MASSACRE IN NORWAY:
The 2011 Terror Attacks on Oslo & the Utøya Youth Camp
Stian Bromark (Translated by Hon Khiam Leong), Potomac Books, Dulles, Virginia, 2014, 217 pages, $24.95

Massacre in Norway describes the 22 July 2011 car-bomb attack in the government quarter of downtown Oslo and the subsequent shooting of dozens of Labour Party youths at an island camp by a 32-year-old Norwegian extreme nationalist named Anders Behring Breivik. The book is written in a journalistic style that primarily uses first-hand interviews with survivors and witnesses.

The majority of the work focuses on these interviews, elaborating on the human dimension and experiences of the victims. Enough background information is provided for the reader to understand the overall scenario and what prompted the killer to concoct this two-stage massacre. The author lays out chronologically the events of that day, the bombing followed by the shootings, the panic and survival of the youth, their hospitalizations, and their recovery. He then provides a brief synopsis of the trial of Breivik.

The book concentrates on the human aspect of the camp survivors and their post-traumatic stress. The author does provide one chapter (ten pages) that gives insight into the mind of the perpetrator and what drove him to commit the attacks on his fellow Norwegians. Much of the story is filled with interesting, but irrelevant, information such as what clothing people were wearing and the songs the youth sang while at the camp.

The positive elements of this book are the captivating accounts of the bombing, shootings, and acts of survival; contrasted by the surprisingly positive, mature attitude and demeanor of the young witnesses during the trial. It also reveals some of the unpreparedness of the government first responders for the events and their corresponding second- and third-order effects.

My main criticism of the book is its lack of any examination of the cause-and-effect relationship in the mind of the shooter (albeit that was never intended by the author), especially today when these types of mass shootings are becoming more commonplace. This would have been a good opportunity to explore the multifaceted dynamics of another seemingly senseless killing spree, by all accounts committed by a relatively normal member of society. I would still recommend this book to those that are in the field of homeland security and combating domestic terrorism.

Lt. Col. George Hodge, U.S. Army, Retired, Lansing, Kansas

THE GHOSTS OF HERO STREET:
How One Small Mexican-American Community Gave So Much in World War II and Korea
Carlos Harrison, Berkley Publishing Group, New York, 2014, 326 pages, $26.95

During World War II and the Korean War, no street in the United States provided more soldiers, sailors, airmen, or Marines to the war effort than 2nd Street (Hero Street) in Silvis, Illinois. This tiny neighborhood was composed mainly of Mexican-American immigrants whose families moved to the United States in the early 1900s to fill voids in the manual labor force. They lived in abandoned rail cars without electricity or running water, yet, these families faithfully answered the call to serve a nation that did not consider them as equals. Fifty-seven sons of Hero Street joined the various services during World War II and the Korean War; eight never returned home. Unfortunately, those heroes that did return remained second-class citizens, with the same austere lifestyle as before they left.

Carlos Harrison, a respected journalist and a Pulitzer Prize winner, conducted extensive research for his book and excels at providing historical evidence to support his story. In The Ghosts of Hero Street: How
One Small Mexican-American Community Gave So Much in World War II and Korea, the author’s primary objective is to provide a historical account of the citizens of 2nd Street and their involvement in these wars. The small Mexican-American community provided so much and received so little in return for their sacrifice.

Harrison provides an overview of how these families moved from Mexico to Illinois to find a better life until the wars interrupted that goal. He then transitions to honoring the lives of each person who paid the ultimate sacrifice for his nation. Harrison provides an excellent narrative for each of the service members that died in battle. He paints an incredible picture of their lives prior to the war, and their final experiences in battle that resulted in their deaths. The author’s detailed accounting of the incidents provides an emotional connection for the reader and vivid mental pictures of the servicemembers’ final moments.

The final chapters of Harrison’s book address the struggle to honor the memory of the fallen. The veterans returned to a neighborhood where the Veterans of Foreign Wars bartender stated, “I’m sorry, but you guys are blackballed. The membership was afraid there are so many of you guys that you would take over the post.” These veterans fought another war for the next 25 years to gain recognition for the great price that 2nd Street paid for freedom in World War II and the Korean War. In 1968, the nation finally honored the fallen sons of the community by changing the name of 2nd Street to Hero Street. Hero Street became a paved road in 1975, allowing the veterans’ grandchildren to ride bikes in the street year round. In 2007, the Hero Street USA Monument was completed and dedicated to the brave men who answered the call to battle for the freedom that many never experienced in their lifetime.

Carlos Harrison has written a superb book. Highly detailed and informative, it provides readers with an understanding of the challenges of being Mexican-American in the twentieth century. It also presents them with an excellent historical account of the support provided by Mexican-Americans to the U.S. military during World War II and the Korean War. The combination makes this a book that will appeal to a wide array of readers and be of particular importance to military leaders.

Lt. Col. John E. Elrich, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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WAR DOGS: Tales of Canine Heroism, History, and Love
Rebecca Frankel, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2014, 256 pages, $26.00

“If there are no dogs in Heaven, then when I die I want to go where they went.”
- Will Rogers

Dogs hold a special place in a soldier’s heart. They are our companions. They are our family. For thousands of years, faithful dogs joined soldiers on the battlefield, time and again proving their worth as stalwart warriors, loyal friends, and even as healers. Author Rebecca Frankel, the special projects editor at Foreign Policy, spent 12 months researching the U.S. military’s working-dog programs. War Dogs: Tales of Canine Heroism, History, and Love is a testament to the unique bond shared between soldiers and their dogs.

War Dogs is replete with personal, often emotional, stories. Some will make you laugh. If you ever loved a dog, then some of them may cause you to shed a tear. This book, however, is more than just a simple collection of war vignettes. Frankel examines current theories associated with canine psychology, emotions, and intelligence, and their impact upon training prospective military working dogs.

She skillfully weaves canine science, war dog history, and recent combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq into one brilliant narrative. Frankel purposefully avoids discussion on the ethics of employing dogs in war, but proves they have a lasting place in the U.S. military—a position I wholeheartedly support. However, Frankel clearly believes the dogs come back from war forever changed, just like the soldiers they protect.
*War Dogs* drives home a key lesson U.S. military leadership repeatedly fails to heed. Like the rest of the armed services, the size and capability of working-dog programs is cyclic. Summarized, the Pentagon does not maintain sufficiently robust working-dog programs during peacetime and must rapidly expand those same programs in time of war. A properly trained K9 team requires months of specialized selection and training. Similarly, successful and capable war dog programs require years to develop. Despite a proven record of success in World War II and Vietnam, the Pentagon virtually eliminated war-dog programs at the end of those conflicts.

Those dog programs extant on 9/11 were too few in number and scope of training for the operations that followed in Iraq and Afghanistan, especially given our enemies increasing use of IEDs. While the Pentagon wisely, if belatedly, ordered a “dog surge” to support the Global War on Terrorism, it has already begun to downsize working-dog programs. This is a tremendous mistake. Any Iraq or Afghanistan veteran will tell you war dogs routinely save lives and there are never enough of them. While the future of warfare is forever changing, one aspect is constant: our soldiers will be more effective and safer with a well-trained war dog at their side.


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**THE ACCIDENTAL ADMIRAL:**
A Sailor Takes Command at NATO
Adm. James Stavridis, U.S. Navy, Retired, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 2014, 288 pages, $32.95

Adm. James Stavridis has written a very readable book that is part history and part leadership theory with a sprinkling of recommendations for the future dropped in at the end. The first part of the book is historical in that it begins just before his appointment to the position of supreme allied commander for operations (SACEUR) at North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and commander of the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM).

Stavridis’ perspective on how he arrived as the first admiral to ever hold the senior position at NATO proves interesting. After taking command in 2009, he recounts in six chapters his most pressing challenges. He does this primarily through a geographic lens with chapters focused on Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, the Balkans, Israel, and Russia. In each chapter he paints a candid picture from a strategic leader’s viewpoint on how he approached the problems he encountered in each region.

After the historical tour of challenges, he shifts to a discussion of leadership in a broader sense. There are five chapters on various aspects of leadership. Most of these leadership tenets are valid, not just at the four-star military level, but to all leaders.

He admits that a lot of the leadership principals he applied are not mysterious at all, but asserts that the real mystery is why so few leaders actually implement them. A common thread through the chapters is the emphasis on the need for leaders to know and encourage their people, and strongly promote innovation for solving the complex problems of our times.

Finishing out the book are some insights regarding the future of NATO and the threats that keep Stavridis up at night. He coins a new term, “deviant globalization,” to describe the convergence of aspects of globalization in ways that create mayhem and not stability. Ironically, the greatest threats will come from creative innovators and leaders during these occurrences. This demands that our own leaders must embrace and promote innovation to solve the problems posed by deviant globalization.

Stavridis is an excellent writer, as one would expect since he has written articles on doing just that (N.B.: his 2008 article in the U.S. Naval Institute’s *Proceedings*, “Read, Think, Write, and Publish”). His personal anecdotes make for a very upbeat and easily read book. Oddly, he does not document interactions with the more fractious leaders he must certainly have encountered in his tour at a command position of global influence. It would have been informative to hear how he dealt with the more difficult strategic leaders bent on obstructing the forward progress of the SACEUR. The closest he comes to a substantive criticism of anyone is his characterization of Vladimir Putin saying, “He will be a difficult ‘partner’ indeed.”
This insightful book demonstrates that Stavridis’ rise to command at U.S. Southern Command and later to become the first admiral to serve as SACEUR and USEUCOM commander was not, as the title suggests, an accident.

**Lt. Cmdr. Harold A. Laurence, U.S. Navy, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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**THE GERMAN ACES SPEAK II: World War II through the Eyes of Four More of the Luftwaffe’s Most Important Commanders**

Colin D. Heaton and Anne-Marie Lewis, Zenith Press, Minneapolis, 2014, 296 pages, $30.00

*The German Aces Speak II* is the second volume in what the authors propose as a series. Like the first volume, this book is about the lives of four prominent World War II Luftwaffe fighter pilots: Erich Hartmann, Johannes Steinhoff, Dietrich Hrabak, and Günther Rall. Despite an extensive bibliography, it is not a scholarly work and there are more extensive biographies available about Hartmann, Steinhoff, and Rall. Instead, *The German Aces Speak II* contains the unabridged interviews the authors conducted with each subject over a period of years. The abridged interviews have appeared in numerous history magazines, including, *Aviation History* and *World War II*.

The lives and careers of Hartmann, Steinhoff, and Rall are well known to most aviation historians. Except for the occasional revelation, there is not much new here. On the other hand, there is not much written about Hrabak, so it was refreshing to read about his exploits. During the interviews, these distinguished pilots discussed their backgrounds, wartime exploits, and postwar experiences. In addition, they included their candid impressions of Hitler as well as the other senior leaders of the Nazi hierarchy, revealing how these impressions changed over the course of the war.

For example, each noted the gradual deterioration in Hitler’s physical appearance and mental acumen each time they met with him. They were also forthcoming in their opinions of their fellow pilots, being almost unanimous in their assessment. Nevertheless, Hartmann admitted that, as he aged, he had softened his attitude toward those pilots who collaborated with the Soviets during their postwar internment.

As noted previously, not much is written about Dietrich Hrabak so it was disappointing to find his interview was only twenty-one pages long compared to the 105 pages devoted to Hartmann. Understandably, given the format of the book, the authors were limited to the amount of available material. However, it would be interesting to know more about the man who commanded not only, arguably, the Luftwaffe’s most successful fighter wing, but also the other three subjects of this book. In addition, the authors did not provide enough context for these interviews, such as when, where, and even why they were conducted. For example, while each subject is describing his life, it is not readily apparent where one interview session stops and the next begins. This leads to some repetition and backtracking in the chronology. Finally, what was the purpose of the interviews? Were they intended to capture the pilot’s lives, their combat exploits, or their postwar careers? The answer to these questions might explain why Hrabak’s interview was so short.

Although *The German Aces Speak II* is not a scholarly work and there may be more extensive biographies of Hartmann, Steinhoff, and Rall available, it is a fast-paced, enjoyable book for anyone interested in the exploits of these exceptional pilots.

**Marlyn R. Pierce, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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**THE REPUBLICAN ARMY IN THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR, 1936-1939**

Michael Alpert, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 2013, 374 pages, $99.00

On 17 August 1936, a group led by Francisco Franco and other Nationalist officers launched a coup attempt against the leftist government of the Spanish Republic. Though the coup failed, the insurgents were left in control of much of Spain. They also commanded the allegiance of most of the officer corps and much of the regular Spanish military, to include the combat-tested Army of Africa. Thus, they had the implements to turn a failed coup into a civil war. Through the fall of 1936, as Nationalist
columns converged on Madrid, the embattled government was forced to cobble together its defenses from a rag-tag array of paramilitary units, workers’ militias, and the handful of regular officers and conscripts who remained loyal to the republic.

The motley Republican array stopped the Nationalists at the gates of the capital, and as the war dragged into 1937, the army of the republic would eventually evolve into a formidable force of 70 divisions and 17 corps equipped with tanks, aircraft, and artillery. In *The Republican Army in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939*, historian Michael Alpert describes this remarkable evolution.

It is a story of building an army in the middle of a bitter conflict and, for this reason, it is story of desperate expedients; some were successful, others failed. It is the story of overcoming party rivalries, as the Republican general staff sought to militarize the undisciplined militias raised by the anarchists, Communists, Socialists, Trotskyites, and others who made up the coalition opposing Franco.

Finally, it is a tragedy. The Republican army was never able to overcome its shortcomings in modern weapons, leadership, training, and political unity. By early 1939, facing the better-equipped (thanks to Hitler and Mussolini) and more effectively led Nationalist armies, the Republican army would collapse. For many of those Republican officers unable to escape into exile, defeat meant a firing squad.

Alpert’s book is not an account of battles and command decisions. It is an institutional history that examines the way the Republican army was built, how its leaders were found, and how it was staffed by commissars charged with ensuring the reliability of its officers and the maintaining the morale of the conscripts who eventually made up the bulk of its manpower.

It is a detailed and well-researched story with an inherent interest for military professionals. However, the author assumes the reader has a basic understanding of causes, course, and outcomes of the Spanish Civil War. Those without such a foundation are encouraged to read Hugh Thomas’ classic, *The Spanish Civil War*, or Anthony Beevor’s more recent, *The Struggle for Spain*, before attempting Alpert’s book. With that one caveat, the book is highly recommended.

**Scott Stephenson, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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**A SPY AMONG FRIENDS:**

*Kim Philby and the Great Betrayal*


Ben Macintyre’s book *A Spy Among Friends* recounts the story of Kim Philby, a British MI6 (Military Intelligence, Section 6) officer and a member of the Cambridge Five, one of the most infamous Soviet spy rings. Although Kim Philby’s treachery is well known by Cold War historians and spy lore enthusiasts, the novelty of *A Spy Among Friends* is that it focuses not on Philby’s betrayal of country, but on his betrayal of friends. Macintyre’s captivating book is a tragic story of friendship failed by deceit that has readers wishing for an alternative ending that they know will never come.

The story centers on Philby’s friendship with fellow MI6 officer Nicholas Elliott, a man who defended Philby for over a decade before a Soviet defector’s confirmation of Philby’s guilt left Elliott professionally and personally devastated. Elliott could not fathom how a scion of a respected family, educated at one of Great Britain’s best schools, could betray not only his country, but also his class. Elliott was not alone in declaring Philby’s innocence; even Foreign Secretary Harold McMillan once stated there was “no reason” to believe Philby was a traitor.

Philby’s world began to unravel in 1951 when Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean (two other members of the Cambridge Five) defected to Moscow. The defection of Philby’s two close friends raised questions about Philby’s allegiance, resulting in his removal as the MI6 liaison to the CIA. Although Philby remained free for another 12 years, his career as an intelligence officer would never recover. In 1951, Philby returned to Great Britain and, although he eventually left MI6, no charges were brought against him. In 1956, Philby left Great Britain to become a “correspondent” in Beirut. It is in Beirut where Elliott eventually accepted that his friend was a fraud and confronted him. Following the encounter, Philby fled to Moscow and lived the remainder of his life behind the iron curtain.

What Macintyre’s book highlights is that, although Philby betrayed numerous friends and colleagues, he deceived himself the most. Philby stated that he
“always operated on two levels, a personal level and a political one. When the two have come into conflict, I have had to put politics first.” Philby could not grasp that, once known, his friends could not isolate Philby’s separate personas as easily as he could. After defecting to Moscow, Philby realized the cause he sacrificed so much for was mere fiction. In this regard, Philby is a tragic character that not only lost his life, but his reality. A Spy Among Friends is a worthwhile read for intelligence historians, espionage enthusiasts, and those interested in human drama. Macintyre’s focus on Philby and his friends makes this tragic story accessible to non-historians who are interested in human tragedies, while also reminding historians that individuals shape and are shaped by history.

Although Philby’s story is well known, Macintyre brings depth that is often lost within accounts focused on Philby’s treacherous deeds and not the individuals involved. Macintyre crafted an engaging story; once readers crack the book, they will find it difficult to put down.

Maj. David P. Oakley, U.S. Army, Fort Sam Houston, Texas

D-DAY IN HISTORY AND MEMORY: The Normandy Landings in International Remembrance and Commemoration
Edited by Michael Dolski, Sam Edwards, and John Buckley, University of North Texas Press, Denton, Texas, 2014, 320 pages, $24.95

On 6 June 1994, as a young Army captain, I was part of the Normandy D-Day landings 50th commemoration. I met soldiers and civilians from the different participating countries and first heard the different interpretations and meanings of the events that took place on that historic day.

Similarly, this book is an edited collection of six essays by different authors—historians who provide differing views from the perspective of their respective countries. The authors do not validate which of the six viewpoints is correct, but do an excellent job of objectively explaining the facts from their respective country’s viewpoints in terms of political, cultural, and contemporary issues. The long introduction provides a quick overview of D-Day and establishes the purpose of the book. While the figures in the book are appropriately placed and connected to the text, the addition of a map or a few more photos or graphs would have added some very useful visual aids for better comprehension.

As one would expect, the six viewpoints are quite different. America sees herself as the “savior of the world” and promotes its heroics through media, political speeches, and visits to Normandy. The British see D-Day as a vindication of Dunkirk, an expression of British commitment to France, the last great demonstration of British Imperial unity, and a reversal of all the defeats suffered by the British since 1939. These points are woven into British culture via politics, press, and cinema.

The British conceived and planned the invasion, and were able to match U.S. men and materiel, making D-Day a British success story. The Canadian view is downplayed on the public level due to historians who criticized the military for not reaching their D-Day objectives and a government in Ottawa that had no priority for promoting commemorations. The French view is thankful for liberation, yet grieves from the destruction caused by the Allies. The lack of Allied recognition of French losses and sacrifice continues to irritate the French public.

The Germans focused more on the Holocaust and the liberation from Hitler on 8 May 1945, as well as U.S. media portrayals of D-Day. Today’s Germans, now distanced from the events of the past, are recognizing their sacrifices of D-Day with tourism and memorials. A brief discussion of Austrian viewpoints is included in the German section. The Soviet/Russian view is in stark contrast to the Western Allies. Much of this is due to the Cold War nationalism of both sides. The Soviet/Russian viewpoint, written by the USSR-controlled media, focused on Red Army successes accompanied by disparaging media reports on the “slow and bumbling” Allies.

This contributed to the Soviet (now Russian) public’s negative view of the Allies that continues today. There were similarities as well, with a common one being that two famous American movies—The Longest Day and Saving Private Ryan—affected the D-Day memories in each country.

This book is an easy read—interesting, informative, and quite authoritative. The different authors are
well-published and current historians for the country they researched. Their research is evident in the sources and time periods discussed. Each addresses the evolution of D-Day remembrance and memory from 6 June 1944 through today with one author including the impact of social media.

Having visited Normandy four times, I strongly recommend the book to anyone who is a student of D-Day or planning a visit to Normandy.

James L. Kennedy, Jr., Fairfax, Virginia

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THE WRONG ENEMY:
America in Afghanistan, 2001-2014
Carlotta Gall, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, New York, 2014, 329 pages, $28.00

After more than 13 years of war at a cost of nearly a trillion dollars and over 2,300 U.S. soldiers killed in action, have we been fighting the wrong enemy in Afghanistan? The answer to that question is the focus of Carlotta Gall’s book The Wrong Enemy. Gall’s central theme is that, despite the costly efforts of the U.S. and its allies to bring stability to Afghanistan, Pakistan has been actively working against them.

While the covert Pakistan-Taliban relationship is a key focus of this book, Gall’s work shows that it is only one factor in a complex situation that has been made worse by years of miscalculations and missed opportunities by all the parties involved.

Claims of Pakistan support for Taliban are nothing new and have been reported by other sources for years. What makes this work unique is how Gall expertly guides the reader through the historical and political labyrinth that defines this relationship using a combination of first-hand observations, interviews, and second-hand accounts. Her intimate knowledge of the region and its players is enhanced by her nearly continuous traveling and reporting from both Pakistan and Afghanistan since 9/11.

The story of Pakistan’s rocky 30-year relationship with the Taliban is recounted from the standpoint of both past and current members of the Taliban, as well as from Pakistanis with intimate knowledge of Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) agency. From the beginning of the Pakistan-Taliban relationship, training and financial support were provided through a special branch of the ISI manned by retired officers from the Pakistan army. Over the decades, a very close relationship developed that continued to expand even after 9/11 and the start of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan. However, in the last few years the ISI’s influence has started to falter as the Taliban has become more radical, and it increasingly appeared Pakistan had created a monster it could no longer control.

As an example, Col. Imam, a graduate of U.S. Special Forces training, began working with the Taliban after his retirement from the Pakistan military in the 1990s. Imam developed a close relationship with the Taliban and even became Mullah Omar’s mentor after 9/11. As the Taliban’s religious extremism increased, he was eventually detained and executed despite pleas from the ISI for his release. Additionally, Gall suggests that Pakistan’s double-dealings with the U.S. and the Taliban potentially has had negative effects on its own military as she reports growing support among young Pakistani officers for the Taliban and their goals.

Another theme Gall investigates is the relationship between the U.S and Afghanistan President Ahmed Karzai. She readily acknowledges the corruption of the Karzai government and that his focus on the tactics of tribal politics instead of strategy has worsened the war. Nevertheless, she does try to evaluate the war from his perspective. She maintains that no one should be surprised with the levels of corruption found in Karzai’s government given that he is a poor administrator who has been overwhelmed with vast sums of money. Second, Gall feels that the U.S. approach to the war, particularly in terms of civilian casualties, has severely weakened Karzai’s ability to control the Afghan political situation.
She believes that the U.S. has misunderstood the security situation from the outset and that its initial approach was actually helping the Taliban. The approach changed when Gen. Stanley McChrystal and Gen. David Petraeus adjusted the U.S. focus to counterinsurgency and protecting civilians, but, by then, the damage had been done and the Taliban were entrenched.

Despite this, Gall concludes her work by stating that the Afghan security forces are not up to the task of keeping the “Taliban at bay,” and that U.S. and NATO “cannot walk away” until the security of the Afghanistan population “is ensured.” How that is supposed to be done is not addressed, but this book is still relevant on several levels: it provides an excellent overview of the Afghanistan’s recent political history as well as insights into the country’s political process, it provides an outsider’s evaluation of U.S. policy and actions, and it helps the reader understand the delicate situation in Pakistan.

Lt. Col. William Kenna McCurry, U.S. Army, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

WEALTH OF AN EMPIRE:
The Treasure Shipments that Saved Britain and the World

Britain watched in fear as Germany slowly gobbled up Europe. The coming storm became the impetus for evacuating massive sums of gold and treasuries to save Britain and the world from fascism. Switky’s book is a roller coaster ride across the early years of World War II—from 1939, when the British monarchs visited North America, to spring 1941, when constant fear of German invasion punctuated a year of desperate measures. The royal visit hid the first of many gold shipments to Canada and the United States during the “Phony War,” while the threat of German invasion throughout 1940 drove desperate transfers of over one billion dollars in gold and securities from Britain to Canada.

The key attraction of Switky’s book is how the military history of the initial years of World War II interweaves with the political and economic turmoil of Europe and North America. His story highlights the desperate straits Britain faced with an isolationist United States and a growing threat from Germany. He details how Chamberlain and Churchill fought the odds to save the wealth of Britain, understanding the isolation they faced as the beacon of free society in Europe even before the fall of France. They knew that Germany would eventually turn its sights on Britain and its wealth in circumstances where U-boat blockades could choke off shipments of goods necessary for Britain to survive.

Switky’s research highlights the limitations of intelligence during World War II. He details many assumptions in intelligence that drove the mad push to move gold to countries willing to sell supplies, weapons, and support off the island. Of particular note, Switky points to Atlantic operations, contrasting the Admiralty’s point of view with Germany’s actual plans, highlighting the discrepancies in British intelligence during the initial years of the war.

The British government believed a large, capable U-boat fleet operated in the North Atlantic. In actuality, before the loss of Norway, only about half of the German U-boat fleet could operate effectively in the North Atlantic—only five to six U-boats threatening the North Atlantic at any given time. After the loss of Norway and France these numbers changed substantially, but the U-boat threat in the deep Atlantic never matched British assumptions.

Switky details the intricate coordination by the British government, the Bank of England, Canada, and the United States to ensure shipments were properly handled, accounted for, delivered, and stored. He documents the monumental level of secrecy, security, and logistics needed to ensure the safety of gold on both sides of the Atlantic and the availability of the money when needed. In a coordinated effort by the British and Canadian governments, Britain created the U.K. Security Deposit in Montreal, which became a repository and clearing house for British gold and securities in North America.

Wealth of an Empire is great military history about politics, economics, strategy, and campaigns providing an abundance of valuable resources and references. Switky highlights new points of view about World War II that most historians do not discuss, carrying the topic logically to the end with thought provoking
counter-analysis, posing valid what if scenarios for the reader to consider.
Maj. Scott Hopkins, U.S. Air Force, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

JULY CRISIS:
The World’s Descent into War, Summer 1914

Among diplomatic and military historians alike, the origins of the First World War have long stood out as a topic of special interest. Since Barbara Tuchman published The Guns of August in 1962, if not before, there have been myriad attempts to extract sweeping lessons useful to both statesmen and generals. With the centennial of the Great War now upon us, fascination with the July crisis has spiked yet again.

In July Crisis: The World’s Descent into War, Summer 1914, T.J. Otte attempts to produce an original synthesis of modern scholarship on the path to war. The result is not startlingly new, but is certainly fresh in terms of its points of emphasis. In particular, the author seeks to demolish some of the traditional clichés about the war—that it was inevitable, for instance—whether due to the alliance system or the rigidity of military planning. Neither is he persuaded that domestic pressures drove the principal powers into war.

In general, Otte is not overly impressed with the argument that inexorable forces operated beyond the capabilities of leaders to alter the course of events. On the contrary, the author maintains that there was ample opportunity to avoid a war, but that invalid assumptions, decadent institutions, and inept decision-making carried the day. In other words, “the role of individuals in July 1914 was critical.”

Otte speculates that a different cast of players might have brought about a drastically different outcome. He observes that earlier figures such as Alexander I or Talleyrand possessed a much clearer vision about preserving the international order and the positions of the great powers. This was partly by virtue of personality, but evolving circumstances were important as well. By 1914, governing structures in Europe had fallen behind the times.

A lack of accountability and dispersal of authority made logical policy formulation problematic. If there is a poster child for this handicap, it would have to be Austria-Hungary, a dual monarchy with a fractious population and too many competing interests. Curiously, in Otte’s estimation, “Of the powers, only Britain, with her seemingly shambolic and prolix cabinet discussions, produced coherent strategic decisions.”

At the same time, Otte rejects Fritz Fisher’s claim that an overbearing Germany sought war. If anything, the author contends, German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg should be faulted for failing to reign in the reckless behavior of Austria-Hungary. Here, Otte embraces the conventional wisdom of diplomatic historians that Germany’s blank check of support to its junior partner was a fateful misguid ed step, binding the dominant power to a struggle in which it staked its very survival for no compelling reason. Russia, meanwhile, was simultaneously rash and tentative, while France seems to have been guided by strategic inertia.

In all, this work is highly readable and plausibly argued. The author has an easy command of both the history and historiography, blending them into a seamless analysis accessible to a broad readership.
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

COMMAND CONFLICTS IN GRANT’S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN:
Ambition and Animosity in the Army of the Potomac

The Overland Campaign was the most brutal continuous combat action up to that point of the Civil War. The casualty figures during this condensed period of 1864 consisted of staggering numbers of killed, wounded, and missing. These figures were at least partially due to the divisive relationships between the leaders that were prevalent during this period of the Civil War.
Lt. Gen. Ulysses Grant’s Overland Campaign was rife with counterproductive conduct by political appointees, office seekers, senior regular and volunteer army officers, and newspaper correspondents. This did much to foul the plans set forth by the overall commanders—Maj. Gen. Henry Halleck, located in Washington DC; Grant, overall commander of Union forces; and Maj. Gen. George Meade, commander of the Army of the Potomac—to bring the war to a more rapid conclusion.

It was common knowledge that the Confederacy had been bent back but was not broken. However, even with the Unions’ vast resources in manpower and the instruments of warfare, it could not take advantage of the situation. Though there were definitive successes, more often than not, command conflicts thwarted Union efforts to prosecute the war efficiently or effectively.

The inability of the Union commanders to work as a productive and supportive team led to the terrible carnage of the Overland Campaign. They not only distrusted one another, but often delayed actions, ordered fanatical and aggressive maneuvers without concrete operational intelligence, and provided loose and often miscalculated information on enemy strength and position—much to the detriment of the fighting men involved.

The definition the author uses to describe the likes of Grant and Meade for example leaves one to wonder whether they had any suitable qualities other than merely being another level of bureaucracy. The author does spend significant time on the lack of confidence Grant and several of his men (such as Gen. Phil Sheridan) had in a Maine soldier, Maj. Gen. Gouverneur Warren.

Considering the authors’ background (she is a Maine resident), it was not surprising that Warren is one of those highlighted in the text. However, his story is compelling, well documented, and well worth recounting.

Smith’s chronological account is sound as it contains prime source material, but it should have included the final phases of the war as well. From 1865 through the end of the conflict, one particular battle marks the highlight of this dysfunction, back stabbing, and poor command relationships: the Battle of Five Forks. It was here where these relationships led to the removal of Warren from command, and years later, to a court of inquiry to clear Warren’s name. A discussion of these events would have added much to what is otherwise a well-written account.

Col. Thomas S. Bundt, Ph.D., U.S. Army, Fort Lee, Virginia

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**ALL THE GREAT PRIZES:**

*The Life of John Hay, from Lincoln to Roosevelt*


This biography is where we learn of the extraordinary life of an extraordinary American. John Hay was a man who seemed to live a storybook life in service to his nation. As author John Taliaferro points out in an interview, Hay is known either for his wartime service to President Lincoln as Lincoln’s private secretary, or as President William McKinley’s—and later President Theodore Roosevelt’s—secretary of state, but not as both.

In this rich and detailed narrative, the first of its kind since the mid 1930s, Taliaferro paints a rich and vivid picture of Hay’s life and its many intersections with the great moments of the late nineteenth century. To paint this picture the author uses the subject’s own words to provide an authoritative account of Hay’s prolific life. Hay’s writings, and that of friends and family, provide a lens through which to see many historical events. We see a jovial Lincoln in his nightclothes cracking jokes in the middle of the night to ease the tremendous stress of the Civil War. We also see Lincoln the human being in his most vulnerable times: when his beloved son, Willie, dies, and during the formulation and delivery of the Emancipation Proclamation.

This book is not another story of Lincoln, although his presence is felt throughout.

The next phase of the book describes Hay’s struggles to keep the Republican Party true to its most famous member. Hay’s own writing provides firsthand accounts of the corruption behind the Grant administration, which he criticized invectively through his guest editorship of the *New York Tribune*; the elections of Gilded Age Republican and—disapprovingly—Democratic presidents; and, the constant battle within
Hay to be actively involved in government without appearing to be angling for a job. Eventually he landed a short ambassadorship to England, followed by his appointment as secretary of state.

The story is not one of hero worship, nor does it get bogged down as a recital of Hay’s many accomplishments. The author exposes and examines Hay’s myriad professional and intimate personal connections and friendships. We read of his love for not one, but two, married woman of prominence. The letters between Hay’s intimates themselves and to Hay provide a depth of character expertly captured by Taliaferro.

Of note in this excellent work is the chapter concerning the time during Hay’s absence from government. The chapter outlining this phase of Hay’s life contains a volume of correspondence that depicts his internal struggle; from feeling as though he has not done enough to uphold Lincolnian principles, to feeling that he has done everything he could. This is actually the book’s strength, as it allows the reader to feel the weight of Hay’s personal struggle to find his place across the century.

This book is of relevance to the security community in that it paints a very intimate picture of an individual in a position to have a vast impact on worldly affairs. Overall it is an excellent, enlightening, and entertaining read.


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**BROTHERS IN ARMS:**

*Chinese Aid to the Khmer Rouge, 1975-1979*


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In the center of Cambodia is the former Democratic Kampuchea military airfield at Krang Leav. Built with Chinese money and technical expertise, it was the crown jewel of Chinese foreign aid to the short-lived Khmer Rouge regime (1975-1979). Before becoming operational, the airfield was overrun by neighboring Vietnamese troops in 1979. Looking at a long-abandoned airfield in 2010, author Andrew Mertha wonders what exactly did this aid buy the Chinese? In *Brothers in Arms* Mertha, a political scientist and university professor, examines China’s foreign aid to Democratic Kampuchea (DK). This leads him to the greater question of “Why was a powerful state like China unable to influence its far weaker and ostensibly dependent client state?” In his detailed analysis, Mertha quickly sets forth a persuasive and interesting argument that Chinese aid bought little in the way of influencing the policies of the DK government, despite being that regime’s only patron.

He attributes this outcome principally to two reasons. The first, and most important to his argument, revolves around Chinese bureaucratic fragmentation in its foreign aid policy development and execution. Rather than rational decision making, it was institutional restraints, most notably in communication and lines of authority, that drove policy. Second, DK’s secretive, complex, and in many cases fratricidal internal institutions were paradoxically able to resist Chinese influence and, at the same time, remain ill equipped to take advantage of Chinese aid.

To highlight his argument, Mertha uses three case studies that examine aid related to military, infrastructure, and trade projects. A vivid picture emerges of this almost unknown foreign aid program that kept the DK government afloat, helping the reader understand the ultimately counterintuitive patron-client state relationship. These case studies provide deeper insight on governance in Democratic Kampuchea, going beyond the well-documented subject of the “killing fields.”

Why is all of this important? Mertha makes the case that an assessment of the China’s foreign aid to DK, especially regarding bureaucratic politics and processes, helps us better understand China’s inevitable attempts to expand her influence in Southeast Asia through “seductive, no strings attached” foreign aid. This is relevant since the author posits not much has changed with China’s institutional fragmentation in their current foreign aid programs. Finally, this book provokes further reflection on the dynamics and expected outcomes of any nation’s foreign aid program.

This slim volume is well documented. The author used Cambodian and Chinese archival documents, including those from the Cambodian commission currently investigating the policies and practices of the Khmer Rouge regime, as well as interviews of Chinese experts who worked in DK and Cambodian survivors of the regime. Filled with great detail, the book
is alternately fascinating and dry. It offers insightful examinations into a little known topic, but occasionally reads like an academic text.

With America’s national strategy pivoting back to the Pacific, the timely *Brothers in Arms* will interest students of national security policy, China, and Southeast Asian history. Given our own recent challenges with foreign aid programs, this book offers the opportunity for reflection on just what foreign aid buys us.

**Col. John M. Sullivan Jr., U.S. Marine Corps, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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**POLICING WARS:**
On Military Intervention in the Twenty-First Century

In *Policing Wars*, Caroline Holmqvist’s print version of her doctrinal thesis, she describes the thought processes that many of our contemporary leaders, and those that comment on them, have toward the use of the military as an agent of international change. The book discusses neither the conduct of policing wars, nor the politics that lead toward the use of armed forces for those actions, but instead focuses on the concept of policing wars and their justifications. The crux of her argument is that liberal-minded leadership, regardless of political ideologies, view modern conflicts different from wars of the past. The Clausewitz perspective of war as a means to impose one nation’s will upon another is no longer applicable because twenty-first century wars by liberal states, like the United States, are viewed as a corrective measure to regional disorder.

Justification made under this pretext derives from the concept that if there is no political opposition, since the use of policing is a way in which force imposes order, then policing actions cannot be considered war. There is no opposition, the argument goes, because when it comes to democratic principles and other ideas deemed good governance, logically there would be no opposition. Democracy is good government all around, and those opposed to such thought are criminal in nature; hence, policing those that would create disorder against legitimate governance is a justifiable course of action. At least this is what the author is proposing to the reader when discussing the thinking of liberal-minded leaders.

This is the value of Holmqvist’s book. She does not make proposals for how to prosecute or reduce the prevalence of contemporary conflicts, nor does she argue the nature of how they occur. She simply discusses how political leaders may or may not view them, and where the military’s role lies within solving them. Though the reader may not share the same view of world conflict from the perspectives that the author describes, there is indeed value to be had in understanding how others view similar situations; especially in regard to military intervention. The book is short—one-hundred and forty pages from introduction to conclusion—but within that duration, the author thoroughly discusses and describes the topic in depth.

She did not write for the military demographic. Being her area of study, she utilizes the lexicon of a social theorist to such an extent that an unfamiliar reader may need to consult outside references in order to decipher her writings. Casual reading is difficult as key concepts, described by that lexicon, may be inadvertently glossed over only to be referenced multiple times in further passages, requiring backtracking to determine where that preceding concept was described. That said, if the reader can get past these difficulties, *Policing Wars* offers an enlightening perspective on how military intervention is justified in the minds of political leadership.

**Capt. Colin Marcum, U.S. Army, Fort Sill, Oklahoma**

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**THE ROAD TO WAR:**
Presidential Commitments Honored and Betrayed

In *The Road to War* Marvin Kalb describes how every president since Harry Truman has relied on presidential commitments rather than
congressional declarations of war to justify the use of military power abroad. He critically examines presidential commitments since World War II and the role these commitments played in American military action, and advocates vigilance concerning the future use of this well-established precedent in pursuit of national security objectives.

Although no president since World War II has requested that Congress declare war, many have nevertheless committed U.S. forces to fight in foreign lands in pursuit of our national interests. For example, Kalb describes how Truman felt no obligation to consult Congress before sending military personnel to South Korea after North Korea invaded across the 38th Parallel in 1950. Instead, Truman pursued a United Nations mandate to justify American involvement.

Kalb further examines the escalating Vietnam commitments made by successive presidents. He discusses President Dwight Eisenhower’s commitment of Air Force bombers to assist French forces in Vietnam and President John F. Kennedy’s deployment of military advisors. However, the commitments of these two presidents were limited in comparison to the commitments of President Lyndon Johnson.

Kalb describes how Johnson escalated the war that led to over half a million combat troops to South Vietnam. Johnson, like his post-World War II predecessors, did not request a congressional declaration of war. Nevertheless, Johnson received congressional consent through the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. Kalb shows how this set an important precedent for future presidents regarding congressional consent short of a war declaration.

Kalb critically analyzes President Richard Nixon’s continued Vietnam War effort. He describes Nixon’s goal of an orderly withdrawal of American forces and ending the war “with honor.” Kalb further discusses Nixon’s betrayal of support to South Vietnam’s president because of national exhaustion and the Watergate scandal.

Perhaps the most interesting chapter involves America’s commitment to Israel. Kalb contends that the U.S.-Israeli relationship is based primarily on letters between the president and the prime minister, and argues that foreign leaders may interpret commitments made by an American president as promises that will be honored by their successors.

The book’s most valuable contribution is the author’s ability to question the authority of modern presidents to take America to war without congressional approval or support from the American people. Kalb wonders if these actions will continue and if such important decisions will rest solely with the chief executive. Furthermore, the author discusses the idea of a formal defense treaty between the United States and Israel. Kalb argues that a treaty would formalize security concerns of both nations and reduce Israel’s uncertainty of secret American presidential commitments.

The Road to War: Presidential Commitments Honored and Betrayed is a fascinating book that is fast paced and powerful. It is strongly recommended for officers who will lead future military operations that, in light of Afghanistan and Iraq, promise to be increasingly politically contentious with the American people and a less pliable Congress.

Mark Kormos, Fort Belvoir, Virginia

THE EMBATTLED PAST: Reflections on Military History
Edward M. Coffman, University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 2014, 201 pages, $36.00

Award-winning historian Edward M. Coffman is one of our most distinguished American military scholars. In The Embattled Past he weaves together his personal journey with insightful military history articles. More importantly, this book is a collection of his articles spanning from 1977 to 2006, each dealing with an aspect of Army social history, or providing a discussion on military history by one of its master artisans.

Until the early years of the twentieth century, most military history fell into what historians derisively refer to today as drum-and-trumpet military history. In an effort to resolve this issue, historians, including Theodore Roosevelt, attempted to make military history broader and more factually based. Their efforts led to more serious efforts at recording military history that, according to military historian Sir Basil Liddell Hart, were to provide “us with the opportunity to profit by the stumbles and tumbles of our forerunners.” Additionally, Coffman helped usher in a new approach, termed as
“new military history” or “war and society”—a post-World War II shift from focusing on combat history to examining broader historical relationships between war and society.

The Embattled Past provides thirteen of Coffman’s previous works. Coffman added a new introduction that examined the evolution of military history during his career and his personal journey to become an internationally recognized military historian. The first portion of the collection focuses on American military history, and in some instances, specifically on Army social history. His 1993 paper “The American Army in Peacetime” examines the Army’s history when not at war. “The American 15th Infantry Regiment in China, 1912-1938” and “The Philippine Scouts, 1899-1942” provide fascinating views into a bygone era of Army history. In the last half of the book, Coffman selected essays that examined aspects of military history and mentorship. “Talking about War” discusses the use of oral history and military history. The last article is on a rare interview with retired General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, conducted by Coffman in 1960.

Reading this book provides military historians with the feeling that they have been conversing with a friend and mentor, leaving them with an understanding of his road to success and the innovations he contributed. Several of Coffman’s articles are exemplars of social history and demonstrate his gift for making U.S. Army officers, soldiers, and spouses from the past come alive for the reader.

One weakness of this book is that Coffman could have more overtly discussed how his separate articles are related to each other, perhaps by crafting a common theme in the introduction written specifically for this collection. Despite this minor criticism, Embattled Past is a must read for those interested in military history as an academic discipline. The book is also appealing for those interested in the social history of the U.S. Army.

Jon Klug, Arnold, Maryland

THE STRUGGLE FOR IRAQ’S FUTURE: How Corruption, Incompetence, and Sectarianism Have Undermined Democracy

Was the U.S. intervention in, and occupation of, Iraq from 2003-2011 a success? Was the collapse of the Iraqi army in the face of the advance of the Islamic State in 2014 the fault of the U.S. occupation? Many Americans may be asking themselves the same questions as they watch news coverage of Iraq’s recent difficulties. Zaid Al-Ali provides sobering and depressing insight into the answers to these two questions. The U.S. intervention did fail to help Iraq become a stable state and, in fact, encouraged the corruption that followed. Certainly, Al-Ali did not intend to discuss the advance of the Islamic State as his book was published months before their territorial gains in Iraq. However, his book still provides material that explains the weakness in the post-U.S.-occupied Iraq that would lead to the security collapse mentioned above.

Zaid Al-Ali is from an Iraqi family, though he lived outside of Iraq for the majority of his early life. He became a lawyer, returned to Iraq after the U.S. invasion, and worked as a legal advisor to the United Nations in Iraq from 2005-2010. He has family and numerous contacts in Iraq, and much of the book is written based on his own experience and personal interviews. Al-Ali provides value to the reader through his understanding of Iraq, the Arabic language, and the regional culture and issues.

He states in his introduction that “the purpose of this book is to explain how [Iraq’s deplorable] situation has come about,” and he does an excellent job of doing just that. He explains in eight chapters what created the Iraq of 2014—a failing state with an unresponsive central government and with no apparent ability or desire to meet the basic needs of its citizens. Al-Ali provides a general historical context and then discusses the path through which the recent regime of Nouri Al-Maliki came about.

He goes on to describe the growth of the violent insurgency and then he describes two more conceptual insurgencies: corruption and environmental disaster. He ends the book with recommendations that seem irrelevant now that the Islamic State controls a sizable percentage of the country; for example, it seems unlikely that Iraq will draft a new constitution in the near future.

The book is not without flaws. Those unfamiliar with Arabic names and the key players in Iraq may get
lost in the detailed cast of characters. Al-Ali also tends to overemphasize the positive aspects of the Republican and early-Ba’athist periods of Iraqi history.

Al-Ali pulls no punches when describing the incompetence and ignorance of the U.S. government, military, contractors, and businessmen who did much to create an environment in which the violent extremists and the incompetent and corrupt Iraqi politicians could destroy what was left of Iraq after the mismanagement of Saddam Hussein and the “evils” of the U.S.-sponsored international blockade. This is not a book for the faint of heart or the thin skinned. It is, however, a book that paints a unique picture—Iraq from the perspective of Iraqis.

Citizens and service members need to read this book and take heed of the dangers that come from executing plans created from ignorance and developing policies at the behest of disgruntled exiles.

Lt. Col. Brian L. Steed, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

FROM ABOVE:
War, Violence and Verticality
Peter Adey, Mark Whitehead, and Alison J. Williams (Editors), Oxford University Press, United Kingdom, 2013, 356 pages, $35.00

With the disappearance of Malaysia Airlines flight 370 on 8 March 2014, the timing to begin reading From Above was ironic. The irony was that the book evokes reflection on past, present, and future intelligence collection techniques from the air. From Above is a compilation of well-researched topics that are ordered to provoke critical thinking.

The anthology provides a comprehensive look at the advantage intelligence from the sky (and higher)—including political, military, economic, and social, and informational factors—has provided naval and ground force commanders during their development of the operational environment.

The initial thing that drew me to the book was the cover and title. In all of the aviation literature I have read over the years, I have found it extremely difficult to avoid the romanticism of putting yourself in the story. There is something about that bird’s-eye view that provides the vivid scenes and situations from the air.

Going through the contributions of several authors made the book an enjoyable read. It is a work with multiple ideas that individually could be further researched. The chapters are short, but so packed with old and new references that even a veteran collector can learn of new sources, information, and ideas to approach a problem from the air.

Although each chapter covers a different aspect of airborne collection, they each have a particular flair of romanticism that pulls the reader into the topic.

A reoccurring theme through the book is operational art and design. Although these are modern terms, Sun Tzu and Clausewitz knew battlespace management. Gen. George Washington also knew battlespace management as he had his troops on high terrain along the Hudson River during the Battle of New York on the East River as Great Britain’s fleet made its landing.

Among other intriguing topics, the chapters discuss balloon technology of old, mediums of image compilations, airborne systems, space (to include thoughts on satellite information operations), strategic politics between nations, released secrets, and, the intricacies that are generally not available to open sources.

I cannot help but think that there had to be a collection system that knew the exact location of Malaysian flight 370; but in this day and age of cyber warfare, it is too risky for any nation to reveal how they might have obtained that information. Once that source is revealed and that capability demonstrated, there will be a countertechnology developed. From Above will make readers believe these systems are available.

During the search for flight 370, countries called for tapes of conversations, radar images, satellite images, and other media. Social media networking groups that have commercial access to satellites also jumped into the search. As more and more records are released to the public, I could see a second From Above written. This book is highly recommended to all those interested in past and post-modern collection techniques and ideas.

Lt. Cmdr. Scott Dantzsch, U.S. Navy, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas