WAR COMES TO GARMSER:
Thirty Years of Conflict on the Afghan Frontier
Carter Malkasian, Oxford University Press, New York, 2013, 321 pages, $27.95

Forty years ago, Jeffrey Race published a book about the conflict in Vietnam called War Comes to Long An. Now considered a classic, the book offered a sophisticated microhistory of the Vietnam War from the perspective of a single district, one where Race had served as a district advisor. The strength of the book came from insights lost in the more macro and strategic accounts of that complex war.

In his new book War Comes to Garmser, historian Carter Malkasian seeks the same kind of local analysis for one of the small places of the war in Afghanistan. He focuses on Garmser District, a slice of Helmand Province located close to the southern border with Pakistan. Malkasian bases his work on his own experience serving in Garmser as the political officer for a district reconstruction team from 2009 to 2011. What results is one of the most important books written on our long war in Afghanistan.

Malkasian uses the perspective of a historian to seek the deep roots of conflict in Garmser and he finds them, among other places, in the well-intentioned and ambitious irrigation project launched by the United States in Helmand Province in the 1950s. The project opened large areas of land to agriculture and inspired the Afghan government to encourage small, landless tribes from outside the district to settle in Garmser. The larger tribes with a longer history in the region resented the newcomers and did what they could to marginalize them, creating an enduring rift in the social fabric of the district. In a classic example of unintended consequences, when the Taliban originally emerged in Garmser in the mid-90s, they found their earliest adherents among the immigrant tribes.

The Taliban also worked hard to build support among a class of notables who, until then, had limited political power: the mullahs. Between the mullahs and the immigrant tribes, the Taliban built a base of support that outlasted their original overthrow in 2001. These same constituencies helped to restore Taliban rule to Garmser in 2006.

In reviewing the 30 years of conflict in Garmser, Malkasian seeks to answer the question of whether U.S. efforts to build peace and effective governance in this strange and remote land—“the graveyard of empires”—were doomed from the start. He concludes they were not, and the last half of his book considers the U.S. Army surge in Afghanistan and the protracted campaign to take Garmser back from the Taliban. It is the story of missed opportunities and little victories that ultimately resulted in a hard-won and fragile success. Malkasian concludes with the key to success: “In war: resolution.”

One possible criticism of the book is that Malkasian has largely written himself out of this story. In this, he has been too modest. Others judged him to be one of the most effective civilian advisors to serve in Afghanistan. In his book, Little America, Rajiv Chandrasekaran writes, “He won the trust of skeptical residents through countless meetings and roadside conversations, pressing them to reject the insurgency and support their government.” By mastering the Pashto language and immersing himself in the nuanced elements of tribal culture, Malkasian came to be referred by the natives of Garmser as sahib, an Urdu title of special respect. The local Marine Corps commander believed winning the war against the Taliban meant that every district needed someone with Malkasian’s skills. Sadly, Chandrasekaran found him to be the outlier among the U.S. civilians serving in Afghanistan.
Ultimately, along with a clear writing style, the strengths of this book are Malkasian’s deep understanding of both sides of the insurgency, and his willingness to draw larger conclusions from his experience in Garmsir. It is not too soon to consider this a classic. *War Comes to Garmsir* is very highly recommended.

**Scott Stephenson, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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**NO EXIT FROM PAKISTAN: America’s Tortured Relationship with Islamabad**


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In his 2010 book *My Life with the Taliban*, Abdul Salam Zaeef, a senior founding member of the Taliban and former ambassador to Pakistan, notes that—

Pakistan ... is so famous for treachery that it is said they can get milk from a bull. They have two tongues in one mouth, and two faces on one head so they can speak everyone’s language; they use everybody, deceive everybody.” But Pakistan is not alone in its alleged duplicity. America has been equally fickle and calculating with its relationships too.

*No Exit from Pakistan* highlights two contradictory nations with two fundamentally differing perspectives. Deception, torment, newsworthy misdeeds, and abandonments are claimed on both sides, and contradictory versions of shared history are pervasive. It is little wonder that the book’s author, Daniel S. Markey, a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and former State Department policy planner, highlights that relations between Washington and Islamabad have often run from maddening to exasperating—and will probably continue to do so for the foreseeable future.

*No Exit from Pakistan* is a deeply impressive and compelling study. Markey dexterously articulates the intricate and evolving United States-Pakistan relationship from 1947 onwards, noting that when Pakistan was accommodating, it enjoyed big-hearted American assistance and attention. However, when Pakistan was uncooperative, the tap of support was quickly turned off. It is little wonder that the author posits that, “Washington has viewed the country [Pakistan] as a means to other ends, whether that meant fighting communism or terrorism.” But Pakistan has also played a clever cat-and-mouse game in this regard, regularly dipping into the deep pockets of the United States to serve its purposes—occasionally crooked but more often driven by the perceived steady menace of its neighbor, India.

Dependence on U.S. assistance dollars, weapons, and protection is a convincing argument well made. More recently, Pakistan’s internal troubles have threatened the safety and international peace of the United States, and its burgeoning population, nuclear program, and relationships with China and India (Washington cannot afford to deal with Islamabad in a vacuum) underscore that Pakistan will figure highly in U.S. foreign policy. All told, Pakistan’s collapse or breakup would be disastrous—and not just for the West. It is hardly surprising that the author concludes that it would be little more than wishful thinking to believe that neglecting the challenges posed by Pakistan will make them go away.

Over seven compelling chapters, the author helps the reader understand Pakistan on its own terms, highlighting that the United States has stumbled in its dealings with Pakistan because policymakers made mistaken assumptions about how Pakistan works. He describes United States-Pakistan relations during and after the Musharraf era, including Pakistan’s drone debate, and provides a regional perspective of the United States-Pakistan association. The study concludes with three options for a future U.S. strategy: defensive insulation, military-first cooperation, and comprehensive cooperation.

The author notes, “To be clear, these options are in fact points along a spectrum of U.S. policy choices and they are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The real skill, assuming that such a strategy could be adopted, will be how best to balance—and re-balance—between the three in order to advance America’s short, mid, and long-term goals.” Markey is wise to note that progress, of any sort, will only be achieved through a patient, sustained effort, not by way of quick fixes, smoke and mirrors, or abandonment.

In-depth, balanced, and insightful, *No Exit from Pakistan* is a must-read study. It will appeal to academics, diplomats, policy formers, strategists, and laymen...
alike—i.e., anyone concerned with the fate of the region. Few will be let down by its well-researched narrative, comprehensive analysis, and convincing recommendations; it pulls no punches and stands out from the growing crowd of manuscripts on the topic. This is without doubt the best book I have read on the subject and I recommend it most strongly. Despite historical and ever-present everyday challenges, *No Exit from Pakistan* makes clear why neither side can afford to let the U.S.-Pakistan relationship fold and, uncomfortably, why a close partnership is probably unattainable in the short term. The United States is trapped in its relationship with Pakistan; at least in the short term there is absolutely no exit.

**Col. Andrew M. Roe, Ph.D., British Army, Shorncliffe, United Kingdom**

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**PIRATE ALLEY:**
**Commanding Task Force 151 Off Somalia**
Rear Adm. Terry McKnight, U.S. Navy, Retired, and Michael Hirsh, Naval Institute Press, Maryland, 2012, 272 pages, $29.95

*Pirate Alley: Commanding Task Force 151 Off Somalia* provides a good look inside the piracy occurring off the coast of Somalia. It is co-authored by retired Rear Adm. Terry McKnight, former commanding officer of Anti-Piracy Combined Task Force 151, which operates in the Gulf of Aden area. To the average reader the problem of piracy appears to be one of numbers—not having enough naval vessels to guard the passage of ships as they transit through the shipping lanes along the coast of Somalia.

McKnight explains in extraordinary detail the multitude of problems associated with patrolling this area. From the sheer size of the area (2.6 million square miles), to the endless legal issues (such as who has jurisdiction over captured Somalia pirates operating a hijacked boat from Yemen that attacked a Panamanian flagged shipped crewed by Filipinos that set sail from Dubai going to Kenya carrying food for a UN food program), when Somalia does not have laws against piracy or a functioning government.

McKnight describes the nature and character of the so-called pirates not as fisherman at all, but rather as front-line (non-swimming) soldiers from inland areas of organized crime looking to make fast money in order to leave Somalia. He also addresses the pros and cons of paying ransoms for the return of the ship and sailors. This is just the tip of a complex business network: financiers, negotiators, suppliers, soldiers, and high-ranking government officials all vie for their cut of the ransom money.

He also devotes several chapters to explain the evolution of maritime operations, military and commercial, necessitated to reduce the risk of hijackings. These include military intervention as well as arming commercial vessels with professional contracted security teams; both of these have myriad second and third order problems that are not easily solved. He also includes other details about the rescue of Captain Richard Phillips from the CTF 151 perspective that were not addressed in Richard Phillips’ book or the recently released Tom Hanks movie, *Captain Phillips*. The last two chapters look at strategies, tactics, and possible future options.

Why read this book? To take a quote from page 202, “With more than 90 percent of the goods that fill the shelves of your local Walmart and 50 percent of the globe’s petroleum passing through the high-risk area, including the Gulf of Aden and far out into the Indian Ocean, how could it not be a national security issue?” A must read for military and national strategists.

**Lt. Col. George Hodge, U.S. Army, Retired, Lansing, Kansas**

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**ALVIN YORK:**
**A New Biography of the Hero of the Argonne**

Douglas Mastriano’s book *Alvin York: A New Biography of the Hero of the Argonne* takes the reader through the life of Alvin York. The author begins with a brief coverage of York’s early development as a simple backwoodsman and then his experiences as a soldier leading up to 8 October 1918. Fittingly, one entire chapter focuses on York’s action in the engagement in which he
earned the Medal of Honor. Mastriano then provides an overview of York’s remaining years and his efforts to help his community prepare to meet the challenges of a new world. Mastriano ends his book with a thorough discussion defending his research.

Alvin York was born into a typical hard-scrabble existence common to many Americans raised in the backwoods areas of the country in the late 1880s. The Cumberland Valley of Tennessee was in many respects a good representation of the predominantly rural America of that time. Families scratched out a living from the land with subsistence farming, augmented by hunting and fishing. There was a strong religious element within rural communities as well as a brawling, moonshine-drinking element that took to the bars on weekends. Alvin York was intimately familiar with both elements before he took his place at the “mourners’ bench” on New Year’s Day, 1915, when he accepted the Lord as his savior.

Alvin’s relatively strict brand of religion led him to request status as a conscientious objector and, despite numerous appeals his request was never accepted. Alvin was lucky that some of early military leaders were also men of strong religious convictions. They had many discussions that eventually enabled Alvin to reconcile fighting for his country with his religious views. Like many new soldiers from rural backgrounds, Alvin had little difficulty with the physical rigors and discomforts of soldier training; in fact, his exposure to men from different parts of the country and recent immigrants was probably the greater challenge.

Many rural soldiers had difficulty with sea sickness while traveling to first England and then on to France. Once in France, his unit had experiences typical of most American expeditionary forces as they moved from the coast of France into training areas where they learned tactics, techniques, and procedures from French and British veterans. Alvin’s unit, the 328th Regiment of the 82nd Division, was eased into the lines of a “quiet sector” east of Verdun. Known as the Woëvre Front, Lagny Sector, this quiet sector nonetheless afforded York’s 328th Regiment the complete laundry list of experiences to be expected in the coming battles. They patrolled in no-man’s land, endured artillery barrages and gas attacks, and both conducted and defended against trench line raids.

After its baptism by fire, York’s unit moved to the vicinity of Châtel Chéhéry to play their role in the Argonne Offensive. York’s unit attacked on 8 October 1918 and he took his place among the great warriors in American history. Mastriano takes the reader step by step, rush by rush, through York’s actions in the fight. York used his hunting skills, honed by placing food on his family’s table, and his faith in God to take him through the fighting—to accomplish one of the greatest recorded feats on a battlefield in American military history. With source materials from both German and U.S. historical files, Mastriano provided details of the fight such that readers will feel they are part of the battle. When York marches his 132 captives back into friendly lines he is asked if has captured the whole German army.

Mastriano takes the reader through the remainder of York’s service until his return to the United States on 22 May 1919. Mastriano details how York’s fame grows—despite York’s incredible personal humbleness and refusal to make any fuss over his actions. The story of York’s homecoming—complete with ticker tape parade in New York City—is almost comical. The simple soldier York only wanted to go home and resume his life but he was tugged in various directions by many looking to take advantage of his fame. Upon his return home York continues to refuse offers that would have made him a rich man and Mastriano details York’s efforts to bring education and opportunity to the young people of his rural community as well as his efforts to warn of the dangers posed by Hitler prior to World War II.

The final brief chapter tells of Mastriano’s efforts to accurately locate the specific location of York’s Medal of Honor fight. Though detailed—and convincing to this reader—this chapter detracts slightly from an otherwise excellent book’s focus not only of a true hero of the Argonne, but also a true American civic hero. I believe all readers will find Mastriano’s book to be an easy, informative, and enjoyable read.

MACARTHUR’S WAR: The Flawed Genius Who Challenged the American Political System
Bevin Alexander, Berkley Caliber, New York, 2014, 248 pages, $25.95

An accomplished military historian, Bevin Alexander provides civil and military leaders another stark historical reminder of the imperative of effective civil-military relations in war. He provides a fair, balanced, and often critical narrative of decisions and actions of two major antagonists, President Harry Truman and Gen. Douglas MacArthur, before and during the Korean War. Alexander provides three major themes that contributed to his designation of MacArthur as a “flawed genius”: MacArthur’s larger than life ego; high-stakes political infighting; and a near complete lack of situational understanding concerning Far Eastern affairs, especially Chinese motives and intentions related to Korea. Alexander’s narrative expertly weaves critical connections between the themes, providing readers with a keen insight of the rationale and necessity for Truman’s relief of MacArthur as the U.S. senior commander of the Far Eastern Command.

The book’s opening paragraphs effectively establish the decision-making dilemmas faced by U.S. civilian and military leaders during past and present wars, and the tenuous balance between civilian supremacy in decision making and professional military expertise. Although controversial civil-military relations are not new topics in American military history, the relationship was severely tested on the Korean Peninsula in 1950 where problems were compounded by an international, political, and military environment where leader decisions and actions were frequently wrong.

While MacArthur’s hubris is well documented, the author reiterated his larger than life reputation as an intellectual five-star general who exited World War II as a hero of the Pacific theater. As a highly successful military proconsul credited with the reconstruction of post-war Japan, he was an imposing figure ostensibly well-suited for supreme military leadership in the Far East at the outbreak of the Korean War. However, along with his substantial credentials spanning five decades came an unbearable ego, unbending support for the overthrown Nationalist Chinese government, and an entrenched belief that World War III was not a matter of if, but when, and anything short of total victory, regardless of costs, in any war was anathema to U.S. interests.

With this understanding of MacArthur, Alexander effectively addressed the politics surrounding the relations between Truman and the “flawed genius.” He paints the Truman administration as one highly criticized by political opponents, that struggled mightily to maintain international credibility, and was considered by most as neophytes of the geopolitical climate in the Far East due to an unwavering focus on Europe and the Soviet Union. These, combined with having to deal with an ego-driven MacArthur with presidential aspirations, made dealing with Korean affairs especially contentious, and underscored the multi-faceted complexities faced by U.S. presidents during war.

Although often critical of Truman, Alexander rightfully credits the president with a keen understanding of the realities and horrors of a potential nuclear World War III, an understanding of the importance of relationships within the United Nations and traditional allies, and the courage to recognize and act upon MacArthur’s insubordinate activities and actions even in the face of intense political fallout.

Treating all participants objectively, Alexander is equally critical of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and their approach to Far Eastern affairs, their total unpreparedness and surprise by the invasion of North Korea, and their initial unwillingness to confront MacArthur’s supreme persona, especially after Inchon’s success. However, Alexander credits the JCS for finally standing up to the realities of the “flawed genius” in congressional hearings, eventually swaying public opinion and thwarting political intent to use MacArthur as a means of denigrating the president.

Given the contentious relationship between MacArthur and Truman, manifest in MacArthur’s public statements causing consternation among allies and blatant disregard for presidential orders, Alexander provides overwhelming evidence as to why MacArthur’s relief was essential. This book provides readers with a valuable narrative of the variables that placed an American president and an insubordinate general on a colliding trajectory the outcome of which affected the geopolitical landscape of the Far East and...
fundamental American beliefs of civilian-military relations in ways that still exist today.

Bill McCollum, Ed.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE MOST DANGEROUS MAN IN AMERICA: The Making of Douglas MacArthur

Mark Perry’s efforts as an author reflect eclectic interests ranging from accounts of terrorism and the collection of intelligence to the remarkable account of Mark Twain’s assistance to Ulysses S. Grant as the ailing president wrote his autobiography. The Most Dangerous Man in America is his ninth book. It is a first-rate account of complex relationships between the men who waged war in the Pacific and the key policy makers at the top in Washington. However, it is not truly a biography of MacArthur as the title implies.

The Most Dangerous Man begins with a vignette in which Franklin Delano Roosevelt, in a conversation with an associate, describes Huey Long as the second most dangerous man in America. When asked if Long was second, who then was the most dangerous, Roosevelt responded, “Huey is only second. The first is Douglas MacArthur.”

Perry’s book is not about MacArthur as much as it is about Roosevelt and MacArthur. The careers of these two great men ran together beginning in the 1930s when MacArthur served as chief of staff of the Army and beyond Roosevelt’s death. (MacArthur presided over Japan’s surrender, served as proconsul in Japan, and led U.S. forces in Korea because Roosevelt had made it so.)

They were closely involved but not close. Roosevelt and MacArthur thrust, parried, and counterthrust at each other for more than a dozen years. In fact, they needed and warily respected each other even if their outward cordiality was just for show. The relationship was uneven. Roosevelt stuck by MacArthur who never rewarded the President with any genuine personal loyalty. For his part, MacArthur seems to have understood that in FDR he had met his match.

Perry, to his credit, stays out of the story. He is more circumspect about MacArthur than some other biographers. Clearly he respects the general’s achievements but sees MacArthur’s dark side. Capable of petty complaints and bitter personal enmity, MacArthur also proved susceptible to sycophants. Perry sees this but illustrates that all of the protagonists who made national security policy in Washington and waged war in the Pacific had their foibles. He believes that Douglas MacArthur deserves to be remembered as a brilliant operational commander capable, despite his many shortcomings, of forming effective teams of diverse partners. In many ways, MacArthur set the standard in World War II for mounting truly effective joint operations. He found ways, despite bickering with Nimitz and King, to work effectively with the Navy and with the sometimes fractious Army Air Force.

In the end, he worked well with Adm. Nimitz, Adm. Spruance, Adm. Halsey, and Adm. Kinkaid. Kinkaid, who served as MacArthur’s maritime component commander, became an admirer. MacArthur had an equally close relationship with then Maj. Gen. George Kenney, who commanded his air component. Apparently shocked into indolence, MacArthur’s performance in the early days of World War II could well have led to his relief. Instead Roosevelt and Marshall, both derided by MacArthur in private, stood by him. MacArthur’s subsequent actions justified their support.

Perry is at his best when discussing strategic decision making in the Pacific. The intense debate at the top over priorities that drove resources shows the many protagonists both at their worst and best. MacArthur proved effective in working even with those he disagreed with. Those who expected to dislike him, including Halsey, found working with him surprisingly easy. MacArthur both goaded and rewarded those who worked for him. Dour, competent, and courageous Gen. Walter Krueger often pushed back successfully. MacArthur sometimes “encouraged” Krueger by comparing him unfavorably to Gen. Robert Eichelberger. Eichelberger, who had the thinnest skin among a group of very thin-skinned men, required praise far more than did Krueger. MacArthur knew how to manage most men. But Perry shows that the general was not as effective with those closest to him including his chief of staff, then Lt. Col. Richard Sutherland.
Perry’s assessment of MacArthur’s generalship rests quite accurately on MacArthur’s concept and execution of Operation Cartwheel and on the debate over whether to make the final approach to the Japanese home islands through the Philippines or Formosa. During Operation Cartwheel, MacArthur’s forces combined with those of Halsey to adroitly maneuver the Japanese out of Rabaul. Cartwheel is a textbook illustration of effective joint and combined operations. With respect to the Philippines, MacArthur made the case for advancing on Japan via the Philippines instead of Formosa on two grounds—both of which were compelling.

First and foremost, the United States had a vital strategic interest in minimizing the suffering of the Filipinos who after all were U.S. citizens and had a right to expect succor at the first possible instance. Second, and equally important, in 1944, Japanese counteroffensive operations outran a number of Chinese airfields essentially denying eastern and southern China bases to the Allies. Accordingly, the Philippines and the lesser Japanese Islands such as Iwo Jima provided better alternatives to an assault on Formosa which the Japanese were defending more heavily. Spruance and Halsey agreed with MacArthur’s view thus winning over Nimitz. In the end, Roosevelt, the consummate politician and commander-in-chief sided with MacArthur over the chief of naval operations, Adm. King, and the rest is history.

This is a very good book with clear insight not only into MacArthur but the very real human endeavor of making policy and war. Both are blood sports and not for the faint hearted. This is a must read for young officers who may someday find themselves confronted with difficult operational and even strategic dilemmas. There is no doctrine for this work. Learning to do it requires the approach suggested by Frederick the Great. Frederick believed we are able to learn both from our own experience and that of others. As he put it, “what good is experience if it is not directed by reflection?”

Thinking critically about what we do and what others have done before us is part of our preparation for leadership and possibly high command.

Col. Gregory Fontenot, U.S. Army, Retired, Lansing, Kansas

GLOBAL CRISIS: War, Climate Change and Catastrophe in the Seventeenth Century
Geoffrey Parker, Yale University, New Haven, 2013, 904 pages, $45.00

Professor Geoffrey Parker’s latest work is a broad synthesis of global strife in the seventeenth century. *Global Crisis* is in the main a treatise on the causes of war, a great variety of which are well-illustrated during the period in question. The 1600s serve this purpose well not only due to the frequency of wars but because of the availability of histories, memoirs, and travelogues relative to preceding centuries. Nevertheless, it is a daunting challenge to address so many cases and issues in a single volume. Only Parker’s unsurpassed mastery of the social foundations of early modern warfare makes this a realistic endeavor.

A key element of intrigue and originality in Parker’s exhaustive treatment is the consideration of the influence of global climatic patterns on the surge of violence that marks the seventeenth century. Throughout the work, the author carefully explains the context of struggle and the myriad factors from the seemingly endless religious and sectarian hostilities to ever-present disputes over succession and territorial claims. Along the way, Parker regularly notes ways in which bad weather, and more broadly the pattern of agricultural disruption inflicted by a global climatic shift, exacerbated one situation after another, thus making conflicts more frequent, prolonged, and destructive.

Moreover, he documents each instance with the recorded observations of participants and observers, many of whom noticed that nature or the hand of God had somehow created desperate times. Parker is cautious not to exaggerate the impact of natural calamities and generally steers clear of mono-causal explanations. Rather, he describes at length how fine the margin between prosperity and famine was for most of the world’s population. When economies faltered or famine beckoned, wars that in better times might have been preventable or limited, could be sparked by frantic competition for resources and often assumed deadly proportions.

Parker also ponders sweeping demographic trends, such as the Malthusian implications of formerly
growing populations suddenly facing acute scarcities. Data from diverse regions were highly suggestive. As Parker reports, the seventeenth century was marked by a one-third decrease in cultivated land in China, a twenty percent population decline in Ireland, the loss of 30 percent of the population in Germany between 1618 and 1648, as well as comparably sharp population drops in Poland, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire. He concludes, “These staggering losses were not caused by the Little Ice Age alone, however; it required the misguided policies by religious and political leaders to turn the crisis caused by sudden climate change into catastrophe.”

Overall, this work is compelling both as a historical study and as a cautionary tale about the fate of civilizations in general. To be sure, Parker scrupulously avoids any explicit suggestions about climate and the twenty-first century. Indeed, if anything, the reader might wish for a lengthier and more focused examination of climate in the seventeenth century. Much of the evidence presented is necessarily fragmentary and in many chapters weather and climate appear only fleetingly as factors of interest. Of course, the fact that weather plays a role in shaping human events is hardly startling. Thus, the reader might hope that the author would say even more about the way broad climatic trends can shape the course of global civilization.

Despite its many strengths, this excellent survey of the seventeenth century feels vaguely incomplete. Even so, Parker is to be applauded for yet another superb contribution to the historical literature.

Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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THE LIEUTENANT DON'T KNOW:
One Marine’s Story of Warfare and Combat Logistics in Afghanistan
Jeff Clement, Casemate, Havertown, Pennsylvania, 2014, 264 pages, $32.95

The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have produced many superb memoirs. The overwhelming majority of these volumes have focused on the perspectives of infantrymen or special operators. One view which has been essentially missing is that of the logistician. As is normally the case, anything logistics oriented tends to be neglected. As Nathaniel Greene said in a letter to George Washington in 1778, “Nobody ever heard of a quartermaster in history.”

Marine Jeff Clement provides the seemingly overlooked perspective of the logistician in his outstanding memoir, The Lieutenant Don’t Know. In it, he primarily focuses on his experience as a truck platoon commander for Alpha Company, Combat Logistics Battalion 6 (CLB-6) in 2010. During that year, his unit was deployed in Southern Afghanistan operating principally in the Helmand Province. Its extremely difficult mission was to provide logistical support to the combat units in the most demanding of environments.

For those unfamiliar with the role of the logistics units in Afghanistan; Clement’s memoir will unquestionably be an eye-opener. Clement details the day-to-day challenges he and his marines faced in providing logistical support. In the quest to deliver food, water, ammunition, fuel, and recover vehicles, the logistical convoys had to deal with the constant threat of emplaced improvised explosive devices and ambushes along their movement routes. As the author mentions numerous times, it was never a question of if they would get hit, but when it would occur.

Tied to the above is the author’s discussion on how he personally dealt with the challenges he faced. Throughout the volume, he is candid with his thoughts on decisions he made and just as importantly, ones that were not made. If he felt mistakes were made, he takes responsibility for them. He also addresses the personal and professional relationships he had with his superiors, peers, and the marines he led. Clement’s frankness and level of detail provide readers with a superb snapshot of the life of a young lieutenant in combat.

In his book’s conclusion, Clement states, My story is not glamorous. Combat logistics battalions do not have a sexy mission, and logistics units are rarely the feature of a Hollywood blockbuster. No logistician’s memoir can hope to be as exciting as that of a Green Beret or an operator from Seal Team Six. After the first draft was mostly written, I despaired on that last fact. Who would ever want to read this? My story was that of a regular guy, in a regular unit, not even a front-line combat unit.
In reference to the above paragraph (and to play on the book’s title), I believe “the lieutenant [clearly] don’t know.” Clement has crafted a memoir which may not be glamorous as some, but is highly readable and informative. His angst that his volume may not appeal to readers is clearly unfounded. Without question, this is a volume which will be read and valued by many. In the following years, this will be a book sought out by those seeking an understanding the critical role of logistics in the war in Afghanistan and how the combat loggie adapted and met the incredible challenges the war presented.

Rick Baillergeon, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

GREAT POWERS, SMALL WARS: 
Asymmetric Conflict Since 1945

Great Powers, Small Wars is a well-researched, quantitative book that attempts to identify basic characteristics and variables between great powers and adversaries of lesser power to determine why the stronger power is defeated in war. The book utilizes various databases to determine the characteristics and variables used in the conflicts. The author provides two case studies: the dissolution of the British Empire after World War II and the U.S. War in Iraq, 2003-2011, to support her findings. The case study on Iraq will conjure up many thoughts among U.S. military professionals.

Deriglazova is an associate professor of history and the chair of world politics at Tomsk State University in Siberia as well as a member of the International Relations Department and a former scholar in the Kennan-Fulbright Scholarship program at the Wilson Center in 2009. Deriglazova’s expertise lies in the field of Russian and Eurasian studies.

The book focuses on systematically studying asymmetric conflicts using quantitative methods to explore reoccurring elements found in such conflicts. The underlying theme of the book is a critical analysis on how great powers lose their power by having to come to agreements with lesser powers on terms contrary to their interests at the start of conflicts. The findings are not new, but the statistics associated with the findings are relevant. For example, between 1800-2003, the stronger nation won these types of conflicts 71.5 percent of the time, between 1900-1949 the stronger nation won 65.1 percent of the time, and from 1950-1999 the stronger nation won 48.8 percent of the time.

Statistics for the post-World War II period indicate that the great powers were willing to engage in asymmetric conflicts—the United Kingdom engaged in 14 conflicts, China in 11, the Soviet Union in eight, and the United States in 33—but the data also illustrate the inability of the great powers to achieve their stated goals and interest in over half the conflicts. Deriglazova identifies seven factors for the difficulty great powers had in achieving victory: loss of will by the great power, fatigue or unwillingness to expend more resources to achieve victory, inability to counter asymmetric tactics, public opinion turns against the greater power, political elections in the great power elect representatives who are unwilling to pursue the conflict, interference from outside or external nations or forces, and international condemnation of the conflict.

The case studies are interesting and clearly articulate reasons why great powers have such great difficulty in achieving their desired end states. Money or cost of the war versus the benefit plays a significant role, as do domestic politics, and international attention on the war. The data provided by the author and the variables studied are relevant to the book and the methodology is sound.

The problem for great powers will continue to be ways to achieve success in limited wars against unequal opponents to achieve their national interest. This book goes a long way toward identifying the problems associated with winning asymmetric conflicts, but it will be up to military planners to discover doctrine and practices to win these asymmetric conflicts in the future.

Ken Miller, Platte City, Missouri
THE SOCIOLOGY OF MILITARY SCIENCE: Prospects for Postinstitutional Military Design
Dr. Chris Paparone, Bloomsbury, New York, 2013, 232 pages, $29.95

Paparone built on his earlier works to produce a monograph that is described in several book advertisements as offering “fresh sociological avenues to become more institutionally reflexive.” The premise of the monograph is that military knowledge has been institutionalized to the point that the military community is blind to viable alternative military design methodologies. The monograph treats military organizations and military interventions as complex social phenomena and uses sociology as the basis for further inquiry with the purpose of answering the question: “Can there be a variety of ontological, epistemological, and methodological frames of reference for the design of militaries and their interventions?”

Readers familiar with the works of Karl Mannheim, Kurt Wolff, Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, Nicholas Rescher, Thomas Kuhn, Alfred Schutz, Karl Weick, and Max Weber will enjoy the mental dissection of the current modernist view of military design and the reframing Paparone describes using various social constructs. For readers who are unfamiliar with the professional, academic terms of the social sciences, have a dictionary on hand and start with chapter 5, The Reconstruction of Military Profession. I recommend this chapter as a starting point for a reader familiar with the military but unfamiliar with the social sciences because it relates concepts of social science to known terms and situations in the military.

This link will help bring clarity to the sociology-based discussions in chapters 1-4. Chapter 5 begins by explaining some important postulates of social construction theory as developed by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann. The author then employs their theory to attempt to describe the modernist social construction of the current military profession to get the reader to think reflexively about that construction. This chapter is especially relevant to professional military education instructors and others looking for a new approach to military design. Paparone examines the claim that the military has become too bureaucratized and then uses a comparison of theories on profession and on bureaucracy to show a closer link between the two than we might want to admit.

With this monograph, Paparone provides viable, alternative thought processes, approaches, and lenses to view the foundational concepts that have and continue to shape how we as a military are organized, trained, equipped, and employed. As such, it is a worthwhile read for those who want to understand how we developed the thought processes that created the institution we have today, and new ways of thinking to change it for the future.

Lt. Col. Michelle Garcia, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE BURNING SHORE: How Hitler’s U-Boats Brought World War II to America

It is difficult to imagine that the United States was on the verge of defeat in 1942. The U.S. Navy was reeling from the devastating blow it had experienced at Pearl Harbor. The U.S. Army in the Philippines was weeks away from surrender to Japanese forces when Germany decided to launch Operation Drumbeat, a submarine offense against America’s Atlantic Coast. Operation Drumbeat caught America completely unprepared when German submarines struck in early January 1942.

Within three weeks, 15 German submarines destroyed 35 Allied merchant ships and a British destroyer totaling 181,456 gross registered tons, killing 1,219 crewman and passengers, all without the loss of one German submarine. By June 1942, German submarines would operate almost unopposed along our East Coast sinking 226 Allied merchant ships totaling 1,251,650 gross registered tons.

In The Burning Shore, Offley provides a broad historical review of the Battle of the Atlantic, clearly demonstrating how U.S. unpreparedness, incompetency of policy makers, and parochial interservice rivalry proved almost a bigger threat than German submarines in undermining the war effort. Central to Offley’s account is the encounter between a U.S. Army Air
Force pilot, 2nd Lt. Harry J. Kane, and Kapitänleutnant Horst Degen, the captain of German U-boat 701. The encounter reaches a climax on July 7, 1942 when Lt. Kane and his aircrew spot and sink Degen’s U-701. The event signals a turning point in the war against German submarines and sets the stage for a lifetime friendship between two former foes.

America’s fortunes change through a variety of counter measures including escorting convoys, arming merchant ships, patrolling, and cracking German naval code. The stunning Allied turnaround against German U-boats culminated in a series of convoy battle victories in May 1943, which destroyed forty U-boats and forced the German navy to withdraw their forces from the North Atlantic.

The author’s research is extensive and includes firsthand accounts that convey the harsh reality of life serving aboard a German U-boat. This book is best read by those interested in a broad historical overview of the Battle of the Atlantic and just how close the United States came to military defeat in early 1942.

**Jesse McIntyre III, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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**THE LUCKY FEW: The Fall of Saigon and the Rescue Mission of the USS Kirk**

Jan K. Herman, U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2013, 192 pages, $39.95

Two years after the United States withdrew from Vietnam under the auspices of the 1973 Paris Peace Accords, Saigon fell to the communists and the Republic of Vietnam ceased to exist. The images of the chaos that reigned as the North Vietnamese tanks surrounded and then stormed into the South Vietnamese capital city were seared into the memories of those who watched. Some of the most vivid of these images depicted panicked South Vietnamese citizens fleeing the North Vietnamese onslaught by sea to U.S. ships waiting offshore in the Tonkin Gulf. This group included the remnants of the South Vietnamese Navy and others who took to the sea in whatever vessels were available, as well as those who commandeered helicopters and flew out to meet the U.S. fleet.

*The Lucky Few* tells the unique story of the crew of the USS *Kirk*, a destroyer that played a major role in the 7th Fleet effort to assist people caught up in the fall of South Vietnam. Trained for war and expecting to be involved in combat, the crew of the *Kirk* found themselves involved in a massive humanitarian operation to save those who had managed to escape their dying nation. In the process, the *Kirk* played a major role in the rescue of 32,000 refugees and the escape of thirty-two vessels from the South Vietnamese fleet to sanctuary in the Philippines. The refugees were first taken to refugee camps on Guam, then to refugee camps in California, Arkansas, Florida, and Pennsylvania before finally resettling all over their new country.

This heart-rending story gives a detailed account in very personal terms, from the sailors’ perspective as well as from those who were rescued. It is a sad tale that addresses the human toll of defeat, but it is also a story about the triumph of the human spirit. The epilogue to the book discusses how those rescued from the chaos in South Vietnam, through hard work and determination, earned their rightful place as Americans in their adopted homeland. There is also a discussion of the many moving reunions between rescuers and those who they rescued that took place many years later.

This is an important book that addresses the little-known details of the final days of South Vietnam and the human drama of those who chose to flee their native homeland. It is an invaluable addition to the history of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia and the war in Vietnam.

**Lt. Col. James H. Willbanks, Ph.D., U.S. Army, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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**THE BROTHERS: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and Their Secret World War**


During the 1950s and 1960s, many Americans viewed the Cold War as a matter of absolutes, a struggle between the Western forces of goodness and the aggressive expansionists of the evil Communist bloc. For these people, there was no middle ground—neutralist rulers such as Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and Patrice Lumumba in the Congo might be naive or deceptive, but their actions aided the Soviet
enemy. In this view of the world, the United States was justified in using any measures to prevent other nations from falling under communism. Two of the men most associated with this activist American foreign policy were brothers who formed an unprecedented team during the Eisenhower Administration: Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles.

Stephen Kinzer, journalist and author of previous studies concerning American interventions in the 1950s, has undertaken a dual biography to explore the careers, motivations, and actions of these two remarkable men. The two had much in common. They came from a distinguished family that already included two secretaries of state, they both attended Princeton University, and they both worked for and eventually directed the Wall Street law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell, which lobbied the U.S. government on behalf of the worldwide business interests of its clients.

The author is careful, however, to differentiate between the two men. The elder brother, always known as “Foster,” was a rigid, almost humorless authority figure who was so blind to moral issues that he saw nothing wrong in business dealings with Adolf Hitler and other dictators. Despite this myopia, Foster defined the world in conservative religious terms that prompted him to resist any diplomatic compromises with the Soviet Union. Kinzer treads well-worn ground in this regard, arguing that Foster’s narrow viewpoint contributed to American fears and provoked Nasser into seizing the Suez Canal in 1956.

Allen, by contrast, was much more flexible and personable, a man of great charm who regularly committed adultery and boasted of the accomplishments of the Central Intelligence Agency. Having served as an intelligence officer in Switzerland during both world wars, Allen was entranced by the romantic image of espionage and therefore, according to Kinzer, frequently lost his objectivity concerning international affairs.

For decades, observers portrayed the Dulles brothers as the prime movers in U.S. efforts to overthrow the non-aligned governments of Iran, Guatemala, Indonesia, and the Congo, as well as the Marxist regimes in North Vietnam and Cuba. Allen Dulles went beyond arming the opponents of legitimate governments going further to create phantom rebel armies staffed by mercenaries and to manipulate American publishers to suppress and distort the news of these conspiracies. Kinzer, however, emphasizes the more recent interpretation that President Eisenhower was the actual decision maker who directed and supported all such actions.

In his focus on these two protagonists, the author occasionally engages in over-simplifications about other actors. For example, Gen. Lucius Clay, the influential governor of the American sector of occupied Germany during the later 1940s, appears as “the Allied commander in Europe.” Kinzer also states that Allen Dulles assembled a team, led by James Killian, which developed the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft. Although Killian did indeed recommend development of that plane, he was not just a recruit of Dulles but rather president of MIT and scientific advisor to Eisenhower, and as such was responsible for numerous other government programs including improved science education and guided missiles.

Moreover, a book such as this, intended for the general public, needs maps to help the reader find the many locations described in such a wide-ranging account. Despite such minor discrepancies, however, The Brothers is a well-researched and entertaining account of a now-forgotten era of American foreign policy. Stephen Kinzer is indeed correct that we should re-focus on this period to better understand both our own history and the practical limitations of foreign policy. Col. Jonathan M. House, U.S. Army, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE DESERTERS:
A Hidden History of World War II
Charles Glass, Penguin Group USA, New York, 2013, 400 pages, $27.95

From the American Revolution into the 20th century, American wars have had their heroic elements, the battles and heroes that have reached near-mythical status. They have also had a dark side that tends to be neglected if not buried. Not all who go to war are able to handle its pressures—some suffer what has been called shell shock, battle fatigue, or post-traumatic stress disorder. Others decide that they have reached their limits and abandon their posts, their comrades, and their obligations. The latter
are the deserters, and desertion is an element of all American wars. World War II was no exception, as The Deserters so ably shows.

Fifty thousand American soldiers deserted in World War II. As Glass notes, the percentage of the total force is quite small. However, Glass contends, only 10 percent or less of the military actually went into combat. There was no one-year tour, no 50-mission crush. The same men fought again and again; their only hope of relief was the ‘million-dollar wound.’ Eventually, some of those who survived the constant threat of death broke down under the strain.

This work is not a historical, sociological, or political exploration of the phenomenon with data sets and heavy discussion of military and governmental policies. Rather, it approaches the broad and previously neglected topic of desertion through examination of the lives, particularly in the war, of three men who at one time or more deserted. Two are Americans and the third is British, and their backgrounds and military experiences differ widely. All served in combat, and all reached their limits. One was a decorated hero. Another deserted several times, returning and leaving three times as the pressures became too intense. One of the three even became active in the resistance during one period of absence from his unit.

Glass writes as a journalist rather than as an academic historian. His highly readable work provides much description of the horrors and difficulties of the combat environment, the unfairness of a military system that forced only a small percent to bear the burden of combat while the bulk of the forces remain behind the lines in relative comfort, the hardships of the military prison system, and so on. Although this is not a broad survey, it provides a depth of detail more common to a biography than to a monograph. When appropriate, the author steps back and tosses in context and numbers, but keeps the focus on the three men and their reasons for deserting.

Desertion has long been understood as a shameful betrayal of the mission and one’s comrades. Only recently has a more nuanced reading made allowances for the human frailty of the warrior. The Deserters is a sympathetic but realistic exploration of the pressures of warfare and the toll it takes on even the unwounded. Reading it is time well spent.

John H. Barnhill, Ph.D., Houston, Texas

FIGHTING FOX COMPANY: The Battling Flank of the Band of Brothers
Terry Poyser and Bill Brown, Casemate, Havertown, PA, 2013, 344 pages, $32.95

The book and miniseries Band of Brothers practically made Easy Company, 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division, a household term. But while Easy Company fought its way through the Normandy countryside, the dikes of Holland, the forests of Bastogne, and into the heart of Germany during World War II, Fox Company fought equally hard on Easy’s flank.

Through careful research and interviews with veterans, Terry Poyser and Bill Brown have created a unit history for Fox Company, with all its training, fighting, and comradeship. While Fighting Fox Company parallels the experience of Band of Brothers, it follows a different narrative. Historian Stephen Ambrose created leaders, heroes, and villains in Band of Brothers, particularly in the officer corps. Fighting Fox Company is mostly the story of the enlisted men, often using entire letters written to loved ones or whole pages of first-person accounts to tell its story. The only officer truly fleshed out is Lt. Andrew Tuck, who commanded a platoon, then the company at the end of the war.

Fox Company trained at Toccoa and Fort Benning, Ga., before shipping off to England to prepare for the invasion of Normandy. Parachuting behind Utah Beach on June 6, the men were scattered and fought separate battles until they were able to find their units. Two members of Fox Company helped capture a German battery and Brecourt Manor, and one was the last Americans to leave the battlefield. In the battle for Carantan, which united the Utah and Omaha beaches, a German armor unit struck Fox Company. The unit bent, but did not break, under the force of German tanks and infantry, and the paratroopers of Fox Company knocked out two German tanks before American armor arrived to turn the tide. The action continued through Holland, the siege of Bastogne, and the drive into Germany.

Capt. Dick Winters, who eventually becomes the battalion executive officer, makes a few appearances in the text. When a squad returned from a patrol in
Waldhambach, France, and reported to Winters that they had left a man behind in a German ambush, he refused to let the men retrieve him; it was just too risky. The men were furious, but as one recalled, “Looking back on it later I am sure he [Winters] saved more lives by refusing to let us go.”

The book is at its best when the authors describe Fox Company’s combat actions. The writing is fresh and intense and paints a good picture of World War II front-line combat. The small anecdotes delivered by the veterans make for interesting reading. The book’s weakness is the excessive detail it provides in explaining training jumps; there is just too much information for the casual reader. The letters home could have also been edited to include only the most relevant information.

This is an excellent book for anyone who wants to understand the bigger picture of company-level combat within the 101st Airborne Division in World War II. Also, anyone familiar with the Band of Brothers’ story will want to read this book.

Kevin M. Hymel, Silver Spring, Maryland

THE DEAD AND THOSE ABOUT TO DIE: D-Day: The Big Red One at Omaha Beach
John C. McManus, New American Library / Caliber, New York, 2014, 384 pages, $27.95

The title of this book refers to the often-quoted statement uttered by Col. George Taylor, commander of the 16th Infantry Regiment, who, after landing on Omaha Beach, tried to convince his men to move off the shingle beach and save the landing. Taylor and his heroic action is only one of the events author John McManus chronicles in The Dead and Those About to Die. This book is the latest work by McManus, who has previously written a number of notable works on World War II. Widely considered an authority on the Normandy invasion, McManus has a gift for telling history through the eyes of the participants; this work is no exception.

The author states “Omaha Beach is better known than it is understood” and believes that despite the vast amount of material written about it, much can still be learned. He goes on further to state that the 1st Infantry Division’s role has been largely overshadowed by the much more documented fighting on the western half of Omaha Beach. Yet, in his view the 1st Infantry Division holds the key to new insights about Omaha Beach. McManus’ goal is not to eclipse other histories but to build on the foundations they established and improve upon the knowledge and understanding of the battle. He has eight questions which he feels are still unanswered and, through his research and analysis, this book provides answers for each.

A gifted storyteller, McManus provides more than just a rehashing of the chaos and carnage. Through extensive research he tells the story of the Big Red One, puts it in context, and explains why it mattered. He weaves in many first-person accounts—German as well as American—giving the reader a sense of what it was like to be on the beach that day. McManus’ understanding of military tactics shows in his analysis of what went wrong, the problems in the plan, and the motivations of the soldiers.

McManus discusses each assault wave, what happened, and why, without getting bogged down in the details. Through his research he corrects some misconceptions about events. He also discusses the actions of individuals that made the difference between success and failure. In his analysis of Col. George Taylor, he states, “Taylor made two major contributions: he saved the lives of many men by motivating them to get off the beach where they were vulnerable and helpless and in so doing he reinforced the groups that were already infiltrating the draws and bluffs.”

In addition, the author is forthright in his criticism where he feels his evidence supports it. For example, when discussing the failure of medical evacuation he writes, “Given the laudable commitment of the World War II U.S. armed forces to provide excellent medical care to servicemen, this failure in concept, planning, and sheer humanitarianism is rather stunning.”

McManus succeeds in achieving his goal of increasing our understanding of Omaha Beach and answers his eight questions. He adds to his list of World War II histories with another superb work. Well written and extensively researched, The Dead and Those About to Die will be a great addition to readers’ libraries. I highly recommend this book to all readers, especially those interested in World War II. You will find it well worth your time.

Bob Rielly, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
GOING FOR BROKE: Japanese American Soldiers in the War Against Nazi Germany
James M. McCaffrey, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 2013, 408 pages, $34.95

The story of Japanese American soldiers of the 442nd Regimental Combat Team, 100th Infantry Battalion (Separate), and 522nd Field Artillery Battalion in the European theater is now a standard part of the history of the American experience in World War II. It would seem another account would be superfluous, but McCaffrey justifies his account as an approach that combines operational military and social history.

He works, as he has done in several other books, to describe the wartime experience from the individual soldier’s point of view. His major sources are two large oral history collections, one at University of Hawaii and the other at the Japanese American National Museum in Los Angeles.

He skillfully exploits these two collections as he follows the soldiers from recruitment or induction to their discharge and return to civilian life. The book is divided into 10 chapters; two detail the War Department’s rationale and how the separate infantry battalion and the regiment were formed. The battalion was formed from soldiers in the federalized National Guard units, and the regiment from volunteers already serving in the Army and conscripts from the internment or concentration camps. Two chapters then describe the soldiers’ training in the upper Midwest and the South (depicting the racism they experienced) and their subsequent trip across the Atlantic to the Mediterranean on a troop transport.

Five chapters describe operations in Italy, France, and Germany, relating the Japanese-American soldiers’ role in these campaigns. These chapters have an abundance of operational details and individual experiences, but this book does not have a single map that would orient the reader. As a result, unless one has a good mental picture of Italian, French, and German topography and geography, it is difficult to follow the battle narrative. The final chapter deals with the Nisei soldiers’ experience as occupiers in Germany and Italy, their long wait to go home, and their subsequent discharge from the Army.

Beside the lack of maps, I found the book disappointing because of the author’s failure to provide details of the soldiers as individuals. McCaffrey richly recounts their collective experiences in great detail, but given the resources at his disposal as well as his experience writing social and military history, one wishes for a group biography of the men of the regiment. The author could have provided more details on where they came from; their experiences growing up and the ways those experiences did or did not affect them in the Army; how their wartime experiences affected them; as well as their thoughts of postwar efforts to recognize their service and the ways others have used their actions to form and shape the broad national memory of the World War II.

Lewis Bernstein, Seoul, Republic of Korea

VERDUN: The Lost History of the Most Important Battle of World War I, 1914-1918
John Mosier, New American Library/Penguin Group, New York, 2013, 400 pages, $26.95

As the centennial of the Great War approaches, historians have been hard at work revising conventional understandings of the war, its processes, and its significance. John Mosier is no stranger to revisionist history, and though occasionally overstated, his Verdun is an excellent examination of the battle and its broader context. Mosier argues that the battle is largely misunderstood, thanks to geographical ignorance of this part of the French frontier, as well as propagandistic myths made by the French high command to cover for their distressing battlefield performance in 1914 and on.

Though Mosier focuses on Verdun, he has much to say about the French high command and government, which utterly failed to provide strategic leadership or tactical and technical innovation before and during the war. They did succeed on the information and public perception front and managed to hide the extent of casualties and other failures from the French people for years. As often happens, wishful thinking was compounded into an article of faith that the Germans were losing more men than the French, and thus the French army was actually succeeding. Mosier argues that this belief explains much of French (and British) behavior during the war.
Perhaps Mosier’s most significant revision is his reevaluation of German Gen. Falkenhayn’s goal for Verdun. He is remembered as wanting to “bleed France white” at Verdun, but Mosier, a Falkenhayn apologist, makes a good case for a more subtle goal. Falkenhayn planned to take Verdun before French Gen. Joffre’s anticipated summer 1916 summer offensive in order to break French morale. This could occur either by piercing the line at Verdun, or by eliciting a sadly typical French counter attack which could only lead to staggering French casualties and failure. In either case, the objective was to “Frankreichs Kräfte verbluten,” i.e. to bleed France’s will and strength white. Though Falkenhayn lacked an understanding of how the French political system worked, this objective was far less tactically bankrupt than is generally understood.

Though the 1916 offensive at Verdun did not immediately break French morale, Mosier argues that the battle led indirectly to the French army’s mutinies of 1917. As Verdun’s position became increasingly threatened, despite Petain’s effective defensive schemes, the ever-fragile French government was threatened with removal. It in turn threatened Joffre with removal. He in turn placed Gen. Nievell in command of the Verdun defense. Nievell immediately launched the bloody and futile infantry attacks Verdun is remembered for, which were heralded throughout France as victories. Once Joffre was finally removed, Nievell was placed in command of the disastrous Champagne offensives at Chemin des Dames in April 1917, which prompted the mutinies.

Mosier offers an important corrective to the battle of Verdun, reexamining the tactical significance of various points, incorporating fighting in the near and not-so-near vicinity of the forts, and directly attacking mistakes that have grown up in the common perception of the battle. It is a must read for World War I enthusiasts.

John E. Fahey, Ph.D. candidate, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana

**BATTLE FOR THE NORTH ATLANTIC: The Strategic Naval Campaign that Won World War II in Europe**

John R. Bruning, Zenith Press, Minneapolis, 2013, 300 pages, $40.00

There are no flowers on sailor’s graves,  
No lilies on the ocean waves,  
The only tributes are seagull sweeps,  
And the teardrops that his sweetheart weeps.  

–Anonymous

John Bruning dedicates this book to the compelling sacrifices made by tens of thousands of civilian merchant marine sailors who gave their lives at sea in the Atlantic Ocean to win the war in Europe. The losses taken by these civilians in World War II are rarely acknowledged and it was satisfying to see the honor paid to them. The author points out the merchant mariners lost about 80,000 people in the war, affirming that it may have been safer to join the U.S. Marine Corps in World War II since the loss rate for merchant mariners was higher than that of the marines.

The book is a well-written chronological walkthrough of the unfolding of the war in the North Atlantic. It begins with the Kriegsmarine building up force in 1939, and carries us through the war chapter by chapter, highlighting some of the major turning points that alter the course of the battle in the Atlantic. The events covered extend across all levels of war to create a compelling narrative. At the highest level he draws attention to significant Allied events including the meeting of Churchill and FDR to create the Atlantic Charter, and strategic decisions like the commitment of the United States and Britain to supply Stalin in his war effort.

Operational-level details emerge too. The changes to convoy operations are discussed as are the German operation plans as they evolved to press for German dominance of the Allied supply lines. The German navy’s Operation Drum Roll (aka “The Happy Time”) is recounted in which America learns harsh lessons while shifting from peacetime merchant operations to wartime. The narrative is kept lively and engaging through
the telling of numerous tactical sea engagements in detail. The author does a good job hitting the high points of these sea battles to show the difficult circumstances of the North Atlantic sailor on both sides of the war.

This book is not designed, however, to be a definitive history textbook and has little documentation of the sources for the historical vignettes. What really makes this a book to enjoy is the visual expanse of the imagery. The book has 384 photographs, 12 illustrations, and four maps. The photographs are what make this book so compelling to pick up and read. They show everything from daily life for sailors, for example standing in line on the mess deck to get immunizations, to ships in the death throes of burning and sinking.

If there is one element missing from the book it is more narratives of the merchant marine sailors themselves. The book opens and closes with dedications to the sacrifices of these men, but very little is written in the book from their perspective. A more complete picture of the battle in the Atlantic would have emerged if the author could have spoken directly with some of these men and told the story of the battle for the Atlantic from their point of view.


SINO-U.S. RELATIONS AND THE ROLE OF EMOTION IN STATE ACTION: Understanding Post-Cold War Crisis Interactions
Taryn Shepperd, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2013, 232 pages, $100.00

Understanding emotion is central to understanding human nature, and thus by extension, politics, concludes Taryn Shepperd in her analysis of the role of emotion and identity in Sino-U.S. post-Cold War international relations. To Shepperd, political relations have traditionally focused on the material interests of each actor, generally ignoring the social interests that play a sizable role in national decision making. In contrast, while military and economic interests shape international interactions, she asserts that the way a nation seeks to define itself, its adversary, and its subsequent emotions often supersedes such material considerations.

To highlight this dynamic, Shepperd focuses on the three major Sino-U.S. crises since the Cold War: the Taiwan Straits Crisis (1995-96), the U.S. bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade (1999), and the Spy Plane Incident (2001). Such an approach combines the material interests of both realists and neo-liberals, international competition and cooperation respectively, with the social interests of constructivism. In doing so, the author seeks to combine mono-disciplinary methods in a “more insightful, comprehensive, and critical” way in understanding post-Cold War Sino-U.S. relations.

Within the boundaries of each crisis Shepperd demonstrates that when “the rules of the game were broken,” both actors retreated from material interests, becoming heavily influenced by emotion and identity. These rules, laid out by three major bi-lateral communiqués during the détente of the 1970s, now form the basis of Sino-U.S. relations and any change to the status-quo convulses the entire system. During such periods, policy makers from both nations utilize language in an effort to define themselves and their adversary. Thus, the U.S. seeks to portray itself as “democratic” and “just” while depicting China as “communist” and “belligerent.”

Attempting to define identity through such language often draws on historical memories as “repositories of emotion.” China’s national perception of the “century of humiliation” permits the depiction of the U.S. as a hegemonic aggressor. Conversely, language and identity serve to quell emotion after confrontation shifts to cooperation, particularly when one side sufficiently apologizes to the other.

While intriguing, the constructivist approach which Shepperd employs is not revolutionary. Nations and their policy makers seek to portray themselves in the right, thus a war of words and the depiction of the “other” in antithetical terminology is to be expected. Furthermore, social interests are often tied to perceptions of real material vulnerability, a point not readily acknowledged by the author. A nation which apologizes to end an emotional conflict may be portrayed as feeble, inviting further material threats to its sovereignty, as the “Scramble for China” of the late nineteenth century demonstrates.

Shepperd’s work provides a basis in which to evaluate Sino-U.S. relations and also the interactions of any competing powers. While realist and neo-liberal
perspectives based on material interests often govern policy analysis, Shepperd demonstrates that social interests cannot be neglected. Anyone involved in Sino-U.S. military, economic, or political policy analysis would certainly benefit from Shepperd’s approach. The author’s analysis illuminates the need to incorporate social interests in analyzing international interactions within this appealing, theoretical work on Sino-U.S. relations.

**Viktor M. Stoll, King’s College, London**

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**THE CIVIL WAR IN POPULAR CULTURE: Memory and Meaning**  
Edited by Lawrence A. Kreiser Jr. and Randal Allred,  
University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 2014, 248 pages, $40.00

The Civil War was the bloodiest and most substantial war in American history. The country, fiercely divided by opposing political and moral conventions, embarked upon a war that would reap death and destruction for four lingering years. The war occurred 150 years ago, yet still has the ability to ignite conflict among some Americans.

The Civil War in Popular Culture is a collection of thought provoking essays that analyze how public memory and popular culture have preserved modern day perceptions of the Civil War. Editors Lawrence Kreiser and Randal Allred have drawn upon authors with various academic backgrounds to demonstrate that public memory of the war varies considerably.

The editors have focused on five major themes to represent the scholarship of the Civil War and popular culture. The themes are the aftermath of battle, reunions and battlefield preservation, remembrance over time, the Civil War in fiction and film, and the war as a modern-day hobby. The book opens with an interesting discussion of the effects of post-traumatic stress disorder on Civil War soldiers. Equally fascinating is an essay discussing Confederate amputees and the crisis they faced in defining their own manhood.

A particularly controversial essay in The Civil War in Popular Culture argues that Gettysburg, the nation’s most famous Civil War battlefield, has provided the public with a historically inaccurate perception of the Civil War for years. Until recently, the battlefield was completely void of any information or teachings regarding an African-American presence at Gettysburg. The author stresses that by the late 1800s, public memory began to remember the Civil War as a war between brothers. Due to reconciliation, later generations were taught that the war had little to do with slavery. Such attitudes temporarily dispelled African-Americans from public memory.

Film is one of the most instrumental methods through which popular culture influences the population. Author Paul Haspel has written an engaging account of the film Glory. This captivating motion picture tells the story of the 54th Massachusetts Infantry Regiment, the first Union African-American regiment of the Civil War. While somewhat historically inaccurate at times, the movie proved enormously successful in awakening the public interest of the Civil War in viewers while simultaneously educating the public about African-American participation in the war.

The Civil War in Popular Culture effectively examines the way Americans have used memory and popular culture to remember the Civil War. The book raises the awareness of the reader to the rich history of the Civil War and its powerful influence in present day society. The editors of this volume successfully provide a collection of articulate essays that open new dialogue on the Civil War in relation to popular culture. I highly recommend this book for military professionals interested in the Civil War and to anyone hoping to gain a better understanding of how popular culture has influenced our nation’s interpretation of history.

**Ms. Siobhan Blevins, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.**