Greetings! The year 2014 was exceptional for Military Review. We realized many of our goals as an organization and as a publication, finally attaining full staffing and incorporating most of the promised changes to the journal. Our most important improvement was adding color to the journal’s English edition to enhance its appearance and readability.

More changes are in Military Review’s future. Possibly as early as February we will join forces with the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) to form a new organization called the Army Press. As a combined team we will serve as the focal point for identifying, encouraging, and supporting authors who desire to publish original manuscripts on the Army’s history, policy, doctrine, training, organization, leader development, professionalism, or any other topic of interest to the Army. These contributions can be in the form of books, monographs, or articles. We will provide help to potential authors through mentoring and coaching, ensuring the Press’ programs and products enable scholarship, facilitate professional dialogue, and promote an enhanced understanding of the Army and the Profession of Arms.

Because Military Review can only accept a fraction of the submissions we receive, we will work to place those articles we do not publish in other Army, Department of Defense, or Center of Excellence publications. We will also provide recommendations for manuscript revisions (if needed) before forwarding them to other periodicals to increase their potential for publication. More information on the transition of Military Review and CSI to the Army Press is forthcoming.

This edition of Military Review contains some very unique articles that will grab your attention and perhaps stir some debate. As you can see by our stunning cover photo, we want to draw your attention to an article about the importance of Arctic training and the Army’s challenges in dealing with Arctic warfare contingencies that might arise. Author Capt. Nathan Fry draws from his experience training north of the Arctic Circle with Canadian forces during Exercise Guerrier Nordique on Baffin Island, Canada.

Also in the lineup is an article by Lt. Gen. Donald M. Campbell Jr., commanding general of U.S. Army Europe, and Maj. Michael T. Whitney, a member of the U.S. Army Europe Commander’s Initiative Group, discussing the U.S. response to the recent crisis in Ukraine, Operation Atlantic Resolve. The authors effectively demonstrate that the success of the operation was due to the relationships, trust, and access gained from having permanently based U.S. forces in Europe.

On page 97 is an article of particular interest by Maj. Thomas Craig. He explains the concept of loyal dissent and how, when executed properly, leaders can use loyal dissent to create the conditions for innovation by utilizing subordinates to their fullest potential. Also check out the 1st place winning entry of the 2014 Gen. William E. DePuy Writing Competition by Col. John Culclasure on page 111.

As we approach the end of this banner year, I would like to thank my entire staff for ensuring that Military Review continues to be the “go-to” journal our readers depend on for relevant and thought-provoking articles. I am very fortunate to have such an incredible group of professionals working with me.

Thank you for your continued support of Military Review. We’ll see you next year!

Military Review continues to move forward. Find us at http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/militaryreview/index.asp, or on Facebook and Twitter — follow the evolution! ☑

Troops assigned to 3rd Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment fire an M98 Javelin Weapon System during range operations conducted at Grafenwoehr Training Area located near Rose Barracks, Germany, 23 September 2014.

(Photo by Sgt. William Tanner, 2nd Cavalry Regiment PAO)
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January-February  Training Management: Lost Art or Wave of the Future?
March-April  The Army and the Congress: Who Really Should Have Responsibility and Authority for Preventing and Responding to Sexual Harassment and Sexual Assault?
May-June  Ready and Resilient Campaign: Challenges, Issues, Programs; Officer Broadening
July-August  Inform and Influence Activities
September-October  Technology vs. Personal Leadership
November-December  Global Insurgency—Revisited

A U.S. Army Husky improvised-explosive device detection vehicle, assigned to 1221st Route Clearance Company, South Carolina Army National Guard, leads a convoy 24 June 2014 during route-clearance operations at McCrady Training Center, Eastover, S.C.

(Photo by Tech. Sgt. Jorge Intrisago, Air National Guard)
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Above: Army Reserve Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Operations soldiers with the 401st Chemical Company form an extraction team to get notional injured out of a contaminated area after a simulated chemical agent attack.
(Photo by Staff Sgt. Roger Ashley, 412th Theater Engineer Command PAO)

Left: A wave of fire crashes against the riot shields of soldiers from 2nd Squadron, 38th Cavalry Regiment, 504th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade, during a fire phobia training exercise 22 January 2012 at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center.
(Photo by Sgt. Cody Barber, 11th Public Affairs Detachment)
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The author draws lessons from Gen. Eisenhower to show how the Army can overcome fiscal constraints and maintain its edge by focusing on our soldiers’ best weapon for adapting and innovating: the cognitive process.

This article won 1st place in the 2014 General William E. DePuy Combined Arms Writing Competition.

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A paratrooper from the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team presents a patch to Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite during a welcome ceremony 26 April 2014 at Siauliai Air Base, Lithuania. The Lithuanian president personally shook hands with each of the Sky Soldiers as they disembarked the aircraft.

(Photo by Sgt. A.M. LaVey, 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team PAO)

Assurance in Europe
Why Relationships Matter


At the U.S. Army Europe’s (USAREUR's) 2014 Combined Training Conference in Oberammergau, Germany, Lt. Gen. Donald M. Campbell Jr., commanding general, was asked how the United States was able to respond so quickly to the crisis in Ukraine. His answer was simple—relationships. As Gen. Philip M. Breedlove, commander, United States European Command (USEUCOM) and NATO’s supreme allied commander, Europe, is fond of saying, “you cannot surge trust.”

Since the start of Operation Atlantic Resolve, USAREUR has hosted many visitors, and every one has walked away with an understanding of how vital the permanently based U.S. forces in Europe are and
will continue to be in responding to challenges such as the recent events in Ukraine. USAREUR’s response to unpredictable events can be orchestrated and replicated in a timely manner—as demonstrated by Operation Atlantic Resolve—only because of the relationships, trust, and access it enjoys from its forward-based presence in Europe. Maj. Gen. Almantas Leika, commander, Lithuanian Land Forces, echoed this sentiment when he said of Atlantic Resolve, “We feel in this complicated situation that we are not alone. This is extremely important.”

**A Persistent Presence**

In light of Russian intervention in Ukraine, the United States is demonstrating its continued commitment to collective security through a series of actions designed to reassure NATO allies and partners of America’s dedication to enduring peace and stability in Europe. As part of the persistent presence mission, which has transitioned to Operation Atlantic Resolve, USAREUR forces are conducting land force assurance exercises and expeditionary sustainment, as well as planning future bilateral training opportunities.²

USAREUR leaders feel this is made possible only by the relationships developed through years of stationing in Europe. USAREUR, the Army Service component command of USEUCOM, has a unique ability to leverage friendships built on more than 1,000 annual security cooperation events and exercises. A perfect example of the enabling factors of personal and professional relationships is how the mission in support of Operation Atlantic Resolve developed.

Relationships developed by USAREUR with the affected countries allowed its senior leaders to make initial phones calls to Baltic region chiefs of defense to set the conditions for what at the time was called persistent presence. These phone calls were quickly followed by the USAREUR operations officer, Maj. Gen. Darryl A. Williams, immediately traveling to all the Baltic states and Poland to set the conditions for the reassurance mission. After the initial coordination was complete, the USAREUR deputy commanding general, Maj. Gen. Richard C. Longo, traveled to Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to follow up with their leadership. He performed a joint welcome ceremony for the initial forces from the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team “Sky Soldiers,” based out of Vicenza, Italy, to begin the initial persistent presence mission. After all forces arrived, Lt. Gen. Campbell traveled to each country and met with their key leaders to ensure USAREUR was meeting the host nations’ expectations. These visits by USAREUR senior leaders with key military and political figures demonstrated an unwavering commitment to partners and allies. The successful visits were enabled by the personal relationships developed throughout the year during multinational training exercises and events. USAREUR’s perspective is that the relationships highlighted above are the direct result of U.S. forces being stationed in Europe and developing a foundation of trust through credibility. This trust, in turn, has allowed USAREUR the ability to gain access to key leaders in the affected region and respond to events quickly, when every second was critical to providing friends the assurance they desired. The command’s senior leaders received a truly overwhelming personal response from these countries’ key leaders during face-to-face engagements in the affected areas after USAREUR units had arrived. Country leaders...
expressed amazement that USAREUR could react as quickly as it did and also that senior leaders took time to meet and work with them, in person, and establish a foundation for the mission. While USAREUR played a large role in the response to the situation in Ukraine, the command believes that the overall operation was made possible by a holistic team effort from USEUCOM and the joint and interagency communities in providing a comprehensive response in support of U.S. objectives.

**Operation Atlantic Resolve**

The ability to have soldiers—without a formal request for forces—board a tactical aircraft in Italy, fly just over two hours, walk off the plane, and immediately begin training with a partnered force sends a powerful message of assurance to a country that lives day in and day out in the looming shadow of a perceived threat. USAREUR leadership believes this rapid response could not have been conducted from anywhere else but Europe without a significant amount of country coordination, foreign clearances, and cross-talk over different time zones.

From 23 to 26 April 2014, company-sized contingents of U.S. paratroopers from the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team arrived in Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia to begin exercises with their troops. At each location, as part of a joint welcome ceremony, Longo was on the ground to make remarks about USAREUR’s unwavering commitment to its friends and allies. The leaders of these countries explained how they had called upon NATO, and especially the United States, for support during a trying time. The response included tactical aircraft on the airfield with U.S. soldiers standing shoulder to shoulder in formation with their own forces. USAREUR soldiers were always met by the host country’s soldiers for handshakes and patch exchanges as they arrived. They were welcomed with open arms. Longo, a leader with 34 years of service, later stated, “This was the greatest experience of my military career.”

There are countless other examples of what this assurance message meant to these countries; the Lithuanian president personally shook hands with each of the Sky Soldiers as they disembarked the aircraft, the Estonian president broke bread with three Sky Soldier privates after his welcome speech, and dozens of civilians approached Longo in town to thank him for bringing soldiers to help them.

During the Conference of European Armies in 2013, Longo met all four countries’ chiefs of defense and developed strong professional relationships with them. These friendships allowed him the access he was immediately given when he arrived in their countries before USAREUR forces. He was personally invited to lunch with the chief of defense in each location and accorded the opportunity to sit in on each country’s internal intelligence briefs. He was then able to relate his observations to the arriving company first sergeants and stress the importance of international relationships, USAREUR expectations, and the fact that if
USAREUR did not act to bolster these Baltic allies, it risked a shift in the balance of power in the region. This level of access and USAREUR’s rapid actions would have been extremely difficult for a stateside force to accomplish in the same timeframe, weakening the effect and level of assurance provided.

Another great example comes from Col. Mike Foster, commander of the 173rd Airborne Brigade, and his professional connection to Maj. Gen. Adam Joks, commander of the Polish 6th Airborne Brigade. When Foster visited Joks’ headquarters in late 2013, they went to Pope John Paul II’s hometown in Wadowice, Poland, and sampled the pastries the Pope had every day as a boy on his way to his elementary school. It was at a planning conference in Poland where they scheduled the bilateral airborne operations their two units would later execute in February and May of 2014. The command believes opportunities for building relationships are one of the great benefits of the Army in Europe. Foster’s trusting relationship with Joks is just one example of how Operation Atlantic Resolve was enabled by this forward presence.

**Trusting Relationships Mean Strategic Access**

Location and access matter. U.S. Army forces in Europe live, train, and operate alongside many capable allies and partners every day from a network of strategically positioned bases with the necessary access to respond to contingencies in the Levant, the Middle East, North Africa, Europe, and around the globe. Europe’s borders often provide direct linkages to increasingly unstable and unpredictable regions vital to U.S. national security interests.

The prevailing instability and unpredictable operational environment along the fringe of Europe presents an opportunity for USAREUR forces to be fully responsive to geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) with an economy-of-force posture centered in Europe. USAREUR remains first and foremost prepared for rapid contingency response. It achieves timely Army responsiveness to GCC requirements through assigned, trained-and-ready forward forces, with direct operational access to likely contingencies in this region as demonstrated by Operation Atlantic Resolve. USAREUR forces contain a spectrum of tailored Army capabilities to meet initial GCC operational response requirements until forces based in the continental United States arrive. Access, which remains vital for Operation Atlantic Resolve, is assured by continually reinforcing relationships with allies and partners—relationships built on a foundation of trust. The relationships are the priceless commodity that allows access; that commodity cannot be bought at the last minute. Relationships are the foundation for everything USAREUR seeks to accomplish in Europe.

Another capability to help reinforce access comes from the regionally aligned forces concept. USAREUR’s experience is that regionally aligned forces provide an avenue to reinforce existing relationships that allow for access, while offering tailored capabilities by geographic region. Regionally aligned forces enhance the capabilities of forward-stationed forces and serve to strengthen friendships already developed in regions where there is uncertainty. This concept further illustrates how vital partnerships, built on the shared understanding of training, living, and working together, lead to trust and understanding for the future. Access also provides a way ahead for meeting the challenges of uncertain security environments developing in locations across the globe. Operation Atlantic Resolve provides an excellent example of forward-stationed forces providing initial crisis response, while setting the conditions for follow-on rotational forces to add increased capability and flexibility, achieving a dynamic presence.

The United States, its allies, and its partners share common interests in maintaining a Europe that is safe, secure, and prosperous. USAREUR’s access has forged the bonds to jointly engage with an uncertain future. It continues to see benefits of this concept demonstrated first hand in Operation Atlantic Resolve. Partners and allies of the United States desire assurance in challenging times, and USAREUR forward-based relationships offer that assurance through trust. Relationships and access will continue to be pivotal in an uncertain future, and are the road to overcoming uncertain security environments.

**Live Together, Train Together, and Face Adversity Together**

This simple concept is at the heart of what USAREUR seeks to do with its European allies and partners: Partner and practice together. Only by building strong bonds and connections can
Army paratroopers assigned to the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team conduct an allied training exercise 25 May 2014 alongside soldiers from Latvia’s Land Forces Infantry Brigade at Adazu Training Area, Latvia. Approximately 600 paratroopers from the 173rd ABCT are in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland as part of Operation Atlantic Resolve to demonstrate commitment to NATO obligations and sustain interoperability with allied forces.

(Photo by Sgt. Alonzo Werner, 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team PAO)
Afghanistan and around the world. NATO is a viable deterrent to aggression, and many non-NATO members look to NATO for reassurance. USAREUR’s location, along with the great capabilities of the Joint Readiness Training Center, provides a ready avenue to achieve this shared goal. Every country with which USAREUR currently has units operating for Operation Atlantic Resolve has participated in at least one USAREUR training event at a Joint Multinational Training Command training area, or a combined USAREUR exercise that has been hosted in another country.

This command fully believes that partnering, training, and working with NATO and non-NATO members will lead to the common goal of providing a safe and stable environment and will give USAREUR the ability to respond to crises when needed. Atlantic Resolve illustrates why USAREUR believes relationships matter and will continue to matter in an uncertain and challenging future. Never forget that endeavors involving organizations are always about people and with people—it is the relationships that truly matter.

Notes

1. The Combined Training Conference is a semi-annual conference designed to synchronize and source USAREUR multinational exercises and training events to promote greater interoperability with NATO allies and troop-contributing nations. The conference is run by USAREUR and is cohosted by NATO’s Joint Forces Command Brunssum. The conference, held 17 to 19 June 2014, had more than 150 attendees from 32 nations.

2. Persistent presence land forces assurance exercises are the first in a series of expanded U.S. land force training activities in Poland and the Baltic region taking place for the next few months and beyond. The exercises, conducted by USAREUR soldiers and host-nation forces, are a demonstration of the United States commitment to NATO and to our collective defense responsibilities through increased ground, air, and naval force presence. The intent of the supplementary exercises is to reassure NATO allies that the U.S. commitment to meeting our nation’s Article 5 obligations is unwavering. Accordingly, USAREUR has deployed company-sized contingents of U.S. paratroopers from the 173rd Airborne Brigade to Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia—roughly 600 Soldiers in all—to conduct the expanded land force training. This action comes at the request of the host-nation governments.

3. The Conference of European Armies took place in Wiesbaden, Germany, 30 September to 2 October 2013. The conference’s goal was to enhance this common interest and support a foundation for the strong relationships shared in the region as senior land forces leaders discussed solutions to our many shared security concerns and reinforced their mutual commitment to each other. The conference included senior land forces leaders such as Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, Gen. Philip M. Breedlove, and senior officers from 35 other countries. The theme of the conference was Opportunities to Address Common Security Challenges.

4. According to Field Manual 3-22, Army Support to Security Cooperation (2013), regionally aligned forces are those forces that provide a combatant commander with up to joint task force-capable headquarters with scalable, tailorable capabilities to enable the combatant commander to shape the environment. They are those Army units assigned to combatant commands, those Army units allocated to a combatant command, and those Army capabilities distributed and prepared by the Army for combatant command regional missions. (Regional missions are driven by combatant command requirements and include theater security cooperation, other shaping efforts, and collective response to threats, if necessary.)
The main battle tank of the U.S. Army is under pressure due to critical scrutiny from numerous fronts questioning its relevance to the modern security environment. The M1 Abrams played a key role briefly in Operation Iraqi Freedom and rarely in Operation Enduring Freedom. Moreover, due to an apparent perception within NATO that heavy U.S. armor was no longer needed, the Army redeployed the last of the Abrams based in Europe to the United States in 2013. Elsewhere, the relevance of heavy armor is being challenged. Anti-armor weapon technology has advanced considerably, to the point that even nonstate actors such as Hezbollah have seen some success against advanced main battle tanks (i.e., Israeli Merkavas in 2006). Finally, the downward trajectories of both the overall U.S. military budget and the Army force structure threaten the Abrams force. The cumulative effect of these pressures will make tank force structure and tank modernization efforts prime candidates for budget reductions.

This article is not an argument against all such reductions, but it does propose that contemplated
reductions should be weighed carefully against realistic requirements and associated risks, and that options for maintaining a capable armor force be thoroughly explored based on the viability of extending and revitalizing the remaining Abrams.

Over the decades since the Abrams was first fielded, several technologies have been advancing that should be examined as potential enhancements to extend the useful life of the Abrams. Specifically, technologies for engines and small precision munitions have advanced greatly since the fielding of the first M1 in 1980. Given today’s strategic and fiscal environments, most would consider development of a new-generation main battle tank beyond reach, with any such initiative destined to suffer the same fate as the ambitious Future Combat System (FCS), which was cancelled in 2009 because it was deemed too expensive. That is why pursuing the more modest option of upgrading existing Abrams with new-engine and precision-munition technologies deserves close scrutiny. These technologies could offer enhancements to the Abrams that would extend its useful lifespan well into the future to meet a variety of foreseeable challenges within manageable fiscal resources. Moreover, these technologies may offer tactical synergies when combined with each other and the existing capabilities resident on the Abrams to meet unforeseen requirements. Simulation and experimentation could play a key role in modeling and exploring the tactical implications of such improvements.

Therefore, this article focuses on the Abrams’ tactical utility as justification for pursuing such upgrades. Technological maturity or engineering feasibility are not investigated in depth other than to identify technological trends that appear to match up with desirable enhancements to the Abrams. While technology and engineering questions are certainly critical to the fielding of new equipment, a better understanding of tactical utility must precede such discussions. No sense in perfecting the useless.

**Enduring Need for the Main Battle Tank**

There are two key questions: “Do we still need a main battle tank?” If so, “Will the Abrams serve the purpose in the future?”

Before considering these, it is useful to observe that transitions between classes of weapons usually are gradual rather than abrupt, and with good reason. Even as it becomes apparent that some new technology has a brighter future than an existing one, it often takes some time before the tipping point of obsolescence is reached for older technologies. Very often the overlap of time enables the older technology to serve well beyond that point in some revised role. For example, battleships served as key fire support platforms for U.S. amphibious operations in World War II and later conflicts long after they had ceased to be the preeminent naval warfare system. In another example, the Air Force’s B-52 Stratofortress, which was first introduced into service in 1952 as a strategic bomber capable of attacking deep targets in the Soviet Union with nuclear payloads, continues to serve well as a stand-off weapons platform and as a loitering close-air-support platform in low-threat environments, decades after losing its ability to penetrate sophisticated integrated air defenses. Planned upgrades to its systems now take its anticipated lifespan out to
approximately 2040, almost 90 years since it was first introduced.

Similarly, while some would argue that the tank today does not play as dominant a role in countering enemy armor as it used to, it would be a gross exaggeration to assert that it will no longer play a useful role on the future battlefield. Since its first fielding in 1980, the role of the Abrams has expanded well beyond readiness to defeat Soviet armor in the open terrain of Germany’s Fulda Gap, the mission originally envisioned by many.

One example of the Abrams’ expanded role is in counterinsurgency operations. The emergence of the improvised explosive device in the last decade and the class of new vehicles it spawned serve as a reminder of why highly survivable ground vehicles are important in such environments. A U.S. Marine Corps Abrams-equipped armor company that deployed to Afghanistan in 2011 completed its tour having suffered only one wounded in action, despite experiencing 19 improvised explosive device strikes. This is not to argue that tanks are the solution to all or even most of the challenges while conducting counterinsurgency, but that, as noted in the new Army Capstone Concept, the Abrams’ combination of high mobility and protected firepower can at times prove of paramount importance in such environments.

Urban warfare is another example of the Abrams’ expanded role. The contrast between Mogadishu in 1993 and Baghdad in 2003 highlighted the game-changing role tanks can play in an urban environment. Lack of even a modest U.S. armor presence in Somalia hobbled mission efforts, requiring United Nations armor (Pakistani forces) be called upon to mount a rescue effort of surrounded Army Rangers and other special operations forces in October 1993. In stark contrast, the rapid seizure of Baghdad and quick defeat of organized Iraqi forces at the outset of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 were largely the result of Iraqi inability to effectively counter highly mobile heavy armor in an urban environment.

Additionally, one of this article’s authors had first-hand experience in combat operations with the Abrams in Fallujah, Iraq. From the fall of 2003 through the spring of 2004, the Abrams proved its worth in supporting raids and cordon-and-search operations in and around the city in operations conducted by Task Force One Panther. The Abrams was adept at securing key terrain, providing overwatch with its sensors, and intimidating the insurgents with its imposing physical presence. The Abrams would also later play a decisive role in Operation Phantom Fury, the assault into Fallujah in November 2004. A Presidential Unit Citation issued for operations in Fallujah described “the overwhelming combat power, speed, and shock effect of the incredibly lethal mechanized infantry and armor units ...”

The decisive value of armor in an urban environment is also supported by research conducted by the other author of this article, who closely analyzed four major urban battles fought by U.S. ground forces (World War II to Vietnam) for a doctoral dissertation in military history. In all four cases, tanks proved crucial for the success of U.S. forces in urban environments, including at Hue City (1968), when poor weather over an entire month greatly reduced the air support available.
Armor versus Air Power

However, irrespective of its effectiveness in such collateral roles, countering enemy armor formations remains the key role of the Abrams for several reasons. Though air power has made great gains in its lethality versus armor, as shown in both Gulf Wars, it has clear limits. Consequently, any future overreliance on airpower alone to counter enemy armor will create a perilous single point of failure in U.S. military capabilities. Although there certainly will be cases when airpower is the best option for dealing with enemy armor, there are too many variables to rely on airpower as the only option available. For example, what if some future opponent were able to challenge U.S. control of the air for just a few critical days at the beginning of a conflict?

Such occurred when the Israelis paid a heavy cost for their dependency on air power in the early stages of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, when the effectiveness of Egypt’s air defenses came as a surprise and temporarily neutralized Israeli air superiority.\textsuperscript{10} Elsewhere, the forests and weather of Kosovo, along with strict rules of engagement, made allied targeting of Serbian armor from the air ineffective. NATO estimated that in three weeks of airstrikes, only about a dozen tanks had been destroyed.\textsuperscript{11}

While many of the air-delivered precision weapons available today are billed as all-weather, adverse weather still causes problems with their employment, which requires greater understanding and anticipation of collateral damage risks associated with targeting. Additionally, attacking armor dispersed in an urban environment often involves highly restrictive rules of engagement and other targeting challenges to preclude unnecessary civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure.

Add to the equation the impact of advanced man-portable air defenses, such as the SA-24 that confronted NATO aircraft in Libya in 2011, and we then have a situation where manned aircraft are forced to fly higher while lower-flying armed drones are more vulnerable—all of which degrades the ability to target and deliver payloads accurately against not only armor but other targets. Consequently, an air-only threat to an enemy will not always be a viable option.

In contrast, the availability of heavy armor capable of counter-armor operations provides to friendly planners much greater flexibility and a wide span of options for tailoring operations—simultaneously confronting adversaries with the problem of trying to react speedily and effectively to whatever course of action we might choose.

Historical Examples

The high-speed nature of mechanized combat operations leaves little time for defenders to adapt to the unexpected.\textsuperscript{12} In 1940, the French were well behind the Germans in recognizing or preparing for the potential of mechanized forces. One consequence was that it
took the Wehrmacht’s armored formations only a few weeks to overrun France’s key terrain, a span of time far shorter than the French army needed to adapt to the new mobile threat. Additionally, several Arab-Israeli wars have presented each side with but days to learn, limiting adaptation to its most shallow forms.

By way of comparison, the early German successes in Europe in the late 1930s with mechanized forces shocked the Soviet Union into rapidly reforming their armored forces starting in mid-1940, just one year before the Wehrmacht attacked. Although the Soviet Union had developed a large armor force prior to World War II, Stalin’s purges gutted the Red Army of its human capital for mechanized warfare just before the Nazi invasion. As a result, when the Germans crossed the Soviet border in June 1941, not one of the Red Army’s 61 tank division commanders had more than 12 months in command, and the state of the organization, training, and logistical support for the Soviet mechanized forces was abysmal. The issue was not so much materiel, as the Soviets enjoyed a 3:1 advantage in tanks and assault guns (11,000 vs. 3,600), but rather deficiencies in the broader suite of factors that makes any particular weapon system effective (such as doctrine, organization, training, and personnel).13

Fortunately for the Soviets, the Red Army was able to trade vast amounts of territory for time, though it suffered massive losses. It had enough time to reconstitute an armored force and adjust tactics. The sheer vastness of Russia allowed the Red Army the several years it needed—a cost probably only the Soviet Union could afford to pay.

Unfortunately, neither the French nor the Israelis had the luxury of trading space for time in order to adapt to the new mobile threat, as did the Soviet Union. Moreover, in the current security environment, it is unlikely the United States will have the luxury of time to respond to a crisis that would be mitigated in large part by sending armored units. Despite remarkable technological advances in weapons systems, physically holding ground still matters. Several past U.S. ground counteroffensives would have looked very different if there had been no launching pads available—as there were in the Pusan Perimeter (1950) during the Korean War, in Saudi Arabia (1991) during Operation Desert Storm, and in Kuwait (2003) at the outset of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Support to allies and partners would also suffer in the conduct of security force assistance, as a much smaller U.S. Army tank community would have proportionally less capability.

Were the United States military to sharply reduce (e.g., by 50 percent or more) its heavy mechanized capabilities, building that force back up (not necessarily to today’s level) would likely be a mid-term proposition requiring at least several years. Although the United States currently faces little threat of being overrun by mechanized forces, its global network of allies and partners includes many nations that do. If not pre-positioned or already deployed, many potential scenarios might be decided by employment of even a modest armored force (e.g., one tank company) over a fairly short period via air to some key terrain such as an airfield or port. Efforts by an enemy to overrun such a force would prove very difficult, as Iraqi forces in Baghdad discovered in 2003.14

Army Chief of Staff Gen. Raymond Odierno has implied a continued role for heavy forces in the future. In a November 2012 address, he stated, “I want an Army that is capable of many missions at many speeds, many sizes, under many different conditions, and the capability to operate in any environment.”15

Suite of Improvements

Let us stipulate that U.S. ground combat forces in the future must continue to be composed of a mix of forces as seen today, spanning from light to heavy mechanized. What capabilities might the main battle tanks provide in the heavy mechanized component of that mix, whatever its relative size in the overall force?

Tactical solutions worth serious consideration cannot be conceived in a resource vacuum, and any future developments for heavy armor in the U.S. military need to anticipate austere budgets ahead. The conclusion of the nation-building wars in Asia, and the difficult decisions that will be forced on Congress and the White House from the current massive federal deficits, will almost certainly foster an era of less for the Department of Defense. Therefore, major new weapons development initiatives will be minimal. All-new, cutting-edge systems entail much technological risk, require long timelines to develop and field, and often include substantial increases in unit cost. The coming era is unlikely to tolerate such cost and risk for ground force systems.
However, it is possible for a few key enhancements to today’s M1 Abrams to substantially increase that platform’s effectiveness with manageable technological risk and cost to prolong its serviceable lifespan. The key is to merge the existing strengths of the Abrams with some promising technologies. The Abrams is mobile, survivable, and lethal to line-of-sight targets within four or five kilometers. That said, its engine design is based on older technologies, meaning that it requires frequent refueling, and its main weapon cannot engage targets outside five kilometers or its line of sight.

**Increased Range**

Bearing in mind the low losses suffered by Abrams from enemy action during Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom, it could be argued that the M1’s range limitations hindered optimal full tactical employment far more than did enemy action. In Desert Storm (1991), tremendous efforts were required to keep fuel-hungry U.S. mechanized forces supplied, which shaped the timing of the ground war. Similar fuel-related constraints hampered operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. For example, in one case, a brigade came within an hour of running out of fuel. Additionally, U.S. forces had to be diverted from the drive on Baghdad to isolate and clear urban areas used by Iraqi irregulars as bases from which to interdict U.S. supply convoys. In Baghdad, several ammunition and fuel trucks were lost while running a gauntlet of enemy fire to reach isolated armored units holding key intersections—units that were in dire need of resupply. Therefore, it is time to re-evaluate options to increase the Abrams’ range.

Over the three plus decades the M1 has been in service, the Army has upgraded or replaced almost everything on it but the original Textron Lycoming AGT 1500 turbine engine (based on late-1960s technology). The Army did award a development contract in 2000 for a new turbine engine to be used in both the Abrams and the then-planned Crusader artillery vehicle, but this effort ended shortly after the Crusader was cancelled. The M1A2 System Enhancement Program upgrade added an auxiliary power unit, which saves fuel by reducing the need to run the engine at idle.
Engine technology has come far since the Abrams was introduced. The M1 turbine’s 1,500 horsepower originally stood out from other tank engines for its power, but now many other main battle tanks match that output with more efficient diesel engines. For example, the Leopard II carries 37 percent less fuel and yet has a range five percent greater than the M1.21

Of course, a decision to replace the M1’s engine would involve a diverse set of factors not explored here in detail. However, the tactical limitations that arise from the M1’s current range, combined with the maturity of diesel engine technology and the age of the current M1 engine, make the conversion to a new engine (diesel or otherwise) worth serious consideration.22

Industry successfully conducted trials with a diesel engine in the M1 in 1997 in case any export customer wished to pair a diesel engine with the M1, which suggests the compatibility issues are manageable.23 A key engineering question would be the volume differences between a diesel and the current turbine engine. If the diesel is larger, it might force a reduction in internal fuel capacity, at least partially cancelling out any range increase.

Also, any fuel consumption reductions for the Abrams need to be put in the proper organizational context. Tanks rarely operate alone, but rather as part of combined arms battalions within an armored brigade combat team. Each combined arms battalion contains 58 Abrams and more than twice as many other vehicles, thus diluting the overall fuel savings if only the Abrams becomes more efficient.24

Nevertheless, reducing the fuel needs of the M1 could have ripple effects through logistics units. Less survivable logistics units may reduce their need to traverse unsecured territory and thus reduce the associated risks.25 A reduced fuel demand for the Abrams also could allow a reorganization of logistics units, freeing up manpower for other units. Finally, less fuel demand could mean that fewer logistics personnel are needed in the critical early phases of a deployment (known as a better tooth-to-tail ratio).

Other questions of concern include tactical issues related to changes involving increased noise or smoke output and loss of acceleration with the use of the diesel engine versus the turbine. The turbine provides excellent acceleration, and any reduction in that should be explored for its tactical implications.

**Non-Line-of-Sight Engagement Capability**

The Abrams is unique in presenting both chemical energy (high-explosive antitank rounds) and kinetic energy (sabot rounds) threats to enemy tanks, complicating the enemy’s defensive efforts.26 However, though the 120 mm gun on the M1 is highly accurate and lethal, it is limited to engaging line-of-sight targets out to a range of approximately 5 km.

Introduction of a new medium-range, non-line-of-sight (NLOS) munition for that gun would greatly expand the engagement area, allowing more dispersed Abrams units to exert influence over more terrain. Such rounds would undoubtedly cost more than those now fired from the M1, but their costs may compare favorably with the cost of employing a precision munition from an aircraft when launch platform operating costs are included. Moreover, a medium-range engagement capability would yield survivability benefits by allowing the Abrams to engage from beyond the range of most ground-based anti-armor threats. Over the last decade, the development of a number of smaller and less expensive precision munitions, many for use on drones, may reduce the development risk for a precision round for the M1.

With the advances in air defenses already seen today, particularly man-portable air defense systems, engaging ground targets with precision munitions in some areas without the need to approach those areas with valuable aircraft or employ expensive long-range precision-guided munitions might prove beneficial. The Army does possess this capability currently in its tube and rocket artillery forces (e.g., the Excalibur 155 mm round and guided multiple-launch rocket system round), but to expand it to the highly survivable and mobile M1 would give future commanders more options in high-threat environments.

With an NLOS capability, a force of M1s in some cases might be able to dash forward and degrade air defenses, blending the effects of the 2003 Baghdad thunder runs with the role played by F-117s in
1991. In the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Israelis suffered heavy losses to surprisingly effective Egyptian air defenses until Israeli ground units were able to close with and destroy those air defenses. The U.S. Army was exploring just such a round in the XM1111 Mid-Range Munition, in association with the FCS program, awarding a development contract in 2008. With a planned maximum range of at least 12 km, the fire-and-forget XM1111 would have allowed an M1 to engage targets over an area almost six times larger than possible with today’s 5-km engagement range. However, the Army terminated the XM1111 program in May 2009 as part of the dismantling of the larger FCS program. Any similar future munition would entail various logistics, training, and intelligence challenges. The round would need to fit in the M1’s existing internal ammunition racks, and the crew training and workload ramifications would require study. A tank crew targeting, firing, and tracking an NLOS round likely would be distracted from the direct-fire fight, so the tactical tradeoffs should be investigated. With such a guided precision-engagement capability, the Abrams would have a greater need for acquiring and processing precision targeting data, which in turn might require a change in sensor capabilities in the armored brigade combat team (currently equipped with four Shadow drones).

Role for Modeling, Simulation, and Experimentation

The synergy and relative value of these different enhancements should be explored initially with war gaming, modeling and simulation, and at some later stage, field experiments. Thorough exploration of the many varying conditions, threats, and combinations of enhancements will require a virtual environment capable of a rapid cycle time with modest hardware and personnel requirements. The involvement of experienced operators as human player-participants will be essential to exploring the potential of the new capabilities. A pre-scripted set of enhancements should be part of the process; but as the participants become better acquainted with the models used and the simulated new capabilities, participants should be turned loose to explore the solution space. Ideally, participants would be presented with a budget they could use to select from a menu of enhancements (i.e., greater range or NLOS engagement capability). Those enhancements would be priced to reflect initial estimates of what it would cost to field those enhancements.

Over time, participants would become well acquainted with the capabilities and scenarios and would develop opinions on the relative value and utility of the capabilities; giving them a capabilities

Soldiers from 3rd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Squadron, perform maintenance on an M1A1 Abrams tank at the unit maintenance collection point in central Iraq, 28 March 2003.

(Photo by Sgt. Igor Paustovski, Joint Combat Camera Center)
menu would allow them to explore their own what if s. However, it should not be assumed that these enhancements are worthwhile. Players should be given the option instead to select additional unupgraded vehicles, essentially opting for more vehicles over better vehicles.

To properly explore the benefits of the enhancements and how they trade off with existing Abrams capabilities, some specific details would need to be included in the models. For example, if a new diesel engine required more space, to what extent would that necessitate a reduction in fuel capacity? How would a diesel engine vary from the turbine in acceleration, noise, and smoke generation? How would an Abrams crew be supplied with additional data to aid NLOS targeting? Including such information, even if derived from estimates, would enable some key tactical questions to be at least partially answered.

Good enough should be the mantra, and the pursuit of fidelity should be balanced with constraining the number of what if s that can be explored. Key to this will be defining topics that are not being explored (such as the effects of sleep deprivation). Keeping the modeling and simulation hardware, software, and bandwidth requirements modest might allow a greatly expanded and distributed pool of participants.

**Conclusion**

The Abrams has served well over the last three decades, but the argument for its continued role could use some bolstering. With the future focus of the U.S. military on the Pacific, there may be less need for the employment of large concentrations of armored vehicles, but this does not end the utility of armor. A smaller number of more capable Abrams would mitigate some of the associated strategic mobility and operational logistics challenges while still presenting adversaries with a highly lethal, mobile, and survivable threat. Moreover, recent events in the Ukraine have renewed interest in the Abrams. In September 2014, the Army announced that U.S. Army units employing Bradleys and Abrams would be participating in exercises in Eastern Europe for three months starting in October.31

Were the suite of enhancements described in this article applied to the Abrams successfully, its role might be expanded. Of particular interest could be how an enhanced Abrams might work with special operations forces, the role it could play in amphibious assaults, and its use to degrade air defenses.

The Abrams could be substantially more useful than it is today. Improvements may prove key in the arguments about its place in the future force. Modeling and simulation should be used to explore the implications of using upgraded Abrams tanks across a broad range of combat environments and threats. Although this article has focused on materiel, the implications of successfully enhancing the Abrams extend well beyond the benefits discussed and could include significant improvements to doctrine, organization, and training.

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8. U.S. Army Human Resources Command, Department of the Army, Memorandum, Recommendation for the Award of Presidential Unit Citation for the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2nd Battalion, 2nd Infantry, 4 August 2005.


12. Our colleague Dr. Kevin Woods deserves credit for reminding us of the relative learning time lines presented by conventional combat operations versus irregular warfare.


14. In April 2003, a mixed force of 30 Bradleys and 14 Abrams (supported by mortars, artillery, and aircraft) entered Baghdad to take and hold several locations, including three key highway interchanges. Over the next two days all but one of these objectives were held against heavy enemy counterattacks, costing enemy forces over 120 vehicles and in excess of 600 killed. See David Zucchino, Thunder Runs: The Armored Strike to Capture Baghdad (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2004).


19. Christopher F. Foss, Jane’s Armour and Artillery 2010-2011 (Surrey, UK: HIS Jane’s, 2010), 177.


26. HEAT (High Explosive Antitank) warheads have shaped-charged explosives that penetrate armor via the shape of the explosion formed by the warhead. Sabot rounds rely instead on the kinetic energy of a dense metal dart to penetrate armor.

27. Tom Clancy and Chuck Horner, Every Man a Tiger, (New York: G. P. Putnam’s and Sons, 1999), 337, 346. In 1991, stealth F-117s Nighthawk aircraft were used to penetrate Iraqi air defenses and attack key air defense nodes from within, making Iraqi airspace safer for other nonstealth aircraft.


Bringing Mobility to the Infantry Brigade Combat Team

Capt. Nathan Jennings, U.S. Army

The U.S. Army has a critical, yet largely unaddressed, capability gap. America’s primary land force has reduced operations in Southwest Asia and the Middle East after more than a decade of diverse combat operations that ranged from a massed combined arms invasion into Mesopotamia to decentralized mountain patrols in the Hindu Kush. During this time, the infantry brigade combat team (IBCT), the lightest of the Army’s maneuver brigades, has been revealed to be an organization of severely limited tactical and operational utility.¹ This deficiency stems mainly from a dearth of organic vehicular transport within the light fighting formations. It results in rifle battalions and companies that are ill prepared for the diverse challenges of warfare in the twenty-first century.

The mobility deficit limits the combat potential of the Army’s 14 infantry brigades (approximately 62,000 soldiers) expected to remain after overall brigade combat team reorganization. The deficit will stem from an equipment allocation that will provide a minimal quantity of unarmored high mobility multipurpose wheeled...
vehicles (HMMWVs) and light medium tactical vehicles to move rifle companies to a given tactical line of departure for dismounted operations.\(^2\)

As evidenced by the recurring need to equip every IBCT that was fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan with varying sizes of theater-provided, up-armored vehicle fleets, IBCT formations remain ill prepared for operations requiring rapid and secure mobility. This deficiency will be a liability to readiness in an era when urban combat environments are becoming increasingly common, requiring teams to have some degree of protected transport. While hasty augmentation may have been acceptable with the expansive force structure of recent decades, a smaller Army with fewer maneuver brigades will need each of its brigade combat teams to maintain the option of independent ground dominance that only multifunctional mobility can provide.\(^3\)

The answer to this dilemma is relatively simple: the fighting formations of the IBCT must be organically equipped with armored and digitally networked wheeled platforms that can rapidly transport infantrymen to a tactical point of departure. While the residual fleet of mine-resistant ambush-protected trucks could serve as an intermediate and cost-effective solution (and the M1126 Stryker infantry carrier would be a viable candidate), the Army needs to develop a more effective troop carrier that offers troop protection, less weight, increased mobility, and more passenger space. Equipped with such vehicles, the resulting motorized IBCT would benefit from marked tactical enhancement to internal capabilities while allowing graduated ranges of operational utility.

**Enhancing Tactical Mobility**

The first benefit of organically equipping the light IBCTs with increased numbers of armored transportation assets would be immediate enhancement of rifle battalion protection and maneuverability. Of the 132

U.S. Army Stryker combat vehicles make their way across a flooded street as they patrol in Mosul, Iraq, 14 February 2006. The Strykers were attached to the 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment, 172nd Infantry Brigade.

(U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. John Foster)
maneuver battalions and squadrons—that under current plans will constitute the Army’s force by 2017—42 will be nonmechanized and non-Stryker infantry that will rely on support companies to provide an anemic allocation of soft platforms to facilitate likely tasks such as attack, defend, and secure.

Instead of using the steel or composite armored hulls typically used for modern combat, the U.S. light infantryman now, according to doctrine, rides to battle in the bed of a cargo truck covered with canvas. In the contemporary security environment, where improvised weaponry has increasingly reached unprecedented lethality across nonlinear zones devoid of front lines, American forces must be better equipped than that.

The technological advances made by the Army—compelled by practical experience over more than 13 years of nearly continuous combat—have shown that integration of protected and digitally interfaced wheeled platforms is a critical capabilities multiplier in most operational settings. Beginning with the functions of network-centric command, a generation of infantry leaders has become accustomed to leveraging logistically intensive technology in vehicles and forward-deployed command-and-control elements to digitally enhance situational awareness. While soldiers have operated and will continue to operate without robust electronic support, it is difficult to imagine maneuver leadership exercising sustained battlefield control in twenty-first century operations without some degree of such enhancement.

This vehicular augmentation would have greatest tactical impact at lower echelons where dismounted platoons are currently constrained by their soldiers’ “rucksack” load-bearing capacity. As demonstrated during stability operations in recent conflicts, enablers such as the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) digital mapping and messaging systems, in addition to amplification of FM (frequency modulation) radios by engine generators, allow action elements to remain better interfaced with higher echelons at distance. The habitual integration of tactical vehicles—and their communication systems—within rifle platoons, as opposed to reliance on external units for transport, would afford more responsive coordination between headquarters and maneuvering soldiers.

In addition to improvement of command and control functions, the employment of the proposed vehicles would allow infantry leadership to retain an expanded package of enabling equipment in close proximity for dismounted support. Again recognizing the requirement to execute a diverse set of complex tasks in modern combat, rifle companies must habitually posture to operate with a variety of assets at their immediate disposal. The systems, which could all be held in the mounted sections until needed, could include electronic countermeasures, remote-controlled weapons platforms, unmanned aerial systems, satellite communication devices, explosive ordnance disposal assets, mines, and, heavier breaching equipment. Organic vehicles likewise allow greater ability to bring human enablers—such as interpreters, civil affairs personnel, civilian advisors, and members of the media—to decisive points while also serving as ready transport for detainees and prisoners.

Combat support is another area of tactical operations where internal mobility would improve light infantry formations. Just as armored and digitally networked assets can efficiently and rapidly deliver rifle platoons to a point of debarkation, they would, conversely, enable more extensive medical support on-site and provide immediate ground casualty evacuation. In addition to saving lives, armored transportation vehicles would also allow action elements to carry forward greater quantities of nearly every class of supply. Resupply of such vital commodities as ammunition,
food, water, obstacle material, medical packages, weapons, replacement radios, and life-support equipment would become less frequent. Forward-deployed echelons would have greater flexibility to conduct operations in any contingency.

Apart from the justifications offered above, the major advantage of integrating a reasonable number of the proposed vehicles into rifle battalions moves beyond enabling and logistical aspects of operations and directly into combat application. Serving as a kind of mobile firebase, these platforms and their ability to offer protected machine-gun and antitank fires transform the traditional infantry platoon into a far more impactful fighting unit. While infantry always will retain its primary purpose of delivering assault teams to defeat an enemy at close quarters, the organic option of fixing or attacking with mounted elements would be a significant combat multiplier. Similarly, with increased ability to transport mortar systems to direct support of tactical operations, rifle companies could upgrade from their current 60 mm mortars to 120 mm, the caliber currently enjoyed by their reconnaissance counterparts. Barring that, at a minimum, rifle companies would be far more lethal due to their enhanced ability to emplace organic, indirect, crew-served weapons of any caliber without the time and human limitations resulting from having to transport mortar tubes and rounds on the backs of soldiers.

Due to improved situational awareness, sustainment, and lethality, the motorized rifle battalion would become far more versatile when trained and given the option of integrating motorized transport. In addition, each light company could structure mobile quick-response forces by task-organizing mounted sections. As a result, companies would operate with far more self-reliance—though with added logistical constraints—and would be equipped to carry the panoply of equipment now needed to meet complex challenges.

Moreover, vehicle distribution throughout the light formations would negate the need for the heavy weapons company now in the IBCT structure, which is the only mobile combat element in rifle battalions. However, the company is incapable of efficient troop transport with HMMWVs. Instead, each motorized rifle company would have similar firepower and mobility, combined with traditional infantry strengths. Similar to the proven utility of Stryker formations, the revamped IBCT would offer the best of both worlds: maximally equipped shock troops that get to the battlefield much more efficiently and quickly, but still retain the indispensable qualities that only assaulting infantry provide.

**Increased Land Power Dominance**

The second major effect of empowering IBCTs with integrated and protected ground mobility lies in the operational dimension at higher echelons. Since light infantry, both ground and aerial, will comprise 42 percent of the Army’s maneuver brigades, they are a potential strategic liability when the United States is pressed to deploy heavier, large-scale combat power to achieve sustained land dominance. While campaigns
have arisen and will arise that require minimal vehicle support—such as jungle fighting, mountain operations, and airborne insertion—many future joint endeavors will require robust vehicle augmentation for ground brigades to be effective independently. These will range from offense and defense to stability operations. To support various contingencies, motorizing infantry formations would allow greater flexibility in a force package.

In contrast, the IBCTs now are vulnerable because they lack organic mobility. The Army will keep having to hastily augment the rifle battalions with hundreds of armored trucks in order to project ground effects rapidly over any appreciable distance.

Foremost among the high-intensity scenarios anticipated is one where U.S. ground forces will deploy to deter, degrade, or remove hostile regimes. While some wars will require less vehicle density—as was the case in Grenada, Panama, and Afghanistan—others will require more vehicle-centric maneuver, as in Iraq. Similar to the combined arms offensives against Iraq forces in 1991 and 2003, IBCTs may be called on to follow and support the more lethal and survivable mechanized brigades that would spearhead any penetration. Based on their current equipment, light brigades are inadequate to fulfill this critical role, which would require sustained movement behind a rapid armored advance while fighting through residual resistance and securing key terrain.

The most recent American large-scale offensive, the 2003 march to Baghdad, offers perhaps the most compelling example of the IBCTs’ limitations. When a mechanized division with armored vehicles penetrated Iraq from the south, elements from two light infantry divisions followed in hastily assembled fleets of unprotected trucks. While the thin-skinned HMMWVs allowed an extremely inefficient crew-to-dismount ratio for transport, the light medium tactical vehicles with greater passenger capacity remained highly vulnerable to even the lightest of enemy attacks. In operational areas where enemy forces of both developed and undeveloped societies will unleash the proven lethality of improvised explosive devices and other asymmetric attacks, this manner of rifle squad transport, which remains virtually unchanged in the IBCT inventory today, is unacceptable.

Given the glaring platform deficiencies of unarmored vehicles and the overarching need for light infantry formations to participate effectively as part of combined arms and joint teams, the IBCTs should be readied for support of rapid, high-intensity operations with a modernized vehicle fleet. Decisive action requires decisive movement; and, while elements of the infantry will occasionally be selected for light operations, the majority will likely require multifunctional ground transport to move against determined adversaries. Whether supporting mechanized forces or conducting independent offensive or defensive
maneuvers, all U.S. conventional combat brigades should be equipped with organic armored transport to achieve victory.

Stability operations present another potential scenario where IBCTs may need motorized integration to achieve operational success. With global population trends moving toward greater urbanization and the proliferation of megacities, the Army will again find itself engaged among dense populations in urban environments.

It should be apparent that light infantry brigades will need wheeled, networked, and protected transportation to operate effectively in urban environments. The current unarmored platforms could, conceivably, provide adequate, but highly vulnerable, mobility in an extremely low-threat environment. However, the increasingly sophisticated use of weapons in counterinsurgency campaigns necessitates vehicle improvements that would afford markedly increased survivability and maneuverability.

The recent operational experience in Iraq, and to a lesser—but also relevant—extent in Afghanistan, validated the need to complement light infantry with protected mobility within the fighting formations of the IBCTs. For maneuver brigades to wield maximum influence over their area of operations, commanders needed the tactical versatility to project both mounted and dismounted elements over long distances to produce synergistic effects. In contrast, the current vehicular support structure employed by the light brigades limits their potential to dominate the full range of military operations. Given the design intent for IBCTs to serve as modular, independent, and conditionally self-reliant formations, they should be equipped and trained for a wider range of functions.

As light infantry units are configured, every rifle battalion needs significant theater-equipment augmentation to perform even a portion of the stability tasks previously mastered in places like Mosul, Ramadi, and Baghdad. Even in Afghanistan, where extremely restrictive terrain often demanded steady-state foot patrols, vehicles were used extensively to buttress defensive positions and enable rapid response. For example, the famed rescue in Ganjgal Valley on 8 September 2009, where two soldiers each earned the Medal of Honor for conducting mounted casualty evacuation, centered on the use of vehicles to add critically needed mobility to a protracted fight.

The structural and conceptual transition of IBCTs from light to motorized, from traditional infantry to mobile assault troops, would find many opponents. Traditionalists would argue against dilution of the infantry fighting spirit; however, integrated transport would enhance rather than dilute the lethality of the riflemen. Others would argue against increased attention demanded by wheeled maintenance, but the cost would be far less than in mechanized battalions and would be worth the investment. Still others may assert that the IBCT formations are designed to deploy rapidly and operate on restrictive terrain that precludes vehicle use. This assertion is false. Instead of structuring for narrow utility, the IBCTs should be trained and equipped for a broader range of expeditionary postures, ready for offensive, defensive, and stability operations across diverse operational areas.

**Questioning Legacy Capabilities**

The debate over the future of the IBCT should address the expense versus the viability of the airborne brigade on the contemporary battlefield. With five infantry brigades planned to be airborne, and another three as helicopter assault, the Army should reassess the feasibility of maintaining 24 percent of its maneuver force as aerial soldiers in the face of increasingly lethal anti-access technology that makes large-scale airborne insertion largely obsolete.

With threats such as third-generation infrared surface-to-air missiles proliferating, and an Air Force transport community increasingly hesitant to deliver...
insertion at low altitude over contested landscapes, perhaps the Army’s airborne signature should be reduced. The savings could be applied to increasing overall IBCT mobility. As additional modifications, practical helicopter capacity could be increased, and the 75th Ranger Regiment could be expanded to adopt surgical airfield seizure operations exclusively. This would enable brigades to focus on training for more predictable and likely ground service. \(^{12}\)

**Conclusion**

In the final analysis, the IBCT is a critical formation that needs increased armored vehicular mobility to thrive in twenty-first century warfare. Without increased organic and protected transport, IBCTs are rendered in many ways anachronistic in the face of technologies employed by enemies America will encounter on future battlefields. Options could include establishing ground mobility as the default posture of all light brigades; motorizing all non-airborne formations; seeking balance between proportions of airmobile, light, and mounted infantry formations within each division or corps; or, at a minimum, allocating armored transport to light support battalions.

As a critical component of the Army’s combat maneuver structure, infantrymen deserve and need both protected and networked transport to achieve the fullest measure of battlefield dominance. At the tactical level, this integration would make rifle formations more effective and lethal in diverse combat environments. In the operational sphere, adding motorized density to light infantry would increase the Army’s potential for land dominance. For a downsizing Army that must do more with less, the decision is clear: prioritize increasing mobility and transport protection for the IBCT to empower the soldiers who need it most.

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**Notes**

1. FM 3-90.6, *Brigade Combat Team* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], September 2010); provides the doctrinal composition and capabilities of an IBCT.
2. FM 3-21.20, *The Infantry Battalion* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, December 2006); provides the doctrinal composition and capabilities of an infantry rifle battalion. The IBCT summary is based of the Army force structure before the brigade combat team realignment and reduction planned to begin in 2014.
3. Andrew Feickert, *Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress,* Congressional Research Service Report, 28 February 2014. The Army plans to draw down from 450,000 soldiers to 380,000.
4. FM 3-90.6: 1-11 – 1-12.
5. FM 3-21.21, *The Stryker Brigade Combat Team Infantry Battalion* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, April 2003); provides a description of how digital networks such as FBCB2 enhance motorized infantry operations.
7. FM 3-90.6: 1-11 – 1-12.
10. FM 3-21.21; provides a description of how digital networks such as FBCB2 enhance motorized infantry capabilities to conduct stability operations.
Losing Our Way
The Disassociation of Reconnaissance and Security Organizations from Screen, Guard, and Cover Missions

Robert S. Cameron, Ph.D.

A 1st Cavalry Division vehicle commander peers through his binoculars as he searches for enemy activity 15 August 2004 during the fighting in Najaf, Iraq. The soldiers of 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, used rubble for concealment of their Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles.

(Photo courtesy of the 1st Cavalry Division)
The traditional mission set of cavalry included reconnaissance and security, while the related contemporary doctrine underscored the symbiotic relationship between information collection and the active security screen, guard, and cover missions. In contrast, today cavalry remains associated with reconnaissance, but without the once clear linkage with the active security missions. Pervasive notions throughout the Army now relate reconnaissance organizations with surveillance, but those notions consider security largely in the context of the catchall phrase “area security,” with its force protection orientation. Despite the obvious relevance of area security to counterinsurgency (COIN), it cannot substitute for the ability to execute screen, guard, and cover missions in a fast-moving combined arms maneuver setting. The current absence of doctrinal clarity only obscures the importance once attached to the performance of these missions by a properly trained and configured cavalry organization. Consequently, cavalry’s ability to shape the battlefield and ensure freedom of maneuver for friendly forces is undermined.

In the Beginning

The basic doctrinal meaning of security has not changed since World War II. It “embraces all measures taken by a command to protect itself against any annoyance, surprise, observation, and interference by the enemy. The object of security is retention of freedom of action for the principal elements of the command involved.”

Historically, this outcome resulted from the execution of screen, guard, and cover missions by specially trained reconnaissance and security organizations. In a guard mission, the reconnaissance unit operates forward to provide an early warning and prevent an enemy force from coming within direct fire engagement range of the protected force. When employed in a cover mission, the reconnaissance and security unit operates as a tactically self-contained organization apart from the protected force. It develops the situation early and deceives, disorganizes, or destroys enemy forces encountered. Screen missions provide early warning of a hostile presence, block enemy reconnaissance probes, and impede threat attacks.

Security missions have experienced a doctrinal de-emphasis while simultaneously becoming disassociated with reconnaissance actions. The roots of this change stem from developments in the late 1990s. At that time, the fielding of new sensor technologies, the emergence of a digital network, and the fielding of the Long-Range Advance Scout Surveillance System (commonly known as LRAS3) combined to provide scouts significant capability enhancements, particularly the ability to collect and share information from afar. These improvements engendered a new contact paradigm in which scouts were to gain contact and develop the situation while remaining safely outside enemy direct fire engagement range.

This concept proved attractive since it seemed to resolve the survivability concerns associated with the employment of the high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle in a tactical reconnaissance role. Under the new contact paradigm, scouts maneuvered undetected to identify hostile forces before direct contact occurred, and they shared information digitally with commanders, enabling the latter to maneuver with precision and engage the enemy at a time and place and in a manner of their choice. The paradigm did not require scouts to develop the situation through close contact with the enemy.

The new contact paradigm shaped the employment and organizational principles of the reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) squadron. This unit constituted the reconnaissance organization for the Stryker brigade combat team (BCT). The RSTA squadron possessed little combat capability and served primarily in an information collection role. This design
suited the Stryker brigade’s orientation on small-scale contingencies, where the importance of understanding human terrain outweighed that of security missions against a conventional military threat. The RSTA squadron could establish a screen trace to cover the brigade’s flank or rear. However, lacking combat power, it relied on friendly combat assets to cope with aggressive threats and to execute cover and guard missions. Instead, primary security missions associated with the squadron included convoy escort and area security.

RSTA squadron concepts soon began to shape doctrine for all reconnaissance organizations. In 2002, a new field manual (FM) applied principles intended for the subordinate RSTA troop to the reconnaissance troop of the maneuver BCT. A platoon manual published the same year consolidated doctrine for the multiple reconnaissance and scout platoons then in existence. The result reflected the dominance of RSTA concepts. Reconnaissance was emphasized, but security reflected the passive screen, convoy escort, and general area security outlined for the RSTA squadron and troop.

Conversely, doctrine for those organizations specifically designed to execute the full range of reconnaissance, security, and economy of force operations lapsed. The capstone doctrine for the armored cavalry regiment and the division cavalry squadron, for example, remained in FM 17-95, Cavalry Operations. The last version of this manual was published in 1996. Even the onset of overseas combat operations in 2001 failed to trigger updates to this manual.

While detailed doctrinal guidance for the execution of traditional security missions languished, reconnaissance units went to war. The 2003 march to Baghdad quickly called into question the wisdom of the new contact paradigm.

Standoff information collection from light platforms proved unrealistic in a confused operational area, characterized by a series of movements to contact and the occurrence of sudden, sharp encounters with Iraqi conventional and paramilitary forces. Commanders questioned the validity of standoff reconnaissance and the doctrine it had spawned. Analysis of operations found that “commanders chose not to employ scouts and brigade reconnaissance troops in the role for which they were intended.”

Instead of RSTA concepts, they sought increased survivability and broadened capability for their reconnaissance organizations, particularly the ability to...
develop situations through close contact with enemy forces. In the 3rd Infantry Division, which led the Army’s drive to the Iraqi capital, the cavalry squadron possessed this ability and performed well; the brigade reconnaissance troop and battalion scout platoons did not perform well—they struggled to execute their missions.

Events overcame these concerns. In 2004, the Army began its transition to a modular force structure better suited to sustaining a high tempo of unit deployments in a COIN environment. The overall number of BCTs increased, resourced partly through the elimination of the division cavalry squadron. In subsequent actions the Army converted the 2nd and 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiments into Stryker BCTs, thereby eliminating the last organizations with the organic tools, doctrinal underpinning, and specialized training to execute a broad range of reconnaissance and security operations. The new reconnaissance squadrons of the modular BCTs possessed fewer capabilities and embraced the reconnaissance and surveillance orientation of the original RSTA squadrons.

Rise of the Battlefield Surveillance Brigade

The disappearance of the armored cavalry regiment and division cavalry squadron left command echelons above the brigade without a dedicated reconnaissance and security organization. The battlefield surveillance brigade (BFSB) became the de facto replacement for these units. Equipped with a variety of intelligence collection, assessment, and fusion capabilities, it was optimized to operate across a broad area, and over time, to develop a detailed depiction of hostile activity and networks—attributes suited to the operational environments of Iraq and Afghanistan. The BFSB marked the culmination of a trend in reconnaissance and security organizations begun with the new contact paradigm and the RSTA squadron. The new unit incorporated similar organizational and operational concepts on a larger scale. Indeed, the brigade’s initial designation as a RSTA brigade underscored these roots.

Consequently, the BFSB lacked the organic means to conduct screen, guard, and cover missions. It could not fight for information, it could not lead and protect friendly forces in a movement to contact situation, and it could not ensure friendly forces freedom of maneuver without hostile interference. Its surveillance capabilities outstripped its reconnaissance capabilities, while the BFSB’s minimal combat power made it dependent on other organizations to act on the intelligence it did obtain. Exclusive employment in COIN operations, however, cloaked its inability to operate in the presence of an aggressive threat or in a fast-moving combined arms maneuver operation.

In Afghanistan and Iraq, surveillance, force protection, and area security considerations outweighed the need for screen, guard, and cover missions. Hence, for over a decade organizations primarily oriented toward information collection—like the BFSB—thrived, and the prewar tilt toward reconnaissance and surveillance became a persistent doctrinal trend. The COIN-centric nature of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan expanded the doctrinal footprint of surveillance while diminishing that of traditional active security missions. Sustained COIN operations necessitated long-term monitoring of areas, activities, and people. As a result, reconnaissance and security organizations became associated with reconnaissance and surveillance.

This change in association was and still is promulgated throughout the Army via numerous sources, including U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency’s Force Management System Web. This online source provides descriptions of unit organizations, equipment authorizations, and primary missions. It constitutes a quick reference for soldiers, providing basic information without requiring the user to navigate numerous publications. In nearly every instance, ground cavalry organizations are identified as reconnaissance and surveillance units. Yet surveillance is not security. Surveillance does not include the active measures inherent in security missions, which both shape and protect the brigade commander’s ability to maneuver free from threat interference.

Doctrinal Confusion

These developments eroded Army cognizance of traditional security missions and disassociated them from specially trained reconnaissance and security organizations. Paradoxically, new doctrinal publications neither asserted a divestiture of screen, guard, and cover missions nor affirmed in a forthright manner their importance. In Army Doctrine Reference
Publication (ADRP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, the basic principles governing Army operations were identified together with the six primary warfighting functions. Reconnaissance and surveillance became a task associated with the movement and maneuver warfighting function. Screen, guard, cover, and their related tasks found no coverage at all. Although the protection warfighting function alluded to security, the related task list included nothing more than basic force protection measures expected of all combatant forces.14

A related publication, ADRP 3-90, *Offense and Defense*, directly influenced every other manual associated with tactical tasks. Unfortunately, it encouraged the de-emphasis of traditional security doctrine. ADRP 3-90 noted the importance of security missions, correctly noting their value in providing early warning of hostile actions and sufficient time and maneuver space within which to react to enemy operations. It also identified screen, guard, and cover missions as effective methods of achieving these objectives. Nevertheless, it cautioned commanders against the diversion of combat power to these tasks and reminded them that no BCT included screen, guard, and cover in its mission-essential task list (METL). Moreover, the manual did nothing to restore the broken linkage between reconnaissance and security operations.15

The subordinate manual FM 3-90-2, *Reconnaissance, Security, and Tactical Enabling Tasks, Volume 2*, published in 2013, addressed screen, guard, and cover missions. It provided guidance for the execution of these missions and outlined the underlying principles. Yet this manual, too, nullified this coverage with these statements: “All three types of Army brigade combat teams (BCTs)—armored, infantry, and Stryker—have conduct[ed] security operations as part of their METL. No BCT has the cover, guard, and screen security tasks as part of their [sic] Army METL.”16

Soldiers with 6th Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, prepare to search Starkats Village, Khowst Province, Afghanistan, 2 April 2011. (Photo by Pfc. Donald Watkins, Joint Combat Camera Afghanistan)
Taken together, these statements imply that security operations do not include screen, guard, and cover. Certainly, there is no association between these missions and cavalry organizations. Indeed, FM 3-20.96, "Reconnaissance and Cavalry Squadron," highlighted the capability limitations of the cavalry squadrons of the modular BCTs, directing that the "squadrons of the BCTs and BFSBs must focus their efforts and mission sets on reconnaissance." Such doctrinal guidance marked a retreat from the once clear emphasis placed on the importance of a dedicated organization capable of providing reconnaissance and security for each offensive and defensive task required of ground forces.

These recent doctrinal publications reflect experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq where area security and the protection of key facilities, individuals, and major travel arteries predominated. Hence, in the Army's collective consciousness, security entailed area security, convoy escort, and route security. These missions were performed universally and did not mandate a specially trained organization. The publication of ADRP 3-90 and FM 3-90-2 confirmed this trend in doctrine. Security became the province of all units, regardless of their training, configuration, or METL.

BCT commanders and staffs are not prompted to think of their squadron as a reconnaissance and security organization that can and should be used to perform screen, guard, and cover tasks. That some commanders have, in fact, done so reflects knowledge of past practices. As this knowledge fades, BCT commanders will be less inclined to focus their cavalry squadrons on these tasks unless provoked by the immediate needs of their mission. Consequently, such tasks will not be performed, or combined arms battalions will perform them at the expense of BCT combat power.

With security missions considered a universal responsibility for all ground forces, information collection remained as the primary task of reconnaissance and security organizations that required specialized training. This change is noteworthy, since similar past efforts have not fared well. In World War II, mechanized cavalry doctrine also focused on the singular purpose of reconnaissance. This exclusive orientation did not survive contact with the operational realities of overseas deployment or field commander needs for security missions. Subsequent analysis of reconnaissance operations in World War II found security missions to be common, while pure reconnaissance missions divorced from other mission types were exceptional. Consequently, reconnaissance doctrine from the postwar era to the emergence of the RSTA squadron stressed reconnaissance and security, underscoring their interrelation and the importance of each.

**Future Requirements and the Need for Change**

Ironically, some doctrinal publications now under development will reaffirm the importance of screen, guard, and cover missions; the critical relationship between reconnaissance and security; and the inherent value of cavalry organizations properly trained and configured to do both. The Army needs to resolve the doctrinal ambivalence of the higher manuals, correct the descriptions of cavalry missions in Force Management System Web, and ensure coherent guidance for the execution of information collection and screen, guard, and cover from the overarching guidance in the senior manuals down to the detailed coverage provided in subordinate FMs and Army techniques publications. An emphasis on reconnaissance and security must once again replace reconnaissance and surveillance in doctrine, training, and mindset. Clarity of concept must replace doctrinal inconsistency to ensure the proper use of cavalry organizations.

The Army's shift in orientation from the COIN-only focus of the last decade toward a broader range of warfighting capabilities and potential operational environments make such clarity imperative. Efforts to regain core competencies in every branch are under way, and the combat training centers are hosting training rotations necessitating combined arms maneuver and mastery of the related skill sets. The learning curve has proven steep for units that have completed decisive action training environment rotations, often reflecting a general incomprehension of basic reconnaissance and security principles. Fixing doctrinal inconsistencies related to security missions would facilitate the force's comprehension of those missions, enable more effective training, and ensure that related concept development would properly reflect cavalry's reconnaissance and security role.

Such corrective measures are critical to the successful development of the reconnaissance and security BCT. In 2012, division and corps commanders reached
a consensus regarding the inability of the BFSB to satisfy their reconnaissance and security requirements. They sought a combined arms organization capable of obtaining and evaluating information through direct interaction with a threat or civilian populace, possessing the means to fight for it if necessary. Its security role was summarized as “to provide early warning, identify opportunities, and prevent premature deployment of main body formations.” In essence, these Army leaders sought a more robust organization capable of operations in a complicated and chaotic battlefield environment against a variety of threats.

The crafting of an effective reconnaissance and security brigade organization provides the stimulus and justification for restoring traditional security missions to reconnaissance doctrine. The planned brigades are intended to operate as part of early entry and forcible entry operations. Unlike the BFSB, they will possess combat power combined with information collection and assessment capabilities. They are intended to operate forward and in close proximity to hostile forces, achieving their objectives through combat if necessary.

The new brigade must be imbued with the mindset and experiences of a cavalry organization. To achieve this and leverage fully their capabilities requires coherent doctrine that restores the clear linkage between security and reconnaissance missions. The two are not mutually exclusive, but interwoven. Reconnaissance by its nature provides information and early warning of threats to help prevent the parent force from being surprised, a point expressed in manuals such as FM 17-97: “Reconnaissance keeps the follow-on force from being surprised or interrupted, and protects it against losing soldiers and equipment on the way to the objective.” Indeed, “even during security missions that involve fighting the enemy, the scouts’ primary task remains gathering information.” This relationship flows naturally from the forward and mobile presence of cavalry on the battlefield.

For the planned reconnaissance and security brigades, doctrine must provide the guidance for active screen, guard, and cover missions. These missions must become part of the unit METLs and become central to their training. Continuing to ignore such missions or lump them into the general categories of area security and force protection will hamstring the new organizations before they are fielded, with a concomitant impact on cavalry squadrons and the new standard scout platoons. Units will be called on to execute these missions with or without doctrinal coverage. The difference is that a reconnaissance and security unit with no experience, understanding, or training in screen, guard, and cover missions will do so at a considerable cost in men, materiel, and time.

Alternately, scouts will simply not perform these security missions, endangering themselves and their parent organizations. The first decisive action training environment rotation conducted at the National Training Center in March 2012 included the execution of an offensive mission by an armored BCT. The unit’s reconnaissance squadron ably supported this operation, but upon its conclusion failed to transition into a security mission. The opposing force exploited the absence of a screen line and related active security measures to inflict heavy losses on the BCT and its tactical operations center. Analysis of this defeat underscored the critical linkage between reconnaissance and security:

Reconnaissance squadrons must set conditions for future operations. There is no rest for the weary. The squadron, although significantly fatigued following the reconnaissance phase of the ABCT [armored brigade combat team] operation, should have transitioned immediately to provide security for the ABCT, allowing the rest of the brigade to prepare for future operations.

The Army currently retains soldiers of all ranks with experience and knowledge of how to execute screen, guard, and cover missions. This knowledge base will not remain in the Army indefinitely, but it can be tapped now to end the doctrinal dispersion of security. A doctrinal reset is necessary to ensure that time-proven cavalry missions and principles are retained and readily accessible to every commander, staff officer, noncommissioned officer, and soldier without undertaking an exhaustive literature search.

Conversely, surveillance needs to return to its proper role as a subordinate, enabling function. These measures will ensure that reconnaissance and security organizations possess the doctrinal tools necessary to achieve success on the next battlefield and avoid self-inflicted capability failure before the first shot of the next conflict is fired.

Scouts out!
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NOTES


12. For a description of the BFSB organizational and operational concepts, see FM 3-55.1, Battlefield Surveillance Brigade (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 2010).


18. FM 3-90 [obsolete], Tactics (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 2001), 4-4, 5-1, 6-4, 7-2, 8-15, 9-2, 10-9, 11-4, 12-1, 12-6, and 12-27.

19. See, for example, FM 2-20 [obsolete], Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop Mechanized (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1944), 2, 6-8, and 17-18.


21. These draft publications will be FM 3-98, Reconnaissance and Security Operations, and ATP 3-20.96, Cavalry Squadron.


25. Ibid., 4-1.

Command Sgt. Maj. Wesley Weygandt, commandant of U.S. Army Alaska’s Sgt. First Class Christopher R. Brevard Noncommissioned Officer Academy, welcomes Warrior Leader Course class 03-10 during the commandant’s inbrief 2 December 2009 at Fort Wainwright’s Battle Command Training Center.

(The photo by Sheryl Nix, Fort Wainwright PAO)

The Pen and the Sword
The New Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development System—NCO 2020

After 12 years of war, a debate is emerging over the ability of the Army’s noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps to adapt to the changing operational environment (OE). The future will require adept NCOs armed with increased knowledge and new skills. Developing this NCO of the future can only occur by transforming how the Army educates NCOs today.

This article will briefly discuss the projected OE and identify the cognitive abilities needed to equip the NCO corps for 2020 and beyond. The case to revise the Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) is analyzed using an educational model, against current Army concepts, frameworks, and strategies. The analysis shows a clear need for improved education and development processes and a transformation to the new NCO professional development system—NCO 2020.

**Preparing for the Projected Operational Environment**

The big question is—How will the Army prepare NCOs to lead America’s sons and daughters in volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) environments? The fiscal constraints caused by the Nation’s soaring debt and the shared responsibility of the Army to support these constraints add to the challenges of VUCA environments. The Army must meet these challenges, continue to defend the Nation, and remain the world’s premier land force while becoming smaller, more flexible, and more adaptive.

Recently, Lt. Gen. Keith Walker, deputy commanding general, Futures/director, Army Capabilities Integration Center, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, painted a complex picture of the projected OE. He described it as driven by the competition for wealth, resources, political authority, influence, sovereignty, identity, and legitimacy, where unexpected opportunists will emerge from conflict in a complex environment. The complex environment is shaped by multiple actors, asymmetric threats, and chaotic conditions. It is technologically driven in an information age where adversaries have the ability to communicate and adjust their planning cycles at the speed of Twitter.

The proliferation of technology will degrade soldiers’ previous advantages over our adversaries in communication and weapons. This will place a premium on shorter equipment life cycles as the Army investments in research and development to stay ahead of our enemies. Our land force’s ability to build combat power over several months, or sometimes years, may be eroded as irrational actors learn from our success over the last two decades. The Army will need to invest wisely in its soldiers and NCOs to overcome these challenges.

The proposition in the historical adage “the pen is mightier than the sword” is not an argument for a reduction in training or tactical proficiency. Rather, it is an argument to increase tactical proficiency by training critical, agile, flexible, and creatively thinking NCOs who are able to operate under the Army’s mission command philosophy. The Army must change its current Industrial Age developmental construct. The current system is satisfied with simply training and achieving the lower levels of cognition—knowledge, understanding, and application. The new era will require a blended-learning process that infuses rigor into the NCOES. It is essential for the new system to produce NCOs instilled with the cognitive ability to analyze, synthesize, and evaluate.

**Getting There**

The Army must evolve the current NCOES into an integrated NCO professional development system—NCO 2020. To achieve this change, the NCO corps must use a deliberate, data-driven, analytical process to examine the current NCO development model. The foundation and guideposts for the new system are the Army Leader Development Strategy, The U.S. Army Learning Concept 2015 (ALC 2015), and the Army learning model. The result must be a system capable of developing an NCO corps ready to execute missions in support of national security requirements in 2020 and beyond. While remaining consistent with the NCO corps vision, NCO 2020 must achieve the following objectives:

- Provide the Army with an adaptable, resilient NCO corps capable of training and leading soldiers in uncertain and complex joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operating environments.
- Improve the professionalism of the NCO corps.
- Improve training and education expertise in the NCO corps in order to sustain leader development, support expansibility, and build capacity.
• Provide challenging and rigorous leader development training, education, and experiences that result in earlier technical mastery, increased tactical skills, adaptability, innovation, and agility—in other words, mastery of the NCO general learning outcomes.7

• Articulate learning responsibilities and requirements across the three training domains (operational, institutional, and self-development) and integrate them into a synchronized, effective, and efficient development system.8

• Improve professional development models and learning curricula so that soldiers and leaders can assess leader development progress, track learning events, create goals, and certify professionals.

• Support identification and development of NCOs to serve in operational- and strategic-level assignments.

NCO 2020 will meet these objectives by accepting the challenge, learning from the past, and synthesizing the “as is” with the “can be” using an instructional systems design process. The ADDIE (analysis, design, development, implementation, and evaluation) process is the tool the Army will use to transform the current NCOES into the NCO 2020 system designed to support mission command and provide adaptability to the VUCA environment.9 The outcome will be an NCO corps that supports Army goals and objectives by doing the following:

• Leading teams, squads, and platoons
• Serving in staff roles

• Advising leaders at platoon and higher levels
• Expertly training enlisted soldiers, crews, and small teams
• Taking care of soldiers and their families
• Enforcing standards
• Training subordinates to master their military occupational specialties

Achieving these ends is vital to winning our nation’s wars across the full range of conflict. The NCO corps must leverage the three training domains to enhance future NCO competencies so they can adapt to changing tactical, operational, and strategic conditions as well as a thinking enemy. The complexity of the OE, coupled with the need to execute a full range of decentralized operations in a variety of cultures, will drive the increasing learning demand placed on NCOs.

To ensure a capabilities-based strategy, analysts reviewed the framework in The United States Army Operating Concept.10 The Army operating concept provides a “concept framework” for the development of capabilities for the future force in the 2016 to 2028 timeframe. The framework contains a family of six concepts that examine the projected OE and provide strategic guidance to develop the capabilities required in support of Army modernization. The U.S. Army Capstone Concept is the foundation for a series of documents.11 The operating concept’s six functional concepts align with warfighting functions and three other concepts focused on the development of soldiers, leaders, and organizations.12 The Army operating concept describes how Army forces will conduct operations as part of the joint force to deter conflict, prevail in war, and succeed in a wide range of contingencies in the future OE. These documents guide efforts to identify and develop the requirements of the future force in which an NCO must lead.

In addition to the concepts, the Army Leader Development Strategy (ALDS) describes the characteristics the Army desires in leaders throughout their careers. It contains the guiding strategy to build those characteristics.13 Together, the concepts and ALDS...
provide the theoretical guidance that will drive when, where, and how the Army develops leaders in the twenty-first century. They provide the basis to determine the way ahead for the development of Army NCOs.

A review of Army concepts, which outline the projected OE and a vision for the future force, showed analysts what to prepare our NCOs for in the year 2020 and beyond. The next challenge was determining how to prepare them. The Center for Army Leadership and the Army Innovations and Initiatives Division were instrumental in collecting data and providing trend analysis to identify the gaps in the current development of NCOs. The 2012 Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership: Main Finding Technical Report 2013-1 supplied empirical data to the Institute for Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development, identifying problems in NCO professional certifications and gaps in current NCO professional development strategies. The Army Innovations and Initiatives Division’s NCOES needs analysis examined ways to improve the NCOES and provided recommendations to United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the Institute for Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development.

According to analysis, many aspects of the Army’s training system will remain task-based. The competencies identified in the study represent broader sets of skills necessary to enable task performance within the context of complex OEs. Unlike many tasks with discrete performance standards and a definitive end to the performance, the competencies are in a broader skills construct within the Army learning model. These evolved from ALC 2015. ALC 2015 is the learning environment the Army envisions in 2015.
ALC 2015 seeks to improve our learning model by leveraging technology without sacrificing standards so we can provide credible, rigorous, and relevant training and education for our force of combat-seasoned soldiers and leaders. It argues we must establish a continuum of learning from the time soldiers are accessed until the time they retire. It also clarifies that the responsibility for developing soldiers is a shared responsibility among the institutional schoolhouse, tactical units, and the individuals themselves.

ALC 2015 concentrates on advances in technology rather than the types of technologies. In other words, the concept is capabilities-based with a focus on online gaming and mobile, or portable, learning—interfacing physical, virtual, and group collaboration to achieve learning outcomes. Although prior research and new policies outline the how and what in regard to training our NCOs, we must now concentrate on the when and where the training will take place.16

Learning policies outline high standards consistent across our formation and provide clear expectations aligned to the expectations of learning outcomes. To receive the maximum return on our investment, the Army must ensure it delivers education to the NCO in the right domain at the right times in their careers. To aid in producing well-rounded leaders, the Army can capitalize on the current generation’s familiarity with computers. The Army could deliver more training to NCOs in a self-structured format. The self-structured format allows the institution to raise the quality of the instruction while decreasing the cost. The result is improvement in the NCOs’ technical and tactical proficiency in a shorter amount of time. Albeit economical and timely, the Army must also be judicious about what training it delivers in this format. It must be remembered that soldiering is, above everything else, a human endeavor. Therefore, proficiency in teamwork, problem solving, negotiation skills, and leadership are best taught face-to-face with peers, facilitators, and mentors, not in virtual reality.

**Anchoring on the Army’s Professional Ethic and Values**

As the Army moves forward, it must keep its values as a centerpiece of education. The self-actualized, critically thinking future NCOs of 2020 will need mentorship and guidance to ensure they think and decide in a manner aligned with the values and ethic of the profession. Gen. William S. Wallace alluded to this in a 2008 TRADOC pamphlet on the human dimension, which he described as comprising “the moral, physical and cognitive components of soldier, leader, and organizational development and performance.”17 Focusing on the moral component, our future NCOs must be grounded in the ethical values that are essential elements of current officer training. Incorporating learning objectives covering the Army’s professional ethic and the expected ethical behavior of leaders into all phases of curriculum is critical for NCO 2020.

A key element to being a critical thinker and a decisive enlisted leader in the future Army will be knowing what right looks like. Anchoring NCO 2020’s future to the Army values and professional ethic will meet Wallace’s human dimension imperative of moral development. Strong ethical leadership is the glue that leads to mission accomplishment and increases unit cohesion.

**Conclusion**

The Army faces a future of diminishing resources, agile adversaries, and constantly changing OEs. Rapidly evolving technology will affect perceptions and decisions at an increasing rate and level of complexity. The Army’s NCO corps must be up to the challenge of the geopolitical world envisioned in 2020. Leaders must be instilled with the ability to effectively consider the complexities, think effectively, and adapt beyond pre-conceived conclusions. To develop NCOs to this higher level of cognition, the Army must transform its current NCOES to a newly revised NCO professional development system: NCO 2020.

This article provides the ends and ways to revise the NCOES in accordance with the concepts, frameworks, and strategies already embraced by the Army. Those results will inform the means or Army education and training resources required to provide the rigorous experience these flexible and adaptive NCO leaders require. Innovative technologies and improved education processes can also assist in the delivery of new age development. If the Army believes an adept thinker builds a mightier warrior, then it is time to transform. Developing NCO 2020 will prepare our NCOs for the challenges of future battlefields.
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Notes

3. Edward Bulwer Lytton, Not So Bad As We Seem; or, Many Sides to a Character (London: Chapman and Hall, 1851).
5. Ibid.
7. ALC 2015 provides a set of nine overarching 21st Century Competencies “that are essential to ensure soldiers and leaders are fully prepared to prevail in complex, uncertain environments.” Each competency has associated general learning outcomes (GLOs) that are specific to officers, warrant officers, NCOs, and Army civilians. The NCO GLOs were developed by the Institute for Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development.
12. TP 525-3-1, App. B.
15. TP 525-8-2.
16. TP 525-8-3.
Army Learning Concept 2015 is Under Way


Our enemies are always learning and adapting. They will not approach conflicts with conceptions or understanding similar to ours. And they will surprise us.

—“The Joint Operating Environment 2010”

In December 2012, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) published The U.S. Army Capstone Concept.1 This concept describes a vision of future operating environments, the role of the Army in the joint force, and the broad capabilities required by future Army forces. The concept posits that our nation’s adversaries will increase in number, perform military tasks more quickly, and possess significant military capabilities. These conditions will make operating environments more unpredictable and complex, leading to greater disorder. The concept also asserts that we must prepare our leaders to achieve proficiency in operational adaptability, which means we must educate them to understand their operating environments and adapt to them. How our educational institutions evolve to help create these adaptive leaders and thinkers is outlined in The U.S. Army Learning Concept for 2015 (known as ALC 2015) 2

ALC 2015 initiates an overhaul of how the U.S. Army approaches institutional learning. More important, while the capstone concept describes future conditions, the implementation of ALC 2015 is already underway so that Army forces will be prepared for future operations. The U.S. Army Warrant Officer Career College (USAWOCC) has led the way in implementing ALC 2015 guidance on curriculum and teaching methodologies. Its focus on continuous improvement consistent with ALC 2015 led to TRADOC’s naming USAWOCC a learning institution of excellence, June 2014.3

A Model for Improving Army Education and Training

What sets our Army apart from our adversaries is the Army’s ability to remain adaptive. Adaptiveness gives any force a competitive advantage. As ALC 2015 states, “The U.S. Army’s competitive advantage directly relates to its capacity to learn faster and adapt more quickly than its adversaries.”4

Published in June 2011, ALC 2015 lays the foundation of a campaign for driving change to Army education and training models. According to ALC 2015, “The current [as of 2011] Army individual learning model is inadequate” to meet the Army’s challenges of outpacing our adversaries and fulfilling our responsibilities to the Nation.5

Legacy learning models lack innovation and tend to be bound by outmoded ways and technologies. Any courses that do not meet the needs of students or the Army, including traditional instructor-centric presentations based more on the academic calendar than on needed outcomes, are enemies of adaptive learning—defined by ALC 2015 as “a method that endeavors to transform the learner from a passive receptor of information to a collaborator in the educational process.”6

ALC 2015 lists specific changes that learning organizations can implement immediately to begin their
transitions. While these initial changes do not equal total transformation, they are a good start:

1. Convert most classroom experiences into collaborative problem-solving events, led by facilitators (vice instructors) who engage learners to think and understand the relevance and context of what they learn.

2. Tailor learning to the individual learner’s experience and competence level based on the results of a pre-test or assessment.

3. Dramatically reduce or eliminate instructor-led slide presentation lectures and begin using a blended learning approach that incorporates virtual and constructive simulations, gaming technology, or other technology-delivered instruction.7

In addition, ALC 2015’s instructional guidelines state that all Army education and training programs should integrate skills for working with diverse cultures and joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners; incorporate comprehensive fitness goals into all courses; develop a flexible frame of mind in all learners that will encourage adaptability to meet operational demands; and use ALC’s 21st Century Soldier Competencies as an integral part of all learning outcomes.8

ALC 2015 lists the competencies as—

- Character and accountability
- Comprehensive fitness
- Adaptability and initiative
- Lifelong learner (includes digital literacy)
- Teamwork and collaboration
- Communication and engagement (oral, written, negotiation)
- Critical thinking and problem solving
- Cultural and joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational competence
- Tactical and technical competence (full-spectrum capable)9

We believe every class taught by U.S. Army instructors to every soldier should be linked directly to these critical competencies.

When classes are linked to the competencies, and proven methods of instruction are used, we feel certain the Army will be moving toward the desired end state.

**Warrant Officer Career College Learning Initiatives**

USAWOCC has attacked the challenge head-on, implementing ALC 2015 guidance in 2011—soon after its publication. Consistent with the concept, the college has adopted David A. Kolb’s experiential learning model.10 It has restructured and retrained its faculty and implemented a curriculum that leads to outcomes ALC 2015 describes as “rigorous, relevant, and measurable.”11 USAWOCC trains and educates more than 3,800 students annually through its Warrant Officer Candidate Course (initial military training for warrant officer 1), Warrant Officer Intermediate Level Education (professional military education for chief warrant officer 4) and Warrant Officer Senior Service Education (professional military education for chief warrant officer 5).

USAWOCC now tailors learning to the individual learner’s experience and competency level. The college is developing standardized learning outcomes for warrant officers, and it uses those outcomes together with senior-level education joint learning areas and objectives (joint professional military education phase I, outlined in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction [CJCSI] 1800.01) to tailor relevant, doctrine-based, and learner-centric outcomes that can be measured objectively.12

Strategy discussions in the professional military education classroom are based on the *National Security Strategy* and the *Quadrennial Defense Review*.13 Students identify U.S. national interests in international conflicts. They address those interests through a synthesis of ends, ways, and means. Students examine issues of joint strategic leadership and communications and their places in history. They demonstrate understanding and application through oral and written assignments and practical exercises.

USAWOCC uses ALC 2015’s 21st Century Soldier Competencies as an integral part of all learning outcomes. For example, the commandant of USAWOCC, Col. Garry L. Thompson, is a tireless proponent of comprehensive fitness and leader development. Moreover, he advocates directly to students the value of out-of-classroom learning experiences. To that end, USAWOCC has established pilot programs to reach students through various social media outlets. The programs have drawn positive reactions from current
and former students—who continue to engage the college via social media after graduation.

Initiatives to establish a collaborative virtual environment for students, instructors, and Army leadership have drawn positive attention from the Combined Arms Center, the Army Capabilities Integration Center, and the chief of staff of the Army. These efforts have prompted further in-house reflection on digital and communication strategies for the long term. The faculty and staff are determined to reach students where increasing numbers of them spend much of their time—online—and extend warrant officers’ learning experiences beyond the brick-and-mortar environment.

Many students who participate in the new learning model laud capstone exercises in Warrant Officer Intermediate Level Education and Warrant Officer Senior Service Education for pushing them to think critically, cooperate with unified action partners, and fully consider cultural ramifications of key command decisions. Many students report they develop a better appreciation of commanders’ requirements of staffs. In post-graduation surveys (internal, unpublished), students reflect how much better equipped they are to operate alongside staff officers who are graduates of other intermediate-level education programs.

Within the classroom, USAWOCC has reduced or eliminated instructor-led slide presentations in favor of student-led briefs, student-executed practical exercises, and student-driven operational scenarios. Faculty have transitioned from “sage on the stage” to “guide on the side,” challenging students with Socratic-style questioning techniques and gently steering student-initiated conversation and debate along paths that reach the desired learning outcomes, albeit through student initiative and conclusion.

Warrant officers have much to contribute to the learning of their fellow students. For example, those who possess rare or sought-after special skills have found themselves deployed somewhat disproportionately often compared to other soldiers over the last dozen years. Such have an inordinate wealth of operational experiences to share with their fellow students.

ALC 2015 laments, “The Army often assigns instructors arbitrarily, rather than through a selection process that accounts for subject-matter expertise or aptitude, to facilitate adult learning. Instructor positions are not perceived to be career-enhancing assignments.”14 To meet that challenge, USAWOCC has been aggressively recruiting instructors with the best possible mix of operational and educational backgrounds. Moreover, in 2014, the one-hundred-percent selection rate of faculty

Warrant officer candidates complete a road march 28 July 2011 during Warrant Officer Candidate School at Camp Atterbury Joint Maneuver Training Center, Ind.

(Photo by Jill Swank, Camp Atterbury PAO)
members eligible for promotion to chief warrant officer 4 and chief warrant officer 5 sends encouraging signals that instructor duties, performed well, will be rewarded accordingly. More important, the combination of instructionally and operationally astute educators with knowledgeable, combat-proven senior warrant officer students makes for a very stimulating learning environment.

USAWOCC has expanded its problem-solving events led by facilitators. The military history department conducts staff rides; the international strategic studies department leads operational environment studies; the joint, interagency, and multinational operations department leads students in military decision-making process activities; the communications and management systems department leads program management studies; and, the leadership and professional development department leads studies of senior leader ethical dilemmas.

USAWOCC faculty are constantly creating opportunities for students to match their problem-solving wits against complex, realistic scenarios that require analysis, synthesis, and defense of methods—incorporating factors of mission analysis. Facilitators focus on what ALC 2015 describes as “operational adaptability through critical thinking;” developing a student appreciation of risk and a willingness to adjust to changing situations based on incoming information.

Facilitators integrate joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational considerations as well as cultural factors and mission command into every department’s curricula. In so doing, they develop in students a level of adaptability that enables them to meet the operational demands of their leadership and staff jobs.

**Transition to the Army Learning Concept 2015 throughout the Army**

In general, ALC 2015 was designed to help the Army develop the adaptive thinkers it needs today and in the future. The methods of instruction it advocates are proven by academic research, and its initiatives can be considered common sense. In fact, implementation is underway not only at USAWOCC, but at Army learning institutions across the force.

Some delay in adopting these proven learning methods likely remains—in institutional settings and in the field. That said, if any Army institutions are not working toward aligning their content and delivery to ALC 2015 principles, they are behind the power curve. The 21st Century Soldier Competencies may not be common knowledge, or curriculum developers may not know how to integrate these competencies when developing expected learner outcomes. However, ALC 2015 reminds us, “The urgency to build a competitive Army learning model cannot wait until 2015. It must begin now.”

Therefore, we encourage all who administer Army education and training to examine their organizations and determine if they have improved their programs over the past few years. At a minimum, the leaders of these organizations should be providing professional development opportunities to their faculty so they can learn to apply effective learning models.

USAWOCC’s transition to ALC 2015 is not yet complete. We continue to revise our curriculum, fine-tune our delivery methods, and train our new instructors. In fact, because the Army’s instructor base comes from the operational force—made up of individuals trained or educated primarily on traditional learning models—we expect to be helping new instructors make the transition for several years.

USAWOCC is building Army warrant officers who can think critically and help their commanders solve complex problems. Staying one step ahead of our adversaries, on the battlefield and in the classroom, will keep us all Army Strong.
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Notes


2. TP 525-8-2, 6.
3. A TRADOC Institution of Excellence rating is obtained by achieving a score of 95 percent or higher during a TRADOC accreditation visit.
4. TP 525-8-2, 6.
5. Ibid., 6.
6. Ibid., 62.
7. Ibid., 10.
8. Ibid., 26.
9. For more on the “21st Century Soldier Competencies,” see TP 525-8-2.
11. TP 525-8-2, 7.
14. TP 525-8-2, 8.
16. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-2, 11.
17. Ibid., 9.

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The Challenge of Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Korean Peninsula


Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) create challenges for the U.S. Army that will not go away in the near term. It is apparent that the future operating environment will include a variety of state or nonstate actors that will seek to counter U.S. influence or hold U.S. or allied forces.
at risk through WMD programs. Possible scenarios involving WMD span from the relatively benign, where a nation requests U.S. assistance in dismantling its own WMD program, to cases where adversary states willingly provide WMD to nonstate actors and encourage their use against American interests. The U.S. Army—specifically, the conventional force—should take steps to prepare for countering WMD (CWMD) operations.

This article discusses the way in which the 2nd Infantry Division prepares for CWMD operations on the Korean Peninsula. First, it is necessary to understand the strategic background driving the requirement for developing a CWMD capability on the Korean Peninsula.

**Weapons of Mass Destruction Elimination Operations Background**

Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (8 November 2010, as amended through 16 July 2014), defines WMD as “chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons capable of a high order of destruction or causing mass casualties, excluding the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part from the weapon.” CWMD was formerly referred to as WMD elimination, or WMD-E. As described in the 2014 *Department of Defense Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction*, CWMD is a broad term used strategically to describe the full range of Department of Defense (DOD) and greater United States government efforts undertaken to ensure “the United States and its allies and partners are neither attacked nor coerced by actors with WMD.”

Since CWMD is such a broad and inclusive term in the recently published CWMD strategy document, it is necessary to further define its use here. In this article, CWMD is used specifically to describe the collective tasks identified in FM 7-15, *The Army Universal Task List*, Article 6.9.2.3, “Conduct Weapons of Mass Destruction Elimination Operations,” as “actions undertaken in a hostile or uncertain environment to systematically locate, characterize, secure, and disable, or destroy WMD programs and related capabilities.”

Formerly the primary responsibility of niche units with specialized capabilities, such as special operations forces and technical escort units operating in specific geographic locations (such as Korea), the requirement for Army forces to understand and prepare for CWMD operations now crosses components and geographic combatant commands. CWMD operations are likely to involve direct participation by Army conventional forces.

Since 2011, the United States and its allies have conducted CWMD operations in Libya and Syria, while continuing to deter conflict with an emergent nuclear power on the Korean Peninsula. In 2012, the president issued a clear mandate stressing the importance of CWMD:

> The proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons technology has the potential to magnify the threats posed by regional state actors. ... Accordingly, the Department of Defense will continue to enhance its capabilities, acting with an array of domestic and foreign partners, to conduct effective operations to counter the proliferation of WMD.

Similarly, the national defense strategy charges the DOD with developing capabilities to counter WMD. The 2014 *Department of Defense Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction* expands the range of CWMD options to include a whole-of-government approach, taking advantage of enablers and specialty capabilities not resident in the DOD.

The *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020* envisions a near-future operating environment where the U.S. government leverages all instruments of U.S. national power to conduct global CWMD operations. The U.S. Army supports the joint force by providing a force trained and ready to execute CWMD, specifically through CWMD operations. The CWMD mission has clearly moved out of the exclusive realm of Army special operations and is becoming more and more relevant across the entire conventional force.

**Recent CWMD Initiatives**

At the tactical level, the CWMD mission applies to several division headquarters and brigade combat teams (BCTs). In 2010, the 2nd Infantry Division’s primary focus in the event of major combat operations or a North Korean collapse became the elimination of the North’s WMD platforms and programs. The 2nd Infantry Division knows its adversary and operating environment. However, this responsibility extends...
beyond the forces permanently stationed on the peninsula to include BCTs tasked to deploy and fight with the division. For example, the 82nd Airborne Division, as the global response force, also shares a responsibility for executing CWMD operations; however, it differs from the 2nd Infantry Division in that it must prepare for a much broader and more inclusive range of potential adversaries and operating environments.

Other divisions could have a share of the potential CWMD tasks in troubled locations around the world. Consequently, in the future, regionally aligned forces to the Pacific, as well as rotational BCTs to the Korean theater of operations, will also be required to train on the CWMD mission set. Given this wide range of possible operating environments, commanders should understand the basic CWMD tactical tasks and prepare their forces accordingly.

The requirement to prepare forces for CWMD operations is also apparent across the Army’s training and support institutions. At the time of this writing, the Army’s Capabilities and Integration Center is developing the CWMD requirements and associated capabilities for the Army of 2020.

Additionally, the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center, in coordination with the 20th Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE) Command and other organizations, and in collaboration with the 2nd Infantry Division, are expanding their facilities and changing exercise scenarios to incorporate CWMD missions in iteratively greater complexity.

Also, the Mission Command Center of Excellence and the Maneuver Support Center of Excellence are working to capture the lessons learned from each of these training rotations and incorporate those lessons into emerging doctrine for CWMD operations.

While these organizations continue to develop the tasks to support the CWMD fight, numerous others are making major contributions to the force in training and equipping, in contributing subject-matter expertise and advanced modeling and simulation, and in serving as a conduit to the interagency community. These include the Asymmetric Warfare Group, the Joint Improvised Explosive Device-Defeat Organization, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the U.S. Strategic Command Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the newly activated Standing Joint Force Headquarters for WMD Elimination.

This growing community of interest demonstrates the large number of joint and interagency stakeholders in CWMD.

Meanwhile, the 2nd Infantry Division, in partnership with the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army, has conducted a two-year-long series of increasingly complex CWMD-focused training events. These have included both live and virtual training exercises, leveraging the training venues available in the ROK.

Beginning with a basic command, control, computers, and intelligence integration exercise, training has since evolved into combined ROK-U.S. exercises, integrating conventional forces, special operations forces, specialized CBRNE elements, and explosive ordnance disposal elements. This process provided numerous lessons and revealed a number of capability gaps associated with the division’s ability to execute CWMD operations.

During a recent conference with Naval Postgraduate School students, Maj. Gen. Thomas Vandal, commanding general
of the 2nd Infantry Division, noted, “If anything, the emphasis we’ve placed on this mission and on training for it has highlighted how far yet we have to go.” The complexities inherent in CWMD missions run the full spectrum: from policy issues that have the potential to affect tactical operations, to materiel gaps, to emerging doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures.

**Tactical CWMD Challenges**

Tactical CWMD operations pose unique challenges to maneuver forces. First, conventional forces tasked with CWMD may not necessarily own their operational area. Those forces may have a requirement to isolate, seize, and secure certain facilities; yet, they could be required to coordinate—gain permission of allies—to move through friendly operational areas to the specified objective. Units can expect to execute passages of lines across each individual alliance unit boundary to their assigned objective area. Therefore, each phase of a CWMD mission may be conducted in an environment where movement is constrained by the speed and quality of coordination with the terrain owner. Additionally, operational areas, designated by allied or coalition units, are small enough to effectively limit the effects a commander can employ inside them.

A unit that does not own the terrain may be executing CWMD operations within another force’s operational area, with a lack of compatible communications systems, and with friendly units comprised largely of an amalgam of survivors from former jihadist formations that the United States spent over a decade fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is the scenario that Army conventional forces could face in a number of places throughout the Middle East and North Africa today.

In contrast, although the 2nd Infantry Division would operate in an environment where it has lived and trained for over 60 years, the process of coordinating movement and operations is uniquely complex and challenging. This coordination requires a minimum of five combat support liaison teams, each composed of 20 to 25 soldiers, embedded with five different ROK Army corps headquarters. These teams are not standard table-of-organization-and-equipment elements, which requires the division to create them from within the staff. During combat operations, the division would likely reduce its staff by more than 100 personnel to meet these liaison requirements.

The 2nd Infantry Division headquarters is able to train for this coordination routinely through a robust annual exercise program. Two theater exercises and one to two division command post exercises afford the division the ability to train with its ROK Army partners. Additionally, echelons from platoon to brigade headquarters routinely train with ROK Army units, further building the common understanding necessary for interoperability. This would not be the case with a contingency CWMD operation in another theater. Units should prepare to create liaison teams to support
Preparing for CWMD Tactical Operations

One of the first lessons that the 2nd Infantry Division learned as it began focusing on CWMD is that these operations are not raids; they are deliberate combined arms maneuver operations conducted over extended periods. U.S. Army units excel at the rapid isolation, seizure, and securing of terrain.

However, CWMD missions extend beyond taking control of a piece of ground. The time involved in the exploitation phase of a CWMD operation in an industrial-sized WMD complex—using explosive ordnance disposal, specialty CBRNE forces, and military intelligence units—is almost impossible to estimate until the force is physically on the objective and the various technical enablers conduct an initial tactical site exploitation and facilities assessment. Depending on the size of the objective, this process alone can take several days. Often, depending on what the unit finds on site, the reward for success could be a lengthy stay, waiting for completion of tactical exploitation and for follow-on forces to arrive and take over security on the objective. This requires tactical patience on the part of commanders who may be accustomed to seizing an objective and then moving on to the next objective.

Nevertheless, CWMD operations require CBRNE training beyond simple passive defense. CBRNE passive defense—hard, realistic training in mission-oriented protective posture, instilling the physical and psychological hardening required to operate for extended periods—has not been a priority over the last decade or so of counterinsurgency operations. The CBRN noncommissioned officer position is no longer part of most line companies, adding to the challenge of regaining lost skill sets. CBRN training management and CBRN equipment maintenance became additional duties.

Further complicating things, Skill Level 1 CBRNE task competency is only the start of preparing for CWMD operations, not the end state. Getting a unit to where it can shoot, move, communicate, and sustain in mission-oriented protective posture is the bare minimum. Units will need to become comfortable operating in full protective posture for extended periods. They will need to incorporate psychological hardening into their training, as soldiers will potentially operate with dangerous materials in unfamiliar, hostile environments.

Additionally, units must understand how to integrate technical enablers—CBRN response teams, nuclear disablement teams, explosive ordnance disposal teams—and their equipment during CWMD.
missions. Each of these teams is a highly specialized, extremely low-density asset. Conventional forces should seek opportunities to train with these specialty forces to understand their capabilities, limitations, and operational requirements. Training ensures familiarity with these forces as well as their unique support requirements.

Conventional forces must be trained on the basics of target recognition and facility familiarization. Teaching soldiers to recognize a gas hexafluoride container, or to identify and report the J-hooks indicating glass-lined reactor vessels in a chemical plant, or to know the difference between reactor vessels and fermenters in a biological plant, pays dividends in reducing the time spent on the objective doing initial assessment.

In addition, there is a survivability benefit to training. Most of the material in a WMD production or storage site is sensitive or physically unstable. This requires caution in handling and the implementation of fire control measures to prevent collateral damage from a potential firefight. Training to control weapons effects around the exterior and within the interior of a nerve agent plant, for example, can make the difference between success and catastrophic failure. Likewise, a door built like a bank vault cannot be breached like a bank vault. In a biological weapons plant or a nuclear materials storage area, the big door is there to keep hazardous materials inside.

It is imperative commanders understand that it takes a combination of time, education, and training to achieve proficiency in CWMD operations. At the time of this writing, numerous organizations throughout the Army and other services, the DOD, the intelligence community, and the interagency community are aggressively pursuing material and nonmaterial solutions to the challenges associated with CWMD.

Notwithstanding, one final challenge remains: synchronization among the different stakeholders. No single authority in the U.S. government is synchronizing efforts toward established end states. Consequently, duplication of effort is likely to occur.

Recommendations

Commanders should prepare their units for CWMD by focusing on a number of high-payoff individual and collective tasks. Individually, the eleven Skill Level 1 CBRN defensive tasks listed in Soldier Training Publication (STP) 21-1 SMCT are the minimum requirements for successfully operating in and around a WMD site.

Small-unit collective training should include the following tactical tasks, found in FM 7-15:

- Conduct Tactical Troop Movements (Army Tactical Task 1.3), especially within another formation’s area of operations.
- Isolate WMD Sites (Army Tactical Task 6.9.2.3.1).
- Exploit WMD Sites (Army Tactical Task 6.9.2.3.2).
- Conduct CBRN Defense (Army Tactical Task 6.9.3).
- Conduct CBRN Surveillance (Army Tactical Task 6.9.3.2.1.2), including radiation exposure tasks.
- Perform CBRN Decontamination (Army Tactical Task 6.9.3.2.3).

Large-unit collective training should focus on controlling unit radiation exposure. Ideally, a large-unit collective training event will culminate in a CWMD situational training exercise or command post exercise specifically tailored to an assigned theater or area of operations, focused on isolating the objective and the initial assessment.

Finally, units must deploy with all authorized CBRN defense equipment, and before deployment, every soldier should have a current mask fit and validation.

To overcome the challenges associated with the lack of synchronization of CWMD efforts, the U.S. government must establish a holistic program, one that ties the vast and dispersed members of the CMWD community into a common campaign plan. The simplest and least expensive way ahead is to capitalize on processes that already exist. The Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction Warfighting Forum is one such process. Chaired by the Eighth U.S. Army commanding general, it meets every quarter, with council of colonel meetings to shape the agenda during the off months. This forum, or a comparable one, should be expanded from its present, largely technical discussion, to include members from across the CWMD community and incorporate material more relevant to warfighters at every echelon.
**Conclusion**

The U.S. Army will face the challenges associated with preparing for and executing CWMD operations for some time to come. Dealing with CWMD operations will likely include conventional forces. To this end, the 2nd Infantry Division has been preparing for such missions in close coordination with its ROK Army partners for several years, developing a number of tactics, techniques, and procedures to enable tactical CWMD operations. Moreover, the wider CWMD community continues to work to support soldier and unit preparation in anticipation of such missions. Nonetheless, success in the event of a crisis will ultimately depend on unity of effort at the operational and strategic levels.

Using an expanded medium modeled after initiatives such as the Eighth Army CWMD Warfighting Forum could help synchronize the whole-of-government effort to prepare for dealing with CWMD events.

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**Notes**


6. A JRTC rotation in October of 2013 contained a CWMD mission that looked at small-scale facilities. The recently completed NTC rotation 14-03, in January 2014 expanded this training to include multiple CBRNE facilities and EOD events, as well as the creation of a new Observer/Controller team, Team Desert Fox, specifically for the CBRN Task Force that consisted of maneuver elements and specialty CBRN and EOD technical enablers. NTC rotation 14-08 in June of 2014 expanded this training even further to include CWMD operations in industrial-sized facilities and incorporate ROK maneuver and technical forces.


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Survivability, Sustainability, and Maneuverability
The Need for Joint Unity of Effort in Implementing the DOD Arctic Strategy at the Tactical and Operational Levels

Capt. Nathan Fry, U.S. Army National Guard
As tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union developed in the years following World War II, United States military planners and strategists focused substantial effort and resources on the challenge of Arctic and cold weather warfare, in large part because of potential territorial disputes in areas where Russia bordered Alaska as well as the northern frontier of U.S. ally Canada. Challenged by operational and tactical difficulties in Korea’s cold and mountainous environments as well as the threat of the Soviets’ assumed superiority in cold weather operations, the U.S. Army conducted a series of exercises throughout the 1950s with names such as Ice Cap, Lode Star, Nanook, and Deep Freeze. It produced reports detailing experience and requirements relative to Arctic and sub-Arctic operations well into the late 1970s.¹

However, by the 1980s, competing military and political demands forced Arctic operations strategy and planning into a dormant state that continued into the first decade of the new millennium. This decline in strategic interest reflected predictions that the Arctic would not become truly important again to strategic planners until “valuable deposits of critical war minerals should be discovered” and made critical by “worldwide scarcity” in more accessible regions.²

The Need for a Viable Arctic Strategy

Today, as war in Iraq and Afghanistan assumes a lower priority in NATO members’ national defense strategies, and as the majority of forces are withdrawn from those countries, strategic planners are beginning to anticipate other plausible future conflicts of significant interest. Given that the previous decade has seen the opening of the Northwest Passage, resulting in an increase in commercial and recreational maritime traffic and a significant influx of business interests in the region, one can convincingly argue that an area of emerging strategic concern to the United States should be the Arctic.³

Of the world’s current and aspiring Arctic powers, four of the five countries whose physical borders or territories cross the Arctic Circle seem to be recognizing the need to adjust defense capabilities and to be taking...
steps to create or augment specialized ground-combat units to meet emerging Arctic demands. Notably, Canada, Norway, and Russia have realigned entire units to focus on Arctic readiness and operations. However, the United States has no specialized Arctic warfare capability, despite Alaska holding a substantial portion of valuable territory bordering Russia—which recently has shown few qualms in seizing land with ambiguous territorial boundaries elsewhere.

Notably, Canada, Norway, and Russia have realigned entire units to focus on Arctic readiness and operations. However, the United States has no specialized Arctic warfare capability, despite Alaska holding a substantial portion of valuable territory bordering Russia—which recently has shown few qualms in seizing land with ambiguous territorial boundaries elsewhere.

Though the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) published Arctic Strategy in 2013, the document is, at best, a generalized approach to operations. Its content illustrates the U.S. military’s lack of deep understanding regarding the Arctic problem set and is rife with general tasks that, without significant attention, are currently impossible to implement at the tactical and operational levels.

In subsequent and supporting publications to the DOD’s Arctic Strategy, the U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Coast Guard have shown a focused and serious approach to preparing for Arctic operations. In contrast, the U.S. Army has thus far shown very little interest in the Arctic at the strategic level. This translates into a lack of readiness to respond to any contingencies that might arise for Arctic warfare.

Since there is no formal requirement for U.S. Army, Army Reserve, or Army National Guard units to prepare for Arctic warfare, current force generation structure and personnel management policies continue to undermine building specialty skills in active duty units needed to adequately defend U.S. interests in the Arctic. Also, on-hand Arctic equipment is outdated and inadequate for extended Arctic use. The United States has, as Siemon Wezeman points out in his multicountry study on Arctic military capabilities, fallen into the historical trap of confusing forces stationed in cold climates with Arctic-capable forces.

For example, the Army maintains two combat brigades and multiple support units in Alaska that, although stationed in the north, do not have specific requirements to operate in the Arctic. Historically, confusion between northern and Arctic warfare is a recurring phenomenon. It nearly always results in a large number of environmental and enemy-induced casualties when a northern-trained force that thinks itself well-suited to Arctic conditions confronts a true Arctic specialty force.

**Lessons Learned from Arctic Training**

Recent U.S. military experience tends to confirm the misconception among Army personnel trained in northern warfare that they are Arctic-warfare capable. In February and March 2014, 14 soldiers from the 86th Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Vermont and Maine Army National Guard), the Army Mountain Warfare School, the 10th Mountain Division Lightfighter School, and the Asymmetric Warfare Group joined the 35th Canadian Brigade Group’s Arctic response company for Exercise Guerrier Nordique. The exercise, for which U.S. participation was in its fourth year, occurred in the highest latitude in exercise history—the vicinity of Iqaluit, Baffin Island, Nunavut Territory, Canada. So impressed were the members of the U.S. Guerrier Nordique team with the challenges of Arctic warfare that they resolved to record their experiences in an effort to call the U.S. Army’s attention
to its critical lack of ability to operate in Arctic environments.

As the members of the U.S. element learned during participation in Operation Guerrier Nordique, when temperatures drop to extreme lows, tasks become exponentially more difficult and in some cases impossible to perform using standard cold-weather techniques—such as those that may work at Fort Drum, New York or Camp Ethan Allen, Vermont. The level of cold in Arctic environments, especially when exacerbated by wind and physical terrain, requires a significantly different operational mentality and equipment design methodology than for northern warfare.

Put simply, despite the recent steps DOD has taken toward articulating an Arctic strategy and some increased military attention on the challenges of Arctic operations, current defense efforts do not fully recognize or appreciate the need for a joint ground presence and therefore fail to address the logistical, educational, and operational infrastructure required for successful tactical ground operations in the Arctic.

Attaining the strategic goals outlined in DOD’s Arctic Strategy will require the Army and joint ground warfighting community to focus major attention at the tactical and operational levels on survivability, sustainability, and maneuverability as applied specifically to Arctic environments.

It is vital to emphasize that the foundation of all operations in the Arctic is having human and material resources that can properly function in the extreme cold of the Arctic environment and provide a basic level of survivability. For example, if a person, vehicle, or flashlight fails as soon as it is exposed to a temperature of 50 degrees below zero Fahrenheit, it fails the survivability test and is therefore useless in Arctic operations.10

To illustrate, the author of this article observed, while interacting with the Canadian Rangers (comprised mostly of native peoples whose home and natural environment are the Arctic and sub-Arctic) that everything they used had a specific use for a specific condition. For example, seal skin, dog fur, and caribou fur all have slightly different advantages and properties that the Rangers know and employ properly according to environmental circumstances.11

The lesson learned was that understanding the nuances between pieces of equipment or resources that seem to have an identical purpose equals the difference between success and failure in an Arctic environment. As Arctic strategist Col. Charles McAfee pointed out, taking a piece of equipment that functions well in temperate or moderately cold weather and trying to adapt it to the Arctic environment by “[adding] kits, devices, and assemblages which complicate the item and increase the difficulty of maintenance” rarely meet Arctic survivability requirements.12

The 86th Infantry Brigade Combat Team’s Guerrier Nordique 2014 contingent observed such deficiencies with their clothing, shelters, sleep systems, stoves, and packs. For example, normal military rucksacks, suitable for northern warfare, crushed the insulation in the Extreme Cold Weather Clothing System layers and...
cut off blood flow to the arms and hands. This caused cold and numbness in hands and fingers to develop rapidly, and significantly increased the danger of cold weather injuries. Moreover, the Extreme Cold Weather Clothing System itself, while functioning decently in the cold weather of Vermont, exhibited major design flaws in Arctic conditions.13

Such challenges are not unique to U.S. forces trying to overcome the challenges of the Arctic environment. Despite Canadian advances in certain areas of survivability, such as with his cold weather clothing, the Canadian Army still struggles to solve critical challenges of Arctic warfare, such as the use of ceramic body armor and updated tent designs. That the Canadian Army continues to work through its Arctic tactics and techniques, with its wealth of institutional knowledge in Arctic warfare, is a telling indicator of the challenges of operating in such an extreme environment. This further underscores the need for the U.S. Army and joint community to begin focused preparation immediately.

Apart from equipment concerns, it is also important to emphasize the human dimension of survivability. In the author’s conversations with the 35th Canadian Brigade Group’s lead Arctic trainer, Master Warrant Officer Carl Pelletier, he frequently noted that the Arctic response companies have significant difficulty retaining young soldiers after their rotation into a winter Arctic environment. While the troops fare well during summer training, the misery and demands of the cold drive many soldiers to resign soon after returning from their first winter Arctic exercise.14

Pelletier’s observations echo those of Col. Harold Hansen, an infantry officer writing about mountain and cold weather operations in 1957: “Operations in

National Guard soldiers from Maine and Vermont worked with members of the 35th Canadian Forces Brigade at Baffin Island, just south of the Arctic Circle, as part of Exercise Guerrier Nordique, 4 March 2014.

(Photo by Staff Sgt. Sean Keefe, Maine Army National Guard)
the Arctic and high mountains require a particular breed of man,” he observed.15 Hansen wrote this reflected the need for enthusiastic and committed volunteers like those that populated the ranks of airborne and special operations units. Hansen also noted that, in addition to the mental demands of the extreme cold, the techniques for operating in the cold often demand acquisition of skills such as skiing, which only a fraction of normal infantry troops can master.16 For the U.S. Army and joint community, this means that developing the proper equipment only partially solves the challenge of aligning the proper resources to the survivability principle.

There is a significant challenge in recruiting and retaining personnel willing to spend considerable time under stressful conditions mastering Arctic warfare. As the United States moves toward implementing its Arctic defense strategy, it must devote considerable effort toward putting the proper resources in the hands of the proper personnel to establish the foundation for success in the Arctic.

As the Army creates a pool of human and material resources that enable survivability in the Arctic, it must concurrently deal with the issue of sustainability. Perhaps more than any other operational environment, the Arctic demands a logistic system that provides a continuous stream of support to its ground troops. Although other environments present hazards, such as a lack of water in desert operations, the cold of the Arctic greatly magnifies potential hazards and is utterly unforgiving. As 1st Sgt. Todd Gagnon of the Guerrier Nordique 2014 team observed, “There is no glide path [in the Arctic]. If you don’t have the right supplies, if there is any pause in sustainment, everything shuts down.”17 Therefore, extraordinarily detailed logistic and sustainment planning must accompany the decision to move a military presence into the Arctic and conduct operations.18

Experiences in Exercise Guerrier Nordique 2014 on Baffin Island provide excellent examples of the challenges in supplying land operations. First, due to the thickness of ice on Frobisher Bay, which stopped any ship traffic, air was the only feasible option for transporting supplies and personnel to the logistics point. Second, once infantry platoons deployed from the point of debarkation, they could not perform as semi-autonomous light infantry maneuver elements due to the constant and rapid consumption of stove fuel. Rather, sustainment teams had to maintain a daily resupply run via snowmobile to the distant camps to provide each company with the required 64 gallons of fuel per day to melt water, heat food, and keep shelter interior temperatures around zero degrees Fahrenheit.19

However, these logistic lines were clearly unstable. Even in a noncombat environment, severe weather and multiple vehicle breakdowns always threatened the logistic team’s ability to provide supplies to its deployed units.20 In a combat environment, given surface-to-air threats to air resupply and the need for security during ground resupply, the job would be significantly more challenging. As many soldiers observed during a tense period when a storm delayed supply efforts and forced the Guerrier Nordique team to ration fuel, the easiest way to immediately incapacitate an Arctic force is to disrupt its supply lines.

While working out issues of sustainability and survivability, a unit must concurrently overcome challenges that address the critical task of maneuverability since that component enables a unit to accomplish the combat mission for which it was sent. As with non-Arctic operations, it is not until a unit can accomplish the basic soldier tasks of shoot, move, and communicate that it is truly prepared to operate in the Arctic as a military element capable of projecting force. As such, mastering the principle of Arctic maneuverability marks the transition into true Arctic combat effectiveness.

Winter combat actions in the Russo-Finnish War and certain battles of World War II illustrate that light infantry troops with cold weather clothing and skis do not constitute an Arctic force; and, when they face true Arctic formations, the large and well-equipped light infantry unit cannot match a light, maneuverable Arctic formation.21 As Pelletier repeatedly stated during the Guerrier Nordique rotations, “Arctic warfare is a skill you must acquire over time … that is why the Arctic response companies do operations and the regular [Canadian] forces just survive.”22 In other words, the frequent personnel rotations in the regular forces degrade the Arctic knowledge base every few years, while the response companies’ low personnel-rotation cycle enables them to build a more experienced force capable of transitioning from mere survival to Arctic
operations. Military researchers David A. Hoffman and Greg Netardus also underscore this point: One of the greatest detrimental factors [in] the U.S. Army [in regard to] Cold Weather Mountain operations is [the Army’s] ... need to constantly rotate personnel. There are very few soldiers who have the requisite skills to move into [an Arctic] unit and be proficient, either as a leader or as a unit member. These skills take years to refine and become a cohesive operational entity.23

In short, merely possessing the equipment and logistics required to fight in the Arctic is not sufficient for success—a unit must understand how to overcome the challenges and use its resources to project combat power. This can only be done by constantly training in the Arctic environment.

Apart from the support and personnel issues, one of the U.S. Army’s major shortfalls with employing its limited Arctic resources is a lack of formal maneuver and sustainment tactics. Current doctrine, built upon experiences in relatively temperate environments, fails to address the changes that a force must make in its maneuver tactics to fight and win in an Arctic environment.

Arctic tacticians and practitioners repeatedly stress two main tenants of warfare that conflict with current trends in our brigade-sized, offense-heavy warfare: first, that the upper hand in an Arctic fight goes to the defender, and second, that the most lethal unit is the mobile small unit.24 In the event of an Arctic conflict, it is likely that the need for extensive logistic lines and the difficulty in maneuvering non-Arctic combat vehicles or large dismounted formations will force opposing armies into mobile defensive lines and tactics resembling Lt. Erwin Rommel’s mountain maneuvers in the 12th Battle of Isonzo during World War I.25 The defender who can sustain its force against the enemy and the elements while simultaneously making slow, creeping progress towards its goal will win the day against an enemy who moves quickly but outruns its supply lines and leaves its soldiers at the mercy of the environment.

In developing Arctic maneuver and sustainment tactics, the U.S. Army and joint ground warfighting community will invariably need to augment its very few ski- and mountain-trained troops because, as Col. Walter Downing observed in his 1954 study on future Arctic warfare, the diverse landscape of “[ice] barrens, ... muskeg, rugged mountains, and almost impassible scrub forests” will require forces to traverse snow, ice, rock, and swamp to reach their objectives.26 To illustrate, during Guerrier Nordique 2014, a team landing on Frobisher’s Farthest Island arrived at the beginning of the tidal fall. While the first team walked onto the island, subsequent teams to arrive faced the emergence of an ice cliff exposed by the falling tide, which required the use of basic mountaineering tasks to bypass the obstacle.

In addition to these terrain challenges, consider the effects of degraded communications due to ionospheric blackouts; inaccuracy of traditional compasses; and the difficulty in using the limited cover and concealment to hide a bullet’s ice fog trails, vehicle exhaust plumes, and thermal indicators. One begins to see that Arctic maneuver doctrine will encompass a significantly different way of conducting small-unit warfare to maintain combat superiority.

At the root of the current lack of progress toward a unified joint Arctic and mountain operational requirement is the failure to unify efforts among the few elements scattered among several key organizations in the U.S. military that do practice these increasingly critical skills. In violation of a key doctrinal tenant specified in Joint Publication 1, Joint Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, there is a decided lack of unity of effort within joint ground warfighting units toward establishing the tactical and operational capacity to fulfill the tenets of the DOD’s Arctic Strategy. This begins with the failure to establish “a common philosophy, a common language, a common purpose” in the form of universal joint task list tasks that address Arctic and mountain operational requirements.27

The Northern Warfare Training Center in Alaska, the Mountain Warfare School and the associated 86th Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Mountain) in Vermont, U.S. Army-Alaska, the Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Center, and various elements of special operations forces all maintain independent small cadres of personnel with the requisite skill base for operating in Arctic environments. However, the distance and lack of a formal requirement to operate together results in an ad hoc and informal networking
relationship that undermines our military’s ability to make substantial headway in developing a joint Arctic warfare capability.

**Conclusion**

As Chad Briggs observed, “changing environmental conditions … create new security risks where none existed before.” He goes on to say that military threats likewise shift, demand a new strategic focus, and, in some extreme cases, require an entirely new tactical approach to maneuver warfare.

The Arctic region requires just such a shift in strategic focus. The time may well be coming when countries collide over their interests in the Arctic and sub-Arctic regions. Although we hope for peaceful expansion of business interests and governance into the Arctic, we must also prudently prepare to defend national interests at the top of the world against those who would oppose us or seek to exert control over the region. At present, we are not prepared for such a contingency.

In the face of such a clear and plausible danger, strategic-level leaders and planners should be aware that despite having articulated a formal Arctic strategy for DOD, current capabilities at the joint tactical and operational levels do not include adequately trained and equipped ground combat units who could perform successful Arctic operations. Furthermore, while a small contingent of leaders and instructors in various U.S. military units maintain a certain depth of knowledge in Arctic operations and the associated skills, the Army and joint community lack the critical institutional knowledge and the trained and experienced personnel necessary to quickly create and employ enough units capable of accomplishing the kinds of major operations that may be needed in the Arctic region. As the Arctic becomes indisputably more important and other nations with Arctic borders move toward increased operational capability in the region, every year of delay puts the U.S. military at further risk of being unprepared to defend its own interests or those of its NATO allies in the region. As Arctic explorer Vilhjalmur Stefansson wrote in his treatise *The Northward Course of Empire*, “There is no northern boundary beyond which productive enterprise cannot go until North meets North on opposite shores of the Arctic Ocean.”

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3. Anthony Harrigan, “Northern Defense Frontier,” *Military Review* (Dec 1969): 3-8; Bob E. Edwards, “The Role of the Army in Polar Regions” (student paper, Army War College, 1960), 8. Interestingly, many of the Arctic strategists of the 1950s voiced common assertions that the Arctic, although potential key terrain during the Cold War due to the short distance between the United States and former USSR, would not truly reach its potential until the “mining potential of the Far North should be tapped … harbor areas and storage areas should be constructed … [and] giant vessels regularly ply the Northwest Passage,” attracting sufficient government and business interest to require a military focus on the region.


7. Wezeman, 1.

8. Rex Finley, personal interview with author, 5 May 2014.


11. Canadian Rangers, Personal conversation with author, 4 March 2014. During Guerrier Nordique, the author and the U.S. team members spent considerable time conversing with and learning from the Canadian Rangers. Comprised almost entirely of native Arctic peoples, the Rangers are the most knowledgeable Arctic practitioners in the Canadian Army. In one conversation, the Rangers detailed the differences between various types of skins and furs in relation to their water resistance, warmth, durability, and breathability. The Rangers choose what skin or fur they wear based on the conditions at hand.


13. The outer loft jacket and pants have no functional pockets for carrying equipment and, because standard fighting-load carriers also crush insulation and freeze when worn on the exterior, many soldiers during Exercise Guerrier Nordique 2014 resorted to carrying items in interior pockets where they were extremely hard to access. In contrast, the Canadian insulation system incorporates large exterior pockets that hold ammunition magazines, flashlights, maps, and other mission-critical combat equipment that typically resides in or on the fighting-load carrier. This design allows access to mission-critical gear, maintains insulation loft, and prevents equipment from fully freezing.


17. Todd Gagnon, personal interview with author, 10 March 2014.


19. Pelletier.

20. Eek, 10.


22. Pelletier.


What Lessons Did We Learn (or Re-Learn) About Military Advising After 9/11?

Lt. Col. Remi Hajjar, U.S. Army

As military operations in Afghanistan continue to wind down in 2014, the U.S. military and international partner armed forces need to codify lessons learned on military advising from 9/11 to the present, with special emphasis on capturing insights from the two major counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. A compendium of lessons should include answers to certain essential questions. What major advising lessons did the U.S. military learn since 9/11? What current advising lessons parallel previously gleaned insights from historic advising missions? How should
armed forces treat the advising mission after the troops withdraw from Afghanistan?

The main purpose of this article is to provide a set of the most important military advising lessons learned from past and present. These lessons have been distilled from comparing historical and contemporary advisory experiences extracted from dozens of sources including military journal articles, doctrine, book chapters, and monographs. Although my tour as an advisor in Iraq from 2009-2010 proved informative, I tried to canvass and examine myriad advising sources with an open mind toward capturing the major patterns that emerged.

Recognizing that recording every germane advisory insight in a single short article would be an impossible task, I focus instead on presenting a discrete set of the most salient major contemporary military advising lessons learned in the post-9/11 era, with special focus on combat advising in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some of these lessons learned apply directly to individual advisors, while other topics provide organizational-level insights and considerations for the U.S. military and its friends and allies.

History of the U.S. Military Advising Mission

Military advisors are not a new phenomenon for the U.S. military. In fact, they played a key role in the founding of the United States itself. A small group of competent and dedicated Prussian, French, and other military advisors helped emerging Continental Army forces increase their warfighting capability and professionalism as they waged war against the British Crown for their freedom.

These included such notables as Prussian officer Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben, who produced early manuals of arms, drills, and other training products to instill discipline and order into the new Continental Army. The efforts of advisors such as von Steuben ultimately helped the fledgling American nation successfully fight for and win its independence.4

America’s relatively short national history includes significant involvement in sponsoring numerous large- and small-scale advising missions for strategic reasons of its own. Some of the purposes to advise include, “modernization, nation building, economic penetration or purposes, ideological reasons, and counterinsurgency.”5

Among the more prominent examples, U.S. advisors were assigned to work with surviving national military leaders in Japan and Germany after World War II to stabilize the societies of their war-torn nations and then help rebuild military forces appropriate for each nation’s post-war national defense. The nature of those advisory relationships reflected the idiosyncratic post-Hitler landscape in Germany as well as the post-atomic bomb setting in Japan. Each case required close association among U.S. advisors and military units with German and Japanese military forces for a prolonged period. Not coincidentally, the close working relationships that developed between U.S. advisors and their foreign counterparts, coupled with the subsequent establishment of military bases in Germany and Japan, provided the United States with vital regional and strategic advantages.

In another example, a contingent of U.S. advisors working with South Korean military forces during the Korean War era provided significant leverage against North Korea to halt its aggression.3 Furthermore, the success of U.S. advisors led to the establishment of a permanent U.S. military presence in South Korea, which has facilitated the U.S. advising mission there from the Korean War to the present.

This particular advising mission has not only contributed to a dramatic improvement of South Korean security force capabilities over the long term, but also has enabled U.S. and South Korean military units to train and prepare together. Advisory support has thus undergirded America’s longstanding pledge to stand by its South Korean ally in its still unsettled conflict with North Korea.

In another instance of U.S. advisory support to an ally, America’s preliminary entrance into the Vietnam War began with the covert deployment of Special Forces advisors to work with the South Vietnamese military. As the United States officially entered the war with the deployment of a large conventional force to Vietnam, the advising mission eventually grew in size and scope beyond the capability of Special Forces. This led to significant use of conventional forces in an advisory role.4 One consequence was that by the time the United States withdrew from Vietnam, the U.S. military had acquired broad institutional experience...
with a wide array of pertinent advising lessons and skills. However, for a variety of reasons, including some misunderstandings of—and some outright resistance toward—the “softer” unconventional advising mission by the combat-focused mainstream U.S. military, the Army did not internalize and preserve its advising lessons from Vietnam. Consequently, as the Army distanced itself from the memory of the Vietnam experience and turned its attention to the threat of large-scale standing conventional communist forces in the context of the Cold War, it gradually forgot many of the hard-earned lessons about advising (despite some small-scale conventional advising missions that occurred after Vietnam).5

In any case, as the mainstream U.S. military gradually shelved the advising mission, U.S. Army Special Forces wholly adopted the unconventional advising mission as one of its core charters. Thus, after the Vietnam War, Special Forces honed their advising capabilities and deployed military advisors to numerous regions around the globe—albeit typically in much smaller advisor teams—while the conventional Army generally lost its advising capability until the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts after 9/11.

Relevant Lessons from the Korean and Vietnam Wars to the Present

A retrospective of the U.S. military’s historic advising experiences provides some vital insights and lessons learned that are consistent with the contemporary advising lessons offered in this article.6 Despite some differences between the past and the present, many historic advising mission insights from the Korean and Vietnam Wars ring true with relevance for the present. These include the importance of building relationships with foreign counterparts; the need to draw on numerous pertinent skills, including combat proficiency; the requirement for substantial cross-cultural and
diplomatic skills; the significance of relevant military expertise; the importance of role modeling (from appropriate moral boundaries to proper military procedures); and, the need for adaptability and flexibility (to adjust to unique, ambiguous, and shifting conditions).

Among the first obstacles U.S. advisors had to overcome during the Korean and Vietnam War eras was the low opinion conventional military units commonly held with regard to the advisory mission. Mainstream U.S. military organizations commonly misunderstood and tended to marginalize the unconventional advising mission due to the belief that the advisory mission was a soft activity of questionable utility as compared to traditional, conventional combat operations.

In addition to the challenge of overcoming skepticism and a lack of support from U.S. units, advisors also had to perform a highly stressful cross-cultural juggling act with their foreign counterparts. Advisors had to simultaneously understand counterpart military units’ disparate cultures and objectives—and try to align their counterparts’ objectives with those of the U.S. military.

Successful advisors effectively balanced these diverse interests by adopting a patient, tolerant, and diplomatic approach with their counterparts. In contrast, unsuccessful U.S. advisors included those who inadequately muzzled the commanding, take-charge styles they typically used with U.S. troop formations. Additionally, some advisors suffered from expecting their South Korean or South Vietnamese counterparts to mirror U.S. military procedures or meet U.S. performance standards, which proved to be an unreasonable and ineffectual advisory approach for the circumstances. And, at other times, advisors inappropriately tried to give orders to their counterparts, even though advisors did not possess the command authority to do so.

Some U.S. advisors’ inability or unwillingness to change these approaches toward their South Korean or South Vietnamese counterparts reduced their effectiveness, or worse, aroused hostility. In some extreme cases, South Korean counterparts intentionally stranded their most-hated U.S. advisors on battlefields during the Korean War, which illustrated how some advisors’ lack of cross-cultural skills reduced their chances of survival in combat situations.7

In addition, it is useful to compare the impact of new technologies in previous eras of advisors with contemporary times. The introduction of new technologies appears to have had similar effects on the U.S. advising missions over time. For example, during the Vietnam War, for the first time in history, U.S. citizens watched reports (though sanitized) about the war on television, while an extremely small number of Vietnamese citizens shared the same technological window to view new developments in the war occurring across their own country. Though diffusion of information through technology was much slower in previous eras than today, the emergence of television with its global reach nevertheless dramatically changed the political environment in which the war was being waged, which complicated the advisor mission.

Similarly, but with a much more dramatic and quicker impact on a global scale than advisors in previous eras experienced, today’s near real-time information diffusion from the battlefield has had far reaching effects on the advising mission, with life and death implications for U.S. advisors. For example, very shortly after the global circulation of reports of Korans getting burned along with common trash at an American military base in Afghanistan in 2012, thousands of Afghan people rioted and demonstrated across the country, resulting in damage, violence, and numerous deaths—including the deaths of some U.S. advisors who had no personal involvement in the Koran burning incident.8

Finally, historically, pockets of organizational resistance toward change within the mainstream U.S. military have often successfully marginalized and limited investment in unconventional capabilities—including advising—or anything that detracts from traditional combat capabilities. However, during periods of conflict, real-world demands often have overshadowed this sort of resistance over time. Those demands have caused the growth of unconventional capabilities, including an expanded need for advisors as well as non-combat capabilities needed to conduct stability operations and perform peace-building tasks.9 The current world situation—with conflicts erupting throughout Africa, the Middle East, Asia, Europe, and elsewhere—should provide sufficient indication that the need for such unconventional capabilities (including advising) will not diminish any time soon. On the contrary, world events suggest the conventional military will need to cultivate a broad range of advisory skills.
Major Advisory Lessons Learned or Re-Learned Since 9/11

Several major lessons learned (or re-learned) have emerged from our involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan after the attacks on 9/11. These include the need for advisors to forge strong relationships with their counterparts and linguists, the need to learn about and adapt to the unconventional military advising mission, and other key lessons that follow in this section.

Building strong relationships with counterparts is the most important aspect of the advising mission. The attribute that appears most often in the historic and contemporary military advising documents I reviewed is the need for advisors to build solid working relationships with their counterparts. To succeed in the mission, an advisor’s ability to effectively influence, counsel, teach, mentor, coach, role model, and conduct other actions that support the advising mission hinges on the establishment of rapport, trust, and a positive advisor-counterpart working relationship.

The most important method to develop a productive advisor-counterpart relationship is to create a strong personal connection. Such a relationship results from advisors’ concerted efforts to learn about their counterparts’ personal characteristics and idiosyncrasies. A productive relationship also comes from gaining greater knowledge of the overall context in which the counterparts function and then applying a variety of relevant techniques to leverage this understanding to create mutual trust and a solid bond.

The following advisory approaches (including advising methods to avoid) support creating a beneficial advisor-counterpart relationship to advance the advising mission:

- Avoid the ugly American U.S. advisor style. This is a doomed approach for military advisors. It includes being impatient, threatening, commanding, condescending, and narrow-minded; exuding a my way or the highway style; and, exhibiting United States-centric chauvinism. Such an advisory approach will fail.
- Attain cross-cultural competence to help build combat advisor-counterpart relationships and enhance advisory team survivability.
- Acquire culture-specific competence about a counterpart and the cultural context in which that person thinks and acts. To succeed, advisors must learn relevant and detailed knowledge about the counterpart, the counterpart’s organization, and, the host nation and region.
- Accept a counterpart’s hospitality, and draw on the power of informal socializing to build relationships.
- Use humor, including comical self-deprecation, to build rapport with counterparts.
- Wisely navigate delicate, sensitive issues when interacting with counterparts. Despite warnings from advisor training and doctrine about avoiding taboo topics (politics, religion, etc.), sometimes candid, but private, conversations about these topics build advisor-counterpart bonds. However, appropriate timing and settings for such conversations is essential.
- Serve as a meaningful role model through persistent professional presence.
- Build relationships with counterparts, but avoid over-identification with counterparts or ‘going native.’
- Practice cultural stretching: advisors must often enter discomfort zones and tolerate or participate in some unusual or culturally challenging events to bond.
with counterparts (e.g., trying to eat distasteful foods, letting counterparts hold the advisor’s hand, understanding that counterparts might apply harsh punishments to their own troops, and so on).

- Carefully navigate cases when cultural stretching goes too far. At times advisors need to politely refrain from events (e.g., that cross moral boundaries) and also may need to try to influence counterparts to stop certain actions—without disrespecting counterparts.17

- Remain firm while not being either commanding or too diplomatic; strong, respectful, and courteous military advisors gain their counterparts’ respect.

- Perform cost-benefit analyses about taking mission-related physical and cultural risks to help build rapport with counterparts and advance the mission. For example, sometimes advisors must work hard to acquire permission to reside on their counterparts’ bases, travel in their counterparts’ vehicles (or at least to frequently travel in convoys with their counterparts), soften their conventional military appearance standards (e.g., U.S. Special Forces advisors sometimes grow beards or wear military patches given to them by their counterparts), and so on.18

**Linguists are vital intercultural intermediaries.** A second major post-9/11 advisory lesson learned is the need for advisors to work effectively with linguists (also known as translators or interpreters). During the Iraq and Afghan conflicts, only a very small handful of advisors spoke their counterpart’s language at a working level, or worked with counterparts who spoke English at a high enough level of competence to preclude misunderstandings. Thus, the overwhelming majority of U.S. advisors had to use linguists, many of whom lacked the vocabulary and cultural understanding of both sides to provide translations beyond a basic level. This presented a special problem because without effective communications advisory missions are doomed to failure. Therefore, successful advisors developed special skills to effectively lead, build rapport with, and make full use of their linguists’ talents.

Numerous conditions had an impact on the development of solid linguist-advisor relationships. These included understanding the diverse backgrounds of the actors involved in advising sessions (linguists, counterparts, and advisors), sensitivity to the cultural nuances within different regions and counterpart organizations, and familiarity with the specialized jargon and vocabulary used in the relevant military subject matter in specific advising missions. In some cases, important technical terms and words used by the U.S. military do not exist in the counterparts’ language; thus, linguists had to coin new terms with explanations for counterparts to understand.

Additionally, advisors need to know the occupational origins of their linguists. Is the linguist a school trained military specialist (09L), or a locally contracted civilian? Further, advisors need to learn the category of their linguist in terms of language proficiency as rated by military testing. These issues, in addition to a variety of other circumstances and factors, influence how advisors partner with linguists to advise successfully.19

Since linguists also fill the role of vital intercultural intermediaries between advisors and counterparts in the advising mission, advisors must effectively form bonds and relationships of trust with their linguists.20 A productive advisor-linguist relationship is a
prerequisite to successfully building relationships with counterparts. The following precepts support successful advisor-linguist relationships that advance the military advising mission:

- Advisors must carefully select and hire suitable linguists; linguists selected should either already possess, or show a willingness to learn, sufficient cross-cultural and language skills as well as demonstrate the ability to learn to operate in a military context.

- Advisors must build strong relationships with linguists through informal and on-the-job time spent together.

- Linguists must mentor their advisors about relevant cultural details and help advisors learn some of the language of polite protocol (e.g., important “meet and greet” phrases) to advance the advising mission.

- Advisors must ensure their linguists’ cultural backgrounds (including linguists’ open-mindedness towards counterparts) and language skills are well suited for the specific mission’s needs.

- Advisors must influence linguists to serve as full advisory team members, but not to assume a dominant or lead role. Advisors need to strike the right balance between not relegating linguists to the sidelines while preventing linguists with strong personalities from dominating.

- Advisors’ effective leadership of linguists must extend beyond the advising mission with counterparts and include ensuring healthy interactions among linguists and other members of their U.S. units.

- Advisors must diligently and consistently prepare in advance with linguists for advising sessions and meetings with counterparts.

- Advisors need to use sound techniques for working with linguists while talking with counterparts: advisors should avoid using acronyms, highly technical jargon, and lengthy speeches without taking breaks.21

Conventional forces must adapt to the unconventional military advising mission. The advisory role had been primarily handled by the Special Forces since Vietnam.22 However, the post-9/11 conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan highlighted the substantial need for advisors in such conflicts, causing conventional U.S. military forces to undertake a larger role in the advising mission. One result was that many contemporary mainstream advisors felt caught in a dilemma as they conducted the unconventional advising mission while operating within the sometimes overly rigid or cumbersome conventional military.

Some telling differences exist between the approach of the smaller and more nimble U.S. Special Forces and that of the larger and more lumbering conventional military to the advising mission. Special Forces advisors tend to benefit from mission-essential flexibility, adaptability, and the knowledge and lessons of an organization accustomed to conducting the unconventional mission over several decades. In contrast, advisors from the conventional force often experience the growing pains of serving in an organization with
less advising experience and know-how. As a result, at times, conventional-force advisors suffer from an overly constraining conventional military modus operandi.23

There are several questions and issues that combat advisors who fall under conventional commands must be prepared to encounter. For example, will their leaders and policies enable them to unconventionally adapt to their circumstances to best accomplish the mission? Will conventional combat advisors be permitted to live on their counterparts’ bases, travel in their counterparts’ vehicles, and frequently visit their counterparts in combat zones? Or, will advisors be compelled to rigidly follow all convoy rule requirements even if doing so reduces time spent with counterparts? Will combat advisors be allowed to alter their military appearance standards while working with counterparts (e.g., to grow a beard for an advising tour in Afghanistan or to make minor uniform modifications such as wearing a badge awarded by a counterpart)?24

These are important questions because combat conditions require the Army to strike a delicate and vital balance. On one hand, the force must ensure security, safety, and important soldier standards. On the other hand, it must adequately empower combat advisors by allowing some beneficial unconventional actions so advisors can build camaraderie and trust with counterparts.

**Overcome the second-tier military advising mission syndrome.** Despite some high-ranking political-military leaders that espouse the tremendous importance of the advising mission, as did former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, the organizational acceptance of the advising mission has been mixed and contradictory.25 Some commanders genuinely value and support it, while other units and leaders marginalize and tacitly resist the unconventional advisory mission—showing a strong preference and favoritism for emphasizing conventional direct combat operations at the expense of unconventional activities.26
One consequence is that there is great reluctance among many service members to serve as advisors. This stems from uncertainty about whether serving as an advisor hurts their careers. There is much concern that serving as a conventional U.S. advisor will reduce a soldier’s chances for promotion, as compared to peers who serve in more traditional and bureaucratically well-rewarded roles—especially command positions.27

Such uncertainty is exacerbated by the Army’s inconsistent advisor selection process that often appears to support the idea that the Army treats advising as a second-tier mission. Nevertheless, in some cases, the Army solicits and selects volunteers with strong and relevant performance records, particularly for senior officers assigned as advisors and advisor team leaders. The budding use of a centralized selection list to assign senior advisors is a step in the right direction for the Army, as long as the results of future promotion boards reveal that advisor selectees actually fare comparatively well.

In other cases, the Army haphazardly and involuntarily assigns soldiers as advisors and disregards their background, motivation toward the mission, disposition (personality), and potential to advise well. This seems to apply more commonly to the assignment of junior officers and noncommissioned officers as advisors. Further, at times it seems that the Army uses advisory units as a dumping ground for poor performers or problem soldiers.28

The Army’s inconsistent approach to the assignment of advisors may stem from the problematic assumption that anyone can successfully advise. Most veteran advisors view this as a damaging fallacy that some senior military leaders still believe. Thus, the Army appears ambivalent toward the advising mission, with public pronouncements of support for the mission by strategic political-military leaders, but mixed and inconsistent levels of support for the mission on the ground.

Solving some of these problems to ameliorate the second tier military advising mission syndrome will take greater organizational commitment—reflected in focus, motivation, allocation of resources, concrete steps taken to cultivate and preserve advisory competence, and ultimately, the development of greater organizational acceptance of the mission.

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**Other Impacts on the Contemporary Military Advising Mission**

Numerous other conditions characterize the U.S. military advising mission that require advisors to employ additional applicable skills. Some of these additional important lessons learned are as follows:

**Subject matter expertise is vital in the advising mission.** Advisors who are sent to advise on a specific specialty or set of skills must possess those skills, or have the ability to obtain the services of experts who do. Common areas of required expertise include numerous military and police specialties, combat and noncombat organizational and technical skills, and expertise in leadership or organizational training for different positions and roles (e.g., how to serve as a noncommissioned officer).29

**Advisors need to draw on, work with, and navigate other influential agencies in the field.** These include U.S. and coalition partner units, the media, nongovernmental organizations, and a plethora of other organizations that operate in the advisors’ working environments.30

**“Goodies” can benefit the advising mission.** Advisors provide information, intelligence, resources, money, and other desirable resources to advance the mission—as long as this support does not create excessive counterpart dependency, or stymie counterpart development.31

**Information age technology can benefit and degrade the advising mission.** Advisors should apply suitable new technologies to augment the mission, but they should not expect counterparts to use technology the way the U.S. Army and other U.S. services employ it (e.g., the U.S. military’s sometimes obsessive application of PowerPoint).

**Special considerations are needed for deploying women advisors.** Women can serve as very effective advisors, but advisor units should first conduct a careful analysis of the situation (such as determining a counterpart’s openness to engagement with females and understanding the country’s culture and gender norms) before assigning a female advisor.32 Some circumstances make the use of women advisors imprudent.33

**Defining Military Advisory Success**

One conundrum of the mission is the difficulty advisors share in defining success. The unconventional mission’s ambiguity and long-term nature, and some confusion about the overall nature of advising, contribute to
the challenges of formulating a metric for definitively determining advisory achievement. Consequently, today’s advisors use different methods to define advisory success. Some of the following methods consistently emerge that appear useful in gauging advisory success.

One informal test for defining advisory success is summarized as, “Does it meet the standard of Iraqi (or Afghan) good enough?” This informal approach—though some may regard it as ethnocentrically patronizing or insensitive—actually reveals open-mindedness, tolerance, flexibility, perspective-taking skills, and overall situational awareness. It promotes understanding of performance standards appropriate for a given counterpart and foreign security force based on their own culturally nuanced conditions.

A second approach entails advisors who frame success as working themselves out of a job, meaning, “Have they helped counterparts achieve a level of professional competence and autonomy whereby counterparts no longer need advisors?” This second method for defining success often manifests when advisors work with counterparts against the deadline of the U.S. or coalition military’s imminent withdrawal from a host nation, such as in the latter phases of Iraq and Afghanistan.

A third approach is defining success by gauging the strength of established relationships and friendships. This is obviously an intangible measure of accomplishment in a mission that often lacks conspicuous, tangible, and objective signs of progress. Nevertheless, in addition to trying to apply classic (and sometimes obsessive) objective, precise, and quantitative measures of success (e.g., numbers of trained foreign troops or pieces of equipment and weaponry issued), contemporary advisors often rely on subjective and qualitative estimates of advisory success—which sometimes better fit the nebulous and unconventional nature of the military advising mission. Finally, advisory success is only validated with the test of time and the strength of continuing links between the advisor and the counterpart after a given advisory mission has ended. Signs of success may therefore take many years to become evident.

Conclusion

We have learned that many of the historical advising insights from previous conflicts ring true today, although the information age and other contemporary developments create new complexities in the performance of this essential mission. As shown in the historical and contemporary experiences discussed in this article, military advisors require a sophisticated array of skills; the pentathlete concept certainly applies to successful military advisors. Advisors must cross myriad cultural bridges to build trust with diverse people (including counterparts and linguists) so they can succeed in their unconventional and complex mission. The critical advisory skills required include warfighting and combat competence, subject matter expertise, leadership (especially softer leader tools of influence and persuasion), cognitive flexibility, diplomacy, agility, an ability to rapidly learn and adapt on the job, and, especially, cross-cultural competence.

The future of military advising. As U.S. forces withdraw from Afghanistan, the U.S. military is now faced with the question of what will happen to its advising mission, capabilities, and wealth of experience accumulated over more than a decade of conflict in which advisors played a vital role.

One forecast is that after the U.S. armed forces depart Afghanistan, the conventional military will gradually shelve the advising mission. History seems to indicate that this will be the more likely outcome. After the Vietnam War, the mainstream military forgot many of the advisory lessons and skills it acquired, shuffling responsibility for advising back to the U.S. Special Forces. Similarly, the conventional military’s ambivalence toward advising, including some organizational resistance to conduct the mission, may contribute to a gradual dissolution of the advising mission within conventional forces as the demand for conventional advisors in the field diminishes. Finally, given the ongoing U.S. military drawdown, there will undoubtedly be a strong institutional impetus for the conventional forces to return to their longstanding focus on training for traditional combat roles. Thus, the mainstream military might progressively sweep the unconventional advising mission under the carpet.

However, a second future path for advising could involve the continuation of focus and training on the mission in the conventional military long after the troops leave Afghanistan. In an ideal forecast for the future of advising, the Army might make a modest investment in preserving the advisor capability within the conventional force by developing an advisor training center hub. The advising training center envisioned
would remain fully intact and well-resourced long into the future, serving as a hub to preserve its advisory capabilities and perhaps expand its relevance by focusing on developing skills pertinent to more regions of the world, while also providing a robust general advising portion of the training program. This center would serve the U.S. military by not only continuing the legacy of advisor training but could also augment Army efforts to resource and preserve new culture education and training initiatives. These could include support for already established and relevant culture centers across the military’s branches. Such an initiative would expand cultural focus in professional military education, promote more realistic training with regard to negotiating foreign cultures during field exercises, and serve other useful related developments. Due to the complex nature of the evolving global security environment, the Army should adopt this second alternative to create a robust long-term focus on the advising mission.

Military advising and the next war. Given that accurate predictions about future wars elude even the foremost experts, broad preparation provides an excellent strategy for U.S. forces to prepare for future conflicts. Numerous worldwide events could precipitate the next conflict, including civil wars and falling regimes in the Middle East (with major implications regarding oil reserves); expanding terrorist networks in Southwest or Southeast Asia; violence and instability connected to cataclysmic water and food scarcity in Africa; the destabilizing effects of the widespread drug industry in Mexico and Central and South America; or, even a catastrophic event in the United States requiring humanitarian relief comingled with security operations.

When America enters the next war, its military will require not only sophisticated and versatile service members, but also a robust team of effective military advisors. Cultivating the development of an

Sgt. Alton Farr, serving as a rule of law adviser with Imam Sahib District Advisory Team, 2nd Battalion, 18th Infantry Regiment, 170th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, directs an Afghan policeman during a training session 18 December 2011.

(Photo by U.S. Army Staff Sgt. Christopher Klutts, 170th Infantry Brigade Combat Team PAO)
intricate and powerful multiple skill set—including combat skills, leadership, cross-cultural competence, diplomacy, flexibility, strong moral-ethical fiber, technical military knowledge, and numerous other talents—combined with advisory expertise will best prepare the U.S. armed forces for the next major conflict.

Institutionalizing a concentration on military advising, including an effectual advisor training center, while preserving relevant soft-skill programs (such as culture centers, culture education and training, and other helpful culture-based initiatives) will help the military to remain balanced and well prepared for multifaceted future contingencies.

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Notes

4. Ibid., 32-33.
7. Ibid., 19.
20. Metrinko, 42.
21. Ibid.
22. FM 3-07.10, 23. This doctrine reflects guidance from Secretary of Defense Gates about the importance for the entire U.S. military, including conventional forces, to effectively advise and mentor foreign forces. Gates talked about the importance of the advising mission during addresses at West Point, New York, 21 April 2008, and the Annual Convention of the Association of the United States Army, Washington, DC, 10 October 2007.
24. Seagryst, 68; Grdovic, 24.
25. FM 3-07.10, 2.
26. Grdovic, 28; Moerbe, 29.
28. FM 3-07.10, 99. This doctrine recognizes that when U.S. military units send their "undesirable" (e.g., troops with behavioral problems) to advisory units, this constitutes "what wrong looks like."
29. West, 95; Keith W. Norris, "The Afghan National Army: Has Capacity Building Become Culture Building?,” Military Review (November-December 2012): 31-39. Norris talks about the need to develop a competent NCO corps in Afghanistan; this lesson also pertains to Iraq and many other foreign security forces that the U.S. and coalition forces advise.
30. Metrinko, 63.
31. Potter. Potter discusses the value of advisors sharing intelligence with counterparts as one example.
34. Wesley Moerbe, 24-29.
38. Seagrist, 66.
41. P.K. Keen et. al, "Relationships Matter: Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in Haiti," Military Review (May-June 2010): 11-12. This article extols the virtues of the International Military Education Training (IMET) Program, and Keen argues the U.S. government should invest any extra funding slated to support foreign security assistance in cultural initiatives similar to IMET instead of buying new hardware.

Eyewitness to War, Volume 1
Edited by Kendall D. Gott, Combat Studies Institute Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2006, 327 pages

The first Combat Studies Institute publication that makes exclusive use of oral history, Eyewitness to War, tells the story of the second battle for Fallujah as described by those who witnessed it firsthand. Interviews of 36 participants with a wide variety of ranks and occupational specialties—including two Marines, an airman, and a civilian journalist—provide a riveting account of this 2004 battle, a brutal and bloody fight over urban terrain. Gleaned from the Operational Leadership Experience Project, a program that collects and archives first-person experiences from the Global War on Terror, this work is history in raw form, recorded for future generations by key leaders on the ground and the men and women there to see and hear the events unfold.
Operation Serval
Another Beau Geste of France in Sub-Saharan Africa?

Lt. Gen. Olivier Tramond, French Army, and
Lt. Col. Philippe Seigneur, French Army

Serval is the name of an African wild cat. Beau Geste is the title of a famous 1939 Hollywood movie about the French Foreign Legion in Africa, inspired by a British novel. The expression beau geste (beautiful gesture) suggests someone bravely doing the right thing to help another regardless of personal cost or benefit.

In December 2012, the democratic government of the Republic of Mali—a former French colony in West Africa—asked the French government to help it push back radical Islamist insurgents in the north. Operation Serval is the name of the subsequent French military operation in Mali from January 2013 through July 2014. As of November 2014, French troops remain in Africa’s Sahel region to help Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, and Niger counter terrorists.

This article describes lessons learned from Operation Serval’s force build-up and deployment in 2013. Among these, some lessons learned from Afghanistan yielded good results, and others were rediscovered—even with the very different conditions between Mali and Southwest Asia.1

Starting 11 January 2013, French forces blocked, rolled back, and cornered jihadi armed groups in Mali. Only a few weeks before, they were getting ready to return to their bases after redeploying from Afghanistan. In fact, they were waiting for further force cuts expected to be described in a pending defense white paper on national security, under strict budgetary constraints.

Thanks to pre-positioned forces and a new readiness system, early in 2013 the French Army managed to deploy a whole brigade with its main combat and combat service support assets. These 4,500 troops prevailed in the fight against a fanatic enemy in extremely demanding conditions caused by a harsh climate, long operational distances, and rugged terrain (see figure 1). In the first three months of the intervention, the following effects were achieved:

- **The terrain.** The main towns were liberated and the jihadist stronghold in the north was cleared.
- **The enemy.** The terrorists suffered heavy losses and their infrastructure was disrupted.
- **The population.** Foreign nationals were protected. The jihadist rule was abolished. Free elections occurred July 2013 (and again August 2014).
- **The international community.** France demonstrated its determination and paved the way for African and international troops to help stabilize Mali.

Five months after the beginning of the operation, French, Malian, and Chadian units had rolled across Mali among cheering crowds—visibly happy to be freed from the strict Sharia law (referring to an Islamic moral code, religious law, and court system) enforced by the jihadists. French troops cleared sanctuaries of the group known as al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in the Ifoghas mountain range. They fended off attacks by another group known as the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in Western Africa (MOJWA) in Gao (a region of Mali). In May 2013, France’s President François Hollande said—

We did not intervene instead of Africans, but with the Africans, thus allowing a peacekeeping operation to take place in the conditions of international legitimacy on the one hand, but also efficacy on the other hand. We are staying, there again, with this lighter troop...
strength, in the following months but we will remain in Mali, and around Mali, because we are not done with terrorism yet.2

Mali: Tipping Toward Chaos (1963 to 2013)

Mali is a landlocked country with a butterfly-shaped border in Africa’s northwestern Sahel (a transition zone between the Sahara Desert to the north and savanna grassland to the south). It spreads roughly 1,000 miles from north to south and from west to east, and it and covers an area about twice the size of Texas (1.2 million square kilometers [km], about 480,000 square miles). It is a former French colony, and it has retained French as its official language, as well as many aspects of French governance. However, the population of Mali, as in many African countries, does not belong to a single ethnic group. The main rift occurs along the bend of the Niger River, which separates the dark-skinned Songhai, Bambara, and Peul populations settled around and south of the Niger, from the fair-skinned Arab, Tuareg, and Berber nomads in the north (this description is simplified, as Mali’s populations are very diverse).

Ethnic tensions have plagued Mali since long before its independence in 1960. Conflicts flared up in 1963 to 1964 and in June 1990 in the Adrar des Ifoghas region (adrar means mountain in Berber)—which triggered
a violent reaction of the government against the local population. A vicious cycle of terrorism and repression started, fueling ethnic hostility in the north, political dissent in the south, and criticism abroad, and culminating with the Tuareg uprising of 14 January 2012.

This last insurgency was led by two newly formed groups, the Mouvement National de Libération de l’Azawad (National Movement of the Azawad Liberation, known as MNLA) and its Islamic satellite named Ansar Din (meaning soldier of the faith). The insurgents rapidly took the northern towns of Menaka, Aguelhok, Tessalit, and Léré, causing the Malian Army to withdraw, under pressure, south of the Niger River. The insurgents deprived the government of control over half its territory (representing only ten percent of its population). This setback caused the coup d’état of March 2012, when army Capt. Amadou Sanogo overthrew then-president Ahmadou Toumani Touré.3

The rise of jihadists in the Sahel, which started about the same time in Algeria, was another destabilizing factor. The Algeria-based AQIM (originally called Groupe Salafiste de Prédication et de Combat—translated as Salafi Group for Preaching and Fighting) took advantage of traditional smuggling routes to fund its terrorist activities with drugs and arms trafficking. In addition, it captured foreign tourists or workers from well-to-do countries and demanded ransoms.4 In 2007, the group changed its name and began to expand its ties with international jihadist organizations. AQIM tried to install an Islamic emirate across the Sahara and Sahel, between Mauritania and Chad.

The leaders of AQIM are, mainly, Algerian. Mokhtar Belmokhtar, for example, is a former jihadi fighter turned smuggler in Afghanistan. Abdelhamid Abu Zeid is a hard-line ideologist. Their link to the ethnic Tuareg population is the Ansar Din movement, led by Iyad Ag Ghali and his cousin Abdelkrim, both Tuaregs from Kidal.

The anarchy in Mali, in the wake of the Tuareg uprising, provided the opportunity for these jihadists to realize their ambition. In the first quarter of 2012, MNLA and Ansar Din took control of the northern half of Mali. Rapidly, they imposed a strict Sharia law on the population of the whole region, causing the first rifts between the secular MNLA and the fundamentalist Ansar Din, along with a flow of 300,000 to 400,000 displaced persons.

Ansar Din, with the support of AQIM and MOJWA—one of its splinter groups—managed to expel the MNLA from the major towns. A few Sufi shrines were destroyed in Timbuktu, a historic sacred city—an event reminiscent of the destruction of the Bamian Buddhas by the Afghan Taliban in March 2001. The interim Malian government of President Diocounda Traoré and the international community watched helplessly.5 The United Nations Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 2085, 20 December 2012, authorizing the deployment of what was named the “African-led International Support Mission to Mali.” The European Union validated, in December 2012, a plan for a “European Union Training Mission” to advise the Malian Army and planned to set up the mission in February 2013.6

However, the jihadists started to move south of the Niger bend on 8 January 2013. After they captured the town of Konna from the Malian Army and threatened...
Mali’s capital, Bamako, the time for action against them had come.

**Phase 0, Initial Reaction and Force Buildup (11 to 15 January 2013)**

The first reaction came from a French Special Forces aviation unit stationed in a neighboring country. The unit destroyed a jihadist pick-up column moving south on 11 January 2013. During this raid, a French pilot was fatally wounded in his Gazelle light-attack helicopter. At the same time, French units predeployed in Africa were scrambled to provide a blocking element, and the French Land Forces Command started to generate the follow-on force to drive back the jihadists. Meanwhile, air force and naval aviation assets started targeting jihadist facilities across northern Mali.

Four days later, Hollande was blunt about his overall intentions. In a press conference, he said—

Our aims are the following: first, to stop the terrorist aggression that wanted to take control of the entire country. Second, to secure Bamako, where, I remind you, we have many thousands of our citizens. The third aim is to enable Mali to recover its territorial integrity. This mission was given to an African force, which will have our full support and that will soon be deployed. You asked what we plan to do with the terrorists … Destroy them. Capture them, if possible, and make sure that they can do no harm in the future.

**Reasons for the quick reaction.** The quick French reaction was possible for three main reasons: a very short chain of command, a network of French bases in Africa, and a rapid deployment high-readiness system called Guépard (cheetah).

In France, the president is the commander in chief of the military. He can commit French forces abroad without parliamentary mandate for a period not exceeding four months. Therefore, when the situation started deteriorating, he was able to shift French forces deployed in Africa and to deploy assets based in France very quickly.

The first French ground unit that landed in Bamako was called Groupement Tactique Interarmes No. 1 (GTIA 1, or Battle Group 1, a reinforced battalion). It was composed of a headquarters and an infantry company from the 21st Marine Infantry Regiment and two platoons of light wheeled vehicles (known as the ERC 90, or engine à roues, canon de 90 millimètres) from

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**Figure 2. Map Showing Deployments to West Africa**
the First Foreign Legion Cavalry Regiment—which was finishing its four-month tour of duty in Chad and was airlifted with less than 24 hours’ notice into Mali. The GTIA 1 was reinforced within 48 hours by another armored squadron of ERC 90s that drove more than 1,000 km from Abidjan (in Ivory Coast) to Bamako and another Marine infantry company on Guépard alert that was airlifted from France. A small headquarters element came from the French elements in Senegal to ensure coordination and communications at the operational level. (Figure 2 depicts the origins of the deployed units and the distances they had to travel.)

Lessons from phase 0 initial reaction and force build-up. The preliminary part of the operation demonstrated the value of maintaining legacy French bases in Africa. These bases not only provide a guarantee of security for French expatriates and many others, but also superior training opportunities and an expeditionary mentality for the troops deployed there. French forces had learned to leverage joint cooperation of small units over large areas and had become used to moving quickly and lightly. The long-standing presence of French instructors across western Africa had developed a refined knowledge of the human terrain and a certain amount of interoperability with local forces. This, in turn, allowed better interaction with local leaders and populations, providing invaluable insight into the operational environment. Figure 3 summarizes the main lessons learned from the initial reaction and force buildup.

Concerning contributions of allies, Serval proved that it is easier nowadays to get planes than men. The United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and other NATO partners provided tactical and strategic airlift, air-to-air refueling, or intelligence assets. Belgium provided two medical evacuation helicopters. Other ground contributions were promised for the European Union Training Mission, but not for Operation Serval. Nonetheless, these contributions proved critical for the operation. Logistics assets moved 12,000 metric tons of equipment by train, ship, air, or flatbed trucks in one month—roughly the equivalent of what was repatriated to France from Afghanistan over a one-year period.

Phase 0, Blocking the Jihadists (11 to 21 January 2013)

Supported by French aircraft flying out of France or Chad, GTIA 1 secured the Bamako airport and moved north and east to block the jihadists’ advance. Meanwhile, three more GTIAs, an aviation battle group (groupe aéromobile), and a brigade headquarters were deployed.

On 15 January, a company team was sent to seize the bridge over the Niger River at Markala, (250 km east of Bamako). On 18 January, Malian forces, with
a French advising and liaison team, took back the city of Konna (700 km to the east). In addition, the first African contingents from Nigeria, Togo, and Benin landed in Bamako.

On 20 January, another company of GTIA 1 seized the airfield at Sévaré, after a 640 km road march from the aerial port of debarkation. The next day, Malian forces took Douentza (800 km from Bamako), while GTIA 2 finished boarding the landing ship *Dixmude* for its seaborne deployment to the seaport of debarkation in Dakar, Senegal.

**Makeup of units.** The brigade headquarters, as well as GTIAs 2 and 3, were generated by the 3rd Mechanized Brigade, on Guépard alert. They were deployed partly by sea and partly by military transport aircraft (Boeing C-17s) from allied forces or leased civilian Antonov aircraft. GTIA 2 is based in the 92nd Infantry Regiment, which had brand new eight-wheeled infantry fighting vehicles (*véhicules blindés de combat d’infanterie*, or VBCIs). GTIA 3 is an armored cavalry unit that was pulled from the 1st Marine Cavalry Regiment, equipped with light six-wheeled reconnaissance vehicles (AMX-10RCs) heavily armed with 105 mm guns.

The remaining GTIA 4 was formed by the 2nd Foreign Legion Airborne Regiment (*Régiment Étranger de Parachutistes*) reinforced by the 1st Airborne Regiment (*Régiment de Chasseurs Parachutistes*) and other assets from the 11th Airborne Brigade. Given the huge distances in theater, a logistics battalion and a signal unit were also committed.

For the next three days, GTIA 1 reinforced its positions on the line between Diabaly and Konna, while the rear echelon in Bamako consolidated the logistics and command and control of the operation.

**Lessons from phase 0, blocking the jihadists.**

This phase validated the Guépard alert system, with a whole brigade in France on alert and ready to provide forces within hours of notification. The reaction time was excellent for army units despite some early difficulties establishing coordination among joint agencies.

The legacy fleet of aging vehicles (four-wheeled armored personnel carriers called *véhicules de l’avant blindé* and light armored vehicles—the ERC 90s) proved their ruggedness in the grueling approach march, some vehicles driving more than 2,000 km in 10 days on African roads.

As some vehicles were older than their crews, it was a tribute to their skilled designers, drivers, and maintenance teams that they were able to carry out the mission. (Figure 4 summarizes the main lessons learned from the second part of phase 0, in which forces blocked the jihadists.)

**Phase 1, Seizing the Niger Bend (21 January to 1 February 2013)**

On 25 January, GTIA 1 moved north toward Timbuktu and Gao, relieved in place by the first African-led International Support Mission to Mali troops (a Togolese unit in Mopti and a Burkinabe unit in Markala). Avoiding contact but harassed by air assets, the jihadist armed groups (*groupes armés djihadistes*) withdrew to the north and east of Gao. French elements were airlifted to Gao Airport and secured it in spite of a stiff resistance by MOJWA elements.

On 27 January, GTIA 1 and Malian troops secured the town of Timbuktu without any resistance. A company from GTIA 4 was air-dropped north of the town to cut possible escape routes. GTIA 2 debarked at Dakar and started the 2,000-km journey to the east toward Gao.
On 29 January, airborne engineers were dropped with runway-clearing equipment over Timbuktu airport and cleared it of obstacles left by the jihadists. Chadian and Nigerian forces moved from Nigerian territory toward the eastern Malian towns of Menaka, Ansongo, and Gao.

**Expanded reach.** In the last week of January, Gao became the center of the French deployment, with brigade headquarters and support units moving 1,000 km from the main aerial port of debarkation in Bamako. Upon arrival of the mechanized GTIA 2, French and Malian units began extending their reconnaissance missions along the Niger River and toward the cities of Bourem, Ansongo, and Menaka.

**Lessons from phase 1, seizing the Niger bend.** The rapid succession of air assaults and ground movements under constant air cover, including surveillance and reconnaissance by drones (Harfangs) and maritime patrol aircraft, greatly disrupted the enemy. The lessons learned in Libya on targeting fleeing enemy were put to good use. The aviation battle group carried out all possible missions from close-combat attack to reconnaissance and deep strike. They had a few helicopters hit by small arms and machine-gun fire, but threats from man-portable air defense systems did not materialize.

The rapid advance followed a three-tiered pattern: special operations forces and airborne units seized key airfields and then were joined by French and Malian ground troops, which were in turn relieved by units of the United Nations Stabilization Mission for Mali (Mission des Nations Unies de Stabilisation au Mali, known as MINUSMA) on their previous positions. Logistical support had to follow quickly over hundreds of kilometers, making secured airfields key objectives for air resupply. Communications and information systems were strained to their limits on these unusually large distances. Satellite communications were key, but they were in short supply. Figure 5 summarizes the main lessons learned from phase 1.

**Phase 2, Clearing the Gao Region and the Ifoghas Mountains (8 February to 1 May 2013)**

While ground troops were seizing the main towns on the Niger River, fighter aircraft and helicopters struck logistics depots and training centers further north around Aguelhok and Tessalit. There, the Serval brigade maintained a high operational tempo in order to disrupt the enemy.

On 30 January, French special operations forces and airborne units made an assault landing on Kidal airfield, at the foot of the Adrar des Ifoghas range. Chadian forces moved from Menaka to join them.

**February 2013.** On 1 February, the first armored squadron of GTIA 3 was airlifted from France to Niamey, Niger, and immediately headed towards Gao, 400 km away.

The second week of February saw the first ground engagements of jihadist armed groups against French and Malian forces. On 8 February, a special operations forces element parachuted onto the Tessalit airfield (1,700 km from Bamako), cleared the runway for the arrival of an infantry company, and started patrolling the city with attack helicopter support. A squadron from GTIA 3 drove 500 km from Gao to reinforce them, along with Chadian units from Kidal, while the groupe aéromobile moved its helicopters and support elements from Sévaré to the Gao airfield.

On the same day, MOJWA elements in Gao carried out complex attacks with small arms and suicide vests against French and Malian units. However, the attackers were neutralized after hours of heavy urban fighting, with the support of French infantry fighting vehicles and attack helicopters.
The next 10 days were spent searching for enemy positions around the city of Gao and in the Adrar des Ifoghas range east of Aguelhok. The first improvised explosive devices encountered by French and Malian troops were either of crude design or were poorly emplaced, but some caches yielded better-quality components. Suicide vests were used by insurgents both in Gao and in the Adrar des Ifoghas.

GTIA 1 was relieved by GTIA 3 and moved back to France on 17 February. GTIA 2 secured Gao and its surroundings. GTIA 3 and 4, together with elite Chadian troops, tightened the noose from Tessalit, Aguelhok, and Kidal around the Tigharghar hills in the Adrar des Ifoghas.

The jihadists had the choice of dispersing in small groups in the countryside or defending their sanctuary in the craggy Adrar des Ifoghas. The rugged terrain made it very difficult to detect them from the air. Therefore, Chadian and French ground units had to pursue them on foot, advancing and clearing the slopes under helicopter and artillery support from truck-mounted 155 mm self-propelled gun-howitzers known as Caesars. These strikes destroyed the jihadists’ fire support, consisting of towed Russian 122 mm howitzers (D-30s) and multiple-rocket launchers (BM-21s).

On 19 February, an airborne pathfinder from GTIA 4 was killed while clearing an enemy outpost in Amettetai valley. The next day, Chadian troops clashed with a large group of jihadists in the Tigharghar hills. With French air support, they neutralized more than 90 jihadists—including some leaders of AQIM—but 23 were killed in action, and a few dozen were wounded during the fight and afterward when some jihadists blew themselves up at close range. A French paratrooper was killed on 2 March while assaulting an enemy position in the northern sector.

The joint French-Chadian operation in the Tigharghar range lasted a few more days in very difficult conditions due to the harsh terrain and the punishing heat, but it led to the capture of large weapon and supply depots around the Amedettai valley. Military search techniques honed in Afghanistan were very useful to clear the caves and caches scattered in the mountains.

However, the jihadist armed groups had not been totally eliminated in the Adrar des Ifoghas. On 21 February, a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device blew up a Chadian fuel depot in Kidal. Around the same time, about thirty insurgents and suicide bombers attacked Malian and Nigerian troops in Gao. The French mechanized quick-reaction force from GTIA 2, with attack helicopter support, eliminated them. On 6 March, a French corporal—a member of a liaison team to a Malian unit—was killed near Imenas, 100 km east of Gao. This happened after his unit successfully cleared a village in cooperation with GTIA 2.

March 2013. The Serval brigade maintained its effort in the north until the end of March, seizing large quantities of food, ammunition, and improvised-explosive-device components from AQIM’s sanctuary. The threat from improvised explosive devices was real and caused the next two French deaths: a reconnaissance vehicle (AMX-10RC) driver on 16 March and a special forces operator on 29 April, both with pressure-plate devices.

April 2013. In April, the brigade’s effort focused on the area between Gao and Kidal, while Task Force Sabre (special operations forces) carried out long-range reconnaissance operations in the north.

Recent French combat experience in Afghanistan contributed to—

- High tactical proficiency and effective body armor and helmets that minimized French losses
- High-quality medical support
- Up-to-date combat support including fires digital equipment for tactical air control parties and helicopter pilots

Figure 6. Main Lessons Learned from Phase 2
and west of Mali. The jihadist armed groups avoided direct engagements, while the brigade carried out a series of cordon and search operations on suspected weapons caches.

**Lessons from phase 2, clearing the Gao Region and the Adrar des Ifoghas.** In the fighting phase, French units capitalized on their combat experience in Afghanistan. Many soldiers of Operation Serval fought in the valleys of Kapisa province as late as summer 2011. The French losses in Mali remained low because of their high tactical proficiency and the quality of their body armor and helmets, themselves a legacy of lessons learned in Afghanistan.

Medical support also maintained operational standards developed in Afghanistan, from individual kits to forward lifesaving surgery modules, treating Chadian and French wounded in large numbers as well as noncombat injuries due to dehydration or fractures. Combat support involved the whole range of fires from mortars to laser-guided bombs. New digital equipment facilitated the work of tactical air control parties, helicopter pilots, and infantry fighting-vehicle crews, but dismounted infantry units did not use it. Figure 6 summarizes the main lessons learned in phase 2.

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**Transition (May 2013)**

On 11 May, the 3rd Mechanized Brigade was relieved by the 6th Light Armored Brigade, with heavy augmentation by French Foreign Legion units. The number of French troops dwindled to 2,000.

Further south, the European Union Training Mission brought the first Malian battalion on the road to high readiness at the Koulikoro Training Area, with a composite cadre of French, British, German, Italian, Polish, Slovenian, Greek, Hungarian, and Scandinavian instructors. The aim of this mission was to quickly give Malian troops the capability to maintain their territorial integrity.

In accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2100 of 25 April 2013, African-led International Support Mission to Mali troops were to be integrated into the larger stabilization force of MINUSMA, which would total up to 12,600 soldiers. French troops would remain in Mali as part of a quick-reaction force in support of MINUSMA.

**Challenges of the transition.** The enormity of the operational area, paired with its proximity to Algerian and Nigerian borders, made it very difficult to control for French and Malian ground troops, even with augmentation by nearly 10,000 additional African soldiers. Many insurgents dropped their weapons and fled on foot or on camel, avoiding the use of their telltale pickup trucks. Many AQIM members used their smuggling experience to take all possible escape routes between Mauritania and Libya, and many remain at large. Their capture would require the full cooperation of all regional actors, an effort that falls well beyond the military’s role.

The weather was favorable for operations during the assault phase, with a single sand storm...
complicating the seizure of Kidal. However, during the rainy season (June to October), air support and ground movement in subsequent phases (not discussed in this article) were hampered, complicating surveillance, reconnaissance, logistics, and maneuver.

**Update, November 2014.** The handover to Malian authorities has become a long-lasting collaborative effort between African Union and European Union political leaders, with the French Army ensuring quick-reaction forces in support of Malian confidence building. Since the end of Serval in July 2014, France has built on its operational successes as well as Malian successes in order to adopt a regional approach to the transnational security challenges in this part of the world. All French operations in the Sahel have been merged into Operation Barkhane, covering Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad.

Nevertheless, stability in Mali will need a political settlement, not only between southern and northern ethnic groups but also within the Malian Army itself. If the southern Malian units conduct themselves well, the population likely will resist the return of the insurgents. The Malian government established the Commission for Dialogue and Reconciliation 6 March 2013 to examine any reported abuses by military forces operating in the north.

**Conclusion**

The French president, minister of defense, and even the news media praised the exceptional reactivity, the professionalism, and the determination of French troops during phases 0 through 2 in 2013. François Hollande even paid a visit to Malian interim president Diocounda Traoré, in just-liberated Timbuktu, 2 February 2013. However, as old soldiers say, a mission is not over until the last unit is dismissed into its barracks and every piece of equipment has been turned in and accounted for.

The first challenges of 2013 for France were passed with flying colors. The Afghan combat experience of French troops, combined with their knowledge of the African theater and a good bit of luck, produced good results against a fleeing enemy over more than ninety-five percent of the Malian territory. This mission highlighted the return of France to its traditional area of interest—French-speaking Africa—in compliance with the defense white paper, released July 2013. This role had been somewhat overshadowed by France’s engagement in Afghanistan from 2008 to 2012, notwithstanding intense operations in Ivory Coast and Central African Republic in 2010 and 2011. However, the volume of the French deployment, in such a short time, over such a distance, was indeed unprecedented.

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**Lt. Col. Philippe Seigneur, French Army, was a staff officer in the lessons learned department of the Centre de Doctrine d’Emploi des Forces. He served as an infantry field grade officer in Bosnia, Chad, and Ivory Coast before occupying various international staff positions from Germany to Afghanistan. He is now serving in Germany.**

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**NOTES**


March 1991, before handing over power to democratically elected president Alpha Oumar Konaré in 1992. He was nevertheless elected president in 2002 with sixty-four percent of the vote, and in 2007 with seventy-one percent.

4. Ibid, 72. The group now known as Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (formerly Groupe Salafiste de Prédication et de Combat) took 33 European tourists as hostages in February 2003 and released them 18 August 2011 (one Austrian tourist died of exhaustion during captivity). Other French hostages were taken in 2010, 2011, and 2012; some have been released, others have died in captivity or been killed, and at least one remains captive.


7. See the names of the French soldiers who have died in Mali, at the French Army website: http://www.defense.gouv.fr/terre/base/in-memoriam/mali. For more about French special forces in the Sahel, see Jean-Marc Tanguy’s blog post at Le Mamouth, "(Actualisé Avec Liens)" 4 March 2013, lemamouth.blogspot.fr/2013/03/cos-1000.html.


10. Canada provided one Boeing C-17 Globemaster III military transport aircraft, Great Britain provided one C-17, the United States provided three C-17s, Belgium provided two Lockheed C-130 Hercules military transport aircraft, Denmark provided one C-130, and Germany provided two Transall C-160 military transport aircraft.

11. The name "Caesar" refers to camion équipé d’un système d’artillerie, maximum range 40 km.


13. Ibid.


This article takes part of its title from the quantum property of entanglement, a strange and perplexing feature of subatomic physics. After two particles have interacted, entanglement describes how the properties of one particle directly and simultaneously influence the behavior or properties of the other particle, even after they stop directly interacting and even when separated by great distances of space. They behave as if they remain tethered by an invisible web.\(^1\) Einstein famously called this phenomenon “spooky action at a distance.”\(^2\)

Likewise, common life experience demonstrates that our interpersonal connections often influence our social behavior and conduct—in both positive
and negative ways. Social network analysis (SNA) is a method for discovering and describing webs of relationships among social actors. By describing soldiers as entangled nodes within a web-like social network in which they are connected by numerous (perhaps unseen) affiliations or shared characteristics, this essay proposes that commanders can make use of SNA in two ways. First, the approach can serve in a reactive sense, by enabling commanders to develop and execute wide-impact and strategic disciplinary choices in the wake of criminal misconduct. Second, but no less important, SNA can serve as part of a philosophy of proactive leader engagement and risk management. This article will focus on the first mode, and it will introduce potentially innovative applications of SNA within military justice practice.

Introduction

SNA takes as its fundamental premise the common sense notion that we are products of our social environments. Where we live, what jobs we take, our race, our gender, our personal hobbies, the sports we play, our children, our children’s friends, our addictions, and our institutional affiliations are just some of the factors that give color to our personas and drive our interpersonal actions. Inasmuch as we orient our lives around what others close to us are doing, thinking, saying, and believing, each of the factors we share with other people can be modeled as a link between them and us.

In an early (1991), influential merger of the fields of SNA and police work, Malcolm Sparrow’s critical contribution to SNA was to characterize its attributes as relevant to strategic decision making for very practical, socially-significant ends—such as fighting crime. In arguing that SNA’s tools could and should be applied by civilian law enforcement investigators, Sparrow argued that fiscal constraints and ambiguities in evidence made conventional police investigations outmoded and inefficient. He then illustrated how SNA’s techniques could better allocate public resources for the more effective and efficient targeting of criminal enterprises.

Building on that premise, SNA has potential utility for military leaders attempting to disarm informal or formal networks of soldiers tied together by their misconduct. Similarly, it has potential in the manner in which military leaders might disable networks tied together by collective disenfranchisement or low morale. In other words, network analysis can help to upset a cart full of bad apples.

First, I will sketch some of the basic conceptual elements of SNA. Then, I will propose some ways in which commanders could adopt this perspective to more accurately understand just how entangled their soldiers are with one another, including some ways in which commanders could use their increased situational awareness to make more strategic, warranted, and appropriate disciplinary choices.

While certainly not a panacea for widespread indiscipline, SNA could improve command visibility over these common problems in a way deserving more robust attention and critical review. To facilitate such a review, I will conclude by laying a foundation of common-sense variables: case-by-case factors that bear on whether a commander should rely on heuristics (experienced-based techniques for problem solving and learning) or, instead, augment a heuristic approach with SNA in the wake of misconduct.

Basics of Social Network Analysis

SNA is simply a way of looking at sets of relationships among people to discern the attributes and patterns of those relationships. Knowing these attributes and patterns provides a foundation for making qualitative judgments, meting out punitive consequences, or predicting future behavior based on those models. This network-centric approach has been defined as a “perspective [that] emphasizes structural relations as its key orienting principle, where social structure consists of the body of patterns between and among a people, groups, organizations, and other entities with respect to their beliefs, decisions, and actions.” Due to its emphasis on patterns of relationships between individuals over some period of time, SNA has been a well-known and much-employed methodology for studying clique formation, the evolution of fads, and the spread of rumors or knowledge. As one researcher has phrased it, SNA is the “science of the real world,” which relates to an “interlocking pattern of friendship, business, family, and community ties through which paths could be traced between any random person and any other ... the length of these paths might have something to do with the way that influences—whether they be diseases, rumors,
ideas, or social unrest—propagate through a human population.\textsuperscript{8}

These interlocking patterns of relationships are ubiquitous throughout nature and human-driven activities.\textsuperscript{9} Many have observed that the key concepts of the network perspective were “almost simultaneously discovered” by independent researchers in distinct fields.\textsuperscript{10} As a result, SNA has become an interdisciplinary approach to research and problem solving across many fields and has been applied in diverse areas. These include cultural anthropology, genetics, studying the structure of the World Wide Web, neurology, corporate sociology, research collaboration among scientists in numerous disciplines, decision making by community elites, group problem solving, and the formation of coalitions.\textsuperscript{11} SNA also has found a home in investigations of organized crime, terrorism, and militant insurgencies.\textsuperscript{12}

SNA researchers study network patterns: the presence and absence of ties between various individuals, the strength of those ties, and the extent to which those ties remain static or evolve over time and under what circumstances.\textsuperscript{13} These patterns can illuminate specific actors’ social opportunities and constraints. This, in turn, creates potential insight into who in any particular network has a capacity to “extract better bargains in exchanges, have greater influence, and [be a] focus for deference and attention from those in less favored positions.”\textsuperscript{14}

This observation of the real world shifts the focus away from behavior of discrete actors and their purely intrinsic motivations. Instead, researchers adopt a view that may better depict the social context and other mechanisms that influence the behavior of individuals or, alternately, how a one person’s behavior could influence others.\textsuperscript{15}

Effectively applying a network perspective may appear to be a paradigm shift for traditional military culture as this perspective tasks us to look not just at isolated offenses committed by individual parties but also at poor discipline brewing among soldiers in their off-duty affiliations—the connections that hold units together beneath the surface lines of authority, command, and control.\textsuperscript{16} Thinking of “good order and discipline” problems as related to the structure of relationships is an adaptation of problem solving in other domains, such as health, where harms are spread from person to person.

**Strategic Analysis for Targeting Widespread Misconduct**

To prevent a disease outbreak from exploding into an epidemic, public health officials target not just the infected individuals with healing medications but also engage the social network by which the infection spreads. They may use preventive vaccines, quarantine to close lanes that would otherwise facilitate the spread, and public education (such as safe-sex campaigns or the exchange of needles contaminated with HIV).\textsuperscript{17}

This approach is both proactive and scalable—its strategy is network-centric, and its tactics can be tailored to suit a given type and size of community.\textsuperscript{18} In other words, when undesirable contagions propagate along the social links between and among individuals, efforts are aimed at disrupting the network itself to abort, stem, contain, or otherwise influence those negative consequences.\textsuperscript{19}

Similarly, the military—as an institution, organization, and social community—is susceptible to the spread of misconduct and mission-defeating behaviors
within its organizations and units in somewhat the same way as contagions are spread among susceptible populations. Unlike disease epidemiologists, however, military justice practitioners and unit commanders responsible for enforcing standards of conduct and the military criminal law tend to be reactive and individual-centric in practice. While military commanders are afforded great power and discretion, they cannot predict undesirable or illegal behaviors in order to circumvent them, including whether a particular soldier will commit a crime. Thus, commanders’ responses to misconduct are just that: responses after the fact. Moreover, it is largely axiomatic that a service member is legally accountable only for his or her own criminal acts (exceptions, of course, for conspiracies, accessories, and aiding and abetting), and that due process demands that authorities treat each case on its own merits.

Due to normal resource constraints and operational tempos, little empirical attention generally is paid by the commanders to the larger community in which misconduct occurs, except to the extent that a particular crime might have several victims or disturb the good order of the organization as a whole.

Thinking of the offender as part of a community of other offenders is like asking commanders to view the world in more than the three physical dimensions in which we are accustomed to living.

As a result, military commanders tend to employ their judicial power in a vacuum, largely ignoring the pervasive social background in which the incident, behavior, or offense often occurs. Lying beneath the surface hierarchy and command structure of a military organization is an often-recognized but rarely described or exploited subarchitecture. Like the ruins of ancient European cities buried beneath centuries of urban development, this hidden architecture helps shape the landscape of the unit; its personality, its network of interpersonal relationships, its command climate, its distribution of information, and its ability to adapt to external environmental changes or challenges.

What leaders often encounter when dealing with systemic discipline problems are the consequences of this complicated, shifting web of personal relationships that may cross gender, rank, and duty-position divides. The complexity of this network often hampers the chain of command’s ability to recognize and address problems that are, potentially, deeper or wider than just one soldier’s discrete misconduct. Yet, the law does not demand that pre-prosecutorial decisions search for situational explanations beyond an individual’s intrinsic pathology or consider much more beyond the type of crime and the scale of the harm inflicted.

In other words, conventional military criminal justice does not examine how large-scale patterns of misconduct may be related to, or caused by, small-scale interpersonal interactions. The community, however, is a salient feature that can and should be a consideration as the commander “disposes” of an offense.

The Manual for Courts-Martial is, in a sense, complicit because it also ignores any network-centric perspective. Rule for Courts-Martial (RCM) 306, for example (contained in the manual), tasks the commander to consider and subjectively weight various normative factors to ensure that the disposition choice—whether it takes the form of charges for court-martial, reprimand, administrative reduction, or nonjudicial punishment—is “warranted, appropriate, and fair” under all circumstances.

However, the catalog of factors over which a commander must mull in deciding how to fairly address misconduct by subordinate soldiers does not expressly account for the interpersonal relationships underpinning some misconduct’s context. As a result, the rule induces a missed opportunity—a failure to direct the commander’s attention to visualizing and comprehending network-centric causes and influences.

Nevertheless, the conventional use of RCM 306 is not an actual barricade to creative military justice problem solving and decision making. Nothing in the Manual for Courts-Martial’s rules or in military law precludes a commander from looking beyond the four corners of RCM 306 or from taking innovative steps to help make a disciplinary choice. Therefore, the disposition of offenses, or even the administrative personnel transfers over which unit commanders have control, need not remain blind to the role that a soldier’s social network plays in fostering, sustaining, or aggravating individual misconduct.

SNA offers military commanders and their supporting legal advisors a lexicon of new descriptive terms and concepts: nodes, hubs, centrality, brokers, geodesic distances, cut points, and bridges, to name a few. For example, a node is simply a discrete entity or
actor that may be connected along relational lines to other nodes based on a shared characteristic. Hubs are especially well-connected nodes when compared to the average number of connections of the other nodes in a particular network. Such powerful nodes demonstrate (or at least have potential to demonstrate) a disproportionate influence over other nodes.

In another example, a broker is a node that serves as the single “go-between” or intermediary for other nodes. The geodesic distance between two nodes is the shortest path length—in other words, length is measured by how many other nodes separate the two. The shortest path may depict the most efficient routes for sending or receiving information between nodes. Generally, the greater the proportion of geodesic (short, direct) distances in a network, the more clustered and cohesive it is. The more cohesive, the more resilient it can be to attempts to disrupt communication or resource sharing among the nodes.

A cut point is a node that, if removed from a network, would sever all connectivity between two or more nodes, like a keystone in an archway. Likewise, a bridge describes a relationship or tie that, if removed from a network, would sever the flow between two or more nodes or sections of the network.

When applied to the social network existing in any particular military unit, these concepts (and their mathematical calculations, if more precision is needed) may provide leaders a lens through which to observe interactions among their personnel. When circumstances warrant, these concepts may provide solid footing on which to act preemptively with administrative mechanisms or to consider the RCM factors more realistically. In other words, SNA would provide commanders with a means to “perform strategic analysis of organized [misconduct].”

Additionally, seeing where, and to what extent, social networks exist among soldier-to-soldier relationships may create opportunities to advantageously “invest” and “disable.” For instance, if one measures the prestige and in-degree values over time, for a particular subject of interest, one can get a sense of a person’s stickiness or attractive power, or the attractive power of the person’s web. A person’s centrality in a network reflects the scope of his or her involvement with the other actors and can be regarded as an “important ingredient” in locating criminal “network vulnerabilities.”

The concept of centrality can be parsed into three types: the extent to which the node connects to all other nodes, the proximity of that node to other nodes, or the extent to which a given node mediates the relations between various other groups of nodes. These quantitative values, in turn, are suggestive of a capacity to restrain other nodes—other soldiers—from separating away into isolates or leaving the orbit of that particular hub.

Moreover, if the network is a group of soldiers affiliated by some common interest, activity, or other bond, and members of that network appear to engage in various levels of misconduct (together or individually), knowing the network’s density and identifying potential brokers, cut points, or bridges may facilitate developing novel (but targeted) disciplinary strategies tailored to each node’s unique place, strength, and influence in the network.

Scenario: Drug Distribution Ring Investigation

An example emphasizing the reactive utility of SNA, based on a real-world proof of concept, illustrates this strategic potential. Imagine a scenario in which your legal advisor comes into your office and presents you with evidence that a dozen soldiers in your unit are involved—to some degree—in a series of criminal acts involving illicit methamphetamine use and distribution within the barracks. While discussing the current law enforcement investigation with your trial counsel, your mind reels with the second and third order effects across the command: the distracting impact of the lengthy investigation on the unit’s ability to conduct required live-fire exercises in advance of an upcoming deployment; the individual cost to the command of losing (by court-martialing) the mid-level sergeants who helped to cover-up and participate in the drug use; the low likelihood that the distribution ring was confined to soldiers in just one platoon—but instead had spread across the battalion; the long-term health and physical cost to each drug user; and, of course, the need to deter future distribution and use.

Suddenly, something your lawyer casually mentioned pulls you back into the conversation, and you begin to focus on the seemingly mundane, trivial
information he describes as context and background: where the soldiers live in relation to each other, where the drugs and paraphernalia were found, and what were the various overlapping details provided in some sworn statements. Your sergeant major pipes in with detailed recall of the squads, sections, and platoons to which the suspects are assigned and ably summarizes previous overlapping criminal histories of some of the suspects.

On scrap paper from your desk, you begin sketching out the lines of relationships between the suspects, and you juxtapose that interconnected web against their background characteristics. Unexpectedly, you begin to see visual patterns of influence and power emerge on the page—patterns that do not reflect traditional presumptions of who is leading whom astray. You wonder if this exercise would help you make the right disciplinary decision in each case in a way that more holistically accounts for the second and third order consequences you were just imagining. For instance, one course of action—such as a court-martial with a cap on confinement, to spur a swift offer to plead guilty—would be better than another (say, indiscriminate nonjudicial punishment under Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice for all soldiers in the ring) if that course of action would have a domino-like deterrent effect in this social network of drug use and distribution.

Such an effect could either stem the repeated offenses or allow the subordinate commanders to use a targeted disciplinary choice on a particularly influential hub in order to nudge or shepherd the more easily led (or misled) individuals in the right direction. Choosing one course of action over another, therefore, has implications for the substantive equity of the disciplinary action, as well as for the command’s allocation of investigative resources and attention.

Such a scenario is not only hypothetical, but it was employed by a brigade and battalion commander to more efficiently, fairly, and robustly address a drug distribution ring infesting a particular company deployed to Iraq during combat operations.

Figures 1 and 2 represent two layers of data drawn from the law enforcement investigation into that
company-wide misconduct, taken from the sworn statements given by some of the suspects. The brigade’s legal section used this data to create two separate sociograms—visual depictions of a social network. Figure 1 represents an affiliation network—the involvement of a set of actors in a particular social event—depicting which soldiers sold the drug to whom. The relational lines, with arrows pointing at the buyers, are overlaid against the division of the unit into its three platoons. The size of the circle representing each soldier-node is a function of the number of outward-directed links he has. Barnes, for example, is the largest circle because he sold to the greatest number of other soldiers (eight). Manipulating the size of the circle, while not critical, helps visualize the relative weight of the hubs and other nodes.

In this sociogram, a soldier’s nodal out-degree represents the number of other soldiers in the network to whom he sold the drug; conversely, in-degree represents the number of soldiers from whom a particular soldier-node purchased drugs. The degree centrality value indicates how prominent an individual node is within the network by calculating the proportion of the whole network to which he directs a tie (here, sells drugs to another node).

Figure 2 depicts this affiliation network from a slightly different perspective: who has been observed using the drugs, and by whom. In this sociogram, a soldier’s nodal out-degree is the number of soldiers that a particular node observed using the drugs, whereas his in-degree represents the number of other soldiers who observed this node using drugs. His centrality, as one measure of his prominence, is calculated as a proportion of the network this node witnessed using drugs.

These affiliation network sociograms were built only from the information gleaned from multiple law enforcement interviews and the resulting sworn statements provided by the suspected soldiers. Additional layers of data that could be depicted, if evidence was available, include the amount of methamphetamine sold to each individual in the network; the number of transactions per individual buyer; the same sociogram over multiple points in time or by location, which shows whether the network animates or changes over
time or space; the labeling of nodes that have previous drug use or distribution histories; and adding nodes for all network members’ noncommissioned officers (NCOs), depicting each suspect’s geodesic distance from formal NCO supervision. The amount of information that one can collect and illustrate using SNA techniques becomes a function of the time, patience, and—ultimately—the goals of the commander.

In this real-world illustration, some of the observations the command teams gleaned from the SNA exercise included data that could not be easily deduced or inferred from the sworn statements alone. For instance, the commanders were able to note that—

- Aran was buying from three different sources, which suggested significant dependency, and that cutting his ties to any one of the sellers would not significantly disrupt his use.
- Seven soldiers from one platoon were implicated as buyers or sellers of the drug, suggesting that NCO and officer leadership were either negligent or derelict in enforcement of good order and discipline, or possibly that they knew of the misconduct already but chose to ignore it.
- There was no single cutpoint in this network of sellers (i.e., removing only one seller would not substantially diminish the availability of the drug from other sources within the company).
- Available evidence showed that five soldiers had an in-degree value of at least 2. This suggests methamphetamine use was a social activity engaged in by multiple personnel within this network.
- Aran, despite buying from three sources, was never observed using the drugs, suggesting he was a more isolated node.
- Neebles had a high in-degree (by purchase) and the highest out-degree (by observation of others).
- Fells and Neebles each witnessed sixty percent of the network using methamphetamines.

With this rich portrait of the social relationships among the suspected users and sellers, the battalion and brigade commanders were able to make disciplinary choices that more aptly and more precisely accounted for considerations of rehabilitative need and the various scales of criminal culpability for each individual in the network. Some were obviously more central to the use and distribution of the drugs than others, and the type of discipline imposed accounted for relative passivity of occasional users or the critical role of brokers of this resource between other soldiers across the unit.

**Employment Considerations**

Case-by-case circumstances compel how, when, and if certain military justice options should be used. That calculus is equally appropriate for the choice to employ SNA as a methodology, and it should remain within the judicious discretion of the commander. Admittedly, the drug distribution ring from figures 1 and 2 could have been investigated and prosecuted without the use of SNA. Indeed, most networks of misconduct typically are. SNA, however, can give more analytical justification to the way in which investigators, prosecutors, and commanders label and attack certain elements of those networks. It can also help military justice practitioners visualize the scope and scale of the unseen entanglements that inspire or influence the misconduct. This essay offers several situational variables—extensions from the traditional RCM 306 considerations—that commanders should reflect on before turning to SNA:

- The number of potential offenders
- The span of disciplinary command and control over the potential offenders
- The variation of culpability among the potential offenders
- Disparate positions and rank of the potential offenders

With these additional employment considerations in mind, it is not a large leap to imagine how SNA might be extended beyond military justice. Applications run the range from better (or at least earlier) identification of hubs of misconduct to the more careful observation of those service member nodes that may be susceptible to the negative influences of their more assertive or aggressive comrades. Such observations may trigger opportunities beyond traditional disciplinary measures.

Four opportunities come to mind. The first is conducting more precise and targeted leader engagement to affect those more susceptible nodes. The second, and less direct, opportunity is leveraging the gate-keeping, liaising, consulting, or coordinating broker nodes as a way to subtly influence the conduct of those nodes. The third is deliberately rearranging personnel to break up or disable disreputable networks. The fourth opportunity is selectively embedding or “investing” constructively influential and
trusted service members (of virtually any rank), like firewalls, to block connections to or from undesirably influential nodes and to positively influence the conduct of their weaker-willed compatriots.\(^4\) Both the value and the cost of using SNA in that proactive, risk-management approach is a subject that deserves further exploration and review.

**Conclusion**

At a fundamental level, SNA is another tool to measure, understand, and react to problems influenced by the social connectivity we all naturally share to various degrees. SNA is a powerful tool for uncloaking the critical context that remains obscured or unmeasured by traditional military investigations into widespread misconduct. SNA is neither new nor groundbreaking in its most basic applications.

However, its relatively long history of use since its inception is a result of its demonstrated utility across a broad range of disciplines and of its usefulness in answering a wide variety of questions. SNA's adaptation as a visual or quantitative aid to commanders in making strategic military justice decisions would be an innovative departure from current conventional practice. Given SNA's ample potential and current applications, it is worth further exploration by military justice practitioners.\(^4\)

The author wishes to thank his colleagues in the U.S. Army Government Appellate Division for their insights and Dr. Luke Gerdes, Minerva Fellow in the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership, United States Military Academy, for his technical review and astute suggestions. The opinions in this article are the author's alone and do not represent official policy of the Department of the Army or the Judge Advocate General's Corps.

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**Notes**

5. Extending Sparrow’s observations further, SNA may also allow military leaders to proactively “invest” in these informal networks as a consequence of a more nuanced awareness of the social structures underlying their organizations. As a result, leaders might uncover opportunities to reinforce the cohesive bonds in such networks and thereby increase their resistance to harmful internal “insurgencies” (such as peer-induced misconduct) and to widely felt external traumas (such as combat losses). In other words, network analysis can help plant healthy trees in an orchard where few bad apples can grow.
11. Barabasi, 30-34; Watts, 98; Wasserman and Faust, 6.


22. MCM, see RCM 306.


24. Donald W. Hansen, Judicial Functions for the Commander?, 41 Mil. L. Rev. 1 (1968), http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/milrv41&div=4&cid=4&page=4. Like many investigators or prosecutors, commanders display a “commitment to particularized judgments—to judging the individual’s likely guilt or innocence based primarily upon his own actions, beliefs, and character.” See Andrew E. Tatslitz, Police Are People Too: Cognitive Obstacles to, and Opportunities for, Police Getting the Individualized Suspicion Judgment Right, 8 Ohio St. J. Crim. Law 7 (2010) at 17 (discussing the cognitive flaws in police investigators’ application of “reasonable suspicion” and “probable cause”).


27. Reed, 21.

28. MCM, V-Ic; RCM 306, RCM 307, and RCM 401.

29. An individual or discrete entity that may be connected along relational ties to other individuals or entities based on a shared characteristic, relationship, or action.

30. I use the term hub subjectively, based on the particular features and characteristics of the network being studied.

31. Watts, 52.

32. Hanneman and Riddle, chapter 8.

33. Knoke, 60-61.

34. Ibid, 49.

35. Ibid. These bridging relationships serve as essential conduits of information, resources, or access between various nodes, and thus affect the ability of such commodities or actions to diffuse across the network; Granovetter, 1364.

36. Sparrow, 260.

37. Reed, 20.

38. In any given social network, one could characterize actors as senders or receivers of directed ties. Such labeling signals an actor’s access to, or control over, information, resources, and influence (authority or deference to authority). Prestige measures the extent to which a social actor receives or serves as the object of relations sent by other actors. Actors with higher values can be thought of as more prestigious within that particular network study, in that they receive many ties and need only initiate a few. This value, however, has limitations: by mathematically equating all senders, one could oversimplify the nature of the prestigious relationship because it does not account for variation in the prestige value of the senders themselves. In other words, an actor’s prestige in a group may be qualitatively enhanced if he or she receives ties from another prestigious actor. In this particular network of some specified relation, Knoke, 69; The total number of relations a particular node or actor has is that node’s nodal degree in a nondirected graph (that is, where studying whether the tie exists or it does not without regard to who is initiating or receiving some relation). Conversely, in a directed graph (where we can distinguish who initiates or sends a relation to another node), we can further distinguish between that node’s in-degree (the number of relations received by one actor from other actors) and out-degree (the number of relations sent by one actor to all others). Like the limitations of the prestige value noted above, the in-degree and out-degree value for any focal, actor is limited because it does not distinguish the intrinsic quality of those other actors sending relations to, or receiving relations from, the focal actor.


40. Degree centrality measures the extent to which a node connects to all other nodes in a given social network. Closeness centrality measures the proximity of a given node to other nodes, serving as a proxy characteristic for how long it may take that node to interact with others. Betweenness centrality measures the extent to which a given actor mediates the relations between various other dyads that are not directly connected themselves. This value articulates and helps visualize the actor’s potential for influence or control over information exchange or resources within a network. Knoke, 63-69.

41. An isolate is an actor unconnected to any other actor in a particular network of some specified relation. Knoke, 48.

42. Knoke, 53-56; Watts, 72; Sparrow, 260-61. Generically, in a given network, density equals the proportion of potential ties that exist between nodes. If this value is assessed over time, one could develop a measure of the network’s resiliency, or ability to withstand destabilizing internal or external events.

43. Ibid.

44. Personal notes and records for the investigation and adverse actions resulting from a drug use and distribution ring in this particular unit are on file with the author. All names used in this essay are fictional.

45. Hanneman, chapter 8. Over time, and in relation to other actors in a network, a specific individual could play one or several roles as this broker. For example, if the actor sits between two other nodes and all three share the same affiliation (e.g., membership in an organization), that actor could be characterized as a coordinator. If that actor, however, does not share an affiliation with those two connected nodes, he or she could be thought of as a consultant. When the actor controls access by non-network members to his or her nodes, that actor is a gatekeeper. Additionally, the degree of the actor’s affiliation with some of his connected nodes may characterize him or her as representative (of one group, in contact with non-group actors), or as a liaison (affiliated with no group, but mediating contact between groups in the network).

46. Watts, 230. The firewall analogy is mentioned by Watts in the context of discussing how SNA might identify triggers for domino-like cascades (as in power grid failures) and, conversely, locations in which to place stop-gaps to prevent, if needed, the cascade; Knoke, 5. “Direct contacts and more intensive interactions dispose entities to better information, greater awareness and higher susceptibility to influencing or being influenced by others.”

47. In the author’s opinion, the most useful SNA reference guide for commanders and their legal advisors is Wasserman and Faust’s Methods and Applications (specifically, chapters 2, 3, and 4).
Loyal dissent is usually expressed as carefully thought-out, well-intentioned, usually verbal action designed to help an entire organization or a particular leader perform better and accomplish its mission more successfully. Loyal dissent presents a leader with an alternate idea or a different solution to a problem, sometimes even after a leader has issued orders or made his or her decision. Truly loyal dissent...
does not consist of continuous second-guessing, and it is it never self-serving. Complaining is not loyal dissent, and real loyal dissent is not about a subordinate’s fear of change. It is about the good of the organization and expressed out of genuine concern for the leaders.

**Telling the Difference**

Both loyal and disloyal dissent are present to varying degrees inside every Army organization all the time. Both will naturally occur in military organizations whether we acknowledge it or not, but their existence does not mean an organization is broken or badly led. On the contrary, the presence of dissent is inevitable because it is a normal human reaction to frustration even among highly disciplined soldiers.

Sometimes dissent occurs as a result of the actions of a toxic leader, or adverse working conditions where members perceive little is being done by leadership to remediate or assist them. The majority of dissent in our formations, when it occurs, is not valuable loyal dissent. It is usually the unproductive type and comes in the form of a subordinate’s parochial resistance to authority or change along with some cases of outright disobedience. Unproductive dissent commonly occurs because some percentage of our subordinates fear change or are just selfish and seek a way to resist losing their position, privileges, time, or comforts. Most successful Army leaders have dealt with and overcome such negative challenges from time to time through legal exercise of authority.

Loyal dissent, however, is markedly different and we should learn to harness it to our advantage. Expressing loyal dissent is risky to a soldier’s career as it potentially carries with it the penalty of estrangement from the leader he or she cares about and ostracism by one’s peers. Therefore, loyal dissent is not expressed by selfish subordinates or those adverse to change. Instead, it is selflessly undertaken by people who care deeply about their organization’s purpose, its mission, and who want to help their leaders. Moreover, it is undertaken by subordinates who have a measure of moral courage, are emotionally committed to the unit’s success, and are perhaps concerned the organization may be heading in the wrong direction. In expressing loyal dissent, they have overcome their fear of becoming a lone dissenting voice because they are fiercely loyal to the unit’s purpose and also to their leader. Those who undertake this loyal and productive form of dissent may be among those who truly care most for their organization. In addition, these solution-oriented individuals often have already earned positions of trust and responsibility with access and close proximity to their decision makers.

The dissent of subordinates who fit the profile of loyal dissenters should be leveraged to a leader’s advantage, not simply counteracted like its unproductive opposite. As leaders, we should pause for a moment to determine the nature of the dissent within our ranks. Loyal dissent is valuable. These dissenters are a valuable resource available to Army organizations and leaders because their contributions can help make their units more efficient and potentially save leaders from making mistakes that could lead to their own downfall or embarrass the organization. Therefore, these individuals should be of special interest to smart military leaders because they can be leveraged for their talents, ideas, and dedication to make the organization better and their superiors even more successful.

**Why Some Subordinates Undertake Loyal Dissent**

When subordinates perceive an organization is in decline, the late Harvard professor and Army veteran A.O. Hirshman described them as having three choices. They could quit, which is not really an immediate possibility for most soldiers in the Army. Next they could outwardly feign loyalty while waiting quietly for conditions to improve, which deprives both the organization and its leader of their advice. (We will call this faking it.) Finally, they can openly voice their dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs in an effort to improve it. This final alternative, loyal dissenters have concluded, is a far better alternative than quitting or faking it, which does not contribute to the unit’s success or immediate improvement.

**Distinguishing Loyal from Unproductive Dissent**

There is a danger that leaders will conflate loyal dissent with its opposite. Unproductive dissent is frequently manifest when subordinates merely complain unproductively, as when they believe an organization is in decline, or on the wrong path, without any intent or will to do something about it. Some, of course, can
be expected to be lazy and never fully contribute no matter what decision a leader has made. (Let us again assume these types of subordinates must be dealt with using legitimate authority in ways outside the scope of this article.) However, when leaders confuse unproductive dissent with genuine loyal dissent, and lump both together, their followers will become ingratiating and obsequious. Worse still, those subordinates with the potential to make significant contributions to the unit by supplying creative and perceptive contrary views may decide to simply wait out their leader’s term, electing to contribute in a minimal way in order to avoid attention, and hoping that somehow things will improve due to other external factors. Such a circumstance denies the unit the energy and potential contributions to mission success these soldiers could provide.

Consequently, treating all dissent as adverse is wrong-headed and highly counterproductive. Instead, successful leaders are often those most willing to provide a real and productive forum to leverage the value of loyal dissent.

Evaluating the Nature of Dissent

To discern the difference between valuable loyal dissent and its opposite, consider the source. Loyal dissenters are generally hard working with a proven track record, not complainers who seldom contribute their full potential.

Next, consider their motivation. If resolution of the dissent provides the dissenter with no personal gain, or risks a leader’s disfavor by bringing up a controversial issue, then the reputed loyal dissenter is likely motivated by good intentions or acting for the good of the unit.

Finally, consider the dissenting idea itself. Could it potentially improve your organization? Even if the idea cannot be implemented right now, would future similar ideas from others potentially help your team? If so, consider giving it a chance.

If the dissent passes this three-part test then it is likely loyal in nature. Leaders must then carefully decide how they react to loyal dissent, as everyone in their organization is now watching.

The Challenges to Accepting Loyal Dissent

To employ our subordinates to the organization’s full advantage, we must encourage them to speak freely when appropriate. Loyally dissenting subordinates are not a threat. However, leaders sometimes have a tough time differentiating between challenges to their personal authority—which is not the intent of truly loyal dissent—and challenges to their ideas or policies. A subordinate can disagree with a policy, and bring you a solution or new recommendation, without challenging your right to lead.

Human Context of Dissent

Even loyal dissent may tax our deeply entrenched human aversion and cultural conditioning against challenges to the hierarchy without our even knowing it, leaving both the would-be dissenter and the dominant leader feeling uneasy. This occurs despite the fact the leader may have actually requested that his or her subordinate provide a respectful critique (i.e., “Tell me what you really think”). Overcoming these uneasy feelings that result from productive dissent first requires us to understand their origins and then have the courage and strength to mitigate their stifling effects.

Some resistance to hearing loyal dissent may come from our biological roots. Psychologist and education expert Dr. Howard Gardner argues that, as primates, we are hard wired to seek out hierarchical organizations and then imitate and follow the dominate leaders. This has been a good thing for society overall as it has allowed us to create great civilizations ordered by the rule of law. However, the biological legacy that creates deference to hierarchy may also mean that we are all internally wired to avoid loyal dissent when facing uncertainty and stress.

This aversion is especially apparent among newly formed groups, which characteristically have higher rates of anxiety about their chances for success stemming from their unproven track record. In the Army, new groups are formed and reformed regularly. A battalion or brigade recently reconstituted as part of the Army force generation cycle contains mostly new soldiers and must make ready for combat in short order. These new teams are particularly vulnerable to bottling up loyal and productive dissent.

To reduce anxiety, new groups like these tend to become more homogeneous in thought as a coping mechanism. This may successfully reduce some anxiety, but also disrupts aggregate creativity and dissuades all dissent, both loyal and disloyal. A similar
challenge to the acceptance of loyal dissent occurs when we overvalue harmony inside our organizations. Psychologist and long-time intelligence community researcher J. Richard Hackman has found that “teams whose members share good feelings and a spirit of camaraderie run the risk of groupthink. Dissenting views about what the group is doing may be ignored or squelched—or even self-censored by worried members who do not want to spoil things by raising questions.”

The tendency to groupthink stems from the natural desire of military organizations to minimize internal conflict. We cannot help it. A smoothly running unit is generally considered to be indicative of an effective and cohesive atmosphere. However, the problem with things running too smoothly, as Harvard professor Ronald Heifetz points out, is that “differences in perspective are the engine of human progress.” Loyal dissent provides leaders with this difference in perspective, and that can be quite helpful to our bosses.

Hackman goes on to argue that, while dissenting views may make some members feel uncomfortable, these views are useful because they generate new ideas and creative approaches to problems when harnessed properly. Such new ideas and creative approaches lead to successful winning organizations. Leaders can mistakenly attribute success directly to a unit’s level of cohesion, when in fact unit cohesion is really a result of a unit’s successes. Winning breeds cohesion in a locker room, but cohesion does not always lead to victory. In contrast, loyal dissent can help lead to success by promoting useful innovation; success that then contributes to unit cohesion at all levels.

Setting the Conditions for Loyal Dissent in Your Unit

Loyal dissent does not undermine our leaders; its purpose is to support them and help them make better decisions. Therefore, a leader may need to invest valuable time to teach his or her subordinates how to properly and productively dissent in the unit.

For their part, aspiring loyal dissenters understand that dissent is risky for a variety of reasons; therefore will not be undertaken lightly. Dissenting too often makes one a troublemaker, too seldom and you gain the title of yes-man. Nevertheless, good leaders will facilitate an avenue or mechanism to encourage loyal dissent by setting conditions for it to occur properly and then leveraging it to their advantage.

Five Methods to Leverage Loyal Dissent in Your Formation

First, leaders who wish to harness loyal dissent must look within themselves and determine what kind of command climate they really wish to establish. They have to decide for themselves what role they expect their subordinates to play.

Subordinates who are conditioned to believe they serve only the leader’s interests will rarely let that leader hear anything but praise. In such an environment, leaders will tolerate very little loyal dissent and subordinates understand that they only exist to carry out the leader’s explicit directives and wishes. Very few of us desire this type of organization.

In contrast, in an environment where subordinates are taught that they exist to help the leader successfully lead and help collectively to achieve the organization’s purpose, respectful challenges to the leader’s ideas from time to time may actually be a welcome addition to the process. Good leaders demand that subordinates provide this dissent even though the process may be somewhat uncomfortable for both parties.

Moreover, to make the process work, good leaders must learn to separate the idea from the person delivering it. While professionals must endeavor to speak clearly, calmly, and succinctly to their leaders, we must all remember that loyal dissent can be scary for even the most accomplished subordinates, and allowances must be made for inexperience and insecurity. It is not easy to offer a new idea to the boss, especially when he or she may not want to hear it right away.

It is also important to bear in mind that the dissenting soldier may be quite nervous and insecure of their status immediately following the expression of loyal dissent. As a result, the loyal dissenter may over compensate for this insecurity by acting loud, scared, or boisterous. Consequently, the dissenting soldier may have a tone that the leader finds troubling, or the person may inadvertently make the leader angry.

We all have a normal, natural tendency to attempt to avoid criticism. However, good leaders must learn to master this emotion, overriding their natural fear of constructive criticism from juniors and appearing
generally interested in their respectfully dissenting opinions. If this does not happen, the process will quickly become counterproductive as leaders react poorly to it and send clear non-verbal signals that they do not really like it, no matter if their words indicate to the contrary.

Next, leaders must act in some way on the loyal dissent their subordinates provide them. A leader must take some minimal action, even if he or she chooses not to implement the suggested change or modify the suggested policy. Acknowledging the dissent is enough, or telling the subordinate that you will consider his or her proposal.

In contrast, taking no action at all sends a clear signal, not only to the loyal dissenter who has had the temerity to approach his or her boss, but to all those in the unit who are watching. By taking no action, a leader is communicating that he or she is not really serious about any commitment to consideration of dissenting opinions and may even be disingenuous by feigning that he or she is so, undermining leader credibility.

If the leader chooses not to adopt a suggestion, he or she should still provide the loyally dissenting subordinate feedback on his or her idea. Tell the subordinate why you do not want to act on their advice, when the time is appropriate. When leaders act on loyal dissent, even if they only acknowledge its receipt and commend the subordinate for providing it, they increase their reputation as fair and open-minded. Consider the courage a subordinate must have to muster to tell a commander, respectfully, that the unit is off course. When leaders respectfully acknowledge this loyal dissent, and especially when they implement prudent ideas from subordinates, this follow-up can dramatically increase the loyalty and commitment of every soldier. Additionally, recommendations by loyal dissenters that are actually implemented serve to empower subordinates and engender deeper individual commitment and unit cohesion without undermining essential unit discipline.

Third, leaders must adjust the unit’s on-boarding experiences to encourage loyal dissent. It is during the on-boarding process that new soldiers are taught the “correct way to perceive, think, act, and feel,” while learning the unit’s culture and norms. During this phase, leaders must explain to their subordinates how to successfully and loyally dissent, when to speak up, and how to best do it in their formation. Group norms taught during on-boarding experiences are used to foster collaboration and assist the leader in getting the most out of his or her team. During this on-boarding period, leaders must also help subordinates understand when it is appropriate to simply remain silent. In this way, we leverage loyal dissent at all levels, demonstrating that it is not just the purview of senior officers and NCOs.

Taking steps to institutionalize the process demonstrates that loyal dissent, undertaken at the appropriate time, is not inconsistent with good military discipline and actually supports the chain-of-command. When properly executed, it is the epitome of good followership and demonstrates true loyalty to our leaders. A unit’s norms relative to loyal dissent promulgated during the on-boarding experience can set conditions for success with far reaching effects.
Fourth, leaders must institutionalize real loyal dissent mechanisms and other rituals in their organizations.\textsuperscript{19} There is no need to gripe behind the boss’s back when you can, and should, speak directly to the leader’s face. Leaders who take active measures to formally institutionalize loyal dissent mechanisms create conditions to get the most from their loyal subordinates and disrupt the influence of nonproductive dissenters.

The famous open door policy is just a start, but really only a passive measure. Absolutely everybody has an open door policy, and most require only that the leader sit and wait for subordinates to come to them. In contrast, private sector executive coach and author Ira Chaleff urges business leaders “not to mistake the fact that they have an open door policy with having one that functions.”\textsuperscript{20} He argues that leaders can determine if their open door policy is working well by counting the number of times subordinates from two or more levels down in their organization have actually used it. If the answer is zero or very seldom, then either there is no dissent present in the organization (which would be a real miracle) or something is preventing its effective use.\textsuperscript{21}

Far better to employ dissent mechanisms that act as safety valves against the formation of negative dissent inside your unit.\textsuperscript{22} Leaders must actively and regularly seek out dissenting opinions to create these outlets, and this cannot be easily delegated. Asking subordinate commanders to express a dissenting opinion at the end of each briefing, regularly requiring three recommended ‘improves’ on unit policy from each subordinate, and blocking time on a leader’s calendar for honest two-way counseling are all examples of ritualized active mechanisms for the communication of loyal dissent to leaders.

Former NASA administrator Sean O’Keefe implemented active dissent mechanisms in his organization, stating “my first rule is never to surround myself with people who are just like me. My second rule is always to insist upon someone voicing the dissenting opinion. Always.”\textsuperscript{23} Similarly, loyal dissent is not something our leaders must simply endure; it is something they must actively encourage to improve their organizations.

Finally, leaders must recognize and accept that not every loyally dissenting subordinate will get it right. Leaders must resist the natural temptation to rapidly dismiss the well-intentioned subordinate presenting an imperfect (or bad) idea, lest they inhibit all future loyal dissent in the organization. Word travels quickly when the boss reacts badly to a challenging viewpoint. Truly leveraging loyal dissent in our units means leaders have to exhibit patience when listening to some subordinates whose ideas are not quite ready for implementation, or were formed without all the necessary facts.

This is not advocacy for leaders to needlessly suffer fools or set low standards. Loyal dissenters care greatly about their leader’s opinion. When their proposal is off-base and the leader provides constructive and professional feedback as to why this is so, their behavior will become self-regulating very quickly. Loyal subordinates do not want to waste their leader’s time with poorly conceived ideas that will not, or cannot, be enacted, but occasionally it is bound to occur.

Additionally, punishment of loyal dissent is self-defeating for leaders, as the organization will soon withdraw from providing any future input or advice and move toward self-preservation. Hackman’s research has found that “punishment fosters either withdrawal or variation of behavior as people try to head off aversive outcomes.”\textsuperscript{24} Certainly there are some negative behaviors leaders must always discourage and others they must punish outright. Loyal dissent, however, cannot be one of them. If a leader signals that he or she will only listen to the good ideas presented by subordinates, very soon leaders will find himself themselves listening to no ideas at all.

**Conclusion**

The hybrid threats our Army faces require agile formations at all levels where leaders can harness good ideas from multiple sources. Loyal dissent empowers both leaders and subordinates alike to generate these ideas, and will make our military organizations more successful. When executed properly, leaders use loyal dissent to create the conditions for unit-level innovation by employing subordinates to their fullest potential. In an era of reduced budgets and personnel challenges, this is one way Army units must leverage smart soldiers who fiercely want to directly contribute to the success of the organization.

The Army must balance the need for synchronization with the requirement to innovate and conduct successful decentralized operations. With that in mind, there are some potential drawbacks to loyal dissent. Under certain circumstances, leaders pausing
to carefully consider dissenting opinions could potentially waste too much time at critical junctures and create some measure of inefficiency. This could potentially risk soldier’s lives if undertaken at wholly inappropriate times or in the presence of an inappropriate audience (though such a deliberate pause might also save the unit from making a grave mistake). There is no substitute for a leader’s judgment in these circumstances.

Consequently, it is essential to recognize that there is a time and place for open debate, a time for loyal dissent, and a time to rapidly execute orders without question. A leader’s time is precious, and allowing every single subordinate to have his or her say whenever he or she chose would lead to anarchy.25

Ethical and thoughtful subordinates must be taught to discern when such dissent is appropriate if they are to be trusted to loyally dissent to their leaders. They will not get the timing right every time, but they must try hard to do so. To cultivate the process, leaders may consider selecting a few key subordinates who are encouraged to question the leader’s ideas in a loyal way at most any time, while others are asked to do so only formally through formal dissent mechanisms.26

The key to establishing an environment where loyal dissent is encouraged is remembering that subordinates are not attacking the leader’s personal authority. They trust in your right to lead them but want to help you make a better decision. Loyally dissenting subordinates are attempting to help their leader and their organization succeed.

A command environment that invites disciplined, thoughtful, and well-intentioned loyal dissent increases soldier commitment, a leader’s access to alternate solutions, and helps foster true unit cohesion and discipline.

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Notes

7. Chaleff, 216.
8. Ibid., 218.
13. Ibid., 137.
17. O’Leary, 7.
20. Chaleff, 211.
21. Ibid., 211.
22. O’Leary, 97.
23. Ibid., 104.
24. Hackman, 127.
25. Chaleff, 209.
26. Ibid., 209.
Cadet Angel Santiago (with the ball) led the Army football team to a 28 to 12 victory over visiting Morgan State under the lights at Michie Stadium, West Point, New York, 30 August 2014. Football provides an ideal example of how the logico-scientific paradigm and the interpretive paradigm are employed in a complementary manner by viewers as they interpret the game.

(Photograph by John Pellino, Directorate of Plans, Training, Mobilization, and Security)

Two Faces of Critical Thinking for the Reflective Military Practitioner

Col. Christopher Paparone, Ph.D., U.S. Army, Retired
...an object, event, or situation in human experience does not carry its own meaning; the meaning is conferred on it.
—Herbert Blumer

The quest to educate our military toward the goal of fostering critical thinkers is an obvious part of the dominant narrative in U.S. military circles today. Critical thinking has become quite the catchphrase. Yet, there is little published in military circles demonstrating a philosophical examination of what critical thinking means; hence, my intent here is to start that conversation. My argument calls upon two faces of critical thinking—a metaphor that conveys a dualistic approach toward a more reflective military practice.

A decade ago, I was on faculty at the U.S. Army War College where the curriculum employed a blue booklet on critical thinking authored by Richard W. Paul and Linda Elder. Later, as a faculty member of the Command and General Staff College, I likewise was directed to have our students read and apply the booklet, presumably to assure they were able to critically reason. In the booklet, Paul and Elder present what they claim to be “universal intellectual standards:” clarity, accuracy, precision, relevance, depth, breadth, logic, significance, and fairness. Indeed, the Paul and Elder text seemed to help students detect logical fallacies. That is, Paul and Elder, employing the logico-scientific paradigm, present critical thinking as a deductive-inductive reasoning process necessary to uncover flaws in logic much as one would in evaluating mathematical proofs and physics experiments.

Many of my students and I were left unsatisfied with this logico-scientific approach as it did not seem to address novelty, or what Donald A. Schön described as indeterminate zones of practice—conditions of complexity, uncertainty, and value conflict—which my student-officers had experienced. A search for meaning in these situations had little to do with identifying logical fallacies as prescribed by Paul and Elder. The complexities they experienced were uniquely “observer dependent,” and the observer’s sense of complexity was limited by the available language or institutionalized doctrines to interpret what it was that was complex. Meeting Paul and Elder’s standard that requires bringing intellectual order to such chaos would be a misstep. Because such an uncritical practice could dangerously lead to an illusion of understanding, I began the search for another paradigm associated with critical thinking. My intent here is to describe an alternative—the interpretive paradigm—and present this basis for critical reasoning as a complementary world view. I say complementary, as I argue that both paradigms are essential to make sense of complex unfolding events. In doing so, I will address each by section as follows: I will explain the sociological concept of paradigms; present an American football allegory to illustrate how two paradigms work in tandem; discuss how they critically relate to each other; and, at the end, offer a critical approach to indeterminate zones of professional practice, called action learning, that applies both faces of critical thinking.

Two Paradigms for Sensemaking

A paradigm is the way a particular community of practice makes sense of the world. As such, there are at least three interlaced philosophical systems of inquiry and analysis that underly the logic of paradigms—ontology, epistemology, and methodology. I will compare and explain each of these to help differentiate the logico-scientific from the interpretive paradigm.

The first ingredient to a paradigm is ontology, or an underlying sense of being. Ontology attempts to answer the question, “What is real?” It may be construed along a continuum between beliefs of a purely objective world (involving a concrete sense of reality, or objectivism) and subjective world (the social construction of reality, or subjectivism). Objectivism is the ontological essence of the logico-scientific paradigm. Objectivists are closely aligned with the physical sciences in that reality may be proven to exist independent of mankind’s often flawed perceptions of it (i.e., what would constitute logical fallacies according to Paul and Elder).

In contrast, a subjectivist, at the other end of the ontological spectrum, argues that mankind has symbolically created reality, where reality only exists in context. To the subjectivist, reality is dependent on sociological processes—the hallmark of the interpretive paradigm.

The second ingredient of a paradigm is epistemology—the ensuing belief about what legitimates understanding in light of ontological assumptions. Epistemology answers the question, “What constitutes our knowledge for professional practice?” For example,
to understand the physical world, the logico-scientific knowledge structure is often judged objectively by its orderliness, coherency of theory, rationalized categories and taxonomies, analytic theories of causality, and so forth. To objective purists such as Paul and Elder, emotions and intuitive processes are not only invalid ways to judge knowledge, but they reflect biases that must be overcome. To an interpretivist, epistemology is recognized to be tentative knowledge representing man-made, flexible conceptualizations of reality. Here, epistemology is necessarily an unsettled, Heraclitean process of “never stepping into the same river twice.”

Beyond cognitions, interpretations are narratives that also spawn feelings such as surprise, irony, déjà vu, paradox, tragedy, artfulness, excitement, creativity, comedy, and so on. Intuition and emotions are intertwined to constitute a subjective epistemology; hence, judgment of interpretive forms of knowledge cannot be divorced from either of them.

The third ingredient of a paradigm, methodology, involves how knowledge is legitimized. The logico-scientific paradigm would include the objectivist’s employment of the scientific method, where, typically, the steps are—define the problem based in a coherent theory, search for possible answers, test them objectively for generalizability, and apply the best answer which feeds back into a nomothetic (lawful) knowledge structure, traditionally known as science. From the world view of the subjectivist, the interpretivist employs idiosyncratic methods—such as the use of metaphors, hermeneutics, rich description, or creation of neologisms—for the purpose of deep, situationally specific learning. The idea is to develop distinctive meanings in appreciation of the complex experiences at hand. Note that the logico-scientific paradigm seeks context-free methods designed around sameness while the interpretive seeks context-specific methods designed around uniqueness.

**American Football: An Allegory for Military Operations**

As social beings, we are not stuck in a single paradigm; we experience the world seamlessly between logico-scientific and interpretive ontological assumptions. We can note that what makes professional football interesting is that no two plays, games, or seasons are alike—uniqueness being a key feature of idiographic-based knowledge. Yet, there are logico-scientific repetitions offering a generalizable sameness as well. When we watch a football game, we enjoy it because we have learned to understand the relatively consistent rule structure (sameness) and appreciate that those rules interact with the playing of the game at hand (uniqueness). We know that the rules (a key feature of football epistemology) are a subjective creation because we notice the league changes them as conditions change. We observe how the rules are enforced—in the most unbiased way possible—followed by methodical, physical hand-and-arm signals by well-experienced, objective referees. We also couple those observations with our subjective interpretations of what just happened—our agreement or disagreement with the assessment of penalties—and may actually disagree with the supposedly objective play-review video system.

While we observe and analyze the physical prowess of the individual players and their integration of their positional tasks into a team effort—using objective measurements such as yards gained and passes completed—we interpret individual and team performance from an emotional basis as well (e.g., we become fans). We also are intrigued by how the coaches and quarterback seem to subjectively know when to run, pass, or even intentionally ground the football. We listen to the commentators judge what play should be run and how they criticize plays that did not work as planned. We watch the dynamic physical interactions of the opposing teams while reflecting how both sides can surprise each other. In our own minds, surprise (an emotion) seems a very subjectively interpreted experience as a surprising play is only a shock to the other team, the announcers, and the audience. Sometimes even the team making an unexpected play seems to surprise itself as to the degree of its success or failure, particularly if the play did not unfold as practiced.

In football we reflect on the passage of minutes and seconds—both subjective measures invented by humans and, yet, measures that have become socially objectified as we equate time with physical events. We notice time is controlled by seemingly objective categories: starts, timeouts, halftimes, resets, two-minute warnings, overtimes, and finishes. The subjectivist in us, however, recognizes that these times may vary among college or high-school football conferences when
compared to those at the paid-professional level, again indicating time is a human invention. Also of note to the interpretivist is that there is a certain irony that an hour of official play time often involves more than three hours for a single game.

Football statistics give us the impression of objective fact; hence, predictability. Predictability is the quintessential goal of the logico-scientific paradigm. Measures of player and team performance may give clues as to which teams will make the playoffs. Measures of effectiveness, such as scores at the end of a quarter, half, or game are partially reliable predictors of an overall season victor. However, we cannot imagine looking only at a computer screen with ongoing statistics to fully appreciate what is happening a game. We want to appreciate and emotionally involve ourselves in what is happening on the ground. When viewing the game, we interpret how it is going and realize that strictly monitoring “objective” statistics is not satisfactory. We celebrate (with emotion) when underdogs surprise us by winning games that probability and statistics would deny—and we experience heightened morale (also an emotional state) when the winning team surges.

We are aware, outside the conduct of a game, of ongoing, behind-the-scenes, complex emotional tensions among the players, managers, and owners of the teams. These require subjective judgments as to whether the players will be fined, go on strike, be provided disability pensions, be recruited, or be traded to other teams. We interpret how outside interactions might affect the game at hand and the season ahead. Finally, taking ourselves outside our comfort zone, the interpretivist in us contemplates why culture in the United States has created a very different epistemology of football from most of the rest of the world, whose game we Americans call soccer. We should critically wonder why we call our game football at all. Objectively, the ball is kicked far less than it is carried or thrown.

With this short allegory, we demonstrate that the reality of professional football may simultaneously be ontologically objective and subjective, that the epistemologies (knowledge structures) of football vary along the logico-scientific—interpretive continuum, and that methods of meaning legitimation in the sport are heterogeneous. Making sense of football strictly from the logico-scientific paradigm would certainly constrain our overall interpretations of its complexity, highlighting the need to derive an aesthetic-subjective appreciation of the game. We learn from this allegory that with complexity there must be a great deal of room for interpretation, a respect for other knowledge forms, and other methods of knowledge formation that are equally important to produce richness in our sensemakings about what we are observing.

Indeed, our military sensemakings would become disabling if we were to employ only the logico-scientific paradigm to study the complexity of our recent experiences in Afghanistan, observing the messiness of Syria and Iraq, and in the wake of Russian involvement in the Ukraine. Obviously, such complexity demands even more concoctions of ontological, epistemological, and methodological ingredients than would football.

**Dual Paradigms Offer Complementary, Critical Perspectives**

Logico-scientists criticize interpretivists as too speculative, violating such notions as Paul’s and Elder’s “universal intellectual standards” which offer the promise of removing ambiguity and imprecision. These standards suggest only the logico-scientific paradigm provides a legitimate basis for critical reasoning. That is, the military practitioner should seek to remove all subjectivity about the situation at hand; apply a generalizable epistemology of proven tactics, techniques, and procedures expected to work again and again; and use scientific methods to further legitimize those tactics, techniques, and procedures and add new ones (deducing the rigorous application of authoritative practice and inducing so-called lessons learned and best practices into those doctrines).

Conversely, interpretivism provides a vehicle to criticize logico-scientism. The interpretive purist sees logico-scientism as a collection of socially constructed objectifications that habitually distort reality. As veterans of recent military operations will appreciate, to remove subjectivity, using the intellectual standards suggested by Paul and Elder is inadequate when dealing with befuddling complex situations where subjective appraisals are vitally important. Such confounding situations tend to present themselves at the opposite end of the continua—infusing us with senses of ambiguity, inaccuracy, or imprecision. Equipped only with logico-scientific epistemology, we will hopefully try
to detect logical fallacies when the uniqueness of situations require observer-specific narrative interpretations. Indeed, such sensemaking situations may be mapped better along continua, rather than according universal categories, as depicted by my rendition of Schön’s indeterminate zones of practice (see figure). Here, reflective practice requires that the observer, “think critically about the thinking that got us into this fix or this opportunity; and we may, in the process, restructure strategies of action, understandings of phenomena, or ways of framing ...”\(^{10}\)

Finding meaning in the situation while acknowledging that indeterminate zones of practice exist will always fall somewhere along the continua between the poles of pure logico-scientism and pure interpretivism. This is not a Paul and Elder fallacy, as we teach our officers at our war colleges and staff schools; rather, the situation is too complex to exclusively employ one paradigmatic pole or the other. Hence, the proposed paradigmatic duality provides an important complementary, more fluid, and continuous sense of knowledge creation and destruction. In short, critical inquiry demands oscillating between both paradigms.

Having both paradigms at our service, we may achieve richer forms of professional practice as we may use each polar view to critically reflect on the other. The logico-scientific paradigm seeks to settle on authoritative, institutionally coded understandings that we call military doctrine. Our doctrinal functions such as intelligence, maneuver, and sustainment enable us to develop repeatable practices (such as tasks, conditions, and standards), and expect sameness in future practice (generalizability for training and equipping purposes). At the same time, the interpretivist in us remains critical of any claims to objectivity and suspicious of over-reliance on epistemological reference to generic lessons learned, best practices, or other such doctrines. Our interpretivist view is doubtful of claims of prediction associated with such categorical thinking. Professor Karl E. Weick explains concisely why both paradigms have to work together in professional practice:

[As] complexity increases, people shift from perceptually-based [interpretive] knowing

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**The Logico-Scientism-Interpretivism Continuum**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Logico-Scientific Standards proposed by Paul and Elder</th>
<th>Situations Requiring Interpretation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clarity (settled meaning)</td>
<td>Ambiguous</td>
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<tr>
<td>Accuracy (True)</td>
<td>Inaccuracy ( untrue)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precision (certainty)</td>
<td>Imprecision (random)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevance</td>
<td>Irrelevance (chaotic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depth (profound)</td>
<td>Shallow (superficial)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breadth (holistic)</td>
<td>Narrow (abductive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logic (makes sense)</td>
<td>Illogical (nonsense)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairness (equity)</td>
<td>Unfair (inequity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consensus</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Opaque (weak signal)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Opinion (argument)</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;Ballpark&quot; (&quot;grid square&quot;)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Complex (uncertain)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indirect Relevance</td>
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<td>Limited Depth</td>
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<td>Partial Scope</td>
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<td>Foreign (counter-cultural)</td>
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<td>Incommensurate (paradoxical)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Somewhat Fair</td>
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<td>Somewhat Fair</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indeterminate Zone of Practice</td>
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to categorically-based [logico-scientific] knowing in the interest of coordination. As demands for coordination increases, people begin to perceive one another in terms of roles and stereotypes, distributed cognition becomes more category-based in order to reduce differences and gain agreement, concepts become simpler and more general in the interest of transmission, and there is a greater aversion to inconsistency between interpersonal attraction and beliefs. While all of these changes facilitate coordination, they do so at the potential cost of greater intellectual and emotional distance from the details picked up by direct perception.11

Indeterminate Zones of Practice and Action Learning

Professional military practice should advocate the paradigmatic duality of critical reflection while engaged in action learning—an incremental approach to dealing with complexity.12 Here, ambiguous and emergent tasks become vehicles for learning while acting. Dealing with these indeterminate zones of practice, practitioners try to figure things out as their actions are interactive with a milieu of incongruous actors and activities, such as we witness today, for example, in Syria and Iraq.

Indeterminate zones of practice emerge in settings that are interdependent and dynamic and where institutionalized forms of knowledge are inadequate to frame what is happening or not happening. Action learning includes critical thinking associated with balancing between the paradigms.

While highlighting expected surprises as complex and chaotic situations unfold, the proposed dualistic approach to critical reasoning acknowledges both the need for technical knowledge (e.g., the science of maneuvering on a fortified position) and knowledge that must be crafted in action, while in the midst of novelty (e.g., the immediacy of interpreting why and how to spare a nearby mosque at this particular time and place). In her 2010 monograph, anthropologist Anna Simons exposes the institutional failures associated with not appreciating the value of immersive learning and intuitive forms of knowing needed to interpret situations. Simons deftly critiques those who seek only logico-scientific solutions, referring to our institutional—

propensity to turn unduplicable lessons into generic principles as if anyone should be able to apply them ... [T]he penchant to genericize in and of itself teaches the wrong lesson. It implies that once the right lessons have been taught and trained, anyone should be able to apply them. Yet, history suggests this is hardly the case. More to the point, those who orchestrated successful campaigns in the past invariably broke new ground. That is why their campaigns succeeded. This was usually in the wake of something old and tried, which means such individuals came to the situation able to read and analyze it differently than their predecessors, or they saw different possibilities, or both.13

Like exercising a dualistic world view with the American football allegory, one has to know the rules (institutional doctrines, best practices, and lessons learned) and have the interpretative sensibility of when to break free of them. The logico-scientific paradigm deals with a dominant assumption about causality—that history is useful as a storehouse of proven knowledge for future use. The interpretive paradigm assumes historically situated uniqueness—that the use of history is reserved primarily as a valuable source of heuristics (rules of thumb) that may serve to help interpret (not prescribe) in the here and now.

Both world views require complementary forms of creativity in the face of novelty. A different source of artfulness is implied for each sense of reality. Logico-scientism calls on an established vocabulary that has a historic track record in applying proven principles and cause-and-effect relationships. Here, artfulness is about linking the present situation to the appropriate knowledge base before taking action (e.g., a planning approach)—where, ideally, the risk of surprise is minimized.

Interpretivism, on the other hand, relies on the awareness of both our inadequate linguistic structures and the potential for institutionalized group think among practitioners; hence, surprise is considered a normal feeling. Action learning demands
the testing of institutionalized knowledge and the creation of knowledge-while-practicing, disconfirming old and inventing new meanings in the process of reflecting in and on action.

**Conclusion**

Though our institution expects military practitioners and their organizations to routinely face novel situations vested in highly complex environments, our traditional military institutional approaches to training and education lean too heavily on the logico-scientific paradigm. Training and education should spur reflective practice with the outcome of learning to learn more effectively while acting. Balanced with the logico-scientific paradigm (e.g., task-based learning), professional development must better incorporate the interpretive paradigm.

In that regard, the concept of action learning is supportive of the U.S. military’s current themes of mission command and adaptive leadership. The need to exercise disciplined initiative and critical thinking when faced with indeterminate zones of practice can be addressed through these ideals. To that purpose, this essay has proposed that both faces of critical thinking are required for the betterment of the reflective military practitioner who should strive to oscillate comfortably between the logico-scientific and interpretive paradigms.

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**Notes**


1. Notwithstanding, the Army has developed an exceptional capability to address both faces of critical thinking in its University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies, located at Fort Leavenworth, K.S. However, the philosophy and remarkable practices espoused by this unique organization do not reflect the norm in the Army.


3. Haridimos Tsoukas and Mary Jo Hatch, “Complex Thinking, Complex Practice: The Case for a Narrative Approach to Organizational Complexity,” *Human Relations*, 54(8)(2001): 979-1013. I must give credit here that the Tsoukas and Hatch article inspired me to write this article.


5. Ibid., 986.

6. Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 3rd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1996), 175. I restated from Kuhn’s longer definition where paradigm “stands for the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on, shared by members of a given community.”


10. Schön, 28.


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The fire is the main comfort of the camp, whether in summer or winter, and is about as ample at one season as at another. It is as well for cheerfulness as for warmth and dryness.

—Henry David Thoreau

He never fired a shot in anger. He never experienced combat on the actual frontline. Yet Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower became one of the most effective, innovative, and prestigious officers to serve in the U.S. Army and, eventually, as president. Eisenhower, the soldier, grew into the leader that took a somewhat untested Army, adapted it, and instilled...
it with a degree of agility to undertake very arduous missions. That an officer enjoyed such success without close combat experience may seem odd, yet certain circumstances and events made this possible. With his memoirs, Eisenhower shed light on perhaps the most important transitioning episode of his career.

It seems Eisenhower’s eventual and great contributions to the Army began while sitting “around a small campfire.” More important, he did so in the company of another officer who would have great influence on him. That confluence of events yielded a kernel of wisdom and has ramifications for today’s Army as it faces a future of fiscal constraints and an associated reduction of training and equipment. Accordingly, today’s Army searches for ways to be flexible and adaptable in light of that constrained future. It is neither complicated nor elaborate, but perhaps Ike’s “small campfire” is the model for, or the key to, a successful future Army. The campfire setting suggests a way to emphasize and enhance what is truly a soldier’s best weapon for adapting and innovating: the cognitive process.

First, an understanding of the relaxed campfire zeitgeist in Eisenhower’s personal story is crucial so it can be replicated and applied to both mentoring and learning in today’s Army. Next, introducing one all-important topic within that campfire setting allows focus on the one capability or skill the Army, as a whole, must grasp (and to a degree, the one it pursues now): the concept of the operational center of gravity (COG). Also, with its proper mood and topic, the campfire setting ultimately facilitates the Army’s most valuable asset: the individual, or more specifically, the individual’s mind, which is above all else the foundation of an effective thinker and leader. Finally, inviting other services to enlarge the campfire goes further to gain varied viewpoints on the operational COG concept as well as helping the Army continue its embrace of jointness. And it all starts with a very simple setting.

**The Main Comfort of the Camp**

Eisenhower as an individual, and later as an officer, was a product of his environment and experiences, some of which are generally known. He grew up in somewhat austere conditions in Abilene, Kansas. Later, he attended West Point. He, too, served in an Army that was constrained in terms of budget and manpower. What is intriguing about his early career is how the allure of campaigns and operations, the history of which he loved as a youth, but then detested as a West Point cadet, drew him back to their study. Eventually, history enthralled Eisenhower again. He became adept at delving into historical facts to explain why certain operations either succeeded or failed. This return to a fascination with history, which was so beneficial later in Eisenhower’s career, was not an accident.

Eisenhower attributed his posting in Panama as the origin of his renewed curiosity in history. As part of his duties in that territory, he explored the countryside and at times spent the night there, enjoying the “small campfire” experience. He was not alone during these evening hours, however. Eisenhower’s writings indicate the presence of other officers. When men, regardless of the walk of life, gather within the campfire’s relaxing light, they talk, and they generally talk about everything. In Eisenhower’s story, those conversations centered on history. It is also safe to assume they took a tack on weapons, operations and the future Army. One particular officer in these conversations became a great influence—the main actor in the Eisenhower story who was so crucial in the campfire model.
Eisenhower records how he found a fabulous mentor in Maj. Gen. Fox Conner, the influential officer alluded to earlier.\textsuperscript{13} It was Conner, Gen. Pershing’s operations officer in France during World War I, that cajoled, motivated, and enticed the young Eisenhower to become steeped in military knowledge and history.\textsuperscript{14} Eisenhower warmly described Conner as quite the polymath, a “storehouse of axiomatic advice.”\textsuperscript{15} Conner apparently noticed something, too. He saw great promise in a young officer that could be brought to fruition through needed nurturing. Noting this significant relationship transpired in a very relaxed, almost mystical atmosphere of a campfire is illustrative and instructive.

In the present day, a creative challenge for the Army would be to analyze that episode and establish that same relaxed “main comfort of the camp”—hereafter called the campfire for convenience and consistency—to assist the nurturing, mentoring process.\textsuperscript{16} This paper gives no recommendation for any reinvention of the Army’s mentoring program; the specific interest here is the campfire setting.

The importance of a setting for mentoring is reflected in other nonmilitary managerial and training institutions; one is the sports world. The Australian Sports Commission believes, “The mentor’s first role is to create an environment that is conducive to, and challenging for learning.”\textsuperscript{17} The similarities between sports and the Army might be apparent and are certainly appropriate. Both require team effort, understanding of complex plans, agility, and rapid thinking in a violent environment (if only in the physical contact sense for sports). The sagacious Conner evidently succeeded in exploiting his chosen setting for mentoring, the campfire. Some campfire particulars, upon examination, are intriguing.

Quiet and untroubled, the campfire is mainly about discussion. This setting, regardless of topic, fortunately does not require elaborate facilities or complex exercises. As one example, the staff group exercises conducted in the Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) facilitate learning: small groups, dedicated to cooperation and respect, combined with competent facilitation, a good deal of questioning, and just a hint of a time constraint (after all, a campfire does dwindle over time). Given the small scale of the exercise, soldiers do not get lost in the milieu. Moreover, much like the campfire scene Eisenhower describes, the process is definitely a cognitive experience. The campfire model’s simplicity reveals its other attractive points.

This construct is not restricted to CGSOC. It can be used at all levels and does not require the sophisticated training facilities available to those at combat command level (e.g. U.S. Army Europe’s Warrior Preparation Center).\textsuperscript{18} True, the campfire setting can occur there, but it is equally well suited for the company level on up to battalion, brigade, and division levels. Reviewing Eisenhower’s story, there are a few key points to emphasize when considering this paradigm:

- Aim for simplicity and the avoidance of any dogmatic or routine approach.
- There is no requirement to levy any programmatic requirements on the process.

Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower gives the order of the day, “Full victory—nothing else,” to paratroopers in England, just before they board their airplanes to participate in the first assault in the invasion of Europe.

(Photo courtesy of the Center of Military History)
● There is no need for perfunctory checks on learning.
● Finally, from the tone of Eisenhower’s memoirs, no lecturing is evident. Not once does he mention any critique or rejoinder on the part of Conner. The memoir conveys a good bit of the give and take, interspersed with encouragement, so instrumental in stimulating the cognitive process.

As a case in point, Eisenhower relates how he despised the “memory course” of history at West Point.19 With gentle questioning, querying, and prodding that eventually engendered within Eisenhower renewed interest in the topic, Conner undertook the process of motivating interest. Again, Eisenhower never records a moment of disquiet. By Eisenhower’s own admission, the change in his attitude came when Conner evidently enticed Eisenhower, over time, into the cognitive process.20

The term cognitive now appears in military writing, both Army and joint.21 Contrasting the older staid joint publications, for example, recent versions show how doctrine now eschews the proposition that following an established planning checklist always produces a decent operation plan (and, by the way, operational success). The somewhat new interest in the cognitive invites another reflection on the nurturing-via-mentorship Eisenhower records.

As a side benefit, a good mentor wins from this arrangement too.22 Quite possibly, this mentorship “made” Eisenhower, so Conner could be proud of his contribution to the future Army. Indeed, if there is any doubt to the efficacy of campfire-style mentoring, the Eisenhower-Conner duo stands forth as the epitome of a good leadership and mentorship dynamic developed through just such a process. However, leaders and mentors need to be wary.

Assuming no shortage of campfires, the time spent around them is, nevertheless, finite. That time must be used wisely. Ben Franklin is known for his rhetorical question, “Do you love life?” His snappy follow-on to an assumed reply of “yes” was very pointed: “Then do not squander time; for that’s the stuff life is made of.”23 To apply Franklin’s little jewel of wisdom to the Army, substitute “life” with the word “success.” This is timely, as the Army now returns to garrison and endeavors to keep the high-tempo training pace that soldiers are accustomed to as a result of their intense operational experiences over the decade of conflict.24 This raises another critical point.

Since the Army, like nature, abhors a vacuum, herein lies a trap to avoid: the Army must not mistake activity for action. If there is time to fill, the Army should fill it productively. Therefore, the campfire theme is critical.

The Essential Campfire Topic

Certainly Eisenhower and Conner contemplated the Army’s status in their time.25 History aside, most assuredly they discussed adaptation just as the Army does today. Recently, an apt description was applied to the plight of today’s soldier by Brig. Gen. Daniel Hughes, deputy commanding general, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center–Leader Development and Education and deputy commandant, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Specifically, it entails imagining the soldier as a stick figure, way out on a timeline, extending well into a future where a very complex environment awaits.26 Out on that timeline, how does that soldier recognize and cope with a threat that could come from a multitude of directions?27 In its simplest construct, to survive, the soldier must first perceive a threat and then adapt. Naturally, this demands that the Army must first imbue the soldier with skills to discern that threat. Once the threat is known, then the soldier must in many cases innovate in order to adapt. Training innovation that leads to adaptation, however, seems terribly complicated.

There are many ways available to the Army to do this. But, to borrow from and modify (if not butcher)
an axiom of German ace Adolph Galland, it is fair to state that an army trying to train for everything trains for nothing. So instead, an army must be able to adapt. In light of future resource constraints, the Army certainly realizes it cannot train toward every contingency; it must, however, train to adapt in order to react to every contingency. To do so, it must focus on one particular capability or skill that enhances adaptability and allows flexibility.

The Army, like other services, must embrace a medium, a concept, a theme. For example, the U.S. Air Force long pursued the concept of centralized control and decentralized execution. This specific tenet of airpower ultimately identified the Air Force as a genuine stand-alone service. It led to the exclusivity of the Air Force in a specific medium. For its part, the U.S. Navy boldly states it will “provide offshore options to deter, influence, and win in an era of uncertainty.” Certainly, terrain and the occupation thereof, still matter. But it is a very chaotic terrain. Nevertheless, that is the Army’s domain as espoused by the Army chief of staff with his accurate assessment that the operational security environment is “characterized by great complexity.”

To manage operational complexity, the Army, as of late, applies a planning process for operational design (the Army design methodology). However, operational planning, including design, is a fairly large and detailed process that hinges on something specific in order to be useful. So, what is the one thing the Army must grasp as the sine qua non—the thing that must be understood lest the stick figure described above perish? Certainly, a temptation to concentrate on an end state might perhaps arise, but that would be incorrect. Eisenhower provides the answer. In his book Crusade in Europe, he was implementing design even though he did not use that descriptor. More specifically, Eisenhower concentrates on the all-important idea of operational COG, even though that specific term is not mentioned once, or identified as such. For example, once the Army was able to gain a foothold on the continent of Europe following Operation Overlord, Eisenhower aptly describes what had to be attacked—the “source of power.” He clearly states, “This purpose of destroying enemy forces was always our guiding principle.” Throughout his book, every aspect of planning hinged on that main point. In some respects Crusade in Europe reads like a case study in design, even if current design terminology—for example, COG—is absent.

The emphasis on the design process and operational COG comes at an opportune time. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the world evolved into an incredibly complex environment. Numerous theorists made many attempts to describe it. Thomas H. Henriksen’s pamphlet The New World Order succinctly and accurately captured the era, beginning with this chilling prediction: “Unfortunately for the human race, war has a future.” That rather bleak omen seemed out of place at a time when champagne flowed in all the U.S. alert facilities after President George H.W. Bush stood down the nuclear deterrent force. Somewhat presciently, Henriksen wrote his dire forewarning almost immediately after the stand down.

More than two decades later, the Army likely agrees Henriksen’s prediction proved true. As an article in the Wall Street Journal ruefully reported recently, “the dictators are back.” In that article, Bret Stephens poignantly posited how the mechanics of democracy are not taking root as wished:

Maybe it’s something in the water. Or the culture. Or the religion. Or the educational system. Or the level of economic development. Or the underhanded ways in which authoritarian leaders manipulate media and suppress dissent.

The words “culture” and “religion” stand out as representing the kinds of challenging issues begging for application of Army analytical and operational expertise so hard-earned over the past decades. The phrase “underhanded ways” in particular conjures the complex scenarios demanding analysis of the one thing—the operational COG—that might sway, defeat, or otherwise nullify “authoritarian leaders.” Fortunately, operational design and the operational COG are now critical parts of CGSOC curriculum.

As described earlier, the CGSOC environment serves as a modest start to replicating well a campfire setting. But does CGSOC really embrace the operational COG topic to the appropriate degree?

Students do receive a moderately detailed introduction in a joint operations class, but classes taught by the Department of Military History are almost devoid of the topic. For example, the COG concept is mentioned only once in all of the Department of Military History
lesson plans. To remedy this incongruence, consideration should be given to injecting the operational COG into CGSOC as an overall theme. Practice of its application is needed, as well as undertaking as many historical case studies as possible to study instances when the operational COG was attacked to good effect, or even those cases where it was not.

It is the cognitive process that will tease out and yield the operational COG. No checklist can do this alone. Plus, the operational COG concept is not something learned once. It is a complex element of design, and like anything complex, it must be reviewed and exercised regularly. Thus, another challenge arises: within Army units, it is incumbent upon leadership to keep the operational COG lesson alive. If the Army earnestly emphasizes the importance of a topic, soldiers’ interests are actively sparked.

Passively, reading lists serve as an inducement. After all, it is incumbent upon soldiers to show initiative and undertake a study of the concept on their own. The CSA’s reading list, in particular, offers a superb selection. For instance, a wonderful book is included: Michael Fischer’s Pulitzer Prize winning Washington’s Crossing. The list also gives an apt description of this book’s contents. However, in the overall context of design, why not mention Washington’s aim to defeat an operational COG, of the Hessians at Trenton, by exploiting their critical vulnerability—hubris (a superb point Fischer’s text brings out)? Going a step further, is it too much of a reach to dedicate a reading list solely to classic cases of operational COG identification and defeat?

Actively, outside of formal education and aside from personal professional reading, the challenge of leaders and mentors is to expose young officers to design mechanics as much as possible; thus, the emphasis on the readily accessible campfire concept. Of course, balance is needed. First, young officers must learn their weapons systems and the skill sets that will serve them at the tactical level. Even so, the leader’s challenge is to explain, even at that early stage, how the soldiers’ skills contribute to the overall mission and how they help attack an operational COG. It should be noted this dynamic was in play at the campfire in Eisenhower’s story. He was a rather young subordinate when he and Fox Conner interacted. Of course, not every soldier will become an Eisenhower, but every Army leader can strive to be a Gen. Conner.

At this juncture it is helpful to bolster the persona of Conner with a person from fiction. In Michael Shaara’s The Killer Angels, Sgt. Buster Kilrain, the tough old Irishman so loyal to Col. Joshua Chamberlain, makes a very profound assessment of the good colonel. In the hours before the fateful engagement on Little Round Top, the sergeant passes on this wonderful compliment: “You are damned good at everything I’ve seen you do. A lovely soldier, and honest man and you got a good heart on you too which is rare in clever men.”

### Using Campfires to Fire the Mind

Conner, apparently embodying all that is “rare in clever men,” noted something in Eisenhower. In his biography, Ike: An American Hero, historian Michael Korda describes an evening at Fort Meade shortly after Connor and Eisenhower become acquainted. Again, in a very relaxed setting, the general asks a number of questions to both Eisenhower and George Patton regarding tanks. Most of the questions Conner directs to Eisenhower as “the brains” behind tank warfare (perhaps to the dismay of George Patton). Also, it is these meetings that lead Conner to invite Eisenhower to serve with him in Panama.

This ability to recognize the need for nurture is an important skill, especially as old adages and platitudes about armies begin to resurface. First, an army is a collection of men and women, and yes, the Army is only as good as its leaders. However, to borrow from the joint world, those who become the best do so through skill, knowledge, and experience.

Concerning knowledge, it again helps to reinforce the real-world Conner with fictional Sgt. Kilrain. In Sharra’s story, the old sergeant makes another erudite, pointed comment to the colonel: he taps his head while uttering, “there is only one aristocracy.” Cognition, the “aristocracy,” is perhaps the Army’s best weapon. As part of the cognitive domain, creativity is also getting emphasis.

Marine Corps Gen. James Mattis, while commander of the now-defunct Joint Forces Command, lamented that the “current doctrinal approach to creativity is
Fortunately, changes in joint doctrine now address that insufficiency. For the Army’s specific purposes, however, can that creativity focus on one particular thing, or at least one specific category? Here, again, is where Army leadership can convey the central point to learn: to recognize and defeat the operational COG. An emphasis on the operational COG’s importance will, in turn, help the Army recognize those soldiers best at discerning it. Here, an amazing parallel exists between the Army and the U.S. Air Force. In his book The Right Stuff, author Tom Wolfe records how fighter pilots needed a rare skill set, a certain savvy, to survive flying in early jet aircraft. Moreover, once the machine was mastered, the skill set also warranted a certain “something” that helped the pilot survive combat. Not every pilot had “this quality, this it.” Even more interesting, and maddening, it was something that could not be identified, nailed down, canned, and taught. It is somewhat the same with the operational COG concept; some soldiers are more adept at discerning it.

To distinguish those skilled soldiers, there are a few points to consider. First, the Army must expose soldiers to opportunities—the campfire—in which the importance of the operational COG is discussed. Also, attention must be given to the fact that while motivation is a key to learning, members of the greater Army organization are motivated for different reasons. Going further and deeper to draw on the extant theories of learning and motivation, in general, soldiers’ personal motivation can be linked to intrinsic needs and extrinsic needs. Intrinsic needs are the needs satisfied by the way that the soldiers see themselves—a personal view of the self. In the context of these particular needs, consider those soldiers that may find the operational COG concept difficult and obtuse. Knowing its importance to the Army, however, perhaps they will set a goal and work that much harder to gain the knowledge needed to grasp the topic. The Army would then be well served. This seems to have been the case, partially at least, regarding Eisenhower’s history pursuits; he may have been trying to satisfy an intrinsic need. However, he may have been trying to impress Connor, too, which led to satisfaction of extrinsic needs.

Extrinsic needs are those satisfied “by the actions of others,” through recognition, acceptance, and awards, for instance. The “others” in this case can be considered as Army leadership. Again, in the event soldiers are aware of the importance of the operational COG topic in the eyes of Army leadership, by extension, they will realize it had best be important to them. Their careers, the success of their missions, if not their survival, may depend on it. This may seem antithetical to the campfire concept, but it is not. Soldiers know that advancement in a military institution depends on an exhibition of knowledge and skill important to that institution. This fundamental in no way conflicts with the campfire concept. Again, the Army is well served.

Moreover, whether a grasp of the operational COG concept is reached intrinsically or extrinsically, the Army leadership discovers those soldiers with “the right stuff” that can master it.

To recap thus far, it will be incumbent on leaders to be innovative, use the time at hand, create the campfire setting, and start discussions. If the Army can establish that setting and emphasize the importance of the topic, the foundation of mentorship is laid. Now add to this the challenge of the team.

**Illuminating the One Single Concentrated Effort**

In the opening pages of Crusade in Europe, written 28 years after the campfires in Panama, Eisenhower seems to remonstrate against coalitions (which subsume joint operations), writing about their “ineptitude.” However, following Mediterranean operations, he observes that lessons of the same indicate “there is no separate air, land, or naval war.” In his closing commentary, Eisenhower even goes further to praise the virtues of coalitions. Later, as president, he persists as a champion of the “efficient team,” decrying any attempts by the services to elude joint operations.

To be sure, joint operations have been around a long time. An early and irresistible classic case
executed during the Civil War serves well to underscore this point. In one operation, Adm. David Dixon Porter’s ships assisted Gen. Ulysses Grant’s capture of Vicksburg on the Mississippi River.64 While the operations were not the result of a large, coordinated planning effort, they were eventually successful. Porter records that when Grant was asked how he was to get his troop transports past the Vicksburg batteries, Grant’s response was, “That is the admiral’s affair.” Of course the episode is not a complete lesson in joint planning as it is perhaps more of an anecdote about Grant’s droll character. Nevertheless, Porter’s reflection serves as interesting commentary on the faith one commander had in another (service component) commander.

The faith demonstrated by Grant is no less important today. It is crucial to look outward at the team the Army will join as the “indispensable partner” described by the Army chief of staff.66 It is a safe assumption that the Army will likely lead most joint task forces. So, it is natural for Army leadership to consider what the other services can do for the Army.

Solutions to the problems associated with the complex environment described earlier, at first look, do not lend themselves to other services. While there is no attempt to belittle the other services, the solutions seem to call for boots on the ground. The Navy’s off-shore presence and the decentralized execution of the Air Force are not independent solutions, but rather parts of a solution. Central to any solution is the role of the Army since it is most likely to get tapped to wade into the complex land environment of an operation once senior political interests are formed and clear end states (hopefully) are presented. Receipt of the mission and end state is one thing, but getting to theater or operational area is another. Conducting the fight is still another thing. With the entire joint force shrinking, the Army will need to rely on jointness more than ever, just as the other components will rely on the Army as an indispensable partner for getting the job done in some joint operations area somewhere in some combatant commander’s area of responsibility.

It is logical, therefore, that the Army must remain knowledgeable of the joint tenets as Eisenhower wanted, since as a land force, it is dependent on the other services. The Army will get to the fight by air and by sea, but it is not just about getting there; the Army may also be required to counter threats from those other domains. In order to turn rapidly to exploit a remote critical vulnerability of an adversary, a large percentage of the time the Army may have to rely on some other weapon system in some other domain. Perhaps the Army will obtain a good deal of its agility through cooperation with the other services.

This is not a veiled call for more joint training, joint basing, or joint billets. In the spirit of simplicity, when circumstances allow, we can simply expand the “campfire circle.” The intent is to keep the process low-key and uncomplicated. The Army should, at every opportunity, invite members of the other services into the discussions. Coming together also offers another way to get disparate perspectives on discerning an operational COG, since a different capability or specialty of a service might allow it to go directly to the critical vulnerabilities (e.g., use of an Air Force remotely piloted vehicle), or affect them in other ways. Technically adroit members of any service can give a technically oriented, creative take on the analytical process for identifying an operational COG. This is also one way to continue to skirt parochialism and simply think of the other services as the extension of Army power, even at the risk of some spirited inter-service rivalry. It is a worthy undertaking; after all, it was Eisenhower who exhorted us to “free ourselves of emotional attachments to service systems of an era that is no more.”67

This calls for a continuing effort to break the paradigm of blue on red, and think instead of purple on red. This is no new undertaking for the Army, but rather a reaffirmation. The Army understands that it will not go it alone; it is going to be a team effort.

**Conclusion**

The Army, fortunately, does not need elaborate measures to adapt and innovate. There should be no shortage of campfires, metaphorically speaking, in the coming times of fiscal austerity. The campfire model so beneficial to Eisenhower can be employed today; it is a simple effort of setting, topic, and the cognitive. The Army need only look for any opportunity to re-create that campfire setting that allows the discourse between leaders and soldiers so instrumental in good mentorship. If the Army creates the circumstances, it is a reasonable assumption soldiers can be drawn into the same type of discussions that so benefitted Eisenhower and, by extension, the Army later in his career. In that relaxed setting, soldiers can participate in discussions on
pertinent subjects, on discussions specifically focused on the best mechanism that makes the Army flexible and adaptable: the ability to discern an operational COG. Finally, during any campfire forum, the Army should be willing to invite other services to garner the benefits of “joint talk” and exchange. There may be shortages of resources, but being “as ample at one season as at another” there is no certainly no shortage of campfires.68

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Notes


2. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
7. Ibid., 3.
8. Ibid., 126.
9. Ibid., 186.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Thoreau.
20. Ibid., 186.
27. Ibid.
33. JP 5-0, III-22.
34. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 225.
37. Henriksen.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. These concepts are currently taught in the C400 Operational Art and Design blocks of instruction.
42. Specifically, in H104, Armies of the People and the Birth of Modern Operational Art.
46. Ibid.
48. Eisenhower, At Ease, 179.
49. JP 5-0, III-1.
50. Shaara, 182-183.
52. JP 5-0, GL-13. The publication now reflects a few references to creativity, e.g., regarding operational art, which it defines it as, “The cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies.”
54. Ibid.
55. Observations of the author during the course of the C400 Operational Art and Design block.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid., 52.
59. Ibid., 51.
60. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 4.
61. Ibid., 210.
62. Ibid., 251.
65. Ibid.
BLOOD OF TYRANTS
George Washington and the Forging of the Presidency


In his thought-provoking book *Blood of Tyrants: George Washington and the Forging of the Presidency*, Logan Beirne addresses Washington’s approach to four policy dilemmas also faced by post-9/11 presidents: prisoner abuse, congressional war power, military tribunals, and Americans’ rights.

In a remarkably well-researched volume, Beirne draws from reams of primary source documents to cast a light on many facts related to Washington that have been largely overlooked by history. In doing so, he strips away the stereotypical facade of the stoic, aloof Washington and depicts instead a passionate and fearless leader devoted to the revolutionary cause. He goes on to portray Washington as an honorable and ethical man who struggled with dilemmas similar to those facing modern presidents. Beirne unveils an uncompromising revolutionary warrior and administrator who was also relentless and, at times, ruthless and savage in what he believed was the defense of American freedom. In doing so, Washington set precedents that define presidential powers today.

Beirne begins the narrative with a concise journey through the crucible of Washington’s early military career. He then details Washington’s leadership of the...
Continental Army during the brutal and messy struggle for independence, at which time Washington drew upon the lessons of past experiences—many bitter—coupled with his own wisdom, to develop principled approaches that are models for today’s leaders.

During his narrative, Beirne bluntly addresses the critical questions: “Why should we care about this history? Why is it relevant in today’s postmodern era?” His answer is that the Constitution under which we live—the supreme law of the land—was shaped by the events recounted and can only be fully appreciated by understanding the circumstances of the decisions Washington made. For example, Washington’s Revolutionary War powers established precedents from which today’s presidential powers were derived. Readers are invited to judge for themselves the relevance of Washington’s precedents today.

Beirne explores Washington’s pragmatic attitude regarding the treatment of enemy combatants. While he freely admits much of the modern world now takes a more humane approach toward prisoners of war, Beirne affirms that presidents still must address fundamental questions: What must be done to defend the American people? How extreme can the measures for defending the people be?

Using historical events supported by official documents and the personal letters of Washington, Beirne clearly outlines the escalating “mistreatment” problem faced by Washington. A highly principled man, Washington abhorred prisoner abuse, but he nevertheless countenanced it as a counterthreat to British abuse of prisoners and civilians. As a result, abuse became a weapon that Washington used to retaliate against British torture and, therefore, he helped prevent harm to his people. It was a horrible, but practical, tool employed by Washington under the assumption that in doing so he was carrying out his foremost obligation to protect Americans and the revolution itself.

While Washington felt little obligation to seek congressional guidance in matters of prisoner treatment, he nevertheless sought to adhere to congressional authority in the execution of the war. Beirne asserts his example became the embodiment of what later would be enshrined in constitutional powers as the duties and prerogatives of the commander in chief.

By exploring the natural distrust and suspicion the populace held for a powerful army in a republic system of government, Beirne skillfully guides the reader through the tumultuous relationship between Washington and the feebly empowered Continental Congress. He describes the experiment of congressional control over the war efforts during the initial phases of the revolution and Washington’s extraordinary effort to adhere to confused, unsynchronized congressional mandates and directives.

Among the many issues with which Washington struggled, the Continental Congress’s lack of legislative power to compel states’ compliance to national strategic goals made the essential tasks of paying, feeding, and equipping the Continental Army nearly impossible for him. After a series of battlefield defeats, Washington capitalized on the public trust in his personal leadership, impeccable character, and demonstrated loyalty to challenge congressional war authority and to shame Congress into providing support. Nevertheless, Beirne clearly points out that Washington never attempted to usurp congressional authority over civilian matters.

Intent on protecting the republic, this “republican general” purposefully confined the exercise of his powers to control over the military at a vulnerable time when opportunity and temptation provided him ample opportunity and power to do otherwise. In a final, resounding point, Beirne asserts when the framers of the Constitution designated the president as commander in chief, it was clear that Washington’s wartime example prompted them to include the broad authority to lead the military in defending the nation, as demonstrated through Washington’s battlefield leadership. One of those powers delegated to the military was the authority to direct its own tribunals separate from the authority exercised by Congress over the American people.

Examining another dimension of Washington’s leadership, Beirne tells the gripping story of Benedict Arnold’s treasonous plot to surrender the American fortress at West Point, New York. In doing so, Beirne places the reader in the center of one of Washington’s most serious dilemmas.

Overlapping and contradictory congressional and state laws, as well as international customs that determined “who were subject to military jurisdiction and who came under the cognizance of civil power,” created what Washington admitted was a “confused state.” Providing a historical overview of the origins, processes, and differences between courts martial and military
commissions and tribunals, the author presents the options available to Washington in his dealings with Arnold’s alleged accomplices.

Seething with rage over the trusted Arnold’s tardy deed, and extraordinarily fearful of a deeper plot, Washington sought swift and severe punishment. With revisions to the American Articles of War of 1775, Congress gave the commander in chief the power to try “foreign and American citizens” charged as spies. Joshua Hett Smith, an American citizen, was subsequently tried under courts martial and acquitted of aiding and abetting Arnold. Smith’s coconspirator, Capt. John André, a British citizen and officer, did not share the same fate. Under the ad hoc system of a military tribunal, André was sentenced to death by hanging. Drawing from Washington’s personal writings, the reader feels his personal anguish and pity for André. However, Beirne is quick to point out that Washington was not being cruel, rather pragmatic. He needed to present a strong front against such treachery in order to win the war. He executed André for the good of the nation.

In yet another relatively unknown dimension of Washington’s wartime actions, he ordered the ruthless extermination and annihilation of specified domestic opponents. Beirne exposes his readers to a rarely seen side of Washington as he directs patriot Gen. John Sullivan and 5,000 troops to eradicate the warring Native-American Seneca nation. The narrative thus throws light on the overlooked, often ghastly realities of atrocities committed during the period of frontier warfare.

Beirne then masterfully introduces Washington’s final dilemma: preservation of citizens’ rights amid a revolution. More distinctly, since the Loyalists were considered American citizens, quashing their rights ran afoul of their republican principles, but suppressing the opposition to the revolution was vital to the very survival of the new nation.

Beirne employs riveting historical accounts of intrigue, including a June 1776 assassination plot against Washington, to illustrate the commander in chief’s predicament. This Loyalist scheme, masterminded by Governor William Tyron and New York City Mayor David Mathews, would have jeopardized the entire revolution if successfully accomplished. A third conspirator was Thomas Hickey of Connecticut, a soldier and former guard for Washington. Though scheduled for trial in civilian courts, Tyron and Mathews escaped prosecution. Hickey, tried by military tribunal, was found guilty of treason and became the first American to hang in the name of the Revolution.

This episode defines Washington’s enlightened approach to republican justice in times of rebellion. He routinely referred citizens to civilian courts, reinforcing the procedures determined by the civilian government, and let the chips fall where they may. Beirne concludes his commentary in a circuitous manner as he returns to his original premise. The thorny issues Washington confronted and resolved were no different than those faced by presidents today. Precedents he established during war, codified in the Constitution, became the model for subsequent commanders in chief.

Blood of Tyrants: George Washington and the Forging of the Presidency is superbly written. Beirne’s carefully selected historical accounts and events come alive with emotion thanks to his wonderfully animated writing style. His inclusion and colorful descriptions of many of Washington’s contemporaries and detailed discussions of their motives help create vivid mental images that place the reader alongside Washington as he grapples with these four emerging dilemmas. This book depicts a distinguished leader who struggled with dilemmas comparable to his modern day peers. Today’s leaders would be wise to learn still more from Washington.

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Norman Naimark’s *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe* is a comprehensive study of genocide and ethnic cleansing in Europe from the Armenian Genocide (1915-1918) through the Wars of Yugoslav Succession (1991-1999). The author tells the story in such a way that if one studied this book and no other, one would have a firm understanding of the causes, definitional parameters, and appropriate attitudes towards the issue.

True to his title, Naimark spends less than a page in the book referring to genocides outside of Europe, even by way of contrast or comparison. His treatment of ethnic cleansing within the designated century and continent, however, is complete and detailed.

Some critics disagree with this approach. For example, University of Michigan’s Ara Sanjian, Ph.D., considers lack of treatment outside of Europe a weakness in Naimark’s work.

Sanjian states, “… his argument would certainly have benefited further had he also briefly analyzed some pre-twentieth century instances of ethnic cleansing to show how the absence of elements of modernity gave them a character different from the ones described in this book.”

However, I disagree with Sanjian. By confining his study to a specific time and space, Naimark implicitly sends the message that there is ample material for the study of genocide and ethnic cleansing on a “civilized” continent in a century we still remember. For many, the atrocities are relatively recent, immediate, and real to the reader.

Naimark skillfully fleshes out the concept by commencing his discussion of genocide with examination of the 1894-96 Turkish massacres of Armenian highlanders, a harbinger of the 1915 Armenian genocide. Though the Turks killed or wounded over 200,000 Armenians at that time, Naimark does not consider the initial massacres as an attempt at genocide. Naimark distinguishes the early massacres from genocide by asserting that “the goal was severe punishment, not extermination. Nor do the events of 1894-96 share the general characteristics of ethnic cleansing; no attempt was made to remove Armenians from their homes or to deport them.” Commenting on this proposition, Nick Baron, Ph.D., University of Nottingham’s associate professor of history asserts that ethnic cleansing and genocide are not the same, “characterized by their different objectives.” Baron makes the distinction by asserting that “genocide is the intentional killing off of part or all of an ethnic, religious or national group; the murder of a people or peoples … is the objective. The intention of ethnic cleansing is to remove a people and often all traces of them from a concrete territory.”

Adopting the same semantic framework, Naimark makes the useful technical distinction between a
“limited war of pacification,” and a “genocidal war of pacification.” In shaping the concept of ethnic cleansing and genocide, Naimark makes other useful distinctions and generalizations. For instance, throughout the work the author sees most recent conflicts, as opposed to ancient hatreds, to be causal to ethnic cleansing. He states, “Comparative reflection on the problems of ethnic cleansing also leads to the conclusion that each case must be understood in its full complexity, in its own immediate context, rather than merely as part of a long-term historical conflict between nations.”

The comparatively recent conflict that took place in the Balkans during 1990 provides an example. Naimark notes that though the Serbs deliberately roused glorified memories of Milos Obilic—a medieval Serbian knight who figured prominently in the war between Serbs and the Ottoman Empire and whose memory was well-polished by the centuries since 1389—to mobilize nationalist fervor against Albanians and Croats, the causes for conflict were actually proximate.3

He asserts, “… the brutal, uncompromising nature of the struggle in Croatia and later in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s had much more to do with the history of the region since 1940 … than it did with the inheritance of the distant past.” Thus, he does not attribute the violence mainly to any ancient history of animosity between ethnic groups, but asserts that the main causes of that conflict were recent in origin, which “can be traced to Turkish and Armenian reactions to the loss of the Ottoman lands in the Balkan Wars of 1912-13.” This insistence that genocide stems from recent and current causes of hatred, regardless of the past, is one of his key leitmotifs.

In terms of style, Naimark refrains from condemning those nations or agencies that stood by and did not intervene in genocides. Rather, his narrative unfolds with relative objectivity from the ground-level perspective of individual victims and perpetrators. When he refers to interveners, he tells stories of neighbors, not nations. For example, he describes the actions of Serbians who assisted their Croat neighbors, or of Turks who hid Armenian women. Consequently, Naimark rarely refers to instances in which organizations failed to intervene. Only anomalously does he mention Dutch peacekeepers who “stood aside as the Bosnian Serbs advanced” at Srebrenica.

Some critics misinterpret Naimark’s approach. For example, Baron describes Naimark’s narrative as unduly pessimistic and “dismal.”4 However, I disagree. Baron has not fully accounted for the nature of the subject matter in his analysis. Ethnic cleansing and genocide can only ever be gloomy topics. Taken in this context, Fires of Hatred is not a pessimistic prediction that future genocides are unavoidable.

On the contrary, it is a book that is respectful and deliberately measured, while still challenging the reader’s moral sensibilities. Naimark invokes a sense of horror without sensationalizing, as when he reflects on the use of terror endemic to ethnic cleansing: the chopped off ears and fingers, the brandings, the mutilated genitals, the brains of babies splattered against walls, the gauntlets victims are forced to run, and the sexual assaults. The litany of abuses is unending, and it repeats itself from case to case throughout the century.4

Naimark closes with a warning, “Does the international community have the will to act promptly and decisively? If not, the horrors recounted in this book will surely happen again.”5 This admonition is the only homily in the book, and it is made all the more impactful by the history Naimark recounted so remarkably well. Fires of Hatred is a thorough, discerning, and eloquent work on a dismal subject. However, it is not sensationalized or maudlin.

Even the title, Fires of Hatred, demonstrates Naimark’s effort to appeal to the intellect rather than the emotion. As such, it is an indispensable resource for any scholar studying mass atrocities and ethnic cleansing.

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Notes

HELPING HUMANITY:
American Policy and Genocide Rescue
Keith Pomakoy, Lexington Books, Lanham, Maryland, 2011, 248 pages, $85.00

The United States is often criticized for not intervening as soon as a humanitarian crisis arises. In **Helping Humanity: American Policy and Genocide Rescue**, Keith Pomakoy rebuts this criticism by analyzing U.S. aid efforts during five genocides from humanitarian, political, and military perspectives, as well as reviewing the impact of international tribunals following mass atrocities. Pomakoy asserts that American foreign policy has always been humanitarian-based and intervention in such crises undertaken to the fullest extent possible. However, genocide is a problem without a clear solution, which confounds policy and blunts the effectiveness of humanitarian efforts intended to mitigate it.

**Helping Humanity** attempts to document humanitarian aid efforts and their impact on the development of America’s foreign policy based upon U.S. actions in Cuba, Armenia, Russia, Germany, and worldwide after World War II. Pomakoy concludes the U.S. recognized and responded to each crisis with success using a philanthropic model of humanitarian aid coupled with a realistic understanding of America’s relative political and military strength. He asserts these considerations continue to influence foreign policy.

Pomakoy begins by defining both genocide and philanthropy from policy perspectives and applying those definitions to episodes of mass suffering. His analysis begins with the late nineteenth century humanitarian crisis in Cuba that arose largely from Spanish governmental oppression, and in part culminated with a U.S. invasion and occupation of Cuba as part of operations during the Spanish-American War.

With respect to United States involvement in Cuba prior to the outbreak of war, Pomakoy provides many examples of American individuals and private humanitarian organizations spearheading relief efforts and spurring the United States government into diplomatic action to ease the hardships the Cubans were facing under oppressive Spanish rule.

Prior to the outbreak of the Spanish-American conflict, American government participation in humanitarian relief efforts was conducted primarily through support of private aid organizations, to include counting on such groups to distribute aid collected for the Cubans. Pomakoy contends that diplomatic efforts in conjunction with such private relief efforts initially seemed sufficient to alter Spain’s behavior and alleviate Cuban civilian suffering—the primary American interest. With the outbreak of the war, aid efforts ceased temporarily during the military phase of the conflict, which initially increased and prolonged suffering. This made military intervention a less attractive choice for policy makers as opposed to providing humanitarian aid when considering options during future crises.

Pomakoy applies the preference for philanthropic efforts developed during the Cuban experience to later crises. His research indicates that during each crisis, different diplomatic efforts or military interventions were possible, but the evidence suggests these actions would not have ended the suffering and genocide any more than the philanthropic model did.

Pomakoy’s research is meticulous. Every chapter includes references to not only scholarly works and congressional records, but also first-person accounts. He also includes personal accounts from individuals who benefited by U.S. assistance during several crises as well as foreign state records. These foreign sources provide different viewpoints from traditional American-centric ones and lend credence to his argument that America did provide humanitarian aid that helped reduce suffering in crisis-torn countries.

Each crisis studied uses the same humanitarian-political-military framework to analyze the type and timing of aid provided and outcome of aid efforts. Additionally, the framework is used to analyze and
speculate regarding whether different policy models would have been feasible or possibly more successful at reducing suffering if aid had begun immediately at the onset of a crisis.

While meticulously researched and detailed, Pomakoy stretches his conclusions to their limit. His original thesis was that humanitarian aid did occur, which he proves time and time again. However, he stretches his findings to argue that private humanitarian aid was the start of U.S. foreign policy regarding providing aid.

In reality, from the evidence provided in the book, the humanitarian relief provided prior to U.S. military intervention originated from private concerns and appears rather to indicate an abrogation of what many would have considered an official humanitarian relief responsibility. Moreover, his discussion of the philanthropic model relies heavily on early versions of nongovernmental organizations. This appears untenable as nongovernmental entities do not write and carry out foreign policy. This critique of Pomakoy’s contentions is echoed in Richard Brietman’s review; he laments that Pomakoy did not stop his analysis with merely proving aid occurred.1

Additionally, Pomakoy’s account flattens incidents of atrocities to short, almost clinical, discussions. This minimizes the true horrors of genocide and lulls the reader into believing that privately funded food and other resource-based aid was sufficient to meet civilian needs and end their suffering when many other impediments and interests apart from mere lack of food were contributing to the perilous situation of the civilians affected.

Despite weaknesses, Pomakoy’s approach allows for a more policy-centered discussion and invites the conclusions that foreign policy begins with combined philanthropic aid and diplomatic efforts, and ends with military intervention only when absolutely necessary.

Unfortunately, the basis for Pomakoy’s arguments rest largely on the premise that his example of Cuba was actually a Spanish government-sponsored attempt at genocide in the same category as the others studied. Oddly, by the end of his research Pomakoy himself vacillates in his opinion over whether the Cuba crisis was genocide or merely a humanitarian crisis exacerbated by warfare. On this point, he fails to revisit and validate the lessons drawn from this event and their place in the development of U.S. policy. Further, Pomakoy’s approach seems to ignore his own statement that “… these events were all different ….” One critic, Rafael Medoff, writes that by including Cuba as genocide among the other atrocities, Pomakoy’s argument is rendered almost incoherent.2 The over inclusive use of “genocide” to describe diverse kinds of humanitarian crises minimizes meaningful discussion of the type and extent of aid needed during each crisis, as well as examination of what other forms of aid might have been feasible to achieve policy objectives. Most reviewers criticize Pomakoy’s research for this glaring error.3

Richard Brietman also criticizes Pomakoy for both conducting shallow analysis and ignoring evidence that other aid options were possible in addition to private aid during World War II, as well as failing to discuss the potential impact of alternate options.4

Irrespective, while Pomakoy’s detractors have valid points concerning the overreach of some of his conclusions, they apparently miss his overall point that America did provide humanitarian aid during the defining crises of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Irrespective, this book is important for anyone attempting to create or promote cohesive and coherent humanitarian-based policies. It reinforces the needed interplay between non-governmental organizations’ efforts and military intervention, and emphasizes the necessity of a whole-of-government response to any crisis. Finally, this book should be read by military officers as well as those who have the ability to fundraise and donate humanitarian aid, and members of Congress who can authorize further spending and humanitarian aid efforts.

Maj. Susan Castorina, U.S. Army, Fort Rucker, Alabama

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3. Ibid.
In his memoir *Night*, Elie Wiesel, a Romanian-born, Jewish-American, Holocaust survivor, professor, political activist, and Nobel Peace Prize recipient, details his eight-month struggle for survival while a prisoner at the infamous Auschwitz-Birkenau death camp and the work camp at Buna. In just 109 pages, Wiesel describes both the horrific conditions associated with the Jewish ghettos of Hungary and concentration camps of Poland, as well as the dynamic psychosocial environments within which he and his father had to daily contend.

Catalyzed by memories of omnipresent and seemingly infinite physical and mental stress, Wiesel effectively narrates his own story. It is one that reflects resilience to unspeakable cruelty and suffering, and also the resolve of the human spirit and its ability to transcend even the most deplorable of circumstances.

The author describes through powerful prose how Jewish victims were socialized to the horrors about to be inflicted upon them by Nazi Germany. As prophet to their impending destruction, the character Moshe the Beadle (himself having miraculously survived a mass killing at the hands of the Gestapo in the forests of Galicia) is introduced, crying out against his friends’ and neighbors’ refusal to face Hitler’s true intention for the Jewish people and doing something to defend themselves. Throughout his memoir, Wiesel describes the continued denial associated with the Jewish ghetto residents and their inability (whether consciously or unconsciously) to foresee and accept ideas associated with their eventual demise at the hands of their captors. This is the common theme throughout *Night*—instances of cognitive dissonance as expressed particularly by confirmation bias (i.e. tendency of people to accept information only when it confirms pre-established beliefs) that God would intervene to preclude ... the destruction of European Jewry .... "1

As a result, inaction was easier than actively opposing for an unfortunate many, as characterized by the futile wishing away of fear even when confronted by the reality of real and present tangible danger. Though faced with the stark reality of planned segregations, forced removals, mass confinement, and systematic murder, these were for many too much to logically confront or accept. To face them meant accepting the stories heard around the ghettos that described the horror of cattle trains full of people ... and bodies “... turned into wreaths of smoke beneath a silent blue sky.”2

Those that lived through such wide spread community denial only to survive the horrors of the camps are forever haunted by their loss of faith in humanity and the knowledge that perhaps even God was dead, having “... been hanged here, on these gallows.”3

The psychosocial condition of the Jews, evolving against the backdrop of events masterfully detailed by Wiesel, speaks to the larger human condition involving our ability to transcend madness and chaos in efforts of self-preservation amidst unspeakable horror and tragedy.

Elsewhere, writer David Foster Wallace talked about the existence of man and the multitudinous platitudes associated with everyday life in human existence. Within this concept, Wallace states that “... the most obvious, ubiquitous, important realities are often the ones that are hardest to see and talk about.”4 It is within this context that the same paradigm held true for the millions who lived out their realities under the oppressive yoke labeled “Arbeit macht frie” (work makes you free).

The unrelenting daily realities of overwhelming psychological stress and physical suffering soon became institutionalized; the horrors associated with the collective trauma of what would be later known as the Holocaust, “white noise.” Silence became the narrative; multitudes suffered and prayed in silence ... often to what they increasingly believed to be a now silent God.

Elie Wiesel survived to tell his story, having been among the fortunate few moved to Camp Buchenwald (home to an effective resistance movement) on the eve of Nazi defeat in April 1945. Wiesel’s memoir *Night* ends with his liberation. Unfortunately, his journey into the depths of human suffering was in reality just beginning.

It took Wiesel two more novels (*Dawn* and *Day*) to narrate his full story. Throughout his journey, he struggled with discerning the relationship between God and humanity, effectively staging a “... sustained, developing revolt against God from within a Jewish context.”5
Wiesel is not alone in his questioning of the validity of the covenant between God and man. In *Night*, the character Akiba Drumer, a fellow Jewish prisoner, speaks openly to the protagonist Eliezer and others regarding his loss of faith in God saying, “Where is the divine mercy? Where is God? God is no longer with us.”

In a review of *Night* titled, “A Thousand Darknesses,” Ruth Franklin describes Wiesel’s seeming annoyance that his memoir is often received as a narrative on the loss of faith. However, she contends that what Wiesel has written is “… more than an indictment of God’s absence … [one] in which the Jews in the camp address God in a tone that is half menacing, half sympathetic.” This fractured tone—saturated with fear, anger, and cynicism—is understandable, reflecting the frailty of the human spirit when awash in an environment of death. Do we expect more from a dying people? When we have lost all physical and theological ties to the world (family, dignity, faith in God), we are often left only with questions, questions regarding our existence … and purpose behind such.

Wiesel’s *Night* offers the reader a unique opportunity to vicariously travel with him on this journey of discovery, experiencing the horrors of Auschwitz-Birkenau through a perspective offering both historical insight and unadulterated emotion. Throughout the memoir, readers will find themselves questioning the existence of evil as well as the harsh realities associated with the cruelty of man and the nature of conflict. Where does one go from this place? How does one mentally deal with the loss and destruction of family, friends, and livelihood in magnitudes never before witnessed? Can one ever truly become human again having witnessed such atrocities? These are all questions with which Wiesel, and all Holocaust survivors, are forced to forever struggle. They continue even today.

Maj. Caleb A. Lewis, U.S. Army, Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico

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**Notes**

3. Wiesel, 62.

5. Knopp, 213.
6. Wiesel, 73.

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**SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL:**

**The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda**

Romeo A. Dallaire and Brent Beardsley, Carroll & Graf, New York, 2004, 584 pages, $32.99

Atrocious crimes against humanity in Rwanda began in 1993 when organized groups of the ethnic Hutu majority embarked upon a campaign of genocide against the ethnic Tutsi minority. This was done at a time when relatively few U.N. forces were on site to intervene in the subsequent massacres. In spite of his insistence that military reinforcements were necessary to prevent and stop the brutal killings, Lt. Gen. Romeo Dallaire, commander-designate of the U.N. Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), did not receive any additional resources to assist his small number of troops in protecting the Tutsi victims. As a result, the local government that perpetrated the mass killings was unopposed by any organized defensive force or by international military forces. The result was the murder of over 800,000 Rwandan Tutsis and moderate Hutus.

Following his tour in Rwanda and retirement from the Canadian armed forces, Dallaire documented his experience and provided readers with an intimate tale recounting the time he spent in Rwanda during the attempted genocide of the Tutsi ethnic minority. His story begins with the invitation for him to accept command of UNAMIR, continues with an explanation of the U.N. ’s lack of preparation for the mission, and focuses on his direct observations of the mass atrocities as they unfolded.

In his account, Dallaire provides an elaborate and thorough explanation of the emotions and justification behind his decisions. He lists his actions and the associated motivation behind them. What is particularly interesting is his insight into the actions he opted not to take. He explains in detail the potential outcomes that may have resulted had he made different choices such as attempting to stop the Rwandan
military forces as they were arming to commit genocidal acts.

The story serves as an incredible tale from the most powerful representative of the U.N. and Western society who personally witnessed repeated, vicious violations of human rights during the Rwandan genocide. One of Dallaire’s prominent themes is that powerful nations must decide whether they will waive the justification for intervention based on national interests, and instead become involved in foreign affairs based on humanitarian concerns. He provides insight into the severe complications that arise for world leaders as they must consider the consequences of their decisions.

A passionate human rights advocate and critic of the U.N. as well as U.S. policy toward Rwanda during the unfolding events, Samantha Powers, wrote the foreword for this book. Although her accounts of the U.N. and U.S. failure to intervene are strongly supported with facts, her argument that they failed in their duty to intervene does not consider other perspectives and the associated rationale behind the actions of all parties which were involved. Moreover, her sympathetic approach to Dallaire’s story is one-sided and she does not acknowledge other conditions that may have influenced the international community’s decision not to intervene.

In contrast, journalist Gil Courtemanche opines that fault for the outcome lies in part with Dallaire who, he asserts, was too methodical and did not possess adequate initiative or the critical thinking required of an effective UNAMIR commander.1 However, this analysis is also incomplete in that it does not explore the possibility the U.N. may have selected Dallaire for the operation precisely because he was a senior officer who followed orders and would not go outside the parameters set for him in Rwanda. The U.N. may have considered the potential damages caused by a commander who was likely to intervene in Rwanda’s affairs without permission and then intentionally selected Dallaire because he was not likely to oppose orders. The second and third order effects of the U.N.’s decisions not to intervene did not have a positive result in Rwanda for the international community; however, the decision does not imply the staff did not carefully consider the impact of the selection for a commander.

Contrary to Courtemanche’s position that Dallaire was naive in his comprehension of the U.N.’s intentions during the incidents of violence, Dallaire explained his high level of awareness during the entire operation. Throughout the work, Dallaire reflects on his weaknesses, clearly explaining his perspective at the time of the atrocities and comparing it to his view in hindsight, a year later.

Others have found value in the Dallaire’s account for the lessons it may hold for policy makers and commanders faced with similar circumstances involving mass ethnic conflict in the future. Historians Frank Kalesnik and Bruce Vandervort express a compelling argument regarding the book, noting it is important to consider whether the U.S. and U.N. have taken any lessons forward from the tragic ending in the Rwandan genocide.2

Although the answers to these speculations are not provided in the book, Dallaire’s candid assessments can be used to train and prepare future leaders and troops at all levels on how to handle situations they may encounter while working in such environments. With consideration of Dallaire’s personal testimony, the U.N. and governments of associated nation states can gain valuable insight as to what can occur without Western intervention within a nation plagued by turmoil.

As Dallaire suggests, intervention may on the one hand deter perpetrators from further action. However, on the other hand, intervention may result in escalated acts of war which may involve more than the local governments and rebel forces.

The topic of mass atrocities is a relevant one in the contemporary environment, and Dallaire’s personal testimony as detailed in this book serves as a valuable resource for decision-makers in the international community.

Maj. Patricia C. Murphy, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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MASSACRE IN NORWAY: The 2011 Terror Attacks on Oslo & the Utøya Youth Camp
Stian Bromark (Translated by Hon Khiam Leong), Potomac Books, Dulles, Virginia, 2014, 217 pages, $24.95

Massacre in Norway describes the 22 July 2011 car-bomb attack in the government quarter of downtown Oslo and the subsequent shooting of dozens of Labour Party youths at an island camp by a 32-year-old Norwegian extreme nationalist named Anders Behring Breivik. The book is written in a journalistic style that primarily uses first-hand interviews with survivors and witnesses.

The majority of the work focuses on these interviews, elaborating on the human dimension and experiences of the victims. Enough background information is provided for the reader to understand the overall scenario and what prompted the killer to concoct this two-stage massacre. The author lays out chronologically the events of that day, the bombing followed by the shootings, the panic and survival of the youth, their hospitalizations, and their recovery. He then provides a brief synopsis of the trial of Breivik.

The book concentrates on the human aspect of the camp survivors and their post-traumatic stress. The author does provide one chapter (ten pages) that gives insight into the mind of the perpetrator and what drove him to commit the attacks on his fellow Norwegians. Much of the story is filled with interesting, but irrelevant, information such as what clothing people were wearing and the songs the youth sang while at the camp.

The positive elements of this book are the captivating accounts of the bombing, shootings, and acts of survival; contrasted by the surprisingly positive, mature attitude and demeanor of the young witnesses during the trial. It also reveals some of the unpreparedness of the government first responders for the events and their corresponding second- and third-order effects.

My main criticism of the book is its lack of any examination of the cause-and-effect relationship in the mind of the shooter (albeit that was never intended by the author), especially today when these types of mass shootings are becoming more commonplace. This would have been a good opportunity to explore the multifaceted dynamics of another seemingly senseless killing spree, by all accounts committed by a relatively normal member of society. I would still recommend this book to those that are in the field of homeland security and combating domestic terrorism.

Lt. Col. George Hodge, U.S. Army, Retired, Lansing, Kansas

THE GHOSTS OF HERO STREET: How One Small Mexican-American Community Gave So Much in World War II and Korea
Carlos Harrison, Berkley Publishing Group, New York, 2014, 326 pages, $26.95

During World War II and the Korean War, no street in the United States provided more soldiers, sailors, airmen, or Marines to the war effort than 2nd Street (Hero Street) in Silvis, Illinois. This tiny neighborhood was composed mainly of Mexican-American immigrants whose families moved to the United States in the early 1900s to fill voids in the manual labor force. They lived in abandoned rail cars without electricity or running water, yet, these families faithfully answered the call to serve a nation that did not consider them as equals. Fifty-seven sons of Hero Street joined the various services during World War II and the Korean War; eight never returned home. Unfortunately, those heroes that did return remained second-class citizens, with the same austere lifestyle as before they left.

Carlos Harrison, a respected journalist and a Pulitzer Prize winner, conducted extensive research for his book and excels at providing historical evidence to support his story. In The Ghosts of Hero Street: How
One Small Mexican-American Community Gave So Much in World War II and Korea, the author’s primary objective is to provide a historical account of the citizens of 2nd Street and their involvement in these wars. The small Mexican-American community provided so much and received so little in return for their sacrifice.

Harrison provides an overview of how these families moved from Mexico to Illinois to find a better life until the wars interrupted that goal. He then transitions to honoring the lives of each person who paid the ultimate sacrifice for his nation. Harrison provides an excellent narrative for each of the service members that died in battle. He paints an incredible picture of their lives prior to the war, and their final experiences in battle that resulted in their deaths. The author’s detailed accounting of the incidents provides an emotional connection for the reader and vivid mental pictures of the servicemembers’ final moments.

The final chapters of Harrison’s book address the struggle to honor the memory of the fallen. The veterans returned to a neighborhood where the Veterans of Foreign Wars bartender stated, “I’m sorry, but you guys are blackballed. The membership was afraid there are so many of you guys that you would take over the post.” These veterans fought another war for the next 25 years to gain recognition for the great price that 2nd Street paid for freedom in World War II and the Korean War. In 1968, the nation finally honored the fallen sons of the community by changing the name of 2nd Street to Hero Street. Hero Street became a paved road in 1975, allowing the veterans’ grandchildren to ride bikes in the street year round. In 2007, the Hero Street USA Monument was completed and dedicated to the brave men who answered the call to battle for the freedom that many never experienced in their lifetime.

Carlos Harrison has written a superb book. Highly detailed and informative, it provides readers with an understanding of the challenges of being Mexican-American in the twentieth century. It also presents them with an excellent historical account of the support provided by Mexican-Americans to the U.S. military during World War II and the Korean War. The combination makes this a book that will appeal to a wide array of readers and be of particular importance to military leaders.

Lt. Col. John E. Elrich, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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WAR DOGS: Tales of Canine Heroism, History, and Love
Rebecca Frankel, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2014, 256 pages, $26.00

“If there are no dogs in Heaven, then when I die I want to go where they went.”
- Will Rogers

Dogs hold a special place in a soldier’s heart. They are our companions. They are our family. For thousands of years, faithful dogs joined soldiers on the battlefield, time and again proving their worth as stalwart warriors, loyal friends, and even as healers. Author Rebecca Frankel, the special projects editor at Foreign Policy, spent 12 months researching the U.S. military’s working-dog programs. War Dogs: Tales of Canine Heroism, History, and Love is a testament to the unique bond shared between soldiers and their dogs.

War Dogs is replete with personal, often emotional, stories. Some will make you laugh. If you ever loved a dog, then some of them may cause you to shed a tear. This book, however, is more than just a simple collection of war vignettes. Frankel examines current theories associated with canine psychology, emotions, and intelligence, and their impact upon training prospective military working dogs.

She skillfully weaves canine science, war dog history, and recent combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq into one brilliant narrative. Frankel purposefully avoids discussion on the ethics of employing dogs in war, but proves they have a lasting place in the U.S. military—a position I wholeheartedly support. However, Frankel clearly believes the dogs come back from war forever changed, just like the soldiers they protect.
War Dogs drives home a key lesson U.S. military leadership repeatedly fails to heed. Like the rest of the armed services, the size and capability of working-dog programs is cyclic. Summarized, the Pentagon does not maintain sufficiently robust working-dog programs during peacetime and must rapidly expand those same programs in time of war. A properly trained K9 team requires months of specialized selection and training. Similarly, successful and capable war dog programs require years to develop. Despite a proven record of success in World War II and Vietnam, the Pentagon virtually eliminated war-dog programs at the end of those conflicts. Those dog programs extant on 9/11 were too few in number and scope of training for the operations that followed in Iraq and Afghanistan, especially given our enemies increasing use of IEDs. While the Pentagon wisely, if belatedly, ordered a “dog surge” to support the Global War on Terrorism, it has already begun to downsize working-dog programs. This is a tremendous mistake. Any Iraq or Afghanistan veteran will tell you war dogs routinely save lives and there are never enough of them. While the future of warfare is forever changing, one aspect is constant: our soldiers will be more effective and safer with a well-trained war dog at their side.


Stavridis’ perspective on how he arrived as the first admiral to ever hold the senior position at NATO proves interesting. After taking command in 2009, he recounts in six chapters his most pressing challenges. He does this primarily through a geographic lens with chapters focused on Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, the Balkans, Israel, and Russia. In each chapter he paints a candid picture from a strategic leader’s viewpoint on how he approached the problems he encountered in each region.

After the historical tour of challenges, he shifts to a discussion of leadership in a broader sense. There are five chapters on various aspects of leadership. Most of these leadership tenets are valid, not just at the four-star military level, but to all leaders.

He admits that a lot of the leadership principals he applied are not mysterious at all, but asserts that the real mystery is why so few leaders actually implement them. A common thread through the chapters is the emphasis on the need for leaders to know and encourage their people, and strongly promote innovation for solving the complex problems of our times.

Finishing out the book are some insights regarding the future of NATO and the threats that keep Stavridis up at night. He coins a new term, “deviant globalization,” to describe the convergence of aspects of globalization in ways that create mayhem and not stability. Ironically, the greatest threats will come from creative innovators and leaders during these occurrences. This demands that our own leaders must embrace and promote innovation to solve the problems posed by deviant globalization.

Stavridis is an excellent writer, as one would expect since he has written articles on doing just that (N.B.: his 2008 article in the U.S. Naval Institute’s Proceedings, “Read, Think, Write, and Publish”). His personal anecdotes make for a very upbeat and easily read book. Oddly, he does not document interactions with the more fractious leaders he must certainly have encountered in his tour at a command position of global influence. It would have been informative to hear how he dealt with the more difficult strategic leaders bent on obstructing the forward progress of the SACEUR. The closest he comes to a substantive criticism of anyone is his characterization of Vladimir Putin saying, “He will be a difficult ‘partner’ indeed.”
This insightful book demonstrates that Stavridis’ rise to command at U.S. Southern Command and later to become the first admiral to serve as SACEUR and USEUCOM commander was not, as the title suggests, an accident.  


THE GERMAN ACES SPEAK II: World War II through the Eyes of Four More of the Luftwaffe’s Most Important Commanders  
Colin D. Heaton and Anne-Marie Lewis, Zenith Press, Minneapolis, 2014, 296 pages, $30.00

The German Aces Speak II is the second volume in what the authors propose as a series. Like the first volume, this book is about the lives of four prominent World War II Luftwaffe fighter pilots: Erich Hartmann, Johannes Steinhoff, Dietrich Hrabak, and Günther Rall. Despite an extensive bibliography, it is not a scholarly work and there are more extensive biographies available about Hartmann, Steinhoff, and Rall. Instead, The German Aces Speak II contains the unabridged interviews the authors conducted with each subject over a period of years. The abridged interviews have appeared in numerous history magazines, including, Aviation History and World War II.

The lives and careers of Hartmann, Steinhoff, and Rall are well known to most aviation historians. Except for the occasional revelation, there is not much new here. On the other hand, there is not much written about Hrabak, so it was refreshing to read about his exploits. During the interviews, these distinguished pilots discussed their backgrounds, wartime exploits, and postwar experiences. In addition, they included their candid impressions of Hitler as well as the other senior leaders of the Nazi hierarchy, revealing how these impressions changed over the course of the war.

For example, each noted the gradual deterioration in Hitler’s physical appearance and mental acumen each time they met with him. They were also forthcoming in their opinions of their fellow pilots, being almost unanimous in their assessment. Nevertheless, Hartmann admitted that, as he aged, he had softened his attitude toward those pilots who collaborated with the Soviets during their postwar internment.

As noted previously, not much is written about Dietrich Hrabak so it was disappointing to find his interview was only twenty-one pages long compared to the 105 pages devoted to Hartmann. Understandably, given the format of the book, the authors were limited to the amount of available material. However, it would be interesting to know more about the man who commanded not only, arguably, the Luftwaffe’s most successful fighter wing, but also the other three subjects of this book. In addition, the authors did not provide enough context for these interviews, such as when, where, and even why they were conducted. For example, while each subject is describing his life, it is not readily apparent where one interview session stops and the next begins. This leads to some repetition and backtracking in the chronology. Finally, what was the purpose of the interviews? Were they intended to capture the pilot’s lives, their combat exploits, or their postwar careers? The answer to these questions might explain why Hrabak’s interview was so short.

Although The German Aces Speak II is not a scholarly work and there may be more extensive biographies of Hartmann, Steinhoff, and Rall available, it is a fast-paced, enjoyable book for anyone interested in the exploits of these exceptional pilots.

Marlyn R. Pierce, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE REPUBLICAN ARMY IN THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR, 1936-1939  
Michael Alpert, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 2013, 374 pages, $99.00

On 17 August 1936, a group led by Francisco Franco and other Nationalist officers launched a coup attempt against the leftist government of the Spanish Republic. Though the coup failed, the insurgents were left in control of much of Spain. They also commanded the allegiance of most of the officer corps and much of the regular Spanish military, to include the combat-tested Army of Africa. Thus, they had the implements to turn a failed coup into a civil war. Through the fall of 1936, as Nationalist
columns converged on Madrid, the embattled government was forced to cobble together its defenses from a rag-tag array of paramilitary units, workers’ militias, and the handful of regular officers and conscripts who remained loyal to the republic.

The motley Republican array stopped the Nationalists at the gates of the capital, and as the war dragged into 1937, the army of the republic would eventually evolve into a formidable force of 70 divisions and 17 corps equipped with tanks, aircraft, and artillery. In *The Republican Army in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939*, historian Michael Alpert describes this remarkable evolution.

It is a story of building an army in the middle of a bitter conflict and, for this reason, it is story of desperate expedients; some were successful, others failed. It is the story of overcoming party rivalries, as the Republican general staff sought to militarize the undisciplined militias raised by the anarchists, Communists, Socialists, Trotskyites, and others who made up the coalition opposing Franco.

Finally, it is a tragedy. The Republican army was never able to overcome its shortcomings in modern weapons, leadership, training, and political unity. By early 1939, facing the better-equipped (thanks to Hitler and Mussolini) and more effectively led Nationalist armies, the Republican army would collapse. For many of those Republican officers unable to escape into exile, defeat meant a firing squad.

Alpert’s book is not an account of battles and command decisions. It is an institutional history that examines the way the Republican army was built, how its leaders were found, and how it was staffed by commissars charged with ensuring the reliability of its officers and the maintaining the morale of the conscripts who eventually made up the bulk of its manpower.

It is a detailed and well-researched story with an inherent interest for military professionals. However, the author assumes the reader has a basic understanding of causes, course, and outcomes of the Spanish Civil War. Those without such a foundation are encouraged to read Hugh Thomas’ classic, *The Spanish Civil War*, or Anthony Beevor’s more recent, *The Struggle for Spain*, before attempting Alpert’s book. With that one caveat, the book is highly recommended.

Scott Stephenson, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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**A SPY AMONG FRIENDS:**
*Kim Philby and the Great Betrayal*

Ben Macintyre’s book *A Spy Among Friends* recounts the story of Kim Philby, a British MI6 (Military Intelligence, Section 6) officer and a member of the Cambridge Five, one of the most infamous Soviet spy rings. Although Kim Philby’s treachery is well known by Cold War historians and spy lore enthusiasts, the novelty of *A Spy Among Friends* is that it focuses not on Philby’s betrayal of country, but on his betrayal of friends. Macintyre’s captivating book is a tragic story of friendship failed by deceit that has readers wishing for an alternative ending that they know will never come.

The story centers on Philby’s friendship with fellow MI6 officer Nicholas Elliott, a man who defended Philby for over a decade before a Soviet defector’s confirmation of Philby’s guilt left Elliott professionally and personally devastated. Elliott could not fathom how a scion of a respected family, educated at one of Great Britain’s best schools, could betray not only his country, but also his class. Elliott was not alone in declaring Philby’s innocence; even Foreign Secretary Harold McMillan once stated there was “no reason” to believe Philby was a traitor.

Philby’s world began to unravel in 1951 when Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean (two other members of the Cambridge Five) defected to Moscow. The defection of Philby’s two close friends raised questions about Philby’s allegiance, resulting in his removal as the MI6 liaison to the CIA. Although Philby remained free for another 12 years, his career as an intelligence officer would never recover. In 1951, Philby returned to Great Britain and, although he eventually left MI6, no charges were brought against him. In 1956, Philby left Great Britain to become a “correspondent” in Beirut. It is in Beirut where Elliott eventually accepted that his friend was a fraud and confronted him. Following the encounter, Philby fled to Moscow and lived the remainder of his life behind the iron curtain.

What Macintyre’s book highlights is that, although Philby betrayed numerous friends and colleagues, he deceived himself the most. Philby stated that he
“always operated on two levels, a personal level and a political one. When the two have come into conflict, I have had to put politics first.” Philby could not grasp that, once known, his friends could not isolate Philby’s separate personas as easily as he could. After defecting to Moscow, Philby realized the cause he sacrificed so much for was mere fiction. In this regard, Philby is a tragic character that not only lost his life, but his reality.

_A Spy Among Friends_ is a worthwhile read for intelligence historians, espionage enthusiasts, and those interested in human drama. Macintyre’s focus on Philby and his friends makes this tragic story accessible to non-historians who are interested in human tragedies, while also reminding historians that individuals shape and are shaped by history.

Although Philby’s story is well known, Macintyre brings depth that is often lost within accounts focused on Philby’s treacherous deeds and not the individuals involved. Macintyre crafted an engaging story; once readers crack the book, they will find it difficult to put down.

**Maj. David P. Oakley, U.S. Army, Fort Sam Houston, Texas**

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**D-DAY IN HISTORY AND MEMORY: The Normandy Landings in International Remembrance and Commemoration**

Edited by Michael Dolski, Sam Edwards, and John Buckley, University of North Texas Press, Denton, Texas, 2014, 320 pages, $24.95

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n 6 June 1994, as a young Army captain, I was part of the Normandy D-Day landings 50th commemoration. I met soldiers and civilians from the different participating countries and first heard the different interpretations and meanings of the events that took place on that historic day.

Similarly, this book is an edited collection of six essays by different authors—historians who provide differing views from the perspective of their respective countries. The authors do not validate which of the six viewpoints is correct, but do an excellent job of objectively explaining the facts from their respective country’s viewpoints in terms of political, cultural, and contemporary issues. The long introduction provides a quick overview of D-Day and establishes the purpose of the book. While the figures in the book are appropriately placed and connected to the text, the addition of a map or a few more photos or graphs would have added some very useful visual aids for better comprehension.

As one would expect, the six viewpoints are quite different. America sees herself as the “savior of the world” and promotes its heroics through media, political speeches, and visits to Normandy. The British see D-Day as a vindication of Dunkirk, an expression of British commitment to France, the last great demonstration of British Imperial unity, and a reversal of all the defeats suffered by the British since 1939. These points are woven into British culture via politics, press, and cinema.

The British conceived and planned the invasion, and were able to match U.S. men and materiel, making D-Day a British success story. The Canadian view is downplayed on the public level due to historians who criticized the military for not reaching their D-Day objectives and a government in Ottawa that had no priority for promoting commemorations. The French view is thankful for liberation, yet grieves from the destruction caused by the Allies. The lack of Allied recognition of French losses and sacrifice continues to irritate the French public.

The Germans focused more on the Holocaust and the liberation from Hitler on 8 May 1945, as well as U.S. media portrayals of D-Day. Today’s Germans, now distanced from the events of the past, are recognizing their sacrifices of D-Day with tourism and memorials. A brief discussion of Austrian viewpoints is included in the German section. The Soviet/Russian view is in stark contrast to the Western Allies. Much of this is due to the Cold War nationalism of both sides. The Soviet/Russian viewpoint, written by the USSR-controlled media, focused on Red Army successes accompanied by disparaging media reports on the “slow and bumbling” Allies.

This contributed to the Soviet (now Russian) public’s negative view of the Allies that continues today. There were similarities as well, with a common one being that two famous American movies—_The Longest Day_ and _Saving Private Ryan_—affected the D-Day memories in each country.

This book is an easy read—interesting, informative, and quite authoritative. The different authors are
well-published and current historians for the country they researched. Their research is evident in the sources and time periods discussed. Each addresses the evolution of D-Day remembrance and memory from 6 June 1944 through today with one author including the impact of social media.

Having visited Normandy four times, I strongly recommend the book to anyone who is a student of D-Day or planning a visit to Normandy.

James L. Kennedy, Jr., Fairfax, Virginia

**THE WRONG ENEMY:**
America in Afghanistan, 2001-2014
Carlotta Gall, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, New York, 2014, 329 pages, $28.00

After more than 13 years of war at a cost of nearly a trillion dollars and over 2,300 U.S. soldiers killed in action, have we been fighting the wrong enemy in Afghanistan? The answer to that question is the focus of Carlotta Gall’s book *The Wrong Enemy*. Gall’s central theme is that, despite the costly efforts of the U.S. and its allies to bring stability to Afghanistan, Pakistan has been actively working against them.

While the covert Pakistan-Taliban relationship is a key focus of this book, Gall’s work shows that it is only one factor in a complex situation that has been made worse by years of miscalculations and missed opportunities by all the parties involved.

Claims of Pakistan support for the Taliban are nothing new and have been reported by other sources for years. What makes this work unique is how Gall expertly guides the reader through the historical and political labyrinth that defines this relationship using a combination of first-hand observations, interviews, and second-hand accounts.

Her intimate knowledge of the region and its players is enhanced by her nearly continuous traveling and reporting from both Pakistan and Afghanistan since 9/11.

The story of Pakistan’s rocky 30-year relationship with the Taliban is recounted from the standpoint of both past and current members of the Taliban, as well as from Pakistanis with intimate knowledge of Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) agency. From the beginning of the Pakistan-Taliban relationship, training and financial support were provided through a special branch of the ISI manned by retired officers from the Pakistan army. Over the decades, a very close relationship developed that continued to expand even after 9/11 and the start of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan. However, in the last few years the ISI’s influence has started to falter as the Taliban has become more radical, and it increasingly appeared Pakistan had created a monster it could no longer control.

As an example, Col. Imam, a graduate of U.S. Special Forces training, began working with the Taliban after his retirement from the Pakistan military in the 1990s. Imam developed a close relationship with the Taliban and even became Mullah Omar’s mentor after 9/11.

As the Taliban’s religious extremism increased, he was eventually detained and executed despite pleas from the ISI for his release. Additionally, Gall suggests that Pakistan’s double-dealings with the U.S. and the Taliban potentially has had negative effects on its own military as she reports growing support among young Pakistani officers for the Taliban and their goals.

Another theme Gall investigates is the relationship between the U.S. and Afghanistan President Ahmed Karzai. She readily acknowledges the corruption of the Karzai government and that his focus on the tactics of tribal politics instead of strategy has worsened the war. Nevertheless, she does try to evaluate the war from his perspective. She maintains that no one should be surprised with the levels of corruption found in Karzai’s government given that he is a poor administrator who has been overwhelmed with vast sums of money. Second, Gall feels that the U.S. approach to the war, particularly in terms of civilian casualties, has severely weakened Karzai’s ability to control the Afghan political situation.
She believes that the U.S. has misunderstood the security situation from the outset and that its initial approach was actually helping the Taliban. The approach changed when Gen. Stanley McChrystal and Gen. David Petraeus adjusted the U.S. focus to counterinsurgency and protecting civilians, but, by then, the damage had been done and the Taliban were entrenched.

Despite this, Gall concludes her work by stating that the Afghan security forces are not up to the task of keeping the “Taliban at bay,” and that U.S. and NATO “cannot walk away” until the security of the Afghanistan population “is ensured.” How that is supposed to be done is not addressed, but this book is still relevant on several levels: it provides an excellent overview of the Afghanistan’s recent political history as well as insights into the country’s political process, it provides an outsider’s evaluation of U.S. policy and actions, and it helps the reader understand the delicate situation in Pakistan.

Lt. Col. William Kenna McCurry, U.S. Army, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

WEALTH OF AN EMPIRE:
The Treasure Shipments that Saved Britain and the World

Britain watched in fear as Germany slowly gobbled up Europe. The coming storm became the impetus for evacuating massive sums of gold and treasuries to save Britain and the world from fascism. Switky’s book is a roller coaster ride across the early years of World War II—from 1939, when the British monarchs visited North America, to spring 1941, when constant fear of German invasion punctuated a year of desperate measures. The royal visit hid the first of many gold shipments to Canada and the United States during the “Phony War,” while the threat of German invasion throughout 1940 drove desperate transfers of over one billion dollars in gold and securities from Britain to Canada.

The key attraction of Switky’s book is how the military history of the initial years of World War II interweaves with the political and economic turmoil of Europe and North America. His story highlights the desperate straits Britain faced with an isolationist United States and a growing threat from Germany. He details how Chamberlain and Churchill fought the odds to save the wealth of Britain, understanding the isolation they faced as the beacon of free society in Europe even before the fall of France. They knew that Germany would eventually turn its sights on Britain and its wealth in circumstances where U-boat blockades could choke off shipments of goods necessary for Britain to survive.

Switky’s research highlights the limitations of intelligence during World War II. He details many assumptions in intelligence that drove the mad push to move gold to countries willing to sell supplies, weapons, and support off the island. Of particular note, Switky points to Atlantic operations, contrasting the Admiralty’s point of view with Germany’s actual plans, highlighting the discrepancies in British intelligence during the initial years of the war.

The British government believed a large, capable U-boat fleet operated in the North Atlantic. In actuality, before the loss of Norway, only about half of the German U-boat fleet could operate effectively in the North Atlantic—only five to six U-boats threatening the North Atlantic at any given time. After the loss of Norway and France these numbers changed substantially, but the U-boat threat in the deep Atlantic never matched British assumptions.

Switky details the intricate coordination by the British government, the Bank of England, Canada, and the United States to ensure shipments were properly handled, accounted for, delivered, and stored. He documents the monumental level of secrecy, security, and logistics needed to ensure the safety of gold on both sides of the Atlantic and the availability of the money when needed. In a coordinated effort by the British and Canadian governments, Britain created the U.K. Security Deposit in Montreal, which became a repository and clearing house for British gold and securities in North America.

Wealth of an Empire is great military history about politics, economics, strategy, and campaigns providing an abundance of valuable resources and references. Switky highlights new points of view about World War II that most historians do not discuss, carrying the topic logically to the end with thought provoking
counter-analysis, posing valid what if scenarios for the reader to consider.

Maj. Scott Hopkins, U.S. Air Force, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

JULY CRISIS:
The World’s Descent into War, Summer 1914

Among diplomatic and military historians alike, the origins of the First World War have long stood out as a topic of special interest. Since Barbara Tuchman published The Guns of August in 1962, if not before, there have been myriad attempts to extract sweeping lessons useful to both statesmen and generals. With the centennial of the Great War now upon us, fascination with the July crisis has spiked yet again.

In July Crisis: The World’s Descent into War, Summer 1914, T.J. Otte attempts to produce an original synthesis of modern scholarship on the path to war. The result is not startlingly new, but is certainly fresh in terms of its points of emphasis. In particular, the author seeks to demolish some of the traditional clichés about the war—that it was inevitable, for instance—whether due to the alliance system or the rigidity of military planning. Neither is he persuaded that domestic pressures drove the principal powers into war.

In general, Otte is not overly impressed with the argument that inexorable forces operated beyond the capabilities of leaders to alter the course of events. On the contrary, the author maintains that there was ample opportunity to avoid a war, but that invalid assumptions, decadent institutions, and inept decision-making carried the day. In other words, “the role of individuals in July 1914 was critical.”

Otte speculates that a different cast of players might have brought about a drastically different outcome. He observes that earlier figures such as Alexander I or Talleyrand possessed a much clearer vision about preserving the international order and the positions of the great powers. This was partly by virtue of personality, but evolving circumstances were important as well. By 1914, governing structures in Europe had fallen behind the times.

A lack of accountability and dispersal of authority made logical policy formulation problematic. If there is a poster child for this handicap, it would have to be Austria-Hungary, a dual monarchy with a fractious population and too many competing interests. Curiously, in Otte’s estimation, “Of the powers, only Britain, with her seemingly shambolic and prolix cabinet discussions, produced coherent strategic decisions.”

At the same time, Otte rejects Fritz Fisher’s claim that an overbearing Germany sought war. If anything, the author contends, German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg should be faulted for failing to reign in the reckless behavior of Austria-Hungary. Here, Otte embraces the conventional wisdom of diplomatic historians that Germany’s blank check of support to its junior partner was a fatefully misguided step, binding the dominant power to a struggle in which it staked its very survival for no compelling reason. Russia, meanwhile, was simultaneously rash and tentative, while France seems to have been guided by strategic inertia.

In all, this work is highly readable and plausibly argued. The author has an easy command of both the history and historiography, blending them into a seamless analysis accessible to a broad readership.

Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

COMMAND CONFLICTS IN GRANT’S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN:
Ambition and Animosity in the Army of the Potomac

The Overland Campaign was the most brutal continuous combat action up to that point of the Civil War. The casualty figures during this condensed period of 1864 consisted of staggering numbers of killed, wounded, and missing. These figures were at least partially due to the divisive relationships between the leaders that were prevalent during this period of the Civil War.
Lt. Gen. Ulysses Grant’s Overland Campaign was rife with counterproductive conduct by political appointees, office seekers, senior regular and volunteer army officers, and newspaper correspondents. This did much to foul the plans set forth by the overall commanders—Maj. Gen. Henry Halleck, located in Washington DC; Grant, overall commander of Union forces; and Maj. Gen. George Meade, commander of the Army of the Potomac—to bring the war to a more rapid conclusion.

It was common knowledge that the Confederacy had been bent back but was not broken. However, even with the Unions’ vast resources in manpower and the instruments of warfare, it could not take advantage of the situation. Though there were definitive successes, more often than not, command conflicts thwarted Union efforts to prosecute the war efficiently or effectively.

The inability of the Union commanders to work as a productive and supportive team led to the terrible carnage of the Overland Campaign. They not only distrusted one another, but often delayed actions, ordered fanatical and aggressive maneuvers without concrete operational intelligence, and provided loose and often miscalculated information on enemy strength and position—much to the detriment of the fighting men involved.

The definition the author uses to describe the likes of Grant and Meade for example leaves one to wonder whether they had any suitable qualities other than merely being another level of bureaucracy. The author does spend significant time on the lack of confidence Grant and several of his men (such as Gen. Phil Sheridan) had in a Maine soldier, Maj. Gen. Gouverneur Warren.

Considering the authors’ background (she is a Maine resident), it was not surprising that Warren is one of those highlighted in the text. However, his story is compelling, well documented, and well worth recounting.

Smith’s chronological account is sound as it contains prime source material, but it should have included the final phases of the war as well. From 1865 through the end of the conflict, one particular battle marks the highlight of this dysfunction, back stabbing, and poor command relationships: the Battle of Five Forks. It was here where these relationships led to the removal of Warren from command, and years later, to a court of inquiry to clear Warren’s name. A discussion of these events would have added much to what is otherwise a well-written account.

Col. Thomas S. Bundt, Ph.D., U.S. Army, Fort Lee, Virginia

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ALL THE GREAT PRIZES:
The Life of John Hay, from Lincoln to Roosevelt

This biography is where we learn of the extraordinary life of an extraordinary American. John Hay was a man who seemed to live a storybook life in service to his nation. As author John Taliaferro points out in an interview, Hay is known either for his wartime service to President Lincoln as Lincoln’s private secretary, or as President William McKinley’s—and later President Theodore Roosevelt’s—secretary of state, but not as both.

In this rich and detailed narrative, the first of its kind since the mid 1930s, Taliaferro paints a rich and vivid picture of Hay’s life and its many intersections with the great moments of the late nineteenth century. To paint this picture the author uses the subject’s own words to provide an authoritative account of Hay’s prolific life. Hay’s writings, and that of friends and family, provide a lens through which to see many historical events. We see a jovial Lincoln in his nightclothes cracking jokes in the middle of the night to ease the tremendous stress of the Civil War. We also see Lincoln the human being in his most vulnerable times: when his beloved son, Willie, dies, and during the formulation and delivery of the Emancipation Proclamation. This book is not another story of Lincoln, although his presence is felt throughout.

The next phase of the book describes Hay’s struggles to keep the Republican Party true to its most famous member. Hay’s own writing provides firsthand accounts of the corruption behind the Grant administration, which he criticized invectively through his guest editorship of the New York Tribune; the elections of Gilded Age Republican and—disapprovingly—Democratic presidents; and, the constant battle within
Hay to be actively involved in government without appearing to be angling for a job. Eventually he landed a short ambassadorship to England, followed by his appointment as secretary of state.

The story is not one of hero worship, nor does it get bogged down as a recital of Hay’s many accomplishments. The author exposes and examines Hay’s myriad professional and intimate personal connections and friendships. We read of his love for not one, but two, married woman of prominence. The letters between Hay’s intimates themselves and to Hay provide a depth of character expertly captured by Taliaferro.

Of note in this excellent work is the chapter concerning the time during Hay’s absence from government. The chapter outlining this phase of Hay’s life contains a volume of correspondence that depicts his internal struggle; from feeling as though he has not done enough to uphold Lincolnian principles, to feeling that he has done everything he could. This is actually the book’s strength, as it allows the reader to feel the weight of Hay’s personal struggle to find his place across the century.

This book is of relevance to the security community in that it paints a very intimate picture of an individual in a position to have a vast impact on worldly affairs. Overall it is an excellent, enlightening, and entertaining read.


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BROTHERS IN ARMS:
Chinese Aid to the Khmer Rouge, 1975-1979

In the center of Cambodia is the former Democratic Kampuchea military airfield at Krang Leav. Built with Chinese money and technical expertise, it was the crown jewel of Chinese foreign aid to the short-lived Khmer Rouge regime (1975-1979). Before becoming operational, the airfield was overrun by neighboring Vietnamese troops in 1979. Looking at a long-abandoned airfield in 2010, author Andrew Mertha wonders what exactly did this aid buy the Chinese? In *Brothers in Arms* Mertha, a political scientist and university professor, examines China’s foreign aid to Democratic Kampuchea (DK). This leads him to the greater question of “Why was a powerful state like China unable to influence its far weaker and ostensibly dependent client state?” In his detailed analysis, Mertha quickly sets forth a persuasive and interesting argument that Chinese aid bought little in the way of influencing the policies of the DK government, despite being that regime’s only patron.

He attributes this outcome principally to two reasons. The first, and most important to his argument, revolves around Chinese bureaucratic fragmentation in its foreign aid policy development and execution. Rather than rational decision making, it was institutional restraints, most notably in communication and lines of authority, that drove policy. Second, DK’s secretive, complex, and in many cases fratricidal internal institutions were paradoxically able to resist Chinese influence and, at the same time, remain ill equipped to take advantage of Chinese aid.

To highlight his argument, Mertha uses three case studies that examine aid related to military, infrastructure, and trade projects. A vivid picture emerges of this almost unknown foreign aid program that kept the DK government afloat, helping the reader understand the ultimately counterintuitive patron-client state relationship. These case studies provide deeper insight on governance in Democratic Kampuchea, going beyond the well-documented subject of the “killing fields.”

Why is all of this important? Mertha makes the case that an assessment of the China’s foreign aid to DK, especially regarding bureaucratic politics and processes, helps us better understand China’s inevitable attempts to expand her influence in Southeast Asia through “seductive, no strings attached” foreign aid. This is relevant since the author posits not much has changed with China’s institutional fragmentation in their current foreign aid programs. Finally, this book provokes further reflection on the dynamics and expected outcomes of any nation’s foreign aid program.

This slim volume is well documented. The author used Cambodian and Chinese archival documents, including those from the Cambodian commission currently investigating the policies and practices of the Khmer Rouge regime, as well as interviews of Chinese experts who worked in DK and Cambodian survivors of the regime. Filled with great detail, the book...
is alternately fascinating and dry. It offers insightful examinations into a little known topic, but occasionally reads like an academic text.

With America’s national strategy pivoting back to the Pacific, the timely Brothers in Arms will interest students of national security policy, China, and Southeast Asian history. Given our own recent challenges with foreign aid programs, this book offers the opportunity for reflection on just what foreign aid buys us.

**Col. John M. Sullivan Jr., U.S. Marine Corps, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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**POLICING WARS:**  
On Military Intervention in the Twenty-First Century  

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In *Policing Wars*, Caroline Holmqvist’s print version of her doctrinal thesis, she describes the thought processes that many of our contemporary leaders, and those that comment on them, have toward the use of the military as an agent of international change. The book discusses neither the conduct of policing wars, nor the politics that lead toward the use of armed forces for those actions, but instead focuses on the concept of policing wars and their justifications. The crux of her argument is that liberal-minded leadership, regardless of political ideologies, view modern conflicts different from wars of the past. The Clausewitz perspective of war as a means to impose one nation’s will upon another is no longer applicable because twenty-first century wars by liberal states, like the United States, are viewed as a corrective measure to regional disorder.

Justification made under this pretext derives from the concept that if there is no political opposition, since the use of policing is a way in which force imposes order, then policing actions cannot be considered war. There is no opposition, the argument goes, because when it comes to democratic principles and other ideas deemed good governance, logically there would be no opposition. Democracy is good government all around, and those opposed to such thought are criminal in nature; hence, policing those that would create disorder against legitimate governance is a justifiable course of action. At least this is what the author is proposing to the reader when discussing the thinking of liberal-minded leaders.

This is the value of Holmqvist’s book. She does not make proposals for how to prosecute or reduce the prevalence of contemporary conflicts, nor does she argue the nature of how they occur. She simply discusses how political leaders may or may not view them, and where the military’s role lies within solving them. Though the reader may not share the same view of world conflict from the perspectives that the author describes, there is indeed value to be had in understanding how others view similar situations; especially in regard to military intervention. The book is short—one-hundred and forty pages from introduction to conclusion—but within that duration, the author thoroughly discusses and describes the topic in depth.

She did not write for the military demographic. Being her area of study, she utilizes the lexicon of a social theorist to such an extent that an unfamiliar reader may need to consult outside references in order to decipher her writings. Casual reading is difficult as key concepts, described by that lexicon, may be inadvertently glossed over only to be referenced multiple times in further passages, requiring backtracking to determine where that preceding concept was described. That said, if the reader can get past these difficulties, *Policing Wars* offers an enlightening perspective on how military intervention is justified in the minds of political leadership.

**Capt. Colin Marcum, U.S. Army, Fort Sill, Oklahoma**

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**THE ROAD TO WAR:**  
Presidential Commitments Honored and Betrayed  

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In *The Road to War* Marvin Kalb describes how every president since Harry Truman has relied on presidential commitments rather than
congressional declarations of war to justify the use of military power abroad. He critically examines presidential commitments since World War II and the role these commitments played in American military action, and advocates vigilance concerning the future use of this well-established precedent in pursuit of national security objectives.

Although no president since World War II has requested that Congress declare war, many have nevertheless committed U.S. forces to fight in foreign lands in pursuit of our national interests. For example, Kalb describes how Truman felt no obligation to consult Congress before sending military personnel to South Korea after North Korea invaded across the 38th Parallel in 1950. Instead, Truman pursued a United Nations mandate to justify American involvement.

Kalb further examines the escalating Vietnam commitments made by successive presidents. He discusses President Dwight Eisenhower’s commitment of Air Force bombers to assist French forces in Vietnam and President John F. Kennedy’s deployment of military advisors. However, the commitments of these two presidents were limited in comparison to the commitments of President Lyndon Johnson.

Kalb describes how Johnson escalated the war that led to over half a million combat troops to South Vietnam. Johnson, like his post-World War II predecessors, did not request a congressional declaration of war. Nevertheless, Johnson received congressional consent through the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. Kalb shows how this set an important precedent for future presidents regarding congressional consent short of a war declaration.

Kalb critically analyzes President Richard Nixon’s continued Vietnam War effort. He describes Nixon’s goal of an orderly withdrawal of American forces and ending the war “with honor.” Kalb further discusses Nixon’s betrayal of support to South Vietnam’s president because of national exhaustion and the Watergate scandal.

Perhaps the most interesting chapter involves America’s commitment to Israel. Kalb contends that the U.S.-Israeli relationship is based primarily on letters between the president and the prime minister, and argues that foreign leaders may interpret commitments made by an American president as promises that will be honored by their successors.

The book’s most valuable contribution is the author’s ability to question the authority of modern presidents to take America to war without congressional approval or support from the American people. Kalb wonders if these actions will continue and if such important decisions will rest solely with the chief executive. Furthermore, the author discusses the idea of a formal defense treaty between the United States and Israel. Kalb argues that a treaty would formalize security concerns of both nations and reduce Israel’s uncertainty of secret American presidential commitments.

The Road to War: Presidential Commitments Honored and Betrayed is a fascinating book that is fast paced and powerful. It is strongly recommended for officers who will lead future military operations that, in light of Afghanistan and Iraq, promise to be increasingly politically contentious with the American people and a less pliable Congress.

Mark Kormos, Fort Belvoir, Virginia

THE EMBATTLED PAST: Reflections on Military History
Edward M. Coffman, University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 2014, 201 pages, $36.00

Award-winning historian Edward M. Coffman is one of our most distinguished American military scholars. In The Embattled Past he weaves together his personal journey with insightful military history articles. More importantly, this book is a collection of his articles spanning from 1977 to 2006, each dealing with an aspect of Army social history, or providing a discussion on military history by one of its master artisans.

Until the early years of the twentieth century, most military history fell into what historians derisively refer to today as drum-and-trumpet military history. In an effort to resolve this issue, historians, including Theodore Roosevelt, attempted to make military history broader and more factually based. Their efforts led to more serious efforts at recording military history that, according to military historian Sir Basil Liddell Hart, were to provide “us with the opportunity to profit by the stumbles and tumbles of our forerunners.” Additionally, Coffman helped usher in a new approach, termed as
“new military history” or “war and society”—a post-World War II shift from focusing on combat history to examining broader historical relationships between war and society.

The Embattled Past provides thirteen of Coffman’s previous works. Coffman added a new introduction that examined the evolution of military history during his career and his personal journey to become an internationally recognized military historian. The first portion of the collection focuses on American military history, and in some instances, specifically on Army social history.

His 1993 paper “The American Army in Peacetime” examines the Army’s history when not at war. “The American 15th Infantry Regiment in China, 1912–1938” and “The Philippine Scouts, 1899–1942” provide fascinating views into a bygone era of Army history. In the last half of the book, Coffman selected essays that examined aspects of military history and mentorship. “Talking about War” discusses the use of oral history and military history. The last article is on a rare interview with retired General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, conducted by Coffman in 1960.

Reading this book provides military historians with the feeling that they have been conversing with a friend and mentor, leaving them with an understanding of his road to success and the innovations he contributed. Several of Coffman’s articles are exemplars of social history and demonstrate his gift for making U.S. Army officers, soldiers, and spouses from the past come alive for the reader.

One weakness of this book is that Coffman could have more overtly discussed how his separate articles are related to each other, perhaps by crafting a common theme in the introduction written specifically for this collection. Despite this minor criticism, Embattled Past is a must read for those interested in military history as an academic discipline. The book is also appealing for those interested in the social history of the U.S. Army.

Jon Klug, Arnold, Maryland

THE STRUGGLE FOR IRAQ’S FUTURE: How Corruption, Incompetence, and Sectarianism Have Undermined Democracy

Was the U.S. intervention in, and occupation of, Iraq from 2003–2011 a success? Was the collapse of the Iraqi army in the face of the advance of the Islamic State in 2014 the fault of the U.S. occupation? Many Americans may be asking themselves the same questions as they watch news coverage of Iraq’s recent difficulties. Zaid Al-Ali provides sobering and depressing insight into the answers to these two questions. The U.S. intervention did fail to help Iraq become a stable state and, in fact, encouraged the corruption that followed. Certainly, Al-Ali did not intend to discuss the advance of the Islamic State as his book was published months before their territorial gains in Iraq. However, his book still provides material that explains the weakness in the post-U.S.-occupied Iraq that would lead to the security collapse mentioned above.

Zaid Al-Ali is from an Iraqi family, though he lived outside of Iraq for the majority of his early life. He became a lawyer, returned to Iraq after the U.S. invasion, and worked as a legal advisor to the United Nations in Iraq from 2005-2010. He has family and numerous contacts in Iraq, and much of the book is written based on his own experience and personal interviews. Al-Ali provides value to the reader through his understanding of Iraq, the Arabic language, and the regional culture and issues.

He states in his introduction that “the purpose of this book is to explain how [Iraq’s deplorable] situation has come about,” and he does an excellent job of doing just that. He explains in eight chapters what created the Iraq of 2014—a failing state with an unresponsive central government and with no apparent ability or desire to meet the basic needs of its citizens. Al-Ali provides a general historical context and then discusses the path through which the recent regime of Nouri Al-Maliki came about.

He goes on to describe the growth of the violent insurgency and then he describes two more conceptual insurgencies: corruption and environmental disaster. He ends the book with recommendations that seem irrelevant now that the Islamic State controls a sizable percentage of the country; for example, it seems unlikely that Iraq will draft a new constitution in the near future.

The book is not without flaws. Those unfamiliar with Arabic names and the key players in Iraq may get
lost in the detailed cast of characters. Al-Ali also tends
to overemphasize the positive aspects of the Republican
and early-Ba’athist periods of Iraqi history.

Al-Ali pulls no punches when describing the
incompetence and ignorance of the U.S. government,
military, contractors, and businessmen who did much
to create an environment in which the violent extremists
and the incompetent and corrupt Iraqi politicians
could destroy what was left of Iraq after the misman-
gagement of Saddam Hussein and the “evils” of the U.S.-
sponsored international blockade. This is not a book
for the faint of heart or the thin skinned. It is, however,
a book that paints a unique picture—Iraq from the
perspective of Iraqis.

Citizens and service members need to read this
book and take heed of the dangers that come from ex-
cuting plans created from ignorance and developing
policies at the behest of disgruntled exiles.

Lt. Col. Brian L. Steed, U.S. Army, Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas

FROM ABOVE:
War, Violence and Verticality
Peter Adey, Mark Whitehead, and Alison J. Williams
(Editors), Oxford University Press, United Kingdom,
2013, 356 pages, $35.00

With the disappearance of Malaysia
Airlines flight 370 on 8 March 2014, the
timing to begin reading From Above was
ironic. The irony was that the book evokes reflection
on past, present, and future intelligence collection
techniques from the air. From Above is a compilation
of well-researched topics that are ordered to provoke
critical thinking.

The anthology provides a comprehensive look at the
advantage intelligence from the sky (and higher)—in-
cluding political, military, economic, and social, and
informational factors—has provided naval and ground
force commanders during their development of the
operational environment.

The initial thing that drew me to the book was the
cover and title. In all of the aviation literature I have
read over the years, I have found it extremely difficult
to avoid the romanticism of putting yourself in the
story. There is something about that bird’s-eye view
that provides the vivid scenes and situations from the
air.

Going through the contributions of several au-
thors made the book an enjoyable read. It is a work
with multiple ideas that individually could be further
researched. The chapters are short, but so packed with
old and new references that even a veteran collector
can learn of new sources, information, and ideas to
approach a problem from the air.

Although each chapter covers a different aspect of
airborne collection, they each have a particular flair of
romanticism that pulls the reader into the topic.

A reoccurring theme through the book is oper-
tional art and design. Although these are modern
terms, Sun Tzu and Clausewitz knew battlespace
management. Gen. George Washington also knew
battlespace management as he had his troops on high
terrain along the Hudson River during the Battle of
New York on the East River as Great Britain’s fleet
made its landing.

Among other intriguing topics, the chapters discuss
balloon technology of old, mediums of image compi-
lations, airborne systems, space (to include thoughts
on satellite information operations), strategic politics
between nations, released secrets, and, the intricacies
that are generally not available to open sources.

I cannot help but think that there had to be a
collection system that knew the exact location of
Malaysian flight 370; but in this day and age of cyber
warfare, it is too risky for any nation to reveal how
they might have obtained that information. Once that
source is revealed and that capability demonstrated,
there will be a countertechnology developed. From
Above will make readers believe these systems are
available.

During the search for flight 370, countries called
for tapes of conversations, radar images, satellite imag-
es, and other media. Social media networking groups
that have commercial access to satellites also jumped
into the search. As more and more records are released
to the public, I could see a second From Above written.
This book is highly recommended to all those interest-
ed in past and post-modern collection techniques and
ideas.

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1st Lieutenant Alonzo Hersford Cushing will be awarded the Medal of Honor posthumously to recognize his 3 July 1863 actions at Gettysburg, Pa.

President Barack Obama approved the award to honor the Civil War veteran. An award ceremony will be held at a future date.

Cushing commanded Battery A, 4th U.S. Artillery, Artillery Brigade, 2nd Corps, Army of the Potomac. He was killed in action while defending a Union position in the vicinity of Cemetery Ridge on the final day of the Battle of Gettysburg.

On that day, Cushing’s battery was decimated by Confederate artillery fire until only one serviceable field piece remained. Cushing was severely wounded in the abdomen and the shoulder but refused to be evacuated. He continued to direct the fire of his lone artillery piece in the face of the Confederate assault known as Pickett’s Charge.

Through his actions, Cushing is credited with helping the Union Army successfully prevent the Confederate charge from breaking through the center of Union defenses on Cemetery Ridge at a place later called “The Angle.” Cushing was shot in the head and killed during the height of the assault. He was 22 years old.

Cushing is the 64th soldier to receive the Medal of Honor for actions during the Battle of Gettysburg.

Alonzo Cushing was a native of Wisconsin and a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy. He is buried with full honors at West Point.