

(Stained glass by Louis Comfort Tiffany, 1848-1933. Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

Tiffany stained-glass window of St. Augustine, Lightner Museum, St. Augustine, Florida. St. Augustine (354 to 430 AD), bishop of Hippo, is one of the central figures in the history of Christianity. *City of God* is one of his greatest theological works. Written in the fifth century as a defense of the faith at a time when the Roman Empire was on the brink of collapse, it points the way forward to a citizenship that transcends worldly politics and will last for eternity. *City of God* had a profound influence on the development of Christian doctrine.

Force and Faith in the American Experience

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or the United States, two key questions persistently dominate and determine our public and private decisions. First, how do we create and maintain an effective marriage between religious values and Enlightenment ideals?¹ Second, how do we preserve liberty, to include religious liberty? At first glance, it appears that the culture in the United States and the West more broadly separates religion and politics than the culture of nations in the Middle East that appear more prone to conflate religion and politics. In our estimation, such conventional narratives are shortsighted. More importantly, they are harmful for military leaders in an era in which religious overtones increasingly define strategic interactions.

This article provides a broad context for military leaders to understand the complicated relationship between religion and politics, both domestically and internationally. We first discuss the contemporary scene and the evidence of a resurgence of religion as a force in domestic and international politics. With these contemporary relationships as the backdrop, we examine America's own often fitful journey of balancing the City of Man and the City of God to provide a lens to examine the challenges presented in the new international order.² The interaction of religious organizations and the military in the dispensation of humanitarian relief, in many ways a relatively new phenomenon, is one of the contemporary challenges that we argue demands a framework for incorporating religious considerations in foreign policy. We suggest that understanding the political history of religion as an integral shaper of America's domestic and foreign policy will better equip military leaders with a set of principles to approach the challenges of religious extremism in strategic and campaign planning.

The Contemporary Scene: Religion and State since the End of the Cold War

The current struggle between the so-called Christian West and Muslim East can trace its roots to Moriah, a mountain range considered to be the land inhabited by Abraham, the father of the monotheistic tradition in Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. At Moriah, God reputedly commanded Abraham to offer his son as a sacrifice. Abraham was willing to do so up until the point that God provided an animal for the sacrifice as a substitute for Isaac or Ishmael, depending on the religious tradition through which you read the story. Abraham's devotion to God's commands is held as an example in each tradition of the blessings bestowed upon Abraham and his descendants because of his unflinching obedience to God.

While the Christian and Muslim worlds can point to Moriah as a common scriptural foundation for monotheism, the two religions markedly diverged in their approach to politics in the seventeenth century. The Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 ended thirty years of bloody religious wars in Europe by defining the principles of sovereignty and equality for the system of states in Europe.³ With the Westphalian recognition of state sovereignty over domestic affairs came the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state by other states. In contrast, as Christian Europe celebrated a peace that promised to separate religious authority from political, there was no concomitant "Westphalian moment" for Islam to separate God's law from political institutions.⁴

Surveying the current geopolitical landscape, evidence suggests the sovereignty of the nation-state is in jeopardy as we are confronted with dramatic changes that have occurred in religion-state relations. The most significant challenge to the Westphalian order is the competition between norms of state sovereignty and claims of justification for intervention in sovereign states on behalf of reputed international norms of human rights and self-determination. For example, numerous interventions under the auspices of a United Nations mandate "in the politics of broken, war-torn, malnourished, and dictatorial" states signal a radical departure from the Westphalian construct that gave primacy to the state for ordering and regulating its own domestic affairs.⁵ Additionally, recent coalition operations against Libya and pressure for international action against Syria on the premise of international humanitarian concerns for the welfare of segments of populations within those two nations demonstrate that nation-states no longer have the ability to practice absolute sovereignty within their own borders. The expectation that the community of nations has both a right and a duty to protect citizens inside sovereign states from abuses against their universal human rights is emerging as an international norm that was not a part of the Westphalian notion of state sovereignty.

Moreover, the perception that a community of nations has a duty to protect citizens of sovereign states not their own by enforcing international norms that community has agreed upon is increasingly a part of the rhetoric and laws of the United States. This perception was manifest in the remarks of President George W. Bush during his second inaugural address when he described the "freedom agenda." Bush said "the best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world," implying that every man and woman on earth possesses certain individual rights.⁶ Under the current administration, the advancement of freedom is a pillar of the current National Security Strategy. The National Security Strategy, along with the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA), makes the promotion of religious freedom a specific foreign policy goal of the United States. At the heart of such values is the freedom of conscience associated with religious liberty as stated in the National Security Strategy: "American values are reflective of the universal values we champion all around the world—including the freedoms of *s*peech, worship, and peaceful assembly."⁷ The IRFA authorizes "United States actions in response to violations of religious freedom in foreign countries," codifying protection of religious freedom in other countries in statutory policy.⁸

The growing concerns over religious influence are reflected domestically in the number of organizations engaged in religious lobbying or religious advocacy in Washington, D.C. That number grew from fewer than 40 in 1970 to well over 200 today, with annual expenditures topping \$350 million *s*pent to influence public policy on behalf of the faithful. The growth is also evident in part by the establishment of the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives (2001).⁹

Taken as a whole, these changes suggest a growth of religion's influence on U.S. domestic and foreign policy that has reached an unprecedented level of institutionalization and legitimacy, presenting a first-order challenge to the Westphalian political order. In the context of these developments, the protection of religious freedom, including the right to evangelize, is increasingly being constructed as a legitimate basis for international intervention. According to the IRFA, countries that fail to protect "freedom of religious belief and practice" are subject to the application of the "appropriate tools in the United States foreign policy apparatus," a clear departure from the Westphalian construct of states retaining sovereignty over actions that transpire within their own borders.¹⁰

In contrast to the resurgence of religious overtones in American politics, the reemergence of Islam as an important variable in world affairs is well known from the rise of an Islamic government in Iran in 1979 to the attacks of 9/11. In simpler and balder terms, while the West—and more pointedly, the United States—has been pointing a secular finger at the religiosity of Islamic extremist-based threats (nonstate, state-sponsored, transnational), there are accusatory fingers pointing back toward the West and the style of U.S. hegemonic leadership in the Westphalian secular order.

The widespread belief in predominately Muslim nations that the United States seeks to "weaken and divide the Islamic World" demonstrates the necessity to bring religious considerations into policy decisions.¹¹ The role of religious groups in the overlapping transformations of war, aid, and evangelism should not be understated as religious groups vying for secular state power is a feature of the post-Cold War environment.

In the context of the current international environment, the United States faces two sometimes conflicting values: self-determination versus religious liberty. While self-determination is a principle of U.S. foreign policy, the rise of Islamic governments that threaten individual religious liberty runs counter to the principles established in the IRFA. Though the approach to resolving these two conflicting values is unclear, what is clear is that the violation of either principle may trigger an intervention into the internal affairs of states that were previously held as inviolable in the Westphalian system.

While the West may consider the question of separating religion from the secular power of the state a bedrock principle of modern statehood, the separation of religion from politics in the United States has been more of a thin line than a wall. In the context of religion's role in the modern international environment, an examination of how religion shaped our own political destiny is instructive in preparing military leaders to deal with faith's role in other countries when executing U.S. foreign policy.

America's Religious Tradition

The lyrics of one of America's most popular patriotic songs, "My Country, 'Tis of Thee," illustrate that the foundation of America's notions of democratic liberty can be found in Judeo-Christian scripture:

Our fathers' God, to thee, Author of liberty, to thee we sing;

- Long may our land be bright
- With freedom's holy light;
- Protect us by thy might, great God, our King.

-Samuel Francis Smith,

"My Country, 'Tis of Thee," 4th Stanza



(Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

Ratification of the Peace of Münster (Gerard ter Borch, Münster, 1648). The Peace of Münster was a treaty between the Dutch Republic and Spain signed in 1648 recognizing Dutch independence from the Spanish Crown. The treaty was a part of the Peace of Westphalia, which ended both the Thirty Years' War and the Eighty Years' War. It laid the foundation for the development of the idea of national self-determination in Western international law.

Prominent scholars of the American founding stress that gaining a full understanding of the American Revolution and founding era requires an appreciation for the deep religious roots of America's zeal for liberty. This section explores these foundational roots and addresses two simple questions: Does the religious spirit and outlook of the American revolutionary experience continue with us today? And, if so, what are the impacts and implications regarding the conventional narrative that the United States maintains a great separation between politics and religion? Understanding the answers to such questions will aid us as we consider the role of faith in the modern international environment.

First, when one discusses the American founding, one should clarify which founding is being referenced. The first American founding arguably occurred early in the seventeenth century when John Winthrop and other Puritan leaders set sail on the *Arbella* to solidify the settlement that would become the Massachusetts Bay Colony. On board, Winthrop delivered a sermon titled "A Model of Christian Charity" that introduced a phrase that remains at the heart of American foreign policy. Winthrop implored those on the journey that they should be "as a city upon a hill," creating a society that would serve as an example to others throughout the world.¹²

The religious fervor of the first founding was later reinforced during the Great Awakening of the early eighteenth century, contributing to the zeal for liberty that coalesced in the American Revolution. The revolution was a "conspiracy of faith and reason" in that it captured the spiritual yearnings of the Great Awakening for religious liberty with the enlightenment ideals of a government based upon reason and individual (natural) rights.¹³ As John Quincy Adams noted of the revolution, the Declaration of Independence "connected, in one indissoluble bond, the principles of civil government with the principles of Christianity."¹⁴

A portion of the clergy in America played a leading role in the revolution, reinforcing the connection



(Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

George Whitefield (John Wollaston, 1738). Whitefield was a prominent English-Anglican cleric who became one of the best-known preachers in Great Britain and North America in the eighteenth century. His series of revival sermons is credited for helping spark what became known as the Great Awakening that swept Protestant Europe and British America, and especially the American colonies in the 1730s and 1740s, leaving a permanent impact on American religious and political thought.

of civil liberty and religious freedom. One of these leaders was John Witherspoon, a Presbyterian minister and president of Princeton University, whose ideas pertaining to the justification of the revolution influenced students such as James Madison and Aaron Burr. In one of his most famous sermons, Witherspoon noted that "there was not a single instance in history, in which civil liberty was lost, and religious liberty preserved entire."15 Another influential minister, Jonathan Mayhew, championed the cause of liberty and resistance to tyranny in his sermons and writings. Thomas Jefferson borrowed one of Mayhew's most influential phrases and made it his personal seal during the revolution: "Rebellion to tyrants is obedience to God."¹⁶ The banner "An Appeal to Heaven" was thus not just a rallying cry for religious liberty but rather an appeal to restore the right balance between the limited power of man and the unlimited power of God.¹⁷

While religious principles deeply influenced the revolution, the Founding Fathers were very careful to keep the law of the land separate from the kingdom of God. It was no accident that the first liberty in the Bill of Rights is an assurance of religious liberty. The First Amendment dictating that Congress make "no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof" was meant to protect the church from the influence of the state as much as it was meant to protect the civil authority from the direction of the church. As colonial leader John Wise articulated in a 1717 sermon, the "power of churches is but a faint resemblance of civil power," noting that churches and governments are engaged in different pursuits.¹⁸

Notwithstanding, the separation of church and state articulated in the First Amendment was not an effort to rid religion from political discourse. While those who think the Founders intended a strict separation of religion and politics hearken to the metaphor of a "wall of separation between church and state" used by Thomas Jefferson, separating church and state is not the same thing as separating religion and politics.¹⁹ The Founders were wary of intertwining church and state because using the state's power to further the activities of the church would be an improper invasion of the private sphere. In James Madison's words, one's religious duties can be directed "only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence," thus the church should be closely guarded from the coercive powers of the state.²⁰ Such a separation would protect the conscience of citizens but also guard the activities of the church from undue influence from the state.

While the Founders were careful to separate church and state, they recognized—and encouraged—the interplay of religion in America's political discourse. Paradoxically, many of the Founders thought that by removing the province of the church from the activities of the state, they would actually encourage religion because citizens would be free to choose the religion that most appealed to them.²¹ Thus a free market of religious choice was established, though the contemporary "market" was tilted toward Christianity because of the customs and traditions within the colonies at the time. While Congress was restricted by the First Amendment, prior to the Fourteenth Amendment, the states were not. In turn, many states incorporated laws that violated the spirit of the First Amendment prior to the application of the establishment clause to state law through the Supreme Court's decision in Everson v. Board of Education in 1947.²² Such laws included those espousing state-established churches, tax support to churches, religious tests for office, which were in effect in 11 of the 13 original colonies in the late eighteenth century, and even fines for irregular church attendance.²³

Even though the national government of the time did not attempt to instill morality or virtue within the citizenry through lawmaking, many of the Founders had strong convictions that religion was essential in shaping a moral citizenry. Since many eighteenth-century Americans became literate by reading the Bible, Alexis de Tocqueville noted that religion "directs the customs of the community, and by regulating domestic life, it regulates the state."²⁴ While the government did not sanction a particular religion, many of the Founders recognized that religion was an indispensable part, and asset, to a democratic republic.²⁵ The importance of religion to republican government was captured by George Washington in his farewell address where he cautioned that "reason and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle."26 The First Amendment and the religious marketplace in early America created a nonreligious religiousness—a state in which religion influenced the political dialogue of the community, but did so from a position of nonestablishment.

Balancing the two pillars of the First Amendmentnonestablishment and free exercise—has been an uneasy journey in the course of American political history, demonstrating the complexity of mixing religion and politics. The high point of America's religiosity in the twentieth century occurred in the 1950s when the phrase "In God We Trust" was added to the Pledge of Allegiance and paper currency, and measures of religious observance such as church attendance were at levels not seen since.²⁷ However, the post-New Deal era also ushered in new complexities in combining religious traditions with the features of the modern republic. For one, the incorporation of the establishment clause of the First Amendment with the landmark 1947 case Everson v. Board of Education meant that state and local governments now faced increasing limitations on aid to religious organizations.

Second, the national government was increasingly active in the provision of services like education, health, and charity that were previously the province of religious organizations.²⁸ Third, government regulation of personal sexual morality drew religious groups into the political arena because of the significance of sexual morality to many religious denominations.²⁹

The Supreme Court has frequently been the arbiter in addressing the tension that is inherent in the First Amendment between preserving both nonestablishment and free exercise. As Justice William Rehnquist noted, decisions such as those in the landmark case of Lemon v. Kurtzman, which imparted a three-part test to gauge the compatibility of laws with the establishment and free exercise clauses of the First Amendment, sometimes lead to further entanglement between state and church.³⁰ For instance, the Court has decided that a "state may pay for bus transportation to religious schools-but may not pay for bus transportation from the parochial school to the public zoo or natural history museum for a field trip."³¹ In many cases, restricting the First Amendment to the private sphere may restrict free exercise, but using statutory authority to buttress religious organizations or purposes is a violation of the establishment clause. As one church-state scholar noted, allowing conscientious objector status preserves a person's free exercise, but access to such status might be regarded "as a government-induced creation to join particular churches."32

These examples from the domestic sphere demonstrate that the wall of separation is blurred because of the complexity of church-state issues. As the next section details, this uneasy relationship between supporting biblical ideals while maintaining U.S. interests presents unique challenges in twenty-first century U.S. foreign policy.

Force, Faith, and U.S. Foreign Policy

The United States faces significant challenges in the twenty-first century in balancing the sometimes conflicting ideas of making the world safe for democracy while also promoting self-determination. The particular challenge lies in the Middle East where democracy does not always entail the recognition of religious liberty, as was the case in the American revolutionary experience. This section examines U.S. humanitarian interventions and the activity of religious nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Muslim domains against the backdrop of the recent worldwide resurgence of Islam and Christianity in global politics. As this section details, the twenty-first century strategic planner and military officer stands at the crossroads, both internationally and domestically, of balancing the City (and laws) of Man with the City of God.

The complexity of this balancing act is magnified in U.S. foreign policy, especially in terms of America's fitful relationship with supporting missionaries abroad. Missionaries are often champions of a Wilsonian foreign policy that seeks an international order based on self-determination and the protection of human rights. Missionaries petition the U.S. government for right of entry into other countries and, once there, the protection of their property abroad. Under such circumstances, they are also positioned to pressure the U.S. government to use its influence to promote human rights in countries in which they are proselytizing.³³ This situation has become more complex recently as there has been a dramatic growth of religiously affiliated NGOs into the humanitarian and development sectors that assume responsibility for providing aid and reconstruction during times of war. Many such NGOs view this development as providing a new vehicle for the faithful to increase influence on U.S. foreign policy.³⁴

In parallel with this rise of religious NGOs, intrastate conflicts have both increased and internationalized, resulting in U.S. military forces becoming involved in the burgeoning field of international humanitarian intervention. This development has unavoidably brought them into contact with religiously affiliated NGOs operating in the same areas.³⁵ Concurrently, U.S. involvement in these conflicts has been accompanied by transformations in the norms and rationales that nations have used for legitimizing intervention, with the violation of a state's territorial sovereignty no longer understood to be a necessary precondition for the legitimate use of military force.

Instead, Western militaries are increasingly permitted, if not expected, to intervene in conflicts defined by internal political, ethnic, and cultural cleavages.³⁶

From a U.S. policy standpoint, intervention in such internal conflicts is said to be warranted as a bulwark

against state failure, which is itself seen as an underlying precondition for internal strife and the emergence of extremist movements that could pose threats to U.S. interests.³⁷ Thus, with the development, reconstruction, and stabilization of states being identified as a security objective, the role of the military has expanded beyond combat to increasingly include operations that historically were regarded as the exclusive province of the private humanitarian sector.

Although religion's involvement in the delivery of aid is nothing new, this growth has coincided with two recent changes in U.S. foreign policy that, taken together, have the potential to transform the meaning and impact of religious participation in humanitarian affairs. One of those changes is the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA), which designates religious freedom as an issue to be addressed through U.S. intervention—including punitive sanctions.³⁸ While the IRFA officially "targets no particular country or region, and seeks to promote no religion over another," several religious and human rights organizations have raised concerns that it will be used as a "tool of intrusive evangelism" wielded predominantly by conservative Christians wishing to protect their own foreign missionaries.39

Whether or not these concerns are founded, the IRFA gives religious organizations new and extended forms of U.S. government resources to expand their organizational infrastructures and, secondarily, their access to potential converts.⁴⁰ The second change is that the predominant organizational forum through which evangelists organize is now the development or humanitarian NGO. Given these two changes to U.S. foreign policy, it is clear that the boundary between aid and evangelism has been compromised.

What we have is the simultaneous movement of the military and evangelists into a shared organizational field, the field of humanitarian action. This simultaneous movement and overlap raises critical questions about how these different types of organizations and actors—military, humanitarian, and religious—influence each others' goals, operations, and outcomes.

With regard to this emerging overlap of interests, researchers have begun to look critically at the implications of military involvement in humanitarian missions. For instance, experts at the Feinstein International Famine Center identified the military as contributing substantially to what is being described as a "crisis in humanitarianism." ⁴¹ They argue that, especially in conflict zones where military forces are also belligerents (e.g. Iraq, Afghanistan), partnering with militaries undermines the neutrality, impartiality, humanity, and independence of humanitarian operations, thereby politicizing aid and threatening the efficacy of their missions.

To be sure, the overlap between military and humanitarian operational domains is nothing new, and many of the issues and challenges that exist today were also present in the post-World War II period, and even earlier. But the recent, large-scale expansion of the humanitarian field has brought a larger number of civilian relief organizations and workers into post-conflict regions, exacerbating tensions over the propriety of military involvement in what NGOs regard as civil space.⁴²

Despite the tensions raised by the overlap of religious organizations and the military in humanitarian operations, religious participation in such work appears to be largely embraced, at least in the official corridors of the international community. In fact, most policymakers and academics have applauded religious NGOs for providing compassionate and tolerant solutions to deprivation, health crises, and natural disasters. In part, this embrace of religion is driven by a very real need for the material resources and organizational infrastructures required to carry out international aid projects, resources that in some regions of the world (such as sub-Saharan Africa) only religious institutions are equipped to provide.⁴³ However, in their enthusiasm to embrace the concrete resources that religious organizations bring to bear upon humanitarian crises, commentators have made their evaluations without the benefit of systematic, empirical research on the effects that the distinctly religious features of religious NGOs have on both military and humanitarian operations. Given the salience of religion as a source of division in post-Cold War conflicts, the effects—both intended and unintended—could be considerable.

For example, one way insurgent groups attract supporters is through the provision of goods and services (e.g., food, protection, medicine, systems of justice) that states fail to provide. In turn, one way the United States can compete with insurgents for the "hearts and minds" of local populations is through the provision of



(Portrait of George Washington, Rembrandt Peale, oil on canvas, circa 1853.)

f all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable supports. In vain would that man claim the tribute of patriotism, who should labor to subvert these great pillars of human happiness, these firmest props of the duties of men and citizens. The mere politician, equally with the pious man, ought to respect and to cherish them. A volume could not trace all their connections with private and public felicity. Let it simply be asked: Where is the security for property, for reputation, for life, if the sense of religious obligation desert the oaths which are the instruments of investigation in courts of justice? And let us with caution indulge the supposition that morality can be maintained without religion. Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle.

It is substantially true that virtue or morality is a necessary spring of popular government. The rule, indeed, extends with more or less force to every species of free government. Who that is a sincere friend to it can look with indifference upon attempts to shake the foundation of the fabric?

-Washington's Farewell Address 179644



(Photo by Sgt. David Turner, Multi-National Division–Center)

Chaplain (Maj.) Ibraheem Raheem, Multinational Corps–Iraq, delivers a sermon for Muslim soldiers during a service 29 August 2008 at Camp Victory, Iraq. Raheem, one of only six Muslim chaplains in the Army at that time, was the only one deployed in Iraq.


these same goods and services through neutral humanitarian organizations that allow for their procurement without signaling political commitments.⁴⁵ In regions that are predominantly Christian, the involvement of Christian NGOs in this form of humanitarian work might be unproblematic. But perceptions of the neutrality of Christian NGOs—especially those that evangelize—cannot be assumed in predominantly Muslim territories where religion is a salient source of distinction between opposing forces. Add to this the weakening of the boundary between aid and evangelism—particularly evangelism accompanied by force of arms—and the perception that aid is impartial and independent of U.S. objectives becomes threatened.

The complex relationship between war, aid, and evangelism will likely remain inherent in future conflicts. Throughout American history and for many Americans today, religion provides a sense of identity as well as a basis for a Wilsonian foreign policy that sees it as America's duty to spread its values throughout the world. One of these values is the promotion of human rights that Americans and the West more broadly conceive of in terms of individual rights, as opposed to community or collective rights. Irrespective of American views, different societies will come to different answers regarding the question of what rights they recognize to exist. In an era where international tension is growing on the issue of whether religious freedom outweighs state sovereignty, we conclude with the question, does the fracturing of the Westphalian system portend promise or peril?

Possibilities for Peace: Promise or Peril?

Given the lack of clarity that exists currently in the moral and legal justifications for international interventions on behalf of religious freedom, what principles should the strategic planner and military officer consider in approaching religion's role in executing American foreign policy? The foregoing analysis leads us to three broad conclusions:

Religious liberty is America's greatest moral argument to the world. Rooted in the championing of religious freedom in the founding era, America recognizes in its laws and customs that freedom of conscience is a basic human right, even if this right was not always



Two soldiers on Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico peer with curiosity 15 June 2010 as they see Chaplain (Col.) Jacob Goldstein, a Jewish rabbi, and Brooklyn, N.Y., native, who has served the military since 1977. He often gets curious looks because he wears a beard, in accordance with his Jewish faith, while in uniform.

protected in practice. It is instructive, therefore, to understand our own fitful history in balancing nonestablishment with free exercise and religious diversity. The American example of a democracy thriving amidst its religious diversity is a vital tool of American soft power in approaching religious matters internationally.

Nonestablishment of religion protects the state from religion and religion from the state. Military leaders must take a thoughtful approach to balancing the religious and humanitarian spheres inherent in the majority of post-Cold War international interventions. Preserving nonestablishment in this field protects the state from the appearance of favoring one religion over another while at the same time protecting religious authorities from compromising their claims of authority in the spiritual realm. Critical to this point is the modeling of nonestablishment by military leaders in their public activities as military professionals.

The power of religion both unites and divides. Democracy thrives on political activism, and religious motivation will continue to be a primary means to spark such activism. Just as in our own revolution, we should expect to see religious figures play a leading, if not decisive, role in the organization of new governments in the wake of popular uprisings. Therefore, the two previous conclusions are important to remember as we engage with leaders of these new states as they try to find their own balance between spiritual and secular influence over the state.

Conclusion

Religion unites and divides us—both as a nation and a community of nations. As we have good reason to assume that religion will continue to be a significant variable in American domestic politics and in international relations, American foreign policymakers will be well served to become familiar with America's own fitful journey of balancing the uneasy marriage of religion and politics. By understanding this history and placing it in the context of the evolving international order, our strategic leaders will be better prepared to tackle the hard questions of whether the new international order offers promises for peace or impending peril—and what, in particular, military leaders should consider when bringing religion into strategic and campaign planning. Col. Isaiah (Ike) Wilson III, U.S. Army, serves as chief, Commander's Initiatives Group at U.S. Central Command. He is a former professor of political science and director of American Politics, Policy, and Strategy in the Department of Social Sciences at the United States Military Academy. He holds a B.S. in international relations (USMA), an M.P.A., M.A., and Ph.D. from Cornell University, and two MMAS degrees from the U.S. Army Command & General Staff College and School of Advanced Military Studies. A veteran of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, he has authored numerous articles and a book, Thinking Beyond War: Civil-Military Relations and Why America Fails to Win the Peace.

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Notes

1. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, from the American Studies at the University of Virginia website, <u>http:// xroads.virginia.edu/~HYPER/DETOC/toc_indx.html</u> (accessed 22 October 2014). See this site for background on the importance of religion to morality and morality to republican government in eighteenth century American political history; Ellis Sandoz, *A Government of Laws: Political Theory, Religion, and the American Founding* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2001); and Gertrude Himmelfarb, *The Roads to Modernity: The British, French, and American Enlightenments* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004).

2. In his book *City of God*, St. Augustine frames the history of political civilizations in terms of the "City of God" (those devoted to love of God in Christian scriptures) and the "City of Man" (those devoted to self-interest). We borrow St. Augustine's language in relationship to the American republic's attempts to balance free exercise ("City of God," enabling the pursuit of religious practice) and nonestablishment ("City of Man," separating church and state).

3. Pierre Beaudry, "The Economic Policy That Made the Peace of Westphalia," The Schiller Institute, May 2003, <u>http://www.schillerinstitute.org/strategic/treaty_of_westphalia.html</u> (accessed 22 October 2014).

4. Mark Lilla, "The Politics of God," *The New York Times Magazine*, 19 August 2007.

5. Daniel Philpott, "The Religious Roots of Modern International Relations" *World Politics* 52 (January 2000): 206.

6. George W. Bush, Second Inaugural Address, 20 January 2005, <u>http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.</u> <u>php?pid=58745#axzz11ld3xX90</u> (accessed 3 November 2014).

7. National Security Strategy, May February 2015, 20, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy_2.pdf (accessed 8 February 2015).

8. International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Public Law 105-292, 105th Cong., 27 October 1998.

9. The Pew Forum, "Lobbying for the Faithful: Religious Advocacy Groups in Washington, DC," 21 November 2011, <u>http://www.pewforum.org/Government/Lobbying-for-the-</u> faithful--exec.aspx (accessed 22 October 2014).

10. International Religious Freedom Act.

11. World Public Opinion Polls, "Public Opinion in the Islamic World on Terrorism, al Qaeda, and U.S. Policies," 25 February 2009, <u>http://worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/</u> <u>feb09/STARTII_Feb09_rpt.pdf</u> (accessed 4 November 2014). Large majorities across the nine predominately Muslim territories and countries surveyed perceived U.S. goals included to "weaken and divide the Islamic world."

12. John Winthrop, "A Model of Christian Charity," 1630, from the Massachusetts Historical Society website, <u>http://his-tory.hanover.edu/texts/winthmod.html</u> (accessed 12 November 2014).

13. Sandoz, 139.

15. John Witherspoon, "The Dominion of Providence over the Passions of Men," May 1776, from the Constitution Society website, <u>http://www.constitution.org/primarysources/wither-</u> spoon.html (accessed 22 October 2014).

16. Sandoz, 92.

17. "An Appeal to Heaven" was a phrase utilized on a flag flown during the American Revolution that featured a pine tree in the center of the banner. The phrase implies a spiritual justification for revolution as outlined in John Locke's *Two Treatises of Government*, which influenced the language in the Declaration of Independence with its appeal to the "Supreme judge of the world" for the rights asserted in the Declaration.

18. Jonathan Wise, "Vindication of the Government of New England Churches," 1717, from the Constitution Society website, <u>http://www.constitution.org/primarysources/wise.</u> <u>html</u> (accessed 22 October 2014).

19. Thomas Jefferson, "Jefferson's Letter to the Danbury Baptists," 1 January 1802, from the Library of Congress

^{14.} lbid., 141.

website, <u>http://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/9806/danpre.html</u> (accessed 22 October 2014).

20. James Madison, "Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments," 1785, from Founders Online, National Archives, <u>http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madi-</u> son/01-08-02-0163 (accessed 22 October 2014).

21. Chris Beneke, *Beyond Toleration: The Religious Origins of American Pluralism* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2006), 204. Beneke notes that the constitutional provisions for religious liberty were responsible for the growth in the number and diversity of churches in America following the ratification of the First Amendment.

22. Everson v. Board of Education of the Township of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).

23. Isaac Kramnick and R. Laurence Moore, *The Godless Constitution: A Moral Defense of the Secular State*, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005), 31.

24. de Tocqueville, Volume I, Chapter 17.

25. Sandoz, 132. Sandoz demonstrates that Benjamin Rush's belief that "the only foundation for a useful education in a republic is to be laid in religion" was widespread among the colonists and Founders during the Revolution. While the personal religion of the Founders is widely debated, scholarship supports there was a strong consensus among the Founders of the value of religion in a republic; see also Jon Meacham, American Gospel: God, the Founding Fathers, and the making of a Nation (New York: Random House, 2007). As de Tocqueville noted nearly a century after the American Founding, "in America religion is the road to knowledge, and the observance of the divine law leads man to civil freedom."

26. George Washington, "Washington's Farewell Address, 1796," from the Lillian Goldman Law Library website, Yale Law School, <u>http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp</u> (accessed 22 October 2014).

27. Robert Putnam and David Campbell, American Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010), 88. Putnam and Campbell cite the 1950s as the "high tide of civic religion" of the twentieth century in terms of weekly church attendance, church construction, and positive responses to poll questions such as whether religion was important and whether it could answer today's problems.

28. Ted Jelen, *To Serve God and Mammon: Church-State Relations in American Politics*, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2010), 8.

29. Putnam and Campbell, 117.

30. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985). The three parts of the Lemon Test are 1) the statute must have a secular legislative purpose 2) its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion 3) the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.

31. Ibid.

32. Jelen, 17.

33. Walter Russell Meade, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World (New York: Routledge, 2002), 147-48. For an examination of American missionary work in the Middle East, see Michael B. Oren, Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East 1776-Present (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007). 34. Paul Gifford, "Some Recent Developments in African Christianity," *African Affairs*, 93(373): 513-534; Julie Hearn, "The 'Invisible' NGO: U.S. Evangelical Missions in Kenya," *Journal of Religion in Africa* 32(1): 32-60.

35. James Dobbins et al., *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2003).

36. Examples include Somalia (1993), Haiti (1994; 1996), Kosovo (1999-2000). The U.S./Coalition intervention into Iraq, which began with military invasion in March 2003 and which continued as a U.N.-sanctioned and Iraqi government-authorized stability, security, transition, and reconstruction occupation is also classifiable in this category of internationalized internal conflict.

37. National Security Strategy 2015, 9. The National Security Strategy states specifically that "We will work to address the underlying conditions that can help foster violent extremism such as poverty, inequality, and repression. This means supporting alternatives to extremist messaging and greater economic opportunities for women and disaffected youth. We will help build the capacity of the most vulnerable states and communities to defeat terrorists locally."

38. International Religious Freedom Act.

39. Susanne Hoeber-Rudolph, "Religious Concomitants of Transnationalism: From a Universal Church to a Universal Religiosity?" *The Scared and Sovereign: Religion and International Politics*, ed. John D. Carlson and Erik C. Owens (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2003), 149.

40. International Religious Freedom Act. The act specifies that "United States chiefs of missions shall seek out and contact religious nongovernmental organizations to provide high-level meetings with religious nongovernmental organizations where appropriate and beneficial." It also states that "diplomatic missions should give particular consideration to those programs and candidates deemed to assist in the promotion of the right to religious freedom" when allocating funds. The IRFA also permits "access to the premises of any United States diplomatic mission or consular post by any United States citizen seeking to conduct an activity for religious purposes."

41. The Alan Shawn Feinstein International Famine Center, "The Future of Humanitarian Action: Implications of Iraq and Other Recent Crises," January 2004, 4, <u>http://www.humanrights.unisi.it/h2005/allegati/future.pdf</u> (accessed 22 October 2014).

42. Michael Williams, *Civil Military Relations and Peacekeeping*, Adelphi Paper 321 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998), 14.

43. Evelyn Bush, Transnational Religion and Secular Institutions: Structure and Strategy in Human Rights Advocacy (doctoral dissertation, Cornell University, 2005).

44. George Washington portrait courtesy of the National Portrait Gallery, Washington, D.C.; extract from *Washington's Farewell Address, 1796*, Lillian Goldman Law Library, Yale Law School, <u>http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp</u> (accessed 6 February 2015).

45. John A. Nagl, David H. Petraeus, James F. Amos, and Sarah Sewall, *The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 300.