Christopher Hamner’s *Enduring Battle: American Soldiers in Three Wars, 1776-1945* tackles the age-old question of why men put themselves in harm’s way despite their natural inclination to survive. Hamner explores this question through battles in three American wars: Cowpens, Shiloh, and the Huertgen Forest. He describes the impact that technology, weaponry, equipment, military doctrine, leadership, and the nature of war had on the individual soldier. He shares the individual soldier’s experiences to aid the reader in understanding the ever-evolving nature of war.

Military historians and psychologists have offered theories about the changing aspects of the battlefield, the most popular being group cohesion theory (the bonds linking individuals together). Hamner challenges this theory using Omer Bartov’s *Hitler’s Army*, which says the savage fighting on the Eastern Front rendered unit cohesion an impossibility because of personnel attrition. He challenges conventional thinking that men fight only for their comrades. Hamner argues that the actual answer is far too complex. He says that self-preservation is the ultimate reason for survival and that forming bonds with those around increases the likelihood.

Hamner links Cowpens, Shiloh, and the Huertgen Forest to give the reader an appreciation for how war evolved from 1776 to 1945. He provides a rational understanding of why each battle was fought in a particular manner. Hamner suggests altruism as a potential area for the future study of men in combat. He argues that combat medics are renowned for leaving places of safety to aid wounded comrades and using their own bodies to shield the wounded. Such behavior goes beyond the simple explanation of comradeship or survival, especially in light of the prohibition against medical personnel carrying weapons.

Christopher Hamner’s *Enduring Battle* is a must read for those interested in the psychology of war.

Jesse McIntyre III, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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The battles of Saratoga were crucial turning points in the War of American Independence. The rebel victory convinced the French government to grant diplomatic recognition and extend military aid to the cause of colonial independence. The ultimate insurgent victory resulted from the combination of French military aid, rebel leadership, increasing military proficiency, and the British government’s loss of will to continue the war. However, the rebel cause was not unified. Rivalries pitted the colonies against each other, making it difficult to form a united front.

As contemporaries understood, it was a civil war, with minorities supporting rebellion and loyalty, while most people wished to survive with their lives and property intact or fight their own local disputes. The war divided families and pitted neighbors against one another. Ethnic and religious strife marked relations among the colonists from the outset.

Internal struggle occurred within the southern colonies, but it also occurred in the northern Hudson River-Champlain region. With the frontier on the Hudson, its possession by either side would have
divided New England from the rest of the colonial insurgents or allowed them to unite. Conflicting claims issued by New York and New Hampshire to the area that eventually became Vermont turned the skirmishes into a civil war.

This struggle is the subject of Corbett’s book. He begins with the 1763 treaty, which opened the region to British settlement. He shows how regional religious, political, economic, and family fractures formed and how their differences framed the regional struggle for colonial independence, which the decisive victory at Saratoga did not influence. He shows that the war in the north was identical to the war in the south. He ends, not with the successful achievement of independence but with its aftermath—the debtor rebellions in the 1780s.

Corbett argues that the war for American Independence was a multi-sided struggle pitting rebels, loyalists, and their allies against each other. There was a struggle between the governments of New York and New Hampshire for control of the territory that became Vermont. Settlers holding land grants transferred their loyalty to whomever provided protection and recognized their claims. Colonists took sides based on their own interests, family, social class, and religion.

This rich, dense study shows the complicated interaction of political and military goals and demonstrates that decisive victory was not always decisive for the British who retained practical control of the Hudson-Champlain region until the 1783 peace treaty was signed. The war’s aftermath was as cruel as the war itself. Social splits between men of property (creditors) and ordinary farmers (debtors) flared up after the war ended. The new nation was neither peaceful nor unified—civil war did not end when independence was achieved.

Lewis Bernstein, Ph.D., Seoul, Korea

FORGING NAPOLEON’S GRANDE ARMÉE: Motivation, Military Culture, and Masculinity in the French Army, 1800-1808
Michael J. Hughes, New York University Press, New York, 2012, 284 pages, $50.00

Michael Hughes’ *Forging Napoleon’s Grande Armée* examines the changes within the French military during the early Napoleonic Wars. Soldiers shifted from being committed supporters of the republic and republican values, to devotees to a monarch with absolute power far beyond anything of the Ancien Régime. Hughes looks at five sources of motivation: honor, patriotism, a martial and virile masculinity, devotion to Napoleon, and coercion. The motivators kept Napoleon’s soldiers committed to him and eventually committed to the French nation.

The Army of the Coasts, which eventually formed the core of the Grande Armée, provides an opportunity to study early 19th-century armies. The army remained together as a coherent unit much longer than most 19th-century formations, allowing a more thorough indoctrination and strengthening of unit cohesion. Napoleon created ways to ensure loyalty to himself, including military songs, plays, orders of the day, awards, and honorary associations. Napoleon manipulated the French army from being motivated by revolutionary virtue to a more individualistic honor. Patriotic writers who viewed virtue as alien to the French character deemed this an advisable shift. The army emphasized the search for honor and glory as a reward for military service. Closely tied to this search for glory was the cult of Napoleon who, as the most glorious figure in France, could spread and reflect the glory of his troops. Napoleon was portrayed as the embodiment of honor, glory, and virtue, and as the focus of resacralization of the French monarchy.

*Forging Napoleon’s Grande Armée* is most useful for the military professional in its discussion of military culture. French soldiers believed their service was for the benefit of their nation, which was assumed to be the greatest in the world. They believed France was a beacon of enlightenment that would liberate benighted nations of the world. Soldiers were taught to expect rewards for military service, honor and respect from their fellow Frenchmen, and the exposure to a variety of sexual opportunities both at home and abroad. Feats of virile masculinity, often bordering on rape, were one way of demonstrating the Frenchman’s superiority over foreigners. Even soldiers unimpressed by army life were able to be motivated through primary group loyalties and devotion to lower-level officers. Perhaps more importantly, they were compelled to accept the legitimacy of their government and the wars conducted for the Empire’s sake. Hughes’ analysis of group
loyalty and motivation is compelling and offers a useful case study for the shaping of sentiment in a military unit. **John E. Fahey, Lafayette, Indiana.**

**THROUGH THE PERILOUS FIGHT: Six Weeks That Saved the Nation**  
Steve Vogel, Random House, New York, 2013, 522 pages, $30.00

In the course of celebrations of its bicentennial, America’s war of 1812 (which dragged into 1815) is getting some warranted attention. Renewed war with Britain posed a serious test for a young America that was still sorting out its institutions, not to mention its very identity. Nothing better attests to the fragility of America’s position in the world at that time than the British strike on Washington in the summer of 1814, which left the U.S. capital a smoking emblem of humiliation.  

Author Steve Vogel, an accomplished writer and popular historian, has stitched together a stirring and colorful account of Britain’s fateful drive to defeat the United States in the third year of the war. Drawing extensively from first-person recollections, he invites the reader to see breaking developments from multiple perspectives. From the British side, he focuses on Rear Adm. George Cockburn, describing him as “ruthless and witty” and “determined to make Americans pay a hard price for their ill-considered war with Great Britain.” In his many character sketches, Vogel captures the spectrum of emotional states conjured up by the struggle from contempt and arrogance to fear and rage. Among the central players is Francis Scott Key. Key was a lawyer and friend of James Madison’s administration who found himself in the unlikely position of watching the British attack on Baltimore from a vessel of the Royal Navy. Despite his fascination with historical figures, Vogel has not neglected the gravity of the British campaign or the critical significance of tactical and strategic events. He describes how the Chesapeake region’s killing heat affected the ordinary soldier during forced marches.  

Had it succeeded, the British attempt to capture Baltimore would have been a devastating blow to America’s strategic situation and the national psyche. Instead, U.S. troops rallied in front of the city and Fort McHenry withstood a furious naval bombardment. Cockburn’s thwarted gamble marked a dramatic reversal of fortune and broke the momentum of the 1814 offensive. The U.S. victory in turn restored its negotiating position as well as its self-confidence.  

Through the Perilous Fight is highly readable and brings the history of the war to life. The author does not dwell on diplomatic context or strategic analysis but appropriately notes how validation of its “independence and sovereignty” restored national feeling and “severed ties with America’s colonial past.” A resurgent United States rapidly asserted its ascendancy in the Americas, sidestepping the terms of the Treaty of Ghent in its westward push and proclaiming the Monroe Doctrine as a warning to Europe to back off.  

**Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

**MACARTHUR IN ASIA: The General and His Staff in the Philippines, Japan, and Korea**  

Originally published in Japanese, this book focuses on two themes. First is a study of the 15 “Bataan Boys” who escaped with Gen. Douglas MacArthur from Corregidor, their relationships, and the key roles they played on MacArthur’s staffs for the next decade. Second is an analysis of how MacArthur’s reforms and experiences in the Philippines from 1935-1945 provided a template for policies he later used in the occupation and reconstruction of Japan.  

Hiroshi Masuda tells the story of MacArthur’s prewar preparations in the Philippines, how he responded to Japanese attacks, the conditions on Corregidor, the escape to Australia, and preparations for his return. Here Masuda shines—he combines a riveting story with maps and analysis that provides a different perspective into this period of our history.
The well-trained Japanese 14th Army, 65,000 strong, faced 150,000 U.S.-Filipino forces when the Japanese invaded the Philippines. The Japanese landed their main force in the northwest, spearheaded by the mechanized 48th Division (16,000 men), and sent the 16th Division (7,000 men) to invade southeast of Manila. Numerically, the U.S. and Filipino forces had an overwhelming advantage. And the Americans had more fighter aircraft based at Clark Field than the Japanese used—why then, did they not hold?

Surprise was the major factor. Even though the Americans had been warned of hostilities, the Japanese attacked Clark Field around noontime, destroying 70 percent of the American fighters on the ground. A second factor was MacArthur's reticence to send the bombers he did have against the Japanese airfields in Formosa. After the Japanese surprise attack, that option was no longer viable.

On the ground, 30,000 men comprised the U.S.-Filipino main force—75,000 Filipinos were organized in 10 Army divisions, but with significant equipment challenges. An additional 45,000 were in the constabulary and support units. War plans called for a defense of Manila Bay. However, in the weeks prior to the invasion, MacArthur successfully pushed for a more aggressive defense of all the islands, intending to repel an attack on the coastline. This was a strategy that Lt. Col. Eisenhower, MacArthur's chief of staff in 1939, had previously studied, and rejected—the forces available would not be capable of executing it.

The destruction of U.S. air power at Clark Field, and the withdrawal of the Asiatic Fleet made it easy for Japanese advance parties to land. Recognizing this, MacArthur quickly changed his strategy to the prewar plans, which he had earlier criticized, and directed a withdrawal from Manila to the Bataan Peninsula. Maj. Gen. Wainwright, with 28,000 men, opposed the Lingayan Gulf landings and delayed the Japanese 10 days in their advance on Manila, thus permitting the movement of 80,000 Filipino-American troops and 26,000 civilians into Bataan.

Emphasis on this delaying action was later judged "a tragic error". More emphasis should have been placed on the removal of munitions and provision supplies to Bataan. This failure later haunted the defenders and their ability to survive, without the means to do so. Filipino-American forces in Bataan suffered more from disease, starvation, and lack of munitions than actions in combat.

The Japanese, too, made a number of mistakes, including operational-level miscalculations that cost them heavily. The plan was to first destroy Filipino-American forces, and then take Manila. The Japanese continued to attack toward Manila, where they expected major opposition, even when intelligence indicated the shift of forces to Bataan. They missed the opportunity to keep close contact with the enemy while it was on the run. They occupied a major population center (Manila), but did not achieve the more important goal of destroying the enemy force.

The Japanese also miscalculated that the Americans would not stop in Bataan, but continue their retreat overseas. As 14th Army prepared to attack in Bataan, its key units were withdrawn to other areas (Thailand and the Dutch East Indies). The remaining forces, thinking they faced an almost defeated enemy, were repulsed with 25 percent casualties, including heavy leadership losses. The Japanese were forced to suspend the campaign until the arrival of substantial reinforcements.

The Philippines was a costly investment for the Japanese army. Masuda notes that by 1945, the scale and intensity of the Japanese investment in the Philippines was massive: 631,000 Japanese soldiers fought there, suffering 498,000 (79 percent) killed in action or death due to starvation or disease. By the war's end, this represented 20 percent of their total losses in the Pacific war.

The surrender of the Japanese government in September 1945 ended the fighting, but left the Allies with an unprecedented challenge: the demobilization and disarmament of seven million men organized in 154 Japanese army divisions. This was a far-greater challenge than that faced in Germany, where most organized military forces were already destroyed. There were 2.5 million Japanese soldiers (57 divisions) in Japan, where only two and a half U.S. divisions were tasked to demobilize them.

Masuda captures the essence of what MacArthur and his key staff members did during the occupation of Japan through MacArthur's relief in April 1951.

Masuda and MacArthur’s key staff members credit MacArthur with a sharp mind and an excellent photographic memory. MacArthur always communicated
directives clearly. He was a man of conviction, and seldom became angry. He also had an introverted and unsociable side to his disposition. He rejected any attack, criticism, or defamation directed at him and would transfer the responsibility to others. His fixed ideas and prejudices often distorted his judgment. However, as the key individual responsible for the transformation of Japan, “one finds no one who surpassed MacArthur in dignity, knowledge, coordination, decision making, and control.”

And, what of the general’s staff? Masuda rates Eisenhower (prewar), Sutherland, and Whitney as his best officers. They all readily comprehended MacArthur’s intentions and, perhaps more importantly, shared the ability to convert those into concrete ideas, and communicate them effectively to others. 

Lt. Col. Chris North, U.S. Army, Retired, Afghanistan

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AFTER LEANING TO ONE SIDE: China and Its Allies in the Cold War
Zhihua Shen and Danhui Li, Woodrow Wilson Center and Stanford University Press, Washington DC, 2011, 331 pages, $60.00

As the Cold War recedes into history, researchers have growing access to the archives of various participants. After several decades of research and at least one period of imprisonment, historian Zhihua Shen has obtained extensive records from both China and the former Soviet Union. This has allowed him and his wife, Danhui Li, to assemble an explanation of the tangled relationships between the two leading Marxist regimes, as well as Beijing’s troubled partnerships with North Korea and North Vietnam. The resulting picture, while still incomplete, helps Westerners better understand their former adversaries.

A case in point is the 1950 Chinese intervention in the Korean conflict, an intervention that inflicted a serious, if temporary defeat upon the United States and its allies. The traditional explanation for this intervention was that Beijing was responding to a perceived threat as U.N. forces approached its borders after defeating North Korea. More recently, revisionists such as Sergei Goncharov, John Lewis, and Xue Litai have argued that Mao Zedong was so angered by American intervention in Asia that he concentrated troops on the Yalu River even before the U.N. counteroffensive at Inchon. Mao’s principal reasons for delaying his attack thereafter were to obtain more Soviet military aid and satisfy his critics within the Chinese government. Professor Shen combines these two stories, suggesting that while Mao was inspired partly by a sense of international solidarity with the Korean communists, he sought to avoid direct conflict as long as possible. Mao’s actual reasons for intervention were a complex mixture of a perceived threat from the United States, a desire to limit Soviet influence in the region, and a need to convince Joseph Stalin of China’s loyalty. Once in the war, China repeatedly disagreed with its North Korean ally, and had to get Soviet diplomatic support to ensure a unified military command and logistical system.

Additional chapters look at other issues of the Cold War. From Beijing’s viewpoint, the 1953 armistice agreement represented a diplomatic retreat by the United States, not a communist concession in response to the threat of nuclear attack. Throughout the 1950s, the Soviet Union genuinely attempted to facilitate China’s economic development, but according to Shen, the Chinese broke off the relationship in 1960 because Nikita Khrushchev was skeptical about the Chinese communal system and Great Leap Forward. Finally, the book provides the Chinese version of Richard Nixon’s efforts to establish relations with Beijing. In this view, Beijing was interested in improving U.S.-Chinese relations for fear of conflict with Moscow, but refused to assist or even recognize the American point of view about negotiations to end the Vietnamese war.

The book is a collection of essays rather than a single narrative, and as such is sometimes repetitious and appears to jump back and forth in time. Moreover, the authors present all their conclusions from the Chinese viewpoint, which causes them to repeat impossible claims of casualties inflicted on the United States as well as distorted interpretations of American foreign policy. Despite such minor irritations, however, After Leaning to One Side is a further step in removing the veils that have obscured communist actions during the Cold War. The book also helps the reader understand the history and perceptions of one of the most powerful states in the current world scene.

Jonathan M. House, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
If you want a new idea, read an old book. Similarly, if you seek new ideas on current and future foreign policy issues, take a moment to review a book on a previous foreign policy. Though not the author’s stated intent, it’s hard not to make parallels between many of today’s current foreign policy issues and American policy in Laos in the 1950s. In Before the Quagmire, journalist and author William Rust takes a historical look at American involvement in Laos and examines how a small foreign policy issue was transformed into a much larger conflagration. He does so by seeing Laos in the greater context of the Cold War, and examining the internal American and Laotian decisions that ultimately set the U.S. on a course of greater military involvement in both Laos and Vietnam.

Rust focuses this detailed history of American policy in Laos on the years of the Eisenhower administration. He saves Kennedy’s role for his upcoming book on the Kennedy administration and Laos. Rust points out that contemporary fear of communism often limited what the key players considered as viable policy alternatives: accept communism or try military intervention. In this case, the Eisenhower administration clearly ruled out any role for the communists in any Lao government. Eisenhower in particular found it difficult to reconcile nationalism with communism, and focused on combating what appeared a monolithic and aggressive communist threat. Rust paints a portrait of an Eisenhower who, despite keeping the U.S. out of the French war in Vietnam, was determined not to let Laos fall to the communists on his watch.

Brothers John Foster Dulles at State Department and Allen Dulles at the newly established CIA were central characters in forming American policy towards Laos. While the principal aim of American policy in Laos was to prevent a communist takeover, the policies pursued by the administration—specifically by the State Department, the CIA, and the Defense Department—were often contradictory and counterproductive. Rust brings the reader inside the American embassy in Vientiane, where the internal philosophical struggles, as well as friction between ambassadors and increasingly influential CIA stations chiefs, led to coups and conflicting support to competing Laotian politicians and generals. Rust details various local political and military leaders; these Laotians were principally judged and supported based on their commitment to resist communism, rather than their effectiveness in developing a well governed Laos.

Hence, American foreign assistance to Laos became disproportionately represented through military support, with traditional French military advisors soon pushed aside. This military emphasis enabled various political and military Laotian players, but did little to improve the lives of the predominantly rural and poor Laotians. Even the few attempts to support the population where militarized. In the end the U.S. supplanted France as the principal patron of Laos.

The title of Rust’s book alludes to Laos as the prequel to a greater and ultimately unsatisfying American involvement in Indochina, particularly in Vietnam. Throughout this richly researched narrative are short, insightful character sketches and assessments of key figures, both American and Laotian, which aptly bring a human element to this tragic foreign policy story. Before the Quagmire should interest not only readers of the Cold War and Vietnam War eras, but also provides key insights to students of the development of American foreign policy.

Col. John M. Sullivan Jr, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

BLOWTORCH: Robert Komer, Vietnam, and American Cold War Strategy
Frank Leith Jones, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2013, 416 pages, $52.95

Only rare individuals can effectively balance ends, ways, means, and risk into a coherent design and have the personality and experience to drive its implementation—Robert “Blowtorch” Komer was one such individual. Author Frank Jones provides a discerning and worthwhile biography of Komer. Although a “second echelon” security professional, Komer was a master of strategic art.
Blowtorch is broken into three distinct parts. The first part examines Komer’s early life, from growing up in Missouri to becoming a trusted assistant of President Kennedy. He attended Harvard and was a U.S. Army intelligence officer and historian during World War II. After his wartime service and completion of a master’s degree, Komer climbed the corporate ladder within the new Central Intelligence Agency and then within Kennedy’s White House staff, exerting great influence on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and South Asia. More importantly, he earned Kennedy’s trust, along with recognition from the broader foreign policy community.

The second part focuses on Komer’s efforts during the Vietnam War. Working alongside Vice President Johnson during a goodwill tour of the Middle East and later as an interim national security advisor, Komer earned Johnson’s respect. Komer’s reward proved a challenge, as he served as the head of pacification in Vietnam. Jones describes Komer’s pacification efforts, which included starting the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support organization (CORDS).

Finally, Jones examines Komer’s post-Vietnam efforts, which hold some of the best insights for readers interested in strategy and Cold War history. Komer’s career took on new life during the Carter administration. Rising again to a key advisor position, this time he focused on NATO and U.S.-Middle Eastern strategy. Komer’s criticisms of early Reagan maritime strategy helped shape Navy strategic thought and stoked debate on the 600-ship Navy.

While Jones clearly admires Komer, the author treats him with fairness. On one hand, Jones demonstrated that Komer was a perceptive pragmatist who creatively integrated action and reflection. On the other, Jones reminds us that Komer was an ambitious and difficult man, often disliked as only bureaucratic iconoclasts can be. While one may view these as negative traits, they also embody hallmarks of other great strategists.

Blowtorch is valuable for those interested in counterinsurgency, aspiring strategists, and Cold War historians. Given recent counterinsurgency operations and the prevalence of insurgencies today, Komer’s work in Vietnam, especially starting CORDS, is worth studying and debating. Jones’ book also provides an insider’s view into Komer’s efforts to make and implement strategy throughout the Cold War. Finally, Blowtorch contributes to the historical record of the Cold War by discussing Komer’s formative years and, more importantly, his efforts after Vietnam.

Lt. Col. Jon Klug, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

STRIKE WARFARE IN THE 21ST CENTURY: An Introduction to Non-Nuclear Attack by Air and Sea
Dale E. Knutsen, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2012, 198 pages, $27.95

Everyday citizens who would simply like to know more about the basics are often left in an awkward information void, caught between historic or fictional stories … and detailed discussions full of technical terms,” prefices Dale E. Knutsen regarding current literature on modern strike warfare. Strike Warfare in the 21st Century bridges this gap by addressing complex subjects through the utilization of commonplace terminology and familiar examples. Knutsen’s focus on the fundamentals of strike warfare emanates from a desire to “help Americans better understand some of the tools and factors that influence military operations during times of tension and conflict.”

Strike warfare encompasses myriad sea and air-launched delivery platforms to use nonnuclear weapons against surface targets, both on land and sea. This reduces risk to friendly delivery platforms “by way of standoff engagements.” Knutsen uses this definition to lead the reader through the full range of strike warfare fundamentals, from target designation to strike planning and from weapon classifications to support operations.

Knutsen conveniently breaks his work into two sections—the first on strike warfare operations and the second on strike weapons development. By partitioning the work in this manner, Knutsen addresses both the operational and logistical (procurement) aspects of American strike warfare. Throughout the work the author provides general diagrams, which assist the reader in understanding the key concepts of both sections while avoiding overly technical descriptions. A significant body of appendices further consolidates the concepts of the work within a readily accessible format.
Knutson only briefly examines the critical role of the intelligence process, which drives everything from identifying future capabilities of potential adversaries, to the targeting of adversarial structures, to the post-strike assessment. Knusten’s deferment to the private end of the bureaucratic battleground in the work’s conclusion, which underlies any weapons acquisition project, reveals a “pro-business” leaning. The migratory nature of managerial military personnel, piecemeal congressional budgeting, and excessive oversight “creep,” such as the Nunn–McCurdy Provision, certainly slow acquisition. However, those examples of development projects troubled by private fraud, waste, and abuse are conveniently absent from Knutsen’s concluding remarks.

Knutson’s work provides a compelling, albeit generalized, overview of the development and implementation of U.S. strike warfare. By using commonplace terminology and day-to-day comparisons, the author achieves his objective of bridging the gap between the fictional and technical. Strike Warfare in the 21st Century is an excellent introduction for the average citizen but also for military personnel unfamiliar with the topic. The increasingly joint nature of warfare necessitates that any commander possess an understanding of the capabilities and limitations of strike weapons, which provide life-or-death support within the contemporary operating environment. Knutsen skillfully contributes to this understanding within his appealing work on modern strike warfare.

Viktor M. Stoll, Lee’s Summit, Missouri

LOGICS OF WAR: Explanations for Limited and Unlimited Conflicts
Alex Weisiger, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 2013, 288 pages, $45.00

Logics of War uses bargaining models to explain the intensity and duration of interstate conflicts. Its models are most useful at strategic or political-military policy levels. Logics of War contains no insight on how to conduct war, but is a must read for those concerned about war’s motivation, potential cost, duration, or intractability. Alex Weisiger makes two major contributions. First, he argues that there are multiple paths to war—equifinality in academic jargon. This insight seems fitting given the complex nature of war and liberating by allowing his development of independent causal mechanisms. Second, his explanations are comprehensive, accounting for both short and long wars and variations in intensity.

Logics of War is a political science book, which is at best moderately successful in explaining its statistical methods for the unfamiliar or out of practice. Statistical evidence is buttressed with case studies that any reader can understand. Because the book is not limited across time (after 1816) or space, Weisiger’s theories are not restricted to any particular war. As with any such literature, much depends on the validity and reliability of proxy variables. For example, concepts of power, commitment, trust, or leaders’ interpretation of information are either unavailable or unobservable. However, Weisiger designs and justifies his measures as well as or better than similar scientific literature. Weisiger’s choice of cases such as the Paraguayan War of 1864-1870, World War II in Europe and the Pacific, the Iran-Iraq War, the Falklands War, and the Persian Gulf War builds confidence in the statistical results.

Logics of War characterizes leaders as information-bounded rational actors. Perhaps to appeal to a broader audience, the book avoids the term rational and fails to adequately explain the meaning of rationality paradigms. It is unclear whether this lessens or increases the risk of rejection of its theories. Uninitiated readers may be mystified by or suspicious of the abrupt introduction of bargaining models.

In contrast, Weisiger clarifies and supports three causal mechanisms—over optimism, domestic principal-agent problems, and commitment problems—to explain war’s initiation, limitations (or lack thereof), and ease of settlement. Overoptimistic wars are fought because of participants’ divergent expectations of their outcomes. Battle results more or less quickly inform one or more sides of their misconceptions resulting in fairly rapid negotiation and termination. Principal-agent wars are domestically, rather than externally, motivated and are explained by politicians’ desire to retain power or to serve narrow interests. Because these conflicts are at risk of losing public support, even in authoritarian regimes, they can be intense or long, but not both. Commitment problem wars are potentially
the bloodiest. Commitment problems result when states have difficulty trusting their opponent to bargain in good faith. In an insightful variation of standard realist arguments, Weisiger contends declining powers attack to preclude their relative decline. The most destructive long and intense conflicts are a subset of those in which the defender survives the initial onslaught and concludes the attacker is inherently aggressive. These wars defy negotiated settlement because defending states believe security cannot be assured short of the attacker’s unconditional surrender.

Logics of War does not claim predictive knowledge per se. Indeed, much of the book’s reasoning relies on initial or continued misjudgment by leaders and decision makers. The author’s explanations are based on results rather than forecasts. Nonetheless, practitioners can make good use of Logics of War’s insights. Weisiger’s theories can inform and be applied to the design of policy and campaigns. Alternatively, they may be used to more swiftly discern operating causal mechanisms once war is already engaged. Logics of War’s frameworks potentially add rigor to the analysis of strategic and operational environments.

Richard E. Berkebile, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

GI*s IN GERMANY: The Social, Economic, Cultural, and Political History of the American Military Presence
Eds. Thomas Maulucci and Detleff Junker, Cambridge University Press, New York, 378 pages, $89.10

Is in Germany is a compilation of 15 essays that explains the “complex” relationship between the United States and Germany. The essays are grouped into select topics: strategy and politics, the impact of military communities, tensions between the two countries, the making of the Bundeswehr, and the contentious period covering the 1970s through the 1980s.

Germany’s opinion of U.S. presence in Europe was positive as the U.S. status turned from that of occupier to that of a more benign “protector” role. However, the relationship suffered during the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the ensuing U.S. economic downturn, recurring U.S. soldier criminal activity and racial conflicts, and the poor state of U.S. military readiness in the 1970s and early 1980s. The two countries’ relationship evolved less from efforts in diplomacy and more from social, military, and cultural interactions shaped by the permanent, multi-generational presence of U.S. troops and their families.

After the start of the Korean War, new Cold War battle lines were drawn across the face of Europe. The question was how to defend the continent with Germans insisting on a far-forward defense while U.S. leaders desired a more cautionary defense. Through compromise, Germany’s approach was adopted and the country acquiesced to rebuilding a formidable conventional force right after it regained its sovereignty in 1955. The paradox to building the Bundeswehr was how to make the military force “stronger than Russia but weaker than France.”

Although the Federal Republic embraced U.S. superior air technology, it adopted its own form of mission command (Auftragstaktik) and a conscription force based on inner civic leadership. Simultaneously, the United States provided conventional forces at the pivotal Fulda Gap, stationed families on a permanent basis in Germany, and backed up its commitment with nuclear weapons assuredness. Although political leaders intended to maintain a permanent U.S. presence in Europe, it was the U.S. military that was kept in a state of flux as politicians argued over overseas troop levels. This flux resulted in low standards of living for military members and their families as infrastructure investments were kept on hold for decades at a time. It wasn’t until the 1990s, when major troop redeployments out of Europe were imminent, that the Defense Department recapitalized facilities overseas, only to see many of the renovated and modernized bases handed back to the host nation.

American family members lived alongside allied military forces and the local German population in Berlin, even during the tense periods of the Berlin Airlift in the late 1940s, and later in 1961, and when the Berlin Wall was built. In contrast, the Soviets evacuated their family members. Family member presence in Germany had a multi-fold strategic mission: to show the Germans that the United States was committed to protection of the Federal Republic and to send a signal to the Soviets that the U.S. mission in Europe was
defensive in nature. What better way to show that than by sprouting the landscape with “Little Americas”? Another reason for U.S. families being stationed in Germany was to project U.S. soft power by having citizens serve as goodwill ambassadors. Although, on occasion this backfired as cultural differences surfaced between German citizens and U.S. family members.

_GIs in Germany_ argues that the real reason for family member presence in Germany was to ensure good order and discipline among U.S. soldiers. By 1950, G.I.s had brought 20,000 war brides back to the United States, and most unfortunate by 1955, there were 37,000 out-of-wedlock German and Austrian children fathered by U.S. servicemen.

The U.S. military is coming to grips on how best to use its force posture to ensure that wars are prevented, partnerships are developed, and if necessary, wars are fought and quickly won in a fiscally responsible and politically acceptable manner. America is downsizing family-accompanied maneuver ground units in Germany and Korea in what seems to be a logical cost-saving measure. In return, CONUS-based units are rotated overseas on a temporary, expeditionary basis. Such an approach may make fiscal sense and seem more politically acceptable to congressional leaders, but will a rotational program show enough U.S. commitment and resolve to our foreign allies? Will the rotations and lack of permanence be considered a sign of U.S. ambivalence or weakness to adversarial state actors such as Russia or China or Iran? Will a lack of troops stationed on foreign soil create security angst in Germany, Japan, and Korea, forcing those countries to adopt their own nuclear weapons programs? How will retention be impacted in the military as soldiers and marines leave their families for extended periods on noncombat overseas ventures? Will the military default in clamping down on military members on isolated bases when training overseas?

_GIs in Germany_ is worth a read not just for its account of the cultural, political, and social history that created the relationship between Germany and the United States today, but also to serve as a lesson for the pitfalls that our military is sure to face as it changes how forces are postured in the years to come.

**Lt. Col. Tommy J. Tracy, U.S. Army, Retired, Fort Lee, Virginia**

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**QATAR: A Modern History**

Allen J. Fromherz, Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC, 2012, 204 pages, $29.95

Few would challenge Allen Fromherz’s contention that the tiny state of Qatar is “able to pack a punch far beyond its weight.” With less than 250,000 citizens, Qatar changed Arabic news media, served as an international mediator, and is a key regional ally of the United States. Fromherz’s challenge is to prove that Qatar is not simply a “classic rentier state,” living off its massive oil and gas wealth, but possibly, “a new model of modernity.”

“Rather than following the typical course of angst and anomie normally associated with rapid modernization,” Qatar has forged its own unique “neo-traditional” identity. Fromherz’s study focuses on the ruling al-Thani family, and particularly the current (at the time of publication) emir, Sheikh Hamad’s adroit balancing of internal and external powers strives to shield Qatar from the reckoning that the author believes is inevitably coming to the Gulf monarchies. Historically appealing to British, Iranian, and later U.S. interests, the al-Thani family has avoided the extremes of the ostentatious consumerism of the United Arab Emirates; softened, while ostensibly maintaining the Wahhabism of the Saudis; and provided strong support to the United States, while placating Iran a short distance across the Gulf. Equally impressive has been the al-Thani’s complicated relations with the clans and families inside Qatar, which Fromherz analyzes in a detailed, tribe-by-tribe manner. Through it all, the al-Thani family comes across as benevolent and savvy, yet powerful rulers. For all the trappings of democratization and genuinely massive investment in education and public welfare, Sheikh Hamad remained an absolute ruler, willing even to depose his own father via a coup when he deemed it necessary.

Since its publication, rapidly moving events in the region have made Fromherz’s analysis even timelier. There is a common belief that the extravagant Gulf monarchies—with as little as 15 percent of their population as citizens, in Qatar’s case—would be most vulnerable to revolution. Fromherz asserts that Qatar, in fact, has built a complex network of supports to
lessen that possibility. With the republics of the Middle East currently in revolution, and monarchies like Qatar seeming islands of stability, Fromherz’s analysis deserves a closer look. Similarly, a close study of the elaborate political strategy of Sheikh Hamad is even timelier with his relinquishing of power to his son in March 2013.

Qatar: A Modern History reads more like a reference work than an argument about Qatar’s past and future, with some sections being encyclopedic. Few would want to read it from cover to cover. Despite lifting the veil off Qatar’s official history, it nonetheless gives the ruling family a generous amount of latitude. The 85 percent of the population without Qatari citizenship is mentioned ominously at points, but definitely downplayed in the text. Even with these caveats, Fromherz’s study is essential reading for anyone with a deep interest in Qatar and the future of the Gulf monarchies.

Col. David D. DiMeo, U.S. Army, Retired, Bowling Green, Kentucky

STALIN’S GENERAL: The Life of Georgy Zhukov

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rominent historian Geoffrey Roberts’ book, Stalin’s General: The Life of Georgy Zhukov, focuses on the Soviet Union during World War II. Roberts’ attention is on the Great Patriotic War’s hero, Gen. Georgy Zhukov. Roberts argues that Zhukov was the best all-around general of World War II. However, this major point doesn’t come until the concluding chapter of the book and then comes as a surprise. Roberts uses the preceding chapters to provide a strong biography of Zhukov and his rise to greatness.

Roberts researched the Russian State Military Archives and combed over Zhukov’s memoirs to provide a vivid image of a Soviet success story. Zhukov was born in 1896 to a peasant family and began work as a furrier at age 12. He was later conscripted into the Tsarist army in World War I, where he was wounded and decorated for bravery. He joined the Red Army in 1917 and fought with the Bolsheviks during the Russian civil war. Roberts points out that Zhukov was not merely a military opportunist, but rather a committed communist who believed in the principles of the revolution. Based on his tenacity and overwhelming commitment to victory, Zhukov rose through the ranks of the Red Army. As a result of his performance at Khalkin-Gol, the Battle of Moscow, and the Battle of Stalingrad, he earned the reputation as an outstanding commander and trusted military officer.

Roberts explains the political and military contexts of the various periods throughout Zhukov’s life to provide a deeper understanding of Zhukov and the Soviet Union. As a result Roberts’ biography provides critical historical insights into the Soviet Union during World War II and the early Cold War period.

Roberts highlights areas in Zhukov’s memoirs that do not always reconcile with archival evidence. For example, Zhukov gives the sense that he was at the center of major decision making during World War II, even when he was not. Roberts tells of Zhukov’s tragic demise under Stalin after the war but then springs his thesis that Zhukov is the best all-around general of World War II.

To support his thesis, Roberts argues that Zhukov had an exceptional will to win while hampered with a largely peasant Army that had minimal training. Roberts compares Zhukov to Eisenhower, Montgomery, Patton, and MacArthur, and argues that the “Marshall of the Soviet Union” embodied the best attributes of these stars of the Allied war effort. This thought-provoking thesis is valuable to anyone wanting to consider the relative comparison of generalship in World War II. Roberts’ insightful and well-researched book provides a complete portrait of Zhukov.

Sean N. Kalic, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

ALLIED MASTER STRATEGISTS: The Combined Chiefs of Staff in World War II
David Rigby, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2012, 270 pages, $29.95

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ultinational coalition warfare is not a new concept for the United States. In fact, every major military conflict undertaken by the United States in the 20th and 21st centuries has and continues to involve multinational
coalitions. In *Allied Master Strategists*, author David Rigby adds to the exhaustive field of World War II scholarship by tackling the complex inter-workings of arguably the most successful multinational coalition in modern history, the Anglo-American Alliance during World War II. Rigby focuses on the organization, structure, effectiveness, and personalities involved in the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Established in January 1942, the Combined Chiefs of Staff, serving as “the supreme uniformed military command for the Western Allies,” had the daunting task of formulating strategy to quickly and decisively defeat the Axis powers.

Rigby sets the foundation by providing brief biographical sketches of key members of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. This not only provides essential background information, but also allows a better understanding of the biases—national, service, and individual—which shaped the staff’s overall contributions to the committee. Rigby outlines the structure and intra-workings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and provides insight into the function of the respective national feeder organizations, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and the British chief of staff. When explaining the success of the Western Alliance, Rigby is not short on his praise for Field Marshall Sir John Dill and the British joint staff mission in Washington, which the author rightly argues is instrumental in the close cooperation enjoyed by the military leadership of the Western Allies. By comparison the alliance between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union did not enjoy such a fruitful relationship and was often rife with suspicion and bureaucratic inefficiencies.

Much of the overt tension within the alliance concerned two major strategic decisions—the Germany-first strategy that relegated the defeat of Japan to a secondary effort and the desire of the United States to open a second front on the western European continent in 1942 or 1943. The reader gets a feel for the challenges facing the Combined Chiefs of Staff as Rigby lays out the skillful diplomacy required when addressing these two issues. The Americans, full of emotion after the attack by Japan on Pearl Harbor, sought approval of an offensive campaign plan in the central and western Pacific, while the British feared that vital resources would be diverted from the European Theater of Operation. Likewise, the U.S. delegation was continually suspect of British reluctance to invade the continent, instead favoring operations in the Mediterranean as well as operations the United States felt were guided more by the restoration of colonial influence rather than strategic necessities. Rigby records the gradual shift in power as the might of the U.S. military industrial complex begins to overshadow the equality of the Allies, and the United States moves to a position of dominance in influencing the Combined Chiefs of Staff and overall strategic objectives adopted by the Allies. In the chapter “Delegation versus Control for the Center,” Rigby describes an early version of mission command as the Combined Chiefs of Staff sought to empower the theater commanders to achieve their broadly outlined strategic objectives without becoming entangled in the operations of each theater.

The final portion of the book is devoted to explaining the role the Combined Chiefs of Staff played in shaping wartime production in both Britain and the United States. One quickly grasps the enormity of global warfare by the examination of the production of wartime materials and munitions, the allocation and transportation of those resources, and the force generation and apportionment to each theater. The Combined Chiefs of Staff, by influencing such organizations as the War Production Board in the United States and Ministry of Aircraft Production in Britain, were able to ensure the resourcing of their master strategy. Through the complex allocation of those resources they were able to change the weight applied to efforts and thus had nominal control over the various theaters.

The author does an excellent job providing an introductory look at a complex subject. The book is easy to digest, logically organized, and supported by extensive research balancing primary and secondary sources. It is a great first reference and foundational work for military officers, students of history, and those interested in furthering their knowledge of the Combined Chiefs of Staff or the Anglo-American Alliance during World War II.

*Lt. Col. Steve Rosson, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas*
CARTELS AT WAR: Mexico’s Drug-Fueled Violence and the Threat to U.S. National Security
Paul Rexton Kan, Potomac Books, Dulles, VA, 2012, 192 pages, $29.95

Cartels at War is must-read for professionals needing to understand the crisis emerging on the U.S. southern border. Paul Rexton Kan, an associate professor of national security studies at the U.S. Army War College, offers a concise, but comprehensive analysis of the cartel violence in Mexico, and illustrates why this phenomena may become the primary threat to U.S. national security in the future.

Kan demonstrates how two major structural changes, the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement and the shift in domestic political power from the Partido Revolucionario to the Partido Accion Nacional, established the conditions for cartel expansion and conflict. The former removed barriers for both licit and illicit trade between the United States and Mexico, and the latter ended the cozy “live and let live” agreements between the Partido Revolucionario and the drug lords. The result was increased shipments of narcotics to the north and amplified violence in Mexico.

A valuable aspect of the book is its explanation of what is actually transpiring in Mexico. Many academics, military officers, and journalists conflate cartel violence and activities with insurgencies and terrorism. While they use similar means, Kan demonstrates that the cartels are not striving for a strategic political objective such as the overthrow of a government or the implementation of an ideology. Instead, their activities are considered high-intensity crime, which is “a war waged by violent entrepreneurs who seek to prevail over one another and the state in a hypercompetitive illegal market in order to control it or a particular portion of it. The war is waged for control over the business supply lines and distribution nodes of the illegal narcotics trade. This difference strongly implies that the solutions to the problem are often not military in nature, but require other elements of national power.

In fact, among the policy recommendations he offers at the end of the book, several stand out for their clarity of thought and strategic purpose: avoid further militarization of the situation, strengthen the Mexican state and civil society, concentrate on cartel finances, and tackle U.S. drug usage. Given the constant level of U.S. drug demand over the past years, cartel spill-over violence into American cities and towns beyond the border region, and millions of dollars invested in counter narcotics measures; this book deserves a place in the professional library for critical thinking on the subject. Like recent publications in the same genre such as National Defense University’s Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in the Age of Globalization, Cartels at War provides relevant insights into what is developing as the key threat to U.S. national security in the next decade.

Lt. Col. Kevin D. Stringer, Ph.D., U.S. Army Reserve, Zurich, Switzerland

KIEV 1941: Hitler’s Battle for Supremacy in the East

Judged by its scale, the Battle of Kiev was the Wehrmacht’s greatest victory. By encircling Stalin’s forces in the bend of the Dnepr River, the German First and Second Panzer Groups ripped a vast hole in the enemy line, destroyed an entire Soviet Front along with its four component armies, and captured—according to the German propaganda machine—665,000 men. By any standard, the German triumph in the Ukraine in September 1941 was mind boggling.

David Stahel’s new book, Kiev 1941, gives us a new and insightful account of this titanic battle, yet it is hardly a celebration of Nazi military expertise. Instead, the author builds on the analysis of his earlier work, Operation Barbarossa and Germany’s Defeat in the East, which argued that Germany’s plan to subjugate Soviet Russia in a single campaign was doomed from the start by poor planning, insufficient resources, and dysfunction at the highest levels of command. In his previous book, Stahel focused attention on the difficulties encountered by the campaign’s main effort, the two panzer groups of Army Group Center. In his new book, the author continues that theme by showing how the panzer groups that linked up east of Kiev in late
September were dogged by exhaustion, bad weather, supply and maintenance bottlenecks, and relentless Soviet counterattacks. Stahel does not overturn our understanding of the Wehrmacht’s failure in the East by highlighting German difficulties, but his perspective is fresh and compelling—it is hardly an account of invincible blitzkrieg.

Beyond his operational narrative, Stahel emphasizes that the outcome of the battle depended on two men, Hitler and Stalin. For his part, the late summer of 1941 found Hitler wrestling control of the Russian campaign from his generals who believed the main effort of the operation needed to continue along the axis taken by Army Group Center in the direction of Moscow. It was the Fuhrer’s idea to turn Guderian’s panzers south into the Ukraine and the exposed flank of the Soviet Southwestern Front. At the same time, Stalin insisted on defending Kiev, even after his generals had warned him of the danger of losing the city and its defenders to German encirclement. Hitler took personal credit for the victory; Stalin assigned blame elsewhere.

At the conclusion of the battle, the chief of the German General Staff, Franz Halder, wrote in his journal that the Soviet colossus had lost an arm but that its back remained unbroken. It was a prophetic judgment. The Germans needed weeks to reorient their main effort back on the Moscow axis, time the Soviets used to prepare Moscow’s defense. Those weeks are described in the next book in Stahel’s account of Barbarossa, this one entitled Operation Typhoon, Hitler’s March on Moscow, October 1941. I look forward to reading it, anticipating the same high standard of research and analysis Stahel brings to Kiev, 1941.

Scott Stephenson, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE LAST BATTLE:
When U.S. and German Soldiers Joined Forces in the Waning Hours of World War II in Europe


The Last Battle is the story of a little known battle that took place just across the German border in the Tyrol region of Austria in the final hours of World War II. What makes it unique is that German soldiers, French civilian detainees, and U.S. soldiers fought side-by-side against Nazi Waffen SS troops to safeguard civilian detainees and prevent their likely executions.

The French civilian detainees had been leaders in the French government during the early days of the 1940 German occupation and with Hitler’s orders were arrested and confined. The detainees were moved to Schloss Itter, a hilltop castle located just over the German border in Austria. The French VIPs included French army generals, former prime ministers (who detested each other), a former national defense minister, a trade union secretary-general, a tennis star, and several others. They lived together in the castle, but their political differences kept them from working together. When the detainees realized the German forces were retreating, and on the verge of losing the war, they knew they might be executed so they could not testify against crimes committed by their German captors.

As news broke of Hitler’s suicide and with Allied forces approaching, several high-ranking German Wehrmacht officers in charge of Schloss Itter decided surrendering to advancing Allied forces was probably their best chance of survival. They made the decision knowing that hard-core Nazi Waffen SS troops would kill them if their intent was discovered.

With the help of the castle’s Croat handyman-trustee, a message was carried to approaching Allied forces who eventually received permission to mount a rescue mission. By the time the Allied force arrived at Schloss Itter, all they had was one Sherman tank, 14 American soldiers, the 10 Wehrmacht soldiers defending the castle, and the French VIPs to defend the castle. The 17th Waffen-SS Panzer Grenadier Division attacked and killed the lead German officer working with the Allies and disabled the Sherman tank. The Allies rallied their forces and held on long enough for a relief force to arrive.

The book gives a comprehensive history of each of the characters and shows how they decided to abandon their positions of “loyalty” to band together for survival. Harding does an excellent job in his research and pieces together the few available fragments to tell a story of trust, uncertainty, and moral righteousness.

Lt. Col. George Hodge, U.S. Army, Retired, Lansing, Kansas
THE BLOOD OF FREE MEN:  
The Liberation of Paris, 1944  

Many of the accounts of the liberation of Paris are a part of an agreed-upon myth about the Nazi occupation of France, the conduct of the Vichy government, and the French people. It took a generation for historians to unravel the legend. The fall of France destroyed the French Third Republic and exposed a long-standing sociopolitical divide which Marshal Philippe Pétain’s Vichy government aspired to fill. It unleashed a civil war between resisters and collaborators. Michael Neiberg’s book must be read knowing this context.

Neiberg’s work shows the struggle between French resistance factions, collaborators, the Anglo-American Allies, and the Free French movement (the Wehrmacht was also involved). According to Neiberg’s research, the heroes are the people of Paris who played a large part in their own liberation and Charles de Gaulle, whose opponents included the Anglo-American Allies, the French Communists, and the Nazis.

Neiberg begins with a theme that has become commonplace in the historiography of World War II—the Nazi victory in 1940 destroying the old European bourgeois social and political structure. The defeat led to an undeclared and a barely acknowledged civil war in France. French society was divided between collaborators and resisters. The former included those who preferred Hitler to Leon Blum (a French politician)—reactionaries and opportunists who wished to accommodate themselves to the new realities of power. The latter included French citizens from all segments of the political spectrum who thought subjugation to Germany was inconceivable. The resistance was very small until the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union and the Nazi defeat at Stalingrad. Even then it was still a small portion of the population.

While we may see collaborators solely as opportunists, we should understand that most in western Europe were prepared to collaborate with the Nazis because they were now dominant. In the summer of 1940, it appeared they would rule for a very long time.

The opposition consisted of fringe elements. Neiberg sets the stage by explaining how the opposition fissures were temporarily patched and the ways in which de Gaulle (an unknown renegade general) created a resistance coalition, cooperating with and dominating both communist and noncommunist resistance groups.

Neiberg builds his narrative on primary and secondary material that illuminates commonplace Parisian life under occupation, the character of the Nazi military governor, Gen. Dietrich von Choltitz, and the struggle at Allied headquarters over whether or not Paris should be liberated. Parallel to this discussion, Neiberg shows how the Parisian resistance organizations took matters into their own hands and began a two-week insurrection which, with pressure from de Gaulle and the 2nd French Armored Division, forced American commanders to divert forces to help complete the liberation of Paris.

Neiberg is a scholar and a storyteller who has written an account that keeps the reader in suspense even though one knows how the story will end. His conclusion discusses the meaning of the liberation for postwar French society and politics. The Blood of Free Men: The Liberation of Paris, 1944 is a relatively short book that illuminates the interaction of politics, strategy, and operations in warfare.

Lewis Bernstein, Ph.D., Seoul, Korea

THE DRAGON EXTENDS ITS REACH:  
Chinese Military Power Goes Global  

The Dragon Extends its Reach—the title suggests that China’s military modernization is going strong—and it is. China’s modernization effort has forced Western authors to reexamine the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) capabilities and intentions. The new global environment—marked by digitalization and space conquests—has required China to seek out new resources and competencies, which in turn, have created new missions and requirements for the PLA. They have not attempted such global activities for the past 50 years.

Larry Wortzel’s research has succeeded as few have in uncovering the PLA’s expanding military effort and
encompassing all areas of the PLA from the macro- to the micro-level. As an ex-military attaché to Beijing, he is familiar with China’s military and the various aspects of their culture. He has access to information found mainly in Chinese-language sources, attainable because of his fluency in the Chinese language. For example, he notes that *A Guide to the Study of Campaign Theory* is an unclassified “study guide” for PLA officers on how to understand and apply the campaign doctrine presented in the PLA book, *The Science of Campaigns*. Any Chinese military analyst would consider such a document vital to his understanding of the PLA’s conduct of military operations, but it is only accessible to those who can read Mandarin.

*The Dragon Extends Its Reach* examines a number of areas, each of which is usually covered individually by a single U.S. specialist (C4ISR, ground forces, nuclear doctrine, etc.). Wortzel exceeds this parameter of singularity and offers readers a comprehensive look at the PLA in a single source. His analysis encompasses not only the traditional areas of the military services and their equipment, but also the PLA’s thoughts on deterrence and its use, the integration of information operations into political departments, the PLA’s role in foreign policy, and the integration of current thought with past legacies, among other issues.

The book rarely misses a topic area. For example, there are detailed discussions of the Chinese general staff system; military regions, theaters of war, and military districts; the decision-making process of the military; and legal issues affecting space and ocean activities. Wortzel descends into the depths of the services, to include an examination of topics such as how network-centric operations affect their activities. More importantly, he touches on topics that are seldom, if ever, seen in the open press, such as the Chinese Qu Dian theater-level, automated system of command and control.

The information in this book serves as an excellent introduction to the PLA for those just starting to study the Chinese military, and as a well-rounded compendium for those senior Chinese analysts who may have set their focus on one area of military research.

**Tim Thomas, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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**BREACH OF TRUST: How Americans Failed Their Soldiers and Their Country**

Andrew J. Bacevich, Metropolitan Books, New York, 2013, 238 pages, $26.00

Andrew Bacevich’s *Breach of Trust* is a must read for policymakers, military professionals, and the citizens on whose behalf those groups serve. The only critique is that the book’s title does not capture the richness of Bacevich’s argument. His foundational argument is that the all-volunteer force has allowed 99 percent of the population to shirk the shared responsibility of national defense. Although this accusation has become trite over the last 11 years, Bacevich moves beyond the simple military versus civilian argument, identifying how the all-volunteer force is eroding the checks-and-balances construct upon which American democracy is based and creating perverse incentives that enable global adventurism.

Bacevich argues that initially, the all-volunteer force seemed like a “bargain” for both citizen and soldier. Citizens received a professionally trained military capable of protecting the nation, while remaining unburdened by the requirements of common defense. Soldiers received the approbation of 99 percent of the population who were not only grateful for their service, but more than willing to pay the costs of contracting common defense to the other one percent. Overtime, the population became unconcerned with how the professional Army was employed, as long as the costs were not immediate and life continued seemingly uninterrupted. In return, the soldier enjoyed an elevated status in society and vast improvement in the quality of life compared to their military ancestors.

Bacevich concludes that 40 years later, the decision to “abandon the tradition of the citizen-soldier” resembles less a “grand bargain” and more a millstone around the neck of American democracy. Jingoistic policymakers, unconstrained by a disengaged population, use military force in pursuit of idealistic policy objectives of questionable national interest. An institutional military that bureaucratically benefits from global adventurism willingly undertakes these missions, even if individual soldiers become exhausted from the weight of repeated deployments. The result is what George C. Marshall
warned in August 1944 when he argued, “there must not be a large standing army subject to the behest of a group of schemers. The citizen-soldier is the guarantee against such a misuse of power.”

The military professional, who paradoxically prospers and languishes from the all-volunteer force, will embrace some of Bacevich’s conclusions, while simultaneously angering at others. The military reader should not merely cherry-pick those elements of Bacevich’s argument that seem to elevate the soldier, but also appreciate their role in this Faustian bargain. We often believe what is good for the military is good for the nation (or what is good for our individual service is good for the nation). Although institutional parochialism is often unavoidable, we must remain cognizant that we are here to serve the national interest and not vice-versa. Finally, America’s agonistic system of checks and balances must be fueled by meaningful debate among disagreeing parties. For too long, we have equated non-support for policy as non-support for the troops. Although as military professionals we cannot make policymakers responsible or the population more engaged, it behooves us to remember that sometimes the war protestor is our biggest ally and the hawk our greatest threat.

Maj. David P. Oakley, U.S. Army, Fort Sam Houston, Texas

CAVALRY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

Jim Piecuch’s *Cavalry of the American Revolution* is a fascinating collection of nine essays that visits the introduction and development of the cavalry during the American Revolution. The first essay, Gregory J.W. Urwin’s “The Continental Light Dragoons, 1776-83,” sets the stage for the subsequent essays, providing the reader with a comprehensive overview of the evolution of light cavalry and dragoons during the Revolutionary War. The remaining essays cover key milestones in the implementation and use of light cavalry and dragoons to include the efforts and exploits of Brig. Gen. Casimir Pulaski, Light Horse Henry Lee, and Col. Antony White, as well as decisive battles and campaigns such as the Battle of Cowpens and the Philadelphia Campaign.

Throughout the reading I found myself gripped by two themes. The first is the belated recognition of the tactical value of a mounted force and its slow development and often catastrophic employment. The second theme is the American combination and use of guerrilla tactics and mounted raids against static British tactics and mounted raids against static British outposts that disrupted Maj. Gen. Cornwallis’s southern campaign and set the conditions for the American decisive victories at the battles of Cowpens and Yorktown.

Gen. Washington’s view of the creation of American light cavalry and dragoon formations was similar to the contemporary argument that armor and cavalry formations are too costly and not compatible with today’s operational environment. Initially, Washington did not pressure the Continental Congress to resource a mounted force, opting instead for artillery to support his infantry regiments. Washington assumed that the restrictive New England terrain—with its hills, rivers, and densely forested areas—would neutralize the maneuver of a mounted force. He also believed that the cost of feeding horses and equipping a mounted force was not sustainable and that the Continental Congress could simply not afford it. Most important, Washington did not believe the cavalry would be of much use keeping the British pinned in port cities of Boston and New York. This tactical oversight put Washington’s operational plans at risk. Only after being driven out of New Jersey and New York by British Gen. Howe, aided by his two regiments of light dragoons, did Washington recognize the tactical relevancy of having his own mounted force. He petitioned Congress to field a cavalry force when he recommended the establishment of one or more corps.

Michael Scoggins’ “South Carolina’s Backcountry Rangers in the American Revolution” covers the little known but frequent and bloody skirmishes between Tory Loyalists led by the infamous Lt. Col. Tarleton and partisan patriot’s led by brigadier generals Daniel Morgan, Francis Marion, and Thomas Sumter. These skirmishes are described as a part of a brutal civil war pitting Loyalists and American communities against one another throughout the Carolina back country. The essay also describes the change of American tactics after the fall of
Charleston and Savannah to the British in 1780 and the subsequent performance of Maj. Gen. Horatio Gates. The author illustrates how partisan mounted troopers, along with continental regulars, successfully leveraged guerrilla tactics and mounted maneuvers against static British outposts and lines of communication. This action crippled Maj. Gen. Cornwallis’s Southern Campaign, forcing him to seek refuge at Yorktown with his occupational forces isolated in the coastal ports of Charleston and Savannah.

Cavalry of the American Revolution is not a quick read. Because each of the essays is written independently there is some overlap of information that may or may not be consistent, making the reading difficult to follow. Many of the essays are weighed with details and facts that only contribute to a more sluggish read. A technique I found useful was to refer to a map as I read each author’s description of particular battles and campaigns.

That said, overall I enjoyed the book and reread many of essays. I confess that my library is full of contemporary military history going back to 1939, along with a limited number of Civil War works. This book has spurred a curiosity in the American Revolution and how partisan forces shaped the British southern campaign. One can draw comparisons between the British reliance on strong points and use of loyalist formations to our recent efforts in Afghanistan. I recommend this book.

Lt. Col. Andrew H. Lanier IV, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

RÜCKZUG: The German Retreat from France, 1944
Joachim Ludewig, University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 2013, 504 pages, $40.00

You failed to execute your decisive operation, you are outnumbered by more than 16 to 1, you can move only at night because of your opponent’s overwhelming air superiority, you only have 12 of the 54 divisions you started with, and you have to contend with a delusional psychopathic leader. This is the situation the Germans faced in the summer of 1944 as told by Joachim Ludewig in his detailed and well-researched book Rückzug: The German Retreat from France, 1944. What makes this work both unique and fascinating is that Ludewig analyzes the battle across France primarily from the German perspective with the purpose of determining how the German Army was able to stabilize the western front and eventually establish the conditions for the Ardennes Offensive, despite facing such overwhelming obstacles.

So how were the Germans able to stabilize the front after being on the verge of a complete rout? From Ludewig’s perspective, the two key reasons for this were Auftragstaktik, or mission command, on the part of the Germans, and an adherence to fighting the plan and not the enemy on the part of the Allies. From the German side, the tenants of mission command (initiative, agility, and adaptability) were absolutely indispensable in helping them maintain control of their forces despite being pushed back almost 1,000 kilometers during three months of intense fighting.

The reader is provided a clear picture of a chaotic and rapidly changing situation that was only controlled through strong leadership and the skillful application of mission command. The high tempo of Allied operations placed the German leadership in a position where they only had time to provide their subordinates with a mission and intent, and then had to trust them to exercise the initiative necessary to accomplish the mission. This is precisely the type of environment the current U.S. Army doctrine of mission command is intended to contend with.

Ludewig also finds the Allies guilty of fighting the plan and not the enemy. His research supports the Allies’ assessment that by mid-August the German western front was on the verge of collapse. Furthermore, the author believes that if the Allies had adjusted their plan at this critical point and designated a main effort they could potentially have reduced the war by months. Instead, he finds fault with Eisenhower’s decision to continue advancing across a broad front despite facing a logistics situation that could no longer support that scheme of maneuver. This error in evaluating Germany’s window of vulnerability would continue to haunt the Allies into September. The German’s were extremely vulnerable in August, but in a matter of weeks the situation changed as they were able to stabilize the front. Unfortunately, the Allies did not update their assessments, and this influenced the outcome of Operation Market Garden.
As early as July 1944, Hitler had been contemplating a counterattack against the Allies. However, until conditions were set—weather, terrain, equipment, and a stabilized front—this attack could not happen. From a historical perspective, *Rückzug* clearly demonstrates how important Germany’s ability to manage its retreat from France was in setting the conditions for the Ardennes Offensive in December 1944. From a more current standpoint, this work offers valuable lessons and insights into key concepts such as mission command, planning, and battlefield decision making.

**Lt. Col. William Kenna McCurry, U.S. Army, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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**ANTI-ACCESS WARFARE: Countering A2/AD Strategies**

Sam J. Tangredi, U.S. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2013, 308 pages, $35.91

For strategic landpower advocates concerned over the current AirSea Battle debate, this book is an essential and foundational analysis of the anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) military problem. Given the author’s background as an expert naval analyst, the book may be overlooked at first glance. From the book’s title and provocative dust cover jacket depicting a U.S. aircraft carrier hit by a Chinese guided ballistic missile, one would expect a focus on the technical and tactical details of the Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) with a decidedly naval slant. But this book is not that at all; instead it places the narrow JOAC/AirSea Battle solution to the A2/AD problem into a far larger and properly balanced strategic perspective.

Tangredi, an award-winning naval writer and accomplished defense consultant, examines the issue of defeating A2/AD capabilities from both a historical and a modern-day strategic perspective. He uses selected historical vignettes of A2/AD successes (the Greco-Persian Wars, the Spanish Armada in 1588, Gallipoli in 1915, and the Battle of Britain/Operation Sea Lion in 1940) as well as defeats (Fortress Europe in 1944, the Pacific War in 1942-45, the Falklands War in 1982, and Saddam’s failure to interdict Operation Desert Storm in 1990) to effectively argue for what he terms as “five fundamental elements” of the A2/AD problem. The JOAC paper and AirSea Battle discussions focus on just two of these: the criticality of information and intelligence, and the general predominance of the maritime domain as conflict space. However, the author insists that A2/AD warfare challenges and opportunities must be understood while considering the other three elements (perception of strategic superiority of the attacking force, the primacy of geography, and determinative impact of extrinsic events). Tangredi is quick to point out that countering adversary A2/AD is not an air and/or sea prerogative by default since much depends on the actual circumstances of the situation. Defeating A2/AD methods is also frequently a necessary precursor for the introduction of landpower into the battlespace to win the larger military contest.

The reviewer tested the author’s five fundamental elements in analyzing other historical anti-access scenarios not discussed in the book (the Norwegian campaign in 1940, the air assault into Crete in 1941, the never-executed Axis plan to invade Malta, the air assault into Leros in 1943, and the Soviet amphibious assaults in the vicinity of Novorossiysk in 1943). These fit just as well within Tangredi’s analytical framework as those provided in the text.

After establishing his strategic analytical framework, the author discusses contemporary A2/AD problems: PRC anti-access means and ways versus a potential U.S. military intervention on Taiwan, Iran versus the U.S. in the Persian Gulf, North Korea versus a U.S.-led alliance, and Russia versus NATO in a Central Asian scenario. Most striking is how different all of these situations are from each other and how potential solutions would have to take all five fundamental elements into account.

Through both his historical and contemporary analyses, Tangredi makes a strong case for widening the lens in understanding how adversary A2/AD methods can be successfully overcome. If strategic landpower thinkers are frustrated by the all-too-narrow terms of conversation in AirSea Battle, this book provides a more far-ranging and inclusive mental framework for A2/AD warfare problem-solving.

**Col. Eric M. Walters, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired, Fort Lee, Virginia**
Nicholas Murray examines the “theory and practice of trench warfare” to help readers understand how the belligerents found themselves deadlocked for four years. Murray, an associate professor of history at the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff College, assesses the development and evolution of field fortifications from a theoretical or conceptual perspective using four case studies: the Russo-Turkish War, 1877-1878; the second Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902; the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905; and the Balkan War among and between the lesser Balkan Powers and Turkey, 1912-1913.

The conventional wisdom is that the First World War cost so many lives largely because of military incompetence shared equally among the combatants. The trenches made famous on the western front are often cited as demonstrating the stupidity of the generals who presided over the fighting. However, though incompetence abounded, it was not the only reason for the slaughter of combatants during that war. In 1914, the technology of war had outstripped conceptual thinking about warfare. Even this explanation falls short. Murray’s analysis of the development of field fortifications provides some answers as to why things happened as they did.

Murray examines the evolution of field fortifications through six themes he identified from reviewing field fortification theory from 1750-1914. The themes include: using field fortifications to prevent desertion, providing physical protection for troops, enhancing fighting power, reinforcing key tactical points, providing a secure base, and dominating an area. What he found is that armies adjusted the employment and use of field fortifications to keep pace with improvements in weapons and innovation in field fortification. Belligerents, as they had always done, developed field fortifications along the best lines that the terrain afforded and accounted for differences in that terrain. Over time, these efforts led to more sophisticated, more complex, and in the end, more effective works.

Murray ably makes the case that army leaders carefully considered the role and use of field fortifications in any war they might fight. Even leaders from those armies who had no occasion to fight were able to analyze the use of field fortifications because it remained common until World War I for nonbelligerents to send observers to combat zones. Observers were afforded good access to the fighting by those at war. The U.S. Army and the Europeans paid close attention to fighting they observed or found themselves embroiled in, and learned many valuable lessons. Murray draws many of his observations from American observers of these campaigns.

Murray’s chapter on the state of military thought in 1914 is his best. Murray debunks the claim that Ivan Bloch and others who argued that modern warfare had become impossible were ignored. Murray argues that Bloch was mistaken in much of his thinking. In any case, Ivan Bloch was not ignored.

In only one particular is Murray unconvincing. His assertion that the theory of field fortifications included the idea of using them to prevent desertion is not entirely illustrated in the review of the cases he chose. His contention seems logical nonetheless. For example, deserting from a well-developed trench work would not be as easy as leaving a formation on the move at night. Indeed, desertion from the trenches was uncommon in World War I.

Murray appends a short discussion on field fortifications in the American Civil War. This appendix seems unnecessary and added as an afterthought. Perhaps the appendix is intended to preclude criticism that Murray had not included the American Civil War among his cases. If so, his main reason for not including the American Civil War is that the weapons used were not sufficiently modern. This is unconvincing. It is far more likely that he did not include the American Civil War because Europeans generally felt there was nothing really to learn from the American experience. In any case, the appendix adds little and he owes the reader no explanation for his choices beyond those made in the body of his work.

Despite this criticism, Murray’s Rocky Road is an excellent account of the technical and theoretical evolution of trench warfare. It is essential to the history of World War I because it illustrates that the combatants did not merely burrow into the ground in the fall of 1914. Instead, they took advantage of what they had
learned by observation or by experience in the years before the war. By 1914, the capacity of weapons technology had far outstripped the capability of the contemporary armies to overcome the defensive advantages afforded by these weapons. Worse still, when attacks succeeded, the attacker proved unable to rapidly exploit tactical gains. The armies, particularly those in the West, dug in—however miserable, trenches preserved lives. They were well conceived and took advantage of some 30 years of improvement and careful thought as to how they should be emplaced and developed. Rocky Road is satisfying both in its explanation of the technical changes and of the development of theory from Plevna to the start of the First World War.

**Col. Gregory Fontenot, U.S. Army, Retired, Lansing, Kansas**

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**THE LAST FULL MEASURE:**
How Soldiers Die in Battle

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In *The Last Full Measure*, author Michael Stephenson analyzes a topic that is central to warfare but seldom discussed: how soldiers have died in combat. Stephenson, the former editor of the Military Book Club and the author of a book on the Revolutionary War examines how soldiers met their deaths throughout history. His goal is to explain this topic in a professional, nonsensational, and sensitive manner, and demonstrate that the battlefield realities were often harsher than the romanticized visions and sanitized histories people are accustomed to reading. He argues that “the stench and screams give way to rousing images. The death agonies settle into the encouraging heroic gestures of the war memorial and the movies.” Overall, the author succeeds in his goal and provides the reader a lasting image of combat’s harsh realities and a unique analysis of war.

*The Last Full Measure* brings together the factors that cause death on the battlefield. The author organizes the book chronologically to account for the specifics of each historical period concluding with “Soldiers Die in the Style of Their Times.” This approach makes it easy for the reader to understand the historical period and see the connections across the ages. The book primarily focuses on deaths caused by ground combat rather than by sickness and disease. Each chapter, from ancient times to the wars of today, discusses the weapons that killed soldiers, the tactics and strategy that impacted their deaths, the decisions soldiers made and the ones made for them, and the impact of medical services. Stephenson also analyzes the cultural context that affected the soldiers and played a role in their motivation.

This unique approach, looking at how soldiers died, offers the reader a fresh perspective not normally found in books analyzing the experience of battle. Although some of the information about the experience of battle is covered in other books, linking it to how soldiers died is the book’s strength. Stephenson used memoirs and other research in his analysis. He weaves these personal accounts into his analysis where they are particularly effective at not only illustrating his points, but at providing the reader a feel for the events. The author uses U.S. sources and adds the perspectives of many other nations to bring depth to his analysis. Of particular interest to readers may be the way the author highlights the connections between historical periods of how soldiers died.

Although the book is well written, some readers may find a few of the author’s descriptions a bit over the top. For example, when describing the killing power of artillery he writes, “the cannon was a beast of omnivorous and indiscriminate appetite, guzzling greedily on the herds of men conveniently marching toward its muzzle.” In addition, in the early chapters, the author will occasionally reference battles without providing context, which can be confusing to a reader who does not know the details of those battles. However, these points are minor.

Overall, the book will be a great addition to the libraries of those readers interested in the experience of battle. I highly recommend it.

**Lt. Col. Robert Rielly, U.S. Army, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**
A GENERAL WHO WILL FIGHT: 
The Leadership of Ulysses S. Grant
Harry S. Laver, University Press of Kentucky, 
Lexington, 2013, 189 pages, $32.50

In Charles Portis 1968 novel, a man of “True Grit” is brought to life; grit being defined as having perseverance, fortitude, firmness of mind, resilience, and unyielding courage. In A General Who Will Fight: The Leadership of Ulysses S. Grant, author Harry Laver also explores a man of similar qualities. Laver challenges the reader with one overarching question: how does an ordinary young man, devoid of any apparent drive or leadership traits, rise to the rank of Commanding General of the Union Army? Laver convincingly argues that Grant had an overriding personal quality, which was “a great force of will.” Laver contends that this will, this inner drive, developed throughout Grant’s victories during the Civil War. The author portrays a man shaped by those around him, and clearly demands that the reader question the old axiom that leaders are born not made.

Today’s leaders can learn from Lever’s leadership analysis of Grant and the importance mentors played in Grant’s development. During the Mexican-American War Grant observed both Generals Zachary Taylor and Winfield Scott during the zeniths of their careers. Grant adopted the best attributes of these officers and incorporated them into his leadership style. He also absorbed many tactical lessons during the Mexican-American War. One such lesson that would serve him well in his future was the importance of pressing the fight, no matter what the odds or possible setbacks.

Harry Laver’s main objective is to inform the reader of a side of Grant that is not well known. Laver does not dissect battles; he tells the story of how Grant developed as a leader within the context of his life. Laver clearly meets this goal in a well researched and documented work. The author’s writing style is direct and easy to read. Laver does an excellent job of explaining events after the Mexican-American War, when Grant fell on hard times. Within two years of his stationing out west, Grant resigned his commission as a captain. Over the next five years he attempted many vocations, but failed at all. Laver successfully argues that regardless of these failures, Grant never lost hope that things would get better. He always believed no matter how bad things became, good fortune would eventually come his way.

Once the Civil War commenced, Grant was appointed to the rank of colonel by the governor of Illinois and given command of the 21st Regiment of Illinois Volunteers. Laver continues to chronicle the rise of Grant through the first two years of the war on the western front. During that time Grant encountered another mentor, Brigadier General Charles F. Smith, who served as commandant of West Point when Grant was a student. Grant cherished their relationship and learned from another seasoned warrior. Laver portrays Grant developing his abilities during increasingly significant battles. The author depicts a maturing Grant, expanding his knowledge and developing self-awareness in such places as Forts Henry and Donelson, Shiloh, and Vicksburg. Laver critiques Grant after each of these victories, and expertly explores where Grant stumbled and where he shined.

During these critiques Laver emphasizes Grant’s ever-increasing self-confidence, and underscores his determined resolve to continuously press the battle to achieve victories and ultimately win the war. Today’s leaders could learn from Grants evolving leadership style as he was executing mission command well before his time. It was Grant’s “great force of will” to press on that turned the tide of many battles in the Union favor. Grant eventually commanded all Union armies, battled Lee in the east, and eventually defeated Lee’s Army, accomplishing what many before him could not do.

President Lincoln once said, “Grant has the grit of a bulldog.” Laver persuasively tells the story of a determined man who learned from his mistakes while molding himself after strong role models; a lifelong learner who rose to lead our military during one of the most difficult times in our nation’s history. Given our military’s drawdown and reduced budgets, I would highly recommend this book to all leaders as an example of how to face uncertain times with strength and determination.

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