: “Illegitimate actions are those involving the use of power without authority.” Examples include “unjustified use of force, unlawful detention . . . and punishment without trial.”16 While the initial theoretical definition is generic, FM 3-24’s examples suggest that the state, through law and formal legal systems, is an exclusive source of legitimacy, leaving no room for nonstate institutions.
Overall, FM 3-24 says the state is intrinsically good, and more is better; that which is outside the state and those disinclined to submit to the comprehensive rule of the state deviant. In the absence of any qualifying commentary, FM 3-24 adds up to a directive to pursue the Western-ideal-type state: maximal sovereignty and autonomy, and deeply penetrative, solely responsible for managing social relations and resources. Sociopolitical consciousness and international recognition are assumed.

State and Society in Afghanistan

According to FM 3-24, violence and instability in Afghanistan is a product of the Afghan state’s deviation from the Western-ideal type. Yet, despite significant periods of stability, Afghanistan has never had this type of state. Anthropologist Thomas Barfield compares the Western-ideal type to American cheese: consistent and dominant throughout all of Afghanistan’s territory, without gaps. Successful Afghan states, such as Musahiban dynasty’s from 1929 to 1978, Barfield observes, have been more akin to Swiss cheese, where gaps and inconsistencies are essential features of the product. Attempts to construct an American cheese-type state have not stabilized the country. Rather, they have met resistance and have more often than not failed.

This Swiss cheese model scores differently than Western states among Nettl’s conceptual variables. It resembles Migdal’s mélange, where his basic state capacities—social penetration and regulation, and resource extraction and appropriate—are much reduced or distributed across nonstate actors. The state, as Barfield explains, traditionally has been the domain of particular elite lineages and not accessible to the masses. Authorities and territory could be transferred through inheritance, gifts, and peace agreements. The periphery did not participate in the contest for control over the state. The local leaders could keep local power so long as they submitted to the center. Although limited participation in the state amounted to a certain amount of state autonomy, the state was not entirely sovereign over remote areas. It minimally penetrated society in these parts, and allowed others to regulate social relations and extract and appropriate resources. In Barfield’s words, these areas did not need to be “ruled directly or subjected to the same style of government” as more productive areas. The state could use economic, political, and coercive inducements to keep these areas inline without administering them directly. This is precisely the opposite of the counterinsurgency field manual’s recommendation to extend the government. Rather than bringing the state to the people, each left the other alone.

The relationship between stability and limitations on state authority is traced to Ahmed Shah Durrani, who in 1747 became the first person to rule the territory that is now Afghanistan. Although Durrani spent lavishly on his military, his state was not the single dominant actor throughout Afghanistan. For example, he was obliged to supply leaders of his own Durrani tribe with cash or land in exchange for about two-thirds of his troops. These irregular troops were loath to spend more than a year in service. In addition to tax exemptions, the state did not interfere with Durrani tribal social practices or other resources. In non-Durrani areas, the state extracted heavy taxes but no troops. As in Durrani areas, it left social regulation to others. In sum, the

Ahmed Shah Durrani, 18th century illustration.
provinces functioned as “virtual mini-kingdoms,” where, “provincial governors handled local administration and were practically independent . . . in most nonmilitary matters.” In Migdal’s terms, the state extracted and appropriated certain kinds of resources, but did not penetrate society very deeply and was not the only agent of social regulation.

If Durrani is remembered for establishing an independent Afghanistan, Amir Abdur Rahman, who came to power in 1880, is considered to have created the modern, centralized Afghan state. Yet even his success showed the limits of the Western-ideal type in Afghanistan. Abdur Rahman filled many subnational state positions with his own people. Rather than deriving their authority from tribal or religious standing and/or retaining their own revenue sources and armies as they had in the past, these officials owed their authority to the state. At the same time, Rahman implemented unprecedented direct taxation, most of which was on land holdings, and control over trade. This revenue funded his army and bureaucracy. These endeavors required persistent violence, forced relocation of whole communities, and intense internal surveillance. And yet, despite even these efforts Rahman did not convert the Afghan state from Swiss to American cheese. Rahman’s state did not assume complete, consistent control over resources and social relations. While he extracted more taxes, increased control over trade, and sharply reduced the autonomy of subnational leaders, the primary result was his own security, not a transformation of state-society relations. Rural society remained largely unchanged. Rahman resisted transportation and communications technology, while rural economies remained subsistence-based and qawms (local solidarity networks) remained the primary structure of social organization.

Amanullah Khan, Rahman’s grandson, took power in 1919 and attempted to create the Western-ideal-type state in Afghanistan. Whereas Rahman extended the state but left rural society more or less alone, Amanullah sought to supplant traditional agents of social control and resource management. Amanullah’s 1923 constitution, for example, included extensive new taxes, a unified legal system, an expanded education system (including for women), and a variety of provisions affecting Pashtun family customs. Tax collectors, already extensions of the central state rather than local intermediaries, became increasingly corrupt. Conscription, in contrast to the traditional ratio of one out of every eight eligible males chosen by communities, became mandatory and universal. The Khost Rebellion followed in 1924, ignited by a new poll tax and an increased tax on irrigated land that had been constant since the middle of the 19th century. The revolt ended when Amanullah backed down from some reforms. Amanullah’s trip to Western Europe from late 1927 to 1928 inspired additional modernization efforts. Amanullah demanded Western suits in government sections of Kabul, instituted gender coeducation in elementary schools, prohibited polygamy by government officials, and replaced local religiously trained local judges with secular, government trained judges. He also pushed to end seclusion of women, including the abolishment of the veil. Amanullah only implemented a few of these policies, but the state’s encroachment on local society threatened many. Uprisings quickly spread beyond the Pashtun areas of the Khost rebellion as clerics declared jihad. Just as Amanullah’s reforms were distinct in kind, not just degree, from those of his predecessors, so was the rebellion that would oust him from power. Rather than various groups of elites fighting each other to control the state, entire ethnic groups rallied against the state.

Nadir Shah took power in 1929, beginning what became known as the Musahiban dynasty, which lasted until 1978. For the Musahibans, internal stability was paramount. In the past, the Musahibans believed, unbridled state-centered modernization agendas catalyzed an antistate alliance of conservative rural populations and Islamic structures. These ill-considered efforts were, in Migdal’s terms, attempts to penetrate society, regulate social relationships, and extract and manage resources. The problem had been too much government, not too little. As such, the Musahiban sought to contain local political structures, not transform them. In rural areas, the local word for government referred to the building that contained official offices, since the government did not extend beyond it. Qawm structures still determined many aspects of daily life. Local notables, empowered by political connections, social status, or wealth, were the preferred source of dispute resolution, since the state system was corrupt and slow. Local officials, in turn, chose...
to accept this informal system for the sake of stability. The Musahibans exempted favored tribes from conscription and reduced rural taxes, turning to trade tariffs, aid, and loans to raise revenue. Education reform was a priority, but the magnitude of reforms was limited. Reforms often started in Kabul and other more liberal areas and were slowly extended. Most of these changes did not happen until the Musahibans had been in power for three decades. Rather than issue a decree outlawing the veil, for example, Prime Minister Daud had the wives of the royal family and senior government officials sit without veils at the National Day parade in 1959. Clerical resistance did not translate to popular rebellion since the government had restricted its reforms to the urban elites and had avoided interfering in rural Afghanistan.

This is not to say that rural society did not change during this period and that this change was not destabilizing. American and Soviet aid funded a variety of economic development initiatives—improving roads, improving agricultural, and introducing radios and other technologies. While not particularly burdensome—hence the lack of violence—these changes nevertheless chipped away at social structures. The inevitable enriching of particular social actors, for example, displaced other traditional authorities. The growth of Kabul University incubated both Islamic radicals and the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), Afghanistan’s communist party.

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When Daud moved against the PDPA in the spring of 1978, the PDPA struck back through allied military officers and ousted Daud. The PDPA’s Kalh iq faction moved quickly to implement economic and social reforms. Resistance emerged shortly thereafter. The most inflammatory reforms included land and debt reform and requirements to attend literacy classes, which compelled unmarried male and female participation. These reforms portended a disintegration of traditional qawm-based communal social support structures. As was the case for Amanullah, it was the Khalq policy interventions in rural Afghanistan, including mandating equality for women, a secular legal system, and interference with the customary legal system, that brought resistance.

Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan

In the spring of 2009, President Barack Obama appointed Gen. Stanley McChrystal to reinvigorate the American effort in Afghanistan. When McChrystal completed a strategic review that summer, he advocated for a robust counterinsurgency strategy and requested additional troops. This request set off a tense and prolonged debate through the fall of 2009. By the time it ended with Obama’s December commitment to “surge” over 30,000 American troops into Afghanistan, the administration had examined not just McChrystal’s resource request, but also U.S. interests, objectives, and rationales for the American commitment to Afghanistan.

Field Manual 3-24 framed the terms of the fall 2009 debate. The discussion, as Chandrasekaran explains, centered around two options: the military’s counterinsurgency strategy or a narrower strategy of counterterrorism plus support for the Afghan security forces. Because the military considered the Taliban to be an insurgency that needed to be defeated, the problem, as FM 3-24 indicated, was the absence of the state. If only the state could penetrate Afghan society to deliver services and provide for economic development, the insurgency would wither. By this logic, the government of Afghanistan could not survive if it did not resemble the Western-ideal type. In this view, the alternative counterterrorism approach did nothing to address the insurgency’s sources of strength. Yet, the opposite may have been true. Rather than sapping the insurgency of its strength, pursuit of the Western-ideal type may have actually provoked it. Even if the campaign plan prioritized particular areas, the
state’s functional role in each of them—its degree of penetration and the proposed extent of managing social relations—was more expansive than previous states. In addition, many priority areas of operation were far more remote than those previous Afghan states had controlled directly.

When marines cleared Nawa in the summer of 2009 in what McChrystal saw as a “proof of concept” for the counterinsurgency campaign, service delivery came in the form of schools, jobs programs, and other services. This service delivery was identified as a key factor to ensure that, even if Marines moved on to clear other areas, the Taliban would not be able to return. One of the most prominent manifestations of this “extend the government” ethos was the spring 2010 operation to take Marjah, “a farming community,” in Chandrasekaran’s words, in Helmand Province. After an initial “clearing” phase by U.S. marines, in which Lt. Col. Cal Worth was quoted at the beginning of this piece, a “government in a box” arrived, led by a new district governor. About a month after the operation began, Hamid Karzai personified undesired state reach by touring Marjah with abusive former Governor Sher Muhammad Akhundzada and former police chief Abdul Rahman Jan.

American civilians thought in terms similar to the military. Chandrasekaran writes, “What the Afghans really needed, in the view of almost every U.S. official involved in the war were more Afghan civil servants at the local level. They wanted . . . reopened schools, a functioning health clinic, a clerk to issue identification cards, and agricultural assistance.” In drafting a list of initiatives that it wanted to see from the central government, the U.S. State Department was explicit in the need to appoint officials to local-level appointments and to deliver services. Although few civil servants showed up, the United States worked assiduously to empower those who did. Haji Abdul Jabar, for example, was Kandahar Province’s Arghandab district governor and served as the main conduit for American development assistance to Arghandab.
Funds for development assistance increased dramatically. President Bush’s last annual reconstruction funding request was for $1.25 billion. In 2010, Obama requested $4.3 billion. Contracting firm International Relief & Development was charged with spending $300 million for USAID in a single year. This was enough, by some estimates, to triple or quadruple the economy of individual districts. Often this money went through district governors or governors in an attempt to build state legitimacy and authority. In Nawa, the influx of money transformed activities like ditch cleaning from unpaid obligations to lucrative jobs. Chandrasekaran reports that this financial incentive attracted teachers from schools. A construction industry emerged, and electronics from Pakistan were sold on the main road. Farmers sold excess fertilizer and equipment to buyers in Pakistan. Plastic sheeting did not support agriculture as intended, but was either thrown out or became windows.

Chandrasekaran reports that utility of the Kajaki Dam project was similarly unclear. American forces fought tenaciously to clear the areas north of Kandahar City not only to deny the Taliban a stronghold, but also to secure the half-built Kajaki Dam. The addition of another turbine, it was thought, would allow Kandahar City uninterrupted electricity. This service, in turn, would ensure loyalty to the state. After repeated attempts, including U.S. government contracts with American and Chinese firms, support from British troops, and a Commander’s Emergency Response Program-funded initiative, USAID began work on a $5 billion plan. In the end, though, the project may have exacerbated conflict rather than ameliorate it by indirectly providing resources, such as materials and construction contracts, to fight over. It furthermore revealed the government’s feebleness, as the Taliban siphoned electricity off of power lines and provided it to locals.

Attempts to operationalize the Western-ideal-type state often propped up official but predatory and/or weak actors while ignoring informal centers of power. Residents of Marja reacted unfavorably to Karzai’s tour with the disliked former governor and police chief. “We will tell you that the warlords who ruled us for the past eight years, those people whose hands are red with the people’s blood—those people who killed hundreds—they are still ruling over this nation,” thundered Haji Abdul Aziz, a prominent elder. “For so many years, there were only promises . . . The people have run out of patience.” When a car bomb killed Arghandab district governor Jabar in June 2010, it was not a Taliban assassination. Rather, it was in response to his pilfering of reconstruction and development funds. To those on the ground, it was not clear that U.S. support of Jabar degraded the insurgency; it is clear that it created new challenges.

Because doctrine and strategy did not provide a platform for dealing with politics, FM 3-24 advocates simply increasing the size and responsibilities of the state. It is not surprising that the United States had no coherent political strategy. For example, by the end of 2009, McChrystal stopped trying to oust Abdul Razziq, the commander of the border crossing for the main route for U.S. supplies from Pakistan. While Razziq was believed to be massively corrupt, the U.S.-led coalition decided that border security was paramount. Later in Marja, Haji Zahir was appointed district governor despite having spent
four years in a German prison for attempting to kill his stepson. When Ambassador Eikenberry visited Marja in the aftermath of the clearing operation, Eikenberry avoided Zahir, the man the operation had just installed as the area’s leader, and instead greeted a former police chief known locally as a corrupt pedophile. At the same time, the Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF) in Kabul investigated corruption allegations with vigor. The task force, established by Karzai after his 2009 reelection, was trained and mentored by DEA and FBI agents. As the military began working with unsavory actors as they confronted the consequences of trying to avoid them, the Major Crimes Task Force advisors pushed the unit forward, eventually arresting a top aide to Karzai. Karzai secured the release of his aide, who was held for less than a day.

Conclusion

The problem in Afghanistan, many Western military and civilian officials believe, is that the Afghan government is not strong enough. Usually what these people mean is that the Afghan state has not established a monopoly over violence throughout Afghanistan, has not sufficiently penetrated society, and has insufficient control over social relations and resources. This analysis comes principally from two places. First, Western intellectual history contends that sovereign, autonomous states that deeply penetrate society to control social relations and resources are normal and good—and that deviations should be redressed on both moral and security grounds. Second, military doctrine derived from this intellectual tradition proposes state building in the model of the Western-ideal type to reduce popular support for insurgencies.

Peaceful and stable Afghan states have not adopted the Western-ideal type. Ahmed Shah Durrani, Abdur Rahman, and the Musahiban Dynasty all fell woefully short of its standards. Even Rahman, who ruled Afghanistan more directly and grew the Afghan state to a greater degree than the others, did so at tremendous cost and with unprecedented amounts of violence. Amanullah and Communist attempts to emulate Western models backfired as neither was prepared for the difficulty of fundamentally transforming state-society relations. While this analysis does not offer a specific model to apply to Afghanistan, it does suggest that the Western-ideal type is not as natural as Western intellectual history and military doctrine imply. As such, answers to questions about both the scope of the state and military operations to sap support from an insurgency are not self-evidently the answers that worked in the West.

For Afghanistan, this means reimagining the role of the Afghan state. Rather than expecting and trying to help the Afghan state to deliver services and make its citizens happy, the international coalition should look to the Afghan state to manage foreign relations and enforce broad limits on its periphery, such as prohibiting threats to the state or launching attacks on other countries. This framework could facilitate a negotiated settlement with the Taliban since it allows for variation in subnational governance and would be a potential prize for a Taliban affiliated political party. Such an arrangement would likely require persistent efforts, supported by the United States and others, to enforce boundaries. This approach entails its share of uncertainty as the subnational political arrangements cannot be preordained and will consistently change. It also jettisons a great deal of the human rights objectives for which many have worked. Nevertheless, a state-centric, resource-intensive approach does not offer a path to an acceptable conclusion.

More broadly, the United States faces important questions of social order and state building in the Middle East and elsewhere, but is not prepared to conduct another costly, troop-intensive military campaign. MR


5. Ibid., 13.


8. North, Wallis, and Weingast call this “the double balance: a correspondence between the distribution and organization of violence potential and political power on the one hand, and the distribution and organization of economic power on the other hand.” If, for example, a group has a lot of political/military power but has very little economic power, it will fight to get economic power. If political/military and economic power resides predominantly in one group, fighting will be less likely to break out.


10. Ibid., 28.


12. Another line of reasoning, often summarized in the phrase “winning hearts and minds,” holds that people value economic development and social services and will support whichever party provides it.


14. Ibid., 1-25

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid., 1-14


18. Ibid., 72-73. Winning control over the state did “not so much wipe the board clean as redistribute the existing pieces.” Because these were elite conflicts rather than mass conflicts, people would not be as hesitant to switch sides. Barfield compares them to corporate mergers and acquisitions, where management would change.

19. The internal variability of the Afghan state stems in part from urban-rural disparities. From a Western background, it may be difficult to appreciate the magnitude of the distance between Afghanistan’s urban center and its rural periphery. For example, Barfield tells of a conversation with a merchant: “He explained that villagers had goats with so little local value that they were eager to barter them for imported goods. As an example, the trader showed me a box containing a half-dozen unbreakable tea glasses he had purchased for one hundred afghani in a city bazaar that he would barter for a goat valued in the village at five hundred afghani. . . . When his flock returned to the lowlands, each Tajik goat would then be worth fifteen hundred afghani in the local bazaar, meaning that his initial hundred afghani investment would yield a fourteen hundred afghani profit per animal.”

While Afghanistan’s urban center and its rural periphery are connected by a complex and porous boundary, differences in customs and knowledge as well as distance requires a specialized group of nonstate social actors to traverse the boundary.


21. Ibid., 103-105.

22. Ibid., 102.

23. Ibid., 166.

24. Ibid., 183

25. Ibid., 190.

26. Ibid., 191.

27. Ibid., 191-195. When Nadir Shah was assassinated in 1933, his son Zahir Shah became a figurehead king. Hashin Khan, Nadir’s younger brother, was the true leader until 1946, when he became ill and was succeeded by his brother Shah Mahmud. Daud Khan, Shah Mahmud’s nephew, took the reins of power as prime minister in 1953. Zahir Shah assumed power in 1963, but was ousted by Daud in a 1973 coup. The Musahiban dynasty ended in 1978 with Daud’s murder and Afghanistan’s communist party ascension to power.


29. Ibid., 220-221.

30. Ibid., 223.

31. Ibid., 204-205. While seeking foreign aid, first from Axis powers prior to World War II and later from the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War, taxes declined from being most of the state’s revenue in 1920s to 30 percent in the 1950s to less than 1 percent in the 1970s.


33. Ibid., 220.

34. Ibid., 231.

35. Chandrasekaran, 70-4.

36. Ibid., 144.

37. Ibid., 166.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid., 108.

40. Ibid., 191-97.

41. Ibid., 301-306.

42. Ibid., 143.

43. Ibid., 262.
Of Burning Platforms and Champions

Cmdr. William Hines, U.S. Navy Reserve

“The prevailing style of management must undergo transformation. A system cannot understand itself. The transformation requires a view from outside.”

—W. Edwards Deming

ON 1 FEBRUARY 2012, while speaking to reporters about Afghanistan, then Defense Secretary Leon Panetta stated, “Hopefully by the mid-to-latter part of 2013, we’ll be able to make a transition from a combat role to a train, advise, and assist role.” Secretary Panetta later retracted some of his comments about this accelerated timeline under political pressure. A Pentagon briefing two weeks later made clear that Operation Enduring Freedom was rapidly transitioning from combat operations to transferring responsibility of this current conflict to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Subsequent events at the NATO summit in Chicago in May 2012 confirmed this transition. This ongoing attempt at “Afghanization” relies heavily on American military advisors, with five brigades slated to provide hundreds of 18-man advisor teams. (Whether the U.S. military has the depth of talent to meet this requirement for warrior-diplomats is in serious doubt, but that topic is beyond the scope of this paper.)

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What is being attempted in the wilds of central Asia will (and has) inevitably led observers to draw parallels with the ultimately failed “Vietnamization” effort of the early 1970s. While this paper does not advance claims of the current conflict in Afghanistan being another Vietnam, much of the language is strikingly familiar. Similarities include talk of halting the spread of alien and hostile ideologies, the need to deny the enemy cross-border sanctuary, and laments about the corrupt, unreliable, lazy nature of local allies, their fecklessness made even more aggravating by the contrast with the bold, imaginative, energetic élan of an enemy with the same cultural and ethnic makeup.

As the aforementioned transition continues (and may possibly extend past the formal withdrawal of combat forces at the end of 2014), it increasingly falls into the lap of the military advisor to comprehend why “those” Afghans are the stuff of a Kipling poem, while “these” Afghans are taking naps in the afternoon between bouts of hashish smoking in the morning and selling their American-issued gear in the evening, punctuated by the occasional murderous outburst. From this understanding it is hoped that a sufficiently robust ANSF can be trained and fielded to achieve the long-term American political goal of a relatively stable Afghanistan that is able to rebuff the encroachments of the odious Taliban and its Al-Qaeda camp followers, while also accomplishing the near-term (and politically more important) objective of withdrawing U.S. forces.

A daunting task to be certain, but fortunately, the advisor does not stride forth into this land of confusion unprepared. The American military has gone to a great deal of effort and expense to train its advisors before sending them abroad (I attended the Combat Advisor course at Fort Polk, La. and can attest to the thoroughness and quality of the training.) These courses typically provided rudimentary instruction in language and culture, counterinsurgency doctrine, negotiation techniques, simulated key leader engagements with native Afghan role players, and combat skills.

However, fine training fails to address the salient question of why, after over two combined decades of advisory involvement in Vietnam and Afghanistan (not to mention dozens of less prominent experiences) with countless dollars spent on equipment and countless hours spent on training, the local armies were and are seemingly so incapable of answering the bell.

More simply put, it does not answer the oft-repeated lament of the Vietnam trooper: “Why are their ‘gooks’ so much better than our ‘gooks’?”

As expected from the American military, our training regimen presupposes that the answer lies wholly with us and our efforts. If only we spoke the language more fluently, knew the culture more thoroughly, negotiated with more finesse, drank the chai with more gusto, ate the local cuisine with fewer grimmaces, then maybe, just maybe, we would finally discover the much sought-after key and at long last be able to unlock the puzzle box of the native psyche.

…it has become commonplace for the seemingly disparate worlds of the warrior and the merchant to look to each other to draw lessons on management, leadership, organizational structure, logistics, and a host of other issues.

Unfortunately, as laudable as the attempts to better our cultural understanding are, our efforts alone cannot produce the desired results. We must acknowledge that most if not all of the systemic pathologies of the Afghan Clausewitzian triangle of people, government, and military (like the South Vietnamese before them and a lengthy list of candidates on the verge of anarchic collapse ahead of us) are beyond our capacity to affect. The Afghans must reform themselves. The best an advisor can possibly hope to do is to hew to the counsel of that famed and influential thinker in the field of business process improvement, Dr. W. Edwards Deming, and provide a view from the outside much as he did in his pioneering work in post-war Japan in the 1950s.

The military advisor’s burden often seems a forlorn cause, especially to those of us who have had
the dubious (and hazardous) pleasure of working directly with the Afghans. It is well to remember that around the world on a daily basis thousands of external civilian advisors, armed with the precepts of Deming and his numerous successors, grapple quite lucratively with the task of reforming dysfunctional organizations, staffed with recalcitrant individuals and guided by antiquated precepts. Of course, we are referring to business consultants. It may seem unusual or inappropriate to draw such a direct linkage between military advising and business consulting, but over the past many years, it has become commonplace for the seemingly disparate worlds of the warrior and the merchant to look to each other to draw lessons on management, leadership, organizational structure, logistics, and a host of other issues. Indeed, elite business schools extol the virtues of Sun Tzu, the military injects six-sigma process controls into its operations, and the professional reading lists for soldiers and sailors contain numerous titles from the world of commerce. Thus, it is time for the military to understand how bankrupt companies are made solvent, how ailing divisions are made well, and, regrettably, how some firms are recognized as beyond redemption and liquidated for their residual value.

It is in the realm of the business consultant that we will find two key concepts that must be present to successfully reform any organization. These concepts are the “burning platform” and the “champion of change.” The veritable cottage industry of essays issuing forth from Afghanistan, penned by conscientious, well-trained, observant officers speaking to the enduringly dreadful state of affairs in the ANSF, are a tacit recognition of the absence of these two concepts. Without these two pillars in conjunction, all efforts to build a robust ANSF are doomed to failure, with Afghans merely agreeing to perfunctory changes to secure momentary favor or avoid momentary discomfort. The answer to why the Afghans will not change is contained in their absence: they see no reason to alter their ways, and even if they did, there is no one to lead the reform.

The Burning Platform

“It is not necessary to change. Survival is not mandatory.”—W. Edwards Deming

The metaphor of the burning platform was first coined by Daryl Conner in his book, Managing at the Speed of Change. He recounted the experience of a survivor from the catastrophic fire on the
Piper Alpha oil rig in the North Sea, in July 1988 that killed 167 of the 228 crew members. To save himself from the flames, the worker leapt into the frigid, turbulent ocean below. As Conner described it, “He jumped because he had no choice—the price of staying on the platform, of maintaining the status quo, was too high.”4 As the metaphor goes, leaving the platform (i.e., changing one’s way of doing things) will be painful because one must take a dangerous plunge from a great height into icy waters with no guarantee of survival. The alternative? Certain incineration. In short, no one jumps off one’s platform (the status quo ante) unless the cost of remaining on it becomes prohibitively expensive or deadly.

Even so, despite the seemingly irresistible logic of the metaphor, many will still accept a fiery demise rather than risk a leap into the unknown, perhaps hopeful that the conflagration will somehow extinguish itself or a rescuer will materialize to save the day.

On the face of it, the very term “burning platform” implies issues that should be stark and self-evident. In business, the quarterly report offers a grim prognosis: earnings are down, revenue is flat, expenses are soaring out of control, rivals are devouring market share, shareholders are enraged, and creditors are pounding on the door demanding payment. In short, the firm is in a crisis, its woes on display for the entire world to see, especially if the company is prominent and publicly traded. In the military realm, where things cannot be so neatly (if not deceptively) summed up in a ledger, the wages of failure are even harsher. One’s forces are crushed on the field of battle, or one has reason to believe that would be the case if it ever came down to a test of arms. Lives are lost, treasure squandered, sacred territory plundered, and national pride humiliated.

Yet upon closer examination, one will quickly discover there is no consensus of what actually constitutes the burning platform. The finance office will opine that the marketing department is not doing its job properly. Marketing will in its turn insist that they cannot sell the company’s product because its designers are two steps behind the competition, and even if they were two steps ahead, the assembly line is spitting out unreliable junk the consumer does not trust. The conversation with the manufacturing department reveals that the finance department will not invest in new equipment to replace the current archaic system. In frustration, the consultant turns to make the walk back to finance to begin the cycle of conversation anew.

This grossly oversimplified example merely demonstrates how difficult it can be to identify the root cause or causes of any organization’s difficulties. Militaries are no different, for all of the same organizational challenges are present as in a business, yet the challenges are compounded by the fact that one never really knows how proficient one’s fighting force is until it actually fights, and unlike a typical business that goes about its concerns on a daily basis, wars are rather infrequent. In the aftermath of defeat, fingers point in all directions. Indifferent generalship, poorly trained troops, obsolete equipment, outdated doctrines, hostile media, and spineless political direction—a burning platform exists, but very often, when the entire world is ablaze, it is difficult to tell where the flames are coming from.

Currently all anecdotal and empirical evidence ranging from articles of personal experiences to the formal Commander’s Unit Assessment Tool suggests that we are failing in our goal of transferring security responsibility to a capable ANSF. The Afghans go about their daily business with no sense of urgency, no sense that a burning platform exists in the form of a zealous Taliban foe coupled with the inevitable reduction and withdrawal of American and NATO support. Indeed, our own American “can-do” hyperactivity may aid and abet an Afghan delusion that change is not required. Additionally, in our minds, the burning platform is self-evident: the Taliban. However, in a country permeated with ethnic, linguistic, and tribal divisions, all evidence suggests that the Taliban is just one of many potential adversaries (or allies, for that matter) for the numerous proto-warlords that currently lead the battalions, brigades, and divisions of the ANSF to consider.

The Champion of Change

“The worker is not the problem. The problem is at the top! Management!”—W. Edwards Deming

As history has demonstrated all too vividly and repeatedly, and current events in Afghanistan are proving anew, the presence of a burning platform alone is insufficient to push an organization toward
change. Out of selfishness or simple wrongheadedness, individuals and groups often ignore all signs that change is upon them and that they are in peril of being left behind as the world changes about them. Typically, members need an influential individual to push them off the burning platform into the uninviting waters below. “The consultant must have a strong internal leader/change champion to support her efforts. This would be the individual, clearly accepted and respected by the organization’s members, who would speak up (and speak first) to highlight the change’s positive elements.”

Without doubt, the consulting business is prone to a frothy jargon that makes the critic rightly wonder if the practitioner has an original thought in his head or if he is merely spouting the latest canned buzzwords. A phrase like “champion of change” may especially cause the reader in uniform to ask, “What is this nonsense? The military is already full of leaders.” Unfortunately, being a leader and being a champion of change are two separate entities, especially when one considers there is generally a link between military promotion and upholding the status quo, not for agitating for reform.

As an example, in 1906, the Austrian Army conducted a series of maneuvers before the watchful and anxious eyes of the Hapsburg emperor, the octogenarian Francis Joseph I. By this point in time, the polyglot Austro-Hungarian Empire, not unlike Afghanistan, was already under great pressure internally from its numerous ethnic divisions and externally from rapacious neighbors like Italy and Russia. Worse yet, there was little regard for the Austrian army throughout Europe. This combination of internal feebleness and external aggression should have provided a sufficiently incandescent burning platform to have driven the Austrians to be on the lookout for any advantage, receptive to any innovation, “[but] when the vehicle [an armored car] scared the horses of the imperial suite, Francis Joseph, visibly annoyed, declared that ‘such a thing would never be of military value.’”

Naturally, Francis Joseph was neither the first, nor the last not to recognize the implications of onrushing technological innovation. It seems that, often, only disaster can spur much-needed reforms in both business and war, though even then it is not a certainty.

As an aside, the need for a champion of change is not to suggest that this champion will be correct or his quest for change laudable. History is rife with misguided initiatives for change (societal, business, or military) that led to disaster (Mao’s Great Leap Forward perhaps being the bloodiest example). Thus, it is not the purpose of this paper to examine whether any particular desired end-state for the ANSF, be it an emphasis on light infantry units, heavy mechanized formations, or teams of time-traveling cybernetic organisms, is appropriate or not. Such a debate, especially within the Afghan apparatus, would be highly laudable. However, there is no evidence that any such conversation is taking place.

**Whither the Platform? Whither the Champion?**

“I think that people here expect miracles. American management thinks they can just copy from Japan—but they don’t know what to copy!”

—W. Edwards Deming

So what are the consequences of missing these two essential pillars of reform? As of the latest round of the now discontinued Commander’s Unit Assessment Tool (note: the CUAT has been replaced by the Regional Command ANSF Assessment Report [RASR] as of September 2013) reports in July 2013, only 257 of 827 combined units in the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police received the highest rating, that being the oxymoronic “Independent with Advisors.” At the ministries of interior and defense level, only two of 78 staff sections or cross-functional areas received the CM-1A rating of being capable of autonomous operations. To see only 31 percent of the ANSF and 2 percent of the staff sections receive their highest respective ratings is discouraging after a decade of American and NATO tutelage and a disbursement of $60.28 billion on Afghan reconstruction out of $96.57 billion appropriated by Congress—and all this from a nation renowned for its warrior ethos.

However, even these dismally low ratings may be overly optimistic. An audit by the DOD Office of the Inspector General noted, “The Commander’s Unit Assessment Tool did not capture the capability and effectiveness of ANA logistics and maintenance systems at or below the corps level. As a result, the International Security Assistance Force Joint Command was unable to adequately measure...
progress toward the development of an enduring logistics and maintenance capability in ANA corps, brigades, and *kandaks* (battalions).*10* In other words, the very skills that the Afghans will need to stand on their own after the withdrawal of coalition forces have gone unmeasured. Additionally, anecdotal evidence throughout Afghanistan paints a grim picture of their readiness. As one observer noted, “Entering this deployment, I was sincerely hoping to learn that the claims were true: that conditions in Afghanistan were improving, that the local government and military were progressing toward self-sufficiency. . . . Instead I witnessed the absence of success on virtually every level.”*11*

If we accept that Afghan forces are woefully unprepared for “Afghanization” and that they lack both a burning platform and a champion for change, then it is incumbent upon us to discover why this is the case. While illiteracy and corruption usually top most lists of challenges to superior, sustained Afghan performance (and UNESCO estimates the literacy rate of ANSF as a whole to be a stunningly low 14 percent), these are of secondary, even tertiary import.*12* Undoubtedly literate soldiers are easier to train, especially given the requirements of modern equipment, but this is to suppose that the advantage of the Taliban is in fielding vast hordes of college-educated troops, who spend their evenings waxing eloquent over Persian poetry. As for corruption, it is merely the by-product of a patronage culture that selects officers based primarily on political and familial connection and fails to enforce accountability.

None of this should come as a shock to us. In a parallel with Vietnam, the root of this failure traces back to the Afghan officer class and harkens back to Deming’s admonition that the problem with organizations is always at the top. “All senior advisers found little improvement in South Vietnam’s officer selection and promotion systems, and, while some discussed slight improvements in leadership, all agreed that this remained a serious problem.”*13*
A later historian would quantify how serious the difficulty was. “The greatest obstacle in improving and training the armed forces . . . was the lack of qualified leadership at all levels, both officer and noncommissioned officer . . . battalion and company commanders were often inexperienced and lacked initiative, few operations were conducted in the absence of detailed orders. Senior commanders issued directives, but failed to supervise their execution, and results were usually negligible. American advisers continually cited poor leadership as the foremost reason for unit ineffectiveness. But with the lack of replacements, unsatisfactory commanders were seldom relieved.”

The first problem arising from the lack of qualified leadership is that there will be no identification of a burning platform as the products of a noncompetitive selection system will merely be placeholders or rent-seekers. The second problem is that any champion of change, who might fortuitously arise from the otherwise unpromising swamp of Afghan leadership, will find himself stymied, rendered impotent by the difficult if not impossible challenge of removing both the merely incompetent and those resistant to change. Finally, the lingering influence of Russian doctrine, especially among the higher ranks, will retard the appearance of any champions in the first place. Unfortunately, the opportunity to reform the Afghan officer class has probably long since passed.

**Conclusion**

The goal of “Afghanization,” even if never formally defined, will be virtually identical to that of “Vietnamization”: to allow the United States to withdraw from a costly military effort no longer deemed essential (and possibly considered counterproductive) to the national interest by turning over security responsibility to a properly trained and equipped local national force.

Even if one rightly rejects the notion that there is an inexorable repetition to history, the rapid and ignominous collapse of South Vietnam in 1975 must certainly give pause to American policy makers who most certainly do not wish to see the Taliban return to power. Moreover, they do not want Afghanistan to turn into a recuperative haven for Al-Qaeda, which has already shown its resiliency post Bin-Laden with its efforts in the Benghazi consulate attack and the Syrian civil war. To prevent this, today’s military advisors, much like their forbearers in Vietnam, are hard at work in Afghanistan, struggling to prepare the ANSF to assume their national duty. These efforts are made in the face of illiteracy, corruption, indifference, incompetence, laziness, and treachery.

However, all of this diligent effort will be for naught if we do not shift our advising focus from the mere mechanics of tactics and administration to the higher plane of process improvement. In this regard, an understanding of the business consulting concepts of the burning platform and the champion of change is not just useful, it is essential.

As a final thought, lest one think that military advising is a fool’s errand, always destined for failure, consider the experience of the Continental Army. In the winter of 1777-1778, this battered force received its first military advisor, the Prussian Baron Friedrich von Steuben, who introduced the first manual of arms to American forces. The “burning platform” was the need for Continental units to stand firm in the face of highly trained and well-disciplined British and Hessian infantry. And making sure that all of this happened during that long, miserable winter in the face of naysayers who said back-wood colonials could never learn and critics who saw the specter of dictatorship in the creation of professional American soldiers was General George Washington, America’s first champion of change. **MR**

**NOTES**

8. Ibid., 99.
9. Ibid., 78.
Dr. Kofi Nsia-Pepra is an assistant professor of political science at Ohio Northern University. He holds a master of laws degree from Essex University UK and a Ph.D. in political science from Wayne State University. He served as a flight lieutenant in the Ghana Air Force, was with the United Nations Assisted Mission in Rwanda as a military human rights observer, and served as Ghana’s Air Force detachment commander with ECOMOG in Sierra Leone. His article “Robust Peacekeeping? Panacea for Human rights Violations,” Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies, Vol.18, No. 2, Fall 2012, examines the conviction that robust peacekeeping—a strong and forceful peacekeeping force—works better than UN traditional peacekeeping in reducing human rights violation, specifically, civilian killing.
Contrary to Africa’s strategic insignificance to the United States in the post-immediate Cold War era, it gained primacy in post-9/11 due to terrorism, energy sources, and China’s creeping influence into Africa. Defense secretary Robert Gates warned against the risk of “creeping militarization” of U.S. foreign policy and recommended the State Department lead U.S. engagement with other countries. This article is an examination of the militarization of America’s foreign policy and the ramifications for its strategic interests in Africa. It observes that America’s military involvement in Africa, despite some strategic gains, has backfired due to the inherent contradiction of the use of realist means to achieve liberal ends. The article recommends that it would be prudent for America to deemphasize “hard power” and heighten “soft power” to achieve its interests in Africa.

Why Militarization?

U.S. militarization of Africa is intended to fight terrorism, secure oil resources, and counter China’s influence in the continent. Africa’s relevance in U.S. national security policy and military affairs gained primacy during the Bush administration. Vice Adm. Robert T. Moeller, while serving as deputy commander for Military Operations, U.S. Africa Command, listed oil disruption, terrorism, and the growing influence of China as challenges to U.S. interests in Africa. The spillage of Al-Qaeda’s heinous activities in the Middle East into Africa in 1998 with Al-Qaeda’s bombing of U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam changed America’s disengagement policy with Africa. America’s involvement in Africa was accentuated by the 9/11 attacks and the emerging hotbeds of terrorism in East Africa.

America views weak and failed African states as incubators of threats to its geo-strategic interests in Africa. Weak and failed states are prone to growth of terrorism and international criminal activities such as drugs and money laundering, all of which threaten America’s interests. Susan Rice, former assistant secretary of state for African Affairs, states:

Much of Africa has become a veritable incubator for the foot soldiers of terrorism. Its poor, young, disaffected, unhealthy, uneducated populations often have no stake in government, no faith in the future, and harbor an easily exploitable discontent with the status-quo . . . these are the swamps we must drain . . . to do otherwise, is to place our security at further and more permanent risk.

The lethality of terrorism attained a new height following the 9/11 attacks on the United States, and the composition of the attackers reinforced the argument. Al-Qaeda, for example, enjoyed the hospitality of Sudan, where it organized to launch attacks on U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. Data on global terrorists’ attacks show that, from 1991 to 2007, most terrorists came from weak and failed states such as Somalia, Afghanistan, Sudan, and Algeria.

An analysis of foreign jihadists in Iraq estimated that 25 percent were from Africa, particularly from North Africa and the horn of Africa. The strategically located east African seaboard near the shipping lanes of the giant tankers that supply oil to the United States from the Middle East has become the hub of terrorists and pirates threatening U.S. interests.

A recent U.S. Central Command report anticipated a high regrouping of African trained jihadists into the horn. Consequentially, U.S. military involvement in Africa has increased in the horn region and parts of North Africa to counter growth of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism.

U.S. militarization of Africa is also fueled by Africa’s growing petroleum reserves. Africa today accounts for about 15 percent of U.S.-imported oil, and with the politicization of supplies from the Middle East, the United States relies on Africa for its energy needs. Coincidentally, nearly all of Africa’s oil reserves are in countries experiencing violence or instability, such as Sudan and Nigeria. As Joanne Gowa and Edward D. Mansfield argue, economic transactions generate security concerns since trade thrives in secured environments. America is concerned with the insecurity of trading partners and violence in those countries, prompting U.S. intervention. U.S. current security commitments in the Niger Delta region are to ensure its continuous access to the region’s oil resources. Perceived threats of terrorist attacks by northern Nigerian Islamic fundamentalists on U.S. interests in West Africa, coupled with criminal activities by self-styled warlord Alhaji Dokubo-Asari’s group
that steals crude oil and kidnaps foreign oil workers for ransom in the Delta region, threaten U.S. investments and oil supplies.\textsuperscript{13}

In a realist world, countering the influence of its strategic rivals, especially China, reminiscent of the Cold War, has renewed U.S. interest in Africa. The rapidly growing economies of countries such as Malaysia and China strategically compete with America for Africa’s energy and other natural resources. China, in particular, poses a formidable challenge to U.S. interests in Africa. African leaders seem to cater to China because its aid and investment in Africa exclude conditionality such as good governance and human rights commonly associated with U.S. investment programs, which are viewed by African leaders as imperialistic and neocolonialistic.\textsuperscript{14} China’s investment approach offers Africa equal opportunity and stake in their development in view of China’s subtle diplomacy of noninterference in Africa’s domestic issues. China’s investment and aid programs have been well received because they include infrastructure projects, long ignored by the United States and other Western aid programs.\textsuperscript{15}

**U.S. Military Involvement in Africa**

U.S. aid to Africa has been observed to be increasingly militarized.\textsuperscript{16} In fact, its military is involved in a range of activities that were perceived to be the exclusive prerogative of civilian agencies and organizations in the past.\textsuperscript{17} America’s military involvement in Africa includes—

- Sales of arms.
- Military training and advice.
- Establishment of security commands and intelligence.
- Joint overt and covert military operations with selected security allies.

In 1996, the United States launched the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) program to address challenges of peacekeeping and conflict management in Africa. Fears that the ethnic massacres occurring in Rwanda in 1994 might also occur in neighboring Burundi prompted its formation. In addition, America’s reluctance to get involved in African local conflicts following the 1993 Somali debacle where 18 U.S. Army rangers died in Somalia. The ACRI enabled selected African military forces to respond to crises through peacekeeping missions in Africa. The selection criteria of countries participating were democratic governance and the preparedness of the military to submit to civilian control. Benin, Ghana, Senegal, Malawi, and Mali were the countries selected. Several countries initially considered for participation became ineligible. However, because Uganda and Ethiopia were U.S. military allies they were included in the selection even though they did not pass the test.

Several antiterrorism programs were initiated, including the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, consisting of 1,200 to 1,800 U.S. and allied troops in Djibouti to patrol, interdict, and strike at threatening targets in the Horn of Africa.\textsuperscript{18} The task force led the U.S. engagement with Somalia, establishing three permanent contingency operating locations at Kenyan’s Manda Bay Naval Base and Hurso and Bilate in Ethiopia. From these locations the task force trained allied troops and initiated attacks on Somalia.\textsuperscript{19} The Pan Sahel Initiative deployed U.S. Special Army Forces with the Special Command Europe to Mali and Mauritania, engaging in counterinsurgency wars in Mali and Niger against the Tuareg rebels. The Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Initiative that replaced the Pan Sahel Initiative in 2004 has American military personnel assigned to 11 African nations—Algeria, Burkina Faso, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal—to counter the activities of Islamist militants in the Sahel Sahara region in Northwest Africa. For example, American forces, in a joint operation with Chadian forces, killed 43 alleged militants in the Chad-Niger border.\textsuperscript{20} The Joint Task Force Aztec Silence, created in December 2003, under the European Command, conducts surveillance operations and, in coordination with
U.S. intelligence agencies, shares intelligence with local military forces. America has military ties with Nigeria and other oil-producing west and central African states that include bilateral military assistance, naval operations of the Africa Partnership Station, and other initiatives to promote maritime safety and ensure uninterrupted oil supplies.

U.S. military involvement on the continent as of 2006 was divided among three commands: the European Command, Central Command, and Pacific Command. On 6 February 2007, the Bush administration created a new unified combatant command—Africa Command (AFRICOM)—to promote U.S. national security objectives in surrounding areas. AFRICOM’S foremost mission helps Africans achieve their own security and support African leadership efforts. However, according to Maj. Gen. Mike Snodgrass, chief of staff of Headquarters, U.S. AFRICOM, the command conducts “sustained security engagement . . . to promote a stable and secure African environment in support of U.S. foreign policy.” Gen. Carter F. Ham, former AFRICOM commander, stated that the command’s immediate focus was on “the greatest threats to America, Americans, and American interests. . . . Countering threats posed by al-Qaida affiliates in east and northwest Africa remains my No. 1 priority,” including Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Somalia-based al-Shabaab, and Boko Haram in Nigeria. AFRICOM, in coordination with U.S. military and intelligence agencies, has initiated numerous major projects and programs to implement these policy objectives. These include establishing Camp Lemonier at Djibouti as the base for AFRICOM and allied military units in Africa, creating an AFRICOM liaison unit at the African Union headquarters in Ethiopia, and establishing bases in Seychelles, Djibouti, and Ethiopia for operating drones for surveillance and attack operations.

The United States is also involved in both covert and overt military operations with security allies. Joint American-Kenyan military operations at the Kenya-Somalia border were targeting militant Islamists in Somalia. U.S. troops also pursued
Al-Qaeda and affiliated suspects in Sudan from 2002 to mid-2003. The United States backed the insurgency by the Sudan People’s Liberation, the guerrilla force that fought the northern Khartoum government, but the Bush government allied with the Khartoum government in the U.S.-led Global War on Terrorism.

Darfur reportedly has the fourth-largest copper and third-largest uranium deposits in the world. Sudan is China’s fourth biggest supplier of imported oil. U.S. companies controlling the pipelines in Chad and Uganda seek to displace China through the U.S. military alliance with “frontline” states hostile to Sudan—Uganda, Chad, and Ethiopia. America’s increasing militarization of its foreign policy globally has been criticized by some American foreign policy decision makers and practitioners.

**Strategic Gain or Backlash?**

Despite some short-term modicum of success like the flow of oil from strategic allies such as Nigeria and Angola or the killing of leading terrorists figures in Africa, U.S. militarization policy has elicited backlash against its strategic interests on the continent. Defense Secretary Gates warns against the risk of a “creeping militarization” of U.S. foreign policy and recommends the State Department lead U.S. engagement with other countries. Ambassador Ronald E. Neumann denounces the progressive militarization of U.S. foreign policy over the past 20 years and underlines the perils it has wrought. According to Mark Malan “The danger is this strategy will not achieve the security objectives of addressing the root causes of terrorism, and it certainly won’t address the developmental objectives of U.S. foreign policy.” We observe mounting adverse ramifications for U.S. geo-strategic security interests in Africa.

America’s Cold War military policy correlates with contemporary cycles of violence, crimes, and conflicts plaguing Africa today. Throughout the Cold War (1950-1989), the United States delivered over $1.5 billion worth of weaponry to its top arms clients—Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, and Zaire (DRC)—that constitute the flashpoints of violence, instability, and state collapse in Africa. The ongoing DRC civil war exemplifies the devastating legacy of U.S. arms sales policy to Africa. The U.S. military sustained the violent regime of Mobutu Sese Seko—who brutalized Zairians and plundered the economy for three decades—with military arms ($300 million) and training (worth $100 million) until overthrown by Laurent Kabila’s forces in 1997.

U.S. weapons transfers and continued military training to parties of the conflict have helped fuel the fighting. The United States helped build the militaries of eight of the nine states directly involved in the war that has ravaged the DRC since Kabila’s coup. In 1998 alone, U.S. weapons to Africa totaled $12.5 million, including substantial deliveries to Chad, Namibia, and Zimbabwe—all backing Kabila. On the rebel side, Uganda received nearly $1.5 million in weaponry over the past two years, and Rwanda was importing U.S. weapons as late as 1993 (one year before the brutal genocide erupted).

U.S. military transfers in the form of direct government-to-government weapons deliveries, commercial sales, and funds from the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program to the states directly involved in the DRC conflict has totaled more than $125 million since the end of the Cold War.

Somalia is now a failed state and, like Sudan, it has become a den for terrorism and other criminal activities such as piracy, threatening America’s strategic interests. U.S. arms sales and military training for officers of strategic allies correlate human rights violations, poor governance, and anti-democratic coups in Africa. An IMET trainee, Capt. Amadou Sanogo, led the antidemocratic coup in Mali in March 2012. This ignited U.S. congressional concerns that the United States “may not be adequately assessing long-term risks associated with providing training and military equipment for counterterrorism purposes to countries with poor records of human rights, rule of law, and accountability.”

The U.S. discriminatory selection of countries participating in African Crisis Response Initiative bred animosity and tension among African countries. The division undermined Africa’s collective efforts to confront emerging threats on the continent. Non-U.S. security allies do not cooperate with the United States. Moreover, some U.S. allies, informed by the U.S. foreign policy axiom of permanency of interests, are suspicious of U.S.
intentions and view its presence as exploitative and imperialistic. The African Crisis Response Initiative was not universally popular in Africa. The selection criteria for countries participating in ACRI raised questions about U.S. interests on the continent. Some African states and even France suspected that ACRI’s design gave the United States a military foothold in Africa reminiscent of the colonial and Cold War eras. It was conceptualized as U.S. expansionism and exploitation of Africa’s newfound energy sources. Opposition politicians in African states receiving training as well as the states excluded from the program were critical of Washington for using ACRI to gather military intelligence to advance other exclusive U.S. interests in Africa.

No single issue or event in recent decades in Africa has provoked so much controversy and unified hostility and opposition as the AFRICOM. The intensity and sheer scale of the unprecedented unity of opposition to AFRICOM across Africa surprised many experts. African nations have been repeatedly opposed to the hosting of U.S. bases on the African continent and the militarization of their relations with the United States. Because of this dissent, AFRICOM is located in Stuttgart, Germany. Civil society leaders and journalists in Africa have objected that AFRICOM will pursue narrowly defined U.S. interests at the expense of both the sovereignty and welfare of the African nations. Regional organizations have been most vocal in their critique of AFRICOM. The Southern African Development Community, including U.S. ally South Africa, stated that “it is better if the United States were involved with Africa from a distance rather than be present on the continent.” The Southern African Development Community defense and security ministers urged other states not to host AFRICOM since it would have a negative effect. The economic community of West African states (including Nigeria, a strong U.S. ally), opposed AFRICOM.

African citizens and civil societies also objected to AFRICOM. Ezekiel Pajino of the Center for Empowerment in Liberia calls AFRICOM “a deadly plan of U.S. military expansion on African soil.”
Pajino states “AFRICOM will be the legacy of Bush’s failed foreign policy that threatens future generations of the continents.”

Ikechukwa Eze states, “Apprehension exists about the extent to which AFRICOM may violate rules of sovereignty and its attempt to replace the African Union.” These observations raise concerns about sovereignty, Africa’s welfare, the role of private military contractors, U.S. military administered development assistance, and U.S.-controlled African resources at the expense of ordinary Africans, especially in the face of China’s presence in Africa for energy sources. America’s Africa Command, in conceptual terms and actual implementation, is not intended to serve Africa’s best interests. It just happens that Africa has grown in geopolitical and geo-economic importance to America and her allies. Africa has been there all along, but the United States with the notable exception of the Cold War era, always had a hands-off policy toward Africa. Severine Rugumamu, Professor of Development Studies at the University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, understandably observes that “a consistent axiom guiding U.S. foreign policy toward Africa is permanency of interests and not friends or enemies,” implying shifts in engagements in Africa in accordance with shifts in its strategic interests.


U.S. military involvement indirectly correlates with the protractedness and structural linkages of the conflicts in the region, creating an environment of insecurity and instability prone to terrorist recruitment and crimes such as piracy and money laundering that are detrimental to America’s geo-strategic interests on the continent. Countries militarily allied to the United States are involved in the Congolese and Sudanese/Darfur conflicts. Rwandan and Ugandan troops invaded Congo in 1998 and triggered ongoing cross-border fighting that persists to this day. Rwanda and Uganda are both U.S. and British military client states. Uganda military forces occupied the Congo oil- and mineral-rich towns of eastern Congo. It internally fights the Lord’s Resistant Army rebels, and has been accused of “genocide” against the Acholi people. Rwanda is fighting in eastern Congo, meddling in Burundi, and has some 2,000 forces in Darfur. Ethiopia is at war with Somalia and poised to reinvent Eritrea. Ethiopia, Uganda, and Chad are the “frontline” states militarily disturbing Sudan. Sudan in turn backs guerrilla armies in Uganda, Chad, and Congo. U.S. support for factions and shifting loyalties with parties in the Darfur and Sudan conflicts have affected Sudan’s insecurity and instability.

The United States seems to replicate the Cold War strategic mistakes with high risks of getting deeply into African conflicts, supporting repressive regimes, excusing human rights abuses, diverting scarce budget resources, building resentment, and undermining long-term U.S. interests in Africa.

Oxfam and other charitable groups signed a report called “Nowhere to Turn” that was very critical of the militarization of aid because it puts civilians at greater risk. Elsewhere, in Afghanistan, the Taliban targets schools and hospitals erected by the U.S. Army or associated private contractors, but those erected by civilian or nongovernmental organizations are rarely harassed.

Counterinsurgency analyst David Kilcullen has warned that heavy-handed military action, such as air strikes that kill civilians and collaboration with counterinsurgency efforts by incumbent regimes, far from diminishing the threat of terrorism, helps it grow. Undoubtedly, we witness increasing terrorism in Africa despite U.S. military presence. These conditions of insecurity and instability threaten America’s geo-strategic interests in Africa, demanding strategic change in its dealings with Africa.

Policy Implications—Demand for Soft Power

Defense secretary Gates stresses civilian aspects of U.S. engagement and recommends that the State Department lead U.S. engagement with other countries. He argues, “We cannot kill or capture our way to victory” in the long-term campaign against terrorism,” suggesting increased civilian efforts. Despite its lofty agenda, AFRICOM’s stratagem excluded state capacity building and socio-economic development of the impoverished
people. Refugees International reports that U.S. aid to Africa is becoming increasingly militarized, resulting in skewed priorities and less attention given to longer-term development projects that could lead to greater stability across the continent. Malan argues that “this strategy will not achieve the security objectives of addressing the root causes of terrorism and it certainly won’t address the developmental objectives of U.S. foreign policy.” Gates observes that “America’s civilian institutions of diplomacy and development are undermanned and underfunded relative to both the military budget and U.S. relative responsibilities and challenges around the world.” The Pentagon, which controlled about 3 percent of official aid money a decade ago, now controls 22 percent, while the U.S. Agency for International Development’s share has declined from 65 percent to 40 percent. Obviously, it would be naïve to ignore the relevance of military force in overseas contingency operations, but U.S. failure to address the causes of growing insurgency in Africa is also a strategic miscalculation. Gates recommends bolstering the civilian efforts that he considers vital to U.S. success overseas. According to Gates, “the most persistent and potentially dangerous threats will come less from emerging ambitious states, than from failing ones that cannot meet their basic needs much less the aspirations of their people.” The priority is rather to resolve the problems of poverty, promote good governance, help build weak state capacities, and promote responsible use of the country’s wealth to develop the human capacity of all the citizenry. Weak and failed states, due to their inherent weaknesses, are safe havens for terrorism and international criminal activities such as drugs and money laundering, which finance terrorism. The U.S. must work with African states to arrest the decline in state capacities. The State Department and United States Agency for International Development’s unprecedented Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review to enhance civilian capabilities of U.S. statecraft are most welcomed. The review must design a clear vision that will help build stronger and more effective governance in weak states, reduce corruption, promote rule of law, stimulate economic development, reduce poverty, and promote long-term development. International coordination and trust-building are what makes America strong, and Judah Grunstein articulates this very well by stating:

Much of our national security strategy depends on securing the cooperation of other nations, which will depend heavily on the extent to which our efforts abroad are viewed
as legitimate by their publics. The solution is . . . the steady accumulation of actions and results that build trust and credibility over time.55

To enlist the cooperation of Africa in achieving its interests, the U.S. should formalize good relations with all African states and design a framework that harmonizes their security interests, which includes Africa’s human-security needs. This requires an operational paradigm shift from primarily selective bilateral military policy to one that prioritizes collaborative and multilateral actions with both Africa and global partners. All African states’ issues demand equal attention if the United States is to obviate the imminent threats to its interests in Africa. The challenges we face today are complex and demand collective efforts and use of both hard and soft powers. Selectivity and militarization alone would fail to overcome these challenges. It is prudent the United States debunks its neorealist “hard power” policy and adopts liberal “soft power” policies in line with its idealist values and ends to capture Africa’s support in fulfilling its strategic aspirations on the continent. President Bush acknowledged the ineffectiveness of America’s over-reliance on force alone as a foreign policy, stating that the promotion of freedom was “not primarily the task of arms,” and the United States would not impose its own style of government upon the world. “Our goal instead is to help others find their own voice, attain their own freedom, and make their own way.”56 To demonstrate real commitment to develop a new partnership with Africa, the United States needs to redirect the focus away from strengthening military capacity and toward promoting human development in Africa. The United States, as the only super power in a unipolar world, stands to benefit from a stable, developed, and peaceful Africa. The United States could help create the conditions needed for peace and stability by restricting the flow of military weapons and training and increasing support for sustainable development policies. The United States can also champion a cause of international arms sales code of conduct based on human rights, nonaggression, and democracy. The United States should provide increased development assistance to Africa and encourage civil-society building.

Conclusion

The United States increased military involvement in Africa to suppress terrorism, seek energy sources, and counter China’s influence in Africa. Other nations conceptualized these actions as exploitative and imperialistic, aimed at controlling Africa’s energy resources. The U.S. involvement also raised concerns about challenges to sovereignty, welfare, and the survival of the African Union. America’s covert and overt military alliances and joint operations with selected military allies affected spillage, intensity, protractedness, and duration of the Congo, Sudan, and Darfur conflicts. The U.S. militarization policy has backfired, undermining the attainment of its strategic interests. To elicit Africa’s support, the United States needs to debunk its neorealist “hard power” policy and adopt liberal “soft power” policies such as assisting Africa in its socio-political economic development. MR

NOTES

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The Fourth Revolution—Hyper-learning


IN THE NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2013 Military Review article “Leader Preparation to Support Rebuilding,” I discussed the development, over the past 30 years, of several parallel development paths of both the Army Training System—“hard power”—and generic Teams of Leaders—“soft power.” I believe the performance potential of Teams of Leaders (ToL)—Information Management (IM) X Knowledge Management (KM) X High Performing Leader Team (HP LT) building is equal and perhaps greater than the improved performance achieved routinely by the Observer Controller (OC) X Opposition Force (OPFOR) X After Action Review (AAR) X Instrumentation System (IS) paradigm of the highly successful Army Training System.

I sense that the accelerating impact of both has generated a Fourth Revolution (4R)—“hyper-learning”—the product of the Army Training System (summarized as Combat Training Center [CTC]) multiplied by ToL [IM and KM supporting shared skills, knowledge, attitudes [SKA] generating then sustaining high performing leader teams [HP LTs]].
Hyper-learning has several important, expanding Fourth Revolution (4R) applications:

- Hyper-learning stimulated and supported across various borders of human organization.
- Advantaging the expanding explosion of social networking.
- Increasing significantly the intensity of learning processes.

All advantage the successes of the three preceding “revolutions” in Army learning over several decades.¹

**Foundational Forces of 4R**

The foundational forces of 4R hyper-learning are based on integrated learning environments and high performing leader team building.

**Framework.** The Army Training System framework is represented by CTC mission readiness practices embedded in America’s Army learning performance to standard, effective mentoring, and 360 performance effectiveness reviews. The CTC practices today are the application of effective learning to shared task, condition, standard (TCS) accomplished by simulations supported by observer/controller/trainers and focused by structured situational training exercises (STX)—all accomplished and sustained through the conduct of after action reviews (AARs). This effective process is the CTC development model.

**Teams of Leaders.** ToLs improve performance by developing shared SKA across borders through combining information management (IM), knowledge management (KM), and leader teams (LT) sustained by conducting leader team exercises (LTXs). This process is the ToL development model.²

**Sharing, knowledge, and understanding.** The generation of environments of informal sharing of data, information, knowledge, and understanding right, left, up, and down within organizations stimulates good ideas, collaborative “murder boarding,” merges address books, and creates adaptive workarounds within leader teams performing consistently to TCS across all borders. CTC x ToL advantages U.S. national strengths. These strengths include Yankee initiative seeking better ways and increasing near-compulsive social networking leveraging IM/KM enabling learning distance and time requirements to approach zero while sharing SKA across most borders of human interaction.

**Essential TRADOC proponent support.** Various Training and Doctrine Command Centers of Excellence (Proponent) operations provide general support developing and sustaining doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel, personnel, and facilities (DTLOMPF) capabilities in individuals, teams, and units. This stimulates development of desired combinations of CTC “hard” and ToL “soft” power embedded in mutually supporting high performing leader teams.

**Developing Military Readiness**

The central 4R insight is that the CTC and ToL development models are two sides of the same coin—development of military readiness. Teams of Leaders and CTC reinforce and multiply the effectiveness of the other across combined arms maneuver (CAM) and wide area security (WAS) operations. This is a wholly positive relationship tentatively described as “hyper-learning” now available to support America’s Army.

**Tasks, conditions and standards.** TCS is a fully assimilated prescription of explicit, replicable, verifiable, learning performance requirements. TCS is a keystone process enabling consistent, uniform, assessed performance to standard across

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**“Hyper-learning”—reinforcing processes**

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<tr>
<th>CTC Development Model</th>
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<tr>
<td>TCS objective</td>
<td>comparable to SKA objective</td>
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<td>AAR process</td>
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America’s Army—in a nation, state, federal republic, democracy, and continent. It is the abiding enabler of the unique global national power of absolute diversity, personnel utilization wholly based on demonstrated competent performance to standard—not to particular race, sex, religion, or sexual practice. There are no limits to acquiring the best personnel!

**Skills, knowledge, and attitudes.** SKA are associated with shared purpose (vision), shared trust, shared competence, and shared confidence combine to generate and sustain high-performing teams of leaders (HP LTs) “teamed” across all borders of human endeavor. Diverse leader teams sharing SKA supported by IM and KM become ToLs supporting “winning” leader relationships across joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) capabilities—a precondition to fully effective combined arms maneuver and operations.

**After action review** The AAR is an individual, team, and unit review and analysis of the effectiveness of performance across all levels of responsibility. The mentored AAR embeds candid professional review combined with collaborative development of corrective actions. Juniors review mission performance interactively, both bottom up—selves, peers and seniors—and top down—the chain of command. The AAR is fully institutionalized as a positive, accepted, corrective “360” for TCS performance.

**Leader team exercises.** The LTX is the “driver” that propels and accelerates the team of leaders though the natural team development stages, helping it achieve the high-performance characteristic of shared SKA, exhibiting actionable understanding more quickly. Leader team exercises, grouped or distributed, independent or coached, are the generator of positive interpersonal relationships. They are the “lifeblood” of ToL. They are surprisingly simple iterative discussions conducted by candidate leader teams and structured shown in figure 1.

A **convergence of major forces.** In sum, the Fourth Revolution is the convergence of two mutually supporting major forces. They are very effective for learning to standard and generating high performing leader teams across borders. Both combine to promise profoundly positive increases in U.S. national military readiness. The product is extraordinary due to the remarkable potential of “hyper-learning.”
"Hyper-learning," in this context, influences both the process of learning generation itself and the resultant end state capabilities. "Hyper" is a significant increase in the rate of learning (through training, education, and experience) to a higher-level actionable understanding of content. This occurs when the advantages of the World Wide Web and cross-border teaming are shaped while the shared SKA of high-performing leader teams are developed. The process develops an ability to “predict” likely outcomes by drawing on the high performing leader team’s “insights.” This is not a Zen-like state but rather it reflects advantaging the escalating performance potential of CTC x ToL and then applying that performance for practical purposes. Advantaging the strengths of each, the result is the ability to adapt to anticipated as well as unpredicted change for individuals and teams. Sustainment is possible as long as that particular high-performing leader team is stable!

Personnel stability within the team directly affects the performance of the leader team. If leader teams are not stable, the necessity of repetitive LTXs conducted to regenerate basic leader teams’ shared SKA increases. Even more are required to generate and sustain high performing leader teams.

Think LTX practice as commonly as you now think AARs. If leader teams are stable, performance improves, resulting in increased competence and confidence gained through advantaging shared SKA. However, without leader team stability, it is very difficult to sustain high performance within that leader team. Therefore, it is essential to track stability of key leader teams. When leaders turnover, LTXs with new leaders are necessary to develop or retain high performance. This improves the unit’s efficiency and effectiveness! The cost may be perceived as an unwelcome learning requirement, but it is worth it because the LTX generates high leader team performance comparable to the agreed utility of the AAR.

Therefore, it is essential to have a “hyper-learning” “plan B” available when key leader teams are not stable. One way to address loss of capabilities when important leader teams change composition could be to develop and establish shared high-priority leader team tasks to be trained and shared SKA to be developed. This may appear difficult, but consider embedding ToL development processes to become as routine as AARs of the CTC process are today.5

### Exploiting New Opportunities

The bottom line is that exceptional individual, team, and unit performance stimulated by CTC x ToL interactions is clearly feasible—
- As leader teams are identified and prioritized.
- Through proper execution of the CTC model—multiple iterations executed crawl, walk, run with solid AARs, conducted by proficient observer/controller/trainers.
- When the LTX process is routinely practiced developing shared SKA, increasingly shared across multiple borders, thereby expanding beneficial effects as performance improves.

That is the rationale for the Fourth Revolution hyper-learning. There seems to be multiple ways to apply good ideas created by readers. One way might be to build JIIM leader teams as was done in European Command. Another might be focused officer and non commissioned officer professional development tailored to fill in leader team experience gaps created by assignment patterns during the past decade. A third could be support to improve garrison life through building satisfying, productive service for the whole Army family—the mainstay of continued service. Yankee initiative will mold more applications across America’s Army—extending the Fourth Revolution.

Now, to stimulate thought, I suggest three generic application opportunities—Eliminate traditional constraints, accelerate professional social networking, and expand distributed intensive learning.

#### Eliminate traditional constraints.

Advantage IM, KM and aggressive “digital natives” to eliminate traditional constraints to human interactions such as distance (physical separation), time (prior mission relevant experience), and various borders (venues, domains and boundaries) in building shared SKA.

A near compulsive human urge seems to exist to communicate, both stimulated and enabled by the worldwide web.

“Digital immigrants” contrasted with “digital natives” as described in 2003 has now morphed a decade later into a generation of seasoned “digital natives” and now, to those who are increasingly “digitally dependent.” They are practically addicted to social networking whenever, wherever, for many purposes. Social interactions such as
development of shared SKA seem increasingly advantaged by these digital social media interactions, by the actions of the “digitally dependent.” This seems particularly the situation today for Millennials. As IM and KM capabilities increase exponentially, there seems to be near unlimited capabilities and opportunities to develop shared information, knowledge, and understanding within leader teams. Many of these leader teams become high performers across borders of domains, venues, and boundaries. Each border crossed can generate unanticipated effects just as ripples from a stone dropped in a pool of water can multiply effects.

Essential professional practices stimulating routine communications across borders are embedded in the structure of America’s Army, including Active, National Guard, and Army Reserve as well as joint and intergovernmental. That aspect is not new. What is new is serious, purposeful, broadening of collaboration to build high-performing leader teams drawing on the learning power of the ToL development model across all borders now added to the CTC development model.

Discussed below are various borders of important human interaction and their “crossings.” Each is defined as follows.6

- **Venues.** “The scene or locale of any action or event.”7 Leader learning (training, education and experience) venues are individual, team or collective in institution, self-development or unit.”8

- **Domains.** “A field of action, thought, influence, realm, or range of personal knowledge.”9 Domains for Teams of Leaders development and sustainment are Information Management, Knowledge Management, Leader Team Development, and Domain Integration. The paradigm visualization is the ToL “stool.”10

- **Boundaries.** “Something that indicates bounds or limits.”11 Boundaries of human interaction considered are organizational structure, functional purpose, level of governance, and encompassing social culture.

Borders are crossed in full realization that there seems to be exponential growth in social interactions across all borders—that is, venues, domains and boundaries, as well as directly influencing the ranges of IM and KM effectiveness. Every part of the ToL development model is profoundly changed. “Millennials” emerge as much more than generation Y “digital natives.” They are increasingly digitally dependent with expectations that resistance to crossing the various borders of human interactions will effectively disappear—for better or worse.

In sum, perhaps a revolution in learning stimulated by global communications (www, icloud, and Siri-like knowledge generation) could anticipate and virtually eliminate distance, time, and various borders of personal interactions. That is, there can be near unlimited opportunities to create leader teams across previously uncrossed borders to improve individual and grouped human performance. This suggests the presence of a new Fourth Revolution learning world!

To observe more closely, apply distance, time, and borders approaching zero to each of nine venues of the “Third Revolution.” Apply the developmental model of ToL, including the collective domain existing in organizations subject to organizational bureaucratic boundaries. No case is intended to be conclusive. The purpose is to portray some potential impacts of hyper-learning and the learning opportunities and challenges associated with each of the various combinations and permutations of borders crossed. Digital natives and growing digital dependents seem certain to develop many more.

1. **Individual in Institutional.** Understand and practice ToL requirements and opportunities specifically collaborating to develop leader teams with shared SKA within and across various borders. Understand requirements and the processes to develop both “hard” TCS and “soft” SKA proficiencies in self and others. Practice simulations and gaming to intensify all learning processes by drawing on CTC learning processes. Practice developing high-performing, global, relationships (shared SKA) routinely, by drawing on various current KM professional forums.

2. **Individual in Unit.** Apply individual LTX competencies to build shared SKA while applying the CTC development model supporting unit mission performance. Practice learning from experiences of predecessors in current position through LTXs developing shared SKA.

3. **Collective in Institutional.** Generate mentor export of learning collective “hard” and “soft”
competencies, drawing on ToL and CTC development models to develop shared SKA and TCS appropriate to successful unit mission performance. Achieve through virtual and constructive simulations and games, mentored and assessed by distributed CTC expertise.

4. **Collective in Unit.** Develop collective task competencies to apply CTC and ToL development models through leader teams generating TCS and SKA drawing on AAR and LTX processes across various borders.

5. **Individual Self-Development.** Conduct self-study to improve individual competencies to conduct LTXs developing shared SKA across venues and to conduct AARs to develop TCS.

6. **Team in Institutional.** Learn and practice processes for generating and sustaining both ToL and CTC development models, grouped and distributed.

7. **Team in Self-Development.** Practice LTXs to generate HP LTs across all borders, particularly boundaries of organization, function, level, and culture.

8. **Team in Unit.** Generate vertical and horizontal HP LTs within units and across various borders. Apply the ToL development model as well as the CTC development model coached and assessed in CTCs or as distributed for platoon, company, battalion, and brigade level units and potential JIIM associations. Prioritize down to support regionally aligned force requirements.

9. **Collective in Self-Development.** Applied in distributed structured learning exercises such as situational training exercises or fire coordination exercises enabled by live, virtual, constructive, or gaming simulations. CTC institutions teach and develop ToL development model process.

*Accelerate professional social networking.* Stimulate structured professional forums (SPF) across Army total force and JIIM advantaging HP LTs sharing SKA, increasing security through shared trust, and understanding through shared knowledge advantaging address books, workarounds, and Yankee initiative. 

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**Training Venues to Leader Learning Venues**

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**Leader Learning Venues**

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**Leader Learning Venues**

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Definitions

**ToL Domains.** Information Management (IM), Knowledge Management (KM), and High Performing Leader Teams (HP LT) and Domain Integration as described above and in the recent “Leader Preparation To Support Rebuilding.”

**Boundaries of Human interactions.** Organizational, established within, between, and among various military, private, joint, intergovernmental, international, and multi-national organizations.

**Functional.** All those related to unit and organizational performance such as personnel, operations, intelligence, and logistics.

**Levels.** Hierarchy of governance within organizations.

**Cultural.** Including but not limited to degree of centralization of decision making or ease of communication up and down, left and right, across boundaries.

TRADOC Proponents establish new-shared learning opportunities increasing cross-border relationships. Reinforce associations generated through expanding social networking by conducting LTXs to expand shared SKAs. The effect is to transmit improved learning processes and paths across all learning venues and boundaries. An appropriate objective could be habitual cross-venue and cross-boundary collaboration exploiting leader teaming embedded in America’s Army learning culture, spreading in time to JIIM.

In sum, stimulate focused collaboration particularly top down as well as bottom up to encourage policy and program innovation. Then institutionalize success with adaptive learning support combining CTC and ToL development models. Draw on proven, fielded, learning successes. Train both ToL and CTC processes in institutions. Stimulate bottom up “Millennial” contributions!
“A Way” to Fourth Revolution (4R) Implementation

Review training development and training support required to advantage the new opportunities of “hyper-learning” and the growing challenges of cyber operational security dysfunction. Institutionalize shared SKA formation by leader teams drawing on LTXs.

Encourage incessant practice of AARs and LTXs across all borders. Reward cultures of shared ToL and CTC development model practice.

The critical path will be incorporation of integrated mutually-supporting CTC and ToL development models in pre-command courses and officer and NCO leader professional development policies and programs.

Summary

The Fourth Revolution “hyper learning” is the convergence of two major forces. They are effective learning to standard and generation of high-performing leader teams across borders. Both combine to promise profoundly positive increases in U.S. national military readiness led by America’s Army.

We described several important expanding applications. You, the readers, will suggest, share, and then apply better applications for America’s Army. You—that is what The Fourth Revolution “hyper learning” is all about! MR

NOTES

2. Ibid, 59-60.
5. The CTC process was perceived as “a bridge too far” in the early eighties but the evident increase in readiness “sold” the process.
7. Ibid, 1586.
9. Webster, 424.
11. Webster, 174.
16. For an excellent discussion of the potential requirements for expanding Leader Teams, see Gen Keith Alexander, “The Army’s Way Ahead in Cyberspace,” Army, August 2013, 23-25
Lt. Col. Sholto Stephens, New Zealand Army, is a cavalry officer who has served on active duty since 1990. His operational experience includes four tours in Afghanistan and others in Northern Ireland, Bougainville, Bosnia-Herzegovina, East Timor, and the Solomon Islands. A CGSC graduate, he received the Distinguished Master Tactician award. His most recent deployment was as the commander of the Bamyan PRT, September 2012 to its closure in April 2013.

This is the era of the Afghan generation for the New Zealand Defence Force. Apart from substantial contributions in the Sinai, Timor Leste, and the Solomon Islands, members of the New Zealand Defence Force generally consider Afghanistan to be its premier international military commitment since 9/11. Moreover, Afghanistan is the main theater of operations for New Zealand Defense Forces. New Zealand has supported the coalition in Afghanistan since 2002. Unlike partners from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, the New Zealand Defense Force has not experienced a sizeable commitment to Iraq.¹

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Army officers in any theater harbor within the back pages of their field notebooks lessons worthy of consideration by others. These are lessons learned from experience rather than academic study. In Afghanistan, certain lessons consistently have emerged as essential to the effectiveness of New Zealand Defense Force operations—and possibly to the operations of coalition partners now and in the future. Future counterinsurgency (COIN) and stability missions likely will be similar to the costly but worthy efforts in Afghanistan in the past decade. Therefore, broad lessons such as these, when proven over time, should lead to improvements to military education and training.

**New Zealand Defense Forces in Bamyan Province**

For New Zealand Defence Force operations in Afghanistan, the largest contribution—in terms of number of personnel and continuity over time—has been to the Afghan people of the Bamyan province. Afghanistan comprises 33 provinces and a multitude of cultures not necessarily limited to the borders of Afghanistan.

The Bamyan Province is distinctive, in part, because of its predominantly Hazaran population. Across South Asia and the Middle East, this province is considered the Hazaran heartland. Bamyan is isolated geographically from other population groups because it resides within the Hindu Kush, a long mountain range in southwest Asia. Most Hazaran people actively pursue a peaceful existence for themselves and their children. Hence, the military casualties in Bamyan over a decade, while regrettable, were many fewer than those in other provinces: about 20 members of the Afghan National Security Force and eight New Zealand Defence Force personnel lost their lives.

The New Zealand Defence Force led the provincial reconstruction team (PRT) in Bamyan continuously from 2003 to 2013, mainly with New Zealand Army units—more than 3,500 New Zealand Defence Force personnel served. These are small figures compared with other nations but large for New Zealand forces. From 2003 to 2013, 21 contingents served six- to seven-month rotations.²

All New Zealand team members, no doubt, gained valuable insights that contributed to effective mission accomplishment. The ten lessons highlighted for consideration here are dedicated to those who paid the ultimate price while serving in Bamyan.

**Lesson 1: Success in contemporary conflict depends on applying counterinsurgency principles and lessons effectively.** COIN principles are the new standard for complex problem-solving, for military and civilian efforts. COIN conducted in Afghanistan is the graduate level of contemporary conflict. The New Zealand Defence Force found that all warfighting functions and battlefield operating systems faced significant challenges over the decade of its commitment to Bamyan. This was, in part, because those functions and systems were based on past operations. However, the nature of operations in Afghanistan is significantly different from major conventional operations and two-dimensional conflicts of the past.

New Zealand forces in Afghanistan applied principles, tactics, techniques, and procedures not only from U.S. Army doctrine, but also from British army doctrine. They experienced first-hand the joint, interagency, and multinational aspects of operations described in U.S. Army operational and COIN doctrine. The doctrinal publications used in this author’s education and training were published between 2008 and 2010. Though valuable, they were not always adequate to guide operations.

Forces need to seek out lessons learned in Afghanistan and determine how those lessons apply to current operations. Soldiers should resist the temptation to apply established principles by rote because those principles may not account for their situation. They should exercise judgment to determine how they will integrate and synthesize lessons learned with their education and training.

**Lesson 2: The long-term success of the host nation frames all phases of military operations.**

For a COIN or stabilization mission to be successful, military forces must focus first on the success of the host nation. They must adopt a selfless attitude as they conduct their missions. More specifically, soldiers, leaders, and units must look beyond their own missions and aim to make others successful.

Much current training and education remains rooted in the seize initiative operational phase (phase III of joint operational phases). Experiences in Bamyan showed that if forces focused the majority of their efforts in phase III, they
would fail to grasp the importance of other phases. However, activities such as foreign internal defense, mentoring, and security force assistance—which play an important role in a host nation’s long-term success—must be conducted in the shape, stabilize, and enable civil authority phases (phases 0, IV, and V). These activities are becoming the purview not only of the special operations community, but also of general purpose forces. Increased training emphasis on activities in phases 0, IV, and V will set up coalition forces for greater success in future commitments.

**Lesson 3: Persistence of commitment requires continuity.** Persistence of commitment has numerous implications—in knowledge management, handovers, and enduring relationships, just to name a few. Former Afghan finance minister Dr. Ashraf Ghani, in a July 2012 interview with *COIN Common Sense*, described deficiencies of the International Security Assistance Force’s (ISAF’s) institutional memory over time. Twenty-one rotations of New Zealand forces to Bamiyan caused significant challenges in continuity. The greatest was passing on critical information about past and current operations, including who, what, where, when, and why.

In eight years, Bamiyan’s provincial governor had endured at least 16 military commanders. New Zealand forces’ ability to manage key relationships over time and maintain information and intelligence data was difficult. Ways to improve continuity include adopting effective database tools and increasing the length of tours for selected individuals.4
Lesson 4: Military forces need to build good relationships with stakeholders outside their chain of command. Bamyan bordered four regional commands and no fewer than five different lead nations for PRTs within the eight provinces surrounding it. New Zealand forces learned the importance of not only working within the regional command (east) guidelines and direction, but also of understanding groups to the north, west, and south. (In contrast to coalition military partners, Afghans usually had little concern with boundaries as they appeared on maps.) Nesting efforts within the ISAF joint command’s annual and seasonal plans reduced problems, but nothing beat face-to-face meetings and regular communication with neighboring groups. Lateral coordination was as important as vertical.

Lesson 5: Soldiers must be able to exercise initiative at the tactical level consistent with strategic direction. The ability to apply strategic-level guidance directly and quickly at the tactical level extends beyond how leaders normally interpret mission command. Regardless, it was common for units to receive direction or constraints from the highest levels (either within ISAF or from a national level) and within hours apply parts of that direction at the tactical level. Bypassing formal direction from the next higher headquarters rather than waiting for formal orders happened frequently because of time constraints. This is the new reality: to adapt rapidly, forces must rethink the interpretation of mission command in relation to tactical actions. The unofficial term stractics expresses a linkage between the strategic direction of a force and its operations at the tactical level.

Lesson 6: Military operations support civil functions. Military leaders must consider how military missions support short- and long-term civil functions, and they must understand those functions. Military missions do not ensure successful stabilization or COIN. Long-term success in Afghanistan depends on effective nonmilitary functions. Lines of effort not traditionally considered military, such as anticorruption, counter narcotics, gender equality, insurgent financial tracking, justice sector development, and reintegration and reconciliation are critical to the success of the Afghan government and military forces. A corollary to this lesson is that how forces conduct a COIN or stability mission can be just as important as the end state. Military missions presumed successful can affect civil functions in a host nation for better or for worse. The process and the means used can have unintended consequences to the host nation (as can the end state). Military missions should not be performed in isolation.

The philosophy of mission command emphasizes allowing subordinates freedom to determine how they will accomplish tasks. In Afghanistan, it became evident that mission command could lead to accomplishment of a military mission that eventually would become detrimental to the civil function it should have supported. Military leaders must consider how their tactics, techniques, and procedures affect partners and the host nation.

The unofficial term stractics expresses a linkage between the strategic direction of a force and its operations at the tactical level.

Lesson 7: Military forces should seek unity of purpose among civilian and military partners. Command and control applies to military forces but not necessarily to civil-military partnerships. A simple wiring diagram cannot express the nonlinear relationships common among the numerous stakeholders, let alone assure coordination among them. Unity of effort likely will be impossible because synchronization and integration are so difficult to achieve. Achieving unity of purpose is more pragmatic. The approximately 250-member Bamyan PRT truly was an interagency and multinational entity. It was common to interact with partners from the United States Agency for International Development, New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Malaysian Armed Forces, and European Union police daily. Each organization had an independent chain of command extending to a
higher authority. New Zealand forces supported the overarching ISAF mission, goals of the Afghan constitution and national development strategy, and numerous intergovernmental and nongovernmental stakeholders. Balancing the needs, expectations, directions, constraints, and efforts of all stakeholders was challenging but immensely rewarding when often-disparate planets aligned.

**Lesson 8: Human factors are as important as other variables.** Similar to other coalition partners, New Zealand forces’ intelligence preparation of the battlefield tended to focus on terrain and threat factors during its first years in Afghanistan. While these factors were and are important, equally important is the multitude of human factors: military operations are inherently human-centric. Adopting a focus on human factors can represent a challenging mindset shift for soldiers trained over decades to identify the enemy and seize terrain-related objectives. New Zealand forces learned to focus efforts on the Afghan population and the Afghan National Security Force while concurrently neutralizing the insurgency.

**Lesson 9: Functions such as information and intelligence are as important as movement and maneuver, fires, and combat service support.** Information operations and intelligence functions warrant significant reflection and increased investment for future commitments. Increasing the emphasis on these functions will be a challenge, especially as the depth and breadth of information and intelligence are not widely understood by most. The New Zealand Army is competent in and focused on how it applies maneuver, lethal fires, and combat service support (or sustainment). Current effectiveness and future success depend on adjusting, even revolutionizing, this emphasis.
Lesson 10: There always is room for improvement. New Zealand forces have developed a culture of continuous improvement. Processes, tools, and resources for review, reflection, and improvement are well established and well used. Numerous discussion forums, after action reviews, periodicals, and other resources make it easy for commanders, staff, and operators at all levels to improve operations. However, there is always room to grow. Individuals and organizations can pursue excellence in the profession of arms through an attitude of continuous improvement. The temptation to rest on one’s laurels and avoid self-critique is great. However, no person, organization, custom, system, or idea should be considered exempt from criticism, including the very processes used for improvement.

Conclusion

It is easy to blame perceived deficiencies in military education and training when the situation on the ground bears little resemblance to one’s studies. Nonetheless, military education and training, no matter how up-to-date, cannot ensure soldiers are prepared for all situations they will face in the field. Education and training would be truly deficient if they did not prepare soldiers to learn continuously and exercise judgment. This does not remove the need for military education and training to evolve so they meet the needs of current operations. The sharing of lessons learned can contribute to this evolution and increase the likelihood of successful COIN and stabilization. MR

NOTES

1. An austere New Zealand Defence Force military engineering commitment was made toward reconstruction in Iraq from 2003–2004, and the force provides individual United Nations military advisors to Iraq.
2. New Zealand special operations forces have been committed toward Operation Enduring Freedom and ISAF efforts in Afghanistan since October 2001, in one guise or another, and other individual augmentees to various task forces and headquarters have directly contributed toward the coalition mission in Afghanistan.
4. CALL Handbook no. 11-16, Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Team Handbook, February 2011, 23, provides a partial solution when it emphasizes the importance of a multi-year “strategy that includes . . . a long term end state goal.”
5. See COIN Common Sense 1, Issue 3, July 2010, for several examples of these non-traditional efforts.

CALL Reference Guide no. 11-39, BCT-PRT “Unity of Effort” Reference Guide, allocates a chapter to approaches, outlining the importance of how tasks are accomplished within the eyes of the host nation.
9. Fire, move, and sustain functions were heavily emphasized in the New Zealand Army Grade III and Grade II staff and tactics courses, which are compulsory milestones for all first lieutenants and captains as part of their professional military education.
In July 1941, Gen. George S. Patton Jr. addressed the soldiers of his 2nd Armored Division and advised them that “to get harmony in battle, each weapon must support the other. Team play wins.” This fundamental concept is substantially easier to talk about than to carry off on the ground under pressure. The team play that Patton refers to must be drilled well on the practice field. On the battlefield, there is no opportunity to stop and then retrain to standard. You will be only as effective in combat as you have trained to that point.

Ordering and integrating all weapons platforms to “support the other” at the decisive point was no doubt a challenge for Patton on the battlefields of North Africa and Europe. Doing so on a modern battlefield will be an even greater challenge. Advancements in technology and modernization of platforms have added layers of complexity that render a grasp of battlefield geometry elusive to young leaders who do not prepare for it. One constant in warfighting at the tactical level is that team play still wins. Training our junior leaders to play like a team with these weapons platforms will always be an essential component of any brigade combat team’s (BCT’s) training progression.

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Lt. Col. Shane P. Morgan is the commander of the 1st Battalion, 319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment, 3rd BCT, 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, N.C. He holds a B.S. from Norwich University and an M.A. from Webster University.
We suggest that the development of a logical BCT training progression includes three crucial components:

- Time set aside for senior brigade leaders to consider their long-range training path as a group.
- A dedicated block on the training calendar that gives the BCT commander an opportunity to see every company commander in action.
- Zealous application of a commonly overlooked training step—retraining to standard.

This article offers one approach to a BCT’s training progression and the logic behind it.

Company-level combat readiness requires a well-defined training progression where our officers and noncommissioned officers are repeatedly exposed and trained to employ modern weapon systems. Not unlike any professional athlete, the professional soldier must receive repetitive training on the fundamentals before transitioning to more complex schemes. Our teams must first learn the science of employing fires platforms and then develop the more complex art of synchronizing those fires with maneuver. Brigade combat team leaders should be comfortable with employing all available fires and integrating all available platforms under pressure. If we expect our leaders to confidently control and employ indirect and direct fires in combat then we must routinely construct stressful training scenarios that develop this critical warfighting skill at home station.

For more than 12 years, we have fought a different kind of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, one that demanded extraordinary maturity and insight into the human dimension of conflict. As a military, we now find ourselves asked to prepare for a very different threat. The more conventional threats associated with high-intensity combat have now joined the more familiar asymmetric threats associated with counterinsurgency operations. What we face now is a hybrid threat environment. Our challenge is to prepare ourselves for decisive action while sustaining the skills hard earned from a dozen years of war. The fundamentals of training that were such a clear focus through the 1990s are now unknown skills for those below the sergeant major and battalion commander levels.

It is no longer a given that young company commanders and first sergeants have the practical experience to train and prepare for high-intensity conflict. As a result, the more seasoned senior leaders within BCTs have to teach them how to train and prepare. Cycles have developed in many corners of the Army where collective training events are of questionable quality—the emphasis is often on simply just getting soldiers through the training. Developing the individual skills crucial to collective training proficiency is too often a missing building block in our training progression. A holdover approach from the Army force generation era exists that includes an unrealistic six-month program to reach company-level training proficiency. Yet, we are no longer tied to the stringent time constraints placed on us between Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom deployments.

The impact of this holdover effect is that time is too rarely carved out for a disciplined adherence to the eight-step training model (see figure below). Although leaders are quick to identify areas for retraining during a live fire “hot wash” (a debrief conducted immediately after an exercise with the participants), rarely are these identified weaknesses addressed with dedicated retraining time. The standard Friday retraining and recovery approach is no more than a hand wave. In speaking with our young sergeants, they lament the constant thrusting of their teams into one collective training event

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**Eight-Step Training Model**

1. Plan the Training
2. Train and Certify Leaders
3. Select the Training Site
4. Issue a Complete Order for Training
5. Rehearse
6. Execute
7. After-Action Review (AAR)
8. Retrain
after another without the opportunity to retrain to standard at the individual and small unit level. They want the time to build proficiency from the bottom up so that their soldiers have a strong foundation of the basic skills, but too often they are not given the chance.

Our companies rarely have enough time scheduled to retrain identified areas of weakness. The failure to retrain to standard has emerged as a bad habit because, in the brief training experience of young commanders and first sergeants preparing for combat, there was never enough time to do so. They were always under incredible pressure to move on to the next stage of construction. We began an effort to change this approach in our BCT with a professional discussion on the fundamentals of training with our battalion commanders following a BCT training meeting. Our BCT was moving down the training path too fast. We all agreed that there must be a few days dedicated to talking about training at an off-site location where there was symbolically no rush and sufficient time to work carefully through a discussion of our long-range training path, the direction we should move, and at what pace the training should progress. Only after these discussions with battalion command teams would we publish the brigade’s training guidance.

The guiding principle for mission command in the U.S. Army is trust, and the intent of our training symposium was directly related to solidifying that trust before embarking upon a training path. The outcome was remarkable. We achieved a comprehensive treatment of issues that had been burning in the minds of our leaders, and we not only synchronized the planned training events but also achieved buy-in from the senior leaders across the BCT. We all agreed that the graduate work of integrating fires into training and instilling a combined arms maneuver approach in the training progression began with our own organic fires battalion.

Moving in the Right Direction

We resolved from the start of our training path that the role of the fires battalion commander would graduate at some point to that of brigade fire support coordinator (FSCOORD). This would occur after his individual sections and batteries trained and certified to standard. In an effort to see the end state of training from the beginning, he was asked to develop a comprehensive fire support exercise designed to train every company-size unit in the BCT. As the FSCOORD, he required the latitude, time, and access to BCT and division level resources to develop a method to take the entire BCT where we needed to go. Put another way, his task was to improve our “team play” on the training field.

We agreed that combined arms maneuver training for us would replicate the contemporary operational environment and encompass more than the old “walk and shoot” where fire support systems were limited to artillery and mortars. “Walk and shoot” live fire exercises served as a demonstration and maneuver confidence builder. The centrally planned, controlled, and executed exercises and scenarios included only rudimentary leader decision-making challenges. We felt more opportunities were needed to prepare young leaders for conventional combat operations. The deliberate training and certification of our leaders was the first and most important requirement if we were to progress beyond the rudimentary. We invested the most time and energy in developing leaders and their confidence to make good decisions under pressure. Integrating mortars and artillery into our plan was fundamental. In addition, close air support, close combat aviation, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms were included with the “enterprise managers” we depend upon on the battlefield (joint tactical air controllers, brigade aviation officer, and BCT collection manager). These enterprise managers were involved in every stage of the planning and education process leading up to this training event in order to ensure the integration of available combat power. We focused on presenting a three-dimensional view of combined arms maneuver to our junior leaders.

We charged all leaders in the brigade with mastering the science of applying and employing every modern weapons platform available to them. This was to occur first in the classroom with a foundational review of the technical aspects followed by the virtual employment of these same platforms. The difficulty of the scenarios was gradually increased. We charged the battalions with integrating their tactical assault command posts and tactical operations centers at the appropriate time in the training progression. Because company commanders would never have direct access to and approval
for air and artillery weapons platforms without a discussion with their higher headquarters, we also included assault command posts and tactical operations centers. Our focus was on developing training scenarios that moved gradually closer to a combat environment. This mission command centric approach to training began with a twofold objective: to train leaders on the art of synchronizing fires with maneuver and to simultaneously exercise multi-echeloned mission command challenges through our command posts. We developed this “complex scheme” to prepare us for our game day.

**Integrating and Sustaining Division Norms for Training and Warfighting**

When small units made contact with the enemy in Iraq or Afghanistan, operational and strategic level intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets and additional combat power were quickly brought on station and pushed down to the tactical level to support the on-scene commander. Many times a young platoon leader involved in a “troops in contact” situation quickly found himself maneuvering his platoon under fire against a determined enemy and simultaneously coordinating for support. The leader was required to call for indirect fires, control air weapons teams, and “talk on” close air support. All of these platforms, of course, reside outside the BCT’s immediate organic control. These troops-in-contact events were too often the first opportunities young leaders had the chance to control these assets.

The 82nd Airborne Division’s fires and maneuver community espouses a combined arms approach to training that allows first-time execution to occur at home station as opposed to having it become on-the-job training when under fire for the first time. The 82nd Airborne Division infantry BCTs depend upon the 18th Fires Brigade in our own division formation to provide that training experience. With respect to command oversight in preparation for the fire support coordination exercise (FSCX), the fires brigade commander, in concert with the infantry BCT commander, provide dual-key approval of all combined arms live fire exercises. This close relationship between brigades facilitates a head start toward integrating and validating the future of joint fires in support of combined arms maneuver. The development of our FSCX is a collaborative division-wide effort.
It is safe to assert that artillery units consistently apply standards of precision to live fire training. When it comes to delivering indirect fires accurately and safely, there is no margin for human error. The 82nd Airborne Division’s standard operating procedures and crew drills are widely understood, enforced, and followed. The 18th Fires Brigade maintains proponency of the 82nd Airborne Division’s written standard operating procedures for fires, otherwise known as the “Red Book.” The document contains a compilation of standardization memorandums that provide fire support tactics, techniques, and procedures for all paratroopers assigned to the division.

The first step to the BCT’s planning process for the FSCX is a thorough review of the Red Book with specific focus on the stipulated approach to planning, coordinating, resourcing, and executing an FSCX. The next step is concept development using the Red Book as our guide and the eight-step training model as a handrail for our planning. The division’s standard operating procedure for fires keeps us on a training azimuth for all individual, leader, and collective training and certification requirements. With programmatic issues under control, it was a challenge for the BCT staff to find sufficient time and resources to accomplish the published objective of training every company in the brigade. The method chosen was a month-long intensive training cycle.

The Intensive Training Cycle: A Powerful Tool for the BCT

At our two-day training symposium we agreed that every battalion in the BCT would need 30 days of uninterrupted training time to reach our desired level of collective proficiency. This was the block of training where we would “put it all together” as a team and finally have the opportunity to achieve a degree of harmony in our team play. We protected this time on our calendar. Key to success was to eliminate all distractions and move the entire BCT to the field. Since every battalion had to rotate through an FSCX opportunity, the battalions would have to build their requirements for the remainder of the month around the capstone event. We developed a training rotation where concurrent platoon field training exercises, external company evaluations, and designated squad retraining time were occurring when a unit was not on the FSCX lane. No one was going home at night, so we developed our field-craft as a larger force. This was a unique opportunity tohone our expeditionary skills at the BCT level.

An operations order published three months in advance of execution established the FSCX as the BCT’s main effort during the intensive training cycle. The training focus enabled the fire support coordinator to build planning milestones that supported the FSCX and our gated approach to the BCT training strategy. Although the planning process was initially isolated to the fires warfighting function, battalion commanders and their staffs were soon asked for their respective refinements to the plan. The BCT afforded every battalion the latitude, autonomy, and creativity to develop scalable and realistic tactical scenarios relevant to each battalion’s mission essential task list.

Every company-level commander knew his unit would be in the spotlight during the event—this had the collective effect of driving our young leaders to overprepare. No longer would cogent comments made during leader professional development discussions or the conduct of some other garrison engagement be the sole determinants of their performance evaluations.

These company commanders received a complex set of tasks associated with the FSCX and a broad set of tools to accomplish these tasks. We observed many company commanders with their platoon leaders, platoon sergeants, fire support teams, and mortar sections rehearsing and drilling the same actions they would apply at the FSCX training range. Those young commanders who did not make the same type of investment were easy to identify on the training lane. They struggled in the spotlight of the FSCX.

The plan to carry out an FSCX included some fundamental principles. The first was that every company-sized unit in the BCT would go through the training. We would have a venue for rehearsals built to facilitate walkthroughs, after-action reviews, and professional discussions when companies were not on the actual training site (this was a football field-sized terrain model that accurately depicted every component of the training site). The hot washes and after-action reviews that followed each iteration of the FSCX were disaggregated, with sufficient time to cement the lessons learned.
Each company went through a day iteration (offense) and a night iteration (defense) to exercise both important muscle groups. Development of the offensive “play book” options exercised each unit’s specific mission essential tasks. For example, infantry companies executed a dismounted attack. The cavalry squadron executed a mounted screen live fire exercise where they withdrew under pressure. The brigade special troops battalion’s engineer platoon performed a deliberate breech with their military police platoon in overwatch. Every logistics company across the BCT executed a mounted combat logistics patrol with multiple react-to-contact battle drills. The offensive iterations were consistently a challenge for companies to execute given the inherent difficulty of synchronizing effects on the move and under pressure. The performance of every company improved through night defense iterations, since the lessons of the day iterations were incorporated and the static scenario was more manageable.

The Imperative of Retraining to Standard

We remained steadfast in our commitment to retraining, and yet it still proved a struggle to implement because timelines were tight: 20 company-sized units in 12 days. Consequently, the BCT fenced one day of retraining at mid cycle (day 6) and allocated another retraining day at the end of the cycle (day 12).

In the midst of the FSCX we identified two companies that required retraining with brigade oversight. One company failed to properly utilize their 60mm mortars to cover maneuver, while the other company failed to implement an officer/non-commissioned officer (NCO) partnered approach to execution. The company with 60mm mortar team challenges had a certified section and demonstrated acumen in providing indirect fires from a static position. However, they did not maneuver alongside their company in the “direct lay” mode or deliver the volume of mortar fires required to support the close fight tactical scenario they encountered. We
corrected this deficiency by walking the company commander through two additional iterations without maneuver elements and with the FSCOORD coaching him through the “new” concept. The mortar section sergeant and his team quickly gained an appreciation of how to position tubes with emphasis on when and where mortars should bound and displace while maintaining responsive firing capability. The other retraining issue was easy to identify, but more challenging to correct.

We observed most company commanders effectively using their first sergeants and platoon sergeants during the attack. However, one company did not implement this approach. The senior NCOs were more like potted plants than actual participants in the iteration. We corrected this through a professional discussion during the hot wash and explained the importance of enforcing the partnered team approach at both the platoon and company levels. Our full expectation was for the first sergeant and platoon sergeants to understand the plan just as well as their officer counterparts. We also expected the company officers to leverage the unmatched experience levels of their senior NCOs to navigate the complexity of the dynamic tactical scenario. In retraining, it appeared that the chance to focus on the partnership seemed to unlock the organizational potential of that company. They were exceptional during the retraining iteration.

Where some companies required retraining, other company sized units performed remarkably well under pressure. For example, Alpha Company 2-505 conducted repeated rehearsals both off-site and on the BCT terrain model. This team was well prepared to execute their live fire iteration and effectively employ all weapon systems in their fight. The platoon leader/platoon sergeant teams understood the commander’s intent for fires, knew what assets were available, and possessed a grasp of delivery response times. Equally important, the company fire support officer, along with each platoon forward observer team, clearly articulated fire support tasks, purposes, locations, and triggers for all targets with synchronized movement times and deconflicted airspace along gun target lines. Throughout this company’s deliberate attack to secure the objective, every leader confidently requested the right asset at the right time to best support their maneuver. Because of clear reporting, their higher headquarters quickly approved all fires, and airspace was rapidly deconflicted through U.S. Air Force joint tactical air controllers. Three-dimensional battle space symmetry was achieved, enabling the simultaneous engagement of multiple targets from offset air weapons.

A 60mm mortar team conducts a bounding displacement during the FSCX. (U.S. Army)
teams, close air support, artillery, and mortars. Full-motion video live feeds provided intelligence and battlefield damage assessments. During the unit’s hot wash on the objective area, the company- and platoon-level leadership were asked what contributed to their success. This question was answered without hesitation by an infantry platoon leader, who stated, “we were confident in our abilities, we’ve been planning, preparing, and rehearsing for months, and we’ve executed this same type of scenario in simulation several times over.”

**Achieving Harmony on the Training Field**

Achieving harmony on the training field takes considerable time, organizational patience, and careful preparation. Bringing each weapon system to bear in an FSCX scenario to appropriately support the troops on the ground with massed effects should be the culmination of a deliberately orchestrated training progression. Giving our leaders the time to work with each weapon system and train on each platform in isolation to appreciate their capabilities demands a pronounced organizational commitment. Capitalizing on the growing availability of simulations and virtual training opportunities to test that understanding under stress requires discipline in the training management realm. There will inevitably be discord where training resources disappear or the right leaders are unavailable for whatever reason. All these training distracters will make achieving that “harmony” of effects elusive in advance of a capstone training event. However, executing that capstone event with plenty of time allocated to work and retrain creates a momentum and synergy all its own. Your teams will find a way to get ready because young commanders want to do well. We have the responsibility to give them the tools and the instruction to prepare them properly so they will do well. At the BCT level there must be a similar commitment to test these newly discovered skills for all company-level leaders in an environment that approximates combat.

Gen. Patton obviously had it right when he suggested that team play wins. We would only add to that poignant aphorism that you must first build your teams and walk them through the paces of a sound training progression before you are in a position to fully capitalize on the benefits of team play. There is a significant degree of focus in the 82nd Airborne Division on mastering these fundamental concepts. Our battalion command teams are seeing that the science and art of fires integration and synchronization are skills that we must teach our junior leaders or they will not be able to apply them under enemy fire. As well, the partnership of our senior NCOs with their officer counterparts during the FSCX cemented a principle that should define our fighting forces in the future—we must work together to get all important business done; there is no longer officer business and NCO business—it is all soldier business.

...there is no longer officer business and NCO business—it is all soldier business.

We have very little control over the direction of the new and more dangerous strategic environment that is emerging, but we have total control over how demanding and exceptional we make our training environment. Confident and competent leaders who are thoroughly prepared will achieve the “harmony of effects and team play” required to support combined arms maneuver. Patton would not be surprised to find that the fundamental concepts driving harmony and team play on the modern battlefield remain unchanged. MR
IN 1840, PRUSSIAN Maj. Gen. Carl von Drecker traveled to French Algeria as a military observer. In the French counterinsurgency campaign against Abdel-Kadr’s insurgency he found a vastly different war than what he was used to studying in Europe. Drecker saw no use for Carl von Clausewitz’ *On War*, written just eight years prior, in defeating a guerrilla insurrection. Contrary to Clausewitz’s work, Drecker remarked that there was “no center of gravity” to be found in irregular warfare. He continued, “The finest gimmicks of our newest theoreticians of war lose their magic power . . . indeed, the most sublime ‘Theory of Great War’ will be obsolete and one has . . . to come up with a new one.”

There would indeed be a new theory, one focused on the difficulties inherent in countering insurgencies. The lessons learned by the French in places like Vietnam, Morocco, Madagascar, and Algeria would become the intellectual underpinnings of the “population-centric” school of counterinsurgency. French practitioners such as Joseph Gallieni and Gallieni’s understudy, the French Marshall Louis Hubert Gonzalve Lyautey, put population-centric methods to good use, and David Galula captured them in his widely read book, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*. The core of population-centric counterinsurgency is the belief that the civilian population is the center of gravity and, if the counterinsurgents win the loyalty of the population, the insurgency will be defeated. The most recent expression of this school is the current U.S. Army and Marine Corps doctrine for counterinsurgency, designated Field Manual (FM) 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*.

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However, another theory maintains that a focus on the population is folly, and counterinsurgents must focus solely on the pursuit and destruction of insurgent fighters. Theorists like U.S. Army Col. Gian Gentile, a West Point professor; retired U.S. Army Col. Ralph Peters; Israeli theorist (and Clausewitz critic) Professor Martin Van Crevald; and British military theorist William F. Owen vociferously deny the utility of population-centric methods and argue that seeking out and destroying the enemy is the counterinsurgent’s path to success.

The problem is that both of these theories are wrong. They are built on an inaccurate idea of the center of gravity concept and a misunderstanding of Clausewitz’s theory as a whole. Both ideas assume a predictable, static relationship between the enemy, the civilian population, and the insurgency itself. Despite Drecker’s protestations, it is Clausewitz who offers the most insight into insurgencies, and his ideas reveal that a more comprehensive method is required for successful counterinsurgency. Unfortunately, the dichotomous argument between fallacious enemy-centric and population-centric ideas so dominates the debate that reality is obscured. In On War, Clausewitz’s most important recommendation is that statesmen and commanders must understand the kind of war in which they are engaged. However, they must also first understand war itself.

The Trinity

This essay points out that the analytical reductionism inherent in both ideas has clouded the theories as well as the practice of counterinsurgency. It does so with a focus on third party support to host nations that are fighting an insurgency, also referred to as Foreign Internal Defense.

The central theory in On War is Clausewitz’s “wondrous trinity” describing the forces that affect war and warfare. He believed that war could be thought of as being suspended between three “magnets”: primordial violence, hatred, and enmity; chance and probability; and war’s subordination to rational policy. He further connected each of these aspects with a physical manifestation as an example. The population is usually paired with primordial hatred and violence and the armed forces with chance and probability. The government is responsible for the policy.

While some have used this structure to claim that Clausewitz’s ideas do not apply to nonstate actors and irregulars, it is important to remember that the secondary trinity was merely an example of how the primary trinity can manifest itself. These three constructs exist in an insurgency just as they do in any other war. Although insurgencies usually do not possess a formal military or government, at least at first, they have irregular fighters, they formulate political aims and attempt to establish governmental bodies, and they derive from the population. Whether or not that manifestation is present, the underlying primary trinity remains. Clausewitz went on to say, “A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless.”

Despite this warning, modern counterinsurgency theorists have indeed ignored the portions of the trinity and their interrelated nature. Each theory ignores two of the three aspects of the trinity and, furthermore, assumes an arbitrary relationship between the enemy, the population, and the political goals of the insurgency as a whole that does not exist.

Population-centric theorists predict that without the population, the insurgent military forces cannot or will not continue to pursue their policy goals. Similarly, enemy-centric theorists assume that attrition alone will defeat the enemy’s will, at which point the population will simply adopt the policy goals of the counterinsurgents.

These ideas are the result of conflating means into ends. Gaining the support of the population or killing and capturing insurgents are means to affect the enemy’s will, but not ends in and of themselves. Put in terms of Clausewitz’s wondrous trinity, the current theorists propose to remove one “magnet” and believe the other two will automatically become irrelevant.

This is a result of theorists searching for a center of gravity without understanding the concept itself. Clausewitz describes it as “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends.” He went on to cite examples of centers of gravity, but nowhere does he connect them with specific nodes of the trinity. The center of gravity exists between the nodes, binds them together, acts upon
them, and is acted upon by them. It’s a charismatic leader or a popular ideology, to borrow two of the Prussian’s examples. Thus, it shifts between nodes with the pendulum. Napoleon, as a center of gravity, animated the population, dominated policy, and commanded the army. The two counterinsurgency schools not only falsely identify the center of gravity, but wrongly assume that it is static.

Systems theory also sheds light on how misguided current thought on counterinsurgency has become. Systems theory teaches that there are two types of systems. Structurally complex, or linear, systems work in a predictable manner and consist of parts that have little freedom of movement. Examples of structurally complex systems include automobiles, machine guns, and howitzers. However, interactively complex or nonlinear systems consist of components that have freedom of action and interact in unpredictable ways. Examples of interactively complex systems include economics, diplomacy, war (including insurgencies), and warfare.

For either prevailing theories of counterinsurgency to be feasible, one must assume a predictable, repeatable, cause-and-effect relationship between components. In the case of enemy-centric counterinsurgency, the assumption is that tactical defeat of insurgent fighters will cause collapse of the insurgency. The population-centric school assumes the same sort of popular support for the insurgents. This logic would work if insurgencies were structurally complex; cut the fuel line and the car will stop moving. However, an insurgency is not a machine composed of detailed components that operate in a fixed and predictable manner, and such a simplistic outlook cannot help but be incorrect. Rather, insurgencies are dynamic, nonlinear entities whose parts interact in unpredictable and complex ways.

Praxis
Insurgencies do not fail solely because they lack support of the population or suffer defeat on the battlefield. They slowly drown in a rising tide of defeat across multiple dimensions, amongst the population, on the battlefield, and in their policy goals. Simplistic strategies that ignore this will fail. Clausewitz’s pendulum can be struck and a
system’s fuel line cut, but the trinity will realign and the system will heal. Rather, the trinity’s nodes must be seized and the insurgents’ system flooded. Insurgencies die through suffocation, a lack of freedom to self-correct. Clausewitz alluded to this when he wrote that for an insurgency to be successful it “cannot sustain itself where the atmosphere is too full of danger . . . and it [the insurgency] must be at some distance, where there is enough air, and the uprising cannot be smothered by a single stroke.”

The counterinsurgent force that ignores the insurgents’ military force, the population from which they derive, or the legitimacy and efficacy of the government that they oppose provides a venue that the insurgent forces can exploit.

Successful counterinsurgency methods deny the insurgents air and space. To bridge the gap between theory and praxis, the counterinsurgent must fuse the two methods into a comprehensive strategy, one flexible enough to pivot among the three aspects of the trinity while not ignoring any one. It may be that, when it comes to defeating an insurgency, there is no singular decisive center of gravity that will lead to success. Counterinsurgents will not win a Gettysburg or a Stalingrad. Rather, victory lies with the culmination of an ever-growing tide of attrition, subversion, and coercion.

Counterinsurgents must formulate a comprehensive strategy that fosters in the minds of the insurgents a feeling of creeping and inevitable death at every turn. As war is a struggle of wills, and the opponent’s will is a psychological entity, only the psychological means (including the psychological effects of defeat in combat) can truly attack it. Insurgent fighters must pursue relentlessly, violently, and vigorously so the play of chance and probability seems increasingly skewed toward their extinction. They must see their rational political aims become increasingly improbable as the legitimacy and effectiveness of the nation’s government increases. They must perceive that the passion of the population for their cause is minimized or negated by the counterinsurgent forces.

Utilizing Clausewitz’s secondary trinity as a conduit to affect the primary trinity is the route through which the counterinsurgent must destroy the enemy’s will and psychology. The relations between the trinity will inevitably ebb and flow, and these tides must be successfully navigated by a constantly adapting counterinsurgent force. The tides resemble Col. John Boyd’s prescriptions to “enmesh [the] adversary in a world of uncertainty, doubt, mistrust, confusion, disorder, fear, panic, [and] chaos,” and “magnify their internal friction, produce paralysis [and] bring about their collapse.” The two major schools of thought are insufficient and the continued debate between them stifles progress toward a better understanding. Only a comprehensive theory of victory that considers all three aspects of the secondary trinity as method to affect the enemy’s primary trinity in the pursuit of political ends will lead to decisive strategic effects.

To be sure, the counterinsurgent military force is not solely responsible, or equipped, to conduct a comprehensive strategy. Counterinsurgency is a national-level undertaking. The military strategy must be nested within the larger strategy. While the active insurgent fighters may not always be the center of gravity, defeating them is certainly a good step toward success; thus, the military strategy and the military forces executing it should focus on killing and capturing insurgents. However, other elements of national power must contribute. Additionally, gaining the trust and confidence of the local population can play a part in a larger strategy as well. It is when these two ways become ends that the strategy will fall apart.

...gaining the trust and confidence of the local population can play a part in a larger strategy as well.

History
There are countless historical examples that illustrate these points. In the American Revolution, the British shifted forces to the southern colonies hoping to take advantage of loyalist
sentiment there. Instead, their presence caused a virtual civil war between patriots and loyalists that negated any British military gains. In the Second Boer war, the Boers were defeated by the British in highly conventional fighting, but then transitioned to irregular warfare and continued to fight. During the French-Indochina War, the French enjoyed political control in South Vietnam, but were undone by catastrophic military defeat at the hands of the insurgents at Dien Bien Phu. The French in Algeria and the Americans in Vietnam discovered that military success on the battlefield can be undone by political developments on the home front.

There is a thread of commonality for successful counterinsurgency efforts as well. During the Philippine Insurrection, the U.S. Army fused both ideas to achieve success. The British eventually did defeat the Boers with a combination of enemy-centric, population-centric, and political tactics. In Malaya, the Briggs plan added political and population-centric methods to ongoing British military operations to produce success against communist insurgents. During the Huk rebellion in the Philippines, the American Central Intelligence Agency operative Edward Lansdale and the Philippine politician Ramon Magsaysay designed a comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign that led to success. In Sri Lanka, brutal fighting and marginalization of the Tamil population, aided by geography, overwhelmed the insurgency over the course of 25 years from 1983 to 2009. In Iraq in 2006, it was a combination of increased U.S. troop presence and the Iraqi population’s turn against the insurgents that led to success. One of the best examples was the French counterinsurgency in Madagascar where Gallieni, one of the fathers of population-centric counterinsurgency, used a mix of force, civil affairs, and political control to snuff
out the Hova insurrection. Gallieni described this successful method as a “combination of political action with military action” while simultaneously establishing “intimate contact with the populations, exploring their tendencies, their mentality, and striving to satisfy their needs in order to attach them through persuasion to the new institutions.”7 This is a clear description of a comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign.

**Case Study: Operation Enduring Freedom**

The American military is currently receiving a harsh lesson in counterinsurgency at the hands of the Taliban in Afghanistan. The United States found itself confronting an insurgency after the events of 9/11 and the quick military defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan. The attacks on the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and Flight 93 precipitated a U.S. invasion of Afghanistan where the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization was based. The ruling regime in Afghanistan, the Taliban, had long provided sanctuary for Osama bin-Laden and the core of Al-Qaeda. Although the Department of Defense had no plan in place to attack Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom was adroitly planned and executed with heavy CIA involvement.8 A blindingly fast campaign based on Special Operations Forces and support to the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance succeeded in toppling the Taliban government in less than a month.9 It forced the Al-Qaeda leadership, including Osama bin-Laden, to flee to Pakistan within two months.10 An enemy-centric method for the defeat of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan seemed the right choice as the U.S. success left Afghanistan under the control of the United States and free of meaningful resistance by the end of 2001.

At this point, having achieved success in the military sphere, the United States had a great opportunity to focus on the other legs of the trinity to consolidate its gains against Taliban resurgence. Afghanistan remained relatively quiet for years following the defeat of the Taliban; consequently, the number of foreign troops in Afghanistan was kept to a minimum. In fact, it was the smallest U.S. peacekeeping force since World War II, falling as low as just 6,000 U.S. troops.11 Unfortunately, the NATO leadership squandered this opportunity to make progress in the government and population dimensions within Afghanistan.

In 2003, U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad and U.S. Army Lt. Gen. David Barno, the military commander in Afghanistan, made great strides toward a more comprehensive strategy.12 However, the strategy collapsed as resources and talent were siphoned from Afghanistan into the ongoing war in Iraq. The United States at this time did not view the Taliban as a “strategic threat,” instead believing that its earlier military defeat was sufficient to destroy the organization. 13 The country received scant resources, far less than the aid per capita provided to Bosnia in the mid-1990s.14 Douglas J. Feith, under secretary of defense for policy, remarked that, “nation building is not our strategic goal” (emphasis in original).15 In 2008, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Michael Mullen described the effort in Afghanistan at the time as an “economy of force” mission.16 U.S. troops in Afghanistan were tasked to “hunt the Taliban and Al-Qaeda,” not assist the government or population of the country.17 Despite

Rescue workers drape the American flag on the Pentagon after the 9/11 attack. (U.S. Government)
improvements in the Afghan economy, NATO and Afghan forces began paying for their neglect of Clausewitz’s trinity. 18 Between 2005 and 2006, suicide attacks quadrupled and other armed attacks tripled. 19 Following their truce with Pakistan, Taliban forces had regrouped and were beginning to focus their efforts on retaking Afghanistan from the NATO forces. 20 Insufficient efforts in all three dimensions of Clausewitz’s trinity provided the Taliban this opportunity. In this case, even a more robust military effort in Afghanistan would not have prevented the Taliban from reconstituting in Pakistan and attacking again.

In contrast to NATO’s strategy, the Taliban’s offensive in 2006 was more aligned with the trinity. While continuing to fight NATO forces, the Taliban installed a “shadow government” to provide the population an alternative to the Afghan government under President Hamid Karzai. 21 The Taliban even targeted religious leaders friendly to the Karzai government for assassination to prevent them from convincing the population to support Karzai. 22 In late-2008, increasing violence prompted the Bush administration to conduct a review of its efforts in Afghanistan. That review found violence had risen 500 percent in the previous five years, and Afghan approval of NATO forces had dropped by 33 percent within the last year. These findings prompted a reinforcement of 10,000 U.S. troops to the 32,000 present at the time. 23 In June 2009, Congress confirmed Gen. Stanley McChrystal to command NATO forces in Afghanistan, and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates ordered the general to conduct a strategic review of the situation. 24 This analysis found that NATO forces were “disconnected” from the Afghan populace and “preoccupied with the protection of our own forces.” 25 Additionally, the report found weak Afghan state institutions, a high level of corruption, and frequent abuses on the part of the Afghan government. 26 The report recommended a population-centric counterinsurgency effort that would require additional troop reinforcements. In November 2009, President Obama approved just such a plan and a U.S. troop increase of 30,000. 27 The new mission for NATO included taking control of key population centers and lines of communication and building the governance capability. 28 Thus, the United States finally began to address all three legs of the trinity, albeit while focusing on the Afghan population, eight years after the initial invasion.

Despite the renewed focus on the population, a secret NATO report leaked to the BBC in January 2012 indicated that, in Afghanistan, popular support for the Taliban insurgency increased and Afghan civilians welcomed Taliban efforts at governance. 29 Even if NATO forces were more successful in wooing the Afghan population, it would not have a decisive effect on the Taliban war effort. Afghanistan is a country of over 30 million people. 30 If counterinsurgent forces gain the support of 90 percent of the population, an improbable amount of success, that still leaves the Taliban a support system of three million people. Thus far, the course of Operation Enduring Freedom belies the notion that pure enemy-centric methods or pure population-centric methods will produce success. The Taliban were almost entirely ejected from Afghanistan, yet NATO’s failure to build the Afghan government and protect and control the population opened the door for the Taliban to return. Now that the Taliban has reestablished itself in Afghanistan, winning over the population, if that were even possible, will not be enough to drive them out.

**Conclusion**

To be sure, a comprehensive method that simultaneously pursues victory along numerous dimensions would be a massive, expensive, and bloody undertaking. It is for that reason policymakers must understand the need for a comprehensive strategy before committing to a counterinsurgency campaign, just as they should for any conflict. The counterinsurgents will almost always have constrained resources, but theories that promise a shortcut by targeting only one
dimension of an insurgency are simply snake oil that must be rejected. They cannot correctly inform the statesmen and commanders as they attempt to heed Clausewitz’s command to understand the nature of the conflict. There is no easy way to attack an insurgency’s center of gravity, and there is no singular critical vulnerability. As Clausewitz said, “The victor . . . must strike with all his strength and not just against a fraction of the enemy’s.”

Emphasis mine) Boyd also described just such a comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign, listing military, population, and governmental efforts that must be simultaneously employed to succeed. Even FM 3-24 recommends a wide range of tactics that span multiple lines of operation, but does so in a confusing manner while still professing the centrality of the population. If the defense community continues to cling to fadish, shallow portrayals of counterinsurgency, it will continue to, as Colin S. Gray warned, “encourage an indiscriminate massacre of both guilty and innocent concepts.”

The U.S. counterinsurgency manual is currently under revision. Of course, doctrine is not theory but rather best practices that have been successful in the past. However, it would be wise to get the theoretical context correct to better inform the doctrine. Thus far, the defense community has been remiss in this crucial pursuit. Foundational theory, like Clausewitz’s On War, that seeks first to holistically understand the nature of war, should be the starting point for any theory rather than counterinsurgency specific texts. Thus far, these works have been collections of practices specific to a particular time and place. While they should certainly inform American strategy going forward, they are insufficient. Theorists who misunderstand or cherry-pick On War to support a sophomoric fantasy of enemy-centric counterinsurgency should be ignored. It is past time the U.S. military move beyond the simplistic population-versus-enemy dichotomy and realize that while counterinsurgency is a specific type of warfare, it is still war and thus subject to the same immutable and timeless forces as any other war. American unfamiliarity with counterinsurgency and the wounds of Vietnam blinded us to this fact. It is past time we take off the blinders.MR
Managing Risk in Today’s Army

Maj. Brendan Gallagher, U.S. Army

Of all the characteristics an organizational-level leader must exhibit, one of the most important is the ability to manage risk effectively. A three-part analysis consisting of, first, what recent U.S. Army doctrine has to say about the topic, second, how elements of risk are embedded within virtually every significant leadership decision in the current operating environment, and finally, what implications in today’s Army help shed light on this critical leadership issue.

The Doctrinal Context

Recent Army doctrine addresses the topic of risk in several publications, each from a slightly different perspective. First, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, published October 2011, provides a conceptual foundation for the Army’s recent shift to Unified Land Operations. Within its trim 14-page length, it also directly addresses risk in the following passage:

The theater of operations often contains more space and people than U.S. forces can directly control. Army leaders routinely face making risk mitigation decisions about where and how to employ their forces to achieve a position of relative advantage over the enemy without alienating or endangering noncombatants.¹

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The passage implies that every decision invariably carries an opportunity cost. When a leader decides to employ combat power or influence in a particular way, it generally means he or she cannot employ those same resources in another potentially deserving location at the same time. Therefore, a leader must remain cognizant of the operational variables—political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT)—and the mission variables—mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations (METT-TC)—to understand how the various dynamics interconnect and arrive at a decision.

Field Manual (FM) 5-0, *The Operations Process*, March 2010, addresses risk as well. It discusses how to design an operational approach and it expands upon the link between risk and resources. FM 5-0 stresses that “rarely does one organization directly control all the necessary resources,” and a commander must determine “the acceptable level of risk to seize, retain, or exploit the initiative.” Inherently finite resources will drive critical decisions, which can determine what side gains or maintains the initiative. Where to allocate limited intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance collection assets, where and when to focus combat patrols, and where to emplace a combat outpost are examples of such decisions. In this way, FM 5-0 elaborates upon the connection between the allocation of resources and the assumption of risk.

Risk mitigation is addressed from a slightly different angle in FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*, October 2008. It describes an “interdependent relationship among initiative, opportunity, and risk,” and insists leaders “accept prudent risk to create opportunities when they lack clear direction.” FM 3-07’s incorporation of opportunity helps expand the horizon of the discussion. If a leader is unable or unwilling to assume some degree of risk at critical junctures, it could eliminate the possibility of generating or capitalizing upon such fleeting opportunities.

A recent example of the link between risk and opportunity was the 2007 Sunni Awakening in Baghdad, in which groups of former insurgents stepped forward to break away from Al-Qaeda in Iraq. U.S. commanders at various levels knowingly assumed some obvious risk by allying with these groups to help marginalize or defeat Al-Qaeda in Iraq. Although the Iraqi government continues to grapple with the long-term integration of these former insurgents, U.S. commanders on the ground positively embraced the opportunity. This typified a clear example of the often-challenging balance between risk and opportunity, which FM 3-07 describes.

Although the Iraqi government continues to grapple with the long-term integration of these former insurgents, U.S. commanders on the ground positively embraced this opportunity.

Finally, a slightly older publication, FM 5-19 *Composite Risk Management*, August 2006, also addresses the topic of risk. In contrast to the previous publications, the focus of FM 5-19 is upon the mechanics of risk management. It lays out a systematic process, as depicted in the diagram below. The manual also addresses how to apply this process in conjunction with troop leading procedures, the military decision making process, and overall training management. Although FM 5-19 tends to be somewhat formulaic in its approach, it provides a concrete sequence for units to use during the decision making process.

Collectively, these publications demonstrate the manner in which official Army doctrine has addressed the topic of risk in recent years. They help underscore several key points. First, they highlight the finite resource constraints that are an inherent part of combat operations and how risk is directly tied to them. Second, these publications underline the linkages between risk, initiative, and the exploitation of battlefield opportunities. Furthermore, they provide a deliberate process for units to follow as they work through such challenges. This doctrinal
Risk and the Current Operating Environment

One must appreciate that virtually every leadership decision is fraught with risk, since the presence of risk helps comprise the very definition of what a “decision” is. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, a decision means “the making up of one’s mind on any point or course of action; a resolution, determination.” The definition implies a tradeoff between different paths—in other words, a leader must choose one action over another by comparing the respective costs and benefits. If one course of action is entirely risk-free in every way, then a decision is probably not required because the correct path is obvious. However, leaders today rarely find themselves in such simple circumstances. More frequently there are tradeoffs, and rather than a straightforward choice between good and bad or black and white, leaders today often tend to find themselves operating in murkier shades of gray.

In such instances, each potential path embodies different degrees of risk in various areas, whether in terms of risk to the overall mission, risk to subordinates’ lives, or other areas. It falls upon the leaders’ shoulders to grapple with these competing factors, usually with incomplete information, limited time, and less-than-optimal circumstances.

A hypothetical example helps demonstrate this all-encompassing aspect of risk in practice in the current environment. Suppose a maneuver unit deployed to a combat zone receives credible information regarding a high value target’s (HVT) whereabouts later tonight. This particular HVT is a low-level insurgent financier whose transactions facilitate attacks against coalition forces. The unit had previously planned to focus on route reconnaissance operations during that same time period because the unit has endured numerous improvised explosive device (IED) strikes, and aggressive reconnaissance during those hours helps deny key
terrain to the enemy. The unit’s commander and staff have carefully analyzed the situation and determined they do not have sufficient combat power to conduct both operations. Tonight, they must choose—either conduct a raid of the HVT’s location or focus on counter-IED patrolling. If they choose the raid, they may potentially capture the HVT but at the same time allow the emplacement of IEDs, due to the lack of reconnaissance. They can try to mitigate that risk using intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and other assets creatively, but ultimately the unit may still assume potentially greater risk from IEDs. Alternatively, a focus on route reconnaissance should help secure the routes, which may help save soldiers’ lives in the short term, but could also allow the insurgent financier to slip away for good. Either way, long-term consequences are embedded within this decision.

To further muddy the waters, suppose the unit also received scattered, unconfirmed reports of a planned insurgent attack against a friendly combat outpost sometime in the next two weeks. With this additional information, perhaps another course of action would be to forego both the raid and the route reconnaissance, and instead use all available combat power to bolster the outpost’s defenses. Yet such a decision would heighten the risk in those other two areas—facilitating the financier’s possible escape, and allowing the emplacement of additional IEDs.

One can see from this admittedly simplistic example why there is almost never a straightforward risk-free path. The commander and his staff deal with many conflicting strands of data and intelligence, and each potential path entails differing degrees of risk. The risks may include the weighing of short-term versus long-term priorities, progress in kinetic versus non-kinetic areas, and countless other tradeoffs. The weight of the decision ultimately rests upon the commander’s shoulders, yet the staff is also heavily involved, as the staff should provide him with a recommended course of action, including a method to mitigate the residual risks.

Sgt. Christopher Meinke, left, and Sgt. Shawn Hatley, both from A Troop, 3rd Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment, pull security near the site of a roadside bomb attack on a U.S. convoy in Baghdad’s Adhamiyah neighborhood, 21 August 2008. (U.S. Army)
Whatever decision the unit arrives at can have life or death consequences and can directly affect mission accomplishment.

One can further appreciate that at the organizational level, a leader’s decisions can generate exceptionally far-reaching effects. Whereas at the direct level of leadership units are generally smaller with effects more readily apparent, at the organizational level, there are usually many more factors at play, and results may be simultaneously more indirect yet more consequential. The job of an organizational level leader is often more challenging for this reason, because he or she must account for a wider degree of complexity with more protracted effects. This often requires an even more sustained and focused application of judgment, experience, and creativity than is required at the direct level of leadership. All this adds to the importance of the leader’s decisions and the management of risk.

In the “hybrid” environment the Army currently confronts, which includes both conventional and insurgent threats on an ever-changing battlefield, this assessment and mitigation of risk can be exceptionally complex. After a suicide blast or IED explosion or some other traumatic event, one may be tempted to look back in hindsight and comment on the unit’s leadership and ask why they did not do things differently. In retrospect, one might ask, “Why could they not see the train coming?” However, before traveling down that road, one should consider the myriad threat streams and competing demands existing at the time of the decision. One must attempt to acquire a true sense of what it was like to be in the leadership’s place at the time without the benefit of hindsight, in an environment with few unequivocally “right” answers.

Implications and Relevance to Today’s Army

All this carries important implications regarding the exercise of leadership in the present-day Army. First, it is worth noting at the outset what will not be a useful technique for leaders to adopt in dealing with this challenge: risk aversion. Risk aversion entails an excessive desire to avoid risk at virtually any cost, which can paralyze a unit into inaction or squander key opportunities. In the current environment, this is sometimes characterized by units spending most of their time on fortified bases, hunkered down behind layers of thick defenses with minimal interaction. Such a posture relinquishes the initiative to the enemy, and may create a perception that U.S. forces are unwilling or unable to complete their mission. Risk aversion contributes to an excessively cautious approach, which overly centralizes decision making at higher echelons of authority, and tends to stifle individual initiative. Curiously, the only time FM 5-19, Composite Risk Management directly addresses the topic of risk aversion is in a single, brief sentence: “Do not be risk averse.” The topic of risk aversion deserves further discussion throughout the ranks.

Army leaders at the organizational level and above should appreciate that even successful efforts to mitigate risk in the most prudent and logical ways can still result in occasional losses or outright disaster. Even when taking all the correct precautionary measures, U.S. forces still confront an intelligent, thinking, adaptive enemy, and “the enemy always gets a vote.” Since no unit can guard against every threat at every place and time, there will invariably be instances when the enemy achieves a short-term success via a high-profile attack, assassination, or some other action. Such a negative event may be accompanied by unflattering U.S. media coverage, a rise in organizational stress, and an accompanying desire to hold someone accountable. Yet a rush to judgment may be profoundly unfair to the unit closest to the event and counterproductive to the long-term climate of the Army. A leader’s goal is to establish conditions so such setbacks occur as rarely as possible, but with the implicit understanding that eliminating setbacks is not always achievable.

This is not a recommendation to absolve commanders of accountability for their actions. Leaders unequivocally shoulder the ultimate responsibility for the decisions they make or fail to make, as well as the actions of their subordinate units. Yet there is an enormous gulf between a leader who consistently makes the best decisions possible in an ambiguous, uncertain environment and a leader who is simply negligent, careless, unfit for command, or fosters a poor command climate. There is also a fine line between justly holding leaders accountable for their actions, and “scapegoating.” The Army would be wise to bear such key distinctions in mind in the
years ahead to help foster the best climate possible. This is particularly relevant as the Army seeks to internalize lessons learned from recent high-profile events.

This also helps illustrate why an unofficial adoption of a “zero defect” approach—a phrase which gained prevalence in the Army during the 1990s—would be unfortunate. As the Army appears ready to begin a sizeable drawdown of units and personnel, there may be increasing pressure to only promote or retain those individuals with a spotless record, clear of any blemish whatsoever. Some highly qualified officers and NCOs could find their careers cut short due to a singular setback that occurred on their watch. Such an environment—or even the perception of such an environment—could have negative consequences. It could help prod the Army toward a risk adverse culture by instilling a perception that leaders cannot afford any mistake whatsoever. Commanders could increasingly choose to “play it safe” during training and combat operations out of a desire to avoid jeopardizing their own careers. The widespread adoption of such a mentality could make it harder for Army leaders in the future to make a major decision containing significant risk. It would have been difficult, perhaps impossible, for Eisenhower to green light an invasion of Normandy, for example, had he been paralyzed by risk aversion or a zero defect climate.

Risk mitigation is not an exact science, and there is no such thing as a riskless decision. The process is an art, and even when performed brilliantly, leaders will still occasionally confront setbacks or even outright failure. The multitude of decisions an organizational leader is responsible for every day can literally have life or death impacts, either directly or through secondary repercussions. Yet a leader cannot eliminate every risk on the modern battlefield, because no human could ever achieve such an end state. Rather, a leader must intelligently assume risk in deliberate ways, while seeking to mitigate the residual risks in the smartest ways.

Landing ships putting cargo ashore on Omaha Beach at low tide during the first days of the operation, mid-June, 1944. Note barrage balloons overhead and Army half-track convoy forming up on the beach. The LST-262 was one of 10 Coast Guard-manned LSTs that participated in the invasion of Normandy, France. (U. S. Coast Guard)
possible. Leaders have no choice but to carefully weigh all the various factors in the context of their own best judgment and experience, and commit to what they believe represents the wisest course of action, despite incomplete and often conflicting information.

True breakthroughs on the battlefield will often arrive through “a willingness to accept risk, and do things differently.”12 Operation Overlord and Operation Market Garden represented examples of such risk taking during World War II, with strikingly different results. In the future, the Army’s success may not result from absolute perfection, but rather from experimentation, learning from failure, and the implementation of logical measures to manage risk. Such techniques should be encouraged rather than inadvertently constrained, as the Army strives to find the right balance between the instillation of accountability and the encouragement of sensible risk taking. These two areas are not treated as mutually opposing goals. Overall, the Army should appreciate that how this issue is handled will help determine the Army’s trajectory in the years to come. MR

NOTES

ON 10 JANUARY 2007, President George W. Bush announced that 20,000 additional American troops would deploy to Iraq. The military purpose of this move, now known simply as “the Surge,” would be to secure Baghdad, reinforce success in al Anbar province, and give the fledgling Iraqi government time to solve the political problems tearing Iraq apart. Its greater strategic purpose—unspoken by senior U.S. leaders but clear to everyone—was to prevent the blow to national prestige that would occur if, as appeared imminent, the U.S. military were defeated in Iraq.

Using the additional forces and the counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine that he had helped develop, Gen. David Petraeus led Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) to achieve success that exceeded the expectations of even the most diehard COIN advocates. By the time the Surge was finished, the capability and reach of Al-Qaeda in Iraq had greatly diminished; the Jaish al-Mahdi, the militia of the rebel Shi’a cleric Muctadr Sadr, had begun to lay down its arms; violence had decreased to levels not seen since early 2004; and the Iraqi government had implemented some of the political compromises necessary for a stable Iraq.

Future historians will no doubt consider the Surge to be the most convincing and unexpectedly successful campaign that the U.S. military waged in Iraq and Afghanistan. Attesting to this future judgment is the growing number of impressive books that analyze this success, to include Tom Ricks’ The Gamble, Bing West’s The Strongest Tribe, Bob Woodward’s The War Within, Linda Robinson’s Tell Me How This Ends, and Michael Gordon and Gen. Bernard Trainor’s Endgame.

However, within this campaign’s already resplendent historiography, Dr. Peter Mansoor’s Surge: My Journey with General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq War, stands apart. It is no wonder that it does. Mansoor possesses unique credentials for writing it.
In 2000, Mansoor’s *The GI Offensive in Europe* won the Society for Military History and the Army Historical Society’s distinguished book award. His 2008 memoir describing his time in Iraq as commander of the 1st Brigade of the 1st Armored Division, *Baghdad at Sunrise*, also received critical acclaim. During the Surge itself, Mansoor served as Petraeus’s executive officer. As this campaign wound down, Mansoor left Iraq to retire and take the position of General Raymond E. Mason Jr. Chair of Military History at his graduate alma mater, Ohio State University, where he remains today.

Mansoor is, in short, an accomplished military historian and proven combat leader. What is more, his position as Petraeus’s executive officer gave him almost unique access to the story of the Surge. Mansoor had Petraeus’s staff assemble an archive of primary source documents, which he was later able to get declassified and to reference as he wrote the book. If Petraeus himself were to write a memoir of MNF-I’s role in this campaign, it is possible that historians would consider Petraeus’s account no more authoritative.

If Petraeus were to write such a book, the reader gets an excellent sense of what he would say in his long Foreword to *Surge*. Here, Petraeus declares that the “surge of ideas” was even more important than the “surge of forces.” Two of these ideas were that the most important terrain in Iraq was the human terrain and that the most important mission of coalition forces was to protect Iraqis. Other “big ideas” included a comprehensive civil-military approach, the need to support and grow the Sunni Awakening, the aggressive use of targeted special operations, the education of detainees and other programs to reduce recidivism, and the importance of being “first with the truth” in the media. Some readers will consider this insightful Foreword alone worth the book’s price.

Mansoor’s chapters add the flesh of details to the bones of this Foreword. These details are enhanced by analysis informed by much experience, study, and reflection.

Mansoor begins with an incisive narrative of the post-invasion events that led to a “war almost lost.” This narrative is most original, authentic, and important when told from his perspective as a brigade commander in Baghdad. After all, it was during this crucial period that poor political decisions, a lack of a coherent military plan, and often awful military tactics enflamed the Sunni insurgency and radicalized the Sadrist movement.

In his second chapter, “Designing the Surge,” he gives an insider’s view of the process by which the Surge was designed and the rise of COIN theory, doctrine, and training. He discusses the COIN Center that he established at Fort Leavenworth, the writing and staffing of our military’s COIN manual, and the famous “Council of Colonels” that he and then-Col. H.R. McMaster took part in as two of the Army’s representatives.

The narrative then moves to Baghdad and the implementation of the Surge. The reader is given access to such details as Petraeus’s battle rhythm (to include Petraeus’s weekly video teleconferences with President Bush), Petraeus’s working relationships with Ambassador Ryan Crocker and Gen. Raymond Odierno, and the eccentric, highly educated personalities (often referred to as the “COINDistas”) with whom Petraeus surrounded himself.

This stage-setting discussion evolves into chapters largely devoted to specific events, including the Sunni Awakening; Petraeus’s and Crocker’s testimony to Congress; and the “Charge of the Knights,” the critical battle for Basrah that proved just as important as the Sunni Awakening to reducing Iraq’s level of violence.

Throughout it all, the reader realizes just how much the success of the Surge was due to an almost miraculous alignment of the stars. Mansoor points out, for example, that the Sunnis had to be brutalized for years by Al-Qaeda in Iraq and Shi’a death squads before they could stop fighting and start working with U.S. forces, the one ally who might prevent their becoming a persecuted minority in the new Iraq. He relates how Nouri al-Maliki, Iraq’s prime minister, had to learn to view the Jaish al-Mahdi as a personal threat before he could lead the Iraqi Army against this militia in Karbala and Basrah. And he describes the virtuoso performances that Petraeus and Crocker gave on Capitol Hill that galvanized Republican support and ensured Congress would grant the Surge just enough time to succeed—masterful performances that few other leaders could have pulled off.

Thus, although Mansoor’s faith in COIN is evident, his perspective is a nuanced one. He suggests
that there was a window of opportunity during the first two months after the invasion when a politically aware, COIN-like occupation plan—properly led, resourced, and executed—may have prevented a strong insurgency from rising. But, such poor U.S. decisions as the de-Baathification decree, the disbanding of the Iraqi Army, and the establishment of a sectarian and illegitimate Iraqi Governing Council caused Sunnis to feel disenfranchised from their government and paved the path to civil war. There was yet another moment of opportunity in early 2004 to reach out to the Sunnis after the capture of Saddam Hussein, but the moment was lost when Coalition Provisional Authority leader L. Paul Bremer III failed to take advantage of it.

COIN theory and practice, Mansoor argues, could not have triumphed until the stars were aligned properly. That is, the Surge was “the right strategy at the right time.” As Sheikh Sattar, one of the Sunni leaders of the Awakening, said, “You Americans couldn’t convince us [to fight Al-Qaeda]. We Sunnis had to convince ourselves.”

Mansoor ends the book by concluding that the surge of ideas and forces “salvaged a war almost lost, but only by the slimmest of margins.” But, is Mansoor’s conclusion one that future historians will hold?

In recent months, Iraqis have witnessed levels of internecine violence not seen since the early days of the Surge. If Iraq’s current instability deepens and its government falls or the country breaks apart, future historians are unlikely to judge that the Surge salvaged the war. They would believe this no more than they conclude that the Christmas Bombings of 1972 prevented U.S. defeat in the Vietnam War. Instead, they would say that the Surge, like the Christmas Bombings, helped bring the right parties to the negotiating table but failed to secure a lasting, favorable peace. Instead of victory, they would say, the Surge salvaged opportunity—an opportunity that the United States then squandered with the way it left Iraq.

This begs another question: if events prove that the Surge failed to salvage final victory, what will future military professionals say about today’s COIN theory?

But this narrative is untenable. It applies the certainty of empirical science to the human domain of war—a domain much less predictable than that ruled by the laws of matter and physics. Human beings (counterinsurgents) can certainly influence other human beings (insurgents and their supporters) to change their opinions and to alter their behavior, but no theoretical approach—no matter how well applied—can guarantee such effects. Mansoor’s Surge thus serves as a necessary and salutary corrective to this overweening narrative, one that highlights the degree to which the success of counterinsurgents (particularly foreign counterinsurgents) is dependent upon conditions that they may influence but can never fully control.

The opposing narrative is even more untenable. Those who advance it argue that, due to their great cost in blood and treasure, COIN conflicts abroad can achieve at best Pyrrhic victories. The reason for this, they contend, is that foreigners will never be accepted by a local population.

However, this narrative ignores the scores if not hundreds of foreign occupations in history that, after employing facets of modern COIN theory, obtained successful conclusions at acceptable
costs. These include America’s own occupations of the Philippines, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Germany, and Japan during the first half of the 20th century.

This narrative’s proponents also typically contend that COIN achieved no meaningful success—not even at the tactical level—in either Iraq or Afghanistan. When assessing the Surge, for example, they claim that Iraq’s Sunnis had already turned against Al-Qaeda in Iraq. Petraeus, COIN, and the surge of forces, they say, were not needed to end the Sunni insurgency. Or, they contend, it was really technologically enhanced kill-capture operations that resulted in a veneer of stability in Iraq.

As Mansoor thoroughly documents and explains in *Surge*, this view is counter-factual. The Sunni Awakening, for instance, would neither have lasted nor spread without Petraeus’s strong support.

Mansoor’s robust rebuttal of the anti-COIN narrative is one of the greatest services *Surge* performs. True, as Mansoor admits, this narrative contains some truth: U.S. political leaders should accurately gauge the potential risks and costs of implementing COIN before conducting regime-change operations. But, those who equate the implementation of COIN theory with large-scale occupations abroad or who argue that such occupations never work are clearly seeing only what they want to see.

When U.S. politicians, some day, again send troops to a place where some version of today’s COIN theory must be employed, U.S. military leaders will need to be open-eyed and ready. Thankfully, they now have *Surge* as a practical guide. Mansoor’s book is more than a first-rate history and memoir; it is an instant COIN classic to rank with David Galula’s *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, Stu Herrington’s *Stalking the Vietcong*, John Nagl’s *Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife*, and David Kilcullen’s *The Accidental Guerrilla*.

This does not mean that *Surge* will not receive some criticism. It will. For instance, some readers may find Mansoor’s writing style to be a bit academic, though he is an exceptional, accessible writer. This is because, unlike such authors as Tom Ricks and Bing West, he expends little effort painting vivid scenes and relating dialogue. But, his choice of clear, largely analytical prose was no doubt deliberate. After all, this style lends scholarly authority to a book that is part-memoir—something very difficult to achieve but pulled off well in this case.

What will probably be most criticized is Mansoor’s affixing few if any foibles to Petraeus or to members of Petraeus’s inner circle. Some may contend that, in such matters, the loyalty of Mansoor the friend won out over the duty of Mansoor the historian. However, in light of the remarkable things Petraeus and his “COINdistas” did in service to our country, it also can be argued that Mansoor’s focus on their positive qualities is only right and proper.

Whatever the weaknesses of this book, its strengths far outweigh them. It is much more than a “second draft” of history, as Mansoor in his “Preface” modestly declares it. *Surge* is the definitive account of the campaign it describes and probably will remain so for some time to come. Most importantly, it contains a profound lesson that America’s policymakers and service members need to hear: in the information age, military success is still possible, if conditions are favorable and battlefield problems are treated as having both political and military components—that is, as problems requiring both brains and brawn to solve.

The publication of *Surge* is a literary event that lives up to expectations. College instructors cannot do better than to choose *Surge* as a textbook for classes on COIN or the Iraq War, and it deserves a spot on the bookshelves of every politician, diplomat, military leader, and serious student of modern war.
ON A STAFF ride in Korea years ago, I found myself standing on Glos-ter Hill, a jagged hump just south of the Imjin River and north of Seoul. There, on 25 April 1951, 400 battle-weary men of the 1st Battalion, Gloucestershire Regiment, made their last stand against elements of three attacking Chinese divisions. By mid-morning, out of bullets and surrounded, the surviving Gloucestershires attempted to break out. Only 39 made it; the rest were captured.

I’d always wondered what happened to the Gloucestershires and to the thousands of other UN troops taken prisoner by the Chinese and North Koreans between 1950 and 1953. Now, thanks to William Latham’s fine new book, Cold Days in Hell, I have a good idea.

Blending solid scholarship with smooth style, Latham takes us deftly through the war’s major movements, from the early debacles to the eventual stalemate. He includes an informative chapter on the air war, too, and covers the MacArthur-Truman sideshow efficiently. This is necessary background for understanding the prisoner-of-war narrative. All is rendered vividly and with such good judgment that Cold Days can serve as a useful short history of the war.

Amid the military and political maneuvering, the appalling prisoner-of-war story comes to life. Thanks to Cold War fears and McCarthyism, the usual narrative—well documented here—revolves around the supposed Communist brainwashing of morally weak GIs. According to Cold Days, Communist brutality—the Tiger death march, summary executions, beatings, and especially the captors’ feckless attitude toward their prisoners’ maintenance—dominated the story. As Latham records it, lack of food, shelter, and medical attention led to rampant disease—chiefly dysentery and diarrhea—that harrowed the prisoner-of-war ranks and made captivity a daily hell. The lucky suffered severely; the unlucky died in their own waste. Compared to such misery, Marxist indoctrination must have been merely irritating.

One of the book’s many strengths is its plethora of personal stories. Chief among them is that of Father Emil Kapaun, who received the Medal of Honor in April 2013—60 years after his death on a dirt floor in the Pyoktong prison camp. Reading about this fearless, selfless man’s exploits is a humbling experience. One isn’t surprised that the Catholic Church is vetting Kapaun for sainthood.

Other stories are the result of personal interviews conducted by the author. Korean War veterans comprise a fast-fading generation, and we are fortunate to hear the words of such men as Ray Mellin, deployed with Task Force Smith and captured on the first day of fighting; Dan Oldewage, tail gunner on a B-29 shot down near the Yalu River; and 19 others whose personal testimony gives a visceral feel for what life was like in the Communist camps.

For its interviews alone, Cold Days stands as a valuable contribution to Korean War and prisoner-of-war literature. Add in a perceptive last chapter on post-war mishandling of the prisoner-of-war experience and a generous bibliography, and the book deserves a place on every professional soldier’s reading list. Lt. Col. Arthur Bilodeau, USA, Retired, Louisville, Kentucky
PROFESSOR WENDY PEARLMAN poses the fundamental question of why some political movements rely on nonviolent methods, while others routinely exercise violence. For the serving officer, this is a question of broad professional significance. Understanding the answers will influence the fundamental force posture under which any leader will lead his troops when confronting national movements and insurgencies that are either violent or nonviolent, or perhaps even those of a dual nature.

Pearlman is assistant professor of political science at Northwestern University in Chicago. She holds the Crown Junior Chair in Middle East Studies. She has spent several intense years working and studying throughout the Middle East and on both sides of the Green Line. Her book focuses on the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and its leadership and organization of the Palestinian national movement.

Much of the PLO’s notoriety, of course, has been due to its conflict with the state of Israel. The protracted and deadly struggle has a long pedigree of many parents. At least from a Palestinian and even Arab perspective, one could sum up the root of the problem by citing a former secretary of the Arab League, Azzam Pasha: “The Jew, our old cousin, coming back with imperialistic ideas, with materialistic ideas, with reactionary or revolutionary ideas, and trying to implement them first by British pressure and then by American pressure, and then by terrorism on his own part—he is not the old cousin, and we do not extend to him a very good welcome.” R.H.S. Crossman, a British cabinet member under Harold Wilson and a staunch Zionist, noted “Jewish colonial settlement in Palestine—from the Arab point of view—is simply another variant of Western imperialism . . .” The PLO was one of the chief organizations of resistance that struggled for years against what it regarded as another form of imperialism.

Pearlman is especially interested in explaining why national movements like the PLO chose violence over nonviolence. In addressing the question, she develops an “organizational mediation theory of protest.” The author explains that while most movements embrace violence for many and sundry reasons, there is only one road that leads to nonviolent protest. This course requires social and organizational cohesion: “When a movement is cohesive, it enjoys the organizational power to mobilize mass participation, enforce strategic discipline, and contain disruptive dissent. In consequence, cohesion increases the possibility that a movement will use nonviolent protest.” For the serving officer, Pearlman’s insights offer important insights. When a movement swings toward violence, it is because it has lost the leadership, institutions, purpose, direction, and motivation that provide coherence, restraint, and constraint to its active members. “Its very internal structure thus generates incentives and opportunities that increase the likelihood that it will use violence.” Much evidence from our experience in Iraq and Afghanistan supports the writer’s thesis. Strong leadership and organizational coherence play a crucial role in keeping the peace and dampening down violence. Army officers confronting a potential national movement or insurgency can play a crucial role at key moments and points of intervention by supporting the forces of restraint.

James J. Schneider, Ph. D., Leavenworth, Kansas

PERSUASION AND POWER: The Art of Strategic Communication,
James P. Farewell, Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC, 2012, 270 pages, $29.95

AMERICA’S ABILITY TO market everything from McDonald’s to the latest fad around the world is unparalleled in history, and yet, it is challenged when it comes to marketing itself. James P. Farewell, an internationally recognized expert in strategic communication and cyber warfare, has written an insightful work on what strategic communication is and why we as a nation are failing at it.

Farewell explores the U.S. government’s elusive quest to engage foreign audiences throughout the
world. It often finds itself in an ineffective and inefficient react mode to state and nonstate actors alike. An inability to communicate strategically reflects lack of emphasis by U.S. senior leaders, parochial turf wars between agencies, and the lack of a single comprehensive approach. Farewell describes the inane view held by many in the U.S. government, especially in the Department of Defense, that strategic communication is a process rather than a capability or an art. Farewell counters that it is partly a process, but we need to think of it more as an art of communication. The inability to communicate strategically is further exacerbated because the Department of Defense categorizes strategic communication in terms of inform and influence. He counters that smart public affairs is about influence. He says that “smart public affairs always seeks to influence, if for nothing else than to bolster credibility.”

Farewell proposes viable solutions to maximize the effectiveness of strategic communication efforts. These include centralizing control of strategic communication for the U.S. government within the White House, revising current definitions that are inconsistent and undercut credibility, improving military training in information operations, improving State Department efficiency, measuring effectiveness better, holding people accountable, and realizing that strategic communication equals military strategy.

The strength of Persuasion and Power is its exhaustive research, reflected in numerous vignettes and research that compellingly illustrate successful concepts, benefits, and failures of strategic communication. Scholars and strategic communicators alike will be impressed with Farewell’s research and proposed solutions to enhance strategic communication. Persuasion and Power is a must-read for those with an interest in strategic communication.

Jesse McIntyre III, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


WILLIAMSON MURRAY WANTS his writing to make a difference. Perhaps more than any other living military historian, Murray has aimed his books and articles toward the edification of serving professionals. His success is evident by the use of two of his coauthored anthologies, The Dynamics of Military Revolution and Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, as core texts in the Command and General Staff College military history curriculum. However, some purists argue that Dr. Murray walks on thin ice because extracting practical lessons from complex historical experience is dicey business. In his defense, I believe historians must attempt to distill useful ideas from their research. Otherwise, those less aware of history’s perverse ability to perplex and deceive will take charge of the business of finding lessons learned. Therefore, along with acknowledging his distinguished career and body of work, let us respect Murray’s genuine concern for military education.

He is clearly in the teaching mode in his most recent volume, Military Adaptation in War: With Fear of Change. This book could be considered a sequel to Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, a collection of case studies that delve into the efforts of the major powers to examine the battlefield lessons of World War I as they prepared for the challenge of the next conflict. The problem then was changing militaries during peacetime. Murray now examines the even more difficult challenge of changing armies, navies, and air forces in the midst of an active conflict. As with Military Innovation, he continues to use a case study format. However, in this volume, Murray writes all the essays himself.

The essays are, as in all of Murray’s writing, clear, pithy, and didactic. His case studies include the complex adaptation on the Western Front from 1914 to 1918, and the flawed success of German adaptation in the early years of World War II. From World War II, he includes two case studies from the air war: the victory of Hugh Dowding’s Royal Air Force Fighter Command over the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain and the more uncertain success of Arthur Harris’ Bomber Command in its city-busting campaign against the Third Reich from 1942-1945. His final study looks at the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 and focuses on Israel’s difficulty in managing the operational level of war.

Those acquainted with Murray’s work will find much familiar here. In some cases, it might seem too familiar. In his introductory chapters and case studies, he recycles vignettes, quotations, and citations.
found in his previous work. He even quotes himself in the book’s last page. Nevertheless, a historian with Murray’s resume might be forgiven some repetition. Even those familiar with his body of work should find Military Adaptation in War rewarding to read.

Scott Stephenson, Ph.D.,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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**MY LAI: An American Atrocity in the Vietnam War,**

**ON 16 MARCH 1968,** U.S. soldiers from Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment of the 11th Brigade, Americal Division swept through the village of My Lai. By the time the day was over, more than 500 elderly men, women, and children had been slaughtered. For many Americans, the My Lai Massacre became a symbol for all that was wrong with what they considered an immoral war.

In this book, William Thomas Allison, the son of a Marine and Vietnam veteran, provides a tight, concise narrative of the events that led to the massacre, the massacre itself, the subsequent cover-up, and the trials that eventually transpired once the massacre became public knowledge. While the book does not offer much that is new, it succeeds in the author’s attempt to provide a detailed overview by “pulling together materials from the investigations and trials with scholarship on My Lai, the Vietnam War, and other related issues” to place the event in the overall context of American history.

The author initially focuses on the leadership failures of 1st Lt. William L. Calley Jr., but also addresses the lack of consistently effective leadership within the entire division. Allison also demonstrates how training shortfalls within the unit contributed to the breakdown in discipline that led to the massacre.

There are heroes in this story. Allison recounts the actions of Warrant Officer Hugh Thompson, who landed his helicopter at the village, intervened in an attempt to stop the killing, and subsequently reported the incident to his higher headquarters. He also discusses the role of Vietnam veteran Ron Ridenour, who found out about the massacre after he departed Vietnam and wrote a flurry of over 30 letters to officials in Washington. Eventually, Calley was charged on 5 September 1969, with six specifications of premeditated murder for the deaths of 104 Vietnamese civilians at My Lai. Eight other officers and enlisted men were charged for crimes committed on 16 March 1968.

During the course of the investigation, it became clear there was an extensive cover-up. Consequently, Gen. William C. Westmoreland, senior U.S. commander in Vietnam, ordered an investigation by Lt. Gen. William R. Peers, who began his inquiry on 26 November 1969. Upon completion of the investigation, the Peers Commission accused 30 individuals of having knowledge of the killings, making false reports, suppressing information, false swearing, failing to report a felony, and committing similar derelictions of duty. Ultimately, only one of these officers was court-martialed, and he was acquitted. Of the remainder, 4 were killed in action, 7 had left the Army and could not be prosecuted, and thirteen suffered administrative punishments.

In the end, of those charged directly for their roles in the massacre at My Lai, only Calley was convicted. The author goes into great detail on the cover-up, the subsequent criminal investigation, the work of the Peers Commission, the subsequent trials, and their aftermath.

In summary, Allison provides a detailed and highly useful narrative of all the complexities involved in this story of one of the darkest days in the history of the U.S. Army. My Lai: An American Atrocity in the Vietnam War is strongly recommended for anyone interested in the Vietnam War, particularly serving officers. In a very real sense, it is a cautionary tale of how failures in leadership up and down the chain of command can have tragic consequences—not just for the Army, but also for the nation.

Lt. Col. James H. Willbanks, Ph.D.,
USA, Retired

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**MILITARY LEADERSHIP AND COUNTERINSURGENCY: The British Army and Small War Strategy Since World War II,**

Victoria Nolan’s Engaging Military Leadership and Counterinsurgency will not
disappoint students of British small wars and counterinsurgency.

Nolan, a project manager at the Institute for Social and Economic Research at the University of Essex, United Kingdom, shrewdly employs organizational culture and modern-day leadership practices from the world of business to take a fresh look at the role campaign commanders played in the process of organizational adaptation and the evolution of the British army’s distinctive approach between 1948 and 1960. The so-called British approach, based on a legacy of imperial policing but established during the period of decolonization following World War II, was built on four interconnected pillars: political primacy, close coordination of the civil-military-police triumvirate, the minimum use of force, and social and economic development. However, the glue that commonly bound this approach together, and the core of Nolan’s innovative study, is the central role of military leadership in counterinsurgency.

Using three well-presented case studies—The Malayan Emergency (1948-1960), Kenya and the Mau Mau Uprising (1952-1956) and The Cyprus Revolt (1955-1960)—Nolan skillfully uncovers how military leaders influence organizational learning and the advancement of military organizational culture. In so doing, the book adds much to our understanding of events. She does this by examining three main questions. First, do military leaders transmit and embed organizational culture, and if so, how? Second, what are the qualities displayed by military leaders who are successful in transmitting and embedding culture, and how do these characteristics influence the evolution of the distinctive British approach to small wars? Finally, what conditions enable military leaders to be influential in the organizational learning process? Here, Nolan acknowledges upfront that support of senior leadership is essential to enable campaign commanders to embed small-war culture in military operations and practice.

Clearly portraying the significance of such leaders as Gen. Templer in Malaya, Gen. Erskine in Kenya, and Field Marshal Sir John Harding in Cyprus, Military Leadership and Counterinsurgency is divided into six well-written and thought-provoking chapters. Of note, “The Legacy of Imperial Policing,” provides a much-needed chronological setting, covering the emergence of the British army as a small-war army in the Victorian era. The book is cleverly separated into a series of helpful sections and subsections; each is bite-size, succinct, and easily digestible. I have one minor criticism—that Nolan overly leads the reader by focusing and refocusing the student on the question set. That said, for those who do not have the luxury of reading the book uninterrupted, this approach is beneficial.

In addition to the astute findings in the case studies, Nolan provides wider commentary for reflection. She notes that there can be multiple short- and long-term cycles of organizational learning, and that wisdom can develop over an extended period of time—as an army gains experience of similar types of conflict and builds up a knowledge base of how to approach analogous challenges. She believes that studies on military learning and innovation need to focus on the key role played by leaders, and that leadership, organizational learning, and the evolution of culture are conceptually tied together. She cautions, “In the future it will be necessary to consider not only whether learning has occurred within the group under consideration but also whether this learning can be and has been applied and operationalized in practice. The danger, as always, is that the fog of war often means that effective strategies, tactics, or techniques are lost; capturing best practice is never straightforward”.

One could argue that Nolan’s summation is predictable: “it is my conclusion that leaders who are charismatic and dynamic are influential in transmitting and embedding organisational culture (in this case the British army’s small-war culture), particularly when they are supported by like-minded superiors, and when they also have a history of small-war experiences.” However, it is the careful analysis and unmistakable logic used to reach this finding that are truly insightful and worthwhile. Drawing on a wide range of primary and secondary sources, Nolan uncovers the realities of organizational learning through the twin prisms of military leadership and organizational culture. By taking this approach, she highlights the mixed successes of campaign commanders and underlines what worked and why. This will be of particular relevance to today’s military commanders faced with a mutating insurgency in Afghanistan.

Overall, Military Leadership and Counterinsurgency is a well-timed, enjoyable, and engaging
study that will be of interest to historians, serving soldiers, and sociologists alike. Nolan’s findings add much to our understanding of the important role of leadership in counterinsurgency and shed new light on celebrated military leaders. This text will enhance the shelf of any professional or personal library and is highly recommended.

Col. Andrew M. Roe, Ph.D., British Army, Episkopi Garrison, Cyprus

LINCOLN AND MCCLELLAN AT WAR,
Chester G. Hearn,
Louisiana State University Press,
Baton Rouge, LA, 2012, 272 pages, $45.00

THE MOST RECENT of Chester G. Hearn’s six books on the American Civil War, Lincoln and McClellan at War, provides military and political leaders a stark reminder of the importance of good civil-military relations during war. A natural follow-on to the author’s Lincoln, the Cabinet, and the Generals, Hearn provides valuable historical perspectives to one of the most poignant examples of a poor relationship; the relationship that existed between President Abraham Lincoln and Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan during the American Civil War. Three themes emerged that contributed to the poor relations; a dearth of strategic leaders in the Union, McClellan’s disdain for authority and actions of superiors, and political and ideological differences between Lincoln and McClellan.

The lack of strategically thinking military and civilian leaders available to the Union early in the war provided an enduring theme throughout the book. While the author credited the president and his administration with scant understanding of the herculean tasks of rapidly recruiting, organizing, equipping, training, and fielding an expanding army, he also recognized Lincoln had few choices among his available generals. Led by the venerable Gen. Winfield Scott in early 1861, the United States was ill-prepared for the coming conflict. Moreover, the flight of operational and strategic military talent to the Southern cause gave Scott and Lincoln few choices, forcing them to look outside the existing active force for talent. Their eyes fell on the youthful George B. McClellan to train and lead the Union’s premier force, the Army of the Potomac.

Hearn described McClellan, “The Little Napoleon” or “Little Mac,” as an 1846 West Point graduate, a veteran of the Mexican War, and a leader exposed to the art of European, particularly Napoleonic, warfare during extensive study abroad while on active duty. After inexplicably resigning his commission in 1857 at a relatively early age, McClellan applied his engineering skills to the expanding railroads, and quickly rose to the position of vice president of the Illinois Central during the late 1850s before returning to federal service. Hearn’s narrative rightfully recognizes McClellan as charismatic, intelligent, a master planner, a superb trainer, and a leader highly respected by soldiers. At the youthful age of 34, he was a perfect choice to lead the infant Army of the Potomac. However, the author also highlights McClellan’s lack of experience in leading and successfully deploying large formations in combat throughout the narrative. This, combined with the author’s recognition of Lincoln’s persistent lenience and patience with McClellan and his immediate successors, remained as a festering theme that continued until the discovery of the winning capabilities and promotion of Ulysses S. Grant.

Further, Hearn adroitly credits McClellan with personality traits that severely weakened relations with Lincoln and arguably resulted in prolonging the war at an untold cost of lives and national treasure. Highlighted among these was Hearn’s second theme; McClellan’s intense disdain for authority and actions of superiors. While Hearn’s focus was rightfully oriented on McClellan’s relations with Lincoln, his well-documented research suggested McClellan chaffed at directives from all sources considered as threatening to his command and unfettered flexibility. Regardless of whether it was McClellan’s constant bickering on operations and strategy with the president (who he considered inferior to himself), his incessant demands of Lincoln and Secretary of War Edwin Stanton (who, interestingly, was initially considered an ally) for more men and resources, or his outright disdain and hatred of Gen. Scott and competing peers, the majority of blame for conflict must rightfully lie with McClellan. The author’s reference to McClellan’s correspondence, particularly to his
wife Ellen, was particularly valuable. On several occasions, Hearn suggested that if Lincoln had the insight of McClellan’s character as exposed in letters to his wife, the Union and Lincoln would have been spared untold friction, and likely would have accelerated his relief.

Hearn’s third theme was one of political and ideological differences. The author described Lincoln as a staunch abolitionist and Republican and McClellan as an unwavering Democrat and one tolerant to slavery as a means of ending the war. Clearly, the two diametrically opposing positions led to suspicion of McClellan’s actions. While not directly stating that McClellan’s “slows” were a strategy to thwart Lincoln’s political and ideological goals, the author at least insinuates such. This is especially evident through Hearn’s thought-provoking discussion of McClellan’s planning and prosecution of the Peninsular Campaign, as well as his unwillingness to cooperate with Lincoln’s strategy to end the war in the early years by seizing opportunities to capture Richmond. Without directly accusing McClellan of insubordination for political reasons, Hearn did suggest politics might have contributed to McClellan’s desire to leverage the increasing popular dissatisfaction of the war for political gain. In this, the author makes a compelling case, especially given the Democratic Party’s nomination of McClellan for president in the 1864 election.

While some may identify additional themes, Chester G. Hearn’s *Lincoln and McClellan at War* provides readers with valuable insights into the conflict that existed between President Lincoln and his commander of the Army of the Potomac. While every war fought by the United States contains some element of conflict between political and military leaders, Hearn’s book provides readers a lasting reminder of the tragic consequences of the poor relations that existed between Lincoln and McClellan. Unfortunately, history repeated itself with similar themes almost a century later on another peninsula halfway around the world between President Harry Truman and Gen. Douglas MacArthur. Both would have benefitted greatly from Hearn’s historical insights.

**Bill McCollum, Ed.D.,**  
**Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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**PATTON: Blood, Guts, and Prayer,**  
Michael Keane, Regnery Publishing,  
Washington, DC, year, pages, $27.95

MICHAEL KEANE’S BIOGRAPHY of the leader who displayed such great contradictions weaves together a compact, readable book focused on three specific facets of Patton’s history and remarkable character: blood, guts, and prayer.

In the chapter named “Blood,” Keane examines Gen. Patton’s genealogy, highlighting the experiences and influences of his ancestors, especially his grandfather and great-uncle who served as officers in the Confederacy; both Patton brothers died of battle wounds during the Civil War. The genealogy traces even further back to Hugh Mercer, a contemporary and colleague of George Washington, who crossed the Delaware River with Washington in the Christmas attack on the Hessian Barracks in Trenton. Mercer also died of battle wounds during the Revolutionary War. Keane illustrates how Patton’s familiarity with his family’s military heritage shaped the character of the historic figure we know well.

In “Guts,” Keane explores Patton’s demonstrated physical courage, building a perspective for better understanding the “slapping incident” that almost terminated Patton’s career and would have demoted him all the way to colonel. Keane’s presentation of correspondence between generals Eisenhower and Marshall about Patton’s relief and potential future make it abundantly clear what a narrow escape it was. In his own defense, Patton indicated in conversation and correspondence that he had “saved an immortal soul,” by grabbing his attention and having him sent back to his unit. One may wonder if Patton was so obsessed with proving his own physical courage that he was frightened by what he saw as a lack of courage in others—that somehow a threat of contagion existed, not only to the troops he commanded, but also to him.

Keane’s biography interweaves evidence of Patton’s deep-seated belief in a God-ordained destiny. Keane notes that Patton believed himself
to be a veteran of a number of ancient battles, but does not reconcile the contradiction between reincarnation and Patton’s Christian beliefs. In “Prayer,” the biographer presents the dilemma, then moves on to other aspects of Patton’s faith. He reconciles Patton’s penchant for profanity as an attention-getting device that Patton in fact learned and practiced. What Keane does most convincingly is present evidence that Patton inevitably turned to God in times of personal trial, be it life-threatening injury, professional adversity, or operational military crisis. Patton considered prayer a potent force, and leaned heavily on his chaplains to employ that force, much as he leaned on his artillerymen to employ the force of lethal fires. The conversation between Patton and one of his chaplains, in which he says “that men get what they want by planning, by working, and by praying,” leaves little doubt that Patton’s devout Christian beliefs were genuine, an integral part of his character, and an essential ingredient of his overt actions.

Keane’s short, topical biography is a valuable contribution to the body of knowledge surrounding this almost mythical American general.

**Thomas E. Ward II, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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**YEAR OF GLORY: The Life and Battles of Jeb Stuart and His Cavalry, June 1862-June 1863**, Monte Akers, Casemate Publishers, Havertown, PA, 2012, 371 pages, $18.00

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**B**y the end of the Chancellorsville Campaign in May 1863, perhaps no military leader other than Robert E. Lee enjoyed the fame and notoriety of Maj. Gen. James Ewell Brown “Jeb” Stuart. Placed in command of the Confederate Second Corps after the wounding of Stonewall Jackson, Stuart relentlessly pressed the Confederate assault, ultimately driving the Union army from the field and achieving one of the South’s greatest victories. The boldness, aggressiveness, and sheer will to win in the Virginia wilderness—coupled with his dashing, if not reckless, exploits as commander of the Confederate cavalry—propelled this Southern cavalier into annals of military history. Little did anyone know that June 1863 would mark the end of Stuart’s remarkable, unmatched year of military success.

For the student of Civil War history, Monte Akers’ Year of Glory: The Life and Battles of Jeb Stuart and His Cavalry, June 1862-June 1863 provides the reader with an extraordinary look into that remarkable year. As seen through the eyes and thoughts of Stuart and his staff, Akers skillfully integrates their personal diaries, journals, official logs, and records into a vivid account of the daily activities in Stuart’s camp. He fills the book with humorous anecdotes involving Stuart and his personal staff as they brave life in the Confederate cavalry. Akers portrays Stuart as a smart, yet mildly vain, socialite with an affable, gregarious personality and a man captivated by the fineries and social graces of the Old South’s intelligentsia. Even as the enemy threatened his position, Stuart felt it was his social duty to acquire a local home and host an elaborate gala. His antics nearly cost him his life and command on several occasions.

With equal passion, Akers characterizes Stuart, the cavalry warrior, by his unflappable, clear thinking analysis, combined with daring and unquestioned courage. Through Stuart’s own words and actions, the reader sees an emotional, caring leader bound by strong personal relationships with his men and filled with conflicting feelings and loyalties toward family, particularly his four-year-old daughter Flora; his peers; and his country. The reader becomes acquainted with a warrior who is as unashamed to openly weep at the deaths of Flora and confidant Maj. John Pelham as he is to lead his outnumbered troops on a near-impossible mission. Akers leaves little doubt that Stuart was a soldier’s soldier, universally admired and respected by those in his command and feared by his enemy.

Akers’ animated writing style places the reader within Jeb Stuart’s inner circle as they gather around the campfire singing a popular melody or conferring over future combat operations. For the student of Civil War history, this work provides a deeper understanding of one of the most intriguing leaders and characters of the war. Despite several typographical errors, Year of Glory is a great addition to any Civil War collection.

**Lt. Col. Harry Clay Garner, USA, Retired, Fort Belvoir, Virginia**
ENGINEERS OF VICTORY: The Problem Solvers Who Turned the Tide in the Second World War,

PAUL KENNEDY, AUTHOR of the classic The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, has delivered another outstanding book with Engineers of Victory. In this work, Kennedy examines problem solving and critical thinking during the Second World War by focusing on five critical areas: the U-boat battle in the Atlantic, air war over Europe, stopping the blitzkrieg, amphibious warfare, and overcoming the vastness of the Pacific Ocean. Each issue is examined from both an Allied and Axis perspective in order to define their respective problems. The result is a thoughtful analysis that traces the linkage in problem solving between the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

What Kennedy sets out to prove is that the application of superior force does not necessarily win wars, but rather “the intelligent application of superior force.” The reoccurring theme throughout this work is that the Allies were successful in large part due to the “culture of encouragement” they created. Kennedy describes this culture as a support system that had “efficient feedback loops, a capacity to learn from setbacks, [and] an ability to get things done.” A prime example of this culture in action is the U-boat battle in the Atlantic Ocean. In early 1943, the Allies were suffering tremendous losses in this critical theater in part because their equipment and doctrine didn’t measure up to the challenge. Convoy doctrine at this time was either “kill the wolves or protect the flock.” However, by critically assessing their doctrine the Allies were able to refine their tactics and procedures so they could do both. The same level of analysis helped them to restructure their command and control organizations, refine lines of information, and better integrate all of their weapon systems. The creation of organizations such as the Department of Miscellaneous Weapons Development enhanced the development of weapon systems. This department, guided by the principles of “curiosity, experiment, risk taking, and thinking outside the box,” was responsible for the development of several key systems such as airborne anti-submarine radar and enhanced direction finding equipment. Almost the exact opposite mentality existed among those responsible for the air war over Europe. The picture Kennedy creates is one of misguided politics and erroneous mental models with near catastrophic results. One of his more poignant points is that Allied bomber command did not analyze the lessons learned from the Battle of Britain—the key one being that “against a well-defended and well-organized aerial defensive system, a force of bombers could not always get through.” In the early years of the war, doctrine and theory did not reflect the reality of the operational environment. Specifically, bombers could not adequately defend themselves without long-range fighter escorts and bombing did not destroy the morale of population. Kennedy shows that the Allied bombing campaign really did not begin to show effective results until the mismatch between the environment, equipment, doctrine, and theory were realistically addressed.

Although Kennedy’s book focuses on the Second World War, it reinforces key lessons for military operations in general. He shows that the leaders and planners of this era worked hard to understand their current environment, but they also spent a great deal of energy thinking about the future. For that reason, they began developing the equipment and doctrine necessary for the coming war before it started. However, he also shows their success required the ability to continue critically accessing and analyzing all aspects of their doctrine and equipment while the conflict was ongoing. Finally, Kennedy demonstrates that the success of the American way of war is because of the superior application of military force and the intelligent application of superior military force.

Lt. Col. William Kenna McCurry, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

RIDERS OF THE APOCALYPSE: German Cavalry and Modern Warfare, 1870-1945,
David R. Dorondo, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2012, 336 pages, $36.95

FROM THE EARLIEST forms of shock-and-awe-style warfare, to today’s modern battle tank, none draws more romanticism and mysticism than
that of the horse in combat. Images of the Egyptian war chariot to the armor-clad medieval knight bearing down on a line of infantry resonate in current thought through its profound and revolutionary effect on the battlefield. Throughout the ages, horsemen and those of similar special units were regarded as the elite of the modern battlefield. Riders required training in horsemanship to guide their 1,000-pound animal into a deadly abatis, as well as the ability to conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and screening of enemy movements without detection or destruction. These skills enabled an army to gain, almost instantly, a decided tactical advantage over another. Acknowledging that all weapon systems eventually become obsolete by advancements and/or battlefield conditions, one that has miraculously survived is the horse.

To understand horse survival in light of advances in weaponry, David R. Dorondo takes us back to their use in German warfare. He sets the stage with the German Uhlan in the Franco-Prussian War. The Prussians used horses to disrupt operations, perform valuable reconnaissance, and in some circumstances, stave off defeat in order to allow the main field armies to regroup and survive to fight again. The French did not share in these same successes and in one contest thousands of horsemen perished; the Prussians had to put to death nearly 10,000 of their horses due to injuries. However, the German generals analyzed what they did wrong, to include the French lessons in different contexts and thereby designed a different purpose for which the horse arm is more uniquely suited.

In later conflicts, the Germans focused on using horsemen as a means to conduct a long range reconnaissance and interdiction of enemy supply trains. The roles in World War I required different uses based on the context (Western and Eastern front use of the horse was modified by terrain and the type of warfare). The spade and wire of the Western front was ill suited for the horse’s utility other than supply but in the Eastern front the horse had an offensive capacity as well. The horse’s role continued to evolve over the course of landscapes and warfare all the way up to World War II, where the German army required them in nearly every operation because they did not possess the necessary numbers of mechanized assets. The terrain of the Eastern front allowed the horse to retain mobility after armor became mired in the mud and lubricants froze in the subzero temperatures. Horses were well suited to protect the flanks of large armies and employed in a number of roles to include far-forward scouting and widening of assault lanes to allow better battlefield placement of the main force. As a result, all Panzer Divisions of the time had cavalry units attached to them. The later role of the cavalry in the genocidal policies of the Reich cemented the worst images of the German horsemen as the SS cavalry units began to dominate and conduct operations against partisans and civilians as well. Although the German horseman’s role is largely diminished for open warfare, their skills as horsemen and breeders of some of the stoutest mounts in the world are still apparent. Horsemen were used in Afghanistan as part of the German contingent’s contribution as well as on patrols in Austria and German frontiers and mountaineous regions where vehicles did not fare well. Dorondo demonstrates that horses still may have a role to play tomorrow.

Col. Thomas S. Bundt, Ph.D.,
Fort Lee, Virginia

A DEATH IN SAN PIETRO,
Tim Brady, Da Capo Press, Boston, MA, 2013, 267 pages, $16.76

IN ITS OPENING stages, this book seemed like one of those lightweight History Channel presentations: an attempt to intertwine three rather disparate plot lines involving a minor World War II battle with the journalism legend Ernie Pyle and a Hollywood look at World War II. To my great surprise, it all worked out. Moreover, in details of the battle for San Pietro on the road to Rome, it is a heavyweight military work.

San Pietro was a costly victory and possibly folly, but its story was lost to military history with the disastrous crossing of the Rapido River a short time later. Coming down from Lt. Gen. Mark Clark, this order remains unforgotten and unforgiven in the state of Texas, home of the hard-hit 36th Division (also at San Pietro). In fact, Tim Brady’s entire book is almost a long but interesting footnote—prelude to Clark’s motives in the Rapido assault.
Much of the early book is about the prewar building of the 36th Division with recruits drawn from the small towns of central Texas. Brady also rehashes the oft-told story of Ernie Pyle and the seldom-told story of George Marshall’s attempts to mobilize filmmaking in the war effort. The book’s true hero, Capt. Henry Waskow, and the long-suffering general officer who formed and led the 36th Division, Maj. Gen. Fred L. Walker, do not even rate pictures in the black-and-white center spread (I had an advance copy; more may have been added later).

Walker’s rounding out the National Guard division into wartime shape and his empathy with the GIs apparently did not serve him well with Clark. Earlier, Walker was made the goat of the famous 1941 Louisiana maneuvers when, in charge of antitank forces, his only weapons consisted of cardboard signs reading “tank destroyer.” His troops even welded a few mock cannons since none were supplied. Patton’s armor ignored the “tank destroyer” signs and the referees looked the other way. In the after-action review, Patton boasted of how he had “destroyed Walker’s defenses.”

While other divisions were getting the call to battle in North Africa and Sicily, the 36th languished with parades and guard duty in Morocco. Finally, the Texans were selected to participate in the invasion of Italy at Salerno. (In an irony harking back to the Louisiana maneuvers, Walker’s antitank weapons had not landed when the division reached the Salerno beachhead.)

From Salerno until the battle of San Pietro, the narrative is compellingly crisp and parallels the style of Pyle, who is often quoted, and cartoonist Bill Mauldin, who was in the vicinity. The story also rings with vignettes such as a constant mortar barrage that went on during fighting on Sorrento Peninsula, while just down the road, in Amalfi, a seaside resort hotel continued to serve gourmet meals on fine china.

As Walker was pushing his division north and setting up to attack one of the well-constructed German defense lines below Rome, two big-name Hollywood directors—Maj. Frank Capra and Capt. John Huston—were finishing an assignment given them by Gen. George Marshall. The chief of staff called on Capra to produce a series of documentary films that would explain “the principles for which we are fighting.” At the screening of Huston’s classic about the battle for San Pietro, one three-star general walked out. The film was bottled up by the War Department until Capra took the matter to Marshall at which time it was released not only to troops but also to American audiences.

The book closes with Pyle’s death on an island near Okinawa, but it should have ended with Pyle’s earlier tribute to Capt. Waskow, killed leading his platoon on the 4,000-foot heights of Mt. Sannuco, the gateway to San Pietro and the Liri Valley. It was considered one of Pyle’s finest columns, and is reprinted in this book.

George Ridge, J.D.,
Tucson, Arizona

THOSE ANGRY DAYS: Roosevelt, Lindbergh, and America’s Fight Over World War II, 1939-1941,
Lynne Olson, Random House, New York,
576 pages, $22.38

AMERICANS LIKE TO think of World War II as “The Good War”: an unambiguous and unifying conflict that pitted the nation against the forces of evil. Although this narrative rings true, it masks the fact that in the two years prior to the U.S. entry into the war the American people and their political leaders were divided over the role that the Republic should play in the European crisis. In Those Angry Days, Lynne Olson chronicles the passionate, and at times vicious, domestic battles between the nation’s isolationist and interventionist factions in trying to sway public policy toward giving American aid to France and Britain.

Olsen’s wide-ranging narrative revolves around the key roles played by Charles Lindbergh and Franklin Roosevelt in the intervention debate. This personification of the dispute not only humanizes the period’s diplomatic history, but also gives the reader a nuanced and balanced account of issues involved and the fervor that they sparked. As Olsen demonstrates, Lindbergh was far from the simple anti-Semite and pro-Nazi dupe that the Roosevelt administration and pro-intervention press often portrayed him to be, but was rather a man whose technical and clinical mind had him convinced that Britain could not win the war and America’s lack of military preparedness meant that intervention was immoral, illogical, and suicidal.
Roosevelt, on the other hand, believed that America’s entry into the war was inevitable and thus support for the Allies was both a national security and a moral imperative. While Olsen credits Roosevelt for carefully building public consensus toward providing aid to Britain, she also notes that the president frequently displayed indecisive leadership and was far too fearful of allowing his policies to outpace public opinion. However, this did not stop him from using the power of the FBI and the pro-intervention press in “a dirty fight” to wiretap and investigate his isolationist foes and blacken their names at every turn.

While Roosevelt and Lindbergh are center stage in the story, Olsen skillfully weaves a fascinating tale that ties together the views of a host of other interesting characters and contending factions in the fight over intervention. The struggle was far from a foregone conclusion. By the mid-1930s, many, if not most, Americans convinced themselves that Allied propaganda and banking and business interests had hoodwinked the nation into entering World War I. Coupled with the economic woes of the Great Depression, these feelings led large numbers of Americans to argue that the nation’s focus should remain on solving its domestic problems rather than meddling in the affairs of distant and decadent Europe. As college students, future presidents John F. Kennedy and Gerald Ford joined the anti-interventionist America First Committees that sprang up across the nation’s campuses. Olsen notes that many senior officers in the American military, most notably the ranking Air Corps officer Gen. Hap Arnold, opposed aiding Britain and even attempted to derail Roosevelt’s interventionist policies by leaking information to the press and isolationist politicians in the Congress. The debate was so contentious that it even split families. Lindbergh’s own mother-in-law was an avid interventionist and his brother-in-law ran Britain’s pro-intervention propaganda network in the United States.

Frankly, Those Angry Days is one of the most enjoyable books that this reviewer has read in some time. Olsen’s account is fast-paced and is exceptionally well written and researched. In a nation wracked by economic woes, war weariness, political gridlock, and the rise on a new wave of neo-isolationism, Olsen offers some thought-provoking parallels between our time and the “angry days” of 1939 to 1941.

Lt. Col. Richard S. Faulkner, Ph.D., USA, Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas


The evolution of America’s major Cold War alliances “evince a similar pattern of moving beyond the logic of balance of power to what is referred to as management of power” suggests Nigel Thalakada in Unipolarity and the Evolution of America’s Cold War Alliances. The author utilizes case studies of U.S. alliance relationships with NATO, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand to develop a thesis that takes a “pan-alliance” perspective. Thalakada argues that the post-Cold War shift of American-led alliance objectives, from static territorial defense to the global projection of stability, is the outgrowth of America’s unipolar military superiority.

In a multipolar or bipolar world, alliances take the shape of balance of power instruments, balancing against any perceived hegemonic nation or coalition. However, the rise of a unipolar power creates a management of power dynamic within standing alliances. The objectives of both the superpower and its allies evolve to reflect this shift in power, as unspecified global threats replace declared regional adversaries. Allies seek to maintain the “superpower’s security guarantee in face of uncertainty,” to leverage the “superpower’s superior capabilities to achieve national security objectives,” and attempt to influence the “superpower’s exercise of power.”

Concurrently, the superpower seeks to distribute the burden of maintaining international security, stifle the tendency to balance against it, and maintain its international leadership role. Such a dynamic encourages bandwagoning by allies who support superpower objectives rather than attempting to balance against it; in return seeking the political-military and economic benefits, which only the superpower can bestow. Thalakada uses effective examples to emphasize the development of management of power dynamics within American-led alliances after the Cold War—from Australia’s leveraging of superior American capabilities to secure its regional “preemi-
ence,” as demonstrated during the East Timor Crisis, to South Korea’s use of the U.S. security guarantee to reinvest defense funds into economic development initiatives.

Although exhaustive, Thalakada’s approach gives rise to a chicken-or-the-egg causality dilemma. While the author argues that the shift to management of power dynamics is the result of America’s unipolar moment, many of these characteristics were apparent during the bipolar, Cold War world. As Thalakada demonstrates, America pressured Japan to commit to greater burden sharing by defending extended sea-lanes and increasing its military budget in 1981. Likewise, NATO’s weapons and munitions standardization efforts throughout the Cold War reveal that allies were “leveraging the superpower’s capabilities” for interoperability objectives long before unipolarity. Except for a brief concluding synopsis of U.S. alliances with Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore, an admitted lack of coverage of non-western U.S. alliances leaves the work profoundly reliant on a Westernized perspective for its hypothesis.

Thalakada’s work traces the changing nature of U.S. alliances from balance of power to management of power instruments during the unipolar era, while providing a pan-alliance perspective with applicability across America’s transnational security engagements. This work is highly recommended for those seeking a greater understanding of the post-Cold War shift of U.S.-Western alliance dynamics and the direction of ally-centric policies.

Viktor M. Stoll, King’s College, London


The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE Agency (CIA) was created in 1947 to collect human intelligence and provide analysis for senior government policymakers. Most of its early leaders were veterans of the World War II Office of Strategic Services (OSS), an organization better known for covert operations. A series of presidents used the CIA for subversion, attempted assassinations, and deniable military operations, viewing these as “simple” solutions to the complex problems of dealing with governments such as Cuba, Iran, Honduras, and Chile. In the mid-1970s, the Watergate scandal led to publicity for these questionable activities, resulting in severe restrictions on all forms of foreign intelligence.

Professor Randall Woods, the author of numerous other American biographies, has chosen to retell this story as a tragedy concerning one of the best OSS and CIA special operators, William Colby. Parachuting into France and later Norway during World War II, Colby developed an enthusiasm for special operations, an enthusiasm that caused him to join the new CIA in the much murkier moral environment of the early Cold War. According to the author, under Colby’s cool pragmatism was the idealism of a liberal Catholic internationalist, someone who believed in improving rights and living conditions for the people with whom he worked. This tendency reached its height when Colby served several tours with the CIA in South Vietnam, culminating as the head of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, an interagency organization dedicated to counterinsurgency through improving the lives of the rural peasantry. Woods argues that, despite his awareness of the difficulties involved in that conflict, his protagonist could never admit the impossibility of his dream of an independent, democratic Vietnam.

Just as the dream collapsed in 1975, Colby found himself as Director of Central Intelligence presiding over the nadir of his agency. In Wood’s account, Colby was so dedicated to the rule of law that he disclosed the “crown jewels”—CIA involvement in domestic spying, attempted assassinations, and other egregious actions—to Congressional oversight during the post-Watergate investigations. This not only embarrassed officials such as Henry Kissinger, but also gave witch-hunting critics an opportunity to betray genuine secrets in order to score political points. Colby was forced out of office in 1976, only to drown under mysterious circumstances 20 years later.

Cynics might argue that this version makes heroes out of an agency and a man involved in some of the greatest excesses in the history of American government. That said, however, Shadow Warrior is both a strong argument and a well-researched, compelling story, filled with fascinating details about the Cold War and the problems of gathering foreign intelligence in a democracy.

Col. Jonathan M. House, USA, Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas
AUSA Rebuttal

Lt. Gen. Guy C. Swan III, U.S. Army, Retired, Vice President, Association of the United States Army—It is disappointing that Lt. Col. Allen B. Bishop, U.S. Army, Retired, (in a letter to Military Review, November-December 2013) spoke so disparagingly about the Association of the United States Army (AUSA), his own and the U.S. Army’s professional association. It is apparent that the colonel has an alarming misunderstanding of the purpose and mission of the Association. It is also unfortunate that he does not hold the same view of the value of AUSA that tens of thousands of his fellow soldiers who are proud members of AUSA do—the vast majority of whom are enlisted soldiers and NCOs.

Perhaps the Association has not done a good enough job educating and informing America’s soldiers about why AUSA is important to them. Let me try.

Lt. Col. Bishop and all soldiers should know that AUSA was actually formed by the Army itself in 1950 with the then-Vice Chief of Staff serving as the first AUSA president. It is one of only nine such military service organizations that has been granted federal support by Congress to accomplish its mission of supporting the U.S. Army—active Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve.

For over 63 years, AUSA has been “the Voice for the Army” serving as its principal advocate in Washington, D.C., and in communities all over the United States and around the world.

AUSA is the main educator of policy makers, elected officials, and the public on the central role Landpower and the U.S. Army plays in our national defense. The Association’s role is especially vital at this time when some are making dangerous assumptions that the nature of future conflict will not require land forces.

Moreover, AUSA sponsors a myriad of military professional development forums, distinguished speakers, and publications through its highly respected Institute of Land Warfare that provides the “margin of excellence” beyond what the Army provides to its soldiers and leaders with increasingly limited federally appropriated funds. This important AUSA function enhances the opportunities needed to grow the next generation of Army leaders.

The Association of the U.S. Army actively supports a strong national defense industrial base, one that has provided America’s soldiers with the best equipment and weapons in the world. AUSA is uncompromising in this area and the Association will never allow our soldiers to go into battle without the top quality tools that only American industry can provide.

AUSA’s support to soldiers and their families is equally unwavering. Just last year, at the grassroots level, AUSA provided over $1.3 million of goods and services to Army soldiers and families through its 122 chapters worldwide led by hundreds of dedicated volunteers, most of whom are also soldiers, family members, veterans, retirees, or supportive local citizens.

Your readers should also know that in recent years AUSA led the effort to close the pay gap between Lt. Col. Bishop and his civilian peers and fought to ensure that he, his family, and his fellow soldiers have the quality healthcare, family programs, and housing services commensurate with the quality of their service.

AUSA is unashamed of its fight for the long-term health and strength of the All-Volunteer Force that has performed so magnificently over the past decade. The Association’s support of and advocacy for world-class healthcare, competitive pay scales, education and self-development opportunities, and earned retirement benefits help to incentivize our best soldiers to seek a career of service in the world’s greatest army.

AUSA is the Army’s professional association—just as other professional societies serve those in the medical, legal, and similar professions. It is a proud organization formed by soldiers, made up of soldiers, with the express mission of supporting soldiers.

I am certain that Lt. Col. Bishop served admirably as a dedicated and professional Army leader. If he is not already a member, we hope he will consider joining AUSA as a demonstration of his own commitment to the Army Profession.
TRADOC is looking for ideas and thought pieces on Strategic Landpower, what it should be and how it should shape along **doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities** functions.

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Captain William D. Swenson distinguished himself by acts of gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life while serving as an embedded advisor to the Afghan National Border Police, Task Force Phoenix, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan in support of 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, during combat operations against an armed enemy in Kunar Province, Afghanistan, on 8 September 2009. Captain Swenson’s extraordinary heroism and selflessness above and beyond the call of duty are in keeping with the highest traditions of military service and reflect great credit upon himself, Task Force Phoenix, 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division and the United States Army.

Go to [http://www.army.mil/medalofhonor/swenson/citation.html](http://www.army.mil/medalofhonor/swenson/citation.html) to read the entire official narrative and learn more about Capt. William D. Swenson