



(Photo by Sgt. Seth Barham, 4th Infantry Division PAO)

Capt. Joe Pazcogu, commander of Company B, 1st Battalion, 67th Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, talks with 1st Lt. Austin Cattle of Company B and 1st Lt. Mitchell Creel of the 530th Engineer Company during a clearance operation in Kandahar City, Afghanistan, 1 February 2005.

A Paradigm of Dialogue and Trust

Army Mission Command Training

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Know your men, and be constantly on the alert for potential leaders—you never know how soon you may need them.

—Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway

Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, *Mission Command*, defines mission command as “the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.”¹ While deconstructing this definition, it remains clear that the commander has the central role within mission command, as the nexus of command and decision making. However, leadership is corporate, springing from the inculcation of the mission command philosophy through commanders and staffs to their subordinates.² Using corporate leadership, commanders balance the art of command and the science of control.

Commanders and staffs work in concert to leverage their experience and knowledge to accomplish missions. Mission command is the preferred doctrinal approach to command and enables this leverage. The philosophy is based on six principles: build cohesive teams through mutual trust, create shared understanding, provide a clear commander’s intent, exercise disciplined initiative, use mission orders, and accept prudent risk.³ The question is—how do commanders instill these principles into the very fabric of their units?

The *Army Leadership Development Strategy (ALDS)* 2013, reaffirms a commitment to the Profession of Arms, lifelong learning, and embedding the mission command principles within leader development.⁴ The ALDS has three lines of effort: training, education, and experience.⁵ These three lines of effort are enabled through three training domains: the institutional domain, the operational domain, and the self-development domain.⁶

The ALDS is clear: “the operational domain is where leaders undergo the bulk of their development.”⁷ Already, *home-station training* is the new slogan of training and operations officers throughout the force.

Institutional education within the Army can be seen as a baseline—a common ground from which each soldier and officer begins the real process of learning. Graduation from the Army’s institutional schools does not create experts but rather apprentices (journeymen at more senior levels); the diploma merely represents a license to learn. The commander,

as his or her unit’s resident expert, is tasked to mentor, coach, and develop apprentices.

Build Cohesive Teams Through Mutual Trust

Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, established the premise of mission command for the joint force in his 2012 white paper, “Mission Command.” In this paper, he shows trust to be the facilitating factor in future operations. Dempsey borrows a phrase from Dr. Stephen Covey, saying that “operations will move at the speed of trust.”⁸ Due to the changes in operating tempo and large operational areas networked by technology, units will be more widely distributed and more isolated from other friendly units than ever before. Isolation of units will result in a greater need for decentralization of command throughout all echelons.

Amplifying the theme of trust, the 2012 “38th Chief of Staff of the Army’s Marching Orders” further defines trust as the bedrock of the Profession of Arms. Trust is between soldiers and their leaders, their families, and the Army, and between the Army and the American people.⁹ Indeed, the mission command philosophy means that trust should be instilled at all echelons for the Army to be as effective as possible.

In *The Speed of Trust: The One Thing that Changes Everything*, Stephen Covey defines trust as “equal parts character and competence.”¹⁰ Covey describes character as constant, founded on ethics, and essential for “trust in any circumstance.”¹¹ Competence, on the other hand, is situational; it will ebb and flow depending on factors such as trainability, will, and experience.

In the exercise of mission command, it is imperative to ensure that both character and competence are promulgated across the force. The ALDS and the *U.S. Army Mission Command Strategy FY 13-19* both see mission command not only as a war-fighting function enabler but also as an “instrument of cultural change.”¹²

The formation of ethic and character within soldiers begins at the earliest levels of professional military education (PME). In acculturating soldiers to the Army, whether at basic combat training, the U.S. Military Academy, Officer Candidate School, or in the Reserve Officer Training Corps, the common touchstone to character development is the Army Values. Army professional military traditions and educational institutions provide some inculcation of values and ethics. However,

beyond schoolroom blocks of instruction or rote memorization of the Army Values, how does the Army ensure that values are instilled in the force?

The answer lies in practical application. The vast majority of a soldier's career should be spent in the operational field, away from the schoolhouse and the comfort of school solutions presented in 50-minute blocks of PowerPoint instruction. It is during operational assignments where words are put into action and values are truly instilled. The stress of being called upon to discern where on the values spectrum a decision rests, after being awake for days on end during training or deployments, refines a soldier's character. Thus, it is in the crucible of such moments where the Army strengthens its institutional values by inculcating the two components of trust into its soldiers: character and competence.

Developing competence is where the Army shines in many respects. Functional competence is relatively simple to train and test. Motivated soldiers—wanting to learn a job or task and having the capacity to learn—and competent, knowledgeable instructors are a recipe for functional competence.

Yet, with the increasing specialization in the force across military occupational specialties, how does the

Army develop competence across a warfighting function or occupational specialty?

Due to myriad factors, training the force to a reasonable level of competence across warfighting functions and occupational specialties at the institutional level is a difficult endeavor. However, unit leadership can develop a cross-training regime at the operational level to increase the efficacy of knowledge and experience by employing the ALDS.

The ALDS addresses the inherent shortcomings of the institutional education system by recognizing that the onus for mission command inculcation—in particular, the building of teams through mutual trust—rests squarely with operational Army leaders. However, the Army culture remains characteristically defined “through top-down control, endless regulations, and inspections focused on inputs rather than outcomes.”¹³ Trust, therefore, must be built at the unit level (read *home-station training*) through dialogue and actions throughout the Army force generation rotational cycle.

Shared Understanding

Part and parcel of the mission command philosophy is the principle of creating shared understanding



(Photo by Gertrud Zach, Visual Information Specialist)

U.S. Army soldiers assigned to 12th Combat Aviation Brigade and paratroopers assigned to 1st Squadron (Airborne), 91st Cavalry Regiment, 173rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Airborne) conduct a pre-mission brief for an air-assault mission at the 7th Army Joint Multinational Training Command's Hohenfels Training Area, Germany, 19 March 2014.

between commanders, their staffs, and their subordinates. Mutual trust and team building are the key enablers of this principle. Typically, staffs achieve shared understanding of their mission and operational environment (OE) through the receipt of an order from higher headquarters; analysis of the order and OE through staff processes (e.g., the Army design methodology [ADM], the military decision-making process [MDMP], or troop leading procedures [TLP]); and the application of knowledge management principles to process and analyze data coming into the command post (developing information into knowledge). One could easily assume that a good, timely operation order provides the basis for building shared understanding. However, these processes and tools are only a few manifestations of all the elements that go into ensuring shared understanding between commanders, staffs, and subordinate units.

Institutionally, the Army is relatively successful in applying the principle of shared understanding as a staff function. When delving more deeply into the principle, it becomes clear that to be completely successful, there must be dialogue. The *Oxford Dictionaries Online* define *dialogue* as “a discussion between two or more people or groups, especially one directed towards exploration of a particular subject or resolution of a problem.”¹⁴ When a person understands that dialogue is not merely idle conversation—but a purposive, positive task—the benefits should become apparent. However, the Army faces

two significant roadblocks to the institutionalization of dialogue.

First, and perhaps most easily addressed, is the common but unfortunate misconception that mission command is only for officers. Nothing could be further from the truth. As Sgt. Maj. Dennis A. Eger stated at the 2013 Association of the United States Army Mission Command Symposium, “Mission command isn’t officer business, it’s leader business.”¹⁵ The role of the noncommissioned officer (NCO) in mission command is as an enabler. The NCO leads, mentors, and coaches soldiers to understand the commander’s intent and carry out the mission. However, if the NCO corps believes that NCOs have no role in mission command, and the commissioned officer corps believes essentially the same thing about NCOs, how does the Army change this notion? The solution is dialogue.

To support the exercise of mission command, NCOs and officers must dialogue continuously to create a shared vision. If NCOs feel they are on the outside looking in, it is very difficult for them to commit to the mission or the commander’s intent. Therefore, NCOs must be included in staff processes and decision-making processes. NCOs can make substantial contributions. Besides the NCO role as a trusted agent for action in completing missions, an NCOs’ knowledge and insight, acquired from experience, are invaluable in planning operations and training. Consequently, if the Army



inculcates shared understanding among officers and NCOs from two echelons higher to two echelons lower, unit commitment to the mission is easily achieved.

Second, creating an environment conducive to dialogue within a unit is difficult due to several other factors, including the pervasive presence of technology within soldiers' lives. Technology, in effect, keeps many officers and NCOs on shift all the time through e-mails, text messages, or cell phone calls. Additionally, even when officers and soldiers are off duty during deployments, or when they have gone home for the night in garrison, they put in their earphones and begin the process of unwinding, disengaging from others in a form of social isolation.

In contrast, not that long ago—perhaps 20 years—in a typical barracks scene soldiers sat around tables playing cards or dominoes, typically sparring with words, blowing off steam, and having fun as a group. Concurrently, officers would huddle around a table at a dining facility or an officers' club discussing the mission at hand or some other professional development topic. In essence, officers, NCOs, and enlisted soldiers habitually participated in some kind of informal, constructive, after-hours dialogue that the operational Army now often overlooks or discounts. One may not see the intrinsic value of soldiers sitting around playing cards, yet in such

settings soldiers can learn who their compatriots really are—who is a bluffer, who is an incessant talker, who is a hard-charger, and so on.

Among officers sitting around a dinner table, commanders could gain insight about their staffs: Who is daring? Who is reckless? Who thinks deeply, and who does not? Yet today, what normally occurs is that when the duty day is complete, soldiers go their separate ways. While perhaps not intended, this automatic isolation contributes nothing to engendering the trust mission command calls for.

In contrast, many U.S. allies have preserved the regimental mess, allowing commanders to use this forum for dialogue with their staffs on a regular basis. In this venue, much professional development occurs. Commanders and staffs can speak freely, and the seeds of an ongoing dialogue can be sown.

To take it a step further, a similar situation can be imagined that informally associates soldiers with NCOs on a regular basis. Perhaps once a month or quarter, a venue might be found for an entire unit to sit down together to share their thoughts and concerns in an open forum built on mutual trust and dialogue.

The real value of dialogue is the opportunity for professional development and the creation of shared understanding. Shared understanding built on the foundation

Soldiers from 2nd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, conduct a dismounted patrol at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, Calif., 14 February 2013.

(Photo by Spc. Adam Hoppe, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment PAO)



of trust not only promotes a unit's commitment to the mission but also enables esprit de corps and personal commitment of soldiers and leaders to each other. Dialogue is that important—it should be institutionalized to the greatest extent possible. The disengagement effected by headphones and computer games should be limited.

Clear Commander's Intent

Commanders should tell subordinates *what* to do, not *how* to do it. Harkening back to Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations*, a unit commander should be sufficiently prepared to

conduct his operation confidently, anticipate events, and act fully and boldly to accomplish his mission without further orders. If an unanticipated situation arises, committed unit commanders should understand the purpose of the operation well enough to act decisively, confident that they are doing what their superior commander would order were he present.¹⁶

This idea is echoed in the Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0, *Mission Command*:

Commanders articulate the overall reason for the operation so forces understand why it is being conducted. They use the commander's intent to explain the broader purpose of the operation beyond that of the mission statement. Doing this allows subordinate commanders and soldiers to gain insight into what is expected of them, what constraints apply, and most importantly, why the mission is being conducted.¹⁷

With operations now moving with such great speed and complexity, partly due to leaps in technology and mechanization, they can be planned only up to the point of execution. However, it is through the mission command principles of shared understanding and trust that the commander's intent can be expressed so that it yields the greatest effect by enabling initiative.

The commander develops a statement of the commander's intent through critical and creative thinking. Dialogue between commanders and their staffs and soldiers to create shared understanding



supports this process. One approach the Army uses to facilitate creative and critical thinking is the *Army design methodology*, or ADM. As defined in ADP 5-0, *The Operations Process*, the ADM is a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe unfamiliar problems and approaches to solving them. Army design methodology is an iterative process of understanding and problem framing that uses elements of operational art to conceive and construct an operational approach to solve identified problems. Commanders and their staffs use Army design methodology to assist them with the conceptual aspects of planning.¹⁸

A descriptive planning process, the ADM lends itself to dialogue that helps flesh out emerging tasks and objectives. Yet, creative and critical thinking are



(Photo by Sgt. Brian Smith-Dutton, 3rd Brigade Combat Team PAO, 101st Airborne Division)

Leaders from units of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) conduct a combined arms rehearsal 1 April 2014 at Fort Campbell, Ky., in preparation for air-assault operations during Operation Golden Eagle.

not necessarily an output of dialogue. How does the Army practice creative and critical thinking?

Many of the processes used by staffs are inescapably algorithmic, or closed-ended. In other words, they are formulaic and specific; they lend themselves to *checking the block*. In comparison, ADM is heuristic, lending itself not to a formula but to a process of discovery through the application of experience and common sense. The heuristic methodology used in the ADM depends on the collective depth and breadth of experience of the staff members, as opposed to algorithmic methodologies such as the MDMP and TLP, which are structured with a plethora of *how-tos* to guide an inexperienced staff.

Dialogue is an ideal starting point for the teaching of creative and critical thinking within a staff and unit. However, creative and critical thinking skills must also

be practiced through scenario-based training to fully prepare soldiers and their leaders for applying mission command. Currently, the Army extensively uses scenario-based training in its exercises and PME. However, there is an expectation that conventional military thinking (e.g., the MDMP and TLP) will prevail, in contradiction to the usual PME motto of training the force, “how to think, not what to think.”¹⁹ Developing creative and critical thinking helps refine the *coup d’oeil* (“stroke of the eye,” or the ability to immediately see and assess the OE) within the commander and staff. How does this come together in a decisive action training environment?

First, it should be noted that algorithmic paradigms have an important place in training and operations and should not be neglected. Recalling the venerable Army Training and Evaluation Program, units would focus on unit-level functional tasks considered essential to mission accomplishment. These tasks were rehearsed and executed by the numbers to the point that a unit that achieved “T” (trained) status would be able to execute the task at night, in the rain, and in mission-oriented protective posture 4 (known as MOPP 4). This method has great utility for certain tasks. For example, perhaps an engineering unit will need to erect a bridge to facilitate a river crossing. The time to be learning to erect the bridge is not upon arrival at a river’s banks during operations with a division close behind.

Clearly, mastery of functional tasks through drill is extremely important to executing a mission. Yet, on the other side of the training paradigm is the heuristic domain. Here, commanders need to understand and develop not only *how* their subordinates think but also *what* they think. An example from the popular the *Star Trek* movie series illustrates the point. The *Kobayashi Maru* was an unwinnable (with one exception) exercise designed to test the mettle of future commanders and also to reveal to their superiors how and what these future commanders would think when faced with an ambiguous, unwinnable situation with overwhelming odds against them.²⁰

Understanding the nature of heuristics also involves intuitive judgment; the value of difficult exercises is apparent. As commanders more fully understand and visualize their OE, it is instructive for them to be able to intuit what their subordinate leaders likely will do in a highly stressful and ambiguous environment.

To demonstrate the importance of heuristic training, consider that before the World War II battle of Leyte Gulf (1944-1945), the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) had studied extensively the prior actions of U.S. Navy admirals. Understanding that Adm. William F. Halsey was habitually aggressive in his pursuit of Japanese aircraft carriers, the IJN plan, called *Shō-Gō 1*, placed a decoy fleet led by Vice-Adm. Jisaburō Ozawa to lure Halsey's 3rd Fleet away from the eastern flank of the Philippines. After Halsey's 3rd Fleet reconnaissance planes located Ozawa's decoy fleet, he pursued them just as the IJN command had predicted, leaving the San Bernardino Straits unguarded. This allowed the Japanese Central Fleet to pass through the San Bernardino Straits unabated and catch Rear Adm. Clifton Sprague and his Task Unit 77.4.3, *Taffy 3*, with almost disastrous effect.²¹

This example describes two opposing commanders, but the effects of heuristics are clear. The IJN's understanding of Halsey's pathological drive to destroy every IJN carrier allowed Ozawa gain an advantage in support of *Shō-Gō 1*. If the IJN had not known about Halsey, such an audacious tactic would more than likely have been eliminated from their plans. The importance of gaining this kind of knowledge and applying this type of reasoning can be impressed on our own leaders, but this will not happen spontaneously. Commanders and their leaders must have a directed dialogue to achieve this level of knowledge and wisdom, but how?

Cohesive units are forged in the crucible of combat and training. As steel sharpens steel, so must commanders' training programs sharpen the steel of their subordinate leaders and troops. It is not enough in complex OEs to be content with the mere training of tasks. When units deploy for training to the National Training Center, the Joint Readiness Training Center, or the Joint Multinational Readiness Center, what is the end state for training that leaders are seeking? Are Army forces using these training environments as a crucible to forge agile and adaptive officers and soldiers that are allowed to execute orders within the commander's intent, while exercising disciplined initiative and accepting prudent risk? This is where the promulgation of doctrine and the inculcation of the mission command philosophy can provide for the development of creative and critical thinking throughout the force.

Unfortunately, when units are able to deploy to a major training center, the rotations tend to be nominally for

training and in reality only for certification. This is counterproductive to the real intent of training. Certification is templated and uniform and by its very nature restricts creative thinking. Just as engineers need to be able to assemble a bridge in the dark, in the rain, and with MOPP 4 gear, so must commanders and staffs, who are expected to deal with unexpected developments in complex OEs, be able to conduct training that approaches challenges through creative and critical thinking.

The philosophy of mission command allows commanders and units to create an environment of trust and dialogue. One part of trust is that subordinates trust their leaders *to allow them to fail*. Allowing subordinates the freedom to fail in training serves two purposes. First, learning by success is very difficult because there are few lessons learned. In unit training, expectations should be limited to functional competence, with the understanding that the subordinate leadership can choose their own courses of action in support of their commanders. Second, taking risks that could lead to failure in training is, in a manner of speaking, another form a dialogue. It is through the independence of action that subordinate leaders have in mission command that commanders can begin to visualize and develop *how* and *what* their subordinates think and will do when confronted with certain stressors and situations.

This is a major ideological shift in training Army units. Units should focus on training to get better, not simply training to *win* an exercise or training just to check the block. Training should be meaningful by facilitating dialogue with the aim of engendering trust between a unit and its commander.

Exercise Disciplined Initiative, Use Mission Orders, and Accept Prudent Risk

As the principles of the mission command philosophy are inculcated within a unit, commanders and staffs should be comfortable in allowing their subordinates to exercise disciplined initiative within the commander's intent. When units have a foundation of confidence, trust, and dialogue through a robust professional development program, subordinate leaders should be willing and able to take the reins on their part of an operation because they have developed confidence in their own ability and in that of their subordinates. As described in ADRP 6-0,


Disciplined initiative is action in the absence of orders, when existing orders no longer fit the situation, or when unforeseen opportunities or threats arise. Commanders rely on subordinates to act. A subordinate's disciplined initiative may be the starting point for seizing the tactical initiative. This willingness to act helps develop and maintain operational initiative used by forces to set or dictate the terms of action throughout an operation.²²

Again, mission command demands nothing less than trust and critical and creative thinking. How does the Army institutionalize this principle? The answer is for leaders to delegate and to trust.

Let us assume that a commander gives a highly functioning staff, with a solid bedrock of trust, the task to set up and run a rifle qualification range. The commander trusts the staff to accomplish the mission without telling them *how* to accomplish it. Being familiar with their soldiers through ongoing dialogue and professional development, the staff members know who is capable of running the range and who needs mentoring. Therefore, within the constraints of this task, the staff issues the order with the critical personnel assigned to their respective roles, while also mentoring those soldiers who may not be as capable or competent in range operations. The staff and subordinate leaders are able to use their judgment to exercise disciplined initiative in meeting the commander's intent of rifle qualification in a way that best serves the unit and further develops leaders.

Additionally, let us assume there is a problem at the desired range. Knowing the commander's intent, the staff can work within their constraints to achieve the desired end state. There is no need to return to the commander for further guidance unless some concern arises from unforeseen circumstances that could result in a fundamental failure of the mission without further guidance or resources. Disciplined initiative is doing what is legal, moral, and ethical within the commander's intent to accomplish the mission.

Here, the mission order was as simple as, "I would like to get everyone qualified on his or her rifle no later than March 15th." Is this enough information for a unit to complete the mission or task? In this case, yes. However, mission orders are not necessarily as short as the one above. Much has been made of Gen. Ulysses S.



(Photo by Sgt. Juan F. Jimenez, 4th Brigade Combat Team PAO, 82nd Airborne Division)

Paratroopers from the 4th Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, call for indirect fire during an airfield seizure 21 June 2013 at Sicily Drop Zone during Operation Fury Thunder at Fort Bragg, N.C.

Grant's brevity of orders given to Lt. Gen. William T. Sherman in his march to the sea during the Civil War. The minimal information in those orders illustrates a high level of trust and competence between a commander and a subordinate commander. Conversely, a commander, at times, may feel compelled to issue more directive orders depending on the subordinate, the level of trust, or the situation.

However, due to the complexities of OEs and the speed of war, it is imperative that commanders issue orders reflective of the situation and their level of comfort with their staff, while accepting prudent risk. Accepting prudent risk is the culmination point for the principles of the mission command philosophy:

Commanders focus on creating opportunities rather than simply preventing defeat—even when preventing defeat appears safer. Reasonably estimating and intentionally

accepting risk are not gambling. Gambling, in contrast to prudent risk taking, is staking the success of an entire action on a single event without considering the hazard to the force should the event not unfold as envisioned. Therefore, commanders avoid taking gambles. Commanders carefully determine risks, analyze and minimize as many hazards as possible, and then take prudent risks to exploit opportunities.²³

Additionally, practicing issuing mission orders that are outcome based rather than directive for common tasks and training allows the staff to fail in a safe environment. This approach lends itself to improved training and professional development. It allows commanders to leverage the knowledge of their staff and the relatively benign training environment to accept risk and create learning advantages.

Conclusion

U.S. Naval War College professor Milan Vego notes in an article on military creativity in *Joint Force Quarterly* that creative and critical thought is hindered by the authoritarian tendencies of higher commanders, bureaucratic requirements of the military organization that forces fixed routines and outcomes, conformity that is compounded by the very structure of the military, parochialism that leads to resistance to cooperation, dogmatic views on doctrine, and anti-intellectualism.²⁴ These hindrances can be difficult to overcome, especially in an Army that is both shrinking and resetting its mission. However, it can also be argued that now is the perfect time for the establishment of a tradition of creative thought in the Army.

Mission command attempts to resolve “the internal conflict between will and judgment.”²⁵ The *will* is the “can-do” and the *judgment* is the “cannot do.” Samuel Lyman Atwood Marshall states,

The will does not operate in a vacuum. It cannot be imposed successfully if it runs counter to reason. Things are not done in war primarily because a man wills it; they are done because they are do-able. The limits for the commander in battle are defined by the general circumstances. What he asks of his men must be consistent with the possibilities of the situation.²⁶

Commanders can influence soldiers’ will by inculcating the philosophy of mission command within their staffs and subordinates. Their influence extends to modeling the Profession of Arms through vigorous professional development programs, opportunities for subordinates to engage in dialogue, and leader development.

Leader development in the Profession of Arms focuses on three domains: *military-technical*, or, quite simply, competence; *moral-ethical*, or character; and, *political-cultural*, or how the unit and its personnel operate both inside and outside the institution.²⁷ The mission command philosophy forms the bedrock of mentorship in these three domains. To develop agile and adaptive leaders ready and able to conduct unified land operations, units must practice and train these principles in everything that they do.

Moreover, the Army needs what Col. Thomas M. Williams calls “heretics”—people who question accepted ideas, norms, and outcomes.²⁸ To facilitate questioning, commanders can use professional development programs to push their subordinates to express their own original ideas. Again, this assumes a level of trust and willingness that must be established in a unit. Commanders must encourage and allow their subordinates to risk failure through creative and audacious solutions to problems.

On the face of it, this may seem counterintuitive due to the nature of the Army’s business; failure means the loss of equipment, resources, or personnel. However, how often do people learn significant lessons from their successes? Subordinates must be allowed make their own decisions and observe the results within a safe training environment. In this way, they can learn from their mistakes before embarking on real-world missions where failure is no longer an option. More often than not, failures in training lead to more well-rounded individuals and future successes.

Finally, open dialogue and trust are the very foundation of *esprit de corps* and effectiveness. Without trust, a unit will be hobbled by poor communication. Without open dialogue, units likely will miss opportunities to improve performance. With trust and dialogue, they can become more cohesive, with a singular focus on conducting unified land operations to “prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution.”²⁹ ■

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26. *Ibid.*; see S.L.A. Marshall, *Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War* (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith Publishing, 1978), 175.
27. ADP 1, *The Army* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, September 2012), 2-4.
28. Williams, 51.
29. ADP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, October 2011), 1.