

COLD DAYS IN HELL: American POWs in Korea,

William Clark Latham, Texas A&M University Press, College Station, 301 pages, \$30.00

FEATURED REVIEW



ON A STAFF ride in Korea years ago, I found myself standing on Gloster Hill, a jagged hump just south of the Imjin River and north of Seoul. There, on 25 April 1951, 400 battle-weary men of the 1st Battalion, Gloucestershire Regiment, made their last stand against

elements of three attacking Chinese divisions. By mid-morning, out of bullets and surrounded, the surviving Gloucestershires attempted to break out. Only 39 made it; the rest were captured.

I'd always wondered what happened to the Gloucestershires and to the thousands of other UN troops taken prisoner by the Chinese and North Koreans between 1950 and 1953. Now, thanks to William Latham's fine new book, *Cold Days in Hell*, I have a good idea.

Blending solid scholarship with smooth style, Latham takes us deftly through the war's major movements, from the early debacles to the eventual stalemate. He includes an informative chapter on the air war, too, and covers the MacArthur-Truman sideshow efficiently. This is necessary background for understanding the prisoner-of-war narrative. All is rendered vividly and with such good judgment that *Cold Days* can serve as a useful short history of the war.

Amid the military and political maneuvering, the appalling prisoner-of-war story comes to life. Thanks to Cold War fears and McCarthyism, the usual narrative—well documented here—revolves around the supposed Communist brainwashing

of morally weak GIs. According to *Cold Days*, Communist brutality—the Tiger death march, summary executions, beatings, and especially the captors' feckless attitude toward their prisoners' maintenance—dominated the story. As Latham records it, lack of food, shelter, and medical attention led to rampant disease—chiefly dysentery and diarrhea—that harrowed the prisoner-of-war ranks and made captivity a daily hell. The lucky suffered severely; the unlucky died in their own waste. Compared to such misery, Marxist indoctrination must have been merely irritating.

One of the book's many strengths is its plethora of personal stories. Chief among them is that of Father Emil Kapaun, who received the Medal of Honor in April 2013—60 years after his death on a dirt floor in the Pyoktong prison camp. Reading about this fearless, selfless man's exploits is a humbling experience. One isn't surprised that the Catholic Church is vetting Kapaun for sainthood.

Other stories are the result of personal interviews conducted by the author. Korean War veterans comprise a fast-fading generation, and we are fortunate to hear the words of such men as Ray Mellin, deployed with Task Force Smith and captured on the first day of fighting; Dan Oldewage, tail gunner on a B-29 shot down near the Yalu River; and 19 others whose personal testimony gives a visceral feel for what life was like in the Communist camps.

For its interviews alone, *Cold Days* stands as a valuable contribution to Korean War and prisoner-of-war literature. Add in a perceptive last chapter on post-war mishandling of the prisoner-of-war experience and a generous bibliography, and the book deserves a place on every professional soldier's reading list.

**Lt. Col. Arthur Bilodeau, USA, Retired,
Louisville, Kentucky**

**VIOLENCE, NONVIOLENCE, AND THE
PALESTINIAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT,**

Wendy Pearlman, Ph. D., Cambridge University
Press, 2011, 287 pages, \$99.00

PROFESSOR WENDY PEARLMAN poses the fundamental question of why some political movements rely on nonviolent methods, while others routinely exercise violence. For the serving officer, this is a question of broad professional significance. Understanding the answers will influence the fundamental force posture under which any leader will lead his troops when confronting national movements and insurgencies that are either violent or nonviolent, or perhaps even those of a dual nature.

Pearlman is assistant professor of political science at Northwestern University in Chicago. She holds the Crown Junior Chair in Middle East Studies. She has spent several intense years working and studying throughout the Middle East and on both sides of the Green Line. Her book focuses on the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and its leadership and organization of the Palestinian national movement.

Much of the PLO's notoriety, of course, has been due to its conflict with the state of Israel. The protracted and deadly struggle has a long pedigree of many parents. At least from a Palestinian and even Arab perspective, one could sum up the root of the problem by citing a former secretary of the Arab League, Azzam Pasha: "The Jew, our old cousin, coming back with imperialistic ideas, with materialistic ideas, with reactionary or revolutionary ideas, and trying to implement them first by British pressure and then by American pressure, and then by terrorism on his own part—he is not the old cousin, and we do not extend to him a very good welcome." R.H.S. Crossman, a British cabinet member under Harold Wilson and a staunch Zionist, noted "Jewish colonial settlement in Palestine—from the Arab point of view—is simply another variant of Western imperialism . . ." The PLO was one of the chief organizations of resistance that struggled for years against what it regarded as another form of imperialism.

Pearlman is especially interested in explaining why national movements like the PLO chose

violence over nonviolence. In addressing the question, she develops an "organizational mediation theory of protest." The author explains that while most movements embrace violence for many and sundry reasons, there is only one road that leads to nonviolent protest. This course requires social and organizational cohesion: "When a movement is cohesive, it enjoys the organizational power to mobilize mass participation, enforce strategic discipline, and contain disruptive dissent. In consequence, cohesion increases the possibility that a movement will use nonviolent protest." For the serving officer, Pearlman's insights offer important insights. When a movement swings toward violence, it is because it has lost the leadership, institutions, purpose, direction, and motivation that provide coherence, restraint, and constraint to its active members. "Its very internal structure thus generates incentives and opportunities that increase the likelihood that it will use violence." Much evidence from our experience in Iraq and Afghanistan supports the writer's thesis. Strong leadership and organizational coherence play a crucial role in keeping the peace and dampening down violence. Army officers confronting a potential national movement or insurgency can play a crucial role at key moments and points of intervention by supporting the forces of restraint.

**James J. Schneider, Ph. D.,
Leavenworth, Kansas**

**PERSUASION AND POWER: The Art of
Strategic Communication,**

James P. Farewell, Georgetown University
Press, Washington, DC, 2012, 270 pages, \$29.95

AMERICA'S ABILITY TO market everything from McDonald's to the latest fad around the world is unparalleled in history, and yet, it is challenged when it comes to marketing itself. James P. Farewell, an internationally recognized expert in strategic communication and cyber warfare, has written an insightful work on what strategic communication is and why we as a nation are failing at it.

Farewell explores the U.S. government's elusive quest to engage foreign audiences throughout the

world. It often finds itself in an ineffective and inefficient react mode to state and nonstate actors alike. An inability to communicate strategically reflects lack of emphasis by U.S. senior leaders, parochial turf wars between agencies, and the lack of a single comprehensive approach. Farewell describes the inane view held by many in the U.S. government, especially in the Department of Defense, that strategic communication is a process rather than a capability or an art. Farewell counters that it is partly a process, but we need to think of it more as an art of communication. The inability to communicate strategically is further exacerbated because the Department of Defense categorizes strategic communication in terms of inform and influence. He counters that smart public affairs is about influence. He says that “smart public affairs always seeks to influence, if for nothing else than to bolster credibility.”

Farewell proposes viable solutions to maximize the effectiveness of strategic communication efforts. These include centralizing control of strategic communication for the U.S. government within the White House, revising current definitions that are inconsistent and undercut credibility, improving military training in information operations, improving State Department efficiency, measuring effectiveness better, holding people accountable, and realizing that strategic communication equals military strategy.

The strength of *Persuasion and Power* is its exhaustive research, reflected in numerous vignettes and research that compellingly illustrate successful concepts, benefits, and failures of strategic communication. Scholars and strategic communicators alike will be impressed with Farewell’s research and proposed solutions to enhance strategic communication. *Persuasion and Power* is a must-read for those with an interest in strategic communication.

Jesse McIntyre III,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

**MILITARY ADAPTATION IN WAR: With
Fear of Change,**

Williamson Murray, Cambridge University
Press, New York, 2011, 342 pages, \$35.00

WILLIAMSON MURRAY WANTS his writing to make a difference. Perhaps more than

any other living military historian, Murray has aimed his books and articles toward the edification of serving professionals. His success is evident by the use of two of his coauthored anthologies, *The Dynamics of Military Revolution* and *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period*, as core texts in the Command and General Staff College military history curriculum. However, some purists argue that Dr. Murray walks on thin ice because extracting practical lessons from complex historical experience is dicey business. In his defense, I believe historians must attempt to distill useful ideas from their research. Otherwise, those less aware of history’s perverse ability to perplex and deceive will take charge of the business of finding lessons learned. Therefore, along with acknowledging his distinguished career and body of work, let us respect Murray’s genuine concern for military education.

He is clearly in the teaching mode in his most recent volume, *Military Adaptation in War: With Fear of Change*. This book could be considered a sequel to *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period*, a collection of case studies that delve into the efforts of the major powers to examine the battlefield lessons of World War I as they prepared for the challenge of the next conflict. The problem then was changing militaries during peacetime. Murray now examines the even more difficult challenge of changing armies, navies, and air forces in the midst of an active conflict. As with *Military Innovation*, he continues to use a case study format. However, in this volume, Murray writes all the essays himself.

The essays are, as in all of Murray’s writing, clear, pithy, and didactic. His case studies include the complex adaptation on the Western Front from 1914 to 1918, and the flawed success of German adaptation in the early years of World War II. From World War II, he includes two case studies from the air war: the victory of Hugh Dowding’s Royal Air Force Fighter Command over the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain and the more uncertain success of Arthur Harris’ Bomber Command in its city-busting campaign against the Third Reich from 1942-1945. His final study looks at the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 and focuses on Israel’s difficulty in managing the operational level of war.

Those acquainted with Murray’s work will find much familiar here. In some cases, it might seem too familiar. In his introductory chapters and case studies, he recycles vignettes, quotations, and citations

found in his previous work. He even quotes himself in the book's last page. Nevertheless, a historian with Murray's resume might be forgiven some repetition. Even those familiar with his body of work should find *Military Adaptation in War* rewarding to read.

**Scott Stephenson, Ph.D.,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

**MY LAI: An American Atrocity
in the Vietnam War,**

William Thomas Allison, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2012, 184 pages, \$44.96

ON 16 MARCH 1968, U.S. soldiers from Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment of the 11th Brigade, Americal Division swept through the village of My Lai. By the time the day was over, more than 500 elderly men, women, and children had been slaughtered. For many Americans, the My Lai Massacre became a symbol for all that was wrong with what they considered an immoral war.

In this book, William Thomas Allison, the son of a Marine and Vietnam veteran, provides a tight, concise narrative of the events that led to the massacre, the massacre itself, the subsequent cover-up, and the trials that eventually transpired once the massacre became public knowledge. While the book does not offer much that is new, it succeeds in the author's attempt to provide a detailed overview by "pulling together materials from the investigations and trials with scholarship on My Lai, the Vietnam War, and other related issues" to place the event in the overall context of American history.

The author initially focuses on the leadership failures of 1st Lt. William L. Calley Jr., but also addresses the lack of consistently effective leadership within the entire division. Allison also demonstrates how training shortfalls within the unit contributed to the breakdown in discipline that led to the massacre.

There are heroes in this story. Allison recounts the actions of Warrant Officer Hugh Thompson, who landed his helicopter at the village, intervened in an attempt to stop the killing, and subsequently reported the incident to his higher headquarters. He also discusses the role of Vietnam veteran Ron Ridenour, who found out about the massacre after he departed Vietnam and wrote a flurry of over 30

letters to officials in Washington. Eventually, Calley was charged on 5 September 1969, with six specifications of premeditated murder for the deaths of 104 Vietnamese civilians at My Lai. Eight other officers and enlisted men were charged for crimes committed on 16 March 1968.

During the course of the investigation, it became clear there was an extensive cover-up. Consequently, Gen. William C. Westmoreland, senior U.S. commander in Vietnam, ordered an investigation by Lt. Gen. William R. Peers, who began his inquiry on 26 November 1969. Upon completion of the investigation, the Peers Commission accused 30 individuals of having knowledge of the killings, making false reports, suppressing information, false swearing, failing to report a felony, and committing similar derelictions of duty. Ultimately, only one of these officers was court-martialed, and he was acquitted. Of the remainder, 4 were killed in action, 7 had left the Army and could not be prosecuted, and thirteen suffered administrative punishments.

In the end, of those charged directly for their roles in the massacre at My Lai, only Calley was convicted. The author goes into great detail on the cover-up, the subsequent criminal investigation, the work of the Peers Commission, the subsequent trials, and their aftermath.

In summary, Allison provides a detailed and highly useful narrative of all the complexities involved in this story of one of the darkest days in the history of the U.S. Army. *My Lai: An American Atrocity in the Vietnam War* is strongly recommended for anyone interested in the Vietnam War, particularly serving officers. In a very real sense, it is a cautionary tale of how failures in leadership up and down the chain of command can have tragic consequences—not just for the Army, but also for the nation.

**Lt. Col. James H. Willbanks, Ph.D.,
USA, Retired**

MILITARY LEADERSHIP AND COUNTERINSURGENCY: The British Army and Small War Strategy Since World War II,
Victoria Nolan, I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd.,
New York, 306 pages, \$105.00

VICTORIA NOLAN'S ENGAGING *Military Leadership and Counterinsurgency* will not

disappoint students of British small wars and counterinsurgency.

Nolan, a project manager at the Institute for Social and Economic Research at the University of Essex, United Kingdom, shrewdly employs organizational culture and modern-day leadership practices from the world of business to take a fresh look at the role campaign commanders played in the process of organizational adaptation and the evolution of the British army's distinctive approach between 1948 and 1960. The so-called British approach, based on a legacy of imperial policing but established during the period of decolonization following World War II, was built on four interconnected pillars: political primacy, close coordination of the civil-military-police triumvirate, the minimum use of force, and social and economic development. However, the glue that commonly bound this approach together, and the core of Nolan's innovative study, is the central role of military leadership in counterinsurgency.

Using three well-presented case studies—The Malayan Emergency (1948-1960), Kenya and the Mau Mau Uprising (1952-1956) and The Cyprus Revolt (1955-1960)—Nolan skillfully uncovers how military leaders influence organizational learning and the advancement of military organizational culture. In so doing, the book adds much to our understanding of events. She does this by examining three main questions. First, do military leaders transmit and embed organizational culture, and if so, how? Second, what are the qualities displayed by military leaders who are successful in transmitting and embedding culture, and how do these characteristics influence the evolution of the distinctive British approach to small wars? Finally, what conditions enable military leaders to be influential in the organizational learning process? Here, Nolan acknowledges upfront that support of senior leadership is essential to enable campaign commanders to embed small-war culture in military operations and practice.

Clearly portraying the significance of such leaders as Gen. Templer in Malaya, Gen. Erskine in Kenya, and Field Marshal Sir John Harding in Cyprus, *Military Leadership and Counterinsurgency* is divided into six well-written and thought-provoking chapters. Of note, "The Legacy of Imperial Policing," provides a much-needed chronological setting, covering the emergence of the British army as a small-war army in the Victorian era. The book is cleverly separated

into a series of helpful sections and subsections; each is bite-size, succinct, and easily digestible. I have one minor criticism—that Nolan overly leads the reader by focusing and refocusing the student on the question set. That said, for those who do not have the luxury of reading the book uninterrupted, this approach is beneficial.

In addition to the astute findings in the case studies, Nolan provides wider commentary for reflection. She notes that there can be multiple short- and long-term cycles of organizational learning, and that wisdom can develop over an extended period of time—as an army gains experience of similar types of conflict and builds up a knowledge base of how to approach analogous challenges. She believes that studies on military learning and innovation need to focus on the key role played by leaders, and that leadership, organizational learning, and the evolution of culture are conceptually tied together. She cautions, "In the future it will be necessary to consider not only whether learning has occurred within the group under consideration but also whether this learning can be and has been applied and operationalized in practice. The danger, as always, is that the fog of war often means that effective strategies, tactics, or techniques are lost; capturing best practice is never straightforward".

One could argue that Nolan's summation is predictable: "it is my conclusion that leaders who are charismatic and dynamic are influential in transmitting and embedding organisational culture (in this case the British army's small-war culture), particularly when they are supported by like-minded superiors, and when they also have a history of small-war experiences." However, it is the careful analysis and unmistakable logic used to reach this finding that are truly insightful and worthwhile. Drawing on a wide range of primary and secondary sources, Nolan uncovers the realities of organizational learning through the twin prisms of military leadership and organizational culture. By taking this approach, she highlights the mixed successes of campaign commanders and underlines what worked and why. This will be of particular relevance to today's military commanders faced with a mutating insurgency in Afghanistan.

Overall, *Military Leadership and Counterinsurgency* is a well-timed, enjoyable, and engaging

study that will be of interest to historians, serving soldiers, and sociologists alike. Nolan's findings add much to our understanding of the important role of leadership in counterinsurgency and shed new light on celebrated military leaders. This text will enhance the shelf of any professional or personal library and is highly recommended.

**Col. Andrew M. Roe, Ph.D., British Army,
Episkopi Garrison, Cyprus**

LINCOLN AND MCCLELLAN AT WAR,

Chester G. Hearn,

Louisiana State University Press,

Baton Rouge, LA, 2012, 272 pages, \$45.00

THE MOST RECENT of Chester G. Hearn's six books on the American Civil War, *Lincoln and McClellan at War*, provides military and political leaders a stark reminder of the importance of good civil-military relations during war. A natural follow-on to the author's *Lincoln, the Cabinet, and the Generals*, Hearn provides valuable historical perspectives to one of the most poignant examples of a poor relationship; the relationship that existed between President Abraham Lincoln and Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan during the American Civil War. Three themes emerged that contributed to the poor relations; a dearth of strategic leaders in the Union, McClellan's disdain for authority and actions of superiors, and political and ideological differences between Lincoln and McClellan.

The lack of strategically thinking military and civilian leaders available to the Union early in the war provided an enduring theme throughout the book. While the author credited the president and his administration with scant understanding of the herculean tasks of rapidly recruiting, organizing, equipping, training, and fielding an expanding army, he also recognized Lincoln had few choices among his available generals. Led by the venerable Gen. Winfield Scott in early 1861, the United States was ill-prepared for the coming conflict. Moreover, the flight of operational and strategic military talent to the Southern cause gave Scott and Lincoln few choices, forcing them to look outside the existing active force for talent. Their eyes fell on the youthful George B. McClellan to train and lead the Union's premier

force, the Army of the Potomac.

Hearn described McClellan, "The Little Napoleon" or "Little Mac," as an 1846 West Point graduate, a veteran of the Mexican War, and a leader exposed to the art of European, particularly Napoleonic, warfare during extensive study abroad while on active duty. After inexplicably resigning his commission in 1857 at a relatively early age, McClellan applied his engineering skills to the expanding railroads, and quickly rose to the position of vice president of the Illinois Central during the late 1850s before returning to federal service. Hearn's narrative rightfully recognizes McClellan as charismatic, intelligent, a master planner, a superb trainer, and a leader highly respected by soldiers. At the youthful age of 34, he was a perfect choice to lead the infant Army of the Potomac. However, the author also highlights McClellan's lack of experience in leading and successfully deploying large formations in combat throughout the narrative. This, combined with the author's recognition of Lincoln's persistent lenience and patience with McClellan and his immediate successors, remained as a festering theme that continued until the discovery of the winning capabilities and promotion of Ulysses S. Grant.

Further, Hearn adroitly credits McClellan with personality traits that severely weakened relations with Lincoln and arguably resulted in prolonging the war at an untold cost of lives and national treasure. Highlighted among these was Hearn's second theme; McClellan's intense disdain for authority and actions of superiors. While Hearn's focus was rightfully oriented on McClellan's relations with Lincoln, his well-documented research suggested McClellan chafed at directives from all sources considered as threatening to his command and unfettered flexibility. Regardless of whether it was McClellan's constant bickering on operations and strategy with the president (who he considered inferior to himself), his incessant demands of Lincoln and Secretary of War Edwin Stanton (who, interestingly, was initially considered an ally) for more men and resources, or his outright disdain and hatred of Gen. Scott and competing peers, the majority of blame for conflict must rightfully lie with McClellan. The author's reference to McClellan's correspondence, particularly to his

wife Ellen, was particularly valuable. On several occasions, Hearn suggested that if Lincoln had the insight of McClellan's character as exposed in letters to his wife, the Union and Lincoln would have been spared untold friction, and likely would have accelerated his relief.

Hearn's third theme was one of political and ideological differences. The author described Lincoln as a staunch abolitionist and Republican and McClellan as an unwavering Democrat and one tolerant to slavery as a means of ending the war. Clearly, the two diametrically opposing positions led to suspicion of McClellan's actions. While not directly stating that McClellan's "slows" were a strategy to thwart Lincoln's political and ideological goals, the author at least insinuates such. This is especially evident through Hearn's thought-provoking discussion of McClellan's planning and prosecution of the Peninsular Campaign, as well as his unwillingness to cooperate with Lincoln's strategy to end the war in the early years by seizing opportunities to capture Richmond. Without directly accusing McClellan of insubordination for political reasons, Hearn did suggest politics might have contributed to McClellan's desire to leverage the increasing popular dissatisfaction of the war for political gain. In this, the author makes a compelling case, especially given the Democratic Party's nomination of McClellan for president in the 1864 election.

While some may identify additional themes, Chester G. Hearn's *Lincoln and McClellan at War* provides readers with valuable insights into the conflict that existed between President Lincoln and his commander of the Army of the Potomac. While every war fought by the United States contains some element of conflict between political and military leaders, Hearn's book provides readers a lasting reminder of the tragic consequences of the poor relations that existed between Lincoln and McClellan. Unfortunately, history repeated itself with similar themes almost a century later on another peninsula halfway around the world between President Harry Truman and Gen. Douglas MacArthur. Both would have benefitted greatly from Hearn's historical insights.

**Bill McCollum, Ed.D.,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

PATTON: Blood, Guts, and Prayer,
Michael Keane, Regnery Publishing,
Washington, DC, year, pages, \$27.95

MICHAEL KEANE'S BIOGRAPHY of the leader who displayed such great contradictions weaves together a compact, readable book focused on three specific facets of Patton's history and remarkable character: blood, guts, and prayer.

In the chapter named "Blood," Keane examines Gen. Patton's genealogy, highlighting the experiences and influences of his ancestors, especially his grandfather and great-uncle who served as officers in the Confederacy; both Patton brothers died of battle wounds during the Civil War. The genealogy traces even further back to Hugh Mercer, a contemporary and colleague of George Washington, who crossed the Delaware River with Washington in the Christmas attack on the Hessian Barracks in Trenton. Mercer also died of battle wounds during the Revolutionary War. Keane illustrates how Patton's familiarity with his family's military heritage shaped the character of the historic figure we know well.

In "Guts," Keane explores Patton's demonstrated physical courage, building a perspective for better understanding the "slapping incident" that almost terminated Patton's career and would have demoted him all the way to colonel. Keane's presentation of correspondence between generals Eisenhower and Marshall about Patton's relief and potential future make it abundantly clear what a narrow escape it was. In his own defense, Patton indicated in conversation and correspondence that he had "saved an immortal soul," by grabbing his attention and having him sent back to his unit. One may wonder if Patton was so obsessed with proving his own physical courage that he was frightened by what he saw as a lack of courage in others—that somehow a threat of contagion existed, not only to the troops he commanded, but also to him.

Keane's biography interweaves evidence of Patton's deep-seated belief in a God-ordained destiny. Keane notes that Patton believed himself

to be a veteran of a number of ancient battles, but does not reconcile the contradiction between reincarnation and Patton's Christian beliefs. In "Prayer," the biographer presents the dilemma, then moves on to other aspects of Patton's faith. He reconciles Patton's penchant for profanity as an attention-getting device that Patton in fact learned and practiced. What Keane does most convincingly is present evidence that Patton inevitably turned to God in times of personal trial, be it life-threatening injury, professional adversity, or operational military crisis. Patton considered prayer a potent force, and leaned heavily on his chaplains to employ that force, much as he leaned on his artillerymen to employ the force of lethal fires. The conversation between Patton and one of his chaplains, in which he says "that men get what they want by planning, by working, and by praying," leaves little doubt that Patton's devout Christian beliefs were genuine, an integral part of his character, and an essential ingredient of his overt actions.

Keane's short, topical biography is a valuable contribution to the body of knowledge surrounding this almost mythical American general.

**Thomas E. Ward II, Ph.D.,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

**YEAR OF GLORY: The Life and Battles
of Jeb Stuart and His Cavalry, June 1862-
June 1863**, Monte Akers, Casemate Publishers,
Havertown, PA, 2012, 371 pages, \$18.00

BY THE END of the Chancellorsville Campaign in May 1863, perhaps no military leader other than Robert E. Lee enjoyed the fame and notoriety of Maj. Gen. James Ewell Brown "Jeb" Stuart. Placed in command of the Confederate Second Corps after the wounding of Stonewall Jackson, Stuart relentlessly pressed the Confederate assault, ultimately driving the Union army from the field and achieving one of the South's greatest victories. The boldness, aggressiveness, and sheer will to win in the Virginia wilderness—coupled with his dashing, if not reckless, exploits as commander of the Confederate cavalry—propelled this Southern cavalier into

annals of military history. Little did anyone know that June 1863 would mark the end of Stuart's remarkable, unmatched year of military success.

For the student of Civil War history, Monte Akers' *Year of Glory: The Life and Battles of Jeb Stuart and His Cavalry, June 1862-June 1863* provides the reader with an extraordinary look into that remarkable year. As seen through the eyes and thoughts of Stuart and his staff, Akers skillfully integrates their personal diaries, journals, official logs, and records into a vivid account of the daily activities in Stuart's camp. He fills the book with humorous anecdotes involving Stuart and his personal staff as they brave life in the Confederate cavalry. Akers portrays Stuart as a smart, yet mildly vain, socialite with an affable, gregarious personality and a man captivated by the fineries and social graces of the Old South's intelligentsia. Even as the enemy threatened his position, Stuart felt it was his social duty to acquire a local home and host an elaborate gala. His antics nearly cost him his life and command on several occasions.

With equal passion, Akers characterizes Stuart, the cavalry warrior, by his unflappable, clear thinking analysis, combined with daring and unquestioned courage. Through Stuart's own words and actions, the reader sees an emotional, caring leader bound by strong personal relationships with his men and filled with conflicting feelings and loyalties toward family, particularly his four-year-old daughter Flora; his peers; and his country. The reader becomes acquainted with a warrior who is as unashamed to openly weep at the deaths of Flora and confidant Maj. John Pelham as he is to lead his outnumbered troops on a near-impossible mission. Akers leaves little doubt that Stuart was a soldier's soldier, universally admired and respected by those in his command and feared by his enemy.

Akers' animated writing style places the reader within Jeb Stuart's inner circle as they gather around the campfire singing a popular melody or conferring over future combat operations. For the student of Civil War history, this work provides a deeper understanding of one of the most intriguing leaders and characters of the war. Despite several typographical errors, *Year of Glory* is a great addition to any Civil War collection.

**Lt. Col. Harry Clay Garner, USA, Retired,
Fort Belvoir, Virginia**

ENGINEERS OF VICTORY: The Problem Solvers Who Turned the Tide in the Second World War,

Paul Kennedy, Random House, New York, 2013, 436 pages, \$30.00.

PAUL KENNEDY, AUTHOR of the classic *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, has delivered another outstanding book with *Engineers of Victory*. In this work, Kennedy examines problem solving and critical thinking during the Second World War by focusing on five critical areas: the U-boat battle in the Atlantic, air war over Europe, stopping the blitzkrieg, amphibious warfare, and overcoming the vastness of the Pacific Ocean. Each issue is examined from both an Allied and Axis perspective in order to define their respective problems. The result is a thoughtful analysis that traces the linkage in problem solving between the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. What Kennedy sets out to prove is that the application of superior force does not necessarily win wars, but rather “the intelligent application of superior force.” The reoccurring theme throughout this work is that the Allies were successful in large part due to the “culture of encouragement” they created. Kennedy describes this culture as a support system that had “efficient feedback loops, a capacity to learn from setbacks, [and] an ability to get things done.” A prime example of this culture in action is the U-boat battle in the Atlantic Ocean. In early 1943, the Allies were suffering tremendous losses in this critical theater in part because their equipment and doctrine didn’t measure up to the challenge. Convoy doctrine at this time was either “kill the wolves or protect the flock.” However, by critically assessing their doctrine the Allies were able to refine their tactics and procedures so they could do both. The same level of analysis helped them to restructure their command and control organizations, refine lines of information, and better integrate all of their weapon systems. The creation of organizations such as the Department of Miscellaneous Weapons Development enhanced the development of weapon systems. This department, guided by the principles of “curiosity, experiment, risk taking, and thinking outside the box,” was responsible for the development of several key systems such as

airborne anti-submarine radar and enhanced direction finding equipment. Almost the exact opposite mentality existed among those responsible for the air war over Europe. The picture Kennedy creates is one of misguided politics and erroneous mental models with near catastrophic results. One of his more poignant points is that Allied bomber command did not analyze the lessons learned from the Battle of Britain—the key one being that “against a well-defended and well-organized aerial defensive system, a force of bombers could not always get through.” In the early years of the war, doctrine and theory did not reflect the reality of the operational environment. Specifically, bombers could not adequately defend themselves without long-range fighter escorts and bombing did not destroy the morale of population. Kennedy shows that the Allied bombing campaign really did not begin to show effective results until the mismatch between the environment, equipment, doctrine, and theory were realistically addressed.

Although Kennedy’s book focuses on the Second World War, it reinforces key lessons for military operations in general. He shows that the leaders and planners of this era worked hard to understand their current environment, but they also spent a great deal of energy thinking about the future. For that reason, they began developing the equipment and doctrine necessary for the coming war before it started. However, he also shows their success required the ability to continue critically accessing and analyzing all aspects of their doctrine and equipment while the conflict was ongoing. Finally, Kennedy demonstrates that the success of the American way of war is because of the superior application of military force and the intelligent application of superior military force.

**Lt. Col. William Kenna McCurry, USA,
Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

RIDERS OF THE APOCALYPSE: German Cavalry and Modern Warfare, 1870-1945,

David R. Dorondo, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2012, 336 pages, \$36.95

FROM THE EARLIEST forms of shock-and-awe-style warfare, to today’s modern battle tank, none draws more romanticism and mysticism than

that of the horse in combat. Images of the Egyptian war chariot to the armor-clad medieval knight bearing down on a line of infantry resonate in current thought through its profound and revolutionary effect on the battlefield. Throughout the ages, horsemen and those of similar special units were regarded as the elite of the modern battlefield. Riders required training in horsemanship to guide their 1,000-pound animal into a deadly abatis, as well as the ability to conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and screening of enemy movements without detection or destruction. These skills enabled an army to gain, almost instantly, a decided tactical advantage over another. Acknowledging that all weapon systems eventually become obsolete by advancements and/or battlefield conditions, one that has miraculously survived is the horse.

To understand horse survival in light of advances in weaponry, David R. Dorondo takes us back to their use in German warfare. He sets the stage with the German Uhlán in the Franco-Prussian War. The Prussians used horses to disrupt operations, perform valuable reconnaissance, and in some circumstances, stave off defeat in order to allow the main field armies to regroup and survive to fight again. The French did not share in these same successes and in one contest thousands of horsemen perished; the Prussians had to put to death nearly 10,000 of their horses due to injuries. However, the German generals analyzed what they did wrong, to include the French lessons in different contexts and thereby designed a different purpose for which the horse arm is more uniquely suited.

In later conflicts, the Germans focused on using horsemen as a means to conduct a long range reconnaissance and interdiction of enemy supply trains. The roles in World War I required different uses based on the context (Western and Eastern front use of the horse was modified by terrain and the type of warfare). The spade and wire of the Western front was ill suited for the horse's utility other than supply but in the Eastern front the horse had an offensive capacity as well. The horse's role continued to evolve over the course of landscapes and warfare all the way up to World War II, where the German army required them in nearly every operation because they did not possess the necessary numbers of mechanized assets. The terrain of the Eastern front allowed the horse to retain mobility after armor

became mired in the mud and lubricants froze in the subzero temperatures. Horses were well suited to protect the flanks of large armies and employed in a number of roles to include far-forward scouting and widening of assault lanes to allow better battlefield placement of the main force. As a result, all Panzer Divisions of the time had cavalry units attached to them. The later role of the cavalry in the genocidal policies of the Reich cemented the worst images of the German horsemen as the SS cavalry units began to dominate and conduct operations against partisans and civilians as well. Although the German horseman's role is largely diminished for open warfare, their skills as horsemen and breeders of some of the stoutest mounts in the world are still apparent. Horsemen were used in Afghanistan as part of the German contingent's contribution as well as on patrols in Austria and German frontiers and mountainous regions where vehicles did not fare well. Dorondo demonstrates that horses still may have a role to play tomorrow.

**Col. Thomas S. Bundt, Ph.D.,
Fort Lee, Virginia**

A DEATH IN SAN PIETRO,
Tim Brady, Da Capo Press, Boston, MA,
2013, 267 pages, \$16.76

IN ITS OPENING stages, this book seemed like one of those lightweight History Channel presentations: an attempt to intertwine three rather disparate plot lines involving a minor World War II battle with the journalism legend Ernie Pyle and a Hollywood look at World War II. To my great surprise, it all worked out. Moreover, in details of the battle for San Pietro on the road to Rome, it is a heavyweight military work.

San Pietro was a costly victory and possibly folly, but its story was lost to military history with the disastrous crossing of the Rapido River a short time later. Coming down from Lt. Gen. Mark Clark, this order remains unforgotten and unforgiven in the state of Texas, home of the hard-hit 36th Division (also at San Pietro). In fact, Tim Brady's entire book is almost a long but interesting footnote—prelude to Clark's motives in the Rapido assault.

Much of the early book is about the prewar building of the 36th Division with recruits drawn from the small towns of central Texas. Brady also rehashes the oft-told story of Ernie Pyle and the seldom-told story of George Marshall's attempts to mobilize filmmaking in the war effort. The book's true hero, Capt. Henry Waskow, and the long-suffering general officer who formed and led the 36th Division, Maj. Gen. Fred L. Walker, do not even rate pictures in the black-and-white center spread (I had an advance copy; more may have been added later).

Walker's rounding out the National Guard division into wartime shape and his empathy with the GIs apparently did not serve him well with Clark. Earlier, Walker was made the goat of the famous 1941 Louisiana maneuvers when, in charge of antitank forces, his only weapons consisted of cardboard signs reading "tank destroyer." His troops even welded a few mock cannons since none were supplied. Patton's armor ignored the "tank destroyer" signs and the referees looked the other way. In the after-action review, Patton boasted of how he had "destroyed Walker's defenses."

While other divisions were getting the call to battle in North Africa and Sicily, the 36th languished with parades and guard duty in Morocco. Finally, the Texans were selected to participate in the invasion of Italy at Salerno. (In an irony harking back to the Louisiana maneuvers, Walker's antitank weapons had not landed when the division reached the Salerno beachhead.)

From Salerno until the battle of San Pietro, the narrative is compellingly crisp and parallels the style of Pyle, who is often quoted, and cartoonist Bill Mauldin, who was in the vicinity. The story also rings with vignettes such as a constant mortar barrage that went on during fighting on Sorrento Peninsula, while just down the road, in Amalfi, a seaside resort hotel continued to serve gourmet meals on fine china.

As Walker was pushing his division north and setting up to attack one of the well-constructed German defense lines below Rome, two big-name Hollywood directors—Maj. Frank Capra and Capt. John Huston—were finishing an assignment given them by Gen. George Marshall. The chief of staff called on Capra to produce a series of documentary films that would explain "the principles for which we are fighting." At the screening of Huston's classic about the battle for San Pietro, one three-star gen-

eral walked out. The film was bottled up by the War Department until Capra took the matter to Marshall at which time it was released not only to troops but also to American audiences.

The book closes with Pyle's death on an island near Okinawa, but it should have ended with Pyle's earlier tribute to Capt. Waskow, killed leading his platoon on the 4,000-foot heights of Mt. Sammu-cro, the gateway to San Pietro and the Liri Valley. It was considered one of Pyle's finest columns, and is reprinted in this book.

George Ridge, J.D.,
Tucson, Arizona

THOSE ANGRY DAYS: Roosevelt, Lindbergh, and America's Fight Over World War II, 1939-1941,

Lynne Olson, Random House, New York,
576 pages, \$22.38

A MERICANS LIKE TO think of World War II as "The Good War": an unambiguous and unifying conflict that pitted the nation against the forces of evil. Although this narrative rings true, it masks the fact that in the two years prior to the U.S. entry into the war the American people and their political leaders were divided over the role that the Republic should play in the European crisis. In *Those Angry Days*, Lynne Olson chronicles the passionate, and at times vicious, domestic battles between the nation's isolationist and interventionist factions in trying to sway public policy toward giving American aid to France and Britain.

Olsen's wide-ranging narrative revolves around the key roles played by Charles Lindbergh and Franklin Roosevelt in the intervention debate. This personification of the dispute not only humanizes the period's diplomatic history, but also gives the reader a nuanced and balanced account of issues involved and the fervor that they sparked. As Olsen demonstrates, Lindbergh was far from the simple anti-Semite and pro-Nazi dupe that the Roosevelt administration and pro-intervention press often portrayed him to be, but was rather a man whose technical and clinical mind had him convinced that Britain could not win the war and America's lack of military preparedness meant that intervention was immoral, illogical, and suicidal.

Roosevelt, on the other hand, believed that America's entry into the war was inevitable and thus support for the Allies was both a national security and a moral imperative. While Olsen credits Roosevelt for carefully building public consensus toward providing aid to Britain, she also notes that the president frequently displayed indecisive leadership and was far too fearful of allowing his policies to outpace public opinion. However, this did not stop him from using the power of the FBI and the pro-intervention press in "a dirty fight" to wiretap and investigate his isolationist foes and blacken their names at every turn.

While Roosevelt and Lindbergh are center stage in the story, Olsen skillfully weaves a fascinating tale that ties together the views of a host of other interesting characters and contending factions in the fight over intervention. The struggle was far from a foregone conclusion. By the mid-1930s, many, if not most, Americans convinced themselves that Allied propaganda and banking and business interests had hoodwinked the nation into entering World War I. Coupled with the economic woes of the Great Depression, these feelings led large numbers of Americans to argue that the nation's focus should remain on solving its domestic problems rather than meddling in the affairs of distant and decadent Europe. As college students, future presidents John F. Kennedy and Gerald Ford joined the anti-interventionist America First Committees that sprang up across the nation's campuses. Olsen notes that many senior officers in the American military, most notably the ranking Air Corps officer Gen. Hap Arnold, opposed aiding Britain and even attempted to derail Roosevelt's interventionist policies by leaking information to the press and isolationist politicians in the Congress. The debate was so contentious that it even split families. Lindbergh's own mother-in-law was an avid interventionist and his brother-in-law ran Britain's pro-intervention propaganda network in the United States.

Frankly, *Those Angry Days* is one of the most enjoyable books that this reviewer has read in some time. Olsen's account is fast-paced and is exceptionally well written and researched. In a nation wracked by economic woes, war weariness, political gridlock, and the rise on a new wave of neo-isolationism, Olsen offers some thought-provoking parallels between our time and the "angry days" of 1939 to 1941.

**Lt. Col. Richard S. Faulkner, Ph.D., USA,
Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas**

**UNIPOLARITY AND THE EVOLUTION
OF AMERICA'S COLD WAR ALLIANCES,**

Nigel R. Thalakada, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2012, 198 pages, \$85.00

THE EVOLUTION OF America's major Cold War alliances "evinces a similar pattern of moving beyond the logic of balance of power to what is referred to as management of power" suggests Nigel Thalakada in *Unipolarity and the Evolution of America's Cold War Alliances*. The author utilizes case studies of U.S. alliance relationships with NATO, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand to develop a thesis that takes a "pan-alliance" perspective. Thalakada argues that the post-Cold War shift of American-led alliance objectives, from static territorial defense to the global projection of stability, is the outgrowth of America's unipolar military superiority.

In a multipolar or bipolar world, alliances take the shape of balance of power instruments, balancing against any perceived hegemonic nation or coalition. However, the rise of a unipolar power creates a management of power dynamic within standing alliances. The objectives of both the superpower and its allies evolve to reflect this shift in power, as unspecified global threats replace declared regional adversaries. Allies seek to maintain the "superpower's security guarantee in face of uncertainty," to leverage the "superpower's superior capabilities to achieve national security objectives," and attempt to influence the "superpower's exercise of power."

Concurrently, the superpower seeks to distribute the burden of maintaining international security, stifle the tendency to balance against it, and maintain its international leadership role. Such a dynamic encourages bandwagoning by allies who support superpower objectives rather than attempting to balance against it; in return seeking the political-military and economic benefits, which only the superpower can bestow. Thalakada uses effective examples to emphasize the development of management of power dynamics within American-led alliances after the Cold War—from Australia's leveraging of superior American capabilities to secure its regional "premi-

nence,” as demonstrated during the East Timor Crisis, to South Korea’s use of the U.S. security guarantee to reinvest defense funds into economic development initiatives.

Although exhaustive, Thalakada’s approach gives rise to a chicken-or-the-egg causality dilemma. While the author argues that the shift to management of power dynamics is the result of America’s unipolar moment, many of these characteristics were apparent during the bipolar, Cold War world. As Thalakada demonstrates, America pressured Japan to commit to greater burden sharing by defending extended sea-lanes and increasing its military budget in 1981. Likewise, NATO’s weapons and munitions standardization efforts throughout the Cold War reveals that allies were “leveraging the superpower’s capabilities” for interoperability objectives long before unipolarity. Except for a brief concluding synopsis of U.S. alliances with Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore, an admitted lack of coverage of non-western U.S. alliances leaves the work profoundly reliant on a Westernized perspective for its hypothesis.

Thalakada’s work traces the changing nature of U.S. alliances from balance of power to management of power instruments during the unipolar era, while providing a pan-alliance perspective with applicability across America’s transnational security engagements. This work is highly recommended for those seeking a greater understanding of the post-Cold War shift of U.S.-Western alliance dynamics and the direction of ally-centric policies.

Viktor M. Stoll, King’s College, London

SHADOW WARRIOR: The life of William Egan Colby, Randall B. Woods, Basic Books/Perseus, New York, 2013, 576 pages, \$29.99

THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE Agency (CIA) was created in 1947 to collect human intelligence and provide analysis for senior government policymakers. Most of its early leaders were veterans of the World War II Office of Strategic Services (OSS), an organization better known for covert operations. A series of presidents used the CIA for subversion, attempted assassination, and deniable military operations, viewing these as “simple” solutions to the complex problems of dealing with

governments such as Cuba, Iran, Honduras, and Chile. In the mid-1970s, the Watergate scandal led to publicity for these questionable activities, resulting in severe restrictions on all forms of foreign intelligence.

Professor Randall Woods, the author of numerous other American biographies, has chosen to retell this story as a tragedy concerning one of the best OSS and CIA special operators, William Colby. Parachuting into France and later Norway during World War II, Colby developed an enthusiasm for special operations, an enthusiasm that caused him to join the new CIA in the much murkier moral environment of the early Cold War. According to the author, under Colby’s cool pragmatism was the idealism of a liberal Catholic internationalist, someone who believed in improving rights and living conditions for the people with whom he worked. This tendency reached its height when Colby served several tours with the CIA in South Vietnam, culminating as the head of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, an interagency organization dedicated to counterinsurgency through improving the lives of the rural peasantry. Woods argues that, despite his awareness of the difficulties involved in that conflict, his protagonist could never admit the impossibility of his dream of an independent, democratic Vietnam.

Just as the dream collapsed in 1975, Colby found himself as Director of Central Intelligence presiding over the nadir of his agency. In Wood’s account, Colby was so dedicated to the rule of law that he disclosed the “crown jewels”—CIA involvement in domestic spying, attempted assassinations, and other egregious actions—to Congressional oversight during the post-Watergate investigations. This not only embarrassed officials such as Henry Kissinger, but also gave witch-hunting critics an opportunity to betray genuine secrets in order to score political points. Colby was forced out of office in 1976, only to drown under mysterious circumstances 20 years later.

Cynics might argue that this version makes heroes out of an agency and a man involved in some of the greatest excesses in the history of American government. That said, however, *Shadow Warrior* is both a strong argument and a well-researched, compelling story, filled with fascinating details about the Cold War and the problems of gathering foreign intelligence in a democracy.

**Col. Jonathan M. House, USA, Retired,
Leavenworth, Kansas**

AUSA Rebuttal

Lt. Gen. Guy C. Swan III, U.S. Army, Retired, *Vice President, Association of the United States Army*—It is disappointing that Lt. Col. Allen B. Bishop, U.S. Army, Retired, (in a letter to *Military Review*, November-December 2013) spoke so disparagingly about the Association of the United States Army (AUSA), his own and the U.S. Army’s professional association. It is apparent that the colonel has an alarming misunderstanding of the purpose and mission of the Association. It is also unfortunate that he does not hold the same view of the value of AUSA that tens of thousands of his fellow soldiers who are proud members of AUSA do—the vast majority of whom are enlisted soldiers and NCOs.

Perhaps the Association has not done a good enough job educating and informing America’s soldiers about why AUSA is important to them. Let me try.

Lt. Col. Bishop and all soldiers should know that AUSA was actually formed by the Army itself in 1950 with the then-Vice Chief of Staff serving as the first AUSA president. It is one of only nine such military service organizations that has been granted federal support by Congress to accomplish its mission of supporting the U.S. Army—active Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve.

For over 63 years, AUSA has been “the Voice for the Army” serving as its principal advocate in Washington, D.C., and in communities all over the United States and around the world.

AUSA is the main educator of policy makers, elected officials, and the public on the central role Landpower and the U.S. Army plays in our national defense. The Association’s role is especially vital at this time when some are making dangerous assumptions that the nature of future conflict will not require land forces.

Moreover, AUSA sponsors a myriad of military professional development forums, distinguished speakers, and publications through its highly respected Institute of Land Warfare that provides the “margin of excellence” beyond what the Army

provides to its soldiers and leaders with increasingly limited federally appropriated funds. This important AUSA function enhances the opportunities needed to grow the next generation of Army leaders.

The Association of the U.S. Army actively supports a strong national defense industrial base, one that has provided America’s soldiers with the best equipment and weapons in the world. AUSA is uncompromising in this area and the Association will never allow our soldiers to go into battle without the top quality tools that only American industry can provide.

AUSA’s support to soldiers and their families is equally unwavering. Just last year, at the grassroots level, AUSA provided over \$1.3 million of goods and services to Army soldiers and families through its 122 chapters worldwide led by hundreds of dedicated volunteers, most of whom are also soldiers, family members, veterans, retirees, or supportive local citizens.

Your readers should also know that in recent years AUSA led the effort to close the pay gap between Lt. Col. Bishop and his civilian peers and fought to ensure that he, his family, and his fellow soldiers have the quality healthcare, family programs, and housing services commensurate with the quality of their service.

AUSA is unashamed of its fight for the long-term health and strength of the All-Volunteer Force that has performed so magnificently over the past decade. The Association’s support of and advocacy for world-class healthcare, competitive pay scales, education and self-development opportunities, and earned retirement benefits help to incentivize our best soldiers to seek a career of service in the world’s greatest army.

AUSA is the Army’s professional association—just as other professional societies serve those in the medical, legal, and similar professions. It is a proud organization formed by soldiers, made up of soldiers, with the express mission of supporting soldiers.

I am certain that Lt. Col. Bishop served admirably as a dedicated and professional Army leader. If he is not already a member, we hope he will consider joining AUSA as a demonstration of his own commitment to the Army Profession.

General Robert W. Cone

Commander, Training and Doctrine Command

Strategic Landpower

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