

We offer four student reviews of books on genocide at the recommendation of Michael Weaver, assistant professor and instructor of the Mass Atrocity Response Operations Course at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. The course, part of the college's Genocide and Mass Atrocity Studies Program, educates students on response to and prevention of genocide. In contrast to our regular book reviews, you will notice references to other reviews of each book. Besides providing their own critical analyses of their selected books, the students refined their critical-thinking skills by examining analyses of those books by two other scholars in the field of genocide and mass atrocity studies. I hope you enjoy reading these reviews.

From the Editor-in-Chief

FIRES OF HATRED:

Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe

**Norman M. Naimark, Harvard University Press,
Boston, 2002, 256 pages, \$26.50**

Norman Naimark's *Fires of Hatred; Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth Century Europe* is a comprehensive study of genocide and ethnic cleansing in Europe from the Armenian Genocide (1915-1918) through the Wars of Yugoslav Succession (1991-1999). The author tells the story in such a way that if one studied this book and no other, one would have a firm understanding of the causes, definitional parameters, and appropriate attitudes towards the issue.

True to his title, Naimark spends less than a page in the book referring to genocides outside of Europe, even by way of contrast or comparison. His treatment of ethnic cleansing within the designated century and continent, however, is complete and detailed.

Some critics disagree with this approach. For example, University of Michigan's Ara Sanjian, Ph.D., considers lack of treatment outside of Europe a weakness in Naimark's work.

Sanjian states, "... his argument would certainly have benefited further had he also briefly analyzed some pre-twentieth century instances of ethnic cleansing to show how the absence of elements of modernity gave them a character different from the ones described in this book."¹

However, I disagree with Sanjian. By confining his study to a specific time and space, Naimark implicitly sends the message that there is ample material for the study of genocide and ethnic cleansing on a "civilized" continent in a century we still remember. For many, the atrocities are relatively recent, immediate, and real to the reader.

Naimark skillfully fleshes out the concept by commencing his discussion of genocide with examination of the 1894-96 Turkish massacres of Armenian highlanders, a harbinger of the 1915 Armenian genocide. Though the Turks killed or wounded over 200,000 Armenians at that time, Naimark does not consider the initial massacres as an attempt at genocide. Naimark distinguishes the early massacres from genocide by asserting that "the goal was severe punishment, not extermination. Nor do the events of 1894-96 share the general characteristics of ethnic cleansing; no attempt was made to remove Armenians from their homes or to deport them." Commenting on this proposition, Nick Baron, Ph.D., University of Nottingham's associate professor of history asserts that ethnic cleansing and genocide are not the same, "characterized by their different objectives."² Baron makes the distinction by asserting that "genocide is the intentional killing off of part or all of an ethnic, religious or national group; the murder of a people or peoples ... is the objective. The intention of ethnic cleansing is to remove a people and often all traces of them from a concrete territory."

Adopting the same semantic framework, Naimark makes the useful technical distinction between a

“limited war of pacification,” and a “genocidal war of pacification.” In shaping the concept of ethnic cleansing and genocide, Naimark makes other useful distinctions and generalizations. For instance, throughout the work the author sees most recent conflicts, as opposed to ancient hatreds, to be causal to ethnic cleansing. He states, “Comparative reflection on the problems of ethnic cleansing also leads to the conclusion that each case must be understood in its full complexity, in its own immediate context, rather than merely as part of a long-term historical conflict between nations.”

The comparatively recent conflict that took place in the Balkans during 1990 provides an example. Naimark notes that though the Serbs deliberately roused glorified memories of Milos Obilic—a medieval Serbian knight who figured prominently in the war between Serbs and the Ottoman Empire and whose memory was well-polished by the centuries since 1389—to mobilize nationalist fervor against Albanians and Croats, the causes for conflict were actually proximate.³

He asserts, “... the brutal, uncompromising nature of the struggle in Croatia and later in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s had much more to do with the history of the region since 1940 ... than it did with the inheritance of the distant past.” Thus, he does not attribute the violence mainly to any ancient history of animosity between ethnic groups, but asserts that the main causes of that conflict were recent in origin, which “can be traced to Turkish and Armenian reactions to the loss of the Ottoman lands in the Balkan Wars of 1912-13.” This insistence that genocide stems from recent and current causes of hatred, regardless of the past, is one of his key leitmotifs.

In terms of style, Naimark refrains from condemning those nations or agencies that stood by and did not intervene in genocides. Rather, his narrative unfolds with relative objectivity from the ground-level perspective of individual victims and perpetrators. When he refers to interveners, he tells stories of neighbors, not nations. For example, he describes the actions of Serbians who assisted their Croat neighbors, or of Turks who hid Armenian women. Consequently, Naimark rarely refers to instances in which organizations failed to intervene. Only anomalously does he mention Dutch peacekeepers who “stood aside as the Bosnian Serbs advanced” at Srebrenica.

Some critics misinterpret Naimark’s approach. For example, Baron describes Naimark’s narrative as unduly pessimistic and “dismal.”⁴ However, I disagree. Baron has not fully accounted for the nature of the subject matter in his analysis. Ethnic cleansing and genocide can only ever be gloomy topics. Taken in this context, *Fires of Hatred* is not a pessimistic prediction that future genocides are unavoidable.

On the contrary, it is a book that is respectful and deliberately measured, while still challenging the reader’s moral sensibilities. Naimark invokes a sense of horror without sensationalizing, as when he reflects on the use of terror endemic to ethnic cleansing: the chopped off ears and fingers, the brandings, the mutilated genitals, the brains of babies splattered against walls, the gauntlets victims are forced to run, and the sexual assaults. The litany of abuses is unending, and it repeats itself from case to case throughout the century.⁴

Naimark closes with a warning, “Does the international community have the will to act promptly and decisively? If not, the horrors recounted in this book will surely happen again.”⁵ This admonition is the only homily in the book, and it is made all the more impactful by the history Naimark recounted so remarkably well. *Fires of Hatred* is a thorough, discerning, and eloquent work on a dismal subject. However, it is not sensationalized or maudlin.

Even the title, *Fires of Hatred*, demonstrates Naimark’s effort to appeal to the intellect rather than the emotion. As such, it is an indispensable resource for any scholar studying mass atrocities and ethnic cleansing.

Chaplain (Maj.) Mark Beals, U.S. Army, Fort Polk, Louisiana

Notes

1. Ara Sanjian, “Review of *Fires of Hatred; Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth Century Europe*,” *Bulletin of the Royal Institute of Inter-Faith Studies*, 5(1)(Spring/Summer 2003): 3, http://www.academia.edu/838318/Norman_Naimark_Fires_of_Hatred_Ethnic_Cleansing_in_Twentieth-Century_Europe_2003_book_review_in_English.

2. Nick P. Baron, “Review of *Fires of Hatred; Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth Century Europe*,” *School of History and Classics*, University of Manchester published on H-Genocide March, 2004, 2, <https://networks.h-net.org/node/3180/reviews/6267/>

[baron-naimark-fires-hatred-ethnic-cleansing-twentieth-century-europe-and](#).

3. Milos Obilic was a fourteenth century Serbian hero who temporarily fell into disrepute with the Serbian leader Prince Lazar. He redeemed himself by assassinating the Ottoman Sultan Murad I at the battle of Kosovo, 15 June 1389. Milos sacrificed himself in this action.

4. Baron, 186.

5. Norman M. Naimark, *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth Century Europe* (Boston: Harvard University Press, 2002), 199.

HELPING HUMANITY:

American Policy and Genocide Rescue

Keith Pomakoy, *Lexington Books, Lanham, Maryland, 2011, 248 pages, \$85.00*

The United States is often criticized for not intervening as soon as a humanitarian crisis arises. In *Helping Humanity: American Policy and Genocide Rescue*, Keith Pomakoy rebuts this criticism by analyzing U.S. aid efforts during five genocides from humanitarian, political, and military perspectives, as well as reviewing the impact of international tribunals following mass atrocities. Pomakoy asserts that American foreign policy has always been humanitarian-based and intervention in such crises undertaken to the fullest extent possible. However, genocide is a problem without a clear solution, which confounds policy and blunts the effectiveness of humanitarian efforts intended to mitigate it.

Helping Humanity attempts to document humanitarian aid efforts and their impact on the development of America's foreign policy based upon U.S. actions in Cuba, Armenia, Russia, Germany, and worldwide after World War II. Pomakoy concludes the U.S. recognized and responded to each crisis with success using a philanthropic model of humanitarian aid coupled with a realistic understanding of America's relative political and military strength. He asserts these considerations continue to influence foreign policy.

Pomakoy begins by defining both genocide and philanthropy from policy perspectives and applying those definitions to episodes of mass suffering. His analysis begins with the late nineteenth century humanitarian crisis in Cuba that arose largely from

Spanish governmental oppression, and in part culminated with a U.S. invasion and occupation of Cuba as part of operations during the Spanish-American War.

With respect to United States involvement in Cuba prior to the outbreak of war, Pomakoy provides many examples of American individuals and private humanitarian organizations spearheading relief efforts and spurring the United States government into diplomatic action to ease the hardships the Cubans were facing under oppressive Spanish rule.

Prior to the outbreak of the Spanish-American conflict, American government participation in humanitarian relief efforts was conducted primarily through support of private aid organizations, to include counting on such groups to distribute aid collected for the Cubans. Pomakoy contends that diplomatic efforts in conjunction with such private relief efforts initially seemed sufficient to alter Spain's behavior and alleviate Cuban civilian suffering—the primary American interest. With the outbreak of the war, aid efforts ceased temporarily during the military phase of the conflict, which initially increased and prolonged suffering. This made military intervention a less attractive choice for policy makers as opposed to providing humanitarian aid when considering options during future crises.

Pomakoy applies the preference for philanthropic efforts developed during the Cuban experience to later crises. His research indicates that during each crisis, different diplomatic efforts or military interventions were possible, but the evidence suggests these actions would not have ended the suffering and genocide any more than the philanthropic model did.

Pomakoy's research is meticulous. Every chapter includes references to not only scholarly works and congressional records, but also first-person accounts. He also includes personal accounts from individuals who benefited by U.S. assistance during several crises as well as foreign state records. These foreign sources provide different viewpoints from traditional American-centric ones and lend credence to his argument that America did provide humanitarian aid that helped reduce suffering in crisis-torn countries.

Each crisis studied uses the same humanitarian-political-military framework to analyze the type and timing of aid provided and outcome of aid efforts. Additionally, the framework is used to analyze and

speculate regarding whether different policy models would have been feasible or possibly more successful at reducing suffering if aid had begun immediately at the onset of a crisis.

While meticulously researched and detailed, Pomakoy stretches his conclusions to their limit. His original thesis was that humanitarian aid did occur, which he proves time and time again. However, he stretches his findings to argue that private humanitarian aid was the start of U.S. foreign policy regarding providing aid.

In reality, from the evidence provided in the book, the humanitarian relief provided prior to U.S. military intervention originated from private concerns and appears rather to indicate an abrogation of what many would have considered an official humanitarian relief responsibility. Moreover, his discussion of the philanthropic model relies heavily on early versions of nongovernmental organizations. This appears untenable as nongovernmental entities do not write and carry out foreign policy. This critique of Pomakoy's contentions is echoed in Richard Brietman's review; he laments that Pomakoy did not stop his analysis with merely proving aid occurred.¹

Additionally, Pomakoy's account flattens incidents of atrocities to short, almost clinical, discussions. This minimizes the true horrors of genocide and lulls the reader into believing that privately funded food and other resource-based aid was sufficient to meet civilian needs and end their suffering when many other impediments and interests apart from mere lack of food were contributing to the perilous situation of the civilians affected.

Despite weaknesses, Pomakoy's approach allows for a more policy-centered discussion and invites the conclusions that foreign policy begins with combined philanthropic aid and diplomatic efforts, and ends with military intervention only when absolutely necessary.

Unfortunately, the basis for Pomakoy's arguments rest largely on the premise that his example of Cuba was actually a Spanish government-sponsored attempt at genocide in the same category as the others studied. Oddly, by the end of his research Pomakoy himself vacillates in his opinion over whether the Cuba crisis was genocide or merely a humanitarian crisis exacerbated by warfare. On this point, he fails to revisit and validate the lessons drawn from

this event and their place in the development of U.S. policy. Further, Pomakoy's approach seems to ignore his own statement that "... these events were all different" One critic, Rafael Medoff, writes that by including Cuba as genocide among the other atrocities, Pomakoy's argument is rendered almost incoherent.² The over inclusive use of "genocide" to describe diverse kinds of humanitarian crises minimizes meaningful discussion of the type and extent of aid needed during each crisis, as well as examination of what other forms of aid might have been feasible to achieve policy objectives. Most reviewers criticize Pomakoy's research for this glaring error.³

Richard Brietman also criticizes Pomakoy for both conducting shallow analysis and ignoring evidence that other aid options were possible in addition to private aid during World War II, as well as failing to discuss the potential impact of alternate options.⁴

Irrespective, while Pomakoy's detractors have valid points concerning the overreach of some of his conclusions, they apparently miss his overall point that America did provide humanitarian aid during the defining crises of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Irrespective, this book is important for anyone attempting to create or promote cohesive and coherent humanitarian-based policies. It reinforces the needed interplay between non-governmental organizations' efforts and military intervention, and emphasizes the necessity of a whole-of-government response to any crisis. Finally, this book should be read by military officers as well as those who have the ability to fundraise and donate humanitarian aid, and members of Congress who can authorize further spending and humanitarian aid efforts.

Maj. Susan Castorina, U.S. Army, Fort Rucker, Alabama

Notes

1. Richard Breitman, "Helping Humanity: American Policy and Genocide Rescue," *The Journal of American History* (99)2,(2012): 640.

2. Rafael Medoff, "Keith Pomakoy: Helping Humanity: American Policy and Genocide Rescue," *American Historical Review*, (117)3, (2012): 903.

3. *Ibid.*

4. Brietman, 640.

NIGHT

Elie Wiesel, Bantam Books, New York, 1982, 109 pages, \$12.99

In his memoir *Night*, Elie Wiesel, a Romanian-born, Jewish-American, Holocaust survivor, professor, political activist, and Nobel Peace Prize recipient, details his eight-month struggle for survival while a prisoner at the infamous Auschwitz-Birkenau death camp and the work camp at Buna. In just 109 pages, Wiesel describes both the horrific conditions associated with the Jewish ghettos of Hungary and concentration camps of Poland, as well as the dynamic psychosocial environments within which he and his father had to daily contend.

Catalyzed by memories of omnipresent and seemingly infinite physical and mental stress, Wiesel effectively narrates his own story. It is one that reflects resilience to unspeakable cruelty and suffering, and also the resolve of the human spirit and its ability to transcend even the most deplorable of circumstances.

The author describes through powerful prose how Jewish victims were socialized to the the horrors about to be inflicted upon them by Nazi Germany. As prophet to their impending destruction, the character Moshe the Beadle (himself having miraculously survived a mass killing at the hands of the Gestapo in the forests of Galicia) is introduced, crying out against his friends' and neighbors' refusal to face Hitler's true intention for the Jewish people and doing something to defend themselves. Throughout his memoir, Wiesel describes the continued denial associated with the Jewish ghetto residents and their inability (whether consciously or unconsciously) to foresee and accept ideas associated with their eventual demise at the hands of their captors. This is the common theme throughout *Night*—instances of cognitive dissonance as expressed particularly by confirmation bias (i.e. tendency of people to accept information only when it confirms pre-established beliefs) that God would intervene to preclude ... the destruction of European Jewry¹

As a result, inaction was easier than actively opposing for an unfortunate many, as characterized by the futile wishing away of fear even when confronted by the reality of real and present tangible danger. Though

faced with the stark reality of planned segregations, forced removals, mass confinement, and systematic murder, these were for many too much to logically confront or accept. To face them meant accepting the stories heard around the ghettos that described the horror of cattle trains full of people ... and bodies "... turned into wreaths of smoke beneath a silent blue sky."²

Those that lived through such wide spread community denial only to survive the horrors of the camps are forever haunted by their loss of faith in humanity and the knowledge that perhaps even God was dead, having "... been hanged here, on these gallows."³

The psychosocial condition of the Jews, evolving against the backdrop of events masterfully detailed by Wiesel, speaks to the larger human condition involving our ability to transcend madness and chaos in efforts of self-preservation amidst unspeakable horror and tragedy.

Elsewhere, writer David Foster Wallace talked about the existence of man and the multitudinous platitudes associated with everyday life in human existence. Within this concept, Wallace states that "... the most obvious, ubiquitous, important realities are often the ones that are hardest to see and talk about."⁴ It is within this context that the same paradigm held true for the millions who lived out their realities under the oppressive yoke labeled "Arbeit macht frie" (work makes you free).

The unrelenting daily realities of overwhelming psychological stress and physical suffering soon became institutionalized; the horrors associated with the collective trauma of what would be later known as the Holocaust, "white noise." Silence became the narrative; multitudes suffered and prayed in silence ... often to what they increasingly believed to be a now silent God.

Elie Wiesel survived to tell his story, having been among the fortunate few moved to Camp Buchenwald (home to an effective resistance movement) on the eve of Nazi defeat in April 1945. Wiesel's memoir *Night* ends with his liberation. Unfortunately, his journey into the depths of human suffering was in reality just beginning.

It took Wiesel two more novels (*Dawn and Day*) to narrate his full story. Throughout his journey, he struggled with discerning the relationship between God and humanity, effectively staging a "... sustained, developing revolt against God from within a Jewish context."⁵

Wiesel is not alone in his questioning of the validity of the covenant between God and man. In *Night*, the character Akiba Drumer, a fellow Jewish prisoner, speaks openly to the protagonist Eliezer and others regarding his loss of faith in God saying, "Where is the divine mercy? Where is God? God is no longer with us."⁶

In a review of *Night* titled, "A Thousand Darknesses," Ruth Franklin describes Wiesel's seeming annoyance that his memoir is often received as a narrative on the loss of faith. However, she contends that what Wiesel has written is "... more than an indictment of God's absence ... [one] in which the Jews in the camp address God in a tone that is half menacing, half sympathetic"⁷ This fractured tone—saturated with fear, anger, and cynicism—is understandable, reflecting the frailty of the human spirit when awash in an environment of death. Do we expect more from a dying people? When we have lost all physical and theological ties to the world (family, dignity, faith in God), we are often left only with questions, questions regarding our existence ... and purpose behind such.

Wiesel's *Night* offers the reader a unique opportunity to vicariously travel with him on this journey of discovery, experiencing the horrors of Auschwitz-Birkenau through a perspective offering both historical insight and unadulterated emotion. Throughout the memoir, readers will find themselves questioning the existence of evil as well as the harsh realities associated with the cruelty of man and the nature of conflict. Where does one go from this place? How does one mentally deal with the loss and destruction of family, friends, and livelihood in magnitudes never before witnessed? Can one ever truly become *human* again having witnessed such atrocities? These are all questions with which Wiesel, and all Holocaust survivors, are forced to forever struggle. They continue even today.

Maj. Caleb A. Lewis, U.S. Army, Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico

Notes

1. Josephine Knopp, "Wiesel and the Absurd," *Contemporary Literature* (15)2(1974): 212.
2. Elie Wiesel, *Night* (New York: Bantam Books, 1960), ix.
3. Wiesel, 62.
4. David Foster Wallace, Kenyon Commencement Speech (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 2006).

5. Knopp, 213.

6. Wiesel, 73.

7. Ruth Franklin, "A Thousand Darknesses," The New Republic Online (March 23, 2006), http://www.powells.com/review/2006_03_23.htm

SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL:

The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda

Romeo A. Dallaire and Brent Beardsley, Carroll & Graf, New York, 2004, 584 pages, \$32.99

Atrocious crimes against humanity in Rwanda began in 1993 when organized groups of the ethnic Hutu majority embarked upon a campaign of genocide against the ethnic Tutsi minority. This was done at a time when relatively few U.N. forces were on site to intervene in the subsequent massacres. In spite of his insistence that military reinforcements were necessary to prevent and stop the brutal killings, Lt. Gen. Romeo Dallaire, commander-designate of the U.N. Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), did not receive any additional resources to assist his small number of troops in protecting the Tutsi victims. As a result, the local government that perpetrated the mass killings was unopposed by any organized defensive force or by international military forces. The result was the murder of over 800,000 Rwandan Tutsis and moderate Hutus.

Following his tour in Rwanda and retirement from the Canadian armed forces, Dallaire documented his experience and provided readers with an intimate tale recounting the time he spent in Rwanda during the attempted genocide of the Tutsi ethnic minority. His story begins with the invitation for him to accept command of UNAMIR, continues with an explanation of the U.N.'s lack of preparation for the mission, and focuses on his direct observations of the mass atrocities as they unfolded.

In his account, Dallaire provides an elaborate and thorough explanation of the emotions and justification behind his decisions. He lists his actions and the associated motivation behind them. What is particularly interesting is his insight into the actions he opted not to take. He explains in detail the potential outcomes that may have resulted had he made different choices such as attempting to stop the Rwandan

military forces as they were arming to commit genocidal acts.

The story serves as an incredible tale from the most powerful representative of the U.N. and Western society who personally witnessed repeated, vicious violations of human rights during the Rwandan genocide. One of Dallaire's prominent themes is that powerful nations must decide whether they will waive the justification for intervention based on national interests, and instead become involved in foreign affairs based on humanitarian concerns. He provides insight into the severe complications that arise for world leaders as they must consider the consequences of their decisions.

A passionate human rights advocate and critic of the U.N. as well as U.S. policy toward Rwanda during the unfolding events, Samantha Powers, wrote the foreword for this book. Although her accounts of the U.N. and U.S. failure to intervene are strongly supported with facts, her argument that they failed in their duty to intervene does not consider other perspectives and the associated rationale behind the actions of all parties which were involved. Moreover, her sympathetic approach to Dallaire's story is one-sided and she does not acknowledge other conditions that may have influenced the international community's decision not to intervene.

In contrast, journalist Gil Courtemanche opines that fault for the outcome lies in part with Dallaire who, he asserts, was too methodical and did not possess adequate initiative or the critical thinking required of an effective UNAMIR commander.¹ However, this analysis is also incomplete in that it does not explore the possibility the U.N. may have selected Dallaire for the operation precisely because he was a senior officer who followed orders and would not go outside the parameters set for him in Rwanda. The U.N. may have considered the potential damages caused by a commander who was likely to intervene in Rwanda's affairs without permission and then intentionally selected Dallaire because he was not likely to oppose orders. The second and third order effects of the U.N.'s decisions not to intervene did not have a positive result in Rwanda for the international community; however, the decision does not imply the staff did not carefully consider the impact of the selection for a commander.

Contrary to Courtemanche's position that Dallaire was naive in his comprehension of the UN's intentions

during the incidents of violence, Dallaire explained his high level of awareness during the entire operation. Throughout the work, Dallaire reflects on his weaknesses, clearly explaining his perspective at the time of the atrocities and comparing it to his view in hindsight, a year later.

Others have found value in the Dallaire's account for the lessons it may hold for policy makers and commanders faced with similar circumstances involving mass ethnic conflict in the future. Historians Frank Kalesnik and Bruce Vandervort express a compelling argument regarding the book, noting it is important to consider whether the U.S. and U.N. have taken any lessons forward from the tragic ending in the Rwandan genocide.²

Although the answers to these speculations are not provided in the book, Dallaire's candid assessments can be used to train and prepare future leaders and troops at all levels on how to handle situations they may encounter while working in such environments. With consideration of Dallaire's personal testimony, the U.N. and governments of associated nation states can gain valuable insight as to what can occur without Western intervention within a nation plagued by turmoil.

As Dallaire suggests, intervention may on the one hand deter perpetrators from further action. However, on the other hand, intervention may result in escalated acts of war which may involve more than the local governments and rebel forces.

The topic of mass atrocities is a relevant one in the contemporary environment, and Dallaire's personal testimony as detailed in this book serves as a valuable resource for decision-makers in the international community.

Maj. Patricia C. Murphy, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Notes

1. Gil Courtemanche, "The Nightmare Diaries," *The Guardian* (22 April 2005), [Review of the book *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda* by Romeo Dallaire], <http://www.theguardian.com/books/2005/apr/23/highereducation.news3>.

2. Frank Kalesnik and Bruce Vandervort, "Shake Hands with the Devil: the Failure of Humanity in Rwanda," *The Journal of Military History*, (69)2 (2005), 608-609, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3397464>.