With so many news sources offering countless perspectives of the many changes, tragedies, and triumphs our nation and its military face, sorting out fact and opinion can be a challenge. As the director of Military Review, my priority is providing our audiences with dependable and accurate information. Military Review articles are based on research and experience; our rigorous selection process ensures they are from reliable sources.

We strive to keep our readers abreast of issues relevant to the institutional, operational, and historical interests of the Army Profession, and the feedback I’ve received regarding this endeavor has been overwhelmingly positive. Whether focused on improvements to Army professional education, technological advancements, women in combat, the human dimension, or the future of war, I am confident our articles will continue to keep our readers engaged and, perhaps, inspire them to consider new perspectives.

This edition provides prime examples of articles that will spur our readers’ interest. Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster, deputy commanding general, Futures, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, and director of the Army Capabilities Integration Center, presents his thoughts on continuity and change. He believes every commander understands, visualizes, describes, directs, leads, and assesses operations based, in part, on his or her understanding of continuities in the nature of war and changes in the character of warfare. Jude Eden, a former Marine, proposes that standards for combat-related military specialties should not be lowered to allow the inclusion of women into those assignments. These articles feature unique perspectives on very different but relevant topics. I am sure you will enjoy them both, as well as all the other fine articles in our March-April edition.

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Continuity and Change
The Army Operating Concept and Clear Thinking About Future War

Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster, Ph.D., U.S. Army

Expert knowledge is a pillar of our military profession, and the ability to think clearly about war is fundamental to developing expert knowledge across a career of service. Junior leaders must understand war to explain to their soldiers how

Anticipating the demands of future armed conflict requires an understanding of continuities in the nature of war as well as an appreciation for changes in the character for armed conflict.

—The U.S. Army Operating Concept

1st Lt. Robert Wolfe, security force platoon leader for Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Farah, provides rooftop security during a key leader engagement 25 February 2013 in Farah City, Afghanistan. Civilian and military representatives from the PRT visited a newly constructed family guidance center run by Voice of Women in Farah City, an Afghan-operated nongovernmental organization, to discuss gender issues, conduct a site survey, and monitor programming.

(U.S. Navy photo by Lt. j.g. Matthew Stroup)
their unit’s actions contribute to the accomplishment of campaign objectives. Senior officers draw on their understanding of war to provide the best military advice to civilian leaders. Every Army leader uses his or her vision of future conflict as a basis for how he or she trains soldiers and units. Every commander understands, visualizes, describes, directs, leads, and assesses operations based, in part, on his or her understanding of continuities in the nature of war and of changes in the character of warfare.

A failure to understand war through a consideration of continuity and change risks what nineteenth century Prussian philosopher Carl von Clausewitz warned against: regarding war as “something autonomous” rather than “an instrument of policy,” misunderstanding “the kind of war on which we are embarking,” and trying to turn war into “something that is alien to its nature.”¹ In recent years, many of the difficulties encountered in strategic decision making, operational planning, training, and force development stemmed from neglect of continuities in the nature of war. The best way to guard against the tendency to try to turn war into something alien to its nature is to understand four key continuities in the nature of war and how the U.S. experience in Afghanistan and Iraq validated their importance.

First, War is Political

Army forces are prepared to do more than fight and defeat enemies; they must possess the capability to translate military objectives into enduring political outcomes. —The U.S. Army Operating Concept²

In the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, defense thinking was dominated by theories that considered military operations as ends in and of themselves rather than essential components of campaigns that integrate the broad range of efforts necessary to achieve campaign objectives. Advocates of what became the orthodoxy of the “revolution in military affairs” (RMA) predicted that advances in surveillance, communications, and information technologies, combined with precision strike weapons, would overwhelm any opponent and deliver fast, cheap, and efficient victories. War was reduced to a targeting exercise.³ These conceits complicated efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq as unrealistic and underdeveloped war plans confronted unanticipated and underappreciated political realities. In particular, coalition forces failed to consider adequately how to consolidate military gains in the wake of the collapse of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the Hussein regime in Iraq. In Afghanistan, after proxy forces helped topple the Taliban regime, those forces and their leaders undermined state-building efforts. Mujahideen-era militias pursued narrow agendas and competed for power and resources within nascent institutions. In Iraq, policies that exacerbated the fears of the minority Sunni Arab and Turkmen populations strengthened the insurgency as Shia Islamist militias and Iranian proxies subverted the government and security forces. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, political competition for power, resources, and survival drove violence and weakened institutions critical to the survival of the state.

With these lessons in mind, the recently published U.S. Army Operating Concept (AOC) observes that “compelling sustainable outcomes in war requires land forces to defeat enemy organizations, establish security, and consolidate gains.”⁴ Army forces are prepared to reinforce and integrate the efforts of partners as a fundamental part of campaign design.⁵ Military professionals should be particularly skeptical of ideas and concepts that divorce war from its political nature and promise fast, cheap, and efficient victories through the application of advanced military technologies.

Second, War is Human

Conventional and special operations forces work together to understand, influence, or compel human behaviors and perceptions. Army commanders understand cognitive, informational, social, cultural, political, and physical influences affecting human behavior and the mission. —The U.S. Army Operating Concept⁶

People fight today for the same fundamental reasons that the Greek historian Thucydides identified nearly 2,500 years ago: fear, honor, and interest.⁷ The orthodoxy of the RMA, however, dehumanized as well as depoliticized war. In Iraq and Afghanistan, understanding and addressing the fears, interests, and sense of honor among communities was essential to reducing support for insurgent and terrorist organizations. In
Afghanistan, coalition forces struggled to understand local drivers of conflict and instability. Coalition forces sometimes unintentionally empowered predatory and criminal actors, fostered exclusionary political and economic orders, and alienated thereby key elements of the population. The Taliban, regenerating in safe houses in Pakistan, portrayed themselves as patrons and protectors of aggrieved parties in Afghanistan. In Iraq, an inadequate understanding of tribal, ethnic, and religious drivers of conflict at the local level sometimes led to military operations (such as raids against suspected enemy networks) that exacerbated fears or offended the sense of honor of populations in ways that strengthened the insurgency. Later, in both wars, as U.S. Army and Marine Corps forces “surged” into areas that had become enemy safe havens, they developed an understanding of local drivers of violence, often acting as mediators between the population and indigenous army and police forces. Ultimately, more inclusive and legitimate governance and security forces helped U.S. and Iraqi forces move Iraqi communities toward temporary political accommodations that removed support for illegal armed groups that were perpetuating violence and instability.

The cultural, social, economic, religious, and historical considerations that comprise the human aspects of war must inform wartime planning as well as our preparation for future armed conflict. Terrorist and insurgent organizations across the
Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and Asia use violence and propaganda to excite historical grievances, magnify nationalist or sectarian identities, and pit communities against each other. Terrorist and insurgent organizations thrive in chaotic environments associated with communal conflict as
they endeavor to control territory and populations. Some of the armed conflicts that fit this pattern today include those in Mali, Libya, Nigeria, Yemen, Somalia, Central African Republic, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines. Understanding the special circumstances and recent experiences of the people among whom wars are fought is essential if military forces are to avoid mistakes, consolidate gains, and isolate enemies from popular support.

Understanding the human aspects of war prepares leaders, soldiers, and teams for operations in environments of complexity and persistent danger. Moral, ethical, and psychological preparation for combat is critical to building resilient soldiers and cohesive teams that are committed to the Army’s professional ethic. Concepts or plans that neglect the human aspect of war are unlikely to achieve lasting favorable outcomes. Neglecting the political and human continuities of war can lead to confusing military activity with progress.

Third, War is Uncertain

Although advances in technology will continue to influence the character of warfare, the effect of technologies on land are often not as great as in other domains due to geography, the interaction with adaptive enemies, the presence of noncombatants, and other complexities associated with war’s continuities.

—The U.S. Army Operating Concept

The dominant assumption of the RMA was that knowledge would be the key to victory in future war. Near-perfect intelligence would enable precise military operations that, in turn, would deliver rapid victory. In Afghanistan and Iraq, planning based on linear projections did not anticipate enemy adaptations or the evolution of those conflicts in ways that were difficult to predict at the outset.

Army professionals recognize war’s uncertainty because they are sensitive to war’s political and human aspects, and they know from experience and history that war always involves a continuous interaction with determined, adaptive enemies. That continuous interaction with enemies and adversaries helped determine the course of events in the long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Coalition plans did not always keep pace with shifts in the character of those conflicts. In Afghanistan, planned reductions in troops continued even as the Taliban gained control of territory and populations in the south and east between 2004 and 2009. In Iraq, the strategy remained based on rapid transition to Iraqi Security Forces even as large percentages of those forces had become party to a sectarian civil war. Some aspects of the coalition military effort, such as the absence of operational reserves, or the practice of announcing changes in mission and force levels years in advance reveal a tendency to assume that our plans dictate the future course of events and that progress in war is linear and predictable.

The AOC emphasizes the tenet of adaptability and the need for leaders to “assess the situation continuously, develop innovative solutions to problems, and remain mentally and physically agile to capitalize on opportunities.” The AOC also redefines the tenet of depth to highlight the need to “think ahead in time and determine how to connect tactical and operational objectives to strategic goals.”

Fourth, War is a Contest of Wills

While the ability to shape security environments through the threat of punitive action will remain important, Army forces conduct positive actions essential to reassuring allies, influencing neutrals, and dissuading adversaries.

—The U.S. Army Operating Concept

Clausewitz defined strategy as a sustained act of will necessary to master war’s terrible uncertainties. Strategy begins with establishing a clearly defined objective or goal. Strategic goals in Afghanistan and Iraq were, at times, ambiguous. Ambiguity was, in part, due to a belief that one can achieve acceptable outcomes in war without a commitment to win. Because war is a competition involving life and death, and in which each side tries to outdo the other, establishing objectives other than winning can be counterproductive and wasteful. Winning is psychological and moral, as well as physical. Ending war, as Clausewitz observed, requires persuading the enemy that he has been defeated. Winning in war, however, neither requires unconditional surrender
nor a MacArthuresque lifting of restrictions on the amount of force applied. Rarely will winning be as simple as tracking the advance of forces across a map. What winning does require is a rational determination to achieve a sustainable outcome, usually a political outcome, consistent with vital interests.

In late 2001, the Taliban regime collapsed, in large measure because every Afghan was convinced of the inevitability of their defeat. The Taliban regenerated after 2004, not only because they were able to receive support from al-Qaida and foreign intelligence organizations in support bases in Pakistan, but also because they sowed doubts in the minds of Afghans, especially those in the south and east, about the Afghan government’s and the coalition’s ability and willingness to prevent their return. At times, in both Afghanistan and Iraq, doubts about U.S. and partner willingness to consolidate gains and sustain commitments for ample duration and in sufficient scale to win not only encouraged enemies but also sowed doubts among friends and neutrals.

Winning in war, of course, is not a military-only task. Achieving sustainable outcomes consistent with vital interests is an inherently civil-military task that requires integrated planning and execution of political, diplomatic, military, economic, informational, intelligence, and, increasingly, law enforcement and rule of law efforts. The AOC highlights the Army’s role in providing foundational capabilities that permit the United States to project national power and “help integrate and synchronize the efforts of multiple partners.”

To cope with what Clausewitz described as the blind natural forces of “violence, hatred, and enmity” that challenge the will, professionalism, and moral character of soldiers and units, the AOC emphasizes the development of resilient soldiers, adaptive leaders, and cohesive teams capable of operating
effectively and morally in environments of uncertainty and persistent danger.

**The Four Fallacies of Future War**

Thinking clearly about future armed conflict requires consideration of threats, enemies, and adversaries, anticipated missions, emerging technologies, opportunities to use existing capabilities in new ways, and historical observations and lessons learned.

—The U.S. Army Operating Concept

What military and civilian leaders learn from recent experience is important because those lessons influence operational planning and force development. As historian Williamson Murray has observed:

It is a myth that military organizations tend to do badly in each new war because they have studied too closely the last one; nothing could be farther from the truth. The fact is that military organizations, for the most part, study what makes them feel comfortable about themselves, not the uncongenial lessons of past conflicts. The result is that more often than not, militaries have to relearn in combat—and usually at a heavy cost—lessons that were readily apparent at the end of the last conflict.

Efforts to learn and apply lessons of recent armed conflict consistent with continuities in the nature of war will not go unchallenged. That is because four fallacies that portray future war as fundamentally different from even the most recent experiences have become widely accepted. Those fallacies are based in unrealistic expectations of technology and an associated belief that future wars will be fundamentally different from current and past wars.

These fallacies are dangerous because they threaten to consign the U.S. military to repeat mistakes and develop joint forces ill-prepared for future threats to national security.

**The vampire fallacy.** The first of these fallacies, like a vampire, seems impossible to kill. Reemerging about every decade, it was, in its last manifestation, the RMA in the 1990s. Concepts with catchy titles such as “shock and awe” and “rapid, decisive operations” promised fast, cheap, and efficient victories in future war. Information and communication technologies would deliver “dominant battlespace knowledge.”

Under the quality of firsts, Army forces would “see first, decide first, act first, and finish decisively.” Those who argued that these concepts were inconsistent with the nature of war were dismissed as unimaginative and wedded to old thinking.

The vampire fallacy is much older than the orthodoxy of the RMA. Earlier manifestations go back
to strategic bombing theory in the 1920s. What is common across all that time is the belief that technology and firepower are sufficient to achieve lasting strategic results in war. Today, the vampire is back, promising victory delivered rapidly from standoff range, based on even better surveillance, information, communications, and precision strike technologies. Although the vampire fallacy is based on a suite of military capabilities vitally important to national defense, it is insufficient to solve the complex problem of future war.

This fallacy confuses targeting enemy organizations with strategy. Although targeting from standoff range can disrupt enemy organizations, strikes often embolden rather than dissuade enemies unless credible ground forces are available to compel an outcome.17 It is for these reasons that the AOC stresses that American military power is joint power. For example, Army forces make joint fires more effective because they compensate for enemy efforts to avoid detection (e.g., dispersion, concealment, intermingling with civilian populations, and deception). By placing valuable enemy assets at risk, Army forces may force enemies to reveal themselves as they concentrate to defend those assets. In short, Army forces, operating as part of joint teams, create multiple dilemmas for the enemy.

The Zero Dark 30 fallacy. The Zero Dark 30 fallacy, like the vampire fallacy, elevates an important military capability, raiding, to the level of strategy.18 The capability to conduct raids against networked terrorist or insurgent organizations is portrayed as a substitute for, rather than a complement to, conventional joint force capabilities. Because they are operations of short duration, limited purpose, and planned withdrawal, raids are often unable to affect the human and political drivers of armed conflict or make sufficient progress toward achieving sustainable outcomes consistent with vital interests. Like precision strikes, raids often embolden rather than dissuade the enemy and leave populations vulnerable not only to enemy action, but also to enemy propaganda and disinformation. It is for these reasons that the AOC calls for dynamic combinations of combined arms teams and special operations forces to provide multiple options to the joint force commander as well as Army forces capable of defeating enemy organizations and consolidating gains.

The Mutual of Omaha Wild Kingdom fallacy. The Mutual of Omaha Wild Kingdom fallacy
requires explanation for those of younger generations. In the 1960s on Sunday nights, U.S. families with young children gathered to watch *Mutual of Omaha’s Wild Kingdom* on television. The host, Marlin Perkins, introduced the topic of the show and provided commentary throughout, but he rarely placed himself in proximity to dangerous animals. He usually left close contact with the wildlife to his assistant, Jim Fowler. Under the *Mutual of Omaha Wild Kingdom* fallacy, western militaries assume the role of Marlin Perkins and rely on proxy forces in the role of Jim Fowler to do the fighting on land. There is no doubt that security force assistance, foreign internal defense, and combat advisory missions will increase in importance to national security; it is difficult to imagine future operations that will not require Army forces to operate with multiple partners. Primary reliance on proxies, however, is often problematic due to insufficient capabilities or lack of will based on incongruent interests.

Like the vampire and *Zero Dark Thirty* fallacies, the *Mutual of Omaha* fallacy confuses an important capability with defense strategy. While the AOC recognizes special operations as an Army core competency and identifies security force assistance as a first order capability, it also acknowledges that Army forces must not only operate with multiple partners but also be prepared to exert influence and convince those partners that actions or reforms are in their interest. The RSVP Fallacy. Finally, the fourth fallacy solves the problem of future war by opting out of armed conflict, or certain forms of armed conflict, such as fighting on land. The fundamental problem with this RSVP fallacy is that it fails to give due consideration to enemies in wars or adversaries in between wars. Wars often choose you rather than the other way around. And the application of exclusively standoff capabilities to complex land-based problems in war leaves decision making in the hands of the enemy. If Western militaries do not possess ready joint forces capable of operating in sufficient scale and in ample duration to win, adversaries are likely to become emboldened, and deterrence is likely to fail. As George Washington observed in his first State of the Union address: “To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace.”

Ready Army forces play a vital role in preventing conflict because they communicate U.S. commitment and remain capable of compelling outcomes. Army forces are particularly valuable in deterring those who might be tempted to wage limited war to accomplish limited objectives. That is because the forward positioning of capable ground forces elevates the cost of aggression to a level that the aggressor is unwilling to pay and prevents the aggressor from doing what Russia has in Ukraine—posing to the international
community a fait accompli and then portraying its reactions as escalatory.

Moreover, as joint force freedom of movement and action in the maritime, air, space, and cyber domains become more contested, the deterrent value of land forces will become more important. Land forces operating in areas such as the South China Sea or the Persian Gulf may have to control territory not only to deny its use to the enemy but also to project power from land across multiple domains to restrict enemy freedom of action and preserve the joint force’s freedom of movement at sea, in the air, in space, and in cyberspace.

Thinking Clearly about War and the Future of Warfare

Shifts in the geopolitical landscape caused by competition for power and resources influence the character of armed conflict. These shifts, and violence associated with them, occur more rapidly than in the past due to advances in technology, the proliferation of information, and the associated increased momentum of human interaction.

—The U.S. Army Operating Concept

Fallacies persist, in large measure, because they define war as one might like it to be. Preparing Army forces to operate as part of joint, interorganizational, and multinational teams to prevent conflict, shape security environments, and, if necessary, win in war requires clear thinking. Army professionals might begin by rejecting fallacies that are inconsistent with continuities in the nature of war. But Army professionals must also consider changes in the character of warfare.

To understand continuity and change, it is hard to improve on the approach found in historian Sir Michael Howard’s 1961 seminal essay on how military professionals should develop what Clausewitz describes as their own “theory” of war. First, “study in width.” Observe how “warfare has developed over a long historical period.” Next, “study in depth.” Study campaigns and explore them thoroughly, consulting original sources and applying various theories and interdisciplinary approaches. This is important, Howard observes, because as the “tidy outlines dissolve,” we can “catch a glimpse of the confusion and horror of the real experience.” And last, “study in context.” Wars and warfare must be understood in context of their social, cultural, economic, human, moral, political, and psychological dimensions because “the roots of victory and defeat often have to be sought far from the battlefield.” As we consider war and warfare in width, depth, and context, Army professionals might consider change and continuity in four areas: threats, missions, technology, and history and lessons learned during recent operations.
Threats, Enemies, and Adversaries

Diverse enemies will employ traditional, unconventional, and hybrid strategies to threaten U.S. security and vital interests.

—The U.S. Army Operating Concept

It is clear that Army leaders and units must be prepared to fight and win against state and nonstate actors. Due to what some have called the democratization of destructive power, nonstate actors, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Hezbollah possess capabilities previously associated only with the fielded forces of nation-states. For example, nonstate organizations have unprecedented financial resources and access to sophisticated weapons. Moreover, nation-states such as Russia and Iran employ unconventional proxy forces, often in combination with their own special operations or conventional forces. As the historian Conrad Crane has observed, there are two ways to fight the U.S. military—asymmetrically and stupid. Future enemies will not be passive; they will make every effort to avoid U.S. strengths, emulate advanced U.S. capabilities, and disrupt U.S. advantages. They will expand operations to other battlegrounds such as those of perception, political subversion, and criminality.

The AOC acknowledges the continuous interaction with enemies in war and the interaction with adversaries between wars. That interaction requires the Army to be a learning organization. When engaged with determined enemies, Army leaders “think ahead in time to gain and maintain positions of relative advantage over the enemy.” To defeat elusive and capable enemies, Army forces develop situational understanding through action in close contact with the enemy and civilian populations. In contrast to “rapid decisive operations,” Army forces are capable of sustaining high-tempo operations while consolidating gains to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and achieve “lasting outcomes in the shortest time span.” Future Army forces extend the “concept of combined arms from two or more arms or elements of one service to include the application of joint, interorganizational, and multinational capabilities in the conduct of joint combined arms operations.”

Technology

The U.S. Army’s differential advantage over enemies derives, in part, from the integration of advanced technologies with skilled soldiers and well-trained teams.

—The U.S. Army Operating Concept
Science and technology will continue to influence the character of warfare. While the U.S. Army differential advantages over potential enemies will continue to depend in large measure on advanced technology, winning in a complex world requires powerful combinations of leadership, skilled soldiers, well-trained units, and technology. There are no technological silver bullets. The Army must integrate new technological capabilities with complementary changes in doctrine, organization, training, leader development, personnel, and other elements of combat effectiveness. Army technological development emphasizes the need for all formations to possess the appropriate combination of mobility, protection, and lethality. And the Army places soldiers at the center of that effort, pursuing “advances in human sciences for cognitive, social, and physical development” while fitting weapons and machines to soldiers and units rather than the other way around.

**Missions**

The complexity of future armed conflict, therefore, will require Army forces capable of conducting missions in the homeland or in foreign lands including defense support of civil authorities, international disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, security cooperation activities, crisis response, or large-scale operations.

—The U.S. Army Operating Concept

The Army is not a boutique force. Soldiers and units must be prepared for a broad range of activities. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review identified 11 mission areas in which the Army plays a significant role. Army forces must be prepared to conduct operations successfully in the context of future enemy capabilities and technology. Missions will often overlap and place varied and simultaneous demands on the joint force. In future crises, demands on all components of the Army are likely to increase as threats overseas generate simultaneous threats to the homeland.

To shape security environments and prepare for a broad range of missions, Army “conventional and special operations forces contribute to a global land network of relationships resulting in early warning, indigenous solutions, and informed campaigns.” The theater security cooperation activities
of regionally aligned Army forces as well as the foundational capabilities that Army forces provide to the joint force set “favorable conditions for commitment of forces if diplomacy and deterrence fail.” Because future enemies will attempt to deny access to the joint force, future Army forces must be prepared to conduct expeditionary maneuver, “the rapid deployment of task-organized combined arms forces able to transition quickly and conduct operations of sufficient scale and ample duration to achieve strategic objectives.” Highly mobile combined arms air-ground formations will see and fight across wider areas, operating widely dispersed while maintaining mutual support and the ability to concentrate rapidly.

Regional engagement as well as the Army’s ability to conduct expeditionary maneuver and joint combined arms operations are critical to demonstrating U.S. resolve, deterring adversaries, and encouraging allies and partners.

**History and Lessons Learned**

Sir Michael Howard warned that we should not study history to make us “clever for the next time,” but instead to help make us “wise forever.” Similarly, Clausewitz, observed, the study of war and warfare “is meant to educate the mind of the future commander, or, more accurately, to guide him in his self-education, not to accompany him to the battlefield; just as a wise teacher guides and stimulates a young man’s intellectual development, but is careful not to lead him by the hand for the rest of his life.” In short, history can help military leaders ask the right questions, but leaders must consider the unique context and local realities of a particular conflict to develop answers. History does, however, amplify many of the lessons relearned in recent and ongoing conflicts.

On the need to consolidate gains or integrate efforts of multiple partners, for example, the father of the Army War College, former Secretary of War Elihu Root, commented in 1901 on “the wide range of responsibilities which we have seen devolving upon officers charged with the civil government of occupied territory; the delicate relations which constantly arise between military and civil authority.” To cope with the complexity of war in the early twentieth century, Root highlighted the “manifest necessity that the soldier, above all others, should be familiar with history.”

Our Army pursues lessons of recent and ongoing operations enthusiastically but often has difficulty applying these lessons. It is for that reason that the AOC (Appendix B) establishes a framework

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**The Army’s Missions and Contributions to Joint Operations**

The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review identified 11 enduring Armed Forces missions in which the Army plays a substantial role:

- Provide for military defense of the homeland
- Defeat an adversary
- Provide a global stabilizing presence
- Combat terrorism
- Counter weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
- Deny an adversary’s objectives
- Respond to crisis and conduct limited contingency operations
- Conduct military engagement and security cooperation
- Conduct stability and counterinsurgency operations
- Provide support to civil authorities
- Conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster response
The Army Warfighting Challenges

The Army Warfighting Challenges provide an analytical framework to integrate efforts across warfighting functions while collaborating with key stakeholders in learning activities, modernization, and future force design.

TRADOC Publication 525-3-1, The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Winning in a Complex World

for learning around the 20 first-order capabilities the Army must possess to win in a complex world. Lessons from recent armed conflicts, such as the need to put politics at the center of security force assistance, the growing importance of counterthreat finance, the increased overlaps between military and law enforcement operations, or the criticality of mobile protected firepower and combined arms capabilities in urban operations, can now inform interim solutions to warfighting challenges.37

Defining the Future Army: Force 2025 and Beyond

As historians Williamson Murray and MacGregor Knox observed in a seminal book on military innovation, militaries that prepared successfully for the demands of future war took professional military education seriously. They cultivated in their leaders the ability to think clearly about war, considering continuities and changes.

“The military institutions that successfully innovated between 1919 and 1940 without exception examined recent military events in careful, thorough, and realistic fashion. Analysis of the past was the basis of successful innovation. The key technique of innovation was open-ended experiment and exercises that tested systems to breakdown rather than aiming at the validation of hopes or theories. Simple honesty and the free flow of ideas between superiors and subordinates—key components of all successful military cultures—were centrally important to the ability to learn from experience. And the overriding purpose of experiments and exercises was to improve the effectiveness of units and of the service as a whole, rather than singling out commanders who had allegedly failed.”38

Our Army is innovating under Force 2025 Maneuvers, “the physical (experimentation, evaluations, exercises, modeling, simulations, and war games) and intellectual (studies, analysis, concept, and capabilities development) activities that help leaders integrate future capabilities and develop interim solutions to warfighting challenges.”39

Successful innovation will require focused and sustained collaboration among Army professionals committed to reading, thinking, and learning about the problem of future armed conflict, and determining what capabilities our Army and joint force must develop to win in a complex world.

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Notes


2. TP 525-3-1, 10.


4. TP 525-3-1, 16.

5. Ibid., 19.

6. Ibid.


8. TP 525-3-1, 9.

9. Ibid., 21.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid., 22.

12. Ibid., 17.

13. Ibid., 33.


19. TP 525-3-1, 19 and 46. Core competencies are those indispensable contributions in terms of capabilities and capacities beyond what other services and defense agencies provide and which are fundamental to the Army’s ability to maneuver and secure land areas for the Nation.


21. TP 525-3-1, 8.


23. TP 525-3-1, 10.


25. TP 525-3-1, 19.

26. Ibid., 18.

27. Ibid., 15.

28. Ibid., 36-41.

29. Ibid., 36.

30. Ibid., 16.

31. Ibid., 17.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.


35. Clausewitz, 141.

36. Elihu Root, *Five Years of the War Department, Following the War with Spain*, 1899-1903, as shown in the annual reports of the Secretary of War (Harvard, MA: Harvard University, 1904), 160. Digitized July 2008; available at https://books.google.com/books?id=TuUpAAAAYAAJ&dq=Five+-+Years+of+the+War+Department&source=gbs_navlinks_s (accessed 23 January 2015).


39. TP 525-3-1, 33.
The Sexual Harassment and Assault Response and Prevention Program (SHARP) is a high priority as an “enduring mission” across the force. Almost universally there is an understanding that the Army’s culture, the military’s culture, has to change. Given that near-universal understanding, there have been commensurately few essays or articles in military professional media that address

Volunteers attach teal-colored ribbons to trees and other objects across the Presidio 25 September 2013 to raise awareness about sexual assault as part of the Teal Ribbon Campaign.

**SHARP Realities**

**Perspectives in Tackling the Army’s Number One Priority**

Lt. Col. Peter D. Fromm, U.S. Army, Retired
the status of the Army’s SHARP efforts critically. Generally, the institutional Army is attacking this problem as hard as it has anything in its history. However, in addressing the issues involved, it still struggles with exactly what the culture is that is in need of change and precisely what needs to be done to fix it.

There are different schools of thought about this effort. Some soldiers see themselves first as victims of Congress rather than as advocates for the real victims and leaders and stewards of the environments in which these crimes occur. Some suggest that the military is comparatively better off than, say, college campuses, at least in terms of raw percentages. This implies that the real problem in the military is one of the society instead, and it ignores the question of what should be done to change the culture.

Others adopt the related attitude that we are going to shoulder this burden for society and that we will lead the way, just as the Army did for racial and gender integration. The unstated theme of this attitude is, similarly, that “we know we are not as bad as the civilians are on these issues, but we accept this mission anyway because we need to make it right, and we’ll be doing the country a service by leading the way for what is right.” On the surface, this way of approaching the problem appears less wrongheaded, but again, it fails to understand the depth of the task at hand. This may signal to Congress that the military is willing and able to settle the problems of assault and harassment to confuse symptoms with causes. Metric-driven approaches can create the illusion that leaders are doing something to influence causes when they are not; they are watching the problem play out. In that sense, the statistics, though undeniably valuable for gauging the problem (not for directly fixing it), are something of a red herring. The culture has to be understood, and only when understood can it be changed.

What exactly is the culture that needs to be changed? The qualitative dimension of the problem within the military is its power dynamic. In the civilian sector, the power dynamic is mostly economic; wealth equals power. Employees who are victims have legal avenues outside the chain to address harassment and assault and, in the back of their minds, they do not worry about a chain of authority over them that also has legal jurisdiction over them, as soldiers worry. The lawful authority of the military is the obvious reason why it has an urgent problem that has festered and eroded trust among soldiers.

That authority can make life hell for the soldier who rejects a quid pro quo sexual offer, for instance. Usually that soldier is very young and inexperienced and may not understand resources available outside the soldier’s chain of command. Analytical data used in sexual assault review boards should clearly identify chain-of-command abuse reported, as this is a reflection of the uniqueness of the problem within the military. Most do that now. For every report of assault, there is a likelihood (according to Criminal Investigation Division estimates) that the actual number will be 80 percent higher. So, the metric for understanding the quality resting under the surface, alarmingly, also points to the quantity of unreported abuse taking place “under the radar.”

Culture: Sexual Objectification in a Military Setting

When one exercises great power, such as legal authority over others, and lacks moral sense, maturity, or wisdom, this exercise inevitably becomes entangled with basic impulses. It winds up mixing in sexual dynamics, as hard as that fact is for many to admit or to face. In power-authority relationships, such as the rank hierarchies in the military, sexual impulse often arises overtly, as we have frequently seen of late with cases where superiors became sexually involved with subordinates on a consensual basis in illegal and inappropriate relationships. However, if a lower-ranking person rejects a consensual relationship, the situation often ends in sexual harassment or assault.
As we should expect, such abuses happen primarily at the lower levels, at the young levels of leadership, though the abuses of more senior leaders of the recent past may come more quickly to mind. The culture that sets the conditions for this kind of abuse of power is deeply rooted in language. If we call a man a “stud” because of his sexual activities, the culture generally regards the man favorably. Sexual promiscuity carries fewer stigmas for the man than it does for the woman. The word “slut” is a loaded term that culture undeniably holds in a general disfavor. So, it is easy to see that part of the culture in need of change immediately stacks against women. What such language suggests is that, as women are commonly objectified by such language, a cultural attitude prevails that sets the conditions for tolerating harassment of women and even contributes to assault. So, it is no surprise that women suffer assaults much more commonly than men.

However, many men are the victims of sexual assault and harassment too, and in raw numbers, assaults on men are a significant problem within the Army. To understand this aspect of the culture, one has to dive more deeply into power dynamics, beyond the surface issues of drunken men assaulting drugged, drunken, or vulnerable women. To understand this part of the culture, one has to examine the common denominator, and this is the issue of dignity and respect, as Army leadership often points out. The Army has to see language as a critical means for ensuring soldiers are treated with dignity, and it needs to determine how it develops tough warfighters in a climate of respect. Balancing a climate of respect with developing tough warfighters is probably the greatest problem the military has now. Developing soldierly toughness often becomes confused with demonstrating dominance and superiority through harsh or degrading treatment. We still have leaders who demean and disrespect their subordinates as a means to achieve ends they imagine are good.

However, such disrespect is part and parcel of the problem of sexual assault and harassment in the military. The relationship between the desire to objectify others and the impulses of the person doing the objectifying is an idea made famous by Jean-Paul Sartre in
his seminal psychological theory of self-deception (i.e., “bad faith”) in *Being and Nothingness*.

His discussion goes far in explaining the psychological phenomenon behind prison rapes among same-sex populations as a matter of social dominance rather than sexual orientation. Such rapes are supreme acts of disrespect, the stripping of dignity. One can also see the same dynamic in cases of abusive hazing incidents in fraternities.

The impulse to objectify others is always the precursor of psychological violence that also leads to physical violence. There is a sexual component in this impulse, and it is therefore worth keeping in mind that the realities of SHARP are connected to the culture that we tolerate regarding leadership and stewardship in general.

Attacking someone’s dignity, showing disrespect for a subordinate through verbal or physical attacks in the name of developing soldierly toughness, is an act governed by the same impulse as sexual assault. This disrespect is at the heart of the culture that must change if we are to defeat sexual assault and harassment.

As long as leaders can degrade others verbally or physically, and get away with it, as long as we turn our backs when a superior abuses a subordinate, the conditions are set to take the abuse into the realm of overt sexual dynamics. Leaders who engage in hazing or in abusive “smoke sessions” are performing sublimated sexual acts of dominance. The battalion commander or command sergeant major who lets loose a string of obscenities meant to degrade a subordinate is performing an act that is psychologically akin to assaulting that soldier.

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**Note**

Can Trust Be Restored?

Keith H. Ferguson

The U.S. armed forces have a problem with sexual harassment and assault. One look at the headlines seems to tell it all.

The problem of sexual harassment and assault is not just a perception; it is a reality. The Department of Defense Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military: Fiscal Year 2012 reveals that there was a 1.7 percent increase in unwanted sexual contact reported by women in our armed forces compared to the 2010 report. Although there has been no similar increase in the number of assaults on men since 2010, 1.2 percent of active-duty men indicated that they were subjected to unwanted sexual attention in the 2012 report. This indicates that the Department of Defense is faced with a significant problem.²

Loss of Trust

Each case of unwanted sexual contact results in a loss of trust by the American people—not only in the individual service members and leaders of the armed forces.
forces but in the armed forces as a whole. Making matters worse, in some instances those entrusted to guard against sexual harassment and assault have become the alleged abusers themselves.

Can this trust be restored? What does it take to rebuild trust once it is broken or lost? Most important, what will our armed forces do to regain the trust of the American people, service members, and civilians in regard to preventing sexual harassment and unwanted sexual contact in the military? This paper will show how training and education can help reduce these crimes and restore America’s trust in its armed forces.

**Education and Training**

It is not an easy process for any institution or organization such as the military to restore a level of trust once it has been lost. However, a good place to start is by assuring Americans that their military is receiving the training and education necessary to prevent such actions. Although many variables shape an individual’s behavior within an institution, only the most impactful variables related to education and training aimed at stopping sexual harassment and unwanted sexual contact will be addressed here.

Education and training challenges are especially great for the military because it is so big. It makes up 1 percent of the U.S. population and is the largest employer in the United States, employing 3.2 million individuals. Regardless of how large the military organization is, the problem of sexual harassment and unwanted sexual contact needs to be eliminated. Education and training are means to combat this issue.

**Difference Between Education and Training**

Many people assume that education and training are the same. They are not. Training is defined as “organized activity aimed at imparting information and or instructions to improve a recipient’s performance or help him or her attain a required level of knowledge or skill.” Another definition of training is “the acquisition of knowledge, skills, and competencies as a result of the teaching of vocational or practical skills and knowledge that relate to specific useful competencies. Training has specific goals of improving one’s capability, capacity, productivity, and performance.”

These two definitions provide us insight into how the Department of Defense understands and mandates education or training, or education and training.

Education, on the other hand, is “the act or process of imparting or acquiring general knowledge, developing the powers of reasoning and judgment, and generally the preparing of oneself or others intellectually for mature life … the development of the abilities of the mind (learning to know).”

The distinction between training and education is important when developing a plan to combat problems like sexual harassment and sexual assault. Education can be used to create awareness of a problem; training can be used to create preventive behaviors.

The military has developed some of the most professional, cutting edge training and education programs available to address sexual-assault-related issues. However, as with all programs, it is necessary to evaluate them for their effectiveness. Since sexual assault is still happening, one might question the effectiveness of either the content of the training curriculum or the delivery of that curriculum.

**Understanding Education**

Since military leadership has determined that part of the solution for eliminating sexual harassment is education and training, it is necessary to understand how they can be used as deterring tools.

A part of education is a transactional relationship. Instruction is not just a communication of ideas or information; it also inculcates values into students. The transaction occurs as instructors transfer knowledge and values to students. Consequently, there are always at least two entities in this educational relationship, the first being the student. Although maturity, learning style, cultural background, and ability may vary between individuals, the student is the central focus of education.

The second component of the relationship is the teacher or instructor. The variables associated with teaching have dramatically changed in the last 20 years. Prior to the computer age, the look of classrooms was standardized and the model of education relatively consistent from state to state, from school to school, from institution to institution, and from
year to year. This educational model brought both students and instructors to a centralized place to deliver education in person. The ability to form an actual relationship with the instructor was common because people interaction often creates a relationship. Through that relationship, credibility and trust were cultivated, and students were motivated to learn or not learn as a result of the relationship. This model of education has changed significantly over the last 25 years, especially since 1987 when online education became a practical reality as introduced by the University of Phoenix. Our student bodies, our methodologies, and our common practices have changed to accommodate the new generation of learners. Today, 73 percent of students are nontraditional students. The military, being very aware of the new model in the classroom, has developed a multifaceted approach to educating and training to end harassment and sexual misconduct. If the two transactional education models were juxtaposed as mathematical equations for comparison, they would look something like the equations below:

**Old Educational Model Transactional Equation**

(Teacher + Values + Curriculum + Delivery + Actions) x (Student + Sense of Purpose + Values [Reactions to Curriculum + Instructor]) = Education

**New Educational Model (for the Millennial) Transactional Equation**

(Teacher + Values + Curriculum + Delivery + Actions) x (Student + Sense of Purpose + Values [Reactions to Curriculum + Instructor]) x (Mobile Technology + Social Networking) = Education

**Challenge of Teaching Millennial Generation**

Changing the hearts and minds of service members through instruction will assist in eliminating the serious problem of sexual harassment and misconduct. However, a new generation of learners has necessitated a change in how educational materials are presented. Understanding the educational paradigm of millennials is the key to educating and training them. Millennials constitute a unique learning population with very distinctive trust and credibility issues as compared to previous generations. Unlike their predecessors, millennials have grown up with technology. Full digital literacy and competence are very significant characteristics of the millennial. As a result, training and educational practice have changed. One consequential behavioral change of the technology-savvy generation is that they tend to trust human beings less than previous generations.

Previous generations have usually looked to their elders as an authoritative source where knowledge, competence, and values could be gained. The millennials have often found nontraditional anchors for their social structure and the icons of who or what can be trusted. This impacts the classroom and interactions within it.

Although the military has made great strides to make any place where technology can be accessed a classroom, it has not addressed the challenge to the “trust factor” in education that modern technology has imposed. Millennials will check their devices, whether it be smart phones, tablets, laptops, or computers, to verify what an instructor is saying. Using any one of these devices can quickly verify the “truth” of the words an instructor speaks. If a student finds any discrepancy, he or she will quickly challenge the instructor. The way in which the instructor responds to the challenge will greatly affect the entire class. A poor response can diminish both the credibility of, and trust in, the instructor.

**Credibility and Trust: Keys to Effective Education**

Although there have been many changes to the model of education, there are some things that have not changed. Two unlisted components that are essential to education and training are present in both transactional equations. These components are credibility and trust. It does not matter where the classroom is; without credibility and trust, effective education can be seriously diminished. The need for these components has not changed. No matter what the educational goal, a student who does not trust the curriculum or the teacher will not learn the necessary objectives.

**Establishing credibility.** New teachers in many venues are usually told to initiate and maintain credibility in the classroom through discipline. Keep the class orderly, take charge right away. Let your students know who is boss. This control reputedly establishes
credibility, which then enables the teacher to demonstrate competence as a subject matter expert to build student confidence and trust in him or her.

One of the greatest credibility builders in the armed forces is the uniform.11 For men and women initially entering the all-volunteer armed forces, there is a built-in respect for the uniform that clearly identifies a branch of service and reveals rank, expertise, and excellence. Although many new recruits may not understand the significance of each patch or bar on the uniform, they immediately understand that the color, shape, number of stripes, and number of decorations indicate experience and position. It is instant credibility for any instructor.

A student measures an instructor’s credibility based upon what he or she hears and sees based upon the uniform and the bearing of the instructor. This evaluation is not a gut reaction but a careful, informal thought process and, as result, an intellectual decision. A student sizes up the instructor and course material very quickly. This sizing up is accomplished through thought. Students evaluate the instructor, the location of training, and the quality of materials, and they make a judgment. In Bloom’s Taxonomy, this thinking is in the cognitive learning domain.12 Students evaluating credibility of instructor and material is a continuous process. The loss of credibility can create a synergy that impacts other variables that operate in a classroom.

It is the instructor’s responsibility to maintain and grow credibility in the classroom. The most essential component of credibility maintenance is competence. It does not require an instructor to do much to maintain credibility other than demonstrate competence over and over again. However, credibility is challenged when an instructor demonstrates inconsistencies in behavior or mistakes.

One new danger instructors face is that their reputations, whether good or bad, can spread far beyond their organizations as millennials use social media to express observations and judgments about individuals. When perceptions of incompetence proliferate, they diminish credibility. If credibility is undermined, trust is also.

The problem of credibility can be solved easily. If instructors are incompetent, make them competent. Notwithstanding, often, once credibility is totally lost
it cannot be regained. If the incompetent instructor cannot be made competent, he or she must be removed to preclude further damage to an organization’s credibility.

Building trust. The second component to effective education is trust. Trust can be defined as “the willingness of a party (trustor) to be vulnerable to the actions of another party (trustee) based on the expectation that the trustee will perform an action important to the trustor, regardless of the trustor’s ability to monitor or control the trustee.”

Unlike credibility, trust is not established in the cognitive domain; it is a visceral response and is part of the affective learning domain for each learner. The response varies from learner to learner. It is not an instantaneous feeling but something that grows or diminishes as there is contact with the instructor over time. The affective domain regulates the quantity of the education and training that is retained by the student. A student buys into the learning process emotionally. Instructors and curriculum they view as unimportant will likely result in little long-term retention of the curriculum. Like credibility, trust can be grown or lost. If there is no trust, either in the educational material or the instructor, independently or collectively, learning can be diminished.

Over time, several factors have had an impact on these crucial components credibility and trust. Today’s Army is moving toward blended learning in the education and training process. While Army training is often exceptional, in order to fully develop its soldiers, the Army instituted a universal training program. Training provides a programmed response to a set of stimuli.

Programmed training results in a mechanized, universal answer to standardized problems. Part of the solution for combating sexual misconduct has been mandatory training, but anecdotal evidence suggests that many soldiers feel that training is a “check the block” type exercise. This mindset has a direct impact on the Army’s mandatory training programmed response to sexual harassment. It does not require students to engage with the training. Attendance is often the only thing that is measured. Clearly this is not the desired outcome of those higher up in the chain of command. Whether you call it training or education is immaterial. Behavioral change within the student is the desired outcome.

Army Learning Model (ALM)

Making education better is the goal of every educator. With effective education, it is hoped that the military will make a significant reduction in improper sexual contact. To that end, the Army has embarked on an expensive but comprehensive plan to revolutionize the learning process by adopting a new educational model. It redirects every classroom to be learner-centric, to use facilitated discussion in small groups, and to use a blended learning curriculum making extensive use of a technology-based infrastructure.

This transformation has enabled substantial financial and space savings because much of the information that used to be printed in cumbersome books and manuals can now be stored on a device that can fit into a pocket. In addition, those devices can quickly access information from any place where wireless technology is available. Some training is delivered solely by distributed learning. However, many classrooms still have a living instructor who interacts with distributed-learning portions of courses but primarily delivers training and education live and on the platform.

Restoring Institutional Trust

The first step for a leader to begin to rebuild trust is through demonstrating the fourth tenet of the Army Values, selfless service, which is identified through the Army’s LDRSHIP acronym. Students must feel like the instructors are serving the student and the instructors’ sole purpose is to serve the students by providing the best training or education possible.

In 30 years of instruction, this writer has seen some instructors who teach as if they were doing the class a favor by sharing what knowledge they have accumulated. Instructors serve students, not the other way around. Students should feel that the instructor is there to provide assistance and support in their endeavor to complete training and education. Selfless service means that inspirational leadership will be a conspicuous feature of instructor performance so students will be inspired to acquire information and values held by the instructor.

Second, instructional leaders must demonstrate professional managerial skills. It is paramount that instructors understand their actual duties. Humility is a part of this framework. Instructors should never develop a God complex but should recognize their personal fallibility. No instructor possesses all of the knowledge
of a certain topic. Instructors not only must impart their expertise and knowledge but also must be open to learning from the students.

Third, instruction leaders must demonstrate universal equity. Students must be treated with dignity and be treated fairly in every circumstance. Every student must be treated with respect, the third tenet of the LDRSHIP acronym. Instructors must recognize the individual value of every student, understand their personal perspectives, and take care to ensure that students are validated. Students are at different levels when they arrive for training; each needs to be molded into a functioning member of their personal professional discipline or military occupational specialty.

Last, the sixth tenet of the LDRSHIP acronym refers to integrity. As instructors treat students with equity and fairness, trust is grown. Ensuring fairness in the learning process allows students to grow in their knowledge and expertise. Instructors must do everything possible to make sure that credibility and trust do not erode as they perform their duties in managing and instructing students.

An old adage says that “familiarity breeds contempt.” Unfortunately, this is true some of the time. As human beings are fallible, the loss of trust and credibility can be a natural occurrence and is a process. When loss is recognized, steps must be taken to prevent losing more. However, when credibility and trust are diminishing, with work they can be re-established. When instructional leaders adopt new practice in crafting both education and training, we will see a good return on that investment into students.

**Conclusion**

The Army is doing a lot to combat sexual misconduct. Education and training are a part of the solution, and they can lead to real changes in institutional and individual behavior. Education can be used to create awareness of the problem; training can be used to create preventive behaviors. Hard work, committed leadership, competent instructors, and meaningful education and training can help the Army achieve its goal of preventing sexual harassment and assault.
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Notes


10. Ibid.


If you are or will be serving (especially for the first time) in a higher headquarters—such as service component command, combatant command, service staff, or joint staff—it is likely that you will be assigned to or collaborating with something called a commander’s action group (CAG). These are also known as commander’s initiatives groups, commander’s special studies groups, or special assistants groups. If you are assigned to one, you may carry the duty title of special assistant (SA), and your duty description will likely be broad and vague. Additionally, if you are like most first-timers in a CAG, you probably will have heard little to nothing about them in prior assignments.

Yet, in today’s military, CAGs are very common and play important roles in the handling of routine informational needs of senior military leaders. Once
only associated with four-star headquarters, these ad hoc teams have proliferated down to staff directors at three- and two-star-officer level or equivalent civilian levels in response to requirements. In my observations, senior field grade officers are frequently called upon to join CAGs without a clear understanding of what the role entails beyond being ready to provide “whatever the boss needs.” Moreover, some SAs are transients, temporarily assigned for a year or less to gain exposure to the senior leadership environment while awaiting their next assignment, potentially as battalion or brigade commanders. Thus, many SAs learn enough about their particular responsibilities to succeed but do not always gain the broader perspective of what capabilities CAGs can offer to Army leaders.

I served as an SA to various commanders of service component, joint, and combined commands for 10 years, and led action groups for five of those years. Those assignments were tremendously rewarding and allowed me to see first-hand how several general officers and equivalent-level civilians perceived their environment, engaged with stakeholders, made decisions, formulated and communicated their vision, and ultimately accomplished their missions (with varied levels of success). It was eye-opening how differently each commander operated, including the degree to which things at the senior levels got done through informal means—for instance, through collaboration and negotiation—rather than formally through the military bureaucracy.

Performing the duties of an SA can sometimes have the feel of walking on eggshells. The job has a learning curve that is uncomfortably steep. Tasks like speechwriting, ghostwriting, special projects, and internal consulting are generally highly sensitive and fraught with procedural and cultural challenges that could put unwary SAs in untenable positions within the headquarters. Completing assigned tasks is always the easy part. The hard part is ensuring that CAGs remain helpful conduits of information and are effective in getting nonroutine things done between staffs and leadership while not being viewed as duplicating staff responsibilities and roles.

The purpose of this article is to introduce and summarize four common duties that SAs perform. These are, based on my experiences as a speechwriter, ghostwriter, special projects officer, internal consultant, and commander’s archivist. I offer these perspectives for both SAs and the leaders they will serve. I present these views knowing the sensitivities involved in even defining the roles of CAGs and SAs, but I have become convinced that it is better to be more transparent about the expectations rather than less. After all, CAGs are emerging as commonplace within U.S. military organizations.

Special Assistant as Speechwriter

When asked by nonmilitary people what I did as an SA, I usually responded “speechwriter,” as it is the one duty that requires the least amount of explanation. Commanders spend a lot of time communicating orally and in writing with a wide range of internal and external stakeholders through speeches, papers, presentations, and video (such as scripted messages for American Forces Network spots). Only a portion of these engagements fall into the purview of public affairs, hence speechwriters tend to be needed.

Very little in the way of one’s standard career path prepares officers to serve in the capacity of speechwriter. The style of writing is different—from technical to narrative—but that is largely a matter of skill and practice, a competency that can be developed and improved. Being successful as a military speechwriter involves being able to write in the voice of the commander. Consequently, a relationship must exist between the leader and the speechwriter that fosters success.

Relationships should be direct, and empathy is critical. A successful speechwriter develops and sustains a strong and direct one-on-one relationship with his or her senior leader built on empathy, which is defined as “the action of understanding, being aware of, being sensitive to, and vicariously experiencing the feelings, thoughts, and experience of another.” The SA and leader must be synchronized with each other if the former is to be effective in providing speeches and products that are in the voice of the latter. Empathy, however, is fleeting and takes effort to sustain. Senior leaders have busy schedules and cannot always bring their SAs along. Any time that my senior leader and I were incommunicado for a couple days, I found myself having to catch up with the boss’s thinking, which invariably needed to be incorporated into an upcoming important speech. Thus, building trust and demonstrating success in early assignments is important.

No product is final until delivered. Action officers prefer to be proactive and complete tasks through iterative engagements with their supervisors.
For example, in-progress reviews clarify tasks so the action officer can efficiently address a requirement and assume it is completed when passed up the chain. As a speechwriter, however, there were several occasions where the first time my commander was able to review a speech or presentation was in the car on the way to the event, and sometimes that meant my having to make edits and reprint the document minutes before delivery. At one event in a foreign country, I was editing slides during dinner for a post-dinner presentation. Why? The boss had just been informed about something that altered part of his core message. The presentation had to change. While this was an extreme case, it was common practice to incorporate news items or the most recent remarks by the secretary of defense, chairman, or Army chief of staff at the last minute. The lesson learned is to be ready by thinking through such contingencies in advance and to always be on the lookout for new, relevant information that adds value to the communication.

**Exercise care in injecting yourself into the product.** One fellow SA wanted to insert Latin phrases to make our commander sound more erudite. He was routinely disappointed when the products returned from the boss with those words obliterated by red pen. Empathy in speechwriting means both appreciating the needs and communication styles of the leader and holding back one’s own preferences.

The key measure of success is the comfort level that the speaker projects, not just the successful delivery of the message. The introduction of words or phrases that speakers would not ordinarily say can be distracting and seem inauthentic. On the other hand, speechwriters are communications advisors, and good ones who have developed the proper rapport and empathy with the commander...
are often given freedom to suggest effective ways to communicate difficult, controversial, or complex points, whether orally or in written products, such as journal articles.

The organization is the client, not the commander. This is an important philosophical point that comes from watching some SAs go about this task the wrong way. Perhaps, they developed especially pretty or elaborate PowerPoint presentations and designs for the commander's use only or wrote speeches that, if spoken, would have been self-promoting for the commander (and indirectly the SA).

However, those SAs ignored the needs of the organization. Successful SAs know that once the commander has finished speaking, no matter to which audience, the staff must act on the message. The audience and the headquarters staff will each want the slides, so the slides and associated notes pages must be self-explanatory.

Special Assistant as Special Projects Officer

I served in several CAGs where we were tasked to lead some form of strategic review or change effort for the headquarters. The advantage of having CAGs is their ability to operate outside of the normal all-consuming staff churn to tackle tough challenges and organizational needs that are otherwise overcome by ordinary events. CAGs can serve as internal think tanks, conducting important or independent research on complex topics that fall outside the staff's jurisdiction or exceed the abilities of the staff to tackle, or as special projects teams, free to explore creative and innovative solutions to current or future challenges.

Most projects I worked on involved implementing and managing organizational change. Change is a major part of organizational life, and keeping pace with the ever-changing strategic environment is hard. Commanders often look to their CAGs to conduct research and contribute ideas that may spur redesign of processes, systems, and structures in their commands. Depending on the task, these can include preparing analytical white papers, studying emerging doctrine, developing concepts, contributing to staff planning, preparing senior leader communications, and engaging with subject matter experts outside the military, such as those in academia and think tanks. Such projects can be interesting and professionally rewarding, although they can also be demanding and frustrating at times, especially if a study must be close-hold and nonreleasable due to sensitivities.

CAGs may also be involved if a headquarters employs an outside consultant (from within the Department of Defense, other government agency, academia, or private enterprise) to assist with a wide-scale transformation effort. SAs may participate in focus groups or project teams facilitated by the consultant. They may also serve as the contracting officer's technical representative on behalf of the command to monitor contract performance and render assistance to the consultant in accordance with the contract. I served twice in this capacity, and I found the experiences in contracting processes and addressing issues useful in subsequent assignments.

The research and analysis that CAGs conduct can also contribute to the military's professional knowledge base through journal articles and other scholarly activity. During their tenure, some SAs are required by their CAGs to publish at least one independent journal article (or internal white paper if the subject matter is considered for official use only) in a joint or service publication. Getting something published is a very effective way to build critical and creative thinking skills, which are invaluable as SAs progress in their military careers.

Special Assistant as Internal Consultant

Complexity and high operating tempo can mean that military organizations do not have the opportunity or the ability to focus energy for needed introspection. Is the organization doing things right? Is the organization doing the right things? What is being missed? To answer these questions for limited purposes or when budgets are tight, leaders may turn to their CAGs and employ SAs as internal consultants. It is an interesting role that places heavy demands on one's interpersonal skills.

An internal consultant investigates matters within one's own organization for the purposes of advising leadership. Within the military, there are standing internal consultants chartered with advising the commander on specific matters—these include the inspector general (for matters of regulatory compliance and adherence to ethical...
standards), staff judge advocate (for legal matters), and command sergeant major (for enlisted matters). However, anyone on the staff is eligible to pursue an inquiry from the leadership on other matters of mission performance. It is not uncommon to see CAGs tasked to conduct inquiries among directors or senior members when the matter was sensitive but staff meetings were impractical. For example, my commander once tasked me to quietly poll directors for their views on prioritizing transformational efforts and then to provide a one-page summary of ideas.

Because of the sensitivities involved, internal consultants must often exercise care, as playing the role may impact the SA’s efficacy afterward. Building trust is key because ultimately, if deficiencies are found, it is incumbent on the consultant to report them, but if possible to do so in a way that allows the staff to take action first. While assigned to a CAG within a combined (multinational) headquarters, I was asked to look into an internal communication issue among the staff, and it turned out to be a significant problem with a root cause.

I found a way to answer my commander’s inquiry while also allowing the staff members to address the issue on their own so no one was on the defensive. As a result, I found it easier to engage with the staff on subsequent special projects.

Special Assistant as Commander’s Archivist

The commander’s administrative team may handle the filing of hard copies of everything the boss has signed, but the SAs often get involved in all other collection, archiving, and retrieval of the commander’s professional activities. Given that many commanders sustain wide professional networks and often have limited time to reflect or prepare their own journals, they may rely heavily on others to assist. Roles of SAs often include taking notes, writing memoranda, transcribing oral remarks, preparing journals, and maintaining databases. However, the manner in which these are done is dependent on the personal needs and habits of the commander.

Some leaders do not mind large entourages and, therefore, SAs are likely to be in the room to take notes, which simplifies things. Some others, however, prefer a lot more privacy and will restrict notetaking or allow only an aide-de-camp in the room during meetings, which means SAs must work closely with the aide or executive officer to gather the needed information. The expectation is that whatever archives are built will be available and reasonably accurate so the commander can use them to recall past events and help him or her prepare for meetings with stakeholders whose last contact was months (or even years) earlier.

Tips and Cautions

Each CAG is different because each commander, organization, and strategic context is different. Successful SAs find ways to apply their unique talents and experiences, while the less successful find the dynamics of the role uncomfortable. On the other hand, not all CAGs are properly utilized. The following are some questions and related tips for consideration if you have an option to join a CAG.

**How is the CAG’s relationship with the chief of staff (or equivalent)?** CAGs may work for the commander and closely with the executive officer and aide-de-camp, but to accomplish the mission, they depend greatly on...
solid working relationships with the headquarters staff. Strong relationships with the chief of staff provides better access to feeder input for commander products and better chances of the commander’s communications promulgating through the organization.

**What roles do the SAs tend to play?** In addition to determining how well your strengths align with the activities the CAG performs, these roles also determine the CAG’s primary contacts within the staff. If a CAG is being used as primarily as a speechwriting team, then how strong is the relationship with the public affairs officer? If special projects, then what is the relationship with the division chiefs and action officers in the C/J/G-3, 5, or 8 (general staff)?

If internal consultant, which would be less common, then what is the role of the staff judge advocate, inspector general, or deputy chief of staff? If archivist, then what are the expectations of the executive officer and aide-de-camp? If these working relationships are strong, then SA efforts are much more likely to be productive and rewarding.

**Is the CAG being used as a shadow staff?** I am happy to say that this became far less common in my later years in CAGs but was more prevalent a decade earlier and is something worth watching out for. If a CAG is being used to routinely vet staff products (that is, being inserted as a gatekeeper between the staff and commander) or duplicate staff actions, that is a CAG to avoid. Usually, checking into the relationship between the CAG and key staff members will give indicators that this is occurring, but not always.

A corollary question is who does the CAG work for? What I said earlier about speechwriting applies across all CAG functions: the organization is who the CAG serves—and not just the commander. If the CAG is singularly focused on the commander to the exclusion of the rest of the headquarters, then you should look for signs of strain between the CAG and the staff. If so, building relationships with the staff becomes an important early task.

**Tough but Rewarding Duty**

Duty as an SA is challenging and rewarding. It provides a great opportunity to understand broad organizational dynamics and gain insights into the world of strategic leadership. It can offer opportunities to pursue important creative and innovative projects, aid in transformation efforts, and help organizations address difficult challenges. It is also delicate, a duty that requires well-honed interpersonal skills and professional judgment to work in some of the sensitive matters addressed at the senior levels, and no two general officers utilize their SAs the same way. From my personal and professional experience, it is one of the most interesting and impactful assignments that an officer can take.

The author thanks Professor Chuck Allen and Col. Michael McCrea, both of the U.S. Army War College, for their contributions and comments on earlier drafts of this article.

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**Notes**

1. When I joined my first commander’s action group in 2000 and asked the chief what the duties entailed, these four words were the initial response.


5. Ibid.
Women in Combat
The Question of Standards

Jude Eden

Are women in the military discouraged from training to meet the men’s standards? Is this why all women have washed out of the Marine Corps’ Officer Infantry Course? That is one of the charges female Marine 1st Lt. Sage Santangello makes in a March 2014 article for the Washington Post. One of the 29 women, as of this writing, who have failed the course, Santangello says, I believe that I could pass, and that other women could pass, if the standards for men and women were equal from the beginning of their time with the Marines, if endurance and strength training started earlier than the current practice for people interested in going into the infantry, and if women were allowed a second try, as men are. ... Women aren't encouraged to establish the same mental toughness as men—rather, they're told that they can't compete. Men, meanwhile, are encouraged to perceive women as weak.¹
This always seems to happen. As traditionally male military occupational specialties (MOSs) are opened to women, the standards are questioned and maligned as unfairly discriminatory as women’s inability to achieve them is exposed.

**Development of Double Standards**

Double standards were developed because every time women are tested, they prove that they cannot consistently achieve men’s standards and that they suffer many more injuries than men do in the attempt. Proponents pushing more military opportunities for women have never insisted women achieve the men’s standards because their lack of qualification would mean fewer women in the ranks. They could not achieve the standards when the military academies first were integrated. In his 1998 book *Women in the Military: Flirting with Disaster*, Army veteran Brian Mitchell cites results for physical testing at West Point and Annapolis:

- When 61 percent [of female West Point plebes] failed a complete physical test, compared to 4.8 percent of male plebes, separate standards where devised for the women.
- Similar adjustments were made to other standards. At Annapolis, a two-foot stepping stool was added to an indoor obstacle course to enable women to surmount an eight-foot wall.²
- Mitchell also reports that when women were integrated into the Air Force’s Cadet Wing, the [Air Force] academy’s physical fitness test included push-ups, pull-ups, a standing broad jump, and six-hundred-yard run, but since very few of the women could perform one pull-up or complete any of the other events, different standards were devised for them. They were allowed more time for the run, less distance on the jump, and fewer push-ups. Instead of pull-ups, female cadets were given points for the length of time they could hang on the bar … . They fell out of group runs, lagged behind on road marches, failed to negotiate obstacles on the assault courses (later modified to make them easier), could not climb a rope … . The women averaged eight visits to the medical clinic; the men averaged only 2.5 visits … .

(Original page/image)
average, women suffered nine times as many shin splints as men, five times as many stress fractures, and more than five times as many cases of tendinitis.³

By this time, the Army was further along with integrating women but was faced with a problem. There were no standards based on MOS requirements, so recruits were assigned to jobs based only on passing the physical fitness test in basic training. The Army had the right number of females allotted to recently opened heavy-lifting jobs. However, the women could not do the heavy lifting, they suffered higher rates of injury, and their attrition rates were higher.

Therefore, the Army developed an objective standard to test recruits and “match the physical capacity of its soldiers with military occupational specialty requirements.”⁴ Introduced in 1981, the Military Entrance Physical Strength Capacity Test (MEPSCAT) tested lifting capabilities based on MOS demands as light, medium, moderately heavy, heavy (over 50 lbs.), and very heavy (100 lbs.). “In the heavy lifting category, 82 percent of men and 8 percent of women qualified.”⁵

This is catastrophic in terms of mission readiness. According to a 1985 Army report entitled Evaluation of the Military Entrance Physical Strength Capacity Test, “if MEPSCAT had been a mandatory selection requirement during 1984, the Army would have created a substantial shortfall in the moderately heavy category (required lift is 80 pounds) by rejecting 32 percent of the female accessions.”⁶

In her 2000 book The Kinder, Gentler Military: Can America’s Gender-Neutral Fighting Force Still Win Wars?, Stephanie Gutmann reports that a member of the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services responded to this data by casting the familiar pall of unfair discrimination and sexism: “The Army is a male-oriented institution and officials are resistant to changes that will allow women to be fully utilized. … Those [strength] standards reeked of that resistance.”⁷ The proposed MEPSCAT testing standard was never adopted because it exposed women’s lack of qualification for the jobs newly opened to them and to which they were already being assigned. Using that standard would have resulted in significantly less female representation in newly opened MOSs, so MEPSCAT was derided and summarily dispatched.

Those pushing women into combat today are no more able than their predecessors were to show that women can meet the men’s standards, let alone the men’s combat standards. The Center for Military Readiness (CMR), an independent public policy organization, published a report in October 2014 confirming this conclusion. The report cited testing by the U.S. Marine Corps Training and Education Command (TECOM) in 2013.⁸ The command tested 409 male and 379 female Marine volunteers in several combat-related tasks.⁹ The test data highlighted in the CMR’s report include results of the clean-and-press, the 155 mm artillery lift-and-carry, and the obstacle course wall-with-assist-box.¹⁰

According to the CMR, “the clean-and-press event involves single lifts of progressively heavier weights from the ground to above the head (70, 80, 95, [and] 115 lbs.), plus 6 repetitions with a 65 lb. weight. In this event, 80 percent of the men passed the 115 lb. test, but only 8.7 percent of the women passed.”¹¹

The CMR reports,

In the 155 mm artillery lift-and-carry, a test simulating ordnance stowing, volunteers had to pick up a 95 lb. artillery round and carry it 50 meters in under 2 minutes. Noted the [Marine Corps] report, “Less than 1 percent of men, compared to 28.2 percent of women, could not complete the 155 mm artillery round lift-and-carry in the allotted time.” If trainees had to “shoulder the round and/or carry multiple rounds, the 28.2 percent failure rate would increase.”¹²

Moreover, the CMR states,

On the obstacle course wall-with-assist-box test, a 20” high box (used to simulate a helping hand) essentially reduced the height of the 7 ft. wall to approximately 5’4.” Quoting the [Marine Corps] report, “Less than 1.2 percent of the men could not get over the obstacle course wall using an assist box, while wearing protective equipment … [compared to] 21.32 percent of women who could not get over the obstacle course wall.”¹³

Natural Differences

There is a reason to this rhyme, and her name is Nature. She has given us decades of data for a track record. It is not changing even though women are
participating in more sports and bodybuilding than ever. To complete the same physically demanding task, a woman expends much more effort than a man (no fair!). A man’s bones are denser, his heart is bigger—making his aerobic capacity greater—and he is able to develop much more lean muscle mass. He can carry more weight and run farther and faster with it. His units-of-work effort is worth many of hers, and he will be able to maintain a demanding, arduous level of performance for far longer than she will in both the short and long term. Double standards did not create this reality; they are the response to it (and to political pressure to open more jobs to women). Kingsley Browne writes in his 2007 book Co-ed Combat: The New Evidence That Women Shouldn’t Fight the Nation’s Wars,

When males and females both start out in good physical condition, women gain less than men from further conditioning, so that the gap between the sexes actually increases. A study of male and female cadets at West Point, who all started out in relatively good condition, found that although women’s upper body strength was initially 66 percent of men’s, by the end of their first two years, it had dropped below 60 percent.14 Moreover, Browne states,

Sex differences in physical performance are here to stay. As Constance Holden observed in Science magazine, the male advantage in athletics will endure, due to men’s “steady supply of a performance-enhancing drug that will never be banned: endogenous testosterone.”15

In other words, a platoon of the top female CrossFitters is still no match for a platoon of the top male CrossFitters. It does not matter that one individual female CrossFitter may be stronger and faster than one particular male. The idea that one woman somewhere might someday be able to achieve the infantry standard is inadequate to justify putting women in the units. Women have to be able to consistently and predictably make and maintain the men’s standards in order to demonstrate equal ability and be useful in combat.

Even on a lower general standard, women break at far higher rates than men do, with longer-term injuries. More women leave the military, when or before their contracts are up. Women are regularly unavailable for duty for female issues. Chicago Tribune correspondent Kirsten Scharnberg reports in a 2005 article that women suffer post-traumatic stress disorder more acutely.16 The combat “opportunity” is sounding less and less equal all the time.

In his 2013 book Deadly Consequences: How Cowards Are Pushing Women Into Combat, retired Army Col. Robert Maginnis describes several military studies showing the physical suffering of women in combat:

1. A U.S. Navy study found the risk of anterior cruciate ligament injury associated with military training is almost ten times higher for women than for men. 2. A sex-blind study by the British military found that women were injured 7.5 times more often than men while training to the same standards. ... 5. Women suffer twice as many lower-extremity injuries as men, an Army study found, and they fatigue much more quickly because of the difference in “size of muscle,” which makes them more vulnerable to non-battle injury.17

Marine Capt. Katie Petronio, writing in the Marine Corps Gazette about Officer Candidate School, states, Of candidates who were dropped from training because they were injured or not physically qualified, females were breaking at a much higher rate than males, 14 percent versus 4 percent. The same trends were seen at TBS [The Basic School] in 2011; the attrition rate for females was 13 percent versus 5 percent for males, and 5 percent of females were found not physically qualified compared with 1 percent of males.18

We females can train as hard as we like, and we may increase strength, stamina, and fitness. Nevertheless, our increased fitness still will not put us on par with that of the men who are training to their utmost, like men in combat units and the Special Forces. They are the top ten percent of the top ten percent. We also bear too many other risks to be cost effective. No matter how widespread feminism becomes, our bones will always be lighter, more vulnerable to breaks and fractures. Our aerobic capacity
will still be 20 to 40 percent less, and we will still be less able to bear heavy gear at a hard-pounding run. It is not for lack of training. Throughout 2013, the female recruits going through Marine Corps boot camp were being trained to achieve the men’s minimum pull-up standard. They were trained to pass the test, yet 55 percent of them could not make that minimum, according to an Associated Press report.¹⁹ Ninety-nine percent of male recruits can, whether or not they were particularly athletic before shipping off to boot camp.

Can women scale the eight-foot wall in full combat load without steps? No steps are provided to give women a boost in the heat of battle, as they are in coed military boot camps (and even the Marine Corps’ Officer Candidate School). Santangello boasts that she performed 16 pull-ups on her last physical fitness test. That is excellent, but the test is done in a t-shirt and shorts, it is a test only of general fitness, and it is far less strenuous than infantry training, let alone combat. Can women do a dozen pull-ups in full combat gear? That is just one of many requirements in the Combat Endurance Test (CET). Can women carry a man on their backs with a full 80 lb. combat load? These differences in ability are deal breakers in combat—that is why these standards are not arbitrary. The military has yet to see the so-called “push-button war” that activists cite as mitigating for women’s lesser physical strength. Our combat units have often been on foot with their heavy loads in the rough mountainous terrain of Afghanistan. The high infantry standards are designed to keep the weak out because accommodating the weak means lives lost and mission failure. The standards of the Officer Infantry Course are high because infantry officers must not only be educated, brave, and highly athletic, but they also must be better at everything than the members of their units because Marine officers lead from the front. Hence their motto: Ductus Exemplo, leadership by example.

In the 2013 Pentagon briefing to announce the repeal of the combat exclusion, then Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta stated that women are “serving in a growing number of critical roles on and off the battlefield,” and that men and women are “fighting and dying together.”²⁰ However, serving in critical
roles and dying in the combat zone do not equate
to proving equal infantry capabilities. Noticeably
omitted by advocates for women in combat is that
the women who have been injured or died in Iraq
and Afghanistan were not in the combat zone hav-
ing passed the infantry’s standards. We honor their
sacrifice, but we acknowledge that they were part
of support units who went through whatever pre-
deployment workups their leadership gave them
(and these can vary greatly). Being in the combat
zone, dangerous as it is, is still worlds away from the
door-kicking offensive missions of our combat units.
Yet, advocates for women in combat are willing
to keep women on a lower standard as they push
for re-evaluation. USA Today correspondent Jim
Michaels reports, “Nancy Duff Campbell, co-presi-
dent of the National Women’s Law Center, says the
Marines should re-evaluate the standards before
putting women through.”21 In a recent article, U.S.
Army Reserve Col. Ellen Haring opines that the
CET, which women routinely find impossible to pass,
is merely an initiation rite, not comparable measure-
ment for infantry suitability, and therefore passing it
should be abandoned as a formal standard.22

Claims of Discrimination

Lt. Santangello wants us to believe that something
other than women’s ability is the reason they are not
making the infantry’s standards. It is not women’s
fault that 92 percent of them cannot do the 115 lb.
clean-and-press; it is because men are victimizing
brutes. If only this sexism and discrimination did not
exist, women would be able to carry heavier loads
for long distances over rough terrains at a fast clip
without getting four times the injuries. She claims
that not offering women a second try through the
Officer Infantry Course equals discrimination. That is
not true. The only officers, male or female, who get a
chance to try the course again are those slated for an
infantry unit, as Marine Lt. Emma Stokein explains
in a piece called “The Mission Goes First: Female
Marines and the Infantry.”23 Since combat units are

A female Marine steadily treks on during a 20 February 2013 road march. The Infantry Training Battalion, Camp Geiger, N.C., has begun to fully
integrate female Marines into an entire training cycle. This will help the Marine Corps evaluate the performance of the female Marines to deter-
mine the possibility of allowing women into combat-related job fields.
still closed to women, they do not get a second try because this delays their job training and pushes back Marines waiting their first turn. She and all the other non-infantry men who are not allowed a second try are discriminated against based on their MOS, not their sex. Letting her try the course again, which then Commandant Gen. James F. Amos did after Santangello published her article, was applying a double standard. She asks that the rules and standards be ignored and that she get special treatment because she is a woman. That is quite a start for an officer claiming to want equal treatment, and wanting to lead men in combat. Does she want men to follow her example? Once she is head of a platoon, will she expect the men and women she leads to follow her example?

Another claim she makes is the Marine Corps’ deliberate discouragement of women to train hard. This one does not ring true to me because it is so antithetical to my own experience and observations as a female Marine. In my four-year enlistment, from 2004 to 2008, no one ever told me (or anyone around me whom I knew of) that I could not compete because I was a woman, nor anything like it. They would not have dared. They were too worried about being politically correct since an off-color joke overheard by a third party is enough for a sexual harassment claim. Maybe I just had an exceptional experience to have made it through four years from Parris Island to Iraq unscathed by all those Neanderthals. No one ever discouraged me from training enough, and they did not have to encourage me to train more. I already pushed myself the hardest, including plenty of supplementary training so that I would not be the weakest link. Proving the feminist’s lie that men and women are interchangeable takes a lot of extra work. When I was at Camp Lejeune’s gym most days a week, I never noticed any shortage of women. Women compete in sports at the highest levels, and today CrossFit, mud runs, and Iron Man (Iron Woman!) triathlons are all the rage. Was Santangello powerless in 2013 to shore up her own weaknesses if additional conditioning was all it took? Why does a strong, young college hockey player with the guts to join the Marines, the ability to become an officer, and such a strong desire to see women in combat that she would try out for the infantry then wilt at (alleged) discouragement from anyone? How was she able to get so far? Herein lies the usual riddle of feminist dogma shared by nearly all those pushing women into combat: Women are as strong as men, but women are victims of men. They are not strong enough to prevent rape stateside, but they are sure-as-hell ready to go hand-to-hand with members of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.

I also reject Santangello’s charge that men in the military are encouraged to perceive women as weak. If anything, they are encouraged, at peril of ending their careers, to make themselves believe that women and men are interchangeable. Those who do not sing that tune are charged with waging the “war on women.” In my experience, feminism and political correctness are so prevalent in the military that men trip over themselves trying to ensure they do not offend. Military leaders cannot afford to even think the truth: Women are not as strong and athletic as strong, athletic men are. It is biology and physics. It is Nature. Most important, it is consistent and predictable. Women’s biology makes them a deficit in combat. Those who insist combat units should be opened to women can never prove it would be a real benefit because of all the persistent issues. They can only institute a mandatory doublethink.

For the sake of women’s career opportunities, the old tougher standards have already been lowered or abandoned over the decades. Gone are the long jump and the 40-yard man-carry. Training tasks are long-since team-oriented, where individual weaknesses are camouflaged by the group, so the two-person (one dare not call it “two-man”) stretcher-carry is now a four-person stretcher-carry. Between lower standards for women and political correctness that sees making war-fighting men out of boys as abuse, the results are a lower standard of performance overall. Panetta and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Martin E. Dempsey continued this decades-old tradition at the January 2013 Pentagon briefing. Dempsey said, “if we do decide that a particular standard is so high that a woman couldn’t make it, the burden is now on the service to come back and explain, why is it that high? Does it really have to be that high?”

That seems a fantastically obtuse question for a military leader to ask, especially in a time of war. Yet it makes complete sense through the lens of feminist activism because Dempsey also said the military
“must make sure that there are a sufficient number of females entering the career field and already assigned to the related commands and leadership positions.”

The decree demands that the testing and implementation are done simultaneously by January 2016. The burden should be on supporters of women in combat to prove women can make and maintain the infantry and Special Forces standards as they are, and only after that should they proceed to discuss the parameters in which women might be effectively used in combat operations. Instead, the Department of Defense has put the onus on the units, who are also under pressure to prove they are diverse and not sexist by having the correct number of women. Next year’s budget may depend on it. Moreover, what happens in this kind of climate as military budgets are being slashed? The Army recently cut 20,000 from its ranks. Where everything is measured against diversity and “equal career opportunity for women” over mission readiness, we can assume quotas of women will continue to be filled while more qualified men are cut.

The Need for High Standards

Of the myriad of superb reasons to maintain the combat exclusion—such as additional hygiene needs and risks, sex, rape, risk of capture, pregnancy, unit cohesion, broken homes, and abandoned children to name a few—women’s inability to make the infantry standards is simply the first and most obvious. It is the wall women-in-combat activists cannot scale without a step box, if you will.

Meanwhile, the argument to maintain the combat exclusion makes itself easily in every aspect. Including women in combat units is bad for combat, bad for women, bad for men, bad for children, and bad for the country. The argument for the combat exclusion is provable all the time, every time. Political correctness has no chance against Nature. Her victories are staring us in the face at all times. The men just keep being able to lift more and to run faster, harder, and longer with more weight on their backs while suffering fewer injuries. They just keep never getting pregnant. The combat units have needs that women cannot meet. Women have needs that life in a combat unit cannot accommodate without accepting significant disadvantage and much greater expense. Where 99 percent of men can do the heavy-lifting tasks typical of gunners, but 85 percent of women cannot, there is no gap women need to fill. Women are already utilized where they are needed in the combat zone, such as for intelligence gathering, or what I did, frisking women for explosives.

There is nothing going on in the infantry that men cannot do and for which they need women. Panetta said women are “serving in a growing number of critical roles on and off the battlefield. The fact is that they have become an integral part of our ability to perform our mission.” Women have honorably served in the combat zone, but not on the infantry’s standards, on door-kicking missions. Let us be honest. Panetta’s words are spin—not exactly the stuff combat commanders’ dreams are made of when it comes to building the tip of the spear.

Military women are strong, tough, and dedicated in their own right. Women do not need to be in the combat units to prove they are important or to serve honorably and well, and they do not need to be there to gain career opportunities. Women have achieved some of the highest levels of military leadership without entering combat units. The United States is at war with child-raping, honor-killing, suicide-bombing, amputation-happy savages that are beheading and raping their way across Iraq and Afghanistan, not limited by rules of engagement or diversity metrics. The high male standards of U.S. military forces exist so that the Nation can be victorious against its enemies with the fewest casualties possible. We should see attempts to jettison high standards as detrimental to all, and we should soundly reject them.

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Notes


5. Ibid., 2-16.


9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.


22. Ellen Haring, “Can Women Be Infantry Marines?”, Charlie Mike Blog, War on the Rocks.com, entry posted 29 May 2014, http://warontherocks.com/2014/05/can-women-be-infantry-marines/# (accessed 12 January 2015). Haring writes, “the Combat Endurance Test serves as an initiation rite and not a test of occupational qualification. Do initiation rites have a place in our military? … Let’s call it what it is—a challenging initiation into an elite group that prides itself on being tough, resilient, and loyal to the foundational beliefs of this country.”


25. Ibid.

26. Ibid., Former Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta.
On 24 January 2013, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta rescinded the 1994 rule prohibiting women from assignment to combat units. Panetta cited the “great courage and sacrifice” by women on today’s battlefield and the goal of finding the “best-qualified and most capable people, regardless of gender” to perform the mission as justification for this change. Under the previous rule, women were barred from assignment to units below brigade level that had a primary mission of direct ground combat.

Today, only 7 percent of Americans have any direct military experience. Understandably, many civilians, including members of Congress, view this issue in the context of equal job opportunity rather than military
effectiveness, and they are unlikely to realize any negative military consequences. No military justification exists for this change. More important, this change will be detrimental to military readiness and combat effectiveness. Accordingly, the military community must distill the issues and explain, from its perspective, the ramifications of this policy change to the American public.

**Panetta’s Invalid Rationale**

Secretary Panetta’s first justification for rescinding the 1994 rule is the courage, sacrifice, and contribution of women on today’s battlefield. In essence, he argues that women have earned the right to serve in combat arms. However, serving in harm’s way is not the issue. Being on the receiving end of incoming fire does not qualify anyone to be an infantryman. Nobody questions the courage or patriotism of women who enlist and place themselves at risk. However, such qualities alone do not endow them with the abilities required to serve in the infantry. (For this discussion, “infantry” includes ground personnel such as medics and engineers who accompany the infantry into close combat with the enemy.)

Second, Panetta states the goal of rescinding the prohibition as ensuring “the mission is met with the best-qualified and most-capable people.” This too is flawed reasoning. If “best-qualified and most capable” is the true test, then Panetta would have lifted the age restrictions as well. Indeed, men over and under the current enlistment age parameters have proven themselves capable in all types of combat, to include underage personnel being awarded the Medal of Honor. Arguably, there are more 40-year-old men and 15-year-old boys physically capable of performing the tasks of an infantryman than 20-year-old women.

Allowing women to serve in infantry or other direct combat positions constitutes a change in policy with ramifications beyond today’s current conflict. Any such change has implications for women’s assignments in the next war as well as conscription and the involuntary assignment of women to ground combat duties. Therefore, any such policy change must be accomplished with a view toward future wars.

**The Full-Spectrum Conflict Baseline**

Supporters of the Panetta position assert that women are already serving in combat situations in Afghanistan, as they did in Iraq. They argue that although women are prohibited from participating in offensive combat, the proximity of support units (in which women are allowed to serve) to combat arms units and today’s nonlinear battlefield not only have placed women in harm’s way but also have proven they are capable of successfully engaging in combat. However, this view only applies to today’s counterinsurgency fight.

In Afghanistan, female soldiers accompany their male counterparts in order to interact with local civilians, leveraging their gender to calm the women and children residents during operations. Their presence fills a critical gap in a counterinsurgency strategy that emphasizes the protection and engagement of the civilian population. Likewise, women have served in military police, motor transport, and other supporting units that have participated in firefights although without generally engaging in “closing with the enemy.” While significant, these events do not directly correlate to the requirements of infantrymen, particularly in a full-spectrum war.

**Full-spectrum conflict.** The correct baseline for analyzing this question is the full-spectrum conflict, not the current counterinsurgency fight. The counterinsurgency combat of the last 12 years differs materially in scope and conduct from the land warfare against nation-states prosecuted in the twentieth century. This is not to suggest that firefights in Afghanistan are any less intense than other combat. Rather, full-spectrum conflict with an enemy nation-state presents a different type of war.

The objectives in a counterinsurgency campaign differ from those in a full-spectrum conflict. The strategic objective in counterinsurgency operations is the development of effective governance by a legitimate government. Counterinsurgency operations seek the stable and secure environment needed for effective governance, essential services, and economic development. Accordingly, tactics and operations are designed for developing a local government and infrastructure. As a result, American troops have operated primarily out of static infrastructure positions co-located with the objective (i.e., the population). By contrast, ground combat operations for an infantry division in World War II meant up to 400 days of offensive fighting from Italy to France to Germany. This difference in scope
and conduct is further exemplified by the numbers of troops missing in action from each war. More than 19,000 ground troops remain missing from World War II, more than 7,500 remain missing from the Korean War, and 1,600 are still unaccounted for from Vietnam, while only one was listed as “missing-captured” in Afghanistan. Full-spectrum war against nation-states is more fluid and more austere than counterinsurgency.

Just as we remain prepared for an unlikely nuclear conflict, personnel policy assignments must be developed for the worst-case scenario of full-scale war against a nation-state, such as North Korea or Iran (or unforeseen crises such as Ukraine), rather than the limited war found in counterinsurgency operations. In war against a nation-state, we must prepare for the conscription of troops and offensive combat operations in a field environment for prolonged periods of time.

The optimal demographic. Sound public policy requires the wise and prudent use of money, time, and assets. Our policies for military personnel assignment must be suitable for present conflicts as well as when time is of the essence in full-spectrum conflict conscription. Unless we are prepared to incur the costs associated with inducting and evaluating every American for infantry service, regardless of condition, some selection parameters must be established. Accordingly, we must seek the demographic group most reasonably calculated to effect success on the full-scale conflict infantry battlefield. Thus far, the optimal demographic group for infantry service has proven to be young, healthy males. At issue here is the demographic of women. However, the rationale set forth below is not limited to women. It is equally applicable to other demographic groups, such as middle-aged men.

The physical requirements of infantry combat. The physical requirements of combat push men to the extreme. Grasping this fundamental aspect of combat is imperative, and we cannot begin to develop sound personnel policies until that is understood. Overall, there are two components of physical requirements for infantry service. The first is the component of strength, speed, stamina, and agility. The second is the capacity to sustain those physical abilities through the catabolic stress of extended combat operations.

The need for strength, speed, stamina, and agility is evidenced through various infantry combat tasks, such as digging fighting trenches, handling heavy equipment, enduring load-bearing marches, and transporting casualties under fire. The ability to perform some of these tasks is calculated by the Marine Corps Combat Fitness Test (CFT), which measures lifting, running, maneuvering under fire, grenade throwing, and carrying equipment and casualties.

The Naval Health Research Center studied 2,000 Marine Corps CFT participants. That study reports that gender had a significant effect on test performance. Even when wearing heavy and cumbersome personal protective equipment (e.g., flak jackets), males (mostly ages 17 to 26) scored significantly higher than the females (mostly ages 17 to 26) who did not wear such equipment. Gender disparities in upper body strength were later shown when 55 percent of Marine female recruits could not perform three pull-ups by the end of boot camp, while the failure rate for male recruits was 1 percent. These results are consistent with the fact that males have more muscle mass than females, with 50 percent more upper body strength and one-third greater lower body strength.
Second, over a period of sustained combat operations, infantrymen endure fatigue, sleep deprivation, high caloric expenditures, and environmental extremes. These factors create the catabolic stress on bodies that results in muscle loss. In addition to his combat-related functions, today’s infantryman can expect to carry a combat load exceeding 90 pounds. As noted combat historian Col. S.L.A. Marshall observed, “On the field of battle, man is not only a thinking animal, he is a beast of burden ... [whose] chief function in war does not begin until the time he delivers that burden to the appointed ground.” Over time, combat stressors take a toll on the body.

Some argue that the increased athletic performance of women indicates a physical capability for ground combat. But, the purpose of physical training is to establish a basic fitness level and provide a reservoir of strength for combat. The constant physical exertion and strain of combat deplete that reservoir and result in the loss of muscle mass and strength. This follows Capt. Katie Petronio’s often cited experience as a Marine engineer officer in Afghanistan.

Although once a college athlete, the load-bearing work and continuous operating tempo Petronio experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan degraded her body to a detrimental level. Ultimately, she suffered from a compressed spine and muscle atrophy at a higher rate than her male Marine counterparts. Capt. Petronio concluded: “I can say with 100 percent assurance that despite my accomplishments, there is no way I could endure the physical demands of the infantrymen whom I worked beside ... .” This is consistent with studies showing women at higher risk for stress fractures resulting from long-term physical exertion of carrying combat loads. This also correlates with an Army study showing the injury rate for women in Army Basic Combat Training at 50 percent, while only 25 percent for men. Likewise, since requiring female recruits to undergo combat training in 1983, the attrition rate for female recruits at Marine Corps boot camp increased to almost double that of their male counterparts.

The Economics

Military tests revealing the physical disparity between men and women, especially with regard to upper body strength, are not new. Most supporters for allowing women to serve in the infantry recognize the discrepancies in physical strength between men and women, but they point out that not all men are physically suited for combat service either. They contend that if a woman is physically capable, she should be allowed to serve in an infantry unit. However, to say that not all men are suited for ground combat service is not the issue. Not all men are medically suitable for even general military service. Moreover, the basic medical requirements for a male’s induction into the Army do not distinguish between infantry and non-infantry assignments. Historically, if a man passed the induction physical, he was presumed fit for infantry service. However, assuming some women are able to meet the physical tests for infantry service, the economics of this endeavor will make it cost-prohibitive.

The costs to test and evaluate every woman who wants to be in the infantry will not be inconsequential. In 2008, the Army reported the cost of training a combat
arms soldier to be over $50,000.42 Recently, only 7.5 percent of women soldiers surveyed expressed an interest in moving to a combat job.43 While the percentage appears small, it represents approximately 12,750 personnel to process and evaluate at no small cost.

Since September 2013, the Marine Corps has accepted 17 women for the 13-week Infantry Officers Course. Thirteen women failed the first day’s initial physical fitness test, while one woman who passed the test withdrew from the course the following week due to a stress fracture in her foot.44 Since then, only three women have passed the initial physical test, but all were unable to complete the course. Undoubtedly, the Infantry Officers Course is physically demanding, and while not all men complete the course, over 75 percent of men do so successfully.45

Computing the infantry training cost per female and the likely success rate for this demographic makes this process cost-prohibitive. This flaw in Panetta’s plan becomes even more apparent when applied to the next full-spectrum war conscription.

Conscription

The purpose of the military draft is the rapid mobilization of large numbers of combat troops.46 By design, conscription targets the population demographic best suited for its purpose. Currently, that demographic is men between the ages of 18 and 26.47 Despite its name, “Selective” Service conscription encompasses the entire demographic from which members then may be excluded for good cause.48 Until proven medically unfit, all members of the demographic are presumed fit for infantry combat service.49

By allowing women to serve in the infantry, the legal rationale for all-male conscription dissolves, thereby subjecting women to the draft.50 In 1981, the Supreme Court heard the case of Roster v. Goldberg. As now, the law only required males to register for the draft. Goldberg challenged the male-only draft registration law, arguing that the law was unconstitutional, gender-based discrimination. However, in upholding the law, the Court reasoned that because Congress’s stated purpose in having a draft was to raise “combat troops” and because women were excluded by law from serving in combat, an all-male draft was within Congress’s power to regulate the armed services.51 Should the combat arms field now be opened to women, Congress will be forced to address the issue of drafting women.

Placing women in the pool of conscripted military manpower creates legal and fiscal problems. If women are allowed to serve as combat troops, can Congress still draft only men? If not, must men and women be drafted in equal numbers? Can Congress give conscripted women the option to volunteer for infantry service, while not affording the same option to male conscripts? How can conscripted women be assessed for involuntary combat duty without inducting and evaluating all women in the demographic group?

If women are drafted in large numbers, is it a prudent use of time and money to register, induct, and process them for duty as combat troops if, as shown above, the vast majority will not be physically suitable for such service? During Vietnam, the 1968 draft inducted 296,000 men.52 It would not have been sound fiscal policy to have drafted half that number in women. Even peacetime drafts have exceeded 130,000 draftees.53 In 1980, Congress estimated the cost alone of registering women at $8.5 million (1980 dollars).54 Whatever future circumstances may compel us to re-institute the draft, they are likely to also make time of the essence. We will not have the luxury to debate this matter in our legislature nor decide it in court. Now is the time to face this issue.

Small-Unit Cohesion: The Band of Brothers Factor

Perhaps the least understood and yet most significant component of tactical combat effectiveness is small-unit cohesion: the “Band of Brothers” factor. However, most Americans have never heard of it, much less understand it. The significance of combat cohesion must be understood as an issue in this discussion and cannot be lightly dismissed.

Several advocates for women in the infantry totally dismiss the value of the “Band of Brothers” factor. Instead, they contend that groups are bonded more by their commitment to the task rather than the relationship between unit members.55 However, this view fails to consider the critical distinguishing question posed by infantry-unit cohesion: why do men fight?

As William Manchester described his experience on Okinawa in 1945, “Men … do not fight for flag or country, for the Marine Corps or glory or any other abstraction. They fight for one another.”56 Noted
combat historian S.L.A. Marshall said, “Men who have been in battle know from first-hand experience that when the chips are down, a man fights to help the man next to him.”57 In his book Cohesion: The Human Element in Combat, William Henderson contends that small-unit cohesion is “the only force capable of causing soldiers to expose themselves insistently to enemy fire,” and have “all members willing to risk death to achieve a common objective.”58 Fighting cohesion is a critical component of battlefield success. Before introducing the dynamic of young women into this relationship, the possible effects must be examined.

Perhaps women can assimilate into infantry units without any disruption in cohesion. However, assessing the possible effects of this change must be done in light of our common understanding of the relationship between young men and women. In interpersonal relationships, young military personnel behave in large measure as their civilian counterparts.59

Few members of Congress have military experience.60 Before lawmakers and policymakers charge into the uncharted territory of this proposed change, they need an understanding of fighting cohesion, which should come from combat veterans. Otherwise, this critical component to battlefield success is likely to be dismissed out of hand.

Conclusion

Wise policymakers will look beyond today’s conflicts and consider the future. No military reason exists for the Panetta policy, and reliance on the current counterinsurgency battle instead of the next full-spectrum conflict to analyze this issue is misplaced. Infantry combat, especially in a full-scale conflict, is a relentlessly physical ordeal. The optimal demographic for this endeavor is young, healthy males. Overall, women have not proven to be medically suitable for sustained ground combat. Thus, it is cost-prohibitive to recruit and train women for assignment in infantry-type occupations. Moreover, permitting women in the infantry opens the legal door to drafting women, with all the associated legal and economic issues. Whether introducing women into the infantry will adversely affect unit cohesion must be analyzed through our common human experience and as enlightened by those veterans, who can speak to the nature and necessity of unit cohesion for success in battle.

These are the military issues surrounding Secretary Panetta’s directive. It is incumbent on those military members with knowledge and experience to now enter the debate to inform the American people.
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Notes


23. Ibid., 34-35.
29. Haynie and Haynie, 49.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
36. Ibid. 3.
39. Haynie and Haynie, 49; McGrath, 48; MacKenzie, 36-37.
46. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981). Supreme Court held all-male draft constitutional because purpose of draft is to raise combat troops, and Congress excluded women from combat.
47. Title 50 U.S. Code § 453.
49. Karpinos, 7.
51. Ibid.
53. Ibid. Peaceetime draft of 1957 inducted 138,000.
59. Christina Silva, “Navy Seeks to Combat High Rate of Unplanned Pregnancies,” Stars and Stripes, 7 January 2013, http://www.stripes.com/news/navy-seeks-to-combat-high-rate-of-unplanned-pregnancies-1.203122?localLinksEnabled=false (accessed 17 November 2014). The Navy is attempting to cope with a 74 percent unintended pregnancy rate (25 percent higher than the national average); Belmont, Goodman, and Waterman, “Disease and Non-battle Injuries Sustained by a Few Armies-Women Out of Theater due to Reproductive-Related Conditions, 74 Percent of which were pregnancies.
60. Desilver. Only 20 percent of Congress members are veterans versus highs of 77 percent in 1978.
What the Female Engagement Team Experience Can Teach Us About the Future of Women in Combat

Ashley Nicolas
The status of women in combat arms units is a frequent topic in today’s media. Between the admittance of women into The Basic School of the U.S. Marine Corps and the trial phase of the U.S. Army Ranger School, voices can be heard on both sides of the aisle arguing over the perceived capabilities of women in these roles. The prevailing discourse has been the debate over what women can handle, physically and emotionally, and what they are not fundamentally equipped to sustain. Others argue that this is an equal rights issue—that women should be allowed into the ranks simply because men are allowed. Yet, the issue is not whether or not America’s women can rise to the challenge; the issue is that modern warfare requires women to be an integral part of combat forces.

The Need for Female Engagement Teams

The necessity of women in these roles was revealed over the last decade of warfare. The successes experienced by units in the Army, Special Forces, and the Marine Corps during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom—using everything from “Lioness” teams to female engagement teams (FETs) and cultural support teams—prove that modern warfare is changing the role of women in combat. One after action review credits a particular FET with searching hundreds of compounds and thousands of women, and uncovering critical intelligence by members of the team.¹

These anecdotal results were indicative of the success achieved by many units that deployed with FETs. The current operational environment presents an enemy who uses the lack of women in U.S. combat arms as a tactical weakness. The terror group Boko Haram has seen a disturbing spike in the number of women and girls volunteering as suicide bombers. It has been reported that female suicide bombers affiliated with Boko Haram have carried out “more than a dozen attacks ... with some attacks claiming up to 78 victims.”² The use of female suicide bombers in order to exploit cultural sensitivities, as well as the inability of male soldiers to gain intelligence from women and children, weakens the ability of U.S. forces to fight effectively.³ Further, those same conflicts are occurring in regions where cultural sensitivity is paramount, highlighting the critical need for female soldiers to conduct specific tasks that male soldiers are unable to execute. If the recent rise of the self-proclaimed Islamic State is any indication, these conditions will not be changing in the near future.

A 2003 study by the National Center for Women and Policing found that “women officers rely on a style of policing that uses less physical force, are better at defusing and de-escalating potentially violent confrontations with citizens, and are less likely to become involved in problems with use of excessive force.”⁴ These findings are certainly something to consider given that the population in most of our recent conflicts was considered the center of gravity.

The U.S. Border Patrol has also recognized this need. As recently reported by the Associated Press, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (of which the Border Patrol is a part) “acquired a federal exemption to recruit strictly female agents.”⁵ Reasons stated by the agency included needing assistance interfacing with women and children as well as assistance searching women—needs that directly mirror the needs of the U.S. military. Given the role of the Army in humanitarian missions, namely the fight against Ebola, the prevalence of building relationships and working among host-nation populations will continue to grow as part of the Army mission.

However, some arguments for the mainstream integration of women into line units have some validity. Some studies suggest that women are far more prone to injury during training than men. According to the 2011 report *Musculoskeletal Injuries in Military Women,* “the combination of anatomy and physiology appears to predispose women to a higher risk of pelvic stress fractures and knee damage.”⁶ The report states that female soldiers are “about 67 percent more likely than male soldiers to be discharged for a musculoskeletal disorder.”⁷

These statistics, as well as the physically demanding requirements of many of these jobs, have called into question the number of women physically qualified to volunteer for these positions. Despite assurances from the Pentagon that high qualification standards will be maintained, skeptics wonder if standards will ultimately be lowered to answer the call for the presence of women by those solely
focused on equality.” As former Army Lt. Col. Robert Maginnis told Time magazine, “Pentagon brass are kowtowing to their political masters and radical feminists to remove exemptions for women in ground combat in defiance of overwhelming scientific evidence.”

Despite these claims, the need for women in situations where combat is likely cannot be denied. This then begs the question: What is best way to employ women as a combat multiplier? There is a strong argument for the presence of women in a separate “engager” military occupational specialty (MOS) specifically designed to fit within infantry units. This MOS would be designed to satisfy the need that has been identified by taking the most qualified women who meet both the physical and mental standards of the infantry but also satisfactorily complete additional training to address the unique role that women would play in these units. Recent experiences of FETs preparing for deployment to Afghanistan provide a model for the potential implementation of such a program and the challenges that exist in selecting, resourcing, and training.

**Experiences with the Female Engagement Team**

In 2011-2012, I had the honor of serving as the FET leader for the 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), 2nd Infantry Division, based out of Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington. 4th SBCT deployed to Regional Command-South in Afghanistan in the fall of 2012. We knew prior to the deployment that 4th SBCT would primarily be functioning as “battlespace owners” in the Panjwai District with a support battalion on Kandahar Airfield.

Nine months prior to the deployment, the decision was made to augment the brigade with a FET. This decision was made for several reasons. First, many of the brigade’s responsibilities would include work at the village level, especially during base closures. Additionally, around the same time that 4th SBCT began planning for deployment, an Army requirement was released that mandated FETs for brigades deploying to Afghanistan. In many ways, this requirement was the direct result of the successes that teams had experienced in prior rotations.

Because the decision to form the team was made so early, 4th SBCT had the luxury of nine months of training prior to the deployment. Unfortunately, because we were resourcing the brigade team internally, we did not have the ability to pull any female soldier who was interested in joining the team. Once we eliminated those who were not medically eligible to deploy and those who were mission essential, we were left with a fairly small group of women to train.

This brings me to my first point: It is critical that women selected for these roles are volunteers who are valued for their unique skill set, not “extra” soldiers performing an additional duty. If an MOS was created specifically to fill the role of “engagers,” brigades would not be stretched thin trying to fill this requirement from their own ranks. Further, when the time and resources spent on the team are taken from the brigade organically, the FET can be seen as a distraction from the rest of the mission rather than an added capability.

This also creates a situation where the FET is fighting against every other unit in the brigade for resources. Without a specific line in the modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE), the FET is often left without a strong representative in that fight. 1 I specifically remember drawn-out fights over the assignment of M9 pistols to team members. Although it should have been obvious...
why there was a need, because the engagement team was not a line item listed on the brigade MTOE, the unit was seen as a logistical liability and not as an asset that needed to be equipped.

As the 4th SBCT training plan was developed, a strong relationship was formed between FET leadership and the Comprehensive Soldier and Family Fitness team at Joint Base Lewis-McChord. The training plan focused on the “whole soldier” concept—developing soldiers who were well rounded physically, mentally, and spiritually. Soldiers were selected for the team by demonstrating maturity, a willingness to adapt, and a strong commitment to teamwork. The training plan developed with Comprehensive Soldier and Family Fitness team featured several sessions on the development of team identity, communication, building mental toughness, goal setting, and resilience. This was combined with a concentrated effort to build “engager skills” that included work with Fort Huachuca mobile training teams and cultural training programs to ensure team members were well versed in interpersonal skills, report writing, cultural sensitivity, and communication.

Further training was conducted with the brigade military police platoon to focus on detainee operations and personnel and vehicle searches. This would be a critical point in developing a new MOS. It is worth noting that women filling roles in front-line units would not just be female infantrymen. These women would need to develop key skills that would make them an invaluable asset of that unit. As female soldiers in these positions, they would need to be prepared to fill a role that is a unique combination of a military police officer, a human intelligence collector, and a civil affairs soldier. This combination takes special training, careful selection, and a deliberate effort on the part of Army Human Resources Command to ensure that
they are placed in the right positions at the right times to be best leveraged.

**Creating Opportunities for Women**

As an Army, we have trained countless women to fill these roles in the last decade, but because of a lack of a real system of accountability, of uniformity in training, or of proper evaluation, there is no way to account for the level or quality of FET training across the Army.

Further, because no supporting personnel tracking and evaluation system existed, many of the women who volunteered for these roles ultimately did not receive the credit they deserved (awards or evaluations), and were therefore ultimately punished for their courage in taking on these roles. They did not enjoy the boost to their careers that many of their male counterparts did, nor did they enjoy due recognition for their efforts even though they fought side-by-side with their brothers-in-arms.

This lack of benefit was often due to a lack of understanding. Although a soldier’s Enlisted Record Brief may state that she served on an FET, the wide variations in quality of training, levels of experience, and standards for performance make it very hard to measure performance against a soldier who has served in a widely understood and accepted position, such as infantry team leader.

Additionally, soldiers who have served on FETs in the past decade have often been coded as “over strength” in order to allow for personnel transactions that enabled their transfer into an infantry unit. This, combined with inconsistent and unreliable applications of the Army’s FET additional skill identifier, makes it very difficult for soldiers to demonstrate their accomplishments — in proper documentation — for promotion boards.

This lack of recognition serves to create “two classes of service members based on gender — [of] which neither preserves a legitimate national security interest nor shields women from enemy fire. Instead, it protects and perpetuates the brass ceiling that women in the military have yet to shatter.” The advent of an engager MOS would help to change all of that.
Separately, none of the above would change the need to open the door to Ranger School to all women, regardless of MOS. Currently, Ranger School is seen as the premier leadership development school available to young soldiers and officers. Excluding women from the school denies them the experiences, training, and recognition that accompany graduation. This barrier ultimately affects promotion rates, job opportunities, and perpetuates the feeling that women are “guests” in infantry units, where they have not had an opportunity to prove their credibility. By running a trial phase, providing training opportunities for women, and maintaining high standards, it seems that the Army is handling this integration the right way and tackling the challenge head on. It is my hope that regardless of the outcome, the doors will remain open to all those who qualify.

Conclusion
Although U.S. forces are closing the chapter on Afghanistan, conflicts with Islamic extremists do not seem to be going away anytime soon. The Army should continue to prepare for situations in which women will play a key role in engaging with the population, interfacing with leaders, and satisfying a tactical necessity. The nature of modern warfare necessitates that women be trained and ready to fill these roles within the U.S. military. The current situation, in which selection and training for soldiers filling these critical roles are left to the unit, cannot persist. It is time for the Army to identify key skills, standardize training, and create an MOS that will continue the successes of past FETs and cultural support teams for decades to come.
With the assistance of an interpreter, 1st Lt. Alex Graves, 2nd Platoon leader with Company F, 2nd Battalion, 506th Infantry Regiment, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, speaks with an Afghan National Army commander with the 3rd Koy, 3rd Kandak, 1st Brigade, 203rd Corps during a mission in Khost Province, Afghanistan, 30 May 2013.

The Art of Command and the Science of Control
Brigade Mission Command in Garrison and Operations

Col. Val Keaveny, U.S. Army, and
Col. Lance Oskey, U.S. Army
This article is intended to provide a system and some tools to enhance the practical application of brigade-level mission command, both in garrison and in operations. As a former brigade commander and battalion commander and former task force senior observer/controller at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), I, Col. Val Keaveny, have spent the last ten years of my military service focused on exercising mission command at the battalion and brigade levels.

Our brigade (506th Infantry Regiment, 4th Brigade Combat Team) was given a diverse mission set during our recent nine-month deployment to eastern Afghanistan that included an advise-and-assist mission, traditional security operations, aggressive equipment retrograde, and forward operating base (FOB) and combat outpost closure requirements. The brigade assumed additional missions as the conditions and requirements changed, which included assuming responsibility for four additional provinces, relocating our brigade tactical operations center to a separate province, and establishing a command and control headquarters for future use as a general officer headquarters. This article outlines tools that, throughout all of this, were essential to our brigade’s ability to accomplish missions.

Michael Flynn and Chuck Schrankel’s 2013 Military Review article “Applying Mission Command Through the Operations Process” defines and summarizes why mission command as doctrine and practice is so important, but it lacks specificity on how to implement mission command within the setting of a battalion- or brigade-size element.1 To fill the gap, this article describes the eight critical tools our brigade combat team developed as part of a functional mission command construct. These tools are interconnected and designed to complement each other. These mission command tools serve to augment commander-centric activities (such as battlefield reconnaissance and commander’s estimate) in order to accomplish the mission. These tools are not new or novel, but the discipline in ensuring they are nested, updated, and enforceable is critical to overall success:

- Commander’s intent
- Campaign plan framework
- Cyclic decision-making process (targeting)
- Battle rhythm
- Terms of reference
- Definition of “the fights”
- Long-range calendar
- Knowledge management system

There are many other mechanisms, systems, and organizations (such as tactical operations center, operational design, crisis-action planning sequence, and deliberate linear planning using the Army’s military decisionmaking process [MDMP]) that are critical to overall mission success, but the tools listed above were critical to our implementation of mission command.

Commander’s Intent: Sharing a Vision

In Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations, the term commander’s intent is defined as a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state that supports mission command, provides focus to the staff, and helps subordinate and supporting commanders act to achieve the commander’s desired results without further orders, even when the operation does not unfold as planned.2

This first mission command tool allowed me to share my vision and direction with the staff and subordinate units. The last portion of the definition is critical, as I drafted my initial commander’s intent into a formal document during the brigade’s most recent deployment to Afghanistan six months prior to assuming responsibility in theater—and that document went largely unchanged until significant operational and tactical changes to the environment and mission dictated an update.

During Operation Enduring Freedom, this document (paired with our “campaign plan framework”) allowed me to provide operational guidance to battalion commanders, senior security force advisors, and my brigade staff that was equally applicable to the rifle company commander or senior Afghan advisor. As I conducted battlefield circulation, I initially checked my company-level leaders on two areas: first, that security measures were properly planned and executed; and second, that the commanders understood my intent. While I did not expect company commanders to be able to recite the details under each line of effort from my campaign framework (though battalion commanders and staffs did need this level of detail), I absolutely expected them to understand and adhere to my intent.
Campaign Plan Framework: A Road Map to Achieving Your Intent

In JP 5-0, Joint Operational Planning, a campaign plan is defined as a series of related major operations aimed at accomplishing strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. Planning for a campaign is appropriate when the contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major operation. Thus, campaigns are often the most extensive joint operations in terms of time and other resources. Campaign planning has its greatest application in the conduct of large-scale combat operations, but can be used across the range of military operations.  

Joint and Army doctrine do not formally recognize a campaign plan (per the doctrinal definition) as a tool at the tactical level of Army operations. However, most units since the early days of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom have created and nested their deployment operations across time and space using the campaign model. In fact, given that the missions and the complexities of operations far exceed established doctrinal planning constructs, I have found the creation of a campaign framework (both in garrison and deployed) as a natural and necessary complement to my commander’s intent. My intent rarely changed; however, my campaign plan was updated (iteratively based on our planning cycles, and then only after a thorough and deliberate planning process recommended such changes) to reflect changes that were less seismic than those that would have required an update to my intent.

In garrison, I structured my campaign plan around three logical lines of effort: leader development, training, and fortifying the team. In combat, my three lines of effort were Afghan National Security Force development, security operations, and retrograde. In both cases, the end state to my campaign plans matched my commander’s intent, but the milestones, objectives, and subordinate lines of effort changed periodically to match the realities on the ground.

As the campaign plan and my intent served as the (largely) unchanging azimuth for our operations, the cyclic decision-making process allowed the brigade to make small course corrections along the way.

Targeting: Timely Cyclic Decision Making

Targeting is defined in JP 3-0 as “the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities.”

Although our brigade used the Army’s doctrinal MDMP for some of our conventional planning (e.g., initial campaign plan development and redeployment operation order), we found that the use of a targeting-style decision-making process was more responsive to the fast pace of operations, and it directly nested with my campaign plan. Although there are several approaches to targeting within our Army, I define targeting simply as a deliberate, cyclic planning process. My initial targeting cycle was two weeks, as I found this to be adequate to preempt changing conditions during our deployment. I later elongated the process to a four-week cycle after the end of the fighting season (i.e., the warm-weather months in Afghanistan). In fact, the length of the process was not as important as executing the same targeting process we fine-tuned during our JRTC deployment where it was a three-day model. The most important input from using a targeting model (versus the MDMP) is the subordinate commander assessment that starts each cycle. Immediate orders production allows the battalion an entire targeting cycle to refine planning before execution at the company level.

Planning six weeks prior to execution allowed me to shape events at the brigade level in a synchronized, coordinated manner despite being spread across two provinces and partnering with a multitude of Afghan Security Force organizations. My targeting ensured that, although tactical operations and unit-level advising occurred daily at the platoon, company, troop, and security force advisory and assistance team (SFAAT) level, all activities nested toward a common brigade end state.

I viewed our battle not as a thousand unrelated tactical engagements but as a thousand interconnected tactical engagements united by a common end state and achieved through common objectives that we established in our targeting meeting. At the end of each targeting cycle, we published a targeting fragmentary order that prioritized and synchronized assets (time, resources, and priorities) over the duration of the targeting cycle. The targeting cycle allowed me to prioritize and synchronize the key tasks from my
commander’s intent to match the tactical and operational challenges during a given time period.

**Battle Rhythm: Small Steps Lead to Big Change**

In Field Manual (FM) 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, Army doctrine defines battle rhythm as “a deliberate daily cycle of command, staff, and unit activities intended to synchronize current and future operations.”

With the commander’s intent and campaign plan framework setting the azimuth, and the targeting cycle providing course correction, the daily maintenance of the brigade’s effort was achieved through rigid adherence to the battle rhythm. The brigade battle rhythm document (expertly managed by the brigade executive officer) served to define the timing, attendance, inputs, and outputs of every brigade meeting, briefing, and working group over the course of the week and month. With changes and deletions approved by exception, strict adherence to the battle rhythm allowed me, and my staff, to quickly and efficiently maintain a common estimate of the situation. Adherence to the battle rhythm provided predictability to my commanders and senior SFAAT leaders (who knew when I required their attendance at critical meetings) and ensured that my visualization of the battlefield was shared with the staff and entire brigade. For example, our daily battle update brief, usually completed in 45 minutes, served as my daily staff estimate update. More than just a recitation of facts and figures, this briefing served as the mission analysis for our brigade’s lethal targeting cycle—normally executed within the following 24 to 48 hours based on the air tasking order and availability of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms. This meeting was critical to creating an agile force. The battle rhythm provided the mechanism by which we were able to plan and react to significant mission and task changes during our deployment.

When our brigade was given the mission to move its tactical operations center from the well-established FOB Salerno to a significantly smaller outpost located in another province (which had no infrastructure for such a move), our battle rhythm allowed us to plan, prepare for, and execute this move. The meetings, briefs, and working groups were all previously determined—the staff merely had to adjust the topics and agendas for each meeting to address the topics at hand (I say this fully acknowledging the herculean staff work associated with each of these operations). Rarely did we have to convene special planning sessions to address the latest mission change. Closing major FOBs early,
assuming multiple provinces as additional battle space, creating the headquarters for a new one-star headquarters—these are just a few of the significant transitions that our brigade was tasked to accomplish—in addition to (not in place of) our existing mission set.

Terms of Reference, Definition of “The Fights,” Long-Range Calendar, and Knowledge Management System

The last four tools are those that I considered essential to maintain optimal effectiveness and operational synchronization. As with all of my products, I had a garrison and deployment version of each, but they served the same purpose: to provide common definitions, expectations, and norms to staff products that, when properly completed and regularly updated, provided value to the staff and commanders.

Our “terms of reference” document listed the duty positions and expectations of the key commissioned and noncommissioned officers within the brigade. Although relatively bland on first look, this document was essential when we were tasked with establishing a one-star headquarters. To meet the requirements of the new headquarters, we were able to use the terms of reference as a base document and efficiently update it with new positions and new duties that we previously did not have to fill.

Our task organization document was similar to those that all units prepare and update. However, when dealing with unfamiliar command structures or new organizations, this document was again critical to get right as we executed multiple major transitions. For example, at one point our brigade was responsible for half of a province in which we had no forces assigned—and the provincial capital was owned by a coalition force with separate national caveats. Under these circumstances, a clear task organization and well-defined responsibilities were essential.

The nondoctrinal document titled “the fights” was born out of my experience as an observer/controller, where seemingly every asset known to exist in the Army inventory was assigned to the company commander who was in direct- or indirect-fire contact at the moment. The overwhelmed company commander had neither the ability nor the time to properly deconflict and synchronize each asset for best use. “The fights” document defined the responsibilities of the company, battalion, and
brigade leaders and staffs based on the unique mission set assigned. I required its use for all major missions. For example, our retrograde effort required tremendous effort from the company leaders from a manpower standpoint, but the bulk of the effort in planning and execution was by the battalion and brigade staffs. This document also proved invaluable in determining roles and responsibilities for our SFAAT mission and the establishment of the one-star headquarters.

Finally, the long-range calendar and knowledge management system captured the results of our daily, weekly, and monthly planning sessions. The calendar allowed us to ensure that our operations remained synchronized with the many other variables of time (to include Afghan holidays and seasonal weather patterns). The establishment of and adherence to a collaborative knowledge management system (we used the portal for almost all of our work) was critical to ensuring that the information available was mutually shared.

I always carried with me only a few documents: my campaign plan, our latest targeting slide summary, and the long-range calendar. I was able to conduct battlefield circulation for a few hours, or even a few days, with the confidence that our units and staffs were working toward achieving my intent by way of our measurable objectives through the execution of our targeting cycle and daily battle rhythm.

Mission command involves a complex mix of both prescriptive and detailed control mechanisms that allow subordinate commanders to execute mission orders at the point of execution within their commander’s intent. Too much adherence to a process can result in an environment that appears micromanaged, yet a lack of structure results in staff and unit activities that are frantic, ill timed, and unsynchronized against common objectives and end states.

**Recommendations: Continuing to Refine Mission Command**

The tools and techniques outlined in this article served me well, and I have recommended their use to numerous brigade commanders during my tenure as the JRTC brigade task force senior observer/controller and as a brigade commander. However, I realize that some of these tools are not doctrinal and therefore may not be universally taught in our schoolhouses and training centers. In conclusion, I offer several recommendations.

First, I am convinced that a planning model based on campaign planning is an extremely valuable tool for battalion and brigade commanders to help visualize, describe, and direct the actions of their organizations. I used a campaign plan model in garrison and in combat that was nested with the plans of my higher headquarters. The use of this tool is a natural next step in the use of the Army design methodology. Even without formal codification, I strongly recommend its use.

Second, I recommend that leaders identify a cyclical planning process to continuously revisit, measure, and adjust their long-range and campaign plans. The Army’s structured staff planning methods are the MDMP and the troop leading procedures. Doctrinally, Army targeting consists of a formal process within the fires warfighting function to synchronize indirect and joint fires against a given set of targets. Our brigade combined the rigor of the MDMP within the framework of a targeting model to allow our brigade to shape our environment.

Third, I recommend formalizing a daily targeting-style planning process to rapidly address emerging problems, tasks, or threats. Our training centers have identified some best practices, but I would recommend that the Army codify our lethal and nonlethal targeting techniques as practiced over the last 12 years and update our doctrine.

Fourth, knowledge management training should include accreditation of SharePoint and other technical systems (such as Command Post of the Future [CPOF] and SharePoint) for officers assigned to the brigade level. We had a multitalented knowledge management officer, but he lacked the formal training in the technical use of commonly fielded systems. Additionally, mission command information systems still require extensive use of contractors for maintenance, and they are not universally compatible (e.g., CPOF and SharePoint).

Finally, I know that these mission command techniques and procedures enabled our brigade to accomplish a wide variety of missions—and ultimately save lives. However, at the point of execution, soldiers and leaders displaying adherence to high standards, discipline, and teamwork while executing with an agile and adaptive mindset were as important as the plans and orders that were published. That focus on soldier, leader, and team development is what motivated me to ensure that my systems for exercising mission command were at their best so that we would truly maximize the potential of the team.
Col. Val Keaveny is serving as the 101st Airborne Division’s chief of staff. He was the last brigade commander for the 4th Brigade Combat Team (506th Infantry Regiment), 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) before its inactivation. He commanded 3rd Battalion, 509th Infantry Regiment in Iraq. He holds a B.S. in aviation management/flight technology from Florida Institute of Technology, an M.M.A.S. from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and an M.S.S. from the U.S. Army War College.

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Notes

4. JP 3-0.

Strike Force

A Case Study in Mission Command at Battalion Level and Below, Kandahar, 2010

Anthony Carlson, Ph.D., an iBook from the Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Now available in iTunes

The case study includes maps, video, and other elements to illustrate mission command principles in action. To download Strike Force from iTunes, go to: https://itunes.apple.com/us/book/strike-force/id716830363?ls=1
On a lonely forward operating base in Iraq, an 18-year-old private, who five months before worried only about whom he might take to the prom, listens carefully to his commanding officer as if his life depends on it. It does. The soldier’s mission is to deliver critical supplies to units spread across his region. The commander orders him not to stop on the road for anything—even for children blocking the road. The enemy uses them to obstruct the road, hoping soldiers’ moral sense will cause them to stop their vehicles,
which leaves convoys open for attack. If he should meet any children on the road, the soldier is ordered to run them down if they refuse to get out of the way.\(^1\)

Four Navy SEALs (members of a sea-air-land team) drop into an isolated village in Afghanistan to identify the location of a Taliban commander. Their operation is exposed when they are discovered by a young shepherd boy and his companions. The SEALs agonize over whether they should kill the shepherds and continue the mission or let them go. By freeing them, the SEALs undoubtedly will alert others to their presence, bringing probable death and mission failure.\(^2\)

Four insurgents kneel blindfolded before the squad of soldiers who captured them. These same insurgents were captured and handed over to the Iraqi government twice before. Each time they were released to fight again. The previous night, these same insurgents had injured U.S. soldiers with a command-detonated improvised explosive device—the wounded were members of the same squad as those now holding the insurgents at gunpoint. After conferring with the battalion commander, the platoon sergeant—having sworn to protect the lives of his men—moves deliberately to a position behind the kneeling insurgents. He takes out his M9 Beretta pistol and fires a bullet through the head of each prisoner.\(^3\)

These types of morally complex quandaries of war could be considered part of what is commonly called the fog of war. This idea, attributed to famed strategist Carl von Clausewitz, refers to the uncertainty and ambiguity that surround military operations.\(^4\) Former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara explains: “What the fog of war means is—war is so complex it’s beyond the ability of the human mind to comprehend all the variables. Our judgment, our understanding, are not adequate. And we kill people unnecessarily.”\(^5\)

**A Complex Moral Decision**

In war, soldiers make judgments of life and death. The magnitude of such absolute decisions is nearly beyond comprehension. No remediation can change the outcome of killing, justifiable or not. When faced with killing someone, soldiers often try to synthesize moral and legal values with their mission, their safety, and the safety of fellow soldiers. They may struggle with the decision to kill, and eventually
they may struggle with the memory of killing for many years afterward.

When soldiers make decisions about killing, they make moral choices. When soldiers have time to consider a moral problem and make a decision, their thought process usually integrates an ethical foundation of personal concepts of virtue that influence intent, rules that guide actions, and the consequences likely to follow the decision. Even if all these things are understood theoretically, applying these moral concepts is not a habit in the average soldier. Therefore, when a decision must be made and action taken in the moment, the conscience is morally disengaged. The enormity of the decision is only considered in the aftermath.

In the dense fog of war, soldiers need more than these sometimes-competing frameworks ranked by the dominant value and only contemplated when given the opportunity after the fact. Soldiers need a way to understand and apply moral guidance and internalize moral standards as second nature to all their actions. This essay proposes that the principles of just war theory can help soldiers develop a clear moral vision when they have to measure out whether to kill.

Ideally, soldiers take life in the belief they will make the world a better place—or at least prevent it from getting worse. They believe their actions in war, while unpleasant, are necessary. They feel morally responsible for protecting and defending others from malicious attack and unlawful assault. Of course, this is an idealized understanding of a soldier’s duty, which is intrinsically tied to trust and faith in the government of the United States.

The Nation’s decisions must be perceived as just and implemented to protect the American people or its allies rather than for selfish gain. This means that to maintain faith in the government, soldiers must believe that the war they fight is just. The standard for determining if war is just is known as just war theory, or justified war.6

Just war theory consists of criteria addressing justice in going to war (jus ad bellum), justice in waging war (jus in bello), and justice after the war (jus post bellum). The theory comprises a systematic application of moral reasoning for the decision to undertake armed conflict against another state. It includes conduct during war and after its completion. Just war theory claims that sometimes war may be justified and preferable to an immoral peace.7 But if war is to occur, it must be guided by morality, and the most evil aspects of warfare must be muted, limited, or eliminated.

Both jus ad bellum and jus post bellum are of great importance when a nation’s leaders are considering war. Their implications are strategic because they apply to the state giving guidelines for actions during and after war. Moreover, the strategic implications of decisions made by political and senior military officials have immediate tactical and operational effects on the military forces that prosecute the war.

Soldiers asked to give their lives or to take lives in defense of their country deserve a well-reasoned justification for their sacrifice and labor. To tell soldiers only that they will do their duty in unquestioning obedience is an abuse in a professional military. Soldiers will bear the aftereffects of such actions for a lifetime. They deserve to understand the meaning and purpose of their actions so they can manage and give order to the consequences.

In the same way, civilians in a democracy demand justification to provide both blood and treasure to any such endeavor. Sun Tzu, in the oldest known manuscript on war, postulates in his “First Constant” that before going to war, a state should consider “The Moral Law, which causes the people to be in complete accord with their ruler so that they will follow him regardless of their lives, undismayed by any danger.”8 This means that to maintain a fighting force willing to give their lives for a national goal, both the soldiers and the civilian population must believe their cause is right. Just war principles, when considered, can provide the moral high ground.

Just war principles provide moral, psychological, practical, and strategic reasons for conducting warfare, juxtaposed with enemies’ motives and actions that would lead to unacceptable devastation if not stopped by violent means. To help forces handle the moral dilemmas they stumble into in the fog of war, the military equips its personnel with principles of jus in bello—justice in waging war. Most military personnel know the applied form as the rules of engagement or the law of armed conflict. This is the codification of just war by treaty and international commitments as they apply to different situations and battlefields.
Soldiers need to understand the principles of jus in bello because they can help clarify moral reasoning. Jus in bello dominates other paradigms of moral justification for actions in war. When understood and applied, it dissipates much of the fog of war by guiding when the taking of life is appropriate and when it is not. The rest of this discussion focuses on applying jus in bello at the tactical level.

### Jus in Bello

Jus in bello, in its simplest form, can be broken down into two concepts: distinction and proportionality. Distinction concerns distinguishing between non-combatants (friendly and soldiers and civilians who are not actively involved in combat, so they are posing no threat) and combatants (all who are involved actively in combat). Civilians not participating in combat are, morally, immune from attack, although some could be injured or killed unintentionally in what is termed “collateral damage.” Prisoners are not combatants and should be safeguarded from attack. Proportionality concerns soldiers using only the amount of force necessary to meet the task, but no more. Both of these concepts are designed to limit the destruction of warfare.

While these concepts seem simple and straightforward, their application can be far more complicated. What really constitutes a combatant? Sometimes this is easily determined by the uniforms combatants wear. Yet, in irregular warfare, clear identification of an enemy may sometimes only be made when that enemy is firing a weapon. Furthermore, how can a person’s participation in warfare be ascertained? If civilians are manufacturing arms and equipment for the enemy, do they become lawful targets? These types of difficult questions illustrate the fog of war.

Soldiers struggle internally with a number of competing values in the fog of war, weighing the expediency of mission objectives and the cost of victory against actions they believe to be morally right. Overpowering emotions such as anger, grief, and revenge complicate their decision making. Moral codes of the profession of arms, the law of war, and the rules of engagement, although helpful, often are inadequate in the chaotic situations of war. Factoring in the relatively young average age of a soldier in combat and the limited time available for making a decision, the difficulty of moral decisions in war becomes evident.

At least jus in bello, through the concepts of distinction and proportionality, provides a baseline for determining the actions that would be moral. For example, it is clear that a civilian—even a citizen of an enemy state—who is not an immediate participant in combat, is an unlawful target. Similarly, it is clear that destroying an entire town to kill a few enemy combatants is morally wrong. There is a baseline, a point of reference from which to decide.

The U.S. Army as an institution is not blind to the difficulty of these situations, and it does not want command authority preempted by legalities. Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22, Army Leadership, tasks commanders, officers, and other leaders to apply ethical reasoning to different situations using character traits and beliefs developed in the individual when the rules of engagement and law of armed conflict prove insufficient. Therefore, there is a place for value judgments. The Army puts its full faith in the moral judgment of its leaders on the battlefield. However, to understand moral decisions in combat, one must also understand the community of the warrior.

### The Warrior Society and Moral Leadership

Personal survival on the battlefield is a group effort. Individual ethics and adherence to principles of jus in bello are played out within the context of the group, within a society of warriors. A soldier belongs to concentric circles of groups, from team, squad, platoon, and company, to battalion, brigade, division, and even higher. The group dynamic is paramount to survival, and soldiers fight in the smallest of these warrior society groups.

Not all are equal within the group; some hold status because of rank, technical skill, or strong personality. Nevertheless, the fear of losing one’s reputation in these groups because of moral lapses, lack of courage, or ineptitude during the fight can be a stronger motivator than avoiding losing one’s life. These thoughts are echoed by Albert Bandura in his social cognitive theory, where he states,

People do not operate as autonomous moral agents impervious to the social realities in which they are immersed. Moral agency is socially situated and exercised in particularized ways depending on the life conditions under which people transact their affairs.
Unfortunately, a group’s norms can lead to individuals conducting extreme violations of ethical standards derived from jus in bello. The group and the leaders can also emphasize immoral behavior that leads to disengagement of a soldier’s moral sense. If the leadership of a unit begins to fail in addressing even minor infractions of discipline, especially those related to human dignity, soldiers can easily lose their core moral beliefs. The type of conduct that should proceed from moral beliefs can become lost as well. This process can quickly change the moral atmosphere of even the best units, making them susceptible to moral disengagement and the war crimes that follow.

Justin Watt, who served in the Black Hearts platoon, Company B, 1st Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, describes how his leaders, after nine months in one of the most hostile areas of Iraq, stopped caring about discipline in regard to the little things:

They stopped correcting soldiers when they used terms like “rag head” in reference to the Iraqis. It was in their attitude. They just did not care anymore. It sent an immediate signal to the soldiers that certain attitudes and even actions were now permissible. It all started from there and quickly got worse.

Some members of Watt’s platoon would go on to commit one of the worst atrocities of the Iraq War, involving rape and murder. Similarly, a soldier who participated in the infamous massacre of My Lai during the Vietnam War describes his actions after his leadership abandoned all moral guidance:

You didn’t have to look for people to kill, they were just there. I cut their throats, cut off their hands, cut out their tongues, and scalped them. I did it. A lot of people were doing it, and I just followed. I just lost all sense of direction.

Base and cruel natures hidden in the depths of the human soul can surface during the stress of combat, surprising those who believe such natures do not exist in themselves. Some acts of cruelty proceed naturally from character flaws, while others are a side effect of the state’s mechanized brutality that is intrinsic to war. Without an outside authority reemphasizing and holding to standards, even those who enter combat with a sense of moral principles can lose their way.

Leaders, officially sanctioned or chosen by consensus of the group, are key to the moral conduct of a unit. Moral leadership of those in command, exemplified by virtue and strengthened by the moral principles established in jus in bello, can steady those around them assaulted by the horrors of war.

However, that does not mean that soldiers hold special immunity to perpetrating atrocity in units with virtuous leadership. Even with the support of moral codes and good leadership, soldiers must confront the dissonance within them and master it. At times, some choose to value priorities such as victory or survival over convictions about what is right. Others simply fail their own sense of honor when confronted by the extremes of combat and when overcome by strong emotion. These soldiers disengage their moral belief system in favor of other priorities they value more highly in the moment.

**Victory Over Honor**

Practical concerns for victory drive some soldiers to put their consciences and rules of war aside. In offensive maneuvers, the speed and superiority of firepower can mean the difference between victory and defeat, and the management of prisoners can hinder a unit’s effectiveness. Sending soldiers to secure prisoners’ transfers to the rear leaves combat units weaker and more vulnerable to counterattack. Diverting vital offensive personnel to secure prisoners who had killed or maimed members of the unit moments before is a risk some are unwilling to take. After all, if defeated, they could never be sure their own lives would be spared by the enemy to which they surrendered.

Sometimes the calculus of victory wins out over honor or other concerns, even the condition of the soul. If soldiers believe their only choice is victory or death, then for some nothing is sacred or off-limits to achieve victory. The motive becomes completely utilitarian, where victory can supersede all wrongs. The laws of war, along with the values of a nation or a religious faith, are set aside for victory. Such a vision is morally repugnant to adherents of Christian religions, as illustrated in the Gospel of Matthew: “What good will it be for someone to gain the whole world, yet forfeit their soul?” A more worldly view, however, holds victory in
much higher esteem, as we can see from the history of

Henry’s actions at the battle of Agincourt, 1415, illustrate a case of choosing victory over
honor. Beset by a superior force of French knights
on French soil, Henry V broke with the medieval
chivalric code to secure victory. After surviving
two waves of French attackers, Henry expected a
third assault that would break his defenses. Fearing
an uprising from the multitude of prisoners he had
captured during the first two waves, he ordered his
knights to kill the prisoners.

After the noble knights refused, Henry turned to
his archers, who stood outside the chivalric system.
More than 200 of his archers began killing the pris-
oners. Once the French attack did not materialize,
The king rescinded his directive.

Morality was set aside for the practical goal of
victory. Henry, nominally a Christian king, knew
such actions were considered murder, but his actions
were calculated to win the day. His victory was glo-
ified and romanticized by Shakespeare, and Henry’s
moral lapse faded from memory.18 No doubt Henry’s
actions steeled French resistance to English claims,
which prolonged one of the longest wars in world
history, the Hundred Years War.

For the U.S. Army, to be victorious outside its own
ethic and moral identity would be equal to being de-
feated from within.19 The Army’s approach to victory
is based on the expected morality of its soldiers, who
represent the American people. If the pursuit of victory
in war can motivate some to set aside moral trappings,
personal survival can be even more powerful. The basic
human instinct for survival is universal.

Survival Over Honor

Combat is a physically and emotionally turbulent
environment where emotional extremes climb and
fall unexpectedly. The reality of death and violence
drives the human condition to its limits. In this atmo-

sphere, physical survival can dominate, driving all other
concerns to a secondary position. Notions of victory,
honor, or obedience to law recede while base kill-or-be-
killed instincts emerge.
One study shows that most people favor self-interest over principled reasoning. This supports Abraham Maslow’s famous psychological theory of a hierarchy of needs, whereby a deficiency in physical safety turns the need to survive into the prime impulse. Some soldiers will do whatever is necessary to survive, even if it means violating their conscience. Moreover, human beings may feel that as long as they are alive, they can seek forgiveness. When a person dies, all is finished. Biblical scripture conveys the idea that where there is life, there is hope: “Even a live dog is better off than a dead lion.” Basic instincts of survival and victory are material expressions of human existence. Their vision tends to be limited to the here and now, and it precludes a transcendental existence after death. These drives, however, can be overridden by powerful emotions appealing to an even more primal response.

Revenge Over Honor

Emotions such as revenge can trigger an overpow- ering rage in combatants who see life violently ripped away in front of their eyes. Morality and concepts of rules in war slip to the back of the mind—disengaged—and become reluctant witnesses to atrocity. Once the passion of vengeance dissipates, the conscience will fight its way back and begin a separate battle for peace within the individual. Often, dominating vengeful emotions focus on the enemy, but in later psychoses, they may push an individual to attack innocents.

In his book Achilles in Vietnam, Jonathan Shay postulates that revenge in war is often linked to the deep psychological and cultural need to resurrect fallen comrades. Shay quotes a veteran who recalls revenge killings: “Every [expletive] one that died, I say, ‘____, here’s one for you, baby. I’ll take this mother[expletive] out and I’m going to cut his [expletive] heart out for you.’” The soldier was talking to his comrade as if he were alive and present. This illustrates that not only are the dead brought back to life through this sacrificial act of bloodletting but also feelings of helplessness and fear are banished. Keeping faith with friends’ ghosts who haunt the battlefield in the survivor’s mind affirms a sense of justice in the insanity of war, even if it is vengeance.

Americans should not fall into the delusion that their soldiers have any special immunity from the moral stressors and temptations of war. Like anyone, soldiers may suffer from lapses in character when tested by the extremes of combat. Even soldiers from the so-called “Greatest Generation” committed war crimes. During the liberation of St. Lo in France, after the horrors of fighting in the hedgerows, U.S. forces fanned out in bands of soldiers, gathering up surrendering German troops, summarily shooting them as they were taken into custody. Several chaplains witnessed these brutal actions and were appalled. One of the American soldiers went through the pockets of his German victim and found a picture of the soldier’s wife and baby. Out of guilt, he sought the chaplain and tried to justify his action by reasoning that “it was either him or me.” The chaplain angrily pointed out that this was hardly the case since the German bore no weapons and had his hands up in surrender when the soldier murdered him.

Many soldiers die spiritually in combat because they feel forced to betray what they believe to be right. They are haunted for the rest of their lives. One only needs to look through the ranks of American veterans to find high suicide rates. Moreover, drug abuse is higher among veterans than the rest of the population. In addition, homelessness and alcoholism are rampant among combat veterans. The soul can die before the body; it only takes longer for physical collapse. Such soldiers become like the living dead, the joy of life vanishing on the day of battle. They return home as shadows of their former selves, casualties of conscience. Therefore, to avoid this tragedy, it is imperative that each commander form an ethical command climate, as described in ADRP 6-22. This climate must be built on the foundation of jus in bello, as described in Field Manual (FM) 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare.

Human Desecration and Moral Injury

War, by its nature, causes innocents to suffer and die. Nations at war make mistakes, and the cost is paid in lives. At times, the orders established to protect the whole bring about the unintended deaths of civilians, a circumstance euphemistically referred to as collateral damage. However, these deaths may be excused by the law of armed conflict as a case of double effect, meaning that the deaths as a measured risk were not intentional nor an instrument of gain in the conflict.
Yet, killing of any kind still causes anguish in the human heart. The weight of this anguish crushes the human and unhinges the psyche. In fact, according to Roy L. Swank and Walter E. Marchand, an average human being can survive only 60 days of unremitting sustained combat before he or she breaks down mentally.30 Witnessing or perpetrating unjust killing is a particularly traumatic experience.

In a 2008 article, Pvt. 1st Class Earl Coffey describes an anguish-causing desecration from the Iraq War to correspondent Billy Cox.31 In the 2003 incident, a civilian vehicle had failed to stop, and this was interpreted as a threat:

I saw an Abrams [tank] fire a super sabot round right through a pickup truck, and the woman who got out begged us to kill her while she watched her husband and her children burn to death ... In perfect English, she's saying, "Why? Why are you doing this? We're Christians!"32

According to Shay, the ruin of the soul caused by the unraveling of moral character in the face of continued combat and traumatic experiences is termed moral injury, and it is associated with acute stress disorder, or post-traumatic stress disorder.33 During the American Civil War, it was called “soldier’s heart.” In World War I, it was called “shell shock.” In World War II, it was termed “combat fatigue.” In Vietnam, it would be called “combat stress reaction.”

Stress disorder focuses on the trauma of an event while moral injury focuses on grief, regret, betrayal, shame, and other spiritual aspects of combat. Combat operational stress affects all soldiers who participate in war, and most symptoms subside over time. However, prolonged combat—or particularly traumatic experiences—can leave soldiers affected for life.

A study by the Institute of Medicine of the National Academies reports that the majority of troops back from Iraq and Afghanistan have had few problems readjusting. The study finds that 44 percent report some difficulties, which may include depression and alcohol use. Of this group, another 3 to 20 percent will be affected with what is now termed “stress illness.”34 According to post-traumatic stress disorder expert Dr. Bridget Cantrell, soldiers without moral grounding appear to have a tougher time resisting post-traumatic stress disorder. Cantrell and Chuck Dean describe how one soldier who fought in Central
America and Grenada, after killing a number of people, lost much of his ability to cope when he came to the conclusion that his actions had betrayed his Christian upbringing, which had taught him to respect life.35 His moral disengagement and later realization of a loss of moral identity may have been prevented if combat training and command had emphasized the principles of jus in bello.

There would have been a doctrine to reinforce his beliefs and help him come to a moral conclusion on what he believed about his role and his actions as a soldier. Albert Bandura defined this process from a sociological framework, where individuals adopt standards of conduct that provide deterrents to bad behavior through self-respect and self-demands of ethical conduct.36

Soldiers should not contemplate their role and its implications only after an event. If leaders can help soldiers think about their values in advance, the shock of combat will be somewhat inoculated against many of these unforeseen stressors because soldiers will have a greater sense of their moral self.

Collapse of Character and Insanity
Shay describes one type of acute reaction to combat stress as the “berserker state.”37 According to Shay, the word comes from the ancient Norse warriors who fought in mad, uncontrolled states during combat. The berserker feels both beneath humanity as an animal and above it as a God.38

Shay relates how one soldier from Vietnam could not remember a single person he served with in two years of a berserker state. When this condition advances to an all-consuming force, soldiers are known to have killed friend and foe alike.39

According to his lawyer, Staff Sgt. Robert Bales, convicted of killing 16 Afghan civilians in Kandahar Province in March 2012, claims a similar disconnect from reality. He retains almost no memory of the atrocity. Bales claims symptoms consistent with post-traumatic stress disorder before committing the atrocities.40 Bales was on his fourth deployment and had been taking Valium, steroids, and alcohol before the incident.41

It is safe to assume that relatively few people commit atrocities in war, considering how many have served in militaries across the world. It may also be assumed that even fewer experience such a horrific disconnect from reality that they fall into insanity. However, no one who has seen war is unaffected.

In considering what is valued above honor and the effects discussed, only one course of action is prudent for a soldier to follow. That course of action is an idealistic approach that values what is believed to be right or good over self-interested urgencies that, ironically, lead to a loss of identity. This is the iconic prototype of virtue depicted in movies as the hero. It is the ideal that our society favors. Therefore, how does the military equip soldiers for moral survival in the dim fog of war? How does the military make them heroes? The answer is foundational to that same profession—it is found in jus in bello.42

Survivability Through Honor
For the individual, the long-standing idea that a strong ethical framework is an asset in combat remains true. Jus in bello is, and always has been, a buttress to the moral foundation that most soldiers bring with them into the military. A morally formed and disciplined soldier is an imperative to an effective fighting force. These attributes are described collectively as character and are espoused in Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-22, Army Leadership.43

In World War I, considered by many to be the first modern war, the soldier and his morality were weighed as one component of endurance in battle. The key to survival for the British soldier in the trenches was believed to be a morality born out of Christian belief, which was and is the state religion of the United Kingdom. At the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, students and faculty were obliged to subscribe to the Church of England’s Articles of Religion.44 The products of these institutions became the officer corps of the British forces. These officers instilled virtues such as temperance, loyalty, and candor in their soldiers. Most British officers believed this model of Christian virtues to be resilient in the stress of combat, providing a better chance of survival.45 Again, it was the society of the group that emphasized a moral code of conduct. Similar examples appear throughout history. A strong ethical framework guided individual soldiers in World War II as well.

During the invasion of Normandy, German and American soldiers sometimes found themselves being
treated side-by-side for wounds by opposing forces at battlefield aid stations across the area of operations. Donald Crosby describes how an American chaplain, Francis Sampson, witnessed a badly wounded German soldier crawl to a wounded American who had slipped off his litter onto the hard ground. The German soldier, in obvious pain, gently repositioned the critically wounded American into a more comfortable position. This would be the German soldier’s last act of kindness. He died later that night.


Their orders were to treat U.S. soldiers only. They were not to take German prisoners alive for the first 48 hours. Because of their Christian faith, they ignored this order. Control of the ground of their aid station changed hands numerous times as the fighting around them dragged on. They became overwhelmed with more than 80 German and American wounded soldiers bleeding in pews and even on the altar of the small stone church.

This aid station was defended only by a Red Cross flag when the wooden door of the church burst open. A German officer stood primed with machine gun tightly gripped at the ready, rage in his eyes. When he saw that German soldiers were being treated by the medics, the officer’s countenance quickly became serene as his rage drained away; he tearfully thanked the American medics for their care of his soldiers and promised to send a surgeon to assist with the wounded.

These examples show how soldiers even in the turmoil of combat can stay centered on their morality and spiritual belief, strengthened by the principles of jus in bello. While war may take lives and destroy the structures of civilization, it need not destroy a soldier’s identity as expressed in care for other human beings and adherence to sacred beliefs. Even the taking of life can be done with sober intent in relation to the enormity of the action. Jus in bello guides the soldier to recognize the humanity of the enemy, thus preventing dehumanization that can lead to atrocity and even genocide.

Victory Through Honor

In combat, the saying “death before dishonor” expresses virtue at all costs. However, such a sacrifice is not always required. Indeed, more times than not, honor and other virtues may assist in victory. There are times when moral behavior and adherence to jus in bello can support triumph not just for the individual but also for the force. Moral action not only is the right thing to do but also it is the most effective thing to do.

According to Dave Grossman, during World War I, U.S. soldiers had such a reputation of humane conduct that in World War II, many Germans advised their young relatives entering into service, “Be brave, join the infantry, and surrender to the first American you see.”

The American reputation for good treatment had survived from one generation to the next. Once Germany neared defeat in World War II, units fighting the Soviet Army would move out of the sector in order to surrender to American troops. Needless bloodshed was averted because they expected, and typically were given, good treatment.

According to Andrew Roberts, attitudes were far different on the Russo-German front. Both sides were swept into cycles of atrocity against soldiers and civilians. By the end of the war, German and Soviet soldiers were fighting each other to the last man, seldom taking prisoners. Soviet soldiers were told they were not accountable for civil crimes committed on German soil and that property and women were theirs by right and were the spoils of war. More than two million German women and girls were raped. This vengeful policy was a reaction to Nazi atrocities committed in the Soviet Union during invasion and occupation by German troops.

Good moral conduct and a reputation of fair play have beneficial results on the traditional battlefield, but also they have beneficial results in counterinsurgency. For example, morality played a strategic role in the guerrilla warfare of Vietnam, as it did in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

While insurgents often use terrorist tactics, counterinsurgency forces are limited in their actions. In his classic Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, David Galula explains that insurgents are judged by promises, but counterinsurgents are judged by their actions, and they are tied to their responsibility as well as to what they have done. If they lie or cheat, their short-term gains
will be overturned, and they will be discredited forever. The prize in this sort of warfare is the hearts and minds of the people. It is the center of gravity of battle.

In Iraq, according to retired Iraqi Maj. Gen. Najim Abed Al-Jabouri, much of U.S. operational success was a by-product of al-Qaida’s brutality against the Iraqi people. Al-Qaida in Iraq and other insurgent groups used kidnapping, murder, and intimidation to gain support. This approach had the opposite effect, turning civilians against them and their cause.

In contrast, and for the most part, U.S. soldiers proved themselves partners with the Iraqi people. Local politicians, some who had been insurgents, became allies. This meant extending trust, which in war can lead to becoming exposed to an enemy. In turn, many Iraqis met coalition troops halfway. The beginning of this turnaround was known as the “Anbar Awakening.” It extended into a program spanning the entire country. Former Iraqi insurgents changed sides to work for Iraq and maintained checkpoints that provided security against foreign fighters.

Nevertheless, such a stance is tenuous. If undone, the military could have quickly lost those gains. Soldiers and other supporting agencies must adhere to jus in bello and act with discipline and moral restraint, or they will risk extending a war indefinitely.

Conclusion

The effects of ethical decisions made in combat are far-reaching and echo in consequences later in life; they may become the most significant force in a soldier’s life and in the lives of others on the battlefield. Ethical decisions can cause a war within the spirit of the warrior even as battle wages around him or her. Strong emotions batter the warrior, combining with extreme stress and unspeakable desecrations, to push soldiers to their spiritual and psychological limits. It is imperative that the Army prepare soldiers for making difficult moral decisions during combat. One way to equip them is through study of the application of jus in bello, which is worked out in the law of land warfare.

In addition, a solid faith, moral grounding, and a developed character seem to anchor an individual to peace of mind and spirit despite the turbulence of the battlefield. Jus in bello can be a vital tool in synthesizing these characteristics and reminding soldiers of their moral selves. Albert Bandura’s social cognitive theory refers to a similar process, in which individuals adopt standards of ethical conduct that deter immoral behavior.

Unfortunately, soldiers usually understand the rules but they sometimes do not adhere to them.
Many times, they prefer victory or their own survival, or they are overcome by emotions such as revenge or grief. Something in their mind turns off their conscience. Bandura describes disengagement of the moral self-regulatory system as a psychological maneuver designed to circumvent the conscience. According to Bandura, when the conscience is working properly, people engage their personal standards by using self-sanctions, self-reflection, and proactive measures. These measures can prevent some of the catastrophic behavior described in this essay. Valuing one’s own life, success, or anything else over one’s beliefs of what is right disengages the conscience.

Soldiers need to engage in ethical thought well before they face ethical dilemmas in the fog of war. Jus in bello provides the subject matter and discussion parameters. If the Army can get soldiers to think about and understand the concepts of just war—especially justice in waging war—it can make the mind fit for battle. With the mind prepared, body and soul will follow. Soldiers will be able to resist the devastation war can impose on themselves and on others.

Notes


5. Robert S. McNamara, quoted from Robert S. McNamara...


28. ADRP 6-22.


32. Ibid., 15.

33. Shay, 31-32.


37. Shay, 87.

38. Ibid., 88.

39. Ibid., 88.


46. Crosby, 133.

47. Ibid.


49. Ibid., 84-89.


51. Ibid., 205.


53. Ibid.

54. Grossman, 211.


57. Ibid.


60. Bandura, ”Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities,” 205.

61. Ibid.
For the United States, two key questions persistently dominate and determine our public and private decisions. First, how do we create and maintain an effective marriage between religious values and Enlightenment ideals? Second, how do we preserve liberty, to include religious liberty? At first glance, it appears that the culture in the United States and the West more broadly separates religion and politics than the culture of nations in the Middle East that appear more prone to conflate religion and politics. In our estimation, such conventional narratives are shortsighted. More importantly, they are harmful for military leaders in an era in which religious overtones increasingly define strategic interactions.
This article provides a broad context for military leaders to understand the complicated relationship between religion and politics, both domestically and internationally. We first discuss the contemporary scene and the evidence of a resurgence of religion as a force in domestic and international politics. With these contemporary relationships as the backdrop, we examine America’s own often fitful journey of balancing the City of Man and the City of God to provide a lens to examine the challenges presented in the new international order. The interaction of religious organizations and the military in the dispensation of humanitarian relief, in many ways a relatively new phenomenon, is one of the contemporary challenges that we argue demands a framework for incorporating religious considerations in foreign policy. We suggest that understanding the political history of religion as an integral shaper of America’s domestic and foreign policy will better equip military leaders with a set of principles to approach the challenges of religious extremism in strategic and campaign planning.

The Contemporary Scene: Religion and State since the End of the Cold War

The current struggle between the so-called Christian West and Muslim East can trace its roots to Moriah, a mountain range considered to be the land inhabited by Abraham, the father of the monotheistic tradition in Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. At Moriah, God reputedly commanded Abraham to offer his son as a sacrifice. Abraham was willing to do so up until the point that God provided an animal for the sacrifice as a substitute for Isaac or Ishmael, depending on the religious tradition through which you read the story. Abraham’s devotion to God’s commands is held as an example in each tradition of the blessings bestowed upon Abraham and his descendants because of his unflinching obedience to God.

While the Christian and Muslim worlds can point to Moriah as a common scriptural foundation for monotheism, the two religions markedly diverged in their approach to politics in the seventeenth century. The Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 ended thirty years of bloody religious wars in Europe by defining the principles of sovereignty and equality for the system of states in Europe. With the Westphalan recognition of state sovereignty over domestic affairs came the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state by other states. In contrast, as Christian Europe celebrated a peace that promised to separate religious authority from political, there was no concomitant “Westphalian moment” for Islam to separate God’s law from political institutions.

Surveying the current geopolitical landscape, evidence suggests the sovereignty of the nation-state is in jeopardy as we are confronted with dramatic changes that have occurred in religion-state relations. The most significant challenge to the Westphalian order is the competition between norms of state sovereignty and claims of justification for intervention in sovereign states on behalf of reputed international norms of human rights and self-determination. For example, numerous interventions under the auspices of a United Nations mandate “in the politics of broken, war-torn, malnourished, and dictatorial” states signal a radical departure from the Westphalian construct that gave primacy to the state for ordering and regulating its own domestic affairs. Additionally, recent coalition operations against Libya and pressure for international action against Syria on the premise of international humanitarian concerns for the welfare of segments of populations within those two nations demonstrate that nation-states no longer have the ability to practice absolute sovereignty within their own borders. The expectation that the community of nations has both a right and a duty to protect citizens inside sovereign states from abuses against their universal human rights is emerging as an international norm that was not a part of the Westphalian notion of state sovereignty.

Moreover, the perception that a community of nations has a duty to protect citizens of sovereign states not their own by enforcing international norms that community has agreed upon is increasingly a part of the rhetoric and laws of the United States. This perception was manifest in the remarks of President George W. Bush during his second inaugural address when he described the “freedom agenda.” Bush said “the best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world,” implying that every man and woman on earth possesses certain individual rights.
Under the current administration, the advancement of freedom is a pillar of the current National Security Strategy. The National Security Strategy, along with the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA), makes the promotion of religious freedom a specific foreign policy goal of the United States. At the heart of such values is the freedom of conscience associated with religious liberty as stated in the National Security Strategy: “American values are reflective of the universal values we champion all around the world—including the freedoms of speech, worship, and peaceful assembly.” The IRFA authorizes “United States actions in response to violations of religious freedom in foreign countries,” codifying protection of religious freedom in other countries in statutory policy.

The growing concerns over religious influence are reflected domestically in the number of organizations engaged in religious lobbying or religious advocacy in Washington, D.C. That number grew from fewer than 40 in 1970 to well over 200 today, with annual expenditures topping $350 million spent to influence public policy on behalf of the faithful. The growth is also evident in part by the establishment of the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives (2001).

Taken as a whole, these changes suggest a growth of religion’s influence on U.S. domestic and foreign policy that has reached an unprecedented level of institutionalization and legitimacy, presenting a first-order challenge to the Westphalian political order. In the context of these developments, the protection of religious freedom, including the right to evangelize, is increasingly being constructed as a legitimate basis for international intervention. According to the IRFA, countries that fail to protect “freedom of religious belief and practice” are subject to the application of the “appropriate tools in the United States foreign policy apparatus,” a clear departure from the Westphalian construct of states retaining sovereignty over actions that transpire within their own borders.

In contrast to the resurgence of religious overtones in American politics, the reemergence of Islam as an important variable in world affairs is well known from the rise of an Islamic government in Iran in 1979 to the attacks of 9/11. In simpler and balder terms, while the West—and more pointedly, the United States—has been pointing a secular finger at the religiosity of Islamic extremist-based threats (nonstate, state-sponsored, transnational), there are accusatory fingers pointing back toward the West and the style of U.S. hegemonic leadership in the Westphalian secular order.

The widespread belief in predominately Muslim nations that the United States seeks to “weaken and divide the Islamic World” demonstrates the necessity to bring religious considerations into policy decisions. The role of religious groups in the overlapping transformations of war, aid, and evangelism should not be understated as religious groups vying for secular state power is a feature of the post-Cold War environment.

In the context of the current international environment, the United States faces two sometimes conflicting values: self-determination versus religious liberty. While self-determination is a principle of U.S. foreign policy, the rise of Islamic governments that threaten individual religious liberty runs counter to the principles established in the IRFA. Though the approach to resolving these two conflicting values is unclear, what is clear is that the violation of either principle may trigger an intervention into the internal affairs of states that were previously held as inviolable in the Westphalian system.

While the West may consider the question of separating religion from the secular power of the state a bedrock principle of modern statehood, the separation of religion from politics in the United States has been more of a thin line than a wall. In the context of religion’s role in the modern international environment, an examination of how religion shaped our own political destiny is instructive in preparing military leaders to deal with faith’s role in other countries when executing U.S. foreign policy.

**America’s Religious Tradition**

The lyrics of one of America’s most popular patriotic songs, “My Country, ’Tis of Thee,” illustrate that the foundation of America’s notions of democratic liberty can be found in Judeo-Christian scripture:

- Our fathers’ God, to thee,
- Author of liberty, to thee we sing;
- Long may our land be bright
- With freedom’s holy light;
- Protect us by thy might, great God, our King.

-Samuel Francis Smith,

“My Country, ’Tis of Thee,” 4th Stanza
Prominent scholars of the American founding stress that gaining a full understanding of the American Revolution and founding era requires an appreciation for the deep religious roots of America’s zeal for liberty. This section explores these foundational roots and addresses two simple questions: Does the religious spirit and outlook of the American revolutionary experience continue with us today? And, if so, what are the impacts and implications regarding the conventional narrative that the United States maintains a great separation between politics and religion? Understanding the answers to such questions will aid us as we consider the role of faith in the modern international environment.

First, when one discusses the American founding, one should clarify which founding is being referenced. The first American founding arguably occurred early in the seventeenth century when John Winthrop and other Puritan leaders set sail on the Arbella to solidify the settlement that would become the Massachusetts Bay Colony. On board, Winthrop delivered a sermon titled “A Model of Christian Charity” that introduced a phrase that remains at the heart of American foreign policy. Winthrop implored those on the journey that they should be “as a city upon a hill,” creating a society that would serve as an example to others throughout the world.12

The religious fervor of the first founding was later reinforced during the Great Awakening of the early eighteenth century, contributing to the zeal for liberty that coalesced in the American Revolution. The revolution was a “conspiracy of faith and reason” in that it captured the spiritual yearnings of the Great Awakening for religious liberty with the enlightenment ideals of a government based upon reason and individual (natural) rights.13 As John Quincy Adams noted of the revolution, the Declaration of Independence “connected, in one indissoluble bond, the principles of civil government with the principles of Christianity.”14

A portion of the clergy in America played a leading role in the revolution, reinforcing the connection...
of civil liberty and religious freedom. One of these leaders was John Witherspoon, a Presbyterian minister and president of Princeton University, whose ideas pertaining to the justification of the revolution influenced students such as James Madison and Aaron Burr. In one of his most famous sermons, Witherspoon noted that “there was not a single instance in history, in which civil liberty was lost, and religious liberty preserved entire.”15 Another influential minister, Jonathan Mayhew, championed the cause of liberty and resistance to tyranny in his sermons and writings. Thomas Jefferson borrowed one of Mayhew’s most influential phrases and made it his personal seal during the revolution: “Rebellion to tyrants is obedience to God.”16 The banner “An Appeal to Heaven” was thus not just a rallying cry for religious liberty but rather an appeal to restore the right balance between the limited power of man and the unlimited power of God.17

While religious principles deeply influenced the revolution, the Founding Fathers were very careful to keep the law of the land separate from the kingdom of God. It was no accident that the first liberty in the Bill of Rights is an assurance of religious liberty. The First Amendment dictating that Congress make “no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof” was meant to protect the church from the influence of the state as much as it was meant to protect the civil authority from the direction of the church. As colonial leader John Wise articulated in a 1717 sermon, the “power of churches is but a faint resemblance of civil power,” noting that churches and governments are engaged in different pursuits.18

Notwithstanding, the separation of church and state articulated in the First Amendment was not an effort to rid religion from political discourse. While those who think the Founders intended a strict separation of religion and politics hearken to the metaphor of a “wall of separation between church and state” used by Thomas Jefferson, separating church and state is not the same thing as separating religion and politics.19 The Founders were wary of intertwining church and state because using the state’s power to further the activities of the church would be an improper invasion of the private sphere. In James Madison’s words, one’s religious duties can be directed “only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence,” thus the church should be closely guarded from the coercive powers of the state.20 Such a separation would protect the conscience of citizens but also guard the activities of the church from undue influence from the state.

While the Founders were careful to separate church and state, they recognized—and encouraged—the interplay of religion in America’s political discourse. Paradoxically, many of the Founders thought that by removing the province of the church from the activities of the state, they would actually encourage religion because citizens would be free to choose the religion that most appealed to them.21 Thus a free market of religious choice was established, though the contemporary “market” was tilted toward Christianity because of the customs and traditions within the colonies at the time. While Congress was restricted by the First Amendment, prior to the Fourteenth Amendment, the states were not. In turn, many states incorporated laws that violated the spirit of the First Amendment prior
to the application of the establishment clause to state law through the Supreme Court’s decision in Everson v. Board of Education in 1947.22 Such laws included those espousing state-established churches, tax support to churches, religious tests for office, which were in effect in 11 of the 13 original colonies in the late eighteenth century, and even fines for irregular church attendance.23

Even though the national government of the time did not attempt to instill morality or virtue within the citizenry through lawmaking, many of the Founders had strong convictions that religion was essential in shaping a moral citizenry. Since many eighteenth-century Americans became literate by reading the Bible, Alexis de Tocqueville noted that religion “directs the customs of the community, and by regulating domestic life, it regulates the state.”24 While the government did not sanction a particular religion, many of the Founders recognized that religion was an indispensable part, and asset, to a democratic republic.25 The importance of religion to republican government was captured by George Washington in his farewell address where he cautioned that “reason and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle.”26 The First Amendment and the religious marketplace in early America created a nonreligious religiousness—a state in which religion influenced the political dialogue of the community, but did so from a position of nonestablishment.

Balancing the two pillars of the First Amendment—nonestablishment and free exercise—has been an uneasy journey in the course of American political history, demonstrating the complexity of mixing religion and politics. The high point of America’s religiosity in the twentieth century occurred in the 1950s when the phrase “In God We Trust” was added to the Pledge of Allegiance and paper currency, and measures of religious observance such as church attendance were at levels not seen since.27 However, the post-New Deal era also ushered in new complexities in combining religious traditions with the features of the modern republic. For one, the incorporation of the establishment clause of the First Amendment with the landmark 1947 case Everson v. Board of Education meant that state and local governments now faced increasing limitations on aid to religious organizations.

Second, the national government was increasingly active in the provision of services like education, health, and charity that were previously the province of religious organizations.28 Third, government regulation of personal sexual morality drew religious groups into the political arena because of the significance of sexual morality to many religious denominations.29

The Supreme Court has frequently been the arbiter in addressing the tension that is inherent in the First Amendment between preserving both nonestablishment and free exercise. As Justice William Rehnquist noted, decisions such as those in the landmark case of Lemon v. Kurtzman, which imparted a three-part test to gauge the compatibility of laws with the establishment and free exercise clauses of the First Amendment, sometimes lead to further entanglement between state and church.30 For instance, the Court has decided that a “state may pay for bus transportation to religious schools—but may not pay for bus transportation from the parochial school to the public zoo or natural history museum for a field trip.”31 In many cases, restricting the First Amendment to the private sphere may restrict free exercise, but using statutory authority to buttress religious organizations or purposes is a violation of the establishment clause. As one church-state scholar noted, allowing conscientious objector status preserves a person’s free exercise, but access to such status might be regarded “as a government-induced creation to join particular churches.”32

These examples from the domestic sphere demonstrate that the wall of separation is blurred because of the complexity of church-state issues. As the next section details, this uneasy relationship between supporting biblical ideals while maintaining U.S. interests presents unique challenges in twenty-first century U.S. foreign policy.

**Force, Faith, and U.S. Foreign Policy**

The United States faces significant challenges in the twenty-first century in balancing the sometimes conflicting ideas of making the world safe for democracy while also promoting self-determination. The particular challenge lies in the Middle East where democracy does not always entail the recognition of religious liberty, as was the case in the American revolutionary experience.
This section examines U.S. humanitarian interventions and the activity of religious nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Muslim domains against the backdrop of the recent worldwide resurgence of Islam and Christianity in global politics. As this section details, the twenty-first century strategic planner and military officer stands at the crossroads, both internationally and domestically, of balancing the City (and laws) of Man with the City of God.

The complexity of this balancing act is magnified in U.S. foreign policy, especially in terms of America’s fitful relationship with supporting missionaries abroad. Missionaries are often champions of a Wilsonian foreign policy that seeks an international order based on self-determination and the protection of human rights. Missionaries petition the U.S. government for right of entry into other countries and, once there, the protection of their property abroad. Under such circumstances, they are also positioned to pressure the U.S. government to use its influence to promote human rights in countries in which they are proselytizing. This situation has become more complex recently as there has been a dramatic growth of religiously affiliated NGOs into the humanitarian and development sectors that assume responsibility for providing aid and reconstruction during times of war. Many such NGOs view this development as providing a new vehicle for the faithful to increase influence on U.S. foreign policy.

In parallel with this rise of religious NGOs, intrastate conflicts have both increased and internationalized, resulting in U.S. military forces becoming involved in the burgeoning field of international humanitarian intervention. This development has unavoidably brought them into contact with religiously affiliated NGOs operating in the same areas. Concurrently, U.S. involvement in these conflicts has been accompanied by transformations in the norms and rationales that nations have used for legitimizing intervention, with the violation of a state’s territorial sovereignty no longer understood to be a necessary precondition for the legitimate use of military force.

Instead, Western militaries are increasingly permitted, if not expected, to intervene in conflicts defined by internal political, ethnic, and cultural cleavages. From a U.S. policy standpoint, intervention in such internal conflicts is said to be warranted as a bulwark against state failure, which is itself seen as an underlying precondition for internal strife and the emergence of extremist movements that could pose threats to U.S. interests. Thus, with the development, reconstruction, and stabilization of states being identified as a security objective, the role of the military has expanded beyond combat to increasingly include operations that historically were regarded as the exclusive province of the private humanitarian sector.

Although religion’s involvement in the delivery of aid is nothing new, this growth has coincided with two recent changes in U.S. foreign policy that, taken together, have the potential to transform the meaning and impact of religious participation in humanitarian affairs. One of those changes is the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA), which designates religious freedom as an issue to be addressed through U.S. intervention—including punitive sanctions. While the IRFA officially “targets no particular country or region, and seeks to promote no religion over another,” several religious and human rights organizations have raised concerns that it will be used as a “tool of intrusive evangelism” wielded predominantly by conservative Christians wishing to protect their own foreign missionaries.

Whether or not these concerns are founded, the IRFA gives religious organizations new and extended forms of U.S. government resources to expand their organizational infrastructures and, secondarily, their access to potential converts. The second change is that the predominant organizational forum through which evangelists organize is now the development or humanitarian NGO. Given these two changes to U.S. foreign policy, it is clear that the boundary between aid and evangelism has been compromised.

What we have is the simultaneous movement of the military and evangelists into a shared organizational field, the field of humanitarian action. This simultaneous movement and overlap raises critical questions about how these different types of organizations and actors—military, humanitarian, and religious—influence each others’ goals, operations, and outcomes.

With regard to this emerging overlap of interests, researchers have begun to look critically at the implications of military involvement in humanitarian missions. For instance, experts at the Feinstein International Famine Center identified the military as...
contributing substantially to what is being described as a “crisis in humanitarianism.” They argue that, especially in conflict zones where military forces are also belligerents (e.g., Iraq, Afghanistan), partnering with militaries undermines the neutrality, impartiality, humanity, and independence of humanitarian operations, thereby politicizing aid and threatening the efficacy of their missions.

To be sure, the overlap between military and humanitarian operational domains is nothing new, and many of the issues and challenges that exist today were also present in the post-World War II period, and even earlier. But the recent, large-scale expansion of the humanitarian field has brought a larger number of civilian relief organizations and workers into post-conflict regions, exacerbating tensions over the propriety of military involvement in what NGOs regard as civil space.

Despite the tensions raised by the overlap of religious organizations and the military in humanitarian operations, religious participation in such work appears to be largely embraced, at least in the official corridors of the international community. In fact, most policymakers and academics have applauded religious NGOs for providing compassionate and tolerant solutions to deprivation, health crises, and natural disasters. In part, this embrace of religion is driven by a very real need for the material resources and organizational infrastructures required to carry out international aid projects, resources that in some regions of the world (such as sub-Saharan Africa) only religious institutions are equipped to provide. However, in their enthusiasm to embrace the concrete resources that religious organizations bring to bear upon humanitarian crises, commentators have made their evaluations without the benefit of systematic, empirical research on the effects that the distinctly religious features of religious NGOs have on both military and humanitarian operations. Given the salience of religion as a source of division in post-Cold War conflicts, the effects—both intended and unintended—could be considerable.

For example, one way insurgent groups attract supporters is through the provision of goods and services (e.g., food, protection, medicine, systems of justice) that states fail to provide. In turn, one way the United States can compete with insurgents for the “hearts and minds” of local populations is through the provision of

Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable supports. In vain would that man claim the tribute of patriotism, who should labor to subvert these great pillars of human happiness, these firmest props of the duties of men and citizens. The mere politician, equally with the pious man, ought to respect and to cherish them. A volume could not trace all their connections with private and public felicity. Let it simply be asked: Where is the security for property, for reputation, for life, if the sense of religious obligation desert the oaths which are the instruments of investigation in courts of justice? And let us with caution indulge the supposition that morality can be maintained without religion. Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle.

It is substantially true that virtue or morality is a necessary spring of popular government. The rule, indeed, extends with more or less force to every species of free government. Who that is a sincere friend to it can look with indifference upon attempts to shake the foundation of the fabric?

—Washington’s Farewell Address 1796
these same goods and services through neutral humanitarian organizations that allow for their procurement without signaling political commitments. In regions that are predominantly Christian, the involvement of Christian NGOs in this form of humanitarian work might be unproblematic. But perceptions of the neutrality of Christian NGOs—especially those that evangelize—cannot be assumed in predominantly Muslim territories where religion is a salient source of distinction between opposing forces. Add to this the weakening of the boundary between aid and evangelism—particularly evangelism accompanied by force of arms—and the perception that aid is impartial and independent of U.S. objectives becomes threatened.

The complex relationship between war, aid, and evangelism will likely remain inherent in future conflicts. Throughout American history and for many Americans today, religion provides a sense of identity as well as a basis for a Wilsonian foreign policy that sees it as America’s duty to spread its values throughout the world. One of these values is the promotion of human rights that Americans and the West more broadly conceive of in terms of individual rights, as opposed to community or collective rights. Irrespective of American views, different societies will come to different answers regarding the question of what rights they recognize to exist. In an era where international tension is growing on the issue of whether religious freedom outweighs state sovereignty, we conclude with the question, does the fracturing of the Westphalian system portend promise or peril?

Possibilities for Peace: Promise or Peril?

Given the lack of clarity that exists currently in the moral and legal justifications for international interventions on behalf of religious freedom, what principles should the strategic planner and military officer consider in approaching religion’s role in executing American foreign policy? The foregoing analysis leads us to three broad conclusions:

**Religious liberty is America’s greatest moral argument to the world.** Rooted in the championing of religious freedom in the founding era, America recognizes in its laws and customs that freedom of conscience is a basic human right, even if this right was not always
protected in practice. It is instructive, therefore, to understand our own fitful history in balancing nonestablishment with free exercise and religious diversity. The American example of a democracy thriving amidst its religious diversity is a vital tool of American soft power in approaching religious matters internationally.

**Nonestablishment of religion protects the state from religion and religion from the state.** Military leaders must take a thoughtful approach to balancing the religious and humanitarian spheres inherent in the majority of post-Cold War international interventions. Preserving nonestablishment in this field protects the state from the appearance of favoring one religion over another while at the same time protecting religious authorities from compromising their claims of authority in the spiritual realm. Critical to this point is the modeling of nonestablishment by military leaders in their public activities as military professionals.

**The power of religion both unites and divides.** Democracy thrives on political activism, and religious motivation will continue to be a primary means to spark such activism. Just as in our own revolution, we should expect to see religious figures play a leading, if not decisive, role in the organization of new governments in the wake of popular uprisings. Therefore, the two previous conclusions are important to remember as we engage with leaders of these new states as they try to find their own balance between spiritual and secular influence over the state.

**Conclusion**

Religion unites and divides us—both as a nation and a community of nations. As we have good reason to assume that religion will continue to be a significant variable in American domestic politics and in international relations, American foreign policymakers will be well served to become familiar with America’s own fitful journey of balancing the uneasy marriage of religion and politics. By understanding this history and placing it in the context of the evolving international order, our strategic leaders will be better prepared to tackle the hard questions of whether the new international order offers promises for peace or impending peril—and what, in particular, military leaders should consider when bringing religion into strategic and campaign planning.

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**Notes**


2. In his book *City of God*, St. Augustine frames the history of political civilizations in terms of the “City of God” (those devoted to love of God in Christian scriptures) and the “City of Man” (those devoted to self-interest). We borrow St. Augustine’s language in relationship to the American republic’s attempts to balance free exercise (“City of God,” enabling the pursuit of religious practice) and nonestablishment (“City of Man,” separating church and state).


13. Sandoz, 139.

14. Ibid., 141.


17. “An Appeal to Heaven” was a phrase utilized on a flag flown during the American Revolution that featured a pine tree in the center of the banner. The phrase implies a spiritual justification for revolution as outlined in John Locke’s *Two Treatises of Government*, which influenced the language in the Declaration of Independence with its appeal to the “Supreme judge of the world” for the rights asserted in the Declaration.


24. de Tocqueville, Volume I, Chapter 17.
25. Sandoz, 132. Sandoz demonstrates that Benjamin Rush’s belief that “the only foundation for a useful education in a republic is to be laid in religion” was widespread among the colonists and Founders during the Revolution. While the personal religion of the Founders is widely debated, scholarship supports there was a strong consensus among the Founders of the value of religion in a republic; see also Jon Meacham, American Gospel: God, the Founding Fathers, and the making of a Nation (New York: Random House, 2007).
As de Tocqueville noted nearly a century after the American Founding, “in America religion is the road to knowledge, and the observance of the divine law leads man to civil freedom.”
27. Robert Putnam and David Campbell, American Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010), 88. Putnam and Campbell cite the 1950s as the “high tide of civic religion” of the twentieth century in terms of weekly church attendance, church construction, and positive responses to poll questions such as whether religion was important and whether it could answer today’s problems.
29. Putnam and Campbell, 117.
30. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985). The three parts of the Lemon Test are 1) the statute must have a secular legislative purpose 2) its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion 3) the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.
31. Ibid.
32. Jelen, 17.
36. Examples include Somalia (1993), Haiti (1994; 1996), Kosovo (1999-2000). The U.S./Coalition intervention into Iraq, which began with military invasion in March 2003 and which continued as a U.N.-sanctioned and Iraqi government-authorized stability, security, transition, and reconstruction occupation is also classifiable in this category of internationalized internal conflict.
37. National Security Strategy 2015, 9. The National Security Strategy states specifically that “We will work to address the underlying conditions that can help foster violent extremism such as poverty, inequality, and repression. This means supporting alternatives to extremist messaging and greater economic opportunities for women and disaffected youth. We will help build the capacity of the most vulnerable states and communities to defeat terrorists locally.”
40. International Religious Freedom Act. The act specifies that “United States chiefs of missions shall seek out and contact religious nongovernmental organizations to provide high-level meetings with religious nongovernmental organizations where appropriate and beneficial.” It also states that “diplomatic missions should give particular consideration to those programs and candidates deemed to assist in the promotion of the right to religious freedom” when allocating funds. The IRFA also permits “access to the premises of any United States diplomatic mission or consular post by any United States citizen seeking to conduct an activity for religious purposes.”
Sgt. Jeremiah Walden, an infantry trainer assigned to 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor Regiment, 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, adjusts an Iraqi trainee’s weapon 7 January 2015 to ensure he’s covering the correct sector of fire during infantry squad tactical training lanes at Camp Taji, Iraq.

**The Ignorant Counterinsurgent**

Rethinking the Traditional Teacher-Student Relationship in Conflicts

Maj. Ben Zweibelson, U.S. Army

He had only given them the order to pass through a forest whose openings and clearings he himself had not discovered.


More than anything else, professional knowledge and competence win the respect of [host-nation] troops. Effective advisors develop a healthy rapport with [host-nation] personnel but avoid the temptation to adopt [host-nation] positions contrary to the U.S. or multinational values or policy.

Over the past thirteen years, no greater debate has raged among military circles than that of which counterinsurgency methods to apply in difficult environments such as Libya, Afghanistan, Egypt, and elsewhere. While those discussions are worthwhile, this article aspires to offer, instead, a critical and creative philosophical perspective on why and how the U.S. Army teaches counterinsurgency. This discussion explores counterinsurgency from an epistemological perspective, examining why and how we teach. The focus is on the teaching relationships we establish when acting as military advisors and trainers. We determine the nature of these relationships before we even meet our students, including local nationals being trained in counterinsurgency and security.1

This topic lies between strategy and tactics as well as between philosophy and theory. Therefore, it requires some constructs not typically used in counterinsurgency discussions. The focus is epistemological rather than methodological. If we limit ourselves to comparing competing training methods, we may never realize what faults lie beyond or above them that stem from misunderstanding what learning, in a given context, is. We need to examine core tenets and beliefs broadly accepted by our military that might be hindering us from accomplishing our objectives. We need to move the usual debate beyond the relative merits of rival methodologies entirely.

Different Ways of Knowing and Understanding

To illustrate different ways forces know and understand military tasks, using an epistemological perspective, let us consider an infantry platoon conducting land navigation while tracking enemy forces in dense terrain, with many options for navigation. Critical reflection of that platoon's navigation methodology would relate to the type of route and the navigation methods they select. Methodological arguments might revolve around whether terrain association is a better method than pace counts and straight azimuths with a compass. In contrast, an epistemological discussion would set aside the navigation methods and focus on how the platoon understands land navigation, and how it does not. Perhaps the platoon understands land navigation as based on a compass that always points north, in relation to a map. Therefore, the platoon likely would disregard such things as divining rods, tobacco-induced visions, the sudden presence of a deer indicating an animal spirit guide, or the scent of crisp leaves. The platoon does not believe those approaches to be of value for land navigation. Yet, illiterate Native American hunters who lacked maps navigated and tracked just as effectively while using these types of tools.2 Native American trackers were effective navigators who accomplished tasks similar to those of a modern infantry platoon without the methods of map reading and compasses. Their methods were derived from social and cultural concepts of an attuned spirit world.

Thus, owing to differences between their frames of reference, both groups likely would reject the others’ methods and tools in favor of their own, approaching similar tasks differently but achieving similar results. This example illustrates that an organization’s methodology shows how it prefers to approach problems. Studying the organization through an epistemological perspective shows how it understands the idea of what constitutes the problem. Technology or spirituality might be viewed as critical, or as irrelevant, to conducting land navigation. To understand these kinds of philosophical perspectives, we would need to think about how we think about things, how we know and understand.3 When applying this kind of thinking to counterinsurgency, methodological and epistemological concerns would be like those shown in the table on page 96.
The U.S. Army’s generally accepted counterinsurgency methodology places primacy on securing the population while empowering a governmental form (democratic) we favor, supported by some sort of viable security element that moves the society toward stability and viability. To achieve this, we generally regard as essential having to establish, train, and support security forces so they can counter any insurgency within their nation, hence the name counterinsurgency.

Methodological debates on counterinsurgency tend to address competing techniques, socioeconomic theories, and military strategy. An epistemological discussion goes further to address the abstract notion of counterinsurgency knowledge—and how U.S. forces exchange ideas with the host-nation forces that mold their empowered security element. This article examines the perspectives of teachers and students, and how the U.S. Army tends to understand the exchange of knowledge through one form of pedagogy. The Army’s epistemological perspective “acts as both a gatekeeper and bouncer for methodology in that it determines and regulates what is to be known and how it can be known.” The pedagogy of the Army—the essence of teaching—forms the invisible foundation for any counterinsurgency concept or method.

### The Old Master Explication Model

To address weaknesses in the Army’s pedagogical approach, this article draws inspiration from modern French philosopher Jacques Rancière’s *The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation*. This book is about the unusual teaching techniques of French schoolmaster Joseph Jacotot, who was employed by the king of the Netherlands in 1818. Jacotot, speaking no Flemish, was directed to teach French to a class of students who only spoke Flemish. Jacotot’s approach, based on what he called intellectual emancipation, challenged the entire Western model of classical education on epistemological, philosophical, and sociological levels. He taught topics he did not know, without learning Flemish, and he helped liberate his students to learn French by finding their own path. Rancière further developed Jacotot’s ideas.

Why would a story about someone branded a mad schoolteacher by the mainstream educators of his time provide any value to a discussion about counterinsurgency? Although teaching the application of organized

<table>
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<th><strong>Methodological Concerns</strong></th>
<th><strong>Epistemological Concerns</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>Population-centric approach versus territory- or fixed-objective-centric</td>
<td>How an army understands time, relationships, and how to influence them</td>
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<tr>
<td>Police-oriented approach, versus military-oriented, versus information-oriented</td>
<td>How an army views ways to gain support of the population over time</td>
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<tr>
<td>Winning hearts and minds approach versus ends-justifies-the-means</td>
<td>How victory is framed—as the destruction of something tangible, or as the intangible actions of the population at risk (Do we understand a difference?)</td>
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<td>Attacking a network, a system-of-systems nodal approach</td>
<td>How to measure success—as tied to metrics and tangible items or actions, or as associated with conceptual processes</td>
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<td>Securing territory in a clear, hold, and build approach to capitalize on population stability</td>
<td>How governance supports counterinsurgency, the form of government best suited for this environment, and the forms not suitable</td>
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<td>National government and centralized authority tied to rule of law, enforced by security forces for entire population</td>
<td>How to teach security forces, in what manner, and what tasks and functions to teach</td>
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<tr>
<td>Train, advise, and assist security forces to operate and eventually replace all occupying forces</td>
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### Table. Methodological Versus Epistemological Concerns for Counterinsurgency
violence for societal, economic, and political ends is hardly comparable to teaching French to a class of Flemish students, teaching counterinsurgency (through security force assistance) from the Western perspective currently revolves around the classical teacher-student relationship. We see ourselves as the teachers, and when we go to any country in the world that we believe requires counterinsurgency assistance, we teach their forces how we believe they should conduct security, military, and paramilitary operations to meet our foreign policy goals. This foundational concept of pedagogy is so ingrained into our profession that it takes some effort to even recognize it and reflect on it. This makes an epistemological discussion of counterinsurgency rather awkward. We tend to think about concrete teaching and counterinsurgency methods instead of the bigger picture—the values we hold as a group, especially those related to how we conceive of teaching.

Rancière argues that nearly all Western approaches to conveying or discovering knowledge are shackled to a strict and unequal partnership between the teacher and the student, which he terms the old master relationship. In this model, knowledge is administered hierarchically. The master does more than simply giving the information (such as a book) to the students and telling them to learn it. The master attempts to control the learning process, by measuring progress, evaluating students, explaining information at times, and withholding information at other times if the students are not ready for a given level of advancement. Jacotot called this explication, which reduces the independence of students by forcing them into complete dependence upon the master.

The military education system extensively employs this very way of teaching from cadet training and university through a military career up to the senior levels of war colleges. No surprise, it also is how U.S. forces seek to transfer knowledge when advising host-nation forces, in a manner that presumes a relationship of nonequals.

One practical consequence of this old master relationship, in terms of pedagogy, is that it erects and maintains a distance between teachers and the students, a distance discursively invented and reinvented.
so that it may never be abolished.” In all military schooling, grades are controlled by instructors and tied to performance reports and promotion. This creates a constant tension in all aspects of professional education as learners’ careers can succeed or fail based on their grades. Moreover, the methodology establishes a learning hierarchy, not so subtly reinforced by the fear of punishment or failure. Within this framework, teachers use “the art of distance” to control and measure the rate of student progress. Teachers establish hierarchical learning distances. As their students progress through careful and controlled explication, they close each gap, only to have a new distance applied as a new lesson begins. Granted, the U.S. Army Learning Concept for 2015 (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command pamphlet 525-8-2) does offer recognition of multiple learning models. However, close examination of the concept reveals it remains largely shackled to explication methodology, substituting the innocuous term facilitator for teacher or instructor while placing the power in that individual. The concept states that “facilitators are responsible for enabling group discovery,” which implies that only the teacher can guide the group, and without the instructor the class cannot discover anything of significant merit.

The only way students might become equal to their teachers would be to master the topics as well as their teachers have mastered them. However, in the overarching military career path, graduating from one level opens up yet another winding path with yet another master waiting at the next plateau, using controlled distance to maintain a constant hierarchy of knowledge control. Students, whether in the Officer Basic Course or the U.S. Army War College, are shackled to the old master structure, where without the master leading the way, the students might get lost and never complete the journey. Per Rancière, the old master teaching model rests on the idea that students lack the will or ability to learn on their own, and only with the master’s will can they make the intellectual journey to the next level. Therefore, a class of armor lieutenants alone, even with piles of military manuals and courseware, could never properly learn how to maneuver tanks on the battlefield without an instructor there to guide them or to facilitate group discovery. Classes of War College colonels are as dependent on the academic to lead them on strategic lessons as a class of first graders learning their alphabet.

This notion of explication is a core principle of how the military conceives of and manages learning (its values about learning, the epistemological level) and how it approaches pedagogy (its values about teaching, the methodological level). This is true even if we claim to embrace decentralized learning concepts such as self-structured or peer-based learning in our instructor-centric programs.

The Army’s approach to counterinsurgency, and especially to security force assistance, reflects this approach. We maintain the two tenets of the old master model with all foreign security forces—they are the students, and we are the masters. Without our teaching, foreign trainees cannot progress to mastery. In this way, we establish the distance, measure their progress, and guide them on the proper path to becoming a functional military force that only we can actualize as masters of explication. We lock them in a tautological loop from which they cannot escape.

Emancipation From the Old Master Model

Rancière describes Jacotot’s intellectual emancipation approach to teaching as the ignorant schoolmaster method. The premise is that teachers can be, even must be, partially ignorant of what and how students will learn. The teaching method to be adopted in any situation is purely under control of the students, and there is no hierarchical relationship in that “the route the student will take is unknown [to the teacher].” Instead of teaching based on a relationship of inequality, distance, and the implied requirement that the teacher be a master of all the knowledge students would gain, Jacotot experimented with teaching French through topics of which he was completely ignorant. He gave his students control of their exploration of knowledge.

In nineteenth century France, news of Jacotot’s unconventional educational philosophy created quite a stir. His intellectual emancipation method remains worthy of debate. His approach, and Rancière’s twentieth-century interpretation, could apply to any discipline, military or otherwise. To apply Rancière’s ignorant schoolmaster method to security force assistance, soldiers would need to accept his assertions that teachers and students must free their minds of the old master framework; soldiers would need to reject the idea that students are dependent on masters to help them learn. In addition, according to Rancière, teachers
A soldier from 5th Battalion, 25th Field Artillery Regiment, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, observes the firing of a D-30 122 mm howitzer by Afghan National Army soldiers from 4th Kandak, 3rd Brigade, 201st Corps, as an Afghan soldier covers his ears during certification exercises at Forward Operating Base Tagab, Kapisa Province, Afghanistan, 5 September 2013.

(Photo by Sgt. Margaret Taylor, 129th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment)

of counterinsurgency and their students would need to assume that all normal individuals are of equal intelligence—that anyone can learn anything with the will and desire to do so. Teachers of counterinsurgency would need to reject the hierarchical teacher-student structure and consider how to intellectually emancipate their students.21 What is perhaps most important is that the students, and especially the teachers, would have to acknowledge that a certain amount of ignorance is not only acceptable but also necessary. Teachers should not think they have to know everything students will learn or every way they will learn.

The Value of Admitting Ignorance

Let us imagine that Jacotot had been tasked to teach his students a slang street-French, which would have been constantly changing in lexicon and structure faster than he or his students might be able to learn it. The language to be taught would have been transforming even as they were learning it. How would he teach it? This metaphor illustrates a significant reason why teaching counterinsurgency is so difficult. The ill-structured environments characteristic of counterinsurgencies are unique and evolving. No counterinsurgency is likely to be identical to another.

As such, each demands a tailored approach that cannot necessarily be cataloged, templated, and used as a model for training.

Recognizing the certainty of such uncertainty, ignorant counterinsurgents must self-emancipate intellectually by appreciating that the future condition of the counterinsurgent force will likely be something they could not teach—even if they could predict it. In this manner, “we progress toward even greater knowledge of our own ignorance.”22 At times, our doctrine on military advising seems to imply this very thing, although typically it is cast in the overarching context of a dominant old master approach.23

The U.S. Army and the coalition forces approached teaching and training the Afghan police force by trying to cleanse them of several key values the Army found undesirable in law enforcement, such as illiteracy, corruption, nepotism, and sexism. Instead, the Army and the coalition emphasized values they favored. For example, the Afghan National Security Forces (Army, Air Force, and police) were instructed on the values of integrity, honor, duty, country, courage, service, loyalty, respect, and God (Allah) that closely mirrored the U.S. Army values.24 The coalition attempted to build them into a security force similar to coalition member
forces, although U.S. Army doctrine warned against this tendency. Yet, we neglected to ask a fundamental question: Can a police force be considered to function effectively while most of its members remain illiterate and it routinely capitalizes on culturally acceptable levels of corruption, nepotism, and sex discrimination?

Even if we might entertain such a contentious question, a more important question remains: Would our police teachers even recognize such a police force? If not, could they become intellectually emancipated ignorant schoolmasters who would encourage the emergence of some security force that worked differently but better than what their students currently had?

In the old master model, one cannot teach what one does not already know, let alone imagine learning outcomes beyond one’s knowledge and ways of knowing. The practical result is that in teaching counterinsurgency, the U.S. Army has attempted to impose on Afghan Security Forces the Western security values and knowledge it assumes are universal. From an epistemological perspective, U.S. forces teaching counterinsurgency have not considered aiming for learning objectives that would fall outside Western society’s boundaries for knowledge of law enforcement; they have taught what they as teachers could explicate to their students.

This tendency is, unfortunately, supported by Army counterinsurgency doctrine that goes so far as to recommend that advisors essentially manipulate host-nation forces into assuming some of the U.S. Army’s ideas are really their own. This is the old master structure of teaching with explication and distance, and the students are expected to obey in order to progress.

The Army’s approach might be significantly improved if its doctrine encouraged advisors to incorporate host-nation ideas in the design of education and training, to learn as teachers, and to reverse the prevailing old master dynamic. From the Afghan perspective—where their resources, traditions, and current capabilities generate different conditions for, say, policing requirements—could they move toward a novel outcome for Afghan security forces, one that the emancipated students might discover?

In such a recast role, soldier-teachers would need to shed their roles as explicators who could only teach what they already knew, and the students would need to explore and discover a more effective Afghan policing and securing form that would function best in the Afghan counterinsurgent environment. Neither the students nor the teachers would know at first precisely how such a security force would develop; thus, they would become ignorant counterinsurgents, moving along different paths of self-discovery and education.

How Illiterate Mountain Villagers Might Teach Us

Defenders of the old master teaching model might protest some of its points are overstated. One notable objection is that all teachers learn from their students, as many guides and studies for advisors often mention in their introduction. However, there is a difference between saying “this Yemeni policeman taught me so much about friendship,” and “this African warlord turned what I thought I knew about counterinsurgency upside down, and I now question our original approach entirely.”

Most teachers learn from their students when they use the explication method, just as teachers in an elementary school or a war college gain life experiences with class after class of students. However, the master-student structure remains rigid, and only the teacher controls how knowledge is discovered, interpreted, measured, and processed. While a particularly difficult student often forces the teacher to discover new teaching techniques, the student never wrests control of the old master model and so remains on the receiving end of the knowledge transfer. The way of teaching and the knowledge to be explicated remain controlled by the teacher.

What could an illiterate native of a mountain village with no modern technology possibly teach the modern counterinsurgent trainer? Could the villager teach beyond the sharing of experiences during training? Could the foreign counterinsurgent teacher learn from him? Success would require a shared willingness to adopt an intellectually emancipated approach. Both the counterinsurgent and the villager would need to recognize their dependence on the traditional teacher-student structure. However, this is no easy task from either perspective.

Ignorant Counterinsurgency and Security Force Assistance

If ignorant counterinsurgents would approach teaching by acknowledging that teachers and students are equals, that knowledge needs to be discovered before it can be learned, and that students can learn on their own as well as with a teacher, the counterinsurgents...
would be able to unlock new opportunities for emergent processes and results. Instead of driving a security force to mimic the occupying force, or projecting the values of the counterinsurgents’ society (for instance, values of literacy, gender roles, violence, justice, beauty, or truth), the ignorant counterinsurgents would encourage students to explore with them in a partnership of equals.

Further, ignorant teachers would not impede their students’ exploration because of their own ignorance on the topics. Nor would they attempt to teach in the old, stultifying model on topics of which they knew nothing. In Afghanistan, for instance, “the very concept of the non-Muslim American trying to lecture such village crowds about proper Islamic teachings or moral behavior is ironic, but unfortunately [was] a common occurrence.”

In the emancipated model, teachers could not resurrect an old master relationship because an old master could not teach a topic in ignorance; this might seem like hypocrisy to the traditional student. Instead, ignorant teachers would acknowledge their ignorance of a topic—Islamic teachings on morality, for example, and how they affected security operations—and appreciate that as students advanced in developing a viable security force that would incorporate Islamic morality in action, the teacher probably would remain ignorant to some extent. The teachers would have some trouble recognizing when the students had learned what they really needed to know.

Perhaps literacy would not be necessary for the security force members if a majority in the host nation functioned at extremely low literacy. Perhaps male-only policing, nepotism, and a degree of what U.S. forces regarded as corruption would be considered part of the learning outcome. Teachers would not impose knowledge derived from their society’s web of values upon the local students.

Perhaps the students would explore learning how to conduct security by capitalizing upon the very illiteracy, lack of automation, unequal gender roles, and patterns of apparent corruption and nepotism that the outsiders found unacceptable. The students would explore and
learn at their own rate and following their own course. However, after the security force, operating in a largely alien way to the outside counterinsurgent teachers, had proven to be successful over time, the students might be able to articulate to the teachers why they became successful. Now the teachers truly would reduce their ignorance and learn from their students.32

**Of Myths and Men: Tensions Between Teaching Epistemologies**

An Army unit’s overall approach to understanding and teaching counterinsurgency to foreign security forces will have profound effects on the subordinate methodologies they subsequently apply. Requiring soldiers to use the traditional explication approach drives soldiers toward teaching only what they know, thus producing imitations of U.S. forces in the host-nation force. This approach will become counterproductive if the cultural, economic, societal, and other interacting tensions demand a novel security force that is nothing like our own.

In Afghanistan, U.S. military advisors have struggled with one significant example of this: the pull logistics system that is technological, user-based, and highly decentralized. In contrast, the Afghans have a long familiarity with, and strongly embrace, the old Soviet-style push logistics system that is centralized, hierarchical, and conducted in a completely different manner than the U.S. system. To add further friction, the extremely low literacy rate of the Afghan logistics forces, along with very limited automation technology, means that the explication approach to teaching logistics by coalition logisticians has been fraught with problems.

In this environment, Army teachers (who are masters of a technological, decentralized methodology that demands high literacy) were directed to instruct students who were in many ways their opposite. Nevertheless, instead of appreciating the lack of literacy and experience with technological culture among Afghan students, and switching to an emancipatory method to allow them to move on a different path towards a logistics structure the teachers might not recognize at first, Army teachers instead attempted to force the Afghan students toward what the Army teachers knew.

With every cycle of new logistics units arriving in Afghanistan, there have been repeated failed efforts to push computers and automation onto the Afghan security forces, and to change their paperwork processes to make them use a decentralized pull model. The ineffectiveness of this teaching process has been worsened by frequent interference from advising teams that circumvented the Afghan process by moving paperwork within coalition lines to get it done.33

This illustrates the tension between applying an explication approach where the teacher does not have a mastery of the topic, or the students are not interested in the knowledge the master has to offer. Students soon learn that old master judo instructors only can teach judo, and even if the class shows up to learn yoga, they will be forced to learn judo.

At the epistemological level, whether one uses a stultifying or emancipatory teaching approach, there still is a key relationship between ignorance and knowledge. We want to know exactly when we have solved a problem, with something definitive, like accomplishing a checkmate in a game of chess.34 Yet, complex situations immerse us more in our own ignorance as we progress, with few if any authoritative end states. We have a fear of ignorance and the application of ignorance for action. To put the tensions of ignorance-knowledge and stultifying-emancipatory teaching approaches into a quadrant chart for further discussion, the figure on page 103 provides some insight into how these four elements interact.

**Interaction Among Teacher-Student Paradigms**

The predominant military approach appears in quadrant 3 (labeled Q3), in which U.S. military teachers have a mastery of counterinsurgency knowledge based on the organizing methodologies of our military, and they can disperse that knowledge to any foreign military student population to train them to secure their own nation. This may work with a security force assistance mission in a similar society or with a nation that has comparable security capabilities, but it may not work with the diverse, non-Western, hybrid environments where different variables drive the emergence of a novel counterinsurgency solution. This is where quadrant 2 (Q2) of the figure, the emancipatory approach, allows teachers ignorant of certain counterinsurgency disciplines to teach on the topics they do not know, to students who might need to learn in a direction the teachers might be unable to fully imagine or recognize.

In quadrant 1 (Q1), the emancipatory approach also features cases in which the teacher has mastered the
knowledge that the students are learning. However, with the emancipatory approach the teacher does not apply the old master elements of distance and inequality. Instead, in quadrant 1, the teacher encourages exploration and even critical introspection of the knowledge, where the students can question and even violate the discipline in the emergent process of discovering novel solutions.

In quadrants 1 and 2, the students actually teach the teacher, whereas in quadrant 3, the old master merely humors that sentiment while evaluating their progress.

When ignorant teachers use the stultifying traditional approach, they tend to teach and enforce faulty knowledge to students, who subsequently imitate and repeat the process. This can generate a powerful, self-perpetuating discipline comprised of myths and falsehoods. Quadrant 4 (Q4) represents the perpetration of myths that create friction, inefficiencies, and contradictions in an organization, and at times become entrenched in ritualization, indoctrination, or cultural association.

Therefore, preparing a counterinsurgency strategy requires critical reflection, to go beyond the methodological arguments and to consider—from an epistemological perspective—what will be learned, how to teach it, and what approaches will be valid versus invalid.

**Conclusions: Ignorant Teachers and Ignorant Students of Counterinsurgency**

Could military advisors teach what they do not know? Could U.S. logistics advisors teach Afghans about things the advisors do not know? Could the Afghans teach the Americans about how logistics might function with a nonautomated, non-text-based, and culturally appropriate way that would be, perhaps, entirely foreign to the American logistics discipline? Could the American and the Afghan logisticians explore a novel, previously undiscovered logistics approach, one that both could learn about and develop together? Although the example here is logistics, the principle easily transforms to intelligence,
policing, information operations, governance, and nearly every other aspect of counterinsurgency and security force assistance in a host nation.

In Jeffrey Bordin’s 2011 survey of Afghan and American forces within their respective advisor and operator roles, he found that more than half of Afghan soldiers surveyed complained that coalition forces “exhibit[ed] extreme arrogance and refuse[d] to take advice” and “yell[ed] at … [or demonstrated] a lack of respect to Afghan National Security Forces.”35 On the other hand, the surveyed coalition soldiers in advisory or partnered roles responded overwhelmingly that the Afghans were “incompetent,” were “lazy and refuse[d] to work very hard,” could “not be trusted,” and were “traitors” or “unstable,” with “poor Afghan leadership” who were “useless.”36 The coalition and Afghan negative perspectives correlated closely with the traditional master-student teaching model.

Emancipating U.S. military teachers from the old master model would require significant direction, creativity, and radical change at the highest levels of military leadership; nothing short of a focused and systemic effort would break our military free of the grip of explanation in how it views the professionalization of U.S. and foreign military forces.

Even if we could shift our overall counterinsurgency approach away from the old master model toward the intellectually emancipated ignorant counterinsurgent approach, we would need to inspire a similar breakthrough in our counterparts.37 The host-nation security force, likely tied to a similar mindset, would need the same kind of liberation in changing their framing of the relationship between the coalition soldier and the local counterinsurgent. Members of the host-nation forces are not unequal to the coalition’s members, and the coalition’s members are not the masters of the professional knowledge. The local counterinsurgents can learn on their own initiative, in novel directions, and develop their forces into an end state that is even unknown to the coalition professional.38

Both forces could operate in an ignorant counterinsurgent manner and develop a viable, durable counterinsurgency security force that would match the unique needs of that fledgling society. The result should come in a different and unusual form that is foreign to the military professional. Yet, we should not fear our ignorance of this. Instead, we need to embrace uncertainty as a useful perspective to better understand how we perceive counterinsurgency, and why this is.

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Notes


Epigraph. Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], December 2006), 6-17 (now obsolete). After this article was written, a new FM 3-24, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, was published (May 2014). The principles of rapport building remain in Army doctrine.


3. Hazlett, McAdam, and Gallagher, 32. The authors offer a telling explanation of epistemology and critical thinking.


Afghan and Iraqi Security Force developmental period of 2009-2013; the principles it described remain in use.


8. FM 3-07.1.


11. Rancière, xix-xx, 4-7.

12. Anna Simons, “The Military Advisor as Warrior-King, and Other ‘Going Native’ Temptations,” in *Anthropology and the United States Military: Coming of Age in the Twenty-First Century*, eds. Pamela Frese and Margaret Harrell (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 115. Simons explains the colonial origins of inequality in imperial versus colonial (or post-colonial) military relationships as founded on a paradox. If originally inferior to the parent land, how can locals later be equals in an advisory relationship?


15. United States Army Training Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-8-2, *The U.S. Army Learning Concept for 2050* (Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC, 20 January 2011), 19, 21. To turn this concept upside-down, could a group discover something that the facilitator did not enable, nor recognized?

16. Rancière, 4-5, 21. See FM 3-07.1, “As [foreign security forces] master one skill, the advisor can move on to other skills and initiate the process for the new skills;” and JP 3-22, “The advisory team presents the instruction. Trainers/advisors … Stress the execution of the task as a step-by-step process, when possible. … Monitor the HN [host-nation] students’ progress during practice and correct mistakes as they are observed;” and TRADOC Pam 525-8-2, 22.

17. Rancière, 20 to 22.

18. TRADOC Pam 525-8-2, 22.


20. Rancière, 14-15, “Joseph Jacotot applied himself to varying the experiment … he began to teach two subjects at which he was notably incompetent: painting and the piano.”


23. FM 3-07.1, 2-1, “Local forces have advantages over outsiders. They inherently understand the local culture and behavior that outsiders simply lack. To tap into those advantages, advisors must resist blatant military solutions. To overcome the temptation to do what they know and do best, whether relevant to not to the situation, advisors must accept that they are bound by unique situations [emphasis added].”


25. FM 3-24, A-7, “The natural tendency is to create forces in a U.S. image. This is a mistake. Instead, local [host-nation] forces need to mirror the enemy’s capabilities and seek to supplant the insurgent’s role … they should move, equip, and organize like insurgents.”

26. FM 3-07.1, 2-3 to 2-4, “Objective evaluations ensure promotion is by merit and not through influence or family ties. … Appropriate compensation precludes a culture of corruption in the [foreign security forces].”

27. FM 3-24, 6-18, table 6-5, “Be subtle. In guiding host-nation counterparts, explain the benefits of an action and convince them to accept the idea as their own.”

28. Simons, 116. The author addresses the potential rejection of advisor values from the host nation, when social or inter-personal elements drive the acceptance of some assistance, and the rejection of some others. Simons mentions that tangible aid is usually readily accepted, while conceptual changes may not be.


30. Rancière, 21, “At each stage the abyss of ignorance is dug again; the professor fills it in before digging another.”

31. Metrinko, 38.

32. Kilduff and Mehra, 468.

33. These observations are based on this author’s deployments to Afghanistan as battalion executive officer and security force advisor team leader for an Afghan National Army battalion (2013), and a national-level and operational-level planner for NATO Training Mission (Afghanistan) from 2011-2012.


38. Simons, 126. “Instead, advisors always want to be treated as at least slightly better than the natives—or, at least, as first among equals [emphasis added].” Simons discusses the notion of going native and how misleading the concept is in advisor applications.
President Bush shakes hands with Abdul-Sattar Abu Risha, leader of the Anbar Salvation Council, also known as the Anbar Awakening—an alliance of clans backing the Iraqi government and U.S. forces—during a meeting with tribal leaders 3 September 2007 at Al-Asad Air Base in Anbar Province, Iraq. Abu Risha, the most prominent figure in a U.S.-backed revolt of Sunni sheiks against al-Qaida in Iraq, was killed 13 September 2007 by a bomb planted near his home in Anbar Province, 10 days after he met with President Bush.

The Anbar Awakening in Context ... and Why It Is so Hard to Replicate

Matthew T. Penney, Ph.D.
The takeover of large swaths of Iraq by the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2014 may invite new interest in the possible relevance of the Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)-era phenomenon known as the Anbar Awakening. In a remarkable turnaround—in the general time frame between spring 2005 and spring 2007—local Iraqi tribal forces converted from being enemies of U.S. forces to U.S. allies in the fight against al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) and its domination of Anbar Province where it had become most entrenched. Organized tribal resistance to AQI, which had already begun in pockets of Anbar prior to obtaining U.S. support, was a process that emerged from a confluence of factors within a specific set of unique circumstances. Tribal forces did the majority of the fighting throughout the province and brought a critical mass of the Anbar population into Iraqi government agencies (e.g., Ministry of Defense units and police precincts), and a political party called Sahawa—at least for a period.1

Even before 2014, the Anbar Awakening had engendered enduring interest by Western military and intelligence personnel as well as policy discourse over the outcome of OIF. For serious students of the movement who survey the literature produced on the subject, it becomes quickly apparent that one must appreciate the unique conditions that prompted these local figures and their constituents to reject AQI in the particular place, time, and manner in which they did, and that such conditions were requisite for the subsequent relationship they developed with U.S. forces.

Irrespective, debate continues over exactly what happened as the Awakening unfolded. Some authors have sought to assign ultimate credit for the success of the Awakening to a particular service, unit, or person. Others have attributed success to a darker side—a U.S. alliance with unsavory figures, some who had been insurgents fighting coalition forces until expediency enticed them to work with U.S. armed forces. Some accounts have depicted the Awakening as a failed process aimed at national reconciliation, while alternate interpretations have characterized it oppositely as primarily a Sunni challenge to the Shia-dominated Iraqi central government. While opinions differ, the most significant discussion of the debate concerns the extent to which the Awakening can be a template for replicating the establishment of local defense forces to counter insurgencies.2

The problem with using the Awakening as a template for developing counterinsurgency programs elsewhere is that studies of the mechanics of providing support and training often isolate the Anbar Awakening from its historical and cultural contexts that made tribal forces receptive to U.S. support. This begs the question, “Can we apply similar principles again in other circumstances?” I assert that the answer is yes—as long as we are realistic about what the Awakening was and was not, and as long as we account for differences in culture and situational context in such efforts.

Observations on the Anbar Awakening

The synthesis of observations provided in this article are intended to build a greater appreciation for the Anbar Awakening’s place in history and to sharpen the way we think about the extent and limits of its potential applicability to other situations.

In the Anbar Awakening (Sahawa), the United States did not create something—it co-opted an indigenous trend. For example, the United States did not create the anti-AQI force that first emerged in western Anbar in 2005. Rather, the U.S. military and the Iraqi Ministry of Defense opportunistically backed an Albu Mahal–led tribal force, which had lost its control over an important town and trading route and had taken the lead on its own to promote general tribal rebellion against AQI. The United States essentially deputized the resisting tribes as an ad hoc military unit and worked with it to fight AQI and reclaim lost land from AQI-affiliated rival tribes.3 Observing the interim benefits associated with cooperating with the U.S.-led coalition, other tribes followed suit.4 Likewise, in Ramadi in September 2006 when the United States blessed Sahawa, it was not a question of whether we wanted Sahawa to exist but was rather a bid to influence an extant force to keep its efforts in line with U.S. goals in Iraq. Prior to that September, many of Sahawa’s constituent parts had been fighting AQI in the form of organized militias for months—some longer—and were determined to proceed with or without U.S. support.

Even though a movement is indigenous, the United States can help shape it. The Awakening tribes showed signs that, had they been left to their own
devices, they probably would have failed for lack of the ability to unify their efforts.

It is important to observe that, as a confederation of tribes and groups with no tradition of compromising for a greater good, Sahawa was wracked by infighting. Even prior to its leader Sheik ‘abd al-Sattar’s assassination in September 2007, several of the founders broke and formed a competing group. After Sattar’s death, the movement splintered further. Notably, in the early months, Sahawa spokesmen often used a sectarian and militant tone that sharply contrasted with public decorum used later when key leaders were attempting to convert the movement into an anti-establishment, national political organization in 2007 that moved beyond merely an anti-al-Qaida coalition.

It is likely that, had Sahawa successfully converted itself into a Sunni-based tribal party and entered the political scene on its own as an overtly sectarian force hostile to the Shia-dominated Iraqi government, it would have risked either inciting a civil war or achieving a tactical success that created a de facto, highly fractured, secessionist Sunni state at a time when retributive Sunni-Shia violence still raged in Baghdad.

Observing these fault lines among the tribes, U.S. officials who worked with the Sahawa leaders were able to promote a measure of unity by constantly encouraging them to remain cooperative and civil with one another as a condition for continued material and financial support. In conjunction, on a daily basis, the United States also had to stress nonsectarianism, political moderation, and inclusiveness.

The Awakening originated from leaders rising to the occasion. The Awakening was enacted neither by the Iraqis with the grandest hereditary titles nor by the first to align with the United States; it was enacted by the ones who had earned credibility with the people through deeds.

U.S. officials in Anbar had initial contact with an array of locals who claimed to be the head sheiks for their tribal areas and demanded U.S. money and weapons.
Some of these were indeed senior by bloodline and title, but experience showed that such attributes did not always translate into influence with tribal members. Early in the war, most of the ostensibly senior hereditary sheiks failed to serve as actual leaders of any significant portion of the population. This resulted in part because insurgents and AQI cells targeted them, accusing them of being U.S. stooges and traitors. This caused many to flee to neighboring countries, further undercutting their influence. As a result, Sunni councils formed outside Iraq that were mostly comprised of persons who had all but abdicated real leadership. Although they asked to administer some sort of armed front against AQI encroachment, such assemblies of Anbar tribesmen and notables outside Iraq usually amounted to little more than forums to complain as a pretext for seeking lucrative reconstruction contracts.

This dynamic opened the door for several so-called junior sheiks. On paper, many of these lower-tier sheiks were unimpressive, having been marginal figures before the war—petty smugglers, minor sheiks disparaged by their seniors, and Iraqi military or security personnel who had held menial positions under the Saddam Hussein regime. However, those who emerged as recognized drivers of the Awakening by the tribal members were those whose power came not from titles but from credibility acquired by action. They earned credibility by serving as point men, standing up for their constituents and, most importantly, by actual fighting against AQI and co-opted locals.

This situation that involved alleged abdication of leadership by traditional leaders while at the same time other nontraditional leaders were stepping up to confront the crisis facing the tribal members, has profound implications for any future tribal engagement initiatives the U.S. Armed Forces might undertake. It underscores how crucial it is to carefully partner with the right people—not just the ones who are the easiest to reach, the ones we already know, or the ones who have learned how to glad-hand Westerners and manipulate them.

The Anbar Awakening was not reconciliation; it came at the expense of existing Iraqi institutions both in Anbar and Baghdad. The Awakening was a departure from the U.S. fixation on consolidating Iraq’s power in Baghdad. Politically, Sahawa came at the expense of the state-sanctioned Anbar Provincial Council and the main political party in the province, the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP). In fall 2006, the Anbar governor, an IIP member, viewed Sahawa as nothing short of a coup against him. (He would later support Sahawa in order to gain relevance.) But U.S. and Iraqi viewers had to admit that, while Anbar Province nominally had an IIP-led provincial council, Sahawa was the more credible body. It took a series of hotly contested negotiations brokered by the United States and Multinational Force–Iraq (MNF–I) to add Sahawa members to the Anbar Provincial Council for the sake of government legitimacy in the eyes of the Anbar populace—negotiations that proved controversial because they lacked a clear basis in the Iraqi constitution.

The incorporation of Sahawa members—the Concerned Local Citizens (CLC), and later the Sons of Iraq (SOI)—into the Iraqi government caused problems for Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki, who had good reason to be threatened by an empowerment of armed Sunni units. These Sunni groups remained opposed to the Shia-led government in Baghdad and were perceived more as an insurrection-in-the-making against Iraqi authority than a new component of it. United States concerns about Maliki’s willingness to accept them were borne out over time. In 2008, Maliki reluctantly agreed to fund the CLC and the SOI, but in 2010, he suspended the process of incorporating them into the government, barring almost 100,000 Iraqis from the ranks of the Iraqi Security Forces. The status of these units was a perpetual sore point between the United States and Maliki, and was a festering source of bitterness among the SOI who believed commitments for integration into the Iraqi armed forces or police had been made as a condition for them joining to defeat AQI. The quick collapse of Northern Iraq to ISIS in 2014 might be shown to be to some extent attributable to the lingering bitterness of former Sahawa fighters resulting in large part from Maliki’s failure to honor perceived commitments and consequent reticence of the tribes to confront the new threat.

In any future plans to recognize a new base of power, if the United States has equities with whatever national government is losing some turf or control, it may require delicate management of our relations with the host government. This is important because the U.S. preference is so often for a strong central government in the host country.
The solution in Anbar required an intimate U.S. knowledge of local realities. Solutions required an objective depiction of the so-called ground truth. Direct, on-the-ground knowledge was often the only option for understanding broader cultural issues and fast-breaking security developments in the absence of working phone lines, cell phone reception, Internet, and media outlets. The U.S. role in the Awakening required close first-hand observation and familiarity with local conditions to detect the anti-AQI currents and motivations of the tribal leaders. Gaining intimate knowledge of realities in Anbar was not possible by watching Anbar from afar, and, under the best of circumstances, it did not happen quickly.

U.S. elements successfully marketed these activities as part of a broader anti-AQI phenomenon and an expression of Iraqi initiatives. For example, at the police recruitment drives, a given recruit arrived to see an organized, safe event with Iraqi and U.S. personnel working together. The orderliness and efficiency of such programs made a tremendous positive psychological impact on such individuals, who were accustomed to the inefficient, uncaring, and usually corrupt management of similar programs under Iraqi holdover officials of the previous regime. Once serving at the police station, the local policeman became part of a powerful anti-AQI front. U.S.-backed AQI degradation campaigns, media announcements of successful operations, neighborhood beautification programs, soccer field refurbishments, and pro-government messages worked together to further the Awakening’s momentum.13

On the tactical side, the U.S. military and Awakening units vigorously targeted AQI, disrupted its networks, conducted raids on its cell leaders, and denied it a hospitable environment. The tribal rejection of AQI in 2006 involved tribesmen in fierce firefights with, and offensive operations against, AQI. Continued joint military work among MNF–I units, Iraqi security services, and Awakening units was required to clear and hold the key areas.

The Awakening required tremendous expenditures of U.S. taxpayer dollars—but with an important caveat. In addition to the costs of deploying a Marine expeditionary force and special operations forces in Anbar, training the Iraqi army and Iraqi police, and housing officials from other U.S. civilian agencies, the United States spent tens of millions of dollars in Anbar. In the form of Commander’s Emergency...
Response Program (CERP) funds, the U.S. military disbursed a total of more than U.S. $2 billion countrywide in Iraq during fiscal years 2005–2007 on things such as agriculture, irrigation, neighborhood beautification, electricity, and education.14

In June 2007, MNF–I gained permission from the Department of Defense to use CERP funds to pay the CLC and the SOI that, according to a U.S. government audit, cost U.S. $370 million for fiscal years 2007 to 2009.15 However, from spring 2006 to spring 2007, the key period for the Anbar Awakening, expenditures on the neighborhood watch units and Sahawa were much more modest. It was not massive financial outlays and public improvements that accounted for the growth of Sahawa in the crucial period through spring 2007; rather, it was the desire by key tribal leaders to wrest control from AQI and its local affiliates and come to power themselves.

The Awakening required Iraqis who had a vested interest in securing their own areas. The Awakening’s emphasis on local empowerment differed from concepts of a “national” identity for Iraq’s security services, in which a recruit from one area of Iraq could be deployed anywhere in the country in an attempt to generate a unified Iraqi security service. Real security in Iraq, where it existed, was an intensely localized affair. Residents were familiar with their neighborhoods. They knew—and cared—who belonged and who did not. Local control allowed a recruit to be confident that he would not leave his family vulnerable in a long-term absence. It also gave the security services credibility with the people, as opposed to the precarious climate when a member of another tribe or sect oversees security in what is effectively rival territory.

It was not easy for some U.S. and Iraqi officials to come around to this way of thinking as the new emphasis on local control was antithetical to a national identity of the Iraqi security forces that the United States had been trying so long to promote.16

When working with one sub-national element, it was important for the United States to manage the perceptions of other sub-national elements. No matter how war torn Iraq was, the Shia and Kurds were closely watching what the U.S. government was doing with the Anbar Sunnis. Shia and Kurdish perceptions were important regardless of how the United States internally rationalized its Awakening program. For example, to the Shia, there was a serious contradiction of policy when the United States trumpeted Sunni militias as a stabilizing force in Anbar while trying to limit the influence of Shia militias in the south. Similarly, from the Kurdish perspective, the same contradiction existed when the United States lauded the virtues of Sunni militias in Anbar while criticizing the Kurdish militia security presence in disputed territories in north-central Iraq.

To overcome objections, the United States had to show that Sunni militias had state sanction in their transition into the ISF or their conversion into Iraqi Police precincts, and later in the form of the CLC and SOI. Had the United States not been able to do this, U.S. interlocutors would have had less credibility when opposing Shia militias or asking Kurdish authorities not to interfere in certain disputed areas. Some of the most restless places in the world are those in which multiple people groups live inside or among artificially imposed national borders, and U.S. relations with any one of those groups will affect the others.

We can gainfully work with people who do not think and act like us—but we have to be ready to defend doing so. Those who came to power in the Anbar Awakening had few attributes that would please...
twenty-first century, Western, self-styled progressives. For example, in general, the key sheiks had no democratic or pluralistic impulses and would manifest no respect for the U.S. policy of democratization beyond what they had to utter in order to remain in U.S. graces if and when they chose to do so.

Instead, the Anbar Awakening figures were products of a society where power rested in tribal codes, patronage, and nepotism as opposed to legal state institutions. Their adherence to these codes, especially the custom of tribal retributions, were often viewed by U.S. officials as human rights violations, according to Western standards. One consequence of this situation was that, although Iraq ostensibly had a written code of law enforced by state security and judicial mechanisms, in reality, these institutions were nominal, co-opted by insurgents, or lacked the will to carry out their functions under the established law.

Among other concerns, U.S. officials were right to be vigilant about their contacts’ deeds and to pressure them to act within Iraqi law. However, in cases where individuals had committed extra-judicial acts, the United States had to assess whether there was a viable Iraqi governmental mechanism that could have provided a solution and be ready to make the case for the value of continued work with that person in the face of any potential scrutiny, whether from formal U.S. oversight bodies or from the media.

The United States found mutual interests with conservative Muslim populations that al-Qaida claimed to be helping. One of the ways al-Qaida tries to build support in a population is by depicting itself as a defender against, or liberator from, infidel aggression. For example, in Anbar, not only had a Western military occupied Sunni Muslim lands, but the Sunnis’ Shia rivals had come to power in the national government. Both of these developments were fodder for public opinion exploitation. Of all the places al-Qaida sought to establish itself, Anbar, in theory, should have been receptive.
The United States helped locals regain or consolidate their social, religious, and economic roles that had been lost to foreign AQI leaders and AQI’s co-opted Iraqi tribal elements. In Iraq, AQI gave too much power to non-local leaders and waged a distracting war between its local affiliates and their fellow Iraqis. The contest between al-Qaida and the locals was also one between al-Qaida’s religious authority and tribal authority. Whereas al-Qaida propagated the view that authority served the ummah, or community of Islamic believers, the tribal system was inherently local, inward-looking, and exclusive. The leaders of the Awakening, even though some of them were quite religious in their personal lives, had a lot to lose from al-Qaida’s brand of religious authority.

Additionally, most of “al-Qaida in Iraq” was not really al-Qaida. Actual al-Qaida leaders directly affiliated with Osama bin Laden were rare in Anbar. For example, in late 2004, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s network declared allegiance to al-Qaida and became what the West called AQI. However, it was basically a loosely affiliated franchise enterprise of al-Qaida that frequently defied direction provided by actual al-Qaida leaders. Al-Qaida leaders, mostly foreigners who did little fighting themselves, attempted to co-opt the population by integrating through alliances with local clans and tribes. The rank-and-file AQI therefore had little engagement with greater al-Qaida outside of Iraq. As a result, the paradigm of “tribes vs. AQI” was more accurately understood as “tribe vs. AQI-aligned rival tribe.”

This mattered in the Awakening because it caused al-Qaida to become a major sponsor of Iraq-on-Iraq violence. Consequently, AQI brutality, loss of Muslim lives, and a senior leadership composed of foreigners provided an opportunity for the U.S.-led coalition to frame AQI as a hostile imposition on the Anbar people.

When the AQI-led Mujahidin Shura Council declared the creation of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) in October 2006, it was an act of desperation—an attempt to put an Iraqi face on AQI in the wake of the emergence of a popular movement, the Awakening, that was by then outmaneuvering AQI. To deflect assertions that AQI was a foreign-backed movement, AQI assigned an Iraqi, Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, as the leader of ISI. However, he maintained a low profile and withheld his identity from most of AQI, a spurious basis for leadership.

Because there was not one “insurgency” in Anbar, prevailing counterinsurgency thought was a poor fit. Many assumptions of counterinsurgency thought—even if they appreciate flexibility and avoid strict doctrine—were a poor fit for Anbar. One was the assumption implicit in most counterinsurgency thought that the various actors—whether those inside the country or those giving support from the outside—ultimately fell into one of two sides: the insurgency or the counterinsurgency. Trying to analyze the insurgency in Anbar this way was like analyzing a boxing match while paying no heed to a third boxer in the ring. In Anbar, there were three sides. The first was the U.S.-led counterinsurgency. The second was the indigenous Iraqi resistance that resented the war and attempted occupation by both the U.S.-led coalition and so-called AQI. The third was AQI and its local affiliates, whose designs on power made them ultimately appear to be a greater threat to the Anbar population than the United States was. This opened up the opportunity to assert publicly that a solution was only possible with the understanding—among both the resistance and the United States—that the resistance had more to lose from AQI than from the United States.

A second assumption was that the counterinsurgent must separate the insurgents from the population. This proved illusory in Anbar when most of the population also supported the anti-coalition insurgency at some level and in some form. When Anbaris used words like patriotism and nationalism, it was not in reference to their identification with, or support for, the central government of Iraq but in reference to loyalties behind opposition to it.

A third assumption was the need to market state instruments as superior to what the insurgency can offer. In Anbar, instead of marketing state services to appeal to the people, and instead of trying to court local leaders to participate in the Iraqi government through various state-provided incentives, success came in spite of Iraqi state institutions and the services they provided. Thus, the United States had to come to terms with the fundamental illegitimacy of the government of Iraq in the eyes of most Anbaris. By running extra-government militias and transitioning them into the Iraqi Security Forces, and by staging the recruitment of
local police based on arrangements with the sheiks, the United States helped build the instruments of state from the ground up.

**Awakening activity during the Baghdad Surge can yield some dangerous conclusions if taken out of context.** The best-publicized Awakening activity took place in the greater Baghdad area in spring-summer 2007. Most of the literature on the surge, as it came to be called, has focused on a select few senior U.S. commanders who were savvy with the press and had influential contacts among opinion makers. As the mainline story goes, a collection of counterinsurgency theorists arrived in Baghdad in early 2007 and implemented a plan that they had been devising during the previous year. The literature rightly describes how, in the surge, the U.S. military maintained an intimate presence in the streets, with combat outposts and joint security stations across greater Baghdad. Between June and August 2007, as MNF–I, the Iraqi Security Forces, and local units cleared and held more territory, the number of security incidents dropped precipitously.

But this Baghdad-area activity, which was historic and well-led, cannot be treated independently from the Awakening activity that had been occurring in 2005 and 2006. By 2007, local empowerment schemes elsewhere in Iraq, in places such as Tal Afar in Ninawa Province; al-Qa’im, Ramadi, and Fallujah in Anbar; and the Abu Ghurayb area of western Baghdad, had provided several compelling examples of locally generated security initiatives. In contrast to the chronology of actual events, the mainline literature tends to promote a narrative that first talks about what happened in Baghdad in spring 2007 and then anachronistically deals with Anbar in 2006. This obfuscates in some ways the actual chronology.

Much had happened before the 2007 Baghdad phase. The U.S. National Security Council had noted the Anbar Awakening’s importance during its late 2006 policy review, as had the authors of the December 2006 Iraq Study Group Report. President George W. Bush had even mentioned it in his January 2007 State of the Union Address—all pre-surge.

In this author’s conversations with U.S. officials and Awakening leaders in the Baghdad area, the Iraqis in early 2007 frequently invoked these prior incidences as motivation to work with the MNF–I in Baghdad. To be sure, Baghdad is different from Anbar, and the Baghdad-area Awakening was not simply an Anbar model applied to the capital city. The point is that the momentum and success record in Anbar 2005 to 2006 greatly enabled the Awakening activity in Baghdad in 2007 and elsewhere.

This pre-2007 context matters because without it, the Baghdad-area Awakening in spring 2007 takes a too-elitist appearance, as if it originated in a top-down process. The reality was that by spring 2007, the Awakening had worked upward from a phenomenon in pockets of Iraq, encouraged and supported by elements such as civil affairs officers, special operations forces, and brigade commanders and their staffs—eventually recognized and supported by the MNF–I establishment in Baghdad.

**We should be cautious in thinking that an Awakening-style program in another time and place can begin at the top.** In Afghanistan, plans ostensibly drawing inspiration from the Iraq Awakening—even when respecting the vast differences between the two countries—began not from the ground up but from the top down by United States and Afghan elites in Kabul. However, in crucial areas of Afghanistan, such as Helmand Province and the mountains along the eastern border with Pakistan, many locals were already taking the initiative to defend their areas from Taliban or al-Qaida intrusion. Yet, programs supposedly patterned after the Awakening were put into the hands of Kabul-based ministries with little understanding or relevance to the people in the provincial areas. In contrast, the Awakening started at the bottom in response to popular resentment and worked upward; this cannot be forgotten.

**Counterinsurgency obligations do not end once the worst of the violence has passed.** The Awakening may cautiously be called a success during its time, especially considering the abysmal conditions that reigned before. In Baghdad, its purpose was not necessarily to end all fighting but to provide an environment in which Iraq could at least attempt to build a government apparatus. However, serious problems remained.

The most serious problem was Iraq’s prime minister, who instead of seizing the opportunity for national reconciliation and establishing unity, used his security services to neutralize Sunni rivals and to prevent the Kurds
from developing their energy sector. These actions are difficult to explain in any context other than parochial sectarianism.

Saddam Hussein compelled the Sunni, Shia, and Kurds to live together, but in a post-Saddam Iraq, experience has shown that no two will submit to the third. As a result, Iraq’s sectarian and ethnic fault lines have threatened political stability. These fault lines rumble over the notable failure to integrate the mostly Sunni SOI into the Iraqi Security Forces, tribal rivalries, sectarian identification of certain security services, Arab-Kurd conflicts over disputed territories too inflammatory to deal with on the Iraqi constitution’s time table, the emergence of the Islamic State, and the aspirations of Iraq’s neighbors.

Any combination of these could bring back the level of violence and disorder of open civil war.

The Awakening is an indication that the United States must respect a country’s diverse peoples and consider them the foremost potential ally without whom it cannot expect to meet any goal in the country worth pursuing.

Questions for Future Programs

Some questions to be asked of any program in another theater that invokes or draws inspiration from the Anbar Awakening follow:

- Does the proposed group have a shared interest—however narrow—with the United States that will make it cooperate with us? To what extent does this interest overcome any grievances the group may have with the United States?
- Do the components of the group have any internal disputes or factions? How would we manage these?
- To what extent would U.S. cooperation with the group taint the group’s reputation, depicting it as a collaborator with an outside power? How can we manage the U.S. hand in order to not make the group look like a tool of the United States?
- Does the United States have the means and personnel resources to keep the group or its leaders acting in accord?
- To what extent is there already an indigenous trend that can be co-opted or guided?
- Would the program involve local control of the group’s own area? (If the program envisions an expeditionary force outside the group’s area, it should probably not claim inspiration from the Awakening.)
- How can the most influential and authentic leaders be determined?
- By entering into an arrangement with any one of the group’s leaders, which other centers of power (government entities, parties, warlords, or tribes) will be angered, marginalized, emboldened, or otherwise affected? How would this be managed?
Would empowerment of the group come at the expense of any host government entity—whether sovereign, transitional, or provisional—with which the United States has equities? How would we manage our relations with such a government entity?

- Does the host government have the capability and will to support the program, or at least not undermine it?
- Would the act of empowering the group be a tacit admission that some other U.S. goal for national sovereignty had failed? How would the program be reconciled with stated U.S. goals?
- Would the proposed program also require funds for reconstruction and civil affairs?
- Is the need for the program so dire that the United States is willing to work with people who may have poor human rights records and to defend the program from oversight and criticism?
- If the group is intended to counter al-Qaida or its affiliates, has al-Qaida misplayed its hand in some way that can be exploited?

- What are the de-escalation and transition plans in anticipation of the short-term objectives being met?
- What is the recovery plan in the event that the United States would supply the group with resources that may have to be accounted for later?

**Conclusion**

The above may or may not be relevant to a given case, and the answers need not demonstrate that a proposed program look like the Anbar Awakening. Where circumstances differ with the Awakening, we can ask why—and ask how we can tailor the program to the local reality. Doing so will confront each challenge as a product of its own locale and circumstance and may determine that an Awakening-like program may or may not be suitable. However, at a minimum, appreciation for the Anbar Awakening’s context will assist the understanding of a major event in the history of recent warfare, counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency. As a result, it will likely be a subject of continued debate—and seemingly influence—in the years and decades to come.

**Notes**


11. Ibid., 64-88.

12. Wilbanks and Karsh, 57-70; Benraad.


15. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), letter for the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Office of Management and Budget, “Commander’s Emergency Response Program Obligations are Uncertain,” 31 January 2011, 4; and SIGIR, “Sons of Iraq Program: Results are Uncertain and Financial Controls are Weak,” 28 January 2011, 1.


Tribal Militias
An Effective Tool to Counter Al-Qaida and Its Affiliates?
United States Army War College Press, Carlisle Barracks, PA

In this monograph, Dr. Norman Cigar identifies two models for tribal militias—either managed by local governments and supported by outside patrons or managed directly by an outside agent. It notes a number of lessons learned for the United States while acting as the direct managing patron of these groups.

Retaking a District Center
A Case Study in the Application of Village Stability Operations

Lt. Cmdr. Daniel R. Green, Ph.D., United States Navy Reserve
Much of the writing about the Village Stability Operations/Afghan Local Police (VSO/ALP) Program in Afghanistan is of a theoretical nature. While this body of work sometimes uses a limited number of anecdotes to illustrate key concepts, it often lacks a long-term perspective on one area of the war and rarely integrates security, governance, and development initiatives simultaneously. Additionally, tribal leaders, factional histories, and a historical perspective are often missing in studies of VSO/ALP, where emphasis is generally placed upon the actions of U.S. units, with Afghan efforts only peripherally discussed.

What is required is a holistic presentation of village stability operations in practice that balances U.S. efforts with Afghan initiatives and integrates all the key lines of operation in a manner that provides a long-term perspective on one district or village in Afghanistan.

The district of Chora in the southern Afghanistan province of Uruzgan provides a unique opportunity to provide such a perspective. I originally worked in Uruzgan with the U.S. Department of State as the political officer to the Tarin Kowt Provincial Reconstruction Team in 2005–2006 and then returned to the province in 2012 as a mobilized reservist working as a tribal and political engagement officer at Special Operations Task Force–South East. These experiences as both a civilian and a member of the U.S. military provided me with a holistic perspective on the area and greatly informed my views on U.S. operations in the region. Additionally, because I served in the province for two lengthy periods of time separated by six years, I gained a long-term perspective of not just Uruzgan Province but of the district of Chora in particular.

Uruzgan Province: The Heartland of the Taliban

The district of Chora was considered the safest in Uruzgan Province in late 2005. Although it did not have a coalition forces base located in its district center, the active patrolling of 25th Infantry Division units located in Khas Uruzgan District to its east, as well as patrols from the provincial capital of Tarin Kowt, dissuaded the Taliban from establishing a presence in the area. The key tribal chiefs of the Barakzai and Achikzai tribes in the area were substantial leaders in the province, the former being the provincial chief of police and the latter a member of parliament. Although both tribes were influential in their own way, they were largely excluded from the political power of the provincial government, which was dominated by members of the governor’s Populzai tribe. The leaders of the Populzai tribe in southern Chora had benefitted greatly from the provincial government’s largesse and, although they lived in much poorer circumstances than their district neighbors to the north, had more influence with key leaders in the capital.

The district’s approximately 20,000 residents are divided into two sections by a mountain range that bisects the middle of the region from east to west. The whole area is predominately Pashtun and is generally divided into the Barakzai and Achikzai tribes in the northern portion and the Populzai in the south around the village of Chenartu. Hazaran and Baluch ethnic communities are also present, with the Hazaran population in larger numbers in the northern areas closer to the predominantly Hazaran province of Dai Kundi. The district borders Zabul Province to the south and Dai Kundi to the north, and the Uruzgan districts of Khas Uruzgan to the east, Tarin Kowt to the south, and Shahid-e-Hasas to the west.

The Chora area has long served as a transit hub for insurgents from both Helmand and Zabul Provinces. They pour into the districts respectively west and east of Chora and then transit, finally, to the provincial capital of Tarin Kowt. The population is generally anti-Taliban because of their largely Durrani Pashtun tribal affiliation (the Taliban are typically affiliated with the Ghilzai tribal confederation) and are more naturally inclined to support the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA).

Chora: 2005 to 2006–The Taliban Return

The district of Chora was considered the safest in Uruzgan Province in late 2005. Although it did not have a coalition forces base located in its district center, the active patrolling of 25th Infantry Division units located in Khas Uruzgan District to its east, as well as patrols from the provincial capital of Tarin Kowt, dissuaded the Taliban from establishing a presence in the area. The key tribal chiefs of the Barakzai and Achikzai tribes in the area were substantial leaders in the province, the former being the provincial chief of police and the latter a member of parliament. Although both tribes were influential in their own way, they were largely excluded from the political power of the provincial government, which was dominated by members of the governor’s Populzai tribe. The leaders of the Populzai tribe in southern Chora had benefitted greatly from the provincial government’s largesse and, although they lived in much poorer circumstances than their district neighbors to the north, had more influence with key leaders in the capital.
The provincial reconstruction team and 25th Infantry Division team made frequent trips to the district center and the village of Chenartu, and through projects such as a new district center, a traffic circle, and smaller scale projects such as wells, the population received some development assistance. However, when the fighting season began in early 2006, this tranquil spot of Uruzgan, whose residents supported GIRoA, was overrun by the Taliban, with the district center falling to Taliban control.

The Taliban’s offensive was not a limited operation consisting of a small number of fighters; instead, it was a conventional assault with the goal of holding the area and repulsing any subsequent GIRoA effort to take it back. The departure of the 25th Infantry Division in the summer of 2005, in part due to a perception the province was largely secured, facilitated the resurgence of the Taliban in the area. Gone were the days of limited Taliban attacks on the margins of the province; the province was now effectively split into two halves.

As a result, the insurgents poured into Chora from Uruzgan’s western district of Shahid-e-Hasas, which bordered the then insurgent-controlled province of Helmand, and used the cultivated fields of the river basins to mask their movements. While a determined offensive of U.S., coalition, and Afghan forces retook Chora not long after it had fallen in 2006, it was now clear that occasional patrols, raids, and the feeling that the population’s support for GIRoA was sufficient to stop the Taliban from holding the area were tragically wrong. A new approach was required for the area, one where a persistent presence of security forces would be able to protect the population from insurgent intimidation.

Chora: Interregnum

In the intervening years, new efforts were undertaken to provide the sustained security Chora required and to better link it to the provincial capital. A series of patrol bases were constructed from the provincial capital of Tarin Kowt to the Chora area, protecting key lines of communication along and within the river basin. The patrol bases occupied key geographical points that insurgents had used for attacks, protected main roads and population centers, and provided areas for the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) to stage out of to patrol the region.

Subsequently, a new military base was constructed in Chora, which meant that only one district in the province did not have an enduring coalition forces presence. This forward operating base also became a hub for the ANA and a means of support to Chora District’s chief of police as well as its district governor. These additional forces served a crucial role in preventing a second Taliban attempt to overrun the district center in 2007. Additionally, as security improved in the area, a new paved road was built linking Chora to Tarin Kowt, as well as to the northernmost district of Uruzgan called Gizab.

When the Netherlands assumed responsibility for Uruzgan in 2006, its greater focus on the development of the province—added to the Australian government’s efforts that had started after their arrival in late 2005—greatly improved living conditions in the Chora area. A new bridge was constructed, improving access from the district to Tarin Kowt. An electrification project was completed, more schools were constructed, and additional water and economic project improvements were completed.

Although security had improved through the placement and growth of formal security forces, the community was still not enlisted in its own defense. The temporary suspension of violence did not mean violence was absent. The ANA was comprised of soldiers from all over Afghanistan so they lacked a local connection to the people. The ANP, though largely drawn from Uruzgan, were not from the Chora area, were predominantly loyal to the Populzai-dominated government in Tarin Kowt, or both, which meant there was a sense of antipathy between them and the people as well. It is difficult for a community to embrace a police force which is regarded, at least in part, as an occupation force.

Additionally, special operations forces (SOF) had established two village stability platform sites north of Chora District center and along the Tarin Kowt/Chora/Gizab Road. These sites were comprised of SOF living in Afghan villages full-time, recruiting and training Afghan Local Police (ALP) in their respective areas. This ensured the road remained secure up to the northern district of Gizab and better enabled the small population centers along them to resist Taliban intimidation. While security had stabilized in the area, the tribal situation had become markedly more fluid.

Following his removal as provincial chief of police in 2006, Barakzai tribal leader Rozi Khan was elected
district governor of Chora. In the summer of 2008, he was accidentally killed by coalition forces in a nighttime operation. His death destabilized the Barakzai tribe, a tribe with much influence in Chora. His son, Mohammed Daoud Khan, assumed his leadership mantle and continued as the district chief of Chora and head of his family until his removal from office by GIRoA in late 2010. The assassination of Daoud Khan in late 2011, in part retaliation for the assassination of Populazi tribal leader and former governor Jan Mohammed Khan in Kabul in late summer 2011, further weakened the Barakzai tribe’s leadership. It was widely thought within the Populzai tribe that Mohammed Daoud Khan was to blame for the killing of Jan Mohammed Khan although this was never proven.

Rozi Khan’s next youngest son, Khoshal, assumed the leadership of the Barakzai tribe, but since he and his older brother were only in their early to mid-twenties, their tribal position was contested by other Barakzai elders seeking to improve their tribal, political, and social situation. The Achikzai tribal leader, who had originally been district governor of Chora in 2001-2002, had subsequently been elected as one of the province’s representatives to Afghanistan’s parliament. As a political opponent of then governor Jan Mohammed Khan, his election to Parliament in 2005 came as bit of a surprise, and his alliance with Rozi Khan acted as an effective check on any predatory tendencies of the Populzai-dominated provincial government. It also ensured that their respective tribal members had strong representation in tribal and government affairs.

His subsequent defeat in 2010, in part orchestrated through an election process that fell short of international standards of transparency, prompted him to depart the province and reside in Kabul. His new residence protected him from any local assassination attempts organized by his tribal opponents, but it also weakened his local tribe’s power since he was not as able to protect their interests while away.

In this context of weakened tribal leadership and enhanced but temporary security, the Taliban were able to increase their foothold in the Chora region. While the ANA undertook occasional patrols in the area, they had negotiated nonaggression pacts with the Taliban so that their routes and schedules were already known by the enemy. Additionally, while the ANP were more reliably anti-Taliban, the fact that many of them had come from Tarin Kowt, which meant they were outsiders to Chora, prevented them from having as close a relationship with local residents as they could have had. This tendency was especially acute since there remained a lingering perception that the ANP were simply outgrowths of Populzai tribal power seeking to encroach into other tribal areas. Nevertheless, the ANP were able to construct four ALP
checkpoints on their own, protecting some population centers, but not enough to deny the Taliban access to the population. They lacked the manpower to do so.

The Taliban took advantage of this tribal power vacuum, the compromised ANA, and the insufficient ANP to expand their power base in the area. By constantly attacking the ANP through direct attacks, suicide-vest attacks, and car bombs, the Taliban hobbled the police force. Following the transition to Afghan control of two village stability platform sites in northern Chora due to success in recruiting ALP, the SOF team that arrived in Chora’s district center in late spring 2012 prepared to shift the balance of power away from the Taliban and toward GIRoA. Unlike the district of Shahid-e-Hasas, the team’s approach required more than simply growing ALP. It required a proactive approach to push the Taliban out, rehabilitate and empower tribal structures, reassure GIRoA allies, and shape the physical terrain to inhibit the Taliban’s infiltration routes.

Chora: 2012, the People Respond

The special operations team that arrived in Chora in 2012 had already gained experience in establishing ALP and was familiar with the larger issues of Chora from having run a village stability platform site in the same district. The team quickly determined that it had to create breathing space for tribal engagement to take place and for local officials to begin to see the seriousness of the team’s intention to push the Taliban out. There had long been a view held by locals in the area that coalition forces had adopted a “live and let live” attitude when it came to confronting the Taliban insurgency.

In an effort to dispel this perception, clearing operations began soon after the team’s arrival—a mix of partnered Afghan Commando raids, determined clearing operations with similarly partnered Afghan National Army units, and embedded mentoring with the Afghan National Police. As these operations pushed the Taliban back, the team began an active round of community engagements, principally with Barakzai tribal elders, to begin the process of recruiting local military-age males to serve in the ALP. This process uncovered a certain elder who, with his sons, was working with the Taliban to extend his personal power in the region but had enough plausible deniability to seek contracts with the coalition and political influence with GIRoA. This local spoiler could not be killed unless he engaged in hostile acts, but he could be marginalized.

His true intentions were discerned through his early suggestion to build a particular police checkpoint near his village, a task he thought would take the team months to complete but was accomplished within a few days. Then, when he was pressed for ALP recruits, he demurred and left the area. This hidden hand of the insurgency, partly political and partly tribal, had helped serve as the backbone of the Taliban’s shadow government in the area. The team established a checkpoint near his residence that effectively put pressure on him and his family to either turn away from the insurgency or at least remain neutral. Subsequent engagements with area elders signaled an interest by the community to join the ALP but also indicated concern
about how enduring the SOF presence would be and whether Taliban control would return. The team sought to remove these concerns through active patrolling, playing a leading role in the weekly security coordination meeting with the ANA and ANP, and having the ANP chief live at their base.

Additionally, the team actively supported the ANP in their efforts to expand their freedom of movement, or “white space,” and worked by, with, and through them in community interactions to bolster their local status. While both ANP and ALP numbers increased (the ALP went from 40 in the town of Chora to 155), the insurgents were still utilizing the lush undergrowth of the river valley to move between checkpoints, attack the ANP and SOF at times of their choosing, and conceal their activities. Many of these attacks were traced to a village called Nyazi, southwest of Chora and just over the border in Tarin Kowt District.

The Great Wall of Chora

The SOF unit came up with a plan to stem this flow of fighters and to stop their logistical support, but it was unorthodox and risky. The idea was simple and without precedent in the area, and it was difficult to gauge how the community would react. Following continued insurgent attacks against ALP commanders, the ANP, and its leadership; suicide motorcycle attacks; and at least one successful suicide-vest attack among many attempts; the leadership of Village Stability Platform Chora decided to physically cut the “green zone” of vegetation in half through the construction of a wall—the “Great Wall of Chora.” The wall was intended to help the expanding ALP cut off Nyazi Village, the center of Taliban activity, and inhibit insurgent infiltration up from Tarin Kowt to the north, or down from Chora.

Clearing operations in the area opened the way, and the SOF team began construction of the great wall. In total, it would consume more than 100 Hesco barriers—the wire and fabric baskets which, when filled with dirt and rocks, form a bulletproof barrier—and multiple spools of concertina wire. The team brought out earth movers and shovels and began its work in earnest, creating an unbroken barrier at the narrowest point of the cultivated land.

The SOF team soon discovered that the land selected was not only owned by one family, which simplified compensation payments for land use, but that they were great supporters of GIRoA. The leading brother had in fact been teaching school privately in his own home out of fear of Taliban repression if he had been more public with his activities. As the wall was constructed, the brothers volunteered to fill the Hesco barriers and, following their actions, so did other members of the community. The wall was completed after two days of work, and the leading landowner who was running the secret school requested that he be named the commander of the wall. The SOF team gave him one of their patches with the future promise of a sheriff’s badge.

It was becoming clear that the community embraced this unorthodox security strategy. Each end of the wall had a checkpoint, and a third checkpoint was located at its center. Two mountains formed natural barriers around the river valley, which forced road traffic past the two checkpoints at either end of the wall. Any foot traffic through the fields would have to pass by the central checkpoint. The wall had an immediate and dramatic effect on security. When a Taliban probing patrol against the wall had been intercepted by the SOF team and killed, more villagers joined the ALP, and the ANP became more confident in their ability to conduct their own operations. As security improved, a more determined clearing operation commenced, which discovered a Taliban command center in the village and, later, two suicide vests that were subsequently destroyed.
Conclusion

The growth of ALP forces as well as the ANP, and the construction of a series of checkpoints throughout Chora, dramatically improved security in the area and began to physically push the Taliban out. In addition, the wall’s sheer presence also demonstrated to local villagers, GIRoA officials, and tribal leaders that security could be established and become an enduring condition instead of a temporary, unsustainable effect.

The growth of the Afghan local security forces was greatly enabled by the simultaneous construction of the Great Wall of Chora, which set the conditions for securing the villages of Nyazi and Chora. Through shaping the physical terrain of the Chora Valley, the wall stemmed insurgent infiltration into the provincial capital of Tarin Kowt and secured a section of the Tarin Kowt/Chora/Gizab Road, which had long been subject to improvised explosive device attacks.

Moreover, security conditions in the district of Chora began to dramatically improve when SOF in the area launched aggressive offensive operations to push the Taliban back. These actions reassured local Afghan allies about U.S. determination to defeat the Taliban in the area instead of merely coexisting with them. Offensive operations were followed by a robust embedded partnering plan with the ANP and increased support for their efforts. Village Stability Platform Chora liaised with the provincial chief of police to ensure greater materiel and logistical support as well as to improve the morale of the battered force. Additionally, the subsequent removal of an ineffective district governor and the marginalization of a Taliban sympathizer demonstrated to other locals that GIRoA was serious about bringing security and governance to their community.

A community engagement strategy of partnering with and empowering tribal elders to both grow Afghan local police forces and to get them more involved in local political affairs had an extremely positive effect and furthered the rehabilitation of tribal leadership structures. Residents were actively enlisted in their own defense.

Facilitated by U.S. efforts, they participated in local security forces and played an active role in community institutions. The result was that the Taliban were unable to physically intimidate the population, entice it to their cause through payments, or take advantage of its grievances to separate the people from their government.

A balanced approach of using kinetic and nonkinetic strategies greatly enhanced security in the greater Chora Valley and demonstrated that a determined U.S. military unit can sufficiently degrade if not defeat a local Taliban insurgency, given the right approach.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not represent the U.S. Department of Defense or the U.S. Department of State.

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Notes

3. Village Stability Platforms (VSPs) are sites from which special operations forces conduct village stability operations.
Air-Sea Battle and the Danger of Fostering a Maginot Line Mentality

Lt. Col. Raymond Millen, U.S. Army, Retired

Since the Air-Sea Battle (ASB) concept is likely to remain an enduring feature of U.S. national security, it is fitting to consider its ramifications for the future of land power. Conceptually, ASB proposes a solution set regarding potential threats to the global commons (the land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace domains), in order to “preserve U.S. ability to project power and maintain freedom of action.” Accordingly, threats include the ever-increasing numbers and sophistication of missiles (e.g., cruise, ballistic, air-to-air, and surface-to-air), modern submarines and fighter aircraft, advanced sea mines, and fast-attack sea craft, as well as growing competition for space and cyberspace.
The Air-Sea Battle Office argues that such technological capabilities in the hands of adversarial state and non-state actors can not only threaten the global commons but also can obstruct U.S. expeditionary operations by employing anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) strategies. Anti-access activities slow or prevent movement into a theater; area denial activities impede movement within a theater.

To counter these threats, the ASB Office proposes the establishment of a joint Navy-Air Force capability—one that is networked, integrated, and designed to attack in depth—to accomplish the goals identified in the ASB lines of effort:

- Disrupt adversary command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
- Destroy adversary A2/AD platforms and weapons systems
- Defeat adversary-employed weapons and formations

The ASB concept in itself seeks to create greater joint synergy and is ostensibly aligned with U.S. strategic planning documents. However, the ASB Office goes a step further, calling for radical institutional changes in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities to guide how the services organize, train, and equip. Naturally, the ASB Office denies it is calling for the creation of a “new force,” seeking only to reduce risk and increase flexibility for senior policy makers and joint force commanders. But, the concept relegates the Army and the Marine Corps to conducting stability operations or, at best, mopping up enemy resistance after the joint Navy-Air Force conducts the decisive operations. Hence, ASB is conceptually flawed because it violates unity of command and unity of effort.

In the process of making their case, ASB advocates cite some historical examples to underscore the relevance of ASB. The ASB Office references the AirLand Battle doctrine of the 1980s as a progenitor of ASB, though AirLand Battle was an operation-level response to Soviet massed mechanized operational maneuver and not a realignment of service roles and responsibilities. Air Force Gen. Norton A. Schwartz and Navy Adm. Jonathan W. Greenert add that the ASB concept is not new, recalling Navy and Air Force cooperation during the battle of the...
Atlantic in World War II and the Doolittle Raid on Japan. Moreover, they cite examples of U.S. successes against A2/AD situations during the Berlin Airlift (June 1948 to May 1949), and the U.S. support to Israel during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. They might have included U.S. Navy and Air Force cooperation during the War in the Pacific in World War II, in which both arms isolated Japanese-held islands in preparation for Marine and Army invasions. They might also have discussed how Allied use of tactical and strategic air power under the Transportation Plan successfully interdicted German reinforcements to the Normandy beachhead. In both cases, however, land power forces conducted the decisive operations, so their omission is understandable.

At the risk of sounding patronizing, it must be said that a little knowledge of history is almost as damaging as no knowledge. At least with no knowledge, policy makers view the future with a bit more trepidation and circumspection, as an unknown frontier to be crossed. Senior policy makers run great risks by causally reaching back to history as a guidepost for bold action without a full understanding of the context.

The controversial Maginot Line is a case in point and stands as the greatest testament against the ASB concept. Conventional knowledge teaches that France attempted to protect itself from a German invasion by building a fortified line all along its northeast border. Yet, because the Maginot Line ended at the Luxembourg border, the Germans simply drove around it. While it is tempting to dismiss this as yet another example of a French debacle, the backdrop of the Maginot Line is much more complex.

The Maginot Line was much more than a fortified line; it was a mentality that national security could be assured with a silver bullet. The irony is that the Maginot Line performed exactly as intended, and a defense strategy built around it might have succeeded but for a series of incremental decisions in the interwar years that hollowed out the French army and the government’s will to act proactively.

While U.S. policy makers may regard themselves as too savvy to fall into the same mental trap, ASB rests on the same reasoning that captivated French policy makers with the Maginot Line. Accordingly, the first part of this article touches on the salient thinking...
behind France's decision to construct the Maginot Line and its deleterious effect on military readiness; how the Maginot Line undermined France's deterrence strategy, leading to a reliance on passive defense; and the fundamental reasons why the German offensive was decisive—it was not because the Germans simply drove around the Maginot Line. The second part examines how the sophisticated arguments behind the Maginot Line have resurfaced in promoting ASB and the consequences if it is elevated to a national security strategy.

**France's Security Challenge in the Interwar Years**

Victory in World War I did not negate the fundamental security challenges facing France vis-à-vis Germany. Germany's industrial capacity, wealth, and population exceeded France's substantially. Whereas Germany avoided the ravages of war, France suffered horrendous damage. It was clear that without some mitigating modifiers, Germany would defeat France in a future war.

The Versailles Treaty established the first set of modifiers to keep Germany in a debilitated state: the German payment of reparations, limits on its military forces, German territorial losses, and Allied occupation of the Rhineland. Another set of modifiers included French alliances with the new states of Czechoslovakia and Poland, backed up perhaps by Russia, to threaten the heart of Germany in the event of war with France. The last modifier was the Maginot Line, begun in 1930.

Named after André Maginot, the French minister of war, the fortified line was intended to run from the Swiss border to the English Channel. While expensive, its cost would be offset by a reduced standing army. Conceptually, the small standing army occupying the ultra-modern Maginot Line would shield France during the initial phase of a conflict while military and industrial mobilization for a long war took place. The pièce de résistance of the Maginot Line was the promise of a cheap victory. Once the German army had bled itself white attacking the fortified line, the French army would launch a counteroffensive, crushing the remaining German forces and marching into Berlin. In light of these circumstances, Germany would be deterred from attacking France.

A tank sits upon a hilltop display 22 March 2006 at the Casemate d’Esch (built in 1931), once part of the Fortified Sector of Hagenau, a section of the Maginot Line. It is now an artifact on display at the Ouvrage Schoenenburg Museum run by the Alsace Association of Friends of the Maginot Line.
and, should deterrence fail, defeated in an uneven war of attrition.

Along with the Czech-Polish-Soviet Alliance and Versailles Treaty, the Maginot Line created a strong sense of security for France, and here the seeds of a hollow military were sown.

A flurry of successive French governments continually retrenched defense expenditures—lowering readiness, slashing modernization, and further reducing the size of the army. At the time, policy decisions were based on the logic of the moment and implemented incrementally. The losses in World War I caused a drop in the birthrate, resulting in a deficit in the number of available conscripts in the 1930s. Economic, political, and labor upheavals compelled successive French governments to devote fewer resources to defense expenditures. Accordingly, cost overruns in fortification construction and diminished defense spending delayed the planned completion of the Maginot Line. Likewise, the French army received even less attention, but the government clung to the hope that once completed, the Maginot Line would obviate the need for high military readiness. Despite the fact that the French army retained a small core of professional soldiers, the larger part had rotted from disuse, and no amount of effort dedicated to mobilization would suffice to turn about this state of affairs quickly.

The Rising German Threat

As the 1930s unfolded, it bears reminding that France did not have the benefit of hindsight regarding Hitler’s intentions. To many French officials, Bolshevism was a greater threat, so using Russia to balance against Germany struck them as unsavory. Restoration of the German empire occurred incrementally, slowly dismantling the restrictions of the Versailles Treaty; Germany resumed military armament in May 1935, reoccupied the Rhineland in May 1936, and annexed Austria in March 1938. None of these actions warranted a military response, and it is doubtful France could have mustered a military coalition in any case.

While historians would connect the dots of aggression after the war, at the time German diplomacy rested on redressing the grievance of self-determination. The victors of The Great War cited self-determination to justify the dismemberment of the German and Austro-Hungarian empires. Hitler in turn used self-determination as his justification to annex all ethnic German territories into a Greater Germany.

The annexation of the Sudetenland in October 1938 was more than a betrayal of allied Czechoslovakia; the loss of this fortified zone removed the last conventional deterrent against German aggression toward France. Given their geostategic positions, France and Czechoslovakia could act in concert to occupy the German military-industrial heartland, quashing Hitler’s aspirations. With the elimination of Czech interference, Germany no longer faced multiple dilemmas, permitting it to pursue its aggressive agenda unfettered.

Unquestioned faith in the Maginot Line uncoupled France’s reliance on deterrence and balancing alliances to check German militarism. France stood as a bystander as Germany invaded the rest of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 and signed the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact in August 1939, simply playing out the drama before the German invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939. Deterrence had failed, so the security of France rested completely on a passive defense.

The Wehrmacht (German armed forces) took advantage of its military experiences in Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Denmark, and Norway to hone joint operations. By the time Germany launched its invasion of the Netherlands, Belgium, and France on 10 May 1940, the Wehrmacht was a well-oiled military machine. In contrast, the Western allies had virtually no military experiences since World War I. The tranquility of the French colonies and the anti-war sentiment during the interwar years lulled France into perceiving war as unthinkable, hence not worthy of preparation. To use a sports analogy, the Wehrmacht was playing college varsity football, while the West was playing high school junior varsity.

Fall Gelb (Plan Yellow)—the German Offensive in the West

Despite the host of post-war accounts, the Maginot Line actually could have functioned as envisioned. While the Maginot Line extended only as far as the Luxembourg border, the combined British-French-Belgium forces were theoretically sufficient to cover the northern gap, defending key choke points. Also theoretically, the defense could have stanched or significantly delayed the German offensive to prolong the war sufficiently for the allies to
marginalize German military advantages. As an aside, the
Allies had nine months to mobilize and prepare for the
war but wasted this precious time, which was character-
ized as the Sitzkrieg (the sitting war).

The Dyle Plan was not fundamentally flawed. The
Allied forward occupation of the line generally along
the Dyle River did shorten the front substantially.
Nevertheless, the failure to anchor the southern flank on
the Maginot Line, thereby leaving the Ardennes region
essentially undefended, was an unnecessary risk, which
presented the Germans with the opportunity to exe-
cute an operational envelopment. Nevertheless, even
without this blunder, the German army and Luftwaffe
so outclassed the Allies, a German decisive victory was
probably inevitable, though not quite so swift.

The basic idea behind the Maginot Line made
strategic sense in that it promised to provide immedi-
ate defense of France with a smaller army than was
hitherto possible. Its deterrent effect was not tied as
much to the restrictions of the Versailles Treaty and
alliances as it was to a modern army maintaining a
high state of readiness.

Had the French army assiduously retained this
capability, the French government could have exercised
the option to intervene at any point before and including
the Sudetenland crisis. As part of its risk assessment, the
German government correctly assessed that the French
army was a hollow force and the Maginot Line a self-im-
posed prison.

The Air-Sea Battle Nostrum

Like the proponents of the Maginot Line, ASB ad-
vocates demonstrate a mentality that national security
be assured with a silver bullet; they vow to protect
American vital interests most assuredly with joint
naval and air power. Currently, ASB is only a concept.
However, as political and economic pressures mount,
the temptation to elevate it into a strategy will increase
correspondingly. The result will be a much smaller
active Army with a ceiling well below the proposed
490,000 end strength. As a hedge, ASB advocates will
argue that in the case of a major conflict, the feder-
al government can mobilize the U.S. Army National
Guard and Reserve.

Although future events are impossible to predict with
exactitude, governments do exhibit patterns of behavior,
especially if too focused on the exigencies of the moment.

Political, economic, and social turmoil create stresses that
demand solutions, and silver bullet solutions are the most
enticing. What the Maginot Line promised France, ASB
promises America: an economical and pristine way to
secure national security interests without becoming em-
broiled in a protracted land conflict. However, the reality
is that an air-sea-centric strategy unbalances U.S. national
security policy.

Adversaries constantly probe for weaknesses, testing
American resolve and capabilities. A probe could be
limited territorial aggression, intimidation of neighbors
through military posturing, or covert (including proxy)
wart. The unilateral use of air and sea power in such
cases is very rarely effective. From the U.S. perspective,
when committed to ASB, senior policy makers would
find the use of ground forces antithetical to the accepted
strategy, and since the probe is usually minor, not worth
mobilizing land forces. If history is any guide, the accu-
mulation of power eventually turns minor probes into
major threats. The U.S. Cold War containment strategy
was predicated on countering Soviet probes all along
the periphery. Without land power, containment would
have failed.

The ASB concept suggests that the era of great power
threats is over and the United States would have suffi-
cient time to mobilize if its interests were threatened.
As a counterpoint of fact, however, the Third Reich
represented no threat in 1935 but became a regional
threat with the seizure of the Sudetenland in 1938,
and it became a global threat in 1940 with the fall
of France—a period of only five years. Admittedly,
few countries can match the unique circumstances
that made the Third Reich a virulent threat to global
security, but even lesser adversarial powers require
vigilance, and stalwart land power is the sentinel. To
maintain readiness, land power forces require the
continuous cultivation of human capital for sound
leadership, the maintenance of highly trained and
skilled soldiers, and the ability to plan and execute
intricate operations. Once an army falls below a
certain threshold of manpower, regeneration of the
force takes months, even years, depending on the
level of mobilization, before it is prepared to conduct
successful military operations. If senior policy makers
begin to view mobilization as a process akin to making
sausage, the result will be a return to the meat-grinder
wars so often experienced by the U.S. Army.
Like the French army in the interwar years, the deterioration of U.S. land power could remain imperceptible for years, especially if no military threats materialize. Similar to French political decisions during the same period, national security policies are rarely sweeping; instead, they chip away incrementally at readiness, end strength, and modernization. At some point, the institutional Army could be negatively impacted, relegated to an insignificant role in national security policy formulation. If the American public perceives the Army as playing an insignificant role in national security, the recruitment and development of future leaders dedicated to the study and practice of land power could become a challenge. Within a couple of generations, the body of military expertise on land power, which senior policy makers need to make informed decisions, could atrophy.

The two areas most likely to be affected by a deterioration of U.S. land power would be in headquarters and logistics. When cuts are made, headquarters suffer first. In times of crisis, as experiences during World War II and the Korean War attest, staff officers cannot be thrown together and expected to function as a team quickly. If trained staff officers are a deficit, the creation of headquarters teamwork will take even longer, and unity of command will ultimately suffer.

To preserve a modicum of combat capability, the Army will next cut into combat support and combat service support. One of the great strengths of the United States is its military logistical capabilities. This applies not only in times of conflict but also during humanitarian assistance and disaster response operations. While the Navy and Air Force can rightly claim they can provide logistical support to a theater, only the Army has the capability and capacity to deliver logistical support into the interior (i.e., beyond the ports of debarkation). Decreasing this support will cause U.S. global influence and prestige to suffer correspondingly.

The argument that ground forces of other countries can substitute for U.S. ground forces has little basis of proof. Except in some cases of counterinsurgency, friends and allies are highly unlikely to join coalitions and alliances without the involvement of U.S. ground forces because these are a guarantee of U.S. commitment and a tangible willingness to share risks. This commitment also demonstrates to adversaries the degree of U.S. resolve.

Early during the Cold War, for example, the United States deployed four divisions into Europe under NATO to bolster the U.S. security guarantee. In view of the purported 150 Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe, the security commitment was more political and psychological than physical. Despite their relatively small size, the presence of U.S. ground troops provided indispensable assurance to the European allies that the United States would not withdraw its support, thereby leaving them in the lurch. Along with the Marshall Plan, the U.S. military presence undergirded European confidence so they could focus on economic and political recovery instead of obsessing over potential Soviet subversion, intimidation, and aggression. Neither the nuclear umbrella nor the promise of air and sea power could have instilled this confidence.

The intellectual flaw in ASB lies in its essential framework. It is a tactical-operational concept masquerading as a strategy, although it denies this intent. It is like claiming AirLand Battle of the 1980s was a replacement for the containment strategy of the Cold War. Since ASB is tied to the pivot to the Pacific Rim, it leads to the larger question of whether China is an ideological threat to democracies, which demands a strategy of containment, or merely an economic competitor. China may be both, but that dialogue has yet to take place and be explained to the American people and other nations. The Pacific Rim might be economically important to the United States, but so are Europe, the Middle East, and the Americas. How does a military shift promote global trade? Until these strategic issues are aired, pivoting to the Pacific region is placing the tactical cart before the strategic horse.

The danger is a misplaced focus. Just as Bolshevism mesmerized France for much of the interwar years, the pivot to the Pacific Rim might prove irrelevant or even detrimental to U.S. national security in the long run. While the Pacific region is particularly suited to the type of conflict the Navy and Air Force wish to fight, future events might not be so accommodating. If ASB should prove to be a blunder, the Air Force and Navy have very little skin in the game. It will be the men and women of the ground forces who will bear the brunt of the strategic error.

Conclusion

Military historian John Toland once wrote that history does not repeat itself; human nature does. So it is with the Maginot Line and Air-Sea Battle mentalities. The first promised the German army would be bleed white...
on the border, while the interior of France remained unscathed by war. The second promises that the era of protracted land conflicts is over, and that America will remain untouched by war. While there is a tendency in defense studies to repeat assertions to the point they gain general acceptance, history’s rejoinder is reality—the stuff debacles are made of.

The major flaw of the Maginot Line was not in its construction but in French policy decisions, which eroded military readiness to the point that France’s army became a hollow force. Hitler’s early probing revealed the deplorable state of France’s military, nullifying the deterrent value of the demilitarized Rhineland and the alliances with Czechoslovakia and Poland. During the defense of France, the Maginot Line did permit the French army to conduct an economy of force along the German border in order for the army, along with the British and Belgian forces, to achieve sufficient mass in Belgium. Untested, untrained, and outclassed, the Allied armies collapsed at first contact and never recovered during the campaign for France.

Despite protestations to the contrary, proponents of ASB are promoting a gimmick that seeks to obviate the necessity of protracted land warfare. Like the Maginot Line concept, once policy makers commit to it, the result will be a gross imbalance of U.S. military forces. The atrophy of U.S. land power may not become apparent for years, but the rot will be absolute. Ancillary capabilities—stability operations, humanitarian assistance, and disaster response—will slough off; next, logistical and combat support capabilities will attenuate; finally, land forces will be expected to perform missions as in the past but will suffer egregious losses as mounting deficiencies manifest.

As with all ideas that sound cogent at cocktail parties, there is always the hangover to contend with the next morning. U.S. policy makers need to be skeptical—very skeptical.

Notes

2. Ibid., 2.
3. Ibid., 4-5, 7.
4. Ibid., 7-9.
6. The Transportation Plan, operationalized from March to June 1944, was designed to prevent the Germans from rushing reinforcements to the Normandy beachhead. As such, air power isolated the Normandy area by targeting select urban and rail centers, bridges, and other transportation nodes.
7. The Dyle Plan envisioned a joint British-French movement into Belgium once the German offensive began. The strategy served two purposes: first, to shorten the front along good defensive terrain; and second, to ensure French territory was not subjected to the same type of devastation as suffered during World War I.
8. The European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan) was designed to assist in the reconstruction of Europe and to restore confidence in the European people. Marshall believed that the restoration of European economies would create greater political stability, thereby countering the allure of Soviet socialism. Funding of $13 billion resulted in a rejuvenation of European industrialization, increased corporate investments, stimulation of the U.S. economy, and increased trade between North America and Europe. Ultimately, the goal was economic integration and political unification of Europe.
KILLING FROM THE INSIDE OUT
Moral Injury and Just War

Robert Emmet Meagher; Cascade Books, Eugene, Oregon, 2014, 190 pages


In a 2006 book, Robert Meagher, a brilliant classical scholar, delivered the definitive translation of Euripides’ play *Herakles Gone Mad* and argued that Hercules’ killing his beloved wife and children during a bout of post-combat madness sheds light on the timeless psychological horrors of war. *Killing from the Inside Out* examines the psychological effects of combat from another angle, as it pertains to just war theory (JWT) and the theory’s impact on “moral injury.”

The title comes from the poignant story of Noah Pierce. A young infantry soldier during the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Pierce became distressed by several incidents, such as his accidentally crushing an Iraqi child under his Bradley fighting vehicle. After Pierce committed suicide in 2007, his mother said, “he couldn’t forgive himself for some of the things he did” and that the kind of wound he had “kills you from the inside out.” As Meagher correctly describes in *Killing*, Pierce’s story is just one of many attesting to the power of moral injury, a condition causing self-destructive behaviors such as drug abuse, domestic violence, and suicide.

Meagher begins his analysis with the roots of JWT in early western civilization. The concept of sin, he shows, was prefigured in the Greek concept of “miasma” (moral...
pollution). To the Greeks, killing always polluted the killer, regardless of intentions or the act’s perceived justice. This pollution required ritual cleansing, what Christians would later call “absolution,” and cleansing required suffering, read “penance.” Great suffering even transmogrified polluted heroes such as Oedipus and Hercules into “heroes,” or even gods.

Turning to early Christianity, Meagher argues that Jesus’ life and words clearly promoted pacifism, and such was long the predominant understanding among Christians. This understanding shifted with the conversion of the Roman emperor Constantine and Rome’s adoption of Christianity as the state religion. Quickly, the “Lamb of God” was redesigned as the “Lord of Hosts.” Ambrose of Milan and his more influential protégé, Augustine of Hippo, forged a new interpretation of the gospels—one focused on the “spirit” rather than the “letter” of their meaning—to legitimize Christians’ serving in the empire’s wars. Their concept of “just war” was much more restrictive than it would eventually become, however. Ambrose and Augustine, for example, strongly condemned killing in self-defense.

During the Middle Ages, the church grew more powerful than the state. Meagher describes how this led to the concept of just war becoming more elastic. Medieval scholastics such as Thomas Aquinas justified defensive and other wars through the principle of double effect. This dangerous principle can justify just about anything as long as one’s intentions are “pure.” Such dogma enabled the crusades, where a warrior’s every sin found pardon, and JWT went, as Meagher vividly puts it, “stark raving mad.”

Meagher then examines the evolution of JWT from the medieval period to “Early Modern Europe.” He discusses the “Peace of God” and the “Truce of God,” early versions of JWT that narrowly (and unsuccessfully) focused on limiting Christian-on-Christian violence. There is the great humanist scholar Francisco de Victoria, who both condemned and unintentionally helped justify the Spanish conquest of the New World. There is Grotius, one of the founders of international law, who “understood war in judicial terms” and who “was no doubt personally troubled and saddened by the low standards of conduct that legal war condones.”

Meagher ultimately concludes that JWT has served only to legitimize and inspire war. Also, insidiously, this concept has kept veterans afflicted with moral injury from getting the help they need. After all, a nation asks, how can its veterans suffer from moral trauma when the cause for which they fought was just?

The answer to these problems is not to revise JWT or improve its implementation, Meagher says. The theory is inherently flawed. Any view of war as sometimes virtuous is essentially untruthful. War is more accurately referred to, at best, as “necessary” rather than “just.” He views combat veterans as an important resource for moving nations beyond JWT, for they know best “the moral cost of any war” and are far less likely “to concede that a war of necessity is by definition a just war.”

In the wake of two foreign wars of dubious value but of unquestionably high physical, psychological, and moral costs, Meagher’s voice is well worth listening to. After all, the self-righteous rhetoric that accompanies American soldiers to war has not always been all that far removed from the language of jihad. Chaplains often pray for victory, and leaders regularly tell soldiers that they are the greatest warriors of the greatest army of the greatest nation in the history of the world. Perhaps Meagher is right. Perhaps our nation should choose its wars much more carefully. And perhaps, to achieve the best possible outcomes from a truly necessary conflict, we American soldiers must understand ourselves not as self-exalting holy warriors but more fully and rationally, better accounting for who we are, what we do, and what we do to ourselves when we wage war.

Even if readers do not agree completely with Meagher, his words are a salutary corrective to many overweening myths. One of the most alluring and enduring of these myths is that we can kill without being killed ourselves. War, as Meagher makes clear, kills not only those it buries in the ground. It just as surely kills the souls of warriors who, having marched off to war and moral injury, return home, heads held high while the music plays and their loved ones cheer, yet feeling inside they are forever lost.

Lt. Col. Douglas A. Pryer, U.S. Army, currently serves as a J-5 planner in the Middle East Directorate of the Joint Staff. He holds a Master of Military Art and Science (Military History) from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and has published one book and numerous essays regarding warfare’s human domain.
Lt. Gen. (retired) Daniel Bolger opens his book by writing, “I am a United States Army general, and I lost the Global War on Terrorism.” As intended, the statement grabs the reader’s attention, but the focus of the work is not how one general lost the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; rather, his underlying theme is that the U.S. military forgot its Sun Tzu in that it did not know the enemy or itself. This dual failure resulted in a series of unrealistic goals that led the United States to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory—or at least from the jaws of good enough. The blame Bolger places on himself and his fellow general officers is that their “lack of humility” prevented them from challenging the underlying assumptions that drove U.S. policy and from challenging their belief that they could transform Iraq and Afghanistan.

Undoubtedly, the strongest part of Bolger’s argument is that the United States did not understand its enemies in either Iraq or Afghanistan. The historical context for this discussion is set with a review of Desert Storm, the USS Cole, and 9/11 attacks, and the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The driving force behind this analysis is to answer the question, “Who was the enemy?” Bolger contends the failure of policy makers to answer that basic question placed the United States on the long-war road with available options decreasing with every passing year. Furthermore, because senior U.S. leaders did not know who the enemy was, they also did not fully understand the nuances of tribal warfare. In particular, they failed to grasp the importance of patience and the ability of tribal warriors to bide their time.

The second part of Bolger’s argument deals with how the United States saw itself. He contends the U.S. military never reconciled itself to the idea it was a force designed for short, decisive, conventional conflicts and not long, drawn-out counterinsurgency operations. The inability to resolve the conflict of executing a counterinsurgency-centric strategy with a conventional military against a guerrilla force is where Bolger believes general officers came up short. Specifically, the general officer corps’ failed in the execution of operational art and the development of realistic military goals. Consequently, the U.S. military spent more than a decade attempting to accomplish the unrealistic task of creating pro-U.S. democracies in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

The primary drawback with Bolger’s argument is that he leaves the reader wanting more details as to what exactly was transpiring at the general officer level. As hinted in the subtitle, A General’s Inside Account of The Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, the reader expects to get more insight on the closed-door debates that must have occurred at that level. Details into the conversations Bolger had with his fellow general officers, especially in terms of their views and assessments, would make a valuable addition to this book. This is especially so since one of the author’s key assertions is that the failure to align operational-level goals with success at the tactical level led the United States to stay in Iraq and Afghanistan much too long.

For those interested in the ongoing discussion of what happened in Iraq and Afghanistan and how the military should think about future wars, this work is recommended as an addition to their reading lists. In particular, it makes a constructive contribution to the debate on what role counterinsurgency will have in future Army doctrine by questioning the value of winning “hearts and minds” against the effectiveness of counterguerrilla operations. Additionally, Bolger does an excellent job capturing multiple stories of heroism and leadership at the tactical level to help tell the story of the military’s last 13 years of war.

WHY WE LOST: A General’s Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars

From the moment the first promotional advertisements appeared, much was expected of Why We Lost, retired Lt. Gen. Dan Bolger’s reflections on the last 14 years of war. Some hoped that it would be a comprehensive account of operational and strategic decision making that would illuminate the many missteps made over the course of many years. Others hoped fervently it would be an homage to the Army that, like the closing scene of every episode of Scooby Doo, would blame faulty execution of perfect plans squarely on “meddling” politicians. A few expected a detailed analytical study of the many successes and failures experienced by the Army in two protracted wars of attrition.

Finally, there are certainly those who hoped that, based on the provocative title, a senior member of a very limited elite would finally cry mea culpa for promoting war as an instrument of national policy in the first place. Sadly, none of the above expectations are realized in Bolger’s book. Why We Lost is a tremendous disappointment, one that fails to measure up to the level of Bolger’s previous works.

The book opens hopefully enough, with a rueful recollection of how political correctness forced the Joint Staff to repackage Operation Infinite Justice as Operation Enduring Freedom. At few subsequent points, however, does the remainder of the book live up to that standard. Sadly, none of the above expectations are realized in Bolger’s book. Why We Lost is a tremendous disappointment, one that fails to measure up to the level of Bolger’s previous works.

The book opens hopefully enough, with a rueful recollection of how political correctness forced the Joint Staff to repackage Operation Infinite Justice as Operation Enduring Freedom. At few subsequent points, however, does the remainder of the book live up to that standard. Although the book contains a high level of detail about the opening campaigns in both Afghanistan and Iraq, nothing Bolger relates is new. Much of the rest is episodic and only loosely tied to a unifying theme. Because of this flaw, the book does not even succeed as a history of U.S. military efforts in Iraq or Afghanistan. By turns acerbic and sympathetic, Bolger’s narrative is rich in representative anecdotes, such as the story of Lt. Col. Nate Sassaman, but there is almost no “there” where it should be.

When it appears, the “there” can be summed up as, “most American generals (principally Army and Marine Corps generals) fought the war they wanted to fight, not the one confronting them. Because they couldn’t define the enemy properly, they couldn’t deliver victory.” By laying the blame at the feet of individuals, Bolger commits a couple of historiographical, as well as logical, errors. First, if leading individuals of a professional organization are culpable, then the institution that recruited, trained, educated, and promoted them must also be culpable. Yet nowhere in Bolger’s book does he adequately take to task the many institutional processes and cultures that, in Bolger’s view, failed to serve the military or the nation properly. Second, although Bolger doesn’t claim that only the generals are to blame, his identification and assessment of civilian leaders is woefully incomplete. Without a balanced discussion of responsibilities, Bolger’s argument loses much of its force. The result is that former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld becomes the fall guy for the entire foreign policy and national security apparatus of the United States. To be sure, Rumsfeld contributed in important ways to many of the mistakes made, but comparisons of him to Robert S. McNamara are less apt than comparisons to Louis S. Johnson who, in 1949, so zealously embarked on making the DOD efficient that the Joint Chiefs nicknamed him “Secretary of Economy.” And yet, one looks in vain for mention—let alone criticism—of a host of real decision makers in terms of force structure and priorities, including Douglas Feith, Paul Wolfowitz, David Chu, or Michelle Flournoy.

Such omissions would be understandable if Bolger had stuck to his original thesis of poor general officer leadership at the strategic level. Unfortunately, little detail accompanies thumbnail portraits of many of Bolger’s contemporaries unless required to reinforce praise—George Casey; qualified praise—David Petraeus; or faint praise—Stanley McChrystal. Most times, Bolger pulls his punches even when it is apparent to the reader that he meant a comment to be much sharper. For example, Bolger scolds McChrystal for being a naïf concerning the media when his true feelings must have been more visceral. About the only time he comes close to calling a fellow general officer unqualified is when he discusses Karl Eikenberry, both as a commanding general in Afghanistan and as U.S. ambassador to Kabul.
Inexplicably, the yardstick he uses to reach this conclusion is exactly the same one he condemns for having led to groupthink among the generals, i.e., that Eikenberry had deviated from the strictly delineated assignment template for infantry officers. In Bolger’s view, Eikenberry was suspect precisely because he was an academically trained China expert who “never commanded above the battalion level” and therefore lacked the credibility to command those who had. Arguably, however, Eikenberry’s approach to Hamid Karzai’s mental instability and lack of legitimacy will prove to have been better-informed and more in U.S. interests thanconciliation and coddling. In any event, Bolger should have devoted much more effort explaining the true cost of generals who could not properly identify the enemy. Doing so would have made the Sassaman story and similar vignettes much more meaningful to readers outside the Army.

Despite all the above, Bolger nevertheless accomplishes something important with *Why We Lost*. In some respects, Bolger seeks to inherit the mantle of Andrew Krepinevich (author of *The Army and Vietnam*) who posited the same argument about generalship that Bolger uses in *Why We Lost*. More so than Krepinevich, however, by willingly and very publicly claiming responsibility as a general officer for the unsatisfying way our wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have played out, Bolger may have greater success in attracting official support. This might facilitate some desperately needed soul-searching inside the ranks of both the uniformed leadership of all the services and among those who craft our national strategies.

Certainly, the amount of interest and attention generated by Bolger’s book inside the Army reaches levels not seen since Col. Doug McGregor’s *Breaking the Phalanx*. The Army leadership should leverage that interest and attention in support of genuine organizational renewal. Institutional change must occur from the top down, aided and abetted by a cohort of sympathizers at lower levels. The latter exists; it is up to the former to envision and communicate the proper message to them so that together we can better prepare the Army to serve U.S. interests and the American people.

**Col. Thomas E. Hanson, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.**

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**FORTRESS RABAUL: The Battle for the Southwest Pacific, January 1942–April 1943**

Bruce Gamble, Zenith Press, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 2013, 416 pages

Lying thousands of miles from the more famous battles of the central Pacific, the predominately aerial Battle for Rabaul has often been overlooked by war historians. However, the strategic importance of this former German colonial town, located on the northern end of New Britain in modern Papua New Guinea (PNG), was paramount to Japanese war plans. Rabaul was selected by Japan’s Imperial General Headquarters to serve as the strategic heart of the southwest Pacific, securing the southern flank of Truk Lagoon—the “Gibraltar of the Pacific”—from where the Japanese hoped to ambush and crush the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Truk’s importance as home base of much of Japan’s Pacific Fleet meant that Rabaul would need to be secured from the Australians and held at all costs. This strategic assessment led to the capture of New Britain through Operation R, January–February 1942, and the transformation of a tropical, coconut-exporting town into the “most heavily fortified stronghold south of the equator.”

Rabaul’s position provided the Japanese air forces the ability to conduct numerous bombing sorties against the Australian mainland to thwart U.S. resupply of Australia and to prevent any Allied offensive against the occupied Dutch East Indies, which was the chief source of Japanese oil. Thus Rabaul, and the New Guinea theater more broadly, became the principal target for Allied airpower in the Pacific. This massing of Allied combat power from early 1942 onward blunted Japan’s advance toward Australia at the Battle of the Coral Sea and compelled the Japanese to fight an increasingly defensive battle. By April 1943, the great fortress had become a prison for the 100,000 Japanese defenders as Allied forces “island hopped” north. For Gamble, the decisive phase of the Battle for Rabaul ends when Admiral Yamamoto, commander-in-chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet, is gunned down by U.S. P-38s shortly after leaving New Britain on 18 April 1943.

Surprisingly, the author gives slight attention to the place of the indigenous population during the battle. Native laborers on both sides of the front were coerced
or conscripted by the tens of thousands to work under often brutal conditions, building military infrastructure and harvesting rubber for the war efforts. Furthermore, while describing the Japanese massacre of Australian POWs at Tol Plantation in February 1942, Gamble pointedly labels the Japanese “cowards.” While the massacre certainly qualifies as a war crime, Gamble undermines his historical objectivity by resorting to such rhetoric.

Aside from exploring the longest aerial battle of World War II, Gamble’s work highlights the contemporary geopolitical importance of PNG, which divides Australasia from the dominant Asiatic powers north of the equator. Currently, as an energy-hungry China continues to aggressively assert territorial claims in the petroleum-rich South China Sea, PNG’s strategic importance for Australian policy makers is certainly being reexamined. 

Fortress Rabaul would certainly benefit anyone interested in the Pacific war, the history of military aviation, and the geopolitical future of the region as the United States pivots toward the Asia-Pacific.

Capt. Viktor M. Stoll, U.S. Army, King’s College, London, United Kingdom

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**BILLY MITCHELL’S WAR WITH THE NAVY:**
*The Interwar Rivalry Over Air Power*

Thomas Wildenberg, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 2014, 288 pages

Although there have been many books written over the years about Billy Mitchell, historian Thomas Wildenberg has taken a new approach with his latest book. *Billy Mitchell’s War with the Navy* looks at the controversial figure from the point of view of the U.S. Navy and the competition and animosity that developed between the Army and Navy during the interwar period. In addition to contributing to the body of knowledge on Mitchell and the historical period, Wildenberg also wanted to document the inter-service rivalry over airpower that followed World War I. *Billy Mitchell’s War with the Navy* is a fascinating study that illuminates this period of history while providing a new perspective on Mitchell and his impact.

Wildenberg combines thorough research with a very clear and fluid writing style, which provides the reader a balanced analysis of Mitchell as a person and leader, and an appreciation for the historical period. He corrects some of the myths and misconceptions about Mitchell’s role in history. For example, during his research, he discovers “Mitchell’s importance to the development of strategic bombing had been grossly overstated by those interested in perpetuating his iconic image as the founding father of the U.S. Air Force.” The author also points out various topics in which other writers did not thoroughly research some of Mitchell’s statements.

He describes how Mitchell’s strengths and flaws made him a successful leader and he believes that Mitchell’s leadership during World War I is often overlooked—although it was instrumental to leading the nascent Air Force. Although his initiative, drive, knowledge, and ambition were desperately needed, Mitchell also showed he was willing to violate rules and to even “twist truth and distort reality” to support his ideas.

“He had a history of disregarding his non-flying superiors when it suited him,” writes the author, “especially when he felt slighted or threatened.” This yin-yang quality benefited Mitchell throughout his career but also eventually derailed him.

The book is very relevant because it raises some important questions. While the bickering between the armed services and Congress over policy and budget could be a potentially dry subject, the author makes it clear and interesting. Severe austerity provided the circumstances for the rivalry between the services following World War I. *Billy Mitchell’s War with the Navy* is a cautionary tale that will leave readers wondering if today’s severely constrained fiscal environment could also lead to this type of situation. The book highlights the fine line between displaying the moral courage to stand up for your beliefs and the personal motives that may be lying underneath. Whether you believe Mitchell was a hero and a patriot fighting for national defense or a self-serving individual trying to further his own ambitions, Wildenberg’s latest book will have you thinking twice about your convictions.

Ultimately, *Billy Mitchell’s War with the Navy* concludes that Mitchell “would achieve the fame—but not the fortune—he craved, becoming the nation’s foremost evangelist of air power at the expense of the U.S. Navy, which he would come to demonize.” Readers will find the book engaging and informative. I highly recommend this book to all readers, especially those interested in the
The elusive Andrew Goodpaster, “the man with the briefcase,” is the model of a grand strategist in action. Robert Jordan’s biography shines much needed light on the overlooked military career of this central figure in President Eisenhower’s inner circle. Goodpaster rose quietly on merit more than self-promotion. He graduated second in his class at West Point, was molded in George Marshall’s “command post,” and earned a doctoral degree from Princeton well before embarking on this soldier-to-scholar path. With Eisenhower’s personal knowledge that he possessed one of the country’s top minds, Goodpaster was later pressed into long-term service at the White House because of a friend’s sudden death. Although he would become a four-star general and NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), we are only now gaining an understanding of his role at the dawn of the nuclear era.

Jordan, a NATO scholar, leads us through the unique career of an officer swept up in the rush to expand the Army before World War II. He had been a local union leader before he received his appointment to the class of 1939, which is known as “the largest of the large classes.” His mentor, early Rhodes Scholar George “Abe” Lincoln, nominated Goodpaster to a Council on Foreign Relations conference, where his foreign policy speech left an early impression. He completed his assignments quickly, even with a compressed nine-week Command and General Staff College course, before leading an engineer battalion in the Italian Campaign of 1943.

Recovering in Washington after being wounded, Lincoln recruited him for the new Operations and Plans Division of the War Department. In another key strategic planner job, he came to the attention of Gen. Eisenhower and was assigned to a special project to look at the future shape of the postwar Army. His planning duties provided him the opportunity to use his technical skills concerning the employment of nuclear weapons. When Eisenhower became the first SACEUR, Goodpaster was moved to Paris to play a central role in “militarization” of NATO as part of the select advanced planning group. In 1953, Eisenhower brought him back to Washington for the New Look grand strategy focusing on massive nuclear retaliation, readiness, and mobilization.

Although Jordan makes the case for Goodpaster as a premier military leader and a scholar, it is evident he made his greatest mark as an exceptional presidential adviser. He was a central figure in U.S. foreign policy development throughout the 1950s, especially when he served as staff secretary for the fledgling National Security Council. Eisenhower changed the presidential relationship with the military and had less direct contact with the individual services. Instead, he relied more on Goodpaster, who started as the liaison to the Defense Department as well as being the president’s daily briefer concerning State and CIA activities. Later, he was the insider who assessed Eisenhower’s competency to make nuclear decisions after the president’s health setbacks. His work was highly sensitive, and he avoided the press. In another book, John Eisenhower, Goodpaster’s deputy and the President’s son, speculated he was “too good a soldier.” His austere manner may have stunted the recognition it seems he truly deserved.

This book should be read closely by military professionals who want to understand the true complexities of the civil-military relationship at the highest levels.

James Cricks, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.
1942. Ironically, he died not as a result of military action but rather from an accident involving his aircraft. Refreshingly, and unlike many biographies, the approach taken by the authors focuses almost exclusively upon his time as a pilot in the Luftwaffe. The antithesis of the German officer, he was a brash, egotistical womanizer, who was transferred from unit to unit due to his individuality, lack of discipline, and dismissiveness of protocol and tradition. Finally finding a home in Africa with Jagdgeschwader 27 Afrika (JG-27), he honed his skills and gradually grew from a loner and outsider to the darling of the Reich. When he died, he had 158 confirmed kills and was one of the very few recipients of the Knight’s Cross with Diamonds—but he had not lost his rebellious streak.

The authors draw upon first-person anecdotes and interviews with many of his former commanders and colleagues, thereby adding a rarely enjoyed level of insight and intimacy. The challenges of commanding Marseille, and the different methods that were tried, are insightful and useful for the aspiring leader. “How do you control the most gifted fighter pilot in the Luftwaffe?” became the mantra of his commanders.

His antics became legendary within the Luftwaffe and are described in detail throughout the narrative, including his breathtaking audacity in front of Goring and Hitler. Only his flying record saved him from multiple courts marshal for insubordination. Notwithstanding his aggressive flying, he was a very sensitive man who drew no pleasure from a kill. He respected his adversaries as fellow fliers and was well known amongst his peers for his chivalry and thoughtfulness.

Marseille was a cross between a bohemian and hunter, who found himself forced to live in both worlds simultaneously. As the war progressed, one is able to perceive—as did his commanders—the increasing toll the conflict between these two halves had upon him both psychologically and physically, and it speaks volumes of the impact that remorseless combat has upon the warrior. A well-written, insightful, quality book, it entertains while it educates; it is highly recommended.

Maj. Chris Buckham, Royal Canadian Air Force, Stuttgart, Germany

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THE LAST REFUGE: Yemen, al-Qaida, and America’s War in Arabia

Although Yemen is far from being the last sanctuary of the ever-mutating and elusive al-Qaida network, The Last Refuge carefully charts the role that country—a small, complex state on the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula—has played in terrorism since the 1980s. Starting at the anti-Soviet jihad and concluding with modern-day suicide bombers, Johnsen unravels the operational narrative of al-Qaida in Yemen, subsequently retitled al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), offering new insights into an often misconstrued and poorly reported sequence of historical events. He achieves this by providing perceptive descriptions of keystone personalities, beliefs, wider motivations, corruption, and organizational structure. He also links this together with accounts of hidden training camps, safe houses, and abundant plots to attack nonbelievers, infidels, and the wider establishment. All told, this is an impressive study by an authority on Yemen and the region.

Frequently written in a persuasive narrative format, The Last Refuge is packed full of facts and details, which cause the reader to stop and reflect. Johnsen has cleverly drawn on Arabic documents, videos, audio recordings, and interviews, with both al-Qaida and AQAP, to construct his eye-opening storyline. His style is compelling and full of texture and tempo. He is particularly shrewd to have used the cultural lens of Yemen and its inhabitants to provide a counter-viewpoint to the West’s interpretation of events. Therefore, Johnsen is even-handed about Ali Abdullah Salih, the president of North Yemen from 1978 to 1990, and of unified Yemen from 1990 to 2012. An astute—but hesitant—hear the president of North Yemen from 1978 to 1990, and of unified Yemen from 1990 to 2012. An astute—but hesitant—head of state, Salih’s support for U.S. policies oscillated and, of course, he deliberately concealed Islamists from U.S. intelligence. Likewise, the author dissects, fairly, how the decisions and miscalculations of the United States and other countries in the Middle East affected the militants’ achievements and failures. He illustrates equitably the strengths and weaknesses of the employment of Predator drones, armed with devastating Hellfire missiles, although he
also makes a credible argument against the over-reliance on unmanned aerial vehicles to strike AQAP.

There are also other areas of the book that catch the reader’s eye. The rise, initial defeat, and definitive reappearance of al-Qaida in Yemen is one that stands out. A sequence of Yemeni government efforts to “rehabilitate” militants is another. The latter was a fragmentary and misguided attempt to convince a small number of prisoners that their understanding of Islam had been distorted and misrepresented by power-hungry outcasts. Through education and mentorship, the aspiration was to realign beliefs and behavior to a more moderate and acceptable level. The initiative failed, with many supposedly rehabilitated prisoners released from jail immediately re-joining al-Qaida and threatening to kill Americans.

Johnsen also highlights the reality of long periods of detention behind bars. Many impressionable prisoners found solace in selected verses from the Koran, recited by imprisoned al-Qaida veterans. These, time and again, helped them to endure repeated interrogation and suffering—and helped set their plight in a wider religious context. Over time, significant numbers of inmates were influenced to join or continue the jihad because they had been reminded that a jihad is a lifestyle of devotion and sacrifice. Detention centers such as Guantánamo Bay in Cuba, and jails in Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, have proven to be a seeding ground for the insurgency and acted as clandestine training hubs. A stint in prison became a rite of passage. But above all, The Last Refuge underlines that the insurgents only have to be lucky once, whereas security forces have to be lucky every time. This is not easy in Yemen, particularly as the country has become one of the last safe havens of al-Qaida, full of extremists and jihadists.

In sum, The Last Refuge is a must read for diplomats, soldiers, or aid workers heading to the Arabian Peninsula. Although perhaps lacking in a detailed overview of political developments over the period, and possibly a piece on wider lessons learned that would have been helpful to draw all the strands of the narrative together, this is a fascinating, timely, and well-researched study. Comprehensive, but readable and engaging, I recommend this narrative to anyone who wishes to know more about AQAP and the region. Moreover, we would all be wise to remember that al-Qaida in Yemen is determined to strike back at the United States. The organization warned in 2012: “The war between us will not end and the coming days are bringing something new.” We cannot afford to ignore the lessons from Yemen’s knotty and intricate recent history. The Last Refuge goes a long way to help meet this requirement.

Col. Andrew M. Roe, Ph.D., British Army, Episkopi Garrison, Cyprus

KILLING WITHOUT HEART: Limits on Robotic Warfare in an Age of Persistent Conflict
M. Shane Riza, Potomac Books, Dulles, Virginia, 2013, 256 pages

When one mentions the term robot, images of Arnold Schwarzenegger in The Terminator may run through one’s mind. In The Terminator, Schwarzenegger played a robot programmed to execute targeted killings. The robot killed, without any moral standards, anyone who got in the way of its mission. In his book, Killing Without Heart, M. Shane Riza examines some of the legal and ethical issues associated with employing robots, such as armed drones, during military conflicts. Although the book is comprehensive, readers who may not be familiar with “just war” theory or the law of war may find some of the material difficult to follow.

The use of armed drones during the War on Terrorism has created a schism within the United States and abroad. On one hand, proponents of the use of drones argue that targeting terrorists is a great thing because it minimizes military casualties and reduces the footprint of a military force. On the other hand, opponents claim that armed drones kill innocent people, create unnecessary collateral damage, and make war the first choice versus a last resort. The use of drones may trigger a revolution in technology that causes other states or non-state actors to develop weapons to counter the use of these systems or to employ unconventional tactics to exact revenge.

Riza develops a comprehensive argument that supports the latter perspective. He posits the use of armed unmanned weapons, such as drones, contradicts the laws that govern war by destroying the “moral equality of combatants.” Moreover, he questions whether these systems will be successful in ending current or future
military conflicts. Riza surmises that since these lethal unmanned weapons have not had a measurable or significant impact in ending current military operations, it violates “the probability of success” principle associated with just war.

The book is effective in addressing the moral issues associated with powerful nations, such as the United States, engaging in military operations in less developed sovereign countries around the globe with impunity and without risk of life, while less developed nations shoulder the burden of losing human life and the collateral damage that often ensues. The author believes that more debate is needed on the morality and ethics of using robots on the battlefield, especially since the computing power and role of these systems will most likely progress in the future and potentially lead to unintended adverse actions.

Killing Without Heart critically examines the major ethical and practical issues associated with employing robots, such as armed unmanned systems, during military operations. M. Shane Riza challenges the reader to weigh the pros and cons of using these systems. This book is a worthwhile read for those who are interested in examining or debating the major moral, ethical, and legal issues associated with the use of robotics in current and future military operations.


WAYS OF WAR: American Military History from the Colonial Era to the Twenty-First Century

This work provides an informative narrative of how the United States has approached and waged warfare throughout its embattled existence. While rapid transitions through the expanding republic’s inexorable march of campaigns render it inadequate for advanced scholarly endeavors, the text instead provides a survey of American martial efforts within an interconnected narrative that emphasizes evolving approaches to armed conflict. Consciously embracing traditional military history methodology, Muehlbauer and Ulbrich eschew revisionist trends and institutionally critical narratives. Intent on establishing a broadly defined framework, they generally succeed in capturing “the complexities of American military history over the centuries.”

Already adopted into the U.S. Air Force Academy’s core curriculum, Ways of War serves as an excellent primer for officers, noncommissioned officers, and federal civilians seeking understanding of how American warfare has evolved between the colonial period and the 2010s. Beginning with an introduction to analytics that defines the field of military history, the authors explain commonly accepted types and levels of war, varying thematic approaches, and the way-of-war concept that is central to the book’s construction. The work then follows the nearly 300-year arc of American military development across 15 chapters that are either period- or conflict-centric.

While some chapters encompass longer timelines by exploring intermittent conflict during early republic and cold war eras, others pursue deeper analysis of more condensed periods, such as the Civil War and the World Wars. The text concludes with discussion of the complexities of American adventurism and nation building in the post-Cold War era with predictions that the superpower will continue to “adapt to new ways of war” in the face of terrorism, cyberwarfare, and weapons of mass destruction proliferation. Muehlbauer and Ulbrich employ accessible writing that is enhanced by both strategic- and operational-level maps and diagrams, as well as illustrative photographs and pictures. They also include judicious placement of text boxes to draw the reader’s attention to key insights without disrupting narrative continuity.

Weaving the often haphazard development of U.S. war making across global landscapes into a readily digestible narrative, Ways of War is ideal for defense professionals seeking introduction to how the republic has evolved militarily over previous centuries. The authors avoid centering on “drum and bugle” tactical analysis, but instead weave battles into more expansive strategic, political, and social tapestries that inform the tumultuous progression of martial activity. They ultimately emphasize that there is no single American way of war but rather that the embattled nation has embraced, in response to “shifting historical factors and events,” many approaches to armed conflict that have been “complex and contradictory.”
Supplementing academic manuscripts that are often inaccessible to all but the most studied, this work arrives as a valuable and highly utilitarian complement to the current field of U.S. military histories.

Capt. Nathan A. Jennings, U.S. Army, West Point, N.Y.

FORGOTTEN FIFTEENTH: The Daring Airmen Who Crippled Hitler’s War Machine

Obscured to history behind the Eighth Air Force’s bombing campaigns from Britain, the Fifteenth Air Force Bomber and Fighter Wings carried the weight of America’s airpower to Hitler’s most crucial resources during the war, crippling the Nazi military’s ability to move and fight.

Barrett Tillman’s book offers aviation history buffs a comprehensive look at the trials and successes of the Fifteenth Air Force—with a sobering look at what the men, who crippled Hitler’s fuel supply in the Balkans, endured in the lengthy, excruciating fight. Flying missions from Italy, the Fifteenth penetrated the heart of Nazi-occupied territory every day, facing fierce resistance and suffering devastating losses from German forces and their allies. Understanding the very emotional undertones of those losses, Tillman takes a very tempered approach and carefully discusses the missions and tribulations the Fifteenth faced. He does a very good job of looking deep into the men who served—and the sheer number of men and aircraft they lost—compared to the effectiveness of the bombing campaign itself.

Using examples such as Ploiesti, he discusses the contrast between the persistence of U.S. bomber crews in the face of fierce resistance and that of the Axis engineers in the face of Allied bombing.

Born through the efforts of Jimmy Doolittle following the campaigns in North Africa, the Fifteenth Air Force flew out of the plains of Foggia, Italy to be the hammer by which the Allies would pound Nazi Germany into surrender. Tillman does a very thorough job of describing the major events that made the Fifteenth what it was, from the stutter-step development of the Foggia airfield to the constantly shifting target priorities—production plants, fuel supplies, and transport lines. The historical aspects of the Fifteenth’s missions, sacrifices, successes, and failures go to the heart of the grueling combined bombing campaign in the east. Tillman goes into great detail regarding the allied support for missions in the Balkans and Eastern Europe, to include using Russian airbases to shorten mission times and support partisan rebels.

There are extensive numbers of units and people involved in the success of the Fifteenth’s mission. Tillman gives great attention to the perseverance of those players who drove the Fifteenth’s ability to cripple the oil and industrial supply of World War II Germany. Forgotten Fifteenth takes a great look at the capability of the U.S. industrial machine to continue creating bombers and aircraft, and the undaunted spirit of U.S. airmen who flew the missions day-in and day-out knowing the odds. The story speaks volumes for how crucial the Fifteenth’s mission was to winning the war and brings the story to the reader in uncompromising detail.


CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN THE GLOBAL COMMONS: A Comprehensive Approach for International Security

Conflict and Cooperation in the Global Commons is a collection of essays edited by Scott Jasper covering various aspects of the global commons—namely the maritime, air, space, and cyber domains. The volume describes in detail the background of regulatory approaches in each domain and discusses current practices and issues. It then proposes a multi-layered, whole-of-government, whole-of-nations approach to security in the global commons. The book specifically highlights the importance of cooperation as a prerequisite needed to harness the disparate elements of American national power, to include the political, diplomatic, economic, and military realms.

Having put its own house in order, the United States would, according to this book, need to then
incentivize collaboration between nations and between the public and private sectors to produce streamlined, efficient regulatory environments encompassing all actors. The book also introduces an important by-product of globalization, the principle of economic entanglement where countries form interdependent ties that make conflict self-damaging and cooperation mutually beneficial. Creating entanglement in all aspects of national interest is a helpful concept in considering solutions to trends like the rise of China, whose influence reaches into all domains in the commons.

Although the book covers a wide range of ground and provides the reader a good understanding of the commons and the issues associated with them, it falls short when it comes to formulating a solution to those issues. The essay approach creates a patchwork effect that never leads to a holistic solution. It does not neatly build chapter by chapter as a normally structured book might.

Rather, it provides a thorough introduction to the global commons as a topic of import, including background information, descriptions of current problems, and the identification of key requirements future policymakers must consider. Thus, the book is more descriptive than prescriptive. While it does not provide the comprehensive approach for international security indicated by the title, it does succeed in convincing the reader that such an approach is necessary.

Additionally, the book encourages the reader to question the assumptions on which U.S. military policy is built, making the book of value to a military reader in particular. For example, the basic ideas of forward deployment and rapid response inherent in American military policy assume free access to the commons. Instead, the book argues, we must devote resources to shaping the commons as safe and open spaces through which international trade and maneuver can transit. Area denial and anti-access capabilities may also limit U.S. ability to implement a newer military strategy, like sea basing, which is even more dependent on the commons. Knowledge of these issues, and opinions on them, would be valuable to members of the military to understand the strategic context of U.S. policy in the future.

**Capt. Justine M. Meberg, U.S. Army, El Paso, Texas**

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**MONTE CASSINO: Ten Armies in Hell**

Peter Caddick-Adams, Oxford University Press, New York, 2013, 432 pages

Peter Caddick-Adams has produced a well-documented and well-researched history of the four-month battle for Monte Cassino during World War II, which ultimately cost the Allies more than 200,000 casualties. He articulates the strategic importance the town of Cassino during the Italian campaign as a major crossroad the Allies needed for their advance to Rome. As the title infers, Caddick-Adams details the horrific experiences faced by Field Marshal Kesselring, the commander of German forces in Italy, and Lt. Gen. Mark Clark, the Allied commander of Fifth Army—comprised of forces from the United States, Great Britain, and the British Commonwealth as well as Free French, Italian, and Polish divisions—and what the combatants encountered during each phase of the battle.

The author vividly describes the mountainous terrain, weather, and logistical challenges faced by both armies and how the conditions impacted the battle. Numerous firsthand accounts by soldiers and commanders from both sides reveal the inhumane conditions, reminiscent of the trench warfare during World War I. To take advantage of the terrain, German engineers invested extensive resources to build six separate lines of defense across the width of the Italian peninsula. The intent was to hold the Allies south of Rome following the Allied landings at Salerno.

The Allied commanders, led by Clark, believed the key to breaking the German defenses and liberating Rome was through Cassino. In a two-pronged approach, the U.S. VI Corps landed at Anzio, approximately 38 miles south of Rome, in January 1944, to coincide with the attack of the U.S. Fifth Army’s drive through Cassino. The author brings to light the optimism, yet overconfidence, the Allied commanders had regarding the dual attack. He highlights the Allied command’s failure to fully understand the impact that terrain, weather, and rapid German response would have on their operations. Additionally, senior leadership challenges and diverse personalities between Clark and his corps commanders are revealed.

**Capt. Justine M. Meberg, U.S. Army, El Paso, Texas**
The author devoted a chapter to each phase of Allied attacks around Monte Cassino, along with the weather and the eventual pursuit of the German forces beyond Rome. Caddick-Adams also dedicates a chapter to the controversial destruction of the eleventh century abbey of Monte Cassino during the second phase of the battle in February 1944 and the consequence of its destruction. Previously unoccupied by German forces, although Allied officials believed otherwise, the abbey was immediately occupied by German troops, who turned its ruins into a fortified position.

The subsequent assaults by Indian and New Zealand divisions failed to break through due to the fortified positions in the abbey and the town. On a lighter note, the author reveals the German concern for the countless books, manuscripts, and artwork in the abbey; they shipped those treasures, prior to the battle, to the Vatican and other safe locations in Italy and Germany.

The author brings the role allied forces played in Italy to light—a role often overshadowed by the build-up and liberation of France and the eventual defeat of the Third Reich. *Monte Cassino: Ten Armies in Hell* is a great read and is a must for the World War II enthusiast.

R. Scott Martin, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

**CORPS COMMANDERS IN BLUE: Union Major Generals in the Civil War**


Until recently, the corps level of command in the American Civil War has been somewhat neglected in scholarly writing on the war. This anthology—edited by Ethan Rafuse, a noted Civil War author and professor at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and supported by a team of distinguished academic and public Civil War historians—remedies this deficiency with a work providing case studies of the actions of eight Union Army major generals while in corps command.

The choices of personalities are diverse: Meade, a future successful army commander; Hooker, a failed army commander; Gilbert, an accidental and relatively obscure corps commander with only an acting rank; Porter, a cashiered general; McPherson, who was killed as an army commander; Franklin, a staunch McClellan supporter; Mansfield, an aged commander who was killed on his first day of command; and Hancock, the Civil War’s most highly regarded Union corps commander.

Rafuse introduces the anthology with an essay on corps command, which provides a short but useful overview. He recognizes the importance of the corps and that battles were often won, not at the army level, but through the actions of corps commanders and their ability to direct those of their subordinates. The most significant of the following essays is that on Winfield Hancock by Arizona State Professor Brooks Simpson. Hancock is usually considered the best corps commander in the Union Army during the war, although his performance is often only superficially analyzed except for his actions at Gettysburg, where his performance, like everything to do with that battle, has been scrutinized many times. Simpson examines Hancock’s performance in the Overland Campaign, concluding that the II Corps commander was suffering both from the effects of his Gettysburg wound and the general exhaustion found in the Army of the Potomac when he failed at Petersburg at the end of the campaign.

The chapter on Fitz-John Porter by the National Park Service’s John Hennessy perhaps overstates the political factors involved in Porter’s and McClellan’s reliefs while downplaying the military rationale, but otherwise provides a useful context to Porter’s court-martial. The selection by Marine Corps historian Christopher Stowe on Meade’s short career as the Fifth Corps commander unfortunately fails to illuminate one of the great mysteries of Meade—the origin of his distant command style as an army commander—a technique that would not be suitable for lower levels of command. This period is often ignored because Fifth Corps was mostly unengaged during the battle at Chancellorsville, which occurred during Meade’s command, and because he later rose to higher command. The author does, however, stress the qualities, mostly humbled ambition, that resulted in Meade’s selection as army commander.

This book’s greatest strength is its focus on the corps level of command, which makes it unique. However, the work focuses on external—political, social—factors affecting the generals rather than on military and command aspects. Nevertheless, the...
various insights and approaches of the different authors provide a valuable resource and a fine addition to any Civil War library.

John J. McGrath, Leavenworth, Kan.

DEFEATING JAPAN: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Strategy in the Pacific War, 1943–1945

Designing wartime strategies and campaigns is tough business. Civilian and uniformed leaders operating at the nexus of strategic decision making often collide over which considerations—political or military—should hold sway. Should military leaders defer to policy makers or integrate their decisions into their formulations of the best possible expert military advice?

In an insightful new book, Charles Brower takes on a widely held perspective that U.S. uniformed leadership during World War II was often myopic in prioritizing military considerations in their strategic advice to the national leadership, particularly in the European theater of operations. Brower deftly counters that in the Pacific theater, the U.S. Joint Chiefs, including Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall and Chief of Naval Operations Ernest J. King, not only were influenced by political factors but, at times, accorded them primacy.

Brower effectively demonstrates that policy decisions exercised great influence over the conduct of the Pacific War—in particular, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s demand for unconditional surrender, his strong support for a substantive role for China following the war, and insistence that the Pacific war end as soon as possible but no more than one year following the defeat of Germany’s Third Reich.

Brower makes a thorough examination of his domain—the “upper case” designated wartime conferences, such as QUADRANT and OCTAGON, as well as military operations, including lesser known Pacific ventures such as ANAKIM, the retaking of Burma from Japanese forces. Throughout his detailed analysis, the author clearly demonstrates that political matters were always at the forefront of the Joint Chiefs’ thinking and served as the prism through which all subsequent military operations were viewed.

To exemplify this point, let us take FDR’s overriding desire to give China and its leader, Chiang Kai-shek, a key role in any post-war global configuration. The Joint Chiefs, in response, subsequently prioritized Chinese offensive operations in Burma, even when it did not make the best military sense and in spite of stiff opposition from their British counterparts on the Combined Chiefs of Staff. From Brower’s viewpoint, this example is clearly representative of the primacy of policy in much of the Joint Chiefs’ deliberations and subsequent military advice.

Brower’s attention to detail is reflected in his meticulous combing over of wartime diaries, conference notes, and other primary references. He also includes detailed notes and a comprehensive biography. However, the book at times seems repetitive as similar points are analyzed and emphasized from conference to conference. The book’s high cost relative to its length may be off-putting for some.

These nitpicks, however, do not detract from the Brower’s strengths. The author more than effectively shows the difficult give-and-take that national and military leaders wrestled with on some of the weightiest issues of the Pacific and, by extension, World War II. Brower thus makes his case, adding valuable insight and a nuanced view of the impact policy has on military strategy making.

Mark Montesclaros, Fort Gordon, Ga.

WARS OF PLUNDER: Conflicts, Profits and the Politics of Resources
Philippe Le Billon, Oxford University Press, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2014, 288 pages

Within Wars of Plunder, Philippe Le Billon focuses on the three resources—oil, gems, and timber—he believes create the majority of conflicts throughout the world. Oil and timber are required for developing the infrastructure for growing economies, and gems are the status symbols for the wealthy. Le Billon explains that the underdeveloped countries that contain these resources struggle with both external and internal factions.
These groups often use violence as the means to take the resources for the potential wealth generated from sales.

A respected geographer with a Ph.D. from Oxford, Le Billon conducted extensive research for his book and excels at providing historical evidence to support his premise. The primary objective with *Wars of Plunder* is to provide a relationship between resources and the conflicts that often erupt over the wealth the resources provide. His term “resource curse” highlights the disadvantages that some countries with an abundance of resources face when those resources are desired by larger nations. He highlights Nigeria as a good example of a country that possesses a large oil reserve, pointing out that the dependence on profit from oil has not resulted in nation-state equality funded from the oil wealth.

The author provides great insight for ways to utilize resources for peace. He creates three approaches of peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. If we can learn, as a government, about the advantages of peacemaking, we can prevent the conflict before the level reaches the need for military intervention. He highlights the importance of an integrated unified-action approach to sanctions as an effective tool to curb the violence.

Le Billon utilizes the conclusion of his volume to provide three strategies he believes would greatly reduce the number of conflicts in the world. The strategies are categorized against resource conflict, for resource conflict, and for the resource curse. The premise of the strategies is good, but each relies on fairness in global governance. It is impossible to assume that all nations in the world will abide by fairness when competing for natural resources. The author places too much faith in “deep democratization processes that build robust checks and balances within society and consolidate state legitimacy and capacity.” This is evident with China’s presence in Africa and Central Asia to claim oil, timber, and gems in sometimes less-than-legal means. For these strategies to be successful in reducing conflict, all world powers need to work in unison to provide a level playing field.

The author has written an excellent book, which is highly detailed and informative. It provides readers with an understanding of the challenges facing the global economy with the increasing need for resources to meet the demands of growing nations. The book supports educating military officers on the importance of understanding the elements of national power. It also provides military officers with an excellent historical account of the importance of utilizing diplomacy and economic development to reduce conflicts around the globe. This combination makes *Wars of Plunder: Conflicts, Profits and the Politics of Resources* a book that will appeal to a wide array of readers and be of particular importance to military leaders.

**Lt. Col. John E. Elrich, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.**

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**CITIES OF EMPIRE: The British Colonies and the Creation of the Urban World**

*Tristram Hunt, Metropolitan Books, New York, 2014, 544 pages*

There are, rightly, many critics of the British Empire and its legacies. Slave plantations helped to fund it, questionable ideologies justified it, and harsh military actions protected and expanded it. Despite its dark aspects, the legacies of the British Empire continue to shape the modern world in ways ranging from the prevalence of English as a *lingua franca* to the legal and governmental structures of countries across the world. Tristram Hunt demonstrates in *Cities of Empire* that the British Empire also had a major role in shaping global urban culture.

Apologists of the Empire often point to the developmental benefits of imperial rule, and there is considerable truth to these arguments. Devoting somewhat self-contained chapters to Boston, Bridgetown, Dublin, Cape Town, Calcutta, Hong Kong, Bombay, Melbourne, New Delhi, and Liverpool, Hunt shows the British Empire’s common commitment to trade and its attendant infrastructure. He argues that the British Empire was a particularly urban empire dependent on an interconnected network of cities serving as bases for military, economic, governmental, and population expansion. Many of the world’s largest cities were in British colonies, and British urban organization can still be seen.

In addition to global urbanization, *Cities of Empire* offers an enjoyable introduction to British imperial history. Hunt uses each city to illustrate the phases of the British Empire. Some of these are simple chronological
divisions within the strategic emphasis of the Empire. Thus, Boston and the slave economy of Bridgetown, Barbados, symbolize Britain’s early commitment to, and later turn from, the Atlantic, while Cape Town and Calcutta represent Britain’s grown commitment to India during the turn of the nineteenth century. Other cities are emblematic of more ideological trends. For Hunt, Bombay’s improved urban infrastructure is an expression of Britain’s self-proclaimed civilizing mission, while Melbourne’s white settler colony epitomizes the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century belief in a racial union between all Anglo-Saxons throughout the world. The chapter on Melbourne is particularly interesting as contemporary imperial promoters used Australia in general to show that colonization was the key to reinvigorating the Anglo-Saxon race. These expressed bonds were only strengthened by fighting for a common cause during World War I. Of course, the story of the decline of the British Empire is perfectly told in Liverpool’s decaying cityscapes, a victim of Britain’s modernization and turn to Europe rather than Empire.

Engagingly written, Cities of Empire reflects its author’s concerns with the place of Great Britain in today’s world—as British and American economic power is becoming overshadowed by growing Chinese and Indian capacity. Most of Hunt’s cities, including Liverpool, are already being shaped by Chinese capital and trade. As imperial cities—part of the global urban economy—these cities gravitate toward the money. While there are a few oversights, notably regarding the military presence and purpose in some of the towns, Hunt has given an excellent primer on city development and British imperial governance.

John E. Fahey, Purdue University, Ind.


Vietnam’s Year of the Rat investigates the turbulent relationship between Ngo Dinh Diem, then president of the Republic of Vietnam, and members of the U.S. Department of State during the period from 1959 to 1961. The relationship, especially with Elbridge Durbrow, the U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam, forms the backdrop for the Year of the Rat and explains how a series of diplomatic crises, a failed coup d’état, and a worsening security situation in South Vietnam contributed to the later escalation of U.S. forces in 1965.

The author’s argument is that 1960 was “one of the many significant turning points in the war when the United States was presented with a choice on how to proceed and failed to live up to the challenge of making a different decision.” These turning points, unfortunately, stemmed from Diem’s troubled professional relationship with Durbrow. Their disunity centered on differing visions as to how to most effectively achieve security in South Vietnam and how to administer the republic.

Frankum describes how the problems between Durbrow and Diem, and issues resulting from their conflicting methods, extended to the relationship between Durbrow and the Department of State on one side and the Department of Defense on the other. The defense lead was Gen. Samuel T. Williams, the Military Advisory Assistance Group (MAAG) chief of staff, and later his successor, Gen. Lionel McGaar, with notable assistance from Edward Lansdale. These dissenting positions led to conflicting reports and recommendations, which were sent up the chain of command to the White House. Such reporting did not adequately provide President Kennedy with the information he needed in the decision-making process.

These troubled professional relationships were significantly and negatively influenced by two key events in 1960: the Caravelle Manifesto in April and the failed coup d’état by South Vietnamese paratroopers 11 to 12 November. The Caravelle Manifesto was a political tract written by a group of South Vietnamese intellectuals who publicly criticized Diem and his policies. The arguments presented in the manifesto were then manipulated by Durbrow to control resources allocated to South Vietnam and to leverage influence upon Diem. Understandably, Durbrow’s work behind Diem’s back was eventually recognized and rightfully regarded as acts of duplicity.

The most critical event, however, was the failed coup attempt in November 1960, which magnified the growing break between Diem’s administration and the
United States. Later, Frankum argues, ambassadors and President Kennedy himself inherited a relationship and evolving crisis that was likely beyond repair by 1961. This central argument is convincingly described and clearly supported through meticulous research.

Another positive feature of Frankum’s work is his writing; he explains complex series of events in a narrative fashion that is both interesting and informative. There are several books on this murky but important set of years. Notable titles include Robert Sciglio’s *South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress* and Denis Warner’s *The Last Confucian*. Frankum’s effort is a positive addition to scholarship on this topic, and it positively benefits research on MAAG and the U.S. involvement in Vietnam prior to 1965.

**Capt. Nathaniel L. Moir, U.S. Army Reserve, Albany, N.Y.**

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**THE INVISIBLE SOLDIERS: How America Outsourced Our Security**


Ann Hagedorn’s *The Invisible Soldiers* is a remarkable investigation into the ascent of private military security companies (PMSCs). She contends that global conflicts have given rise to corporate warriors operating in the shadows without public scrutiny, and PMSCs are taking over U.S. security responsibilities. Her argument is presented with passion and thoroughness.

Hagedorn, an author and staff reporter for *The Wall Street Journal*, begins in London’s ultra-secretive Special Forces Club. We’re introduced to industry pioneers who have shaped global PMSCs—who developed the model for private security—and who held the interest of the United States.

In the book, the advent of the U.S. Army’s Logistics Augmentation Program (LOGPAC) during the Reagan administration pushed the United States into the private security realm; LOGPAC was developed to bypass the Abrams Doctrine, which was conceived to prevent such a disconnect between the public and the military. Its inception opened the doors for corporations to receive government contracts, effectively ushering in the PMSC era.

The book also claims that LOGPAC’s Balkans’ success, under the Clinton administration, invigorated the privatization of other services. PMSCs were financially and politically lucrative, and there was no longer a need to send reservists to conflicts; one could contract a private military contractor and fight for an eternity. We learn that Congress, the Department of Defense, and the Department of State were all complicit in the rise of PMSCs.

According to Hagedorn, the unveiling of PMSCs occurred in Iraq. There, the government surrendered security to corporations, which were now benefactors of war and, with that, a new, global war-fighting precedent emerged.

In 2007, the Nisour Square incident revealed PMSC activities in Iraq. However, when the media found other stories to cover, PMSC misconduct was no longer discussed. The checks continued to flow, and secrecy shrouded the industry again. Hagedorn presents evidence that the government continued working with the industry’s sketchiest men, and knowing this did not prevent the government from awarding billion-dollar contracts to companies. To be fair, some officials attempted to eliminate PMSC contracts—without success.

Throughout the book, one wonders: Why was our security now in the hands of PMSCs? The answer is simple: there is profit in conflicts since the contracts are enormous. Furthermore, soldiers are too expensive. Cheaply, companies can hire a contractor per mission and fire the contractor afterward. Today, the battlefield is everywhere—as are the PMSCs. Consider their reach through various methods such as cyber, immigration, drones, bodyguards, and anti-piracy, to name a few. As regions become more complex, voids must be filled, and the PMSCs are obliged to fill those voids.

PMSCs prey on conflict and make a serious killing—literally and figuratively. I recommend this book if you can get past the prologue without being angered. While reading, consider the question: Whom are we fighting? In *The Invisible Soldiers*, the answer is clear and frightening. This is a must-read for military members and security enthusiasts.

WAVELL IN THE MIDDLE EAST, 1939–1941: A Study in Generalship

The study of Field Marshall Archibald Percival Wavell’s career is part of the ongoing debate over British military performance during the Second World War. This book deals with Wavell’s performance as the British commander-in-chief in the Middle East from 1939 to 1941. Despite his charisma, his brilliant use of unorthodox tactics, and his successes during World War II, Wavell has languished in historical obscurity, overshadowed by those who came later and benefited from the foundations he laid.

After a brief sketch of his pre-1939 career, Raugh begins with Wavell’s appointment as Middle East Commander-in-Chief in August 1939, weeks before the start of the World War II. When he arrived, his area of responsibility encompassed the region stretching from Egypt to the Persian Gulf, from Iraq to Somaliland. After France fell and Italy declared war, he was surrounded by hostile and potentially hostile neighbors. He had few trained troops and practically no logistical infrastructure, but he had capable air force and navy peers. He also received reinforcements from Britain, India, New Zealand, and Australia.

By spring 1941, he was conducting five simultaneous campaigns with little more than three divisions of ground troops; he won three and lost two. Of the latter, the British campaign in Greece still excites the greatest controversy, and Raugh devotes a chapter explaining how Wavell changed his mind as to its efficacy. He intersperses his narrative account with analyses of Wavell’s choices and decisions while explaining the political and strategic constraints placed upon him by geography and politics. His descriptions and analysis of Wavell’s first great victory, Operation Compass, which destroyed the Italian position in Libya, is a model of narrative clarity. He explains how the operation unfolded and shows how its initial success turned into failure as troops were siphoned off to other tasks at London’s direction.

He shows Wavell as a reluctant participant in operations in Greece and Syria but carrying out his orders as best he could because he understood the political stakes involved. Raugh explains the supposed diversion of resources to an East African campaign as political in nature, crucial to British attempts to sway U.S. public opinion by opening the Red Sea to neutral shipping. Politics was also the primary motivator behind the Greek and Syrian operations.

Through these campaigns and Wavell’s relationship with Churchill, Raugh demonstrates the ways in which military operations interact with strategy. Political-military strategic considerations must always dominate military operations; if war is a continuation of politics by other means, then military operations do not determine strategic goals. His description of Wavell’s troubled relationship with Churchill as a fundamental clash of personality and temperament illustrates the importance of mutual confidence in personal relationships at the highest level.

His final assessment of Wavell’s generalship leads one to conclude that, although Wavell had the loyalty of his staff and his army, he was fatally handicapped by Churchill’s inability to understand his difficulties and his own inability to convey them to the prime minister. In the end, Wavell’s resources were always less than adequate to meet his myriad responsibilities on many fronts, but Wavell would have responded that war is always an option of difficulties. This book is recommended not simply for its clarity but because it shows the interplay of policy and operations and the role personal relationships play at the highest levels, where politics, strategy, and military operations intersect.

Lewis Bernstein, Ph.D., Seoul, South Korea

THE BLACK PANTHERS: A Story of Race, War, and Courage—the 761st Tank Battalion in World War II

The story of the 761st Tank Battalion, “The Black Panthers,” starts off with a promise of delving into the issue of race in a divided Army. Unfortunately, this promise is not fully realized; after the first few chapters, it turns into a well-written unit history.
book. DiNicolo chooses not to address the issue of race again until the end of the book.

The early chapters do get you to think about the question of segregation in the military and some of the issues those soldiers faced. DiNicolo does a good job of looking at the issues from several different viewpoints. He also does an admirable job of identifying the major players, both in and out of the Army, who affected not just the 761st Tank Battalion but all of the “colored” units. DiNicolo does not take sides when presenting this information but does provide enough information so that the reader has a better understanding of the arguments.

The unit was activated 1 April 1942 at Camp Claiborne, Louisiana. It was then transferred to Camp Hood, Texas, where it served as a training unit in support of units of tank destroyers being prepared for deployment. The 761st Tank Battalion took part in the Louisiana Maneuvers of 1943. The unit then deployed to Europe; its soldiers landed with high morale at Omaha Beach in France on 10 October 1944.

The 761st Tank Battalion was attached to the XII Corps’ 26th Infantry Division, assigned to Gen. George S. Patton Jr’s Third Army (an army already racing eastward across France) and committed to combat on 7 November 1944. As a result of the soldiers’ great fighting abilities, their unit spearheaded a number of Patton’s moves into enemy territory. The unit forced a hole in the Siegfried Line, allowing Patton’s 4th Armored Division to pour through into Germany. It fought in France, Belgium, and Germany, and the soldiers were among the first U.S. forces to link up with the Soviet Army at the River Steyr in Austria.

At the end of the book, the issue of race is revisited. The author discusses events that immediately followed the war as well as some of the actions and events that happened after the unit was disbanded. Two of the notable events were the eventual awarding of the unit’s Presidential Unit Citation in 1978 and the upgrading of Staff Sgt. Ruben Rivers’ Silver Star to the Medal of Honor in 1997.

I would recommend this book for armor history enthusiasts and students studying the subject of separate tank battalions in World War II. The book is well written and well researched but does not fully explore the issue of race in a divided army.


SAVAGE WILL: The Daring Escape of Americans Trapped Behind Nazi Lines
Timothy M. Gay, New American Library, New York, 2013, 352 pages

On 8 November 1943, an American C-53 aircraft crash landed in Nazi-occupied Albania. The plane, with its Army Air Force crew of four, carried 13 female Army nurses and 13 male Army medics from the 807th Medical Air Evacuation Transport Squadron. For the next two months, 27 members of group battled incredible odds to finally be rescued. The remaining three members of the contingent, separated from the group, were eventually rescued two months later. Timothy Gay’s outstanding volume, Savage Will, captures their unbelievable story of courage and physical and mental stamina.

Gay provides an engrossing account of the action, taking readers from the days prior to the crash to the successful rescue of the group. In between, he describes the brutal hardships they faced, including a lack of food and water, brutal weather, and a trek of more than 600 miles over extremely challenging terrain, wearing poor footwear and possessing little winter clothing. To make matters even more precarious, their entire journey involved traveling through a country heavily occupied by German soldiers—and in the midst of a civil war. It is a powerful testimony to the ability of human spirit to meet and overcome the substantial challenges they faced.

The author also details the experiences of those who assisted in the rescue. This diverse group includes members of the Albanian resistance, local villagers who provided what little they had to the group, members of the British Special Operations Executive, and the American Office of Strategic Services, more commonly known as the OSS. Each played a special role in either the survival or the rescue of the group, and Gay aptly details their roles.

One of the interesting aspects of the volume is Gay’s ability to interweave the rescue itself with the bigger picture of the war. In particular, he includes significant discussion on the country of Albania, addressing the country’s history, its cultural aspects, and the impact of the war inside the nation. Throughout the volume,
the author seamlessly switches his discussion from the rescue to this broader picture.

The author makes outstanding decisions in terms of the volume’s organization and the addition of supplemental material. These include emplacing superb maps, inserting photographs throughout the volume, adding a timeline, and concluding the book with an epilogue that provides a synopsis of most of the principals’ lives following the rescue. In total, these greatly assist in the reader’s understanding of the rescue and in the personalization of all those involved.

Savage Will is the second volume recently released on this rescue—which, until then, had been overlooked by historians and authors. The first, The Secret Rescue by Cate Lineberry, is every bit as outstanding as Savage Will. I found it a bit more focused on the human dimension of those involved, whereas Gay provides more background material tied to the rescue. Consequently, I believe they are highly complementary of each other. Without question, both should be read and enjoyed.

Rick Baillergeon, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

THE LIBERTY INCIDENT REVEALED: The Definitive Account of the 1967 Israeli Attack on the U.S. Navy Spy Ship
A. Jay Cristol, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 2013, 416 pages

This book is a follow-on to the author’s 2002 book The Liberty Incident. For his previous book, Cristol, a former U.S. naval aviator turned naval lawyer, spent years researching the June 1967 incident when Israeli air force jets and Israeli navy torpedo boats attacked a U.S. flagged naval spy ship in international waters off the Sinai Peninsula. The event occurred during the height of the Arab-Israeli conflict and resulted in the deaths of 34 U.S. sailors in addition to 171 wounded. His conclusions—based on all the declassified information from the U.S., Egyptian, and Israeli governments at the time—upheld the original U.S. board of inquiry finding that the attack had been a case of mistaken identity.

Despite his findings and conclusions, there continue to exist at least a dozen conspiracy theories among former Liberty crewmembers and other supporters.

In his 2013 follow-on book, The Liberty Incident Revealed, Cristol adds newly declassified information that affirms all the previous findings, but he also takes his more than 27 years’ worth of evidence and uses it to deconstruct all the conspiracy theories one by one. Each theory is looked at from multiple points of view and taken apart with overwhelming hard evidence based on official records, interviews, and declassified information, none of which contradicts the others.

When Cristol contacted many of the conspiracy theorists and asked them for evidence to support their positions, he most often found it to be based on second- or third-hand information with no physical evidence offered at all. The author goes to great lengths to play out as many conspiracy theories as possible to see if they could have been remotely possible. The more he runs them out, the less the supporting evidence trail he finds.

There have been six full government-level investigations—U.S. and Israeli—and all have led to the exact same conclusion. Israel cooperated with the United States in the release of its information and provided the transcripts between the attacking jets, motor torpedo boats, and controlling headquarters, which clearly show that the attackers mistook the U.S. ship for an Egyptian supply vessel. Even the release of recently declassified National Security Agency tapes from an orbiting U.S. Air Force EC-121 electronic intelligence collector matches the Israeli version down to the time hack of each transmission.

Cristol uses his law experience and follows precise rules of evidence, as he lays out his conclusions and deconstruction of conspiracy theories, that will be hard to reject. This book is well written, logical in its flow of information, and is recommended for anyone that might find themselves as a member of an investigation board.


Facing Page
Top: Citadel of Herat, anonymous artist, 1879. The Citadel of Herat during the Afghan Revolt in 1879.
Bottom left: Alexander the Great, mosaic tile, unknown artist, circa 100 BCE. Detail of the Alexander Mosaic showing Alexander the Great on horseback. (Image courtesy of National Archaeological Museum, Naples, Italy)
Bottom right: Ghengis Khan and Toghril Ong Khan, Rashid al-Din Hamadani, 1430. Ink painting from the pages of the Jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh depicting Ghengis Khan and his son, Wang Kahn, receiving tribute from the Afghans.
The Citadel

Eons flicker and fall
like flakes of empire to settle
at the bottom of an hour glass.

Yet stands the citadel,
assailed but untaken.

Turreted walls glare down
across the centuries,
dust piled high on their
shoulders,
bones fallow at their feet.

In aching memory:

A shivering tangle of axes and
spears,
bullets and whistling shells,
whispering reapers,
that cleave time and flesh,

and the savage will
that holds the dusty heights
cloudless and austere
while the blood laps
at bare and cracking feet.

About the ramparts
stomp the ghosts of Afghans before they were Afghans,
and the Persians,
and Macedonians hefting their silver shields,
Asian hordes with hardy ponies and humming arrows,
Tommies, Commies, and Yanks,
chiseled faces, frozen in youth.

Each a life spent in the churning nothing,
in the majestic absence
between Oxus and the snarling peaks.

For fun, for empire, for salt, for silk
For God, for you, for me, for
a disinterested democracy,
for nothing.

And the foe paces
over the stark parapets,
another ghost in his train,
bored with victory,
bored with defeat.

—Maj. Wes Moerbe, U.S. Army
Herat, Afghanistan