As I approach my two-year anniversary as the editor-in-chief of this fine professional journal, I can’t help but reflect on the positive changes we’ve experienced, such as adding color imagery, changing our layout, and altering our submission guidelines to improve readability. We’ve enhanced our social media presence, and we’ve attracted prominent high-level contributors to add to our already stellar pool of authors. But, we’re not through yet. More changes are ahead!

Our May–June edition includes some great submissions on a wide variety of topics. Brig. Gen. Ronald Kirklin, the 53rd Quartermaster General of the Army and commandant of the Quartermaster School, provides his thoughts on how the Army can best serve its top midgrade officers in “Identifying and Retaining the Army’s Best Midgrade Officers.” 1st Lt. Don Gomez and Staff Sgt. Samuel Heer provide a company-grade perspective on integrating resilience training at the small-unit level in “Operational Resilience in the Infantry Rifle Platoon.”

Some other great articles I know you will find fascinating are those by Chris Bowers and Rob Hynes. Maj. Chris Bowers analyzes U.S. operations in Sadr City, which provides lessons for future Army activity in extremely large metropolitan areas in his article “Future Megacity Operations—Lessons from Sadr City.” Lt. Col. Rob Hynes makes a compelling argument against including Department of the Army civilians as part of the Army Profession in “Army Civilians and the Army Profession.” Also, Maj. Kane Wright, Australian army, provides his MacArthur Leadership Award-winning submission, “Great Results through Bad Leaders: the Positive Effects of Toxic Leadership,” in which he delivers a unique perspective on what is normally considered a terrible organizational problem.

Military Review continues to improve and increase its readership thanks to the feedback from our readers and the high quality of submissions by our authors. I encourage all our readers to look at the themes for our upcoming editions listed on the next page and to consider submitting an article, and I strongly recommend that authors submit their proposed articles as soon as possible after announcement of the themes for maximum opportunity of early evaluation and acceptance. Although we hold a limited amount of space in reserve for particularly distinguished articles, we routinely begin filling the list of articles accepted for each edition between nine and twelve months in advance of expected publication. Articles submitted within 90 days of an issue’s publication date will still be considered for inclusion in future editions. You can find our submission requirements online at: http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/index.asp#write.

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Col. Anna R. Friederich-Maggard
Announcing the 2015 General William E. DePuy Combined Arms Center Writing Competition

This year’s theme is *The Future of War*. Possible topics include, but are not limited to—

- Changing demographics—what will the world’s population look like and what effect will it have on the Army and the operational environment (e.g., megacities, population growth and displacement, resource distribution)
- Climate change and its threat to security (e.g., water rights, desertification, coastal flooding)
- The impact of regionally aligned forces
- The future of nonstate entities and their relationship to, and impact on, the military
- Army operations on U.S. soil (e.g., erosion of the Posse Comitatus Act)

**Contest Closes 10 July 2015**

1st Place $1,000 and publication in *Military Review*
2nd Place $750 and consideration for publication in *Military Review*
3rd Place $500 and consideration for publication in *Military Review*

For information on how to submit an entry, go to [http://militaryreview.army.mil](http://militaryreview.army.mil)
Themes for Future Editions
with Suggested Topics

Inform and Influence Activities
September-October 2015

- Are there universal principles of human influence?
- The importance of formulating, promulgating, and sustaining a national narrative
- The influence of popular entertainment on public opinion with regard to support of war efforts
- Collisions of culture: The struggle for cultural hegemony in stability operations

The Human Dimension and Technology
November-December 2015

- Knowing your enemy
- Talent management, putting the right soldier in the right job
- The challenge of sustaining the quality of the all-volunteer force in an era of persistent conflict
- The role of technology in enhanced human dimension capabilities
- How will urbanization and social media affect the already complex operating environment?
- Optimizing human performance: quality vs. quantity? How ethics play a role
- Research in the Army, with contributions across the spectrum (medical, psychological, biological, scientific, and historical)

The Future of War
January-February 2016 (Deputy Topic)

- Megacities—What will the United States look like in the next century? What effect will the future status of the United States have on the military?
- Climate change and its threat to security (water rights)
- Impact of regionally aligned forces—present and future
- Future of nonstate entities and the military’s role in it
- Evolving or eroding the Posse Comitatus Act?

Global Insurgencies
March-April 2016

- Quranic concept of war
- Updates on regional conflicts
- Regionally aligned forces reports from the field
Army Firsts
May-June 2016
- The importance of land power and its part in national security (including national defense and foreign relations): 100 years ago, today, and 100 years in the future
- Past wars—What worked/what didn’t work; what is and is not working now
- Weapon systems, an operational approach, right/wrong implementation
- Females in combat military occupational specialties
- Status of openly gay and lesbian servicemember acceptance
- A comparison of male and female posttraumatic stress disorder

The Future of Innovation in the Army
July-August 2016
- How much is just right? Can you have too much?
- Historical examples of institutionally fostered innovation
- Institutional and cultural obstacles to innovation in the U.S. Army of the twenty-first century

Dealing with a Shrinking Army
September-October 2016
- Lessons from post-Civil War, post-World War I, post-World War II, post-Vietnam, and post-Cold War
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- Quality retention during forced drawdowns
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Maj. Christopher O. Bowers, U.S. Army

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Brig. Gen. Ronald Kirklin, U.S. Army

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(U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Rylan Albright)
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Lt. Col. John Cushing, commander, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry Regiment, 4th Advise and Assist Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, kneels beside Iraqi soldiers providing support by fire during a battalion live fire exercise at Ghuzlani Warrior Training Center, 26 May 2011. Soldiers assigned to 2nd Battalion, 9th Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, took part in the culminating event to signify the completion of their training iteration.

(Photo by Spc. Angel Turner, 4th Advise and Assist Brigade PAO, 1st Cavalry Division)
The cities of the future, rather than being made of glass and steel ... are instead largely constructed out of crude brick, straw, recycled plastic, cement blocks and scrap wood. Instead of cities of light soaring toward heaven, much of the twenty-first century urban world squats in squalor, surrounded by pollution, excrement, and decay.

—Mike Davis, Planet of Slums

We are in the age of the slum. Studies of future cities and megacities bristle with statistics, growth trend lines, and comparative analogies, prophesizing: The future of the human race is the city; the future of the city is the megacity, and the reality of the megacity is the slum.

A megacity is a metropolitan area with a total population in excess of 10 million. The recent growth
patterns of megacities worldwide is only outpaced by the growth of their slums, which account for the bulk of recent urban population growth. An ominous report prepared by Swedish-based multinational corporation Ericsson, titled *Networked Society: the Next Age of Megacities*, forecasts recurring growth patterns among megacities: high growth due to migration and birth rates, large informal settlements and young populations, basic infrastructure and public service needs, corruption and lack of transparency, and a lack of empowerment for poor populations.

By 2040, several megacities are projected to have more inhabitants than Australia’s current national population of over 23.7 million. By 2050, 70 percent of the world’s population will live in cities, with as much as 85 to 90 percent of urban population growth occurring in slums. This is important to military planners because future conflict will occur—as it does today—where people live. In the future, they increasingly live in cities and megacities.

The U.S. military has never conducted combat operations in a true modern megacity, with the arguable exceptions of security missions after 9-11 in New York City and during the Los Angeles riots in the 1990s. However, the military has confronted many of the same challenges of a megacity’s scope and scale—its vast networks and connections; its population of densely packed, impoverished millions; and the twin ends of improving conditions while battling a determined enemy for control. This was the U.S. military experience in the Baghdad slum district of Sadr City.

**Sadr City**

Although not part of a true megacity, Sadr City replicates, on a smaller scale, many of the challenges associated with true megacities worldwide. The tribulations of successive U.S. Army battalions and brigades operating among Sadr City’s 2.4 million people may offer a condensed case study of what awaits divisions and corps operating in future megacities of 20–30 million inhabitants.

One of the largest slums on earth, what is commonly called Sadr City, is the al-Thawra (“revolution”) District of Baghdad. With an estimated population of
2.4 million, Sadr City’s 26 square kilometers has more inhabitants than Philadelphia or Dallas.\(^6\)

The growing gap between barricaded elites and slums has fed the growth of what Richard Norton has called “feral cities.”\(^7\) Governments typically abdicate control of huge slums, knowing that the security and services void will be filled by criminal gangs, ethnic or sectarian militias, or extremist groups. Urban slums worldwide are disproportionately populated by the ethnically or socially repressed—Shiites and Kurds, in Sadr City’s case.\(^8\)

In *Planet of Slums*, Mike Davis lays out life in Third World slums. It reads like a checklist of conditions in Sadr City: knee-deep lakes of raw sewage visible in satellite imagery, hills of rotting garbage, under-employed males hustling for informal income in a labor-glutted economy or losing themselves in escapist vices, and endemic infant mortality rates and birth defects. Potable water is rare to nonexistent, and communicable diseases such as typhus and dysentery coexist with rural pestilences like hookworms. Ideological and criminal networks flourish.

The southern third of the al-Thawra District consists of the relatively well-to-do Habbibiya and Jamila neighborhoods. Home to a large Sunni Kurdish population, this area hosts the Jamila Market, one of Baghdad’s largest. Jamila heaves with industry and commerce, its roads clogged with tractor trailers transporting goods from scores of factories, warehouses, and machine shops.

Leaving Jamila, the district gets progressively grittier and more destitute as it moves northeast into Sadr City proper. The central al-Thawra Street transits endless sectors of dense residential housing and burgeoning crowds of thousands of idle young men.

As megacities grow slums in their unclaimed peripheral land, Sadr City grows its own even more fetid slums. At al-Thawra Street’s culmination on Sadr City’s northeast edge, a wide canal of raw sewage delineates the sprawling shantytowns of Hay Tariq and Hay al Muntader, respectively dubbed “Squaretown” and “Triangletown” by U.S. troops. These squatter settlements, which grow at a viral rate, are home to the most impoverished, including many war refugees displaced by fighting elsewhere in Iraq.

With every day a struggle for survival, slum dwellers become experts on parsing risk and opportunity. The groups of armed men who vie to rule over such
desperate and opportunistic populations tend to rely on a common strategy called “competitive control.”

**Competitive Control in a Megacity**

In his book *Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla*, David Kilcullen proposes a *theory of competitive control* to explain the ways in which a nonstate armed group will attempt to control local populations. The concept is that a population will seek a predictable system of norms that tells its people exactly what they can and cannot do in order to be safe. The ability to impose a predictable framework for daily life, along with the sense of safety it engenders, surpasses all other considerations in determining which group the population will support. This tendency is particularly pronounced among the most vulnerable populations, whose lives are defined by uncertainty, such as the rural migrants and refugees in Sadr City.

Armed groups, from street gangs to powerful shadow governments like Hezbollah, attempt to impose such systems of control on populations. They do this through a combination of inducements, linked to penalties, to prevent backsliding or betrayal. The number of factors—both inducements and penalties—that an armed group can credibly deploy comprises its spectrum of control. The wider a group’s spectrum of control, the more durable its hold on a target population.

**Competitive Control in Sadr City**

The Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s movement sought to impose the widest possible spectrum of control on the people of Sadr City—and was quite successful at doing so. The Sadrist spectrum of control went beyond most armed groups by encompassing bona fide religious legitimacy. The Sadr family’s legitimacy was burnished by remaining in Iraq during Saddam Hussein’s rule, where they suffered and died beside the oppressed Shiite people.

For decades, the Sadr family ran a robust and reliable network of charities throughout the Shiite areas of Iraq, particularly among the impoverished masses. Hundreds of thousands of poor Shiites came to depend on the Sadrists as their primary subsistence lifeline. This is not to overstate the Sadr network’s largesse. No
one was lifted out of poverty: unemployment remained rife, infrastructure unrepaired, and waste uncollected. Nonetheless, compared to an overtly hostile and repressive Baathist government, the Sadrist’s limited initiatives earned tremendous loyalty among the slum’s population. The sentiment expressed to a U.S. officer in 2004 was, “even if you paved my street in gold, I’d still follow Muqtada al-Sadr.”

After 2003, the founding of the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) strengthened the coercive portion of the Sadrist spectrum of control with religious courts sentencing and gruesomely punishing those who defied Sadrist control structures. JAM was no slouch when it came to conflict, battling repeatedly against U.S. military forces, ruthlessly purging whole districts of Sunni residents, and manning checkpoints to guard against the very real and murderous threat of al-Qaeda bombings. JAM, in affiliation with the broader Sadrist organization, was able to maintain competitive control of Sadr City through half a decade of opposition by the cream of the U.S. Army. How JAM’s competitive control was eventually disrupted can be seen in a juxtaposition of military operations in 2004 and 2008—two years that saw Sadr City’s heaviest fighting.

The Battles of Sadr City: 2004 and 2008

Liberated by U.S. Marines in the initial invasion, Sadr City was assigned as an area of operations (AO) to a succession of U.S. Army battalions from 2003 to 2006. In March 2004, Task Force Lancer, based around 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment (2-5 CAV), from the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, took charge of the Sadr City AO with roughly 600 personnel, replacing 2nd Squadron, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment. They arrived determined to make progress across multiple lines of effort, with the intent of checking the influence of JAM insurgents, rebuilding and improving infrastructure and services, training Iraqi security forces, and enabling a soon-to-be elected Iraqi government to take control of both the district and the nation.

Contrary to Task Force Lancer’s urban renewal plans for Sadr City, the district exploded in conflict within days. On 4 April 2004, JAM began an uprising in conflict within days. On 4 April 2004, JAM began an uprising in conflict within days. On 4 April 2004, JAM began an uprising in conflict within days. On 4 April 2004, JAM began an uprising in conflict within days. On 4 April 2004, JAM began an uprising across southern Iraq. Openly joined by local Iraqi police, and with mass desertion by local Iraqi National Guardsmen, JAM quickly seized what it considered to be key terrain, overrunning the police stations and attacking the district council office. JAM also ambushed and threatened to overrun a U.S. platoon, quickly pulling armored and mechanized forces from six U.S. battalions into 82 days of ferocious, sustained street fighting. Muqtada al-Sadr declared a cease-fire in May due to pressure exerted on the Sadrists in An Najaf, and the conflict settled into simmering insurgency before a second major uprising from August to October 2004.

Understanding that they lacked the manpower to control such a large population, and lacking resources and enablers not yet available in 2004, Task Force Lancer focused on the most destitute and violent areas in Sadr City’s northern reaches while a succession of other battalions rotated through Habbibiya and Jamila. The task force built a concrete wall along al-Quds Street, separating Sadr City proper and the bulk of JAM from the Jamila Market. Aware of the investments and opportunities south of the wall but denied access to them in their own mahallas, Sadr City’s population began to pressure local leaders and Sadrist imams. With the span-of-control ante raised, and unable to defeat the U.S. forces who nightly parked Bradley fighting vehicles in the heart of their neighborhoods and killed JAM fighters as they attacked, JAM relented. Soon, civic leaders in Sadr City were personally clearing improvised explosive devices (IEDs) from their streets in order to entice U.S. money back north of the wall.

In 2004, military operations in Sadr City were considered Multi-National Division–Baghdad’s decisive operation, but U.S. forces were completely on their own. The provisional government of Iraq (GOI) lacked capacity and legitimacy, and directed security forces incapable of anything but the occasional atrocity. When it was relieved in place by the 3rd Battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment (3-15 IN), 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, in January 2005, 2-5 CAV had killed approximately 1,700 JAM fighters and invested millions of dollars in infrastructure and services but left an AO where the only viable groups competing for control were Americans—very publicly trying to get out of Iraq—and the Sadrists.

U.S. policy goals to expediently transition authority and security responsibility to Iraqis, along with an absence of another JAM uprising, reinforced the inclination among U.S. leadership to be rid of the Sisyphean labor of Sadr City. The Sadrist-influenced Jaafari government readily agreed. When 3-15 IN rotated back to Fort
Stewart, Georgia in January 2006, it officially turned its forward operating base and the Sadr City AO over to the Iraqi army. U.S. military transition teams accompanied their Iraqi charges throughout the district, and U.S. special operations forces continued to mount occasional raids, but the slum became officially a virtual no-go area for the Americans when the Maliki government later barred U.S. forces from entry in October 2007. JAM now owned the district in almost every way and was in the heyday of its power and influence.

The year 2008 brought the first effective and coordinated attacks on JAM’s spectrum of control—first in the Shiite holy city of Najaf, then across southern Iraq and Baghdad, and finally in Sadr City. The Maliki government, enabled by deliberate and fortuitous developments in the Iraqi conflict, challenged JAM control with an Iraqi army assault on Basra, Iraq’s only deep water port, and a shipping and smuggling hub. This mobilized the networked JAM factions across Iraq for a nationwide face-off with government forces. In Sadr City, JAM began rocketing the international “Green Zone.” With Basra under assault and JAM forces quickly defeated throughout the rest of Baghdad, coalition forces moved to take back Sadr City and potentially deal a mortal blow to JAM’s spectrum of control in the Iraqi capital.

The 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division (3-4 BCT), under the command of Col. John Hort, initially focused on Ishbiliya and Habbibiya. The district’s economic key terrain and source of much of JAM’s financial resources, these were also the only portions of Sadr City within the maximum range of the 107 mm rockets and mortars fired by JAM at the Green Zone. As in 2004, denying JAM access to the Jamila Market, and to the indirect fire points, would severely hobble both JAM’s spectrum of control inside Sadr City and its ability to contribute as a cornerstone of the larger Sadrist national uprising.

Moving into the area, 3-4 BCT immediately encountered the same enthusiastic, but tactically crude, mass attacks that Task Force Lancer had faced years earlier. In the fierce, sustained street fighting, lightly armored vehicles, including up-armored Humvees and Strykers, were unable to withstand the inevitable hits from rocket-propelled grenades and improvised explosive devices. Additional heavy forces were once again brought in to bolster the U.S. effort.
The second phase of the operation, dubbed Operation Gold Wall, emplaced a concrete T-Wall barrier along the five-kilometer length of al-Quds Street. As in 2004, this physically prevented JAM infiltration into the Jamila Market area and was a “finger in the eye” to JAM’s ostensible spectrum of control. Desperate to stop the wall’s completion, JAM fighters hurled themselves at 3-4 BCT’s prepared defenses. Over the course of six weeks, U.S. and Iraqi forces killed an estimated 700 JAM fighters and several key leaders.18

Soldiers from 3-4 BCT benefited from a number of enablers, an integrated web of capabilities and authorities unprecedented for a brigade’s control. These included U.S. Air Force fixed-wing close air support, MQ-1 Predator drones and a variety of other armed and unarmed drones, dedicated AH-64 Apache aerial weapons teams, and available multiple launch rocket systems. There was also extensive support from special operations forces, counter-fire radar, RAID (rapid aerostat initial deployment) camera sensors, and other intelligence and surveillance assets. These were integrated in a way that linked the capabilities to tactical units on the ground and employed in innovative and synergistic ways to maximize their effects.19

Even before the fighting died down, U.S. and Iraqi security forces began an intensive cleanup and reconstruction effort, focused in the more economically vibrant Jamila Market area. The population south of the wall responded through providing greatly increased intelligence and cooperation.20

Perhaps the most important but unsung aspect of the 2008 Battle of Sadr City was the performance of the Iraqi security forces, particularly the Iraqi army. From the disgraceful mass desertions of 2004, through the years of playing second-fiddle to an exasperated and condescending U.S. military, the largely Shiite Iraqi army was finally able and ready to fight alongside U.S. forces as a full participant in major combat operations against JAM. The religious and social ramifications of this made it especially profound and constituted a fundamental assault on core aspects of the Sadrists’ spectrum of control by the more genteel, Iranian-influenced Islamic Dawa Party and Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council polities. Equally important, U.S. forces insisted the Iraqi army fight and win a major battle, seemingly on their own merits, in plain sight of their whole nation.

The effect was significant: in a matter of weeks, JAM crumbled, and Iraqi soldiers owned the streets. On 12

![Soldiers from 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, 1st Armored Division, keep a watchful eye on surrounding activities 31 May 2008 as they travel along Route Kansas in the Jamila Market area in the Sadr City District of Baghdad, Iraq.](U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Cohen A. Young)
May, Sadr declared a unilateral cease fire, bowing to the clear shift in the Shiite balance of force across Iraq and preserving what clout and combat power remained to him. On 20 May, the Iraqi army 44th Brigade occupied key terrain inside the remainder of Sadr City unopposed. Unlike 2005, when Iraqi patrols in northern Sadr City were pelted with rubble and excrement, they were cautiously welcomed by people contemplating a calculated switch away from JAM’s increasingly narrow and heavy-handed spectrum of control.

Unfortunately, conditions did not improve in Sadr City. The government was more interested in containing the slums than improving them. As a result, Sadr City’s infrastructure remains a shambles, and Iraqi security forces have failed to protect the residents from a string of dreadful suicide bombings by a resurgent al-Qaida in Iraq and its successor, the Islamic State. Muqtada al-Sadr, after reorganizing JAM into the socio-religious mumahidoon movement and the militant Promised Day Brigades, has retained his deeply-rooted networks in Sadr City.

**Lessons for the Future**

Urban warfare in a megacity environment will be a wide area security mission, supported by combined arms maneuver. U.S. and coalition forces assigned the task will be dwarfed by the scale of cities and populations, as it is not feasible to evacuate millions of civilians from impending battle. The objective will not be to take and clear such an area but to create conditions that force the adversary to “surrender the advantages of the city” and reveal themselves on our terms.

The walls across al Quds Street in 2004 and 2008 are examples of this. The walls publicly isolated JAM from its primary source of revenue, the majority of its avenues into the rest of Baghdad, and its primary indirect fire points and improvised explosive device engagement areas. The wall threatened JAM’s spectrum of control and forced it into offensive actions against prepared defenses.

**Armored vehicles and their effective deployment in sustained street fighting remain critical for combat operations in a dense urban environment.** In the Sadr City battles, tanks and other armored vehicles were required to provide survivability and firepower. This implies a significant training effort to maintain competencies in combined arms maneuver warfare.

The population of a megacity or its component slums will defy the capacity of any realistic Western military coalition to conduct traditional counterinsurgency operations or population control. In steady-state counterinsurgency operations from 2003-2006, one U.S. heavy mechanized and one Iraqi army light infantry battalion were typically responsible for Sadr City—a troop-to-civilian ratio close to 1:2,500—with additional heavy armored forces fighting their way in during heavy combat. After the battles of March-May 2008, a “total of 12 battalions of troops garrisoned Sadr City, with four battalions of U.S. forces providing backup. This approximately equates to a 1:275 troop-to-civilian ratio compared to the 1:50 recommended by the United Nations in peacekeeping operations.”

Megacities and their component slums cannot be ignored. Unable to secure and control the sprawling geography and population, commanders will have to manage risk in allocating their forces and enablers. When U.S. forces largely pulled out of Sadr City from 2006 to 2008, they created a sanctuary and support zone for JAM and its malignant splinter groups. Inevitably, this created conditions that compelled U.S. and Iraqi forces to fight their way back in. Conversely, in both 2004 and 2008, U.S. commanders leveraged a wall and the human terrain to assail a wide swath of JAM’s spectrum of control.

Future commanders must similarly exploit “pressure points,” enabling relatively small forces to generate out-sized effects, and mitigating resource limitations. Innovative techniques can yield unexpected benefits. For example, Task Force Lancer’s weapons buyback program in 2004 was heavily patronized by Sadr City’s weapons dealers and had the unintended benefit of causing the street price of weapons like AK-47’s and rocket-propelled grenades to temporarily skyrocket out of range of most JAM cells.

**Governance is the key.** Louis DiMarco argues that successful urban operations require population representation. The most significant difference between U.S. efforts in Sadr City in 2004 and 2008 is the role played by the Iraqi government and Iraqi security forces. The Iraqi government was in no position to challenge JAM’s spectrum of control in the early years of Operation Iraqi Freedom. However, by 2008, JAM’s spectrum of control in Sadr City had narrowed, becoming more predatory and unpredictable, and less enabled by religious fervor.

The Iraqi government and its affluent Shiite polities were ready to mount a muscular challenge for control of Iraqi
Shia destiny. While the United States again dominated in battle and funded improvement projects, the GOI and Iraqi security forces leveraged the assist and wrestled control away from JAM for an important period of time.

**Conclusion**

The challenges U.S. forces confronted in Sadr City in 2004 and 2008 offer a condensed version of what awaits in future megacities. The ways that U.S. commanders confronted challenges associated with sprawling, crowded slums and an armed adversary’s efforts to retain its control, present lessons that can be applied, scaled up to the division or corps level, in a wider megacity environment.

Future commanders must understand the environment and use enablers and innovative techniques to offset the challenges. They must maintain many of the fundamental strengths of our legacy force and, most critically, must foster credible, enduring involvement by local governance and security forces. Applying hard-won knowledge from the battles of Sadr City and wisely rebalancing future investments, U.S. forces can prepare for conflicts in future megacities and their slums.

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**Notes**


5. Davis, 28. The author uses a “lowball” Sadr City population figure of 1.5 million, tying it for fourth largest.


8. UN-HABITAT, 52-59.


11. Interview with 2-5 CAV veteran, November 2013.


19. Ibid., 14-16.

20. Ibid., 16-17.


23. Johnson et al., 18-19.

24. Knights, 23.

25. Interviews with former 2-5 CAV battalion staff officers, November-December 2013.

Within the next several years, dynamic environmental and generational factors colliding within the ranks of the U.S. Army will place demands on our leadership every bit as challenging as the last 14 years of combat. Under these difficult circumstances, the need to identify and retain the best midgrade officers remains foundational to the Army’s success. The critical tasks linked to the necessity to adapt retention strategy will fall largely on brigade and battalion commanders, together with the burden of managing the Army’s talent into the future.

The situation is uniquely challenging today as compared to the Army’s past experience because generational differences, according to some, have created a cultural
divide between older senior commanders and younger midgrade officers that is difficult to reconcile. If this is so, the institution and its senior commanders will need to modify their traditional approach to managing midlevel officers to bridge the gap between generations in order to ensure the force retains the best talent.

The key to managing officers from the millennial generation (people reaching adulthood around the year 2000 or later) will be establishing a positive command climate attuned to future mission requirements. To accomplish this, commanders must adjust their mentorship style and content to provide positive vision and direction to junior leaders, while coaching them on the availability and value of broadening assignments to prepare them for the future as well as enhance their perspectives in current assignments. Additionally, the Army must concurrently adapt its human resources systems to enable brigade and battalion commanders to administer new talent-management venues to support this kind of holistic process.

To achieve the necessary internal cultural change, the Army has already begun to overhaul its human resource systems to identify quality leaders. This overhaul includes a new officer evaluation report, a multisource assessment feedback tool, and restructured promotion timelines. However, if declining promotion rates from the postwar military drawdown reduce opportunities for advancement, and candid performance evaluations contain unwelcome criticism, promising talent not properly incentivized may behave just as their millennial civilian peers frequently do—by readily seeking employment elsewhere.

Retaining the best of the Army’s millennial leaders will have to start with battalion and brigade commanders tailoring a positive command climate that appeals to millennial sensibilities and values. Midgrade officers’ sense of self-worth, together with optimism that a career in the military will offer good opportunities for success, heavily influences their career decisions. Cultivating this type of optimism begins with a
command climate in which all members of the organization feel appreciated and valued for their contributions. Brigade and battalion commanders may find a special challenge in managing midgrade officers with extensive deployment experience and multiple combat tours. Such midlevel officers will expect the same kind of command receptivity and recognition for their contributions they experienced when leading soldiers in combat, where many made life-and-death decisions on a daily basis.

Additionally, in creating the right command environment for now and in the future, commanders must appeal to midgrade officers’ sense of purpose and adventure by striking a balance between training and family time. Not unlike their predecessors of previous generations, midgrade Army leaders expect hard, rigorous, and meaningful training. They understand the necessity for the hardship and sacrifice of family separation during wartime. However, they are likely to be much less tolerant than previous generations of what they consider make-work reasons for family separation in a garrison army that is no longer fighting a war. This is not a criticism of midgrade officers’ commitment to duty. It is to say the balance between their professional and family obligations will be weighed and judged by a different calculus than previous generations of officers because of the multiplicity of opportunities in the private sector for talented individuals together with changes in overall societal social expectations as well as the time demanding nature of the modern operational environment.

Additionally, since the midgrade Army officer’s experience has likely been focused at the tactical level and direct small-team leadership in a dynamic, fast moving environment, this limited aperture produces anxiety when he or she looks to a future dominated by staff assignments that appear to demand boring bureaucratic indirect leadership skills and tedious process-management staff duties. Many may visualize that the five years that characteristically follow their post-company-level assignments in Army career development, mainly as staff officers, will be neither fun nor rewarding. To overcome such trepidation, brigade and battalion commanders must encourage midlevel officers to move beyond this myopic view, providing them a broader perspective with a more positive vision of the future. To meet the challenge, commanders can help midgrade officers develop broader, more positive outlooks by assigning them increased responsibility and looking for opportunities to include them in high-level collaboration, supported by more sophisticated methods of mentorship.

With regard to the latter, our midgrade millennial leaders will require a different, more customized type of mentorship than previous generations. Final officer evaluation report counseling cannot be the start or end point for identification and retention of talent. Millennial officers will require intensive mentorship from senior leaders who they trust to provide trusted career and life counseling. To this end, commanders must provide
Immediate and intermediate enabling feedback to build trust and foster confidence.

Unfortunately, such mentorship has not been a prevalent feature in development of the current Army, as reported in the 2012 Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL): Main Findings. Yet, mentorship will increasingly become a type of critical support that our brigade and battalion commanders must provide in order to retain and develop midgrade talent. Such mentorship is effective when it is characterized by a trusting leader who carefully explains to the mentored individual the idiosyncrasies of the Army professional development model juxtaposed against the midgrade officer’s personal situation, and facilitates informed planning to meet the mentored individual’s career objectives.

To support the process, mentors should use the Army Leader Development Strategy, the Army Career Tracker, and DA Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management, as they counsel midgrade officers on career progression. Obviously, commanders must invest the time to become familiar with these critical documents to accurately provide professional mentorship in accordance with branch-designated benchmarks for qualification.

Perhaps the most important thing a mentor can do to encourage broadening assignments is to instill confidence in midgrade officers that a break from tactical assignments can actually enhance their careers. To support mentoring officers in giving such confident assurances, the Army must ensure that promotion board instructions specify that officers being considered are not to be penalized for broadening assignments considered outside their traditional career paths.

Additionally, in managing broadening assignments, the Army should strengthen personnel administration mechanisms to ensure midgrade officers who excel at the tactical level and are the most deserving of broadening experience outside their main career tracks are those the system singles out for selection.

This is essential for the broadening concept to actually work. In contrast, at present, many of the most
potentially enriching post-company-command broadening assignments for top officers, such as advanced schooling and fellowships at civilian academic institutions, and training with industry, are offered mainly to the officers who happen to apply for them, and not necessarily to the best officers in the eligible year-group population.10 Consequently, the Army must use a different way of selecting people for academic fellowships and for the Army’s Training with Industry Program. We must implement a competitive broadening selection process that has the same rigor we apply to preparing battalion and brigade command central selection lists.

This should include establishing, as necessary, lower-level selection boards to leverage commander-driven talent identification for further development. To support the talent selection and development processes, selection boards must identify the premier post-company-command broadening assignments and give them to the best midgrade officers.11 Boards can use the quantified and refined evaluation reports prepared by our brigade and battalion commanders to identify the best midgrade officers.

Just as importantly, care must be taken that selection for broadening opportunities does not become a promotional fork in the career path for top performing officers at the tactical level, as now sometimes happens with battalion-level command selections. Mechanisms must be put in place to ensure that talented officers who complete a broadening assignment are rapidly reintegrated into their main career tracks with appropriate operational- and strategic-level assignments to ensure they stay competitive.

Additionally, the personnel system must ensure that those who do not make the initial cut for a broadening assignment are able to make themselves competitive for future promotion through other avenues. This means a clear path must be made available for officers with initiative who need more intensive self-development, as outlined and facilitated by their mentors.

As a result, selections for broadening assignments would be made based on officers’ early tactical performance, while at the same time the institutional process would leave the door open for other officers with somewhat less stellar initial achievement to continue developing and qualifying for further advancement.
The future of the Army, including its ability to meet the demands of future conflicts, depends on having a strong and robust group of midgrade officers. Battalion and brigade commanders must set the structural and cultural conditions within the profession to retain the best talent.

Increased access to premier broadening assignments, customized and compassionate mentorship, and engaged leaders adapting to strategic changes will make the difference. However, breaking out of an entrenched mindset to adopt a fresh perspective and adapting established systems accordingly may be among the biggest challenges facing the Army's senior leaders as they attempt to fulfill their obligations to remain good stewards of the profession.

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Notes

1. Lynne C. Lancaster and David Stillman, The M-factor: How the Millennial Generation is Rocking the Workplace (New York: Harper Collins, 2010). This book discusses the behaviors of millennial generation individuals when they face slower and lower promotion rates, and other changes such as those the Army will experience due to the drawdown.

2. Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA Pam) 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 3 December 2014). This pamphlet changed promotion to captain from three to four years’ time in service and promotion to major from ten to eleven years.


4. Mady Wechsler Segal, “The Military and the Family as Greedy Institutions,” Armed Forces & Society 13(1) (Fall 1986): 9-38. This article discusses how both institutions demand a high level of commitment, loyalty, and time from individuals and are, therefore, “greedy” institutions. Also, it provides the following statistics in support of this argument: 51 percent of wives thought their marriage was negatively affected by their husband’s career, and 47 percent saw this tension as emotional conflict.

5. Ibid.

6. Lancaster and Stillman, 71-73. In the subchapter “Rewards,” authors discuss how collaboration with high-ranking executives can be reward in itself and the millennial demand for customization and constant communication requires intensive mentorship.

7. Ibid.

8. Ryan Riley, et al., 2012 Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey Of Army Leadership (CASAL): Main Findings, Technical Report 2013-1, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Leadership, 2012). This study lists survey results showing the following: Smaller percentages of leaders reported frequently or very frequently learning from superiors (44 percent), engaging in formal leader development programs within the unit (35 percent), and receiving mentoring from someone outside their chain of command (33 percent). Receiving developmental counseling from one’s immediate superior was reported to occur least often, (e.g., 26 percent frequently/very frequently, and 55 percent rarely/occasionally).


11. DA Pam 600-3.
Operational Resilience in the Infantry Rifle Platoon


Resilience training (sometimes called resilience training) is a relatively new concept in the U.S. Army. Its purpose and utility are sometimes not well understood by Army leaders who have focused their time and energy for more than a decade on fighting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Those wars led to the development of new equipment to assist the warfighter, such as the mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicle, and new doctrinal and training publications on counterinsurgency. New programs for resilience training, including the Comprehensive Soldier and Family Fitness program, were also born out of the wars to provide soldiers psychological tools to cope with the stressful situations they faced.
effects of war and military life—such as posttraumatic stress disorder and suicide.²

Most unit leaders ensure they have the correct number of resilience-qualified leaders in their ranks, and they conduct the required annual training. Otherwise, the Army has achieved relatively little integration of resilience training at the small-unit level.³ Fully integrating resilience training not only arms soldiers with the tools to become more resilient but also creates more productive, efficient, and lethal units with higher morale.

Over the course of a year, our infantry rifle platoon successfully integrated resilience techniques into our day-to-day operations. We found that through constant contact, spot corrections, and group classes, small-unit leaders could integrate operational resilience training effectively. Over time, benefits accrued both to individuals and to the unit as a whole.

Becoming Believers

Integrating resilience training at the platoon level requires ensuring unit leaders become believers. Generally, leaders who have been around the Army for some time tend to be more resistant to new requirements. Attitudes such as “I didn’t need resilience training when I was coming up, so nobody does,” or variations of that line of thinking, are common.

My platoon sergeant was initially skeptical of resilience training. A three-tour combat veteran of Afghanistan, he dismissed the idea of resilience training as a distraction from our core mission and a waste of time. After attending the two-week Master Resilience Trainer course and implementing some of the resilience techniques in his own life, however, he too became a believer.

I first learned about the Army’s approach to resilience through Module One of the resilience training given to new Army officers, in which a master resilience trainer gives an introductory class on the fundamentals of resilience. The class covers key concepts and tries to get the students to embrace the concepts—to buy into the program. As a prior-enlisted infantryman, I found the concept interesting. Problem solving and “thinking about the way we think” were not things we spent a lot of time on during my initial tour between 2001 and 2006, when the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were in their infancy. Having left the Army in 2006 (before rejoining in 2011), I experienced first-hand the difficulty of transitioning back to civilian life after fighting a war. The idea that the Army had invested time, money, and organizational energy into giving soldiers tools that might aid in that transition piqued my interest. In short order, I too became a believer.

Integrating Operational Resilience

Together, my platoon sergeant and I decided we wanted to integrate resilience training in the platoon. When we began discussing how we would accomplish this, we agreed that the worst possible course of action would be simply to give traditional classes on resilience and hope that the message would stick. A better method would be to extract some of the best concepts and usable techniques from resilience training and implement them during everyday operations. We decided that we would set out to integrate resilience activities in three main ways: constant contact, spot corrections, and group classes.

Constant contact. Not unlike a mechanical movement, such as changing a rifle magazine or walking under night vision, building resilience requires constant practice. Unfortunately, junior noncommissioned officers cannot simply round up their soldiers and supervise them practicing resilience until they get it right. Most of the hard work happens within the internal monologue of the individual soldier.

To encourage the practice of resilience, leaders need to be ready to engage their soldiers and talk resilience whenever the opportunity presents itself. Soldiers will send cues through their behavior and speech that allow leaders the opportunity to intervene with the right resilience technique. For instance, if a leader finds a soldier falling into a thinking trap such as catastrophizing—making situations appear worse than they are—an opportunity is presented for resilience intervention. Leaders need to remain conscious of resilience training principles and techniques. They should avoid thinking of resilience as an isolated training objective. Instead, they need to think of it as a continuous process linked to all Army tasks.

Additionally, we have found it particularly helpful to get a unit’s “tough” soldiers personally involved. Young soldiers—especially infantrymen—tend to gravitate toward the tobacco-chewing, chip-on-the-shoulder, physical fitness guru. Resilience training, on the other hand, still has a new age, Men Who Stare at Goats...
stigma. Getting a unit’s reputed tough soldiers to serve as the champions of resilience will make getting buy-in from junior soldiers easier.

**Spot corrections.** When soldiers hear the term spot correction, the first things that come to mind are uniform discrepancies or minor behavioral issues, such as walking while talking on a cell phone. Spot corrections can prevent or mitigate mishaps by ensuring a soldier is wearing a seatbelt or adhering to security and safety standards. The spot correction is the immediate tool used by all soldiers to keep our Army within standards.

The spot correction can also be useful in ensuring soldiers are practicing resilience. When a soldier complains that he or she always fails the sit-up portion of the Army Physical Fitness Test, for instance, the soldier may have fallen into a common thinking trap. The leader has an opportunity to spot correct the soldier to avoid thinking traps. The leader can encourage the soldier to look for the actual source of the problem—likely a poor physical training program. Resilience leaders need to attack any problems that can be addressed with resilience techniques whenever they arise. Aggressive spot correcting, over time, will result in soldiers who practice resilience when no one is looking.

**Group classes.** Occasionally, it is still helpful to gather the squad or platoon and pitch a resilience class. It does not have to be the full-blown Module One course—it can simply be an appropriate portion of resilience training. Instead of downloading the slides from the Internet and regurgitating them to a bored group of soldiers, scenario-based group discussion is a good technique for teaching resilience to a group. It is one thing to tell a soldier to avoid thinking traps; it is another to show why avoiding them is important.

In day-to-day resilience training, such as spot corrections, the why behind useful resilience concepts and techniques can become muddled. Group instruction offers a good way to explain these principles and to explore the potential second- and third-order effects of negative thinking. Periodic group training is also a good way to keep the platoon trainers up-to-date on the latest developments and trends in resilience activities.
Applied Resilience Techniques

In implementing resilience in the rifle platoon through constant contact, spot corrections, and group classes, the greatest benefits will develop over time as the training and concepts sink in. Much like physical fitness training, the best results come from a good, consistent plan executed over time. This is true of specific resilience techniques as well. Three techniques we found particularly effective are called avoiding catastrophizing, putting it in perspective, and hunting the good stuff.

Avoiding catastrophizing. Catastrophizing refers to magnifying or emphasizing the significance of a problem, often out of proportion to the situation. Catastrophizing slowly chips away at a soldier’s resilience. In our experience, avoiding catastrophizing has had the greatest impact on building resilience within the platoon.

Army leaders are infamous for catastrophizing. When people preface what they are about to say with “wait until you hear this,” “you’re not going to believe this,” or “I’ve got some bad news,” they are likely catastrophizing. Those types of statements usually send a jolt of adrenaline coursing through the listener’s veins, who undoubtedly will begin imagining the worst-case scenario before the message is given. That adrenaline elevates stress levels and negatively affects decision making and overall well-being. Usually, the actual news is not that bad, but the damage has already been done to the listener’s nerves and attitude.

Injecting unnecessary commentary or placing a negative value judgment on information that simply needs to be communicated to subordinates changes how they process the information. If a leader communicates that an order is stupid or crazy, the subordinate is likely to see it that way and act accordingly. We observed this while training at the National Training Center in March 2014. Our platoon faced a dynamic, rapidly changing environment that challenged all our leaders’ abilities to plan and execute missions. Early in the exercise, the platoon was not being mindful of catastrophizing. When we received a mission from higher headquarters, we communicated it down to the lowest level with judgment-added commentary such as “I know this sounds stupid, but ...” or “You’re not going to believe what they want us to do.” In our case, when we prefaced orders with commentary, often playfully or with no ill intention, the platoon reacted with eye rolls or sluggishness. This pattern is not helpful when trying to execute a mission.

Seeing this happening early in the rotation, we decided that we would stop the madness. Whether information made it to us “pre-catastrophized” or with negative commentary from superiors, we stripped it to the facts and communicated it clearly without catastrophizing. We found that soldiers followed orders more energetically and aggressively when we communicated this way.

Later that year, our platoon deployed to Afghanistan. As part of our daily battle rhythm, the platoon leadership met with squad leaders nightly. Like in training exercises, a deployed environment changes rapidly, and it is easy to fall into catastrophizing as a way to curry favor with subordinates or to add entertaining but unnecessary drama to the day. Most likely, the information the platoon leadership received had already been commented on and had negative judgments added the whole way down the chain. It is at the platoon leadership level where it is most important to strip the communication to its facts because the information is about to be communicated down to the executing element—the squad. If anyone has to believe in and support the mission, it is the element responsible for execution.

As our platoon leadership has reinforced resilience over time, our meetings and daily interactions have become more efficient, more cordial, and shorter. Now, we often preface interactions by reminding each other to avoid catastrophizing and just put out the information. Through constant reinforcement, catastrophizing has slowly eroded from our meetings and daily interactions. Information flows more clearly and efficiently.

Hunting the good stuff and putting it in perspective. Hunting the good stuff refers to thinking of a few things that are going well right now. Putting it in perspective is thinking about a problem within the context of the big picture. Hunting the good stuff is a way to focus on good news so that bad news does not seem overwhelming. By putting whatever bad news comes along in perspective of the big picture while being mindful of the good stuff, it becomes easier to recognize the bad news for exactly what it is—rather than a paralyzing and stress-inducing problem. Integrating these techniques—avoiding catastrophizing, putting
it in perspective, and hunting the good stuff—into our platoon’s battle rhythm has been critical to building operational resilience.

When possible, and when it makes sense, we have tried to incorporate resilience elements into standard training events. Before our platoon takes a physical fitness test, an event commonly accompanied by catastrophizing, we discuss ways to avoid thinking traps and to visualize success—another technique of resilience training. If a soldier is convinced that he always performs poorly on the run, it often becomes a matter of destiny to run poorly. In the days leading up to the event, usually during cool-down stretching, we will discuss techniques that have made other soldiers successful on previous physical fitness tests. Soldiers whose performance in certain events was consistently poor have successfully used resilience techniques to avoid unhelpful thinking traps, and ultimately to improve their performance on physical fitness tests.

During marksmanship training, one of our resilience trainers takes charge of the remedial marksmanship training station. Besides going over basic rifle marksmanship with the soldiers, he integrates resilience elements. Soldiers who start off shooting poorly on a qualification table often get frustrated and consider the iteration a lost cause, which could then lead them to shoot poorly or without enough care as the iteration progresses. Instead of simply focusing on the mechanics of rifle marksmanship (still the most important objective), the resilience trainer emphasizes that missing that first or second shot really does not mean much. A soldier trained to quickly put the event in perspective, in this case by recognizing that a few missed targets does not invalidate the training, can rapidly move on from a missed target, regain composure, and seize the initiative.

**Conclusion**

Resilience training does not compensate for poor military training, nor does it replace good military training. Improving a platoon’s results on physical fitness tests or rifle qualification is still primarily a function of a good physical training plan or a solid basic rifle marksmanship program. Integrating resilience training may help, but it is no replacement for the fundamentals.

Perhaps some Army leaders are resistant to adding new training requirements they consider of dubious value in an already crowded schedule. Given how busy our organizations are today, if a commander does not make something a priority, then it is likely to receive minimal attention, if it is not completely ignored. Since resilience training still has a reputation as an ancillary program within the Army, it is all the more important for unit leaders to make implementing it a priority.

In our experience, we have found that most leaders are not resistant to the program, but they just do not know enough about it. Instead of trying...
to force feed the entire program on busy, overworked leaders, it is better to explain small parts of resilience over time and let them digest it at their own pace. If their interest is piqued, they will start investigating it on their own and make it a priority for their soldiers.

In addition to some military leaders questioning its practicality or dismissing the Army’s program as a distraction, civilian and military resilience programs have their critics.6 The Army as a whole has yet to show significant benefits.7 The concerns raised by researchers are worth further exploration, if for no other reason than to ensure that our soldiers are receiving the best possible training.

With all this in mind, we found that integrating resilience in our infantry rifle platoon with these approaches has had a noticeable effect on platoon operations. This, in turn, has had a direct impact on platoon morale and efficiency.

Integrating resilience training at the platoon level will require a deliberate and sustained effort over enough time to bear fruit. The effects are difficult to see immediately, but over time the lessons become ingrained as any military custom or norm. Where we once needed our resilience leaders to correct soldiers when they were stuck in a thinking trap or were guilty of catastrophizing, now our most junior soldiers are reminding each other to hunt the good stuff and to put it in perspective. As a result, the platoon is more resilient and disciplined, and a disciplined platoon is a more lethal platoon. Enhancing mission readiness is the prime objective of all military training, and integrating resilience training at the platoon level can help achieve that goal.

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Notes

1. Brian B. Feeney, Ph.D., “CSF2 Sees Culture of Resilience Growing in Army Family,” The Official Homepage of the United States Army, http://www.army.mil/article/109529/ (accessed 23 February 2015). The Comprehensive Soldier and Family Fitness (CSF2) program was launched in 2008 by then Army Chief of Staff Gen. George Casey to address the stressors of military service and repeat deployments. In 2013, the original CSF2 program became the main effort of a broader program known as the Ready and Resilient (R2) Campaign.


3. The first four modules of resilience training emphasize individual skills and techniques.

4. The Men Who Stare at Goats, directed by Grant Heslov (Smokehouse Pictures, 2009), DVD (2010). This fictional war comedy film is loosely based on the 2004 nonfiction book of the same name by Jon Ronson about the U.S. military’s attempt to use psychic powers.


Psychologically Fit to Lead
Behavioral Health Initiatives for the Reserve Officer Training Corps


A sick thought can devour the body’s flesh more than fever or consumption.

-Guy de Maupassant

Commissioning professional officers has been the mission of the Army Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) since its establishment in 1916.¹ Today, approximately 60 percent (nearly two-thirds) of the Army’s second lieutenants are commissioned through a collegiate commissioning ROTC program. The Army ROTC programs are comprised of traditional college students, prior service cadets, and soldiers who entered ROTC through the Green to Gold program.²

¹. May-June 2015.
². May-June 2015.
A potential problem with the U.S. Army Cadet Command selection board process comes from its preference for candidates, both cadre and cadets, with recent assignments in tactical or operational units that have served in combat deployments. This selection preference has placed some recent selectees prematurely into unfamiliar environments without the opportunity to reintegrate fully into life in the United States. As a result, some selectees with recent emotional, and sometimes physical, trauma have transitioned from being Army combat leaders into being full-time college students or instructors without sufficient time to readjust and perhaps recover.

For prior-service and Green to Gold cadets with multiple deployments, the psychological impact of physical, mental, and emotional trauma creates a high risk of social, occupational, or academic impairment. However, such behavioral health problems may not become apparent right after soldiers return to the United States. Therefore, a plausible recommendation to Cadet Command and the U.S. Army Recruiting Command is to implement a policy requiring selectees for the Green to Gold program and ROTC instructors to have adequate time to normalize to a domestic environment prior to their ROTC assignments. This normalization could be assisted by extending the report date of the Green to Gold students and ROTC instructors to a minimum of six months after returning from combat deployments, thus prohibiting a permanent change of station (PCS) to an ROTC assignment too soon after returning from combat. Waiting six months before a PCS to an ROTC assignment would, most likely, give the necessary time for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms to manifest (if they are going to) while the selectee was still serving on a military installation.

Rationale for Psychological Clinical Assessment

The rationale for the six-month delay is rooted in preventing potential issues related to psychological clinical assessment, medical treatment coverage, academic disruption, and occupational impairment. Clinically, according to the American Psychiatric Association, one cannot be diagnosed with PTSD until at least six months have lapsed from a potentially activating event experienced in combat. To answer the great need for identifying and treating PTSD, the Army has invested a great deal of money and personnel into the behavioral health effort. As a result, behavioral health initiatives are being propagated throughout the U.S. Army aimed at identifying service-related combat stress reactions and PTSD, which are both recognized psychological diagnoses among the military population. Consequently, behavioral health personnel are available at military medical treatment facilities to psychologically assess and treat Green to Gold selectees and ROTC instructors before their assignment to the ROTC detachments.

The six-month waiting period would allow soldiers the opportunity to access behavioral health care in a military medical treatment facility as needed. In contrast, when a college or university that offers ROTC is hours away from a military medical facility, students and instructors do not have the kind of immediate and ready access to military behavioral health care providers that circumstances may require in the event of the emergence of PTSD. Therefore, a six-month PCS delay for ROTC assignments would serve the best interest of the Army as a whole.

Medical treatment coverage. Additionally, of the Green to Gold recipients, the Active Duty Option selectees are the only group that retains Tricare Prime medical coverage; Green to Gold scholarship and non-scholarship selectees do not. If a psychopathology related to combat stress or
service-related PTSD were to manifest itself during their initial period of ROTC enrollment, Green to Gold scholarship and non-scholarship selectees far from military installations would be without subsidized federal government behavioral health care, potentially resulting in overwhelming financial and, therefore, additional adverse personal or emotional consequences.

**Academic disruption.** Setting aside complications associated with getting access to care, academic impairment due to untreated combat stress reaction or service-connected PTSD would be detrimental to an aspiring college student and future Army officer. Untreated behavioral health disorders could result in career-ending actions for cadets and ROTC instructors, or worse.

Therefore, in a time of shrinking financial resources, maximizing the academic efficiency of students selected for underwritten training to be future officers should be one of the Army’s top priorities.

**Occupational impairment.** Since undiagnosed and untreated behavioral health disorders have been known to cause long-term social and occupational impairments, consideration should also be given to assigning qualified behavioral health personnel to the Cadet Command itself. Currently, the U.S. Army’s behavioral health officers are not assigned to Cadet Command in the capacity of therapists. However, ROTC instructors, as well as the overall Corps of Cadets, could benefit from dedicated centralized behavioral health care specialists capable of providing therapy within ROTC recruiting brigades.

### Behavioral Health Officer Staffing, Implementation, and Utilization

As a concrete measure to stem potential behavioral health issues within the ROTC recruiting brigades, I recommend the creation of an ROTC brigade behavioral health officer position. The creation of this type of position is not without precedent. At present, a brigade behavioral health officer typically serves as the behavioral health advisor to the brigade surgeon and brigade commander. Similarly, a brigade health officer could also serve as a behavioral health consultant to the ROTC detachment commander. The additional duties of a behavioral health officer might include providing command consultations as well as planning and conducting training and education on topics related to behavioral health and resiliency. Psychological diagnostic evaluation and the development of treatment and safety plans could benefit ROTC personnel.

A behavioral health officer could provide additional benefit by rotating to the varying ROTC battalions to give blocks of instruction on resiliency for stress management, anger management, or other psychoeducational imperatives. The behavioral health officer could verbally treat members in the brigade via tele-behavioral health (e.g., telephone or webcam), or perform site visits for face-to-face treatment. Preventing behavioral health problems through education and training is preferable to reacting to a psychological crisis.

In addition to a clinical role, an ROTC brigade behavioral health officer could serve as a subject matter expert for cadets desiring a career path to commission as an Army social worker or psychologist. The Army Nurse Corps has already set the precedent by embedding officers in ROTC brigades as academic advisors and specialized recruiters. Similarly, a behavioral health officer could have multiple roles within these brigades.

### Behavioral Health Partnerships

Obtaining personnel authorizations for behavioral health officers in ROTC units would most likely be a slow process. However, behavioral health concerns need to be addressed now. A short-term approach to alleviating these concerns could include creating...
a memorandum of agreement that would be signed by each university or college with an ROTC program and a behavioral health clinic within 50 miles of that university or college. This would enable cadets and cadre transiting to the ROTC unit to obtain behavioral health services as needed.

Since not every cadet will have funded access to behavioral health care due to factors such as location or financial status, such an agreement with outsourced behavioral health specialists would enable a cadet or cadre to be treated by a civilian therapist familiar with the military. Such long-term contracted services agreements would also help mitigate the frustration of some service members when explaining basic military concepts for context to a therapist who has little or no experience with the military as they attempt to convey meaning about military-related significant events.11

Conclusion

The psychological health of current soldiers and future officers is paramount to a healthy fighting force. The need for recognition and treatment of behavioral health problems does not cease to exist when a soldier or cadet goes to an ROTC detachment. As a result, the force needs to amend policies and provide additional resources to provide psychological support for members of Cadet Command that struggle with PTSD or related syndromes due to traumatic combat experiences.

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Notes


Great Results Through Bad Leaders

The Positive Effects of Toxic Leadership

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I tell you, therefore, as officers, that you will neither eat, nor drink, nor sleep, nor smoke, nor even sit down until you have personally seen that your men have done those things. If you will do this for them, they will follow you to the end of the world. And, if you do not, I will break you.

Transformational leadership is great, and toxic leadership is terrible; it is that simple, right? Historical examples abound of leaders who put service and sacrifice above all else, and the contrasting leaders who destroy their subordinates’ morale in the pursuit of self-advancing goals. For every Dick Winters, there is a Herbert Sobel; for every Sam Damon, a Courtney Massengale.1 There is a tendency in both popular literature and professional military discussion to categorize our leaders into polar extremes due to the consequences that flow from their actions: transformational leaders produce positive results to be emulated—in contrast to toxic leaders who destroy units and should be excised for the good of the organization. Almost excluded from consideration, however, are those circumstances under which an organization can emerge from toxic leadership not only intact but also stronger as a result. This essay seeks to posit the question: Can toxic leadership ever be a good thing? In addressing this question, this essay will utilize a case study of an Australian army engineer company’s experience to demonstrate the circumstances under which toxic leadership can enhance organizational performance.

Toxic Leadership in Context
The toxic leader concept has been debated with increasing frequency in both military circles and private business in the twenty-first century. While proponents of the concept generally agree that a toxic leader displays destructive leadership, there is less consensus on the specific impacts of a toxic leader’s behavior.2 Lt. Gen. Walter Ulmer points to the conclusions of U.S. Army War College faculty and student assessments to define toxic leader impacts, stating that “visible short-term mission accomplishment” is prioritized, often without consideration to “staff or troop morale and/or climate.”3 The implication in this comment is that the climate fostered in the pursuit of short-term achievements will ultimately undermine long-term organizational health. Army Doctrine Publication 6-22, Army Leadership, more specifically addresses the definition of toxic leadership, describing it as “a combination of self-centered attitudes, motivations, and behaviors that have adverse effects on subordinates, the organization, and mission performance.”4 Based on this latter definition, the military professional may question that if mission performance is not affected, can the leadership truly be toxic? Within the context of Ulmer’s assertion that short-term mission accomplishment is indeed possible under toxic leadership, this essay will examine toxic leadership in the specific context of those behaviors the leader exhibits. The organizational consequences that may flow from these behaviors will therefore constitute the basis for assessment of the efficacy of toxic leadership in particular circumstances.

The leader attributes examined in this case study are based on the key elements of toxic leader syndrome framed in the 2004 Military Review article “Toxic Leadership” by George Reed: “an apparent lack of concern for the well-being of subordinates,” “a personality or interpersonal technique that negatively affects organizational climate,” and “a conviction by subordinates that the leader is motivated primarily by self-interest.”5 The instances of toxic leadership discussed in the following sections occur within the framework of these elements.

Case Study: Toxic Leadership in the Operational Support Squadron, 12th Combat Engineer Regiment
With the annual rotation of personnel associated with the 2010 posting cycle, the operational support squadron of the Australian army’s 12th Combat Engineer Regiment welcomed a new squadron commander, Maj. Stolz.6 Stolz, a logistician, was a newly promoted major without prior command experience, and he had not previously served in an engineer regiment. Stolz’ command team provided continuity for the squadron, with the key positions of squadron second-in-command, squadron sergeant major, and all three platoon commanders having served with the squadron for at least 12 months prior to his arrival. On his arrival to the unit, Stolz inherited the dual responsibilities of coordinating logistic support to the regiment while also training and preparing the operational support squadron for certification as part of the brigade’s annual war fighting certification exercise. To meet the latter requirement, Stolz had approximately eight months to train and prepare the squadron.

Textbook Toxic Leadership: Stolz’ Behavior
From the outset, Stolz demonstrated behaviors and attitudes consistent with those commonly attributed
to toxic leaders. In an unfamiliar environment, he adopted a controlling—even micromanaging—approach to his leadership of the squadron. Junior leaders were disempowered from making the decisions they previously made under the authority of the former squadron commander. Stolz required even the simplest decisions regarding troop training and administration to be approved by him first, and his subordinates were expected to provide detailed back briefs on routine matters. While these actions may, at face value, appear to be indicative of a new commander simply finding his or her way in an unfamiliar organization, Stolz' actions soon extended to demonstrate other obvious examples of toxic leader attributes.

Stolz' apparent lack of concern for his subordinates' well-being became evident early in his tenure. Stolz adhered to a rigorous work schedule, which included working weekends. He implemented an internal roster for the squadron in which at least one junior officer in the squadron would be required to work on weekends to assist him “as required.” When the squadron second-in-command approached Stolz after several weeks to highlight that this practice underutilized the officers and that their presence was unnecessary, Stolz disregarded suggestions to instead place the officers “on call.” He insisted that junior officers had an obligation to the unit first and that time away from work was a privilege and not a right.

This mindset extended to other aspects of unit members’ work-life balance. Stolz frequently cancelled approved leave travel plans of his subordinates at late notice, justifying his decisions by highlighting the criticality of affected members to the unit. His requirement that they remain within the local area for recall on short notice resulted in several formal complaints. In one particular instance, Stolz directed an officer to cancel attendance at a close relative’s wedding to attend a squadron social function. In another, a soldier missed the birth of his child to attend a squadron training week for which his position was not critical. Stolz’ summarized his rationale for decisions like these in a simple mantra: “You are in my squadron. If I am at a squadron activity, you will be there too.”

Stolz’ interpersonal techniques also negatively affected the organizational climate in the squadron. Despite his lack of familiarity with the operations of an engineer logistic organization, Stolz was prone to marginalize and diminish the contributions of subject
matter experts within his organization. Living in a garrison-style neighborhood in close proximity to the regiment, Stolz developed a habit of “door knocking” at his subordinates’ houses on Saturdays and Sundays and directing immediate attendance at unscheduled planning meetings. Having removed subordinates from family activities for these meetings, he would belittle the contributions of individuals he disagreed with, following with comments like “I don’t know why I invite you to these conferences,” and “If you have someplace better to be, you better start contributing something of value or we will be here all night.” These conferences served as examples of the abrasive and narcissistic style with which Stolz engaged his subordinates.

The final toxic attribute Stolz consistently displayed was that of motivation purely on the grounds of self-interest. Squadron staff and key leaders quickly reached the consensus that he provided effort and focus only to those aspects of his work and leadership that received the direct observation of the regiment’s commanding officer. Stolz would make repeated attempts to ingratiate himself with superiors by volunteering the operational support squadron to lead or support tasks he believed would enhance his own standing in the commander’s perspective, which frequently overcommitted squadron members and resources. Stolz’ personal involvement in these activities would generally only occur if he believed that the regiment’s, or brigade’s, senior leadership would be present. In one instance, a logistic planning activity instigated by the squadron second-in-command for short-notice noncombatant evacuation contingencies, Stolz only became involved in the activity when he learned the brigade commander had chosen to attend the brief. Immediately prior to the brief, Stolz dismissed the briefing officer and then briefed the activity outline to the brigade commander as his own plan.

By contrast, when the operational support squadron was tasked to deploy on the brigade’s culminating certification activity as an enhanced logistic node to support two battle groups, Stolz abnegated his command of the squadron when he became aware that both the regiment and brigade commander would be at another location and absent from contingency planning. Stolz passed both planning responsibility and command of the squadron to a second-year lieutenant for the activity and, instead, took a two-week skiing vacation at Australia’s Thredbo Ski Resort.

Taken in isolation, the examples cited previously paint a picture of Stolz as a narcissistic and obtuse leader of almost cartoonlike proportions. Although it is clear that Stolz displayed a notable lack of emotional awareness and empathy for subordinates, the intent of the illustrations provided are not to vilify the officer or categorize him as an irredeemable failure of a leader. His toxic approach was not one of intention; in individual conversation with peers on his approach to leadership, he consistently reaffirmed that his method was building a strong team and was effective for the performance of the squadron. However, how these actions actually impacted organizational performance warrants examination.

**Success Due To, and Despite, Leadership**

With the available evidence of Stolz’ actions, it is easy to predict the most likely outcome for the operational support squadron’s organizational climate and performance. Drawing on Joe Doty and Jeff Fenlason’s description of toxic leader impacts, at best, this approach should have engendered a climate that endured Stolz’ leadership until his tenure reached its’ end. At worst, his actions could have damaged esprit de corps, initiative, and drive amongst the members and junior leadership of the organization. In practice, however, his actions produced a third, unexpected effect: the operational support squadron grew as an organization, developed stronger cohesion among its members, and actually improved its long-term mission readiness and performance.

Stolz’ actions primarily served as a galvanizing force for the junior and middle leadership of the squadron. In the face of a demanding and emotionally immature commander, leaders at all levels banded together to mitigate the impacts of his leadership style. To meet the unrealistic work and output expectations Stolz held, officers and their noncommissioned officers were required to cooperate on a level not previously demanded of the squadron. Platoons overburdened with direct taskings by Stolz compensated by task-sharing with other platoons, which would then reciprocate when Stolz’ focus for task allocation shifted.
Platoon command teams solidified as noncommissioned officers assumed greater responsibilities to alleviate the workload of overtaxed lieutenants. In the process, both members would enhance their personal relationship, professional knowledge, and understanding of each other’s roles, becoming a more effective team. These bonds—at the small team, intra-platoon, and inter-platoon levels—would ultimately engender a level of esprit de corps in the face of Stolz’ overbearing leadership style that established the squadron as an extremely close-knit group for several years following Stolz’ departure. The three platoon commanders, sergeant major, and squadron second-in-command have remained in very close contact since departing the unit. To the obvious surprise of officers familiar with Stolz’ style, the squadron developed a reputation within the regiment for its high morale. Stolz’ self-interested motivation had the further unanticipated effect of enhancing the professional aptitude and knowledge of members throughout the squadron. His willingness to volunteer the squadron for excessive taskings and planning activities, coupled with his proclivity to avoid personal involvement, effectively placed his subordinates in a “sink or swim” situation of professional development. In the example of the lieutenant tasked to plan and command the squadron’s deployment in support of the brigade certification exercise, Stolz’ conspicuous absence forced the lieutenant and his peers to seek out the information and agencies they required to prepare the squadron for its deployment. The experience gained in performing a role two ranks higher than he was formally trained for provided the lieutenant invaluable exposure to command and leadership. Finally, Stolz’ approach to leadership indirectly served as a forcing mechanism for the squadron to enhance its long-term operational preparedness. In light of his tendency to continually overcommit the squadron to taskings that enhanced his own profile, squadron leaders sought to better anticipate the possible tasks that they could be assigned. The squadron second-in-command and sergeant major implemented a review of mission essential tasks and directed capabilities the squadron was responsible to provide and then, in concert with platoon staff, implemented an equipment remediation program to address deficiencies and procure new capability-enhancing equipment.

Throughout this process, Stolz did not involve himself, nor provide any guiding direction, but simply warned the squadron leadership that if their “pet projects” jeopardized any tasking, repercussions would follow. Though clearly not his intentional aim, his actions indirectly contributed toward a level of stewardship by the squadron’s leadership to preserve the future operational capability of the organization. The utility of this measure was validated when the squadron later deployed on short notice in December 2010 to provide disaster relief in the Indian Ocean. The unit received a commendation for distinguished performance for its rapid initial response and performance while deployed.

The behaviors exhibited by Stolz throughout his command cannot be misconstrued—they were undeniably toxic. The impact they had on the organization, however, deviates from the traditionally expected results of toxic leadership. His immediate subordinates in the chain of command grew professionally and personally in response to his leadership style. The operational support squadron succeeded both despite, and as a direct result of, the toxic leadership exercised by Stolz.

Contingent Circumstances Are Critical

The success of toxic leadership in enhancing organizational performance is contingent on several factors. Situational context is paramount when examining an isolated case, and that of the 12th Engineer Regiment is no exception. First, continuity of staff played a role. Individuals in key positions had familiarity with the organization, hence, they could compensate for a lack of direction and guidance from Stolz by relying on a relative level of prior experience. As an extension of this, the interpersonal familiarity of Stolz’ subordinate staff set the conditions for the group to unite as a team. These individuals possessed a shared work ethic predisposed to collaboration and cooperation. Had junior leaders been present who lacked this ethic or shared Stolz’ ambitious worldview, it is less likely that the command team would have functioned so well. Finally, the existing environment of the operational support squadron supported a strong culture of professionalism and high performance that ensured the members of the squadron remained focused on effective performance of their jobs, even in the face of poor leadership. To draw from Padilla, et al’s “toxic triangle,” the operational support squadron’s situational context lacked both the susceptible followers and conducive environments.
necessary to truly enable Stolz to impact the squadron as a destructive leader.8

**Does Toxic Leadership Have a Place in the Military?**

The 12th Engineer Regiment case study highlights a situation in which an organization and its members actually benefited from toxic leadership. However, to infer from this that there is a place for toxic leadership in the military is to miss the point. Toxic leadership is not an effective leadership style for managing subordinates, and it can frequently produce disastrous results. To assume that all leaders will recognize the elements of toxic leadership and consciously avoid their application is naïve. Some leaders do not recognize the characteristics in their own behaviors; some misconstrue them for other, desirable, leadership characteristics; and the most dangerous recognize but simply do not care that they display toxic leadership.

**Conclusion**

The key argument in this article is this: when faced with toxic leadership, it is possible to preserve the organization and its individuals, and emerge stronger.

Giving due consideration to the circumstances in the operational support squadron that made unit growth possible, Stolz’ toxic leadership cannot be overlooked as the galvanizing force that stimulated a level of cooperation not previously demanded of the command team. His approach unintentionally forced his subordinates to develop themselves professionally, and his practice of assigning excessive tasking indirectly engendered a sense of stewardship in his subordinates that enhanced operational capability.

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Notes

**Epigraph.** Frank Owen, “General Bill Slim,” *Phoenix, The South East Asia Command Magazine*, 1945. Address to the officers of the 11th East African Division on the Imphal Plain, 1944. This comment illustrates that an effective leader must, above all else, demonstrate concern for his or her soldiers’ welfare. At face value, a naive subordinate of Slim’s may have incorrectly associated these comments with the traits of a toxic leader; however, Slim’s stern warning to his officers concerning their responsibility to take care of their soldiers fundamentally demonstrates just the opposite.

1. Dick Winters and Herbert Sobel were officers in Company E, 2nd Battalion, 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division, popularized in the HBO miniseries *Band of Brothers*. Sobel was a strict disciplinarian, greatly disliked by his men, while Winters was well liked and highly respected. Sam Damon and Courtney Massengale are fictional characters from Anton Myer’s novel *Once an Eagle*. Damon is portrayed as an honorable soldier, while Massengale is depicted as corrupt, ambitious, and conniving.


6. For comparative purposes, an Australian army engineer regiment is equivalent in size and organization to a U.S. Army engineer battalion. The operational support squadron within this organization is roughly equivalent in size and capability to a forward support company and comprises all organic logistic capabilities required to support and sustain the engineer battalion. For purposes of confidentiality, unit designations, dates, and names have been changed. All other details and incidents described remain factual.


8. Art Padilla, Robert Hogan and Robert B. Kaiser, “The Toxic Triangle: Destructive Leaders, Susceptible Followers, and Conducive Environments,” *The Leadership Quarterly* 18 (2007): 180. In this article, the authors argue that destructive leaders must be enabled by other factors to have a significant detrimental impact on the organization to which they belong. The first enabler is susceptible followers, in the form of either conformers that have unmet needs or low maturity, or colluders who hold bad values, ambition, or similar world-views to the leader. The second enabler is conducive environments, characterized by instability, cultural values, and a lack of checks and balances.
The Path to Mission Command

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Leader development is the fundamental basis for a U.S. Army that practices mission command in everything it does. Mission command and leader development are interdependent. Mission command is how we fight, and leader development is part of how we prepare to fight. Leader development that excludes the principles of mission command, or worse, that preaches mission command without putting it into practice, is missing out on the exploitation of human potential, knowledge, and experience that mission command allows. However, a U.S. Army that operates according to the principles of mission command does not just happen naturally, especially in peacetime. How effectively the Army applies the principles of mission command will be the product of leader development in a peacetime environment.

Translating a vision of mission command into practice through leader development in the domains of education, training, and experience is a challenge because of the tension between the presence of uncertainty and the need for synchronization. Commanders need to balance the art of command with the science of control. Mission command has great potential to enable operational success under conditions of uncertainty.
However, commanders may be likely to try to manage uncertainty by exercising a greater degree of centralized control, counter to the philosophy of mission command. Even when synchronization is needed, commanders still must balance how they exercise control over their capabilities with the art of command. In this way, commanders can exploit opportunities brought about by local successes or enemy weaknesses.

The solution to how commanders and leaders can maximize synchronization and thrive despite uncertainty comes from the preparation that makes mission command possible. If leader development in education, training, and experience at all echelons builds a solid foundation of trust built on intent and shared understanding, then units will be able to accomplish their assigned missions at a lower cost than they would if forced to operate in a more directed manner.

Development of the Army’s Mission Command Philosophy

Mission command as described in Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0, Mission Command, seems to have two historical sources of inspiration. The first source is the German tradition of *Auftragstaktik*, or mission-oriented tactics, which broadly describes the German army’s commitment to initiative, aggression, and judgment that was the root of their tactical excellence in the 19th and 20th centuries. *Auftragstaktik* was embodied in XIX Panzer Corps’ river crossing in Sedan in May 1940. The German army’s practices allowed it to seize the initiative, even when outnumbered, and to succeed despite lapses in communications and other unexpected difficulties.

The second source of mission command principles is the pragmatic and democratic traditions of the United States as it fielded armies to win wars as quickly as possible with the lowest loss of life. Initiative in the Army’s history is as much a bottom-up process as top-down, and mission command seeks to exploit this proud tradition. Certainly this was the case over the past 12 years where decentralized counterinsurgency and security force assistance were the norm for conventional Army units. Before 2003, operational plans had a traditional focus on relatively short-term operations with traditional military capabilities. Now battalions conduct stability operations, for instance, for a year or longer. Junior leaders had to shape their operational environments not only through fires and obstacles but also through their interaction with the population and their assessment of pieces of infrastructure, social networks, and political alliances. These realities meant leaders at all levels would need to be able to manage uncertainty.

Given these realities, codifying mission command as the way the Army would conduct operations was a necessary and logical step. However, the development of leaders and units who can operate under this philosophy must be the product of conscious thought and effort, starting with education.

Education for Mission Command

Army leadership schools, beginning with the Warrior Leader Course for noncommissioned officers and precommissioning training for officers, must stress the principles of mission command. A good place to start is with the study of successful leaders who executed and won in conditions of uncertainty. These case studies should be used to accentuate the critical thinking of leaders at all levels and should distinguish skilled execution from luck.

Leaders must confront the costs and risks of their choices. Sometimes, the way a commander chooses to accomplish the mission carries unintended long-term consequences. The emphasis on learning to balance initiative and risk will become even more important at the more senior levels of schooling as leaders must think in terms of operations and campaigns.

Army professional military education should continue to emphasize doctrine as the baseline for thinking about operations to ensure that all professionals have a shared language. This is essential for creating the shared understanding necessary for mission command.

As Michael Howard discussed in his seminal article, “The Use and Abuse of Military History,” soldiering is the only profession where individuals do not practice against a live opponent for long periods. Education, particularly in history and leadership, can give insight into principles that training and experience can refine into useful practices. Education provides insights into how others have solved military problems.

As the Army prepares to conduct operations in an increasingly interconnected and complex world, knowing about the world matters for both commanders and leaders as they must grapple with complexity.
in order to formulate clear intent. Self-education and unit programs are a vital part of ensuring all soldiers understand the complexities of the world in which they will fight. Commanders must imbue their subordinates with intellectual, social, and cultural understanding but must understand what their training has provided. They should study the work of researchers with different points of view, particularly in social sciences, where scholarly researchers do not always agree. For example, a unit that read one of Karen Armstrong’s books to prepare for a deployment to the Middle East would have a very different understanding of the cultures and religions of that area than a unit that read from the works of Bernard Lewis.

Looking to the Pacific, very different views on the growing power of China can be found in Henry Kissinger’s On China versus Aaron L. Friedberg’s A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia. It is the job of commanders and leaders to consider a variety of viewpoints about the world to build the understanding and empathy necessary to accomplish their mission. In this, mission command is rooted not just in formal leader preparation but also in self-study and reflection.

**Training for Mission Command**

The changes to how the Army trained after the Vietnam War were revolutionary in character. Tools such as task-condition-standard, the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System, combat training centers, Mission Command Training Program, and the after action review fundamentally reshaped the Army after 1973. These changes have put meat on the bones of Rommel’s dictum that “the best form of welfare for the troops is first-class training, for this saves unnecessary casualties.” Now, under the U.S. Army’s mission command philosophy, training is where the preparation of education will bear its first fruit. However, emphasis on mission command in support of unified land operations dictates additional changes to how the Army trains.
The first change is that units must primarily focus on what the commander deems necessary. The process of the commander’s dialogue, described in ADRP 7-0, *Training Units and Developing Leaders*, helps commanders select mission-essential tasks from their capabilities-based mission-essential task lists that they and their higher commanders deem most important to train. In this way, commanders can focus the unit’s individual, leader, and collective training. This dialogue must include an understanding of the unit’s probable missions and threats, and the operational and mission variables the unit is most likely to encounter.

Within this dialogue, commanders will endeavor to hone their skills in both of the Army’s core competencies: wide area security and combined arms maneuver. Each of these competencies contains elements of offense, defense, and stability as commanders attempt to impose their will and seize the initiative in a shifting environment of threats, challenges, and opportunities. To make matters even more challenging, units must swing between these two competencies with little or no warning.

A major challenge for commanders that empower their subordinates is understanding what their subordinates are doing and if they are transitioning operations properly. The difficulties of transition were evident in the summer of 2003 as the Army’s and Marine Corps’ offensive operations morphed into stability operations. Commanders must train subordinates in how and when to adjust their execution to meet their higher command’s intent and respond to what is happening in order to seize and retain the initiative in a chaotic environment. This means training not just for combined arms maneuver and wide area security but also for how to transition between these two competencies with little or no warning.

A major part of training is using mission command to synchronize combined arms maneuver and wide area security. Given the relatively slower pace of wide area security, vertical and horizontal communication and cooperation generally are easier but still require the commitment of leaders to make their units learning organizations. However, the high threat and fast pace of combined arms maneuver is more demanding in terms of the need for synchronization. According to ADRP 6-0, the doctrinal solution for orders that can assure mission success is the principle “use mission orders.” However, ADRP 6-0’s discussion of mission orders is underdeveloped regarding synchronization, especially if considered in isolation from the other principles of mission command and from additional doctrine on plans and orders. For example, ADRP 6-0 omits a detailed discussion of the enemy or terrain from the situation paragraph.

Moreover, for mission orders to work, commanders need to build cohesive teams and provide a clear intent. Commanders and staffs need to create shared understanding by articulating their understanding of operational and tactical factors. Without the staff or mission command information systems of a battalion, a company commander and subordinates might have to depend on their own limited resources (especially time) to perform the detailed analysis of terrain, enemy, and civilian considerations that are part of troop leading procedures.

In operations, the exercise of mission command requires the bare number of enabling and restrictive control measures both for execution of the current operation and the exploitation of success. A central principle of maneuver warfare is to reinforce success. The use of reserves, the commitment of resources, and the timely use of fragmentary orders should support both local success and give commanders and units the ability to respond rapidly to changes in the situation. Fragmentary orders, branch plans, and sequels must take into account both what the enemy is likely to do and what the unit’s reconnaissance efforts determine the enemy is doing now.

Part of mission orders directs commanders to rely on “lateral coordination between units.” Mission command, therefore, dictates the higher command should authorize direct liaison between its subordinates and multiple other agencies and units. These other units
must understand that requests and coordination will come from multiple echelons, and higher commanders and staffs must clearly communicate their priorities to all elements in order to allow everyone to prioritize their efforts. This, in turn, will dictate developing either standard operating procedures based on the mission or more detailed orders at the brigade level or higher to determine the proper allocation of resources.

While training can never fully replicate the stress and demands of armed conflict, it must come as close as possible. However, in the era of declining budgets, leaders must also find ways to train that prepare soldiers while being good stewards of taxpayer dollars. As H. John Poole, a theorist of maneuver warfare, writes in a discussion of doing more with less in peacetime, “there is never ‘enough money’ to train.”

CTC rotations and major force-on-force exercises are expensive. At the soldier and squad level, teamwork can be built through daily physical conditioning and on small pieces of terrain. Similarly, at the staff and command levels, staff routines can put into practice the steps of the military decisionmaking process and other doctrinal tools for most planning. By using doctrinal tools in garrison, the split between garrison and field operations can be reduced.

**Experience for Mission Command**

Finally, the art of mission command comes from intelligently applied experience. Until commanders can gain that experience, others must share their experiences, good and bad, with their subordinates as part education and training. If subordinates know why their superiors are stressing certain points, they are more likely to be able to function effectively within the commander’s intent. Commanders can teach the importance of all-around security or of boresighting in darkness by describing how success or failure rested on these practices in the past. Units can develop standard operating procedures based on practices the commander deems important. Commanders should ensure subordinates understand why certain tasks or drills are standardized and invite feedback on how to improve them.

One of the great challenges for commanders exercising mission command is to build combined arms teams at the lowest level while enabling training and mentorship that exploit the hard-won expertise of senior-level subject matter experts. The exercise of mission command is highly personal, and, as such, runs up against the “plug-and-play” mentality. Capabilities attach quickly, but understanding takes time. Therefore, commanders must create combined arms teams as early as possible in the training cycle with as much stability as possible.

No part of the Army has experienced this challenge more keenly over the last decade than the fires community. The demand-driven Army force generation rotational cycle that builds teams quickly and the practice of assigning firing batteries and battalions nontraditional missions have led artillery units to lose proficiency in translating observation into fires as they have become trainers, route security teams, and area security experts. The reassignment of company-level forward observers to maneuver battalions was an immediate gain for their capabilities as they gained an “effects manager” at the company level. At the same time, it was a blow to the ability of brigades and above to mass lethal fires. The return of the division artillery has started to correct this deficiency. However, company teams still need a relationship with their observers. An observer must be able to maneuver dismounted with an infantry platoon or fight his Bradley alongside tanks if he is to be an integral part of the combined arms team.

A compromise is in order. Observers need to be sent back to the artillery battalion and placed in an observer battery, while battalion- and brigade-level fire support officers and noncommissioned officers remain at the maneuver headquarters. The planning and synchronization requirements of brigade and battalion headquarters demand dedicated fire supporters be present to make sure the efforts of the higher headquarters are synchronized, but the observers at the company or troop level need to go back to the artillery battalion to be mentored by the most experienced fire supporter in the brigade. This will enable artillery battalion commanders to develop their most inexperienced fire supporters, while giving battalion and brigade commanders the day-to-day expertise they need to integrate fires into all their operations. Company observers need to attend the training meetings of their maneuver companies and spend the maximum remaining amount of time training with them. The particulars of this relationship need to be clear to all the parties involved to prevent misunderstandings, mishandling, and misuse. Nothing is more frustrating than trying to reward good performance or improve poor performance and run up
against misunderstanding related to the relationship between units.

In terms of preparation, mission command will not always feel like mission command as commanders make their vision, purpose, and priorities clear through exercises, professional development, and counseling. This preparation is where leaders will become acquainted with the strengths and weaknesses within their team. A model for this combination of training, professional development, and consultation is Horatio Nelson’s group of Royal Navy captains in the years before Trafalgar. Self-styled as the “Band of Brothers,” these captains met nightly with Nelson as they discussed how best to fight and destroy the French fleet. These highly personal consultations, combined with Nelson’s good tactical sense and the high level of preparation within the Royal Navy, provided the British with a decisive advantage in 1805. Even though Nelson’s fleet possessed a new state-of-the-art signaling system, his flagship did not need to send any signals during the battle. Nelson’s level of trust in his captains was so high because they understood his desire for them to be aggressive. Thus, Nelson and his commanders enjoyed a strong mutual trust and shared understanding of the expectations for aggressive offensive action, and thus were able to destroy Napoleon’s combined fleet.16

The pursuit and practice of mission command may ultimately serve as a way to mitigate the rising cost of technology because it will allow trust to take the place of constant connectivity. The common understanding of intent built through training is far more reliable than any communications system.17 This understanding will in turn facilitate commanders’ freedom of action on the battlefield, as they will be free to place themselves where they deem most critical rather where they can best link into the various networks. Knowing that the U.S. Army is dependent on technology, any future enemy will seek to disrupt it. Leaders must learn to act to achieve their
higher commander’s intent in the absence of guidance, and only leaders trained, educated, and experienced working within the principles of mission command will be able to function in such a way.

Another challenge to the Army implementing mission command will be preserving its spirit in garrison. Without the challenge of deployment and without the money or space to conduct extensive collective training in the field, units will face succumbing to the friction inherent in the Army’s bureaucracy. Taskings will multiply. Training might become a method of evaluation rather than a chance to learn and improve. With these decreased opportunities for evaluation, commanders will be tempted to exercise ever-tighter control over subordinates during field exercises in order to achieve success. This is where the discipline of mission command must come into play. Leaders must not tolerate failures of standards but they also must design training events so soldiers may learn from mistakes. This will require both the time and the resources for the unit to retrain in the task it is attempting to master. This means extra time built into field exercises to permit retraining, rather than keeping a tight schedule that forces units onto the next lane without the chance to retrain, improve, and win.

Additionally, in terms of experience, the Army must learn to do less. Taking soldiers and leaders away from their units in support of taskings that do not enhance combat effectiveness is contrary to the spirit of mission command. Effective combined arms teams do not come from an environment where combat and winning do not have the highest priority. When protocol or ceremonial taskings matter more than preparation for war, the message is clear about what the local leadership values. This is a matter for senior leaders. This will mean commanders saying “no” to worthwhile but ultimately extraneous things. While something is lost when soldiers are not sent to sing and dance, run in races, or stand in front of static displays, the result would be an Army more focused on winning and soldiers who know that commanders care about them, their time, and ultimately their lives.

The exercise of mission command may also face challenges in the ever-present realm of legal restrictions on actions. The rules of engagement are hard and fast, and therefore commanders at every level must ensure they are as minimally restrictive and as clearly understood as possible. Training events must have rules of engagement that are appropriate, and a discussion of how the rules of engagement shaped the actions of commanders, leaders, and units needs to be part of every relevant after action review. Standard classroom training for the rules of engagement often degenerates into a series of increasingly outlandish and far-fetched “what-ifs,” a process not assisted by the fact that what is permissible under the rules of engagement often depends on the perceptions of the individual soldier under stress and the later judgments of the investigators. By forcing soldiers and leaders to make hard, often difficult choices involving rapidly shifting threats and then examining those choices, practical and legal
ty techniques will become a part of how the unit operates under commander’s intent.

**Conclusion**

Mission command, despite its strengths and potential for bringing out the best in units and individual soldiers, is not a risk-free approach for the Army to adopt. Our enemies will still attempt to find weaknesses and exploit them. Our Army, and our country, must learn how to lead and inspire in a world where our traditional allies are reducing their military forces and where new nations and groups are increasing in power, influence, and desire to consume the world’s resources. Our enemies may not feel bound by any recognizable legal or moral restrictions. Even if we can disrupt their networks, they will fight on without guidance from higher. They may fight on in spite of orders to lay down their arms. Given these realities, leaders who can seize the initiative and win while understanding all the whys and who can effectively communicate those reasons to their subordinates are more important than ever.

Sound strategy, a responsive and fiscally responsible acquisition process, and a continued commitment to selfless service and sacrifice are all keys to the Army’s future success. While no amount of mission command can overcome bad strategy, when the issue is in doubt, more autonomy built on trust, training, and shared understanding of a commander’s intent will usually be the best way to proceed.

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**Notes**


12. ADRP 6-0, 2-1.


14. ADRP 6-0, 2-4.


“B
e ready” is the standard that the 1st Stryker
Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), 25th
Infantry Division strives daily to achieve. The constant “be ready” attitude not only ensures the “Arctic Wolf” Brigade can respond to the nation’s call to “fight tonight” if necessary, but also supports the Army chief of staff’s (CSA) top priority of maintaining a globally responsive Army “to protect U.S. interests and those of our Allies.” The CSA further defined a responsive force as one that is “globally engaged and capable of rapidly

A Stryker combat vehicle from the 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry Regiment, 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, idles on a snow-covered route 31 January 2014 at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska. The Stryker unit from the “Arctic Wolves” Brigade made the nearly 400-mile trip from Fort Wainwright in support of a nine-day field training exercise for its sister brigade, the 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Airborne).
employing scalable force packages from the smallest to the largest depending on the demands of the situation.2

The Arctic Wolf Brigade received the opportunity to demonstrate its readiness when it was directed to provide 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 82nd Airborne Division with the Stryker component of the Global Response Force (GRF) package. Similar to the division ready brigade concept employed prior to the Global War on Terrorism, the GRF is the Army’s contemporary strategic rapid response force. Unlike the division ready brigade concept, the GRF is comprised of numerous components that offer a variety of capabilities from across the entire Army to provide joint commanders with scalable force packages tailored to meet the demands posed by specific situations. Thus, the GRF ensures that the Army can provide globally responsive forces that are agile enough to deliver decisive results in today’s uncertain and complex operating environments.

The 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment was ultimately assigned the mission to provide one Stryker infantry company in support of the GRF for a period of seven months. Accordingly, 3-21 Infantry constantly trained decisive action to prepare soldiers for possible deployments to unpredictable environments, while also sustaining a high level of equipment and personnel readiness during the duration of the mission.3 Consequently, lessons captured during an emergency deployment readiness exercise (EDRE) conducted at Joint Base Elmendorf–Richardson, Alaska demonstrated that the Stryker slice of the GRF affords response force commanders with an extremely credible combat force capable of arriving anywhere in the world immediately upon notification.

Response Force Mission Rehearsal

In September 2013, 3-21 Infantry participated in an EDRE with 1st Battalion, 501st Infantry Regiment (Airborne) that included a forced entry scenario. 3-21 Infantry received a no-notice alert and immediately began preparing for aerial deployment from Fort Wainwright, Alaska. Air Force C-17 cargo planes arrived at Ladd Army Airfield several hours later, and loaded the 3-21 initial response platoon (IRP) for the 60-minute flight to Elmendorf Air Force Base. Simultaneously, 1-501 Infantry jumped into Malemute Drop Zone on Fort Richardson, Alaska, and subsequently seized a fictional U.S. consulate under threat by civil unrest in Baumeister Village (the installation’s urban terrain training area).

Upon arrival at Elmendorf Air Force Base, the 3-21 IRP off-loaded from the C-17 cargo planes and immediately reconfigured their Strykers from air loads to combat loads. Once reconfigurations were complete, the platoon executed a tactical road march to Baumeister Village, conducted linkup with 1-501 Infantry, and received an order to seize a terrorist training camp located several kilometers east of the fictional U.S. consulate (see figure 1). Following a brief troop-leading-procedure process, the 3-21 IRP began a movement to contact toward the camp. Though the 3-21 IRP was completely unfamiliar with the terrain, they used map data and operational graphics posted on their situational awareness screens (Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below, or FBCB2, equipment) to successfully maneuver their Strykers to support-by-fire positions Overwatching the camp.

The 3-21 IRP lacked sensors capable of identifying exact enemy locations since it did not deploy with company unmanned aerial vehicle assets. However, 1-501 Infantry provided intelligence updates of likely enemy actions via tactical messaging. Armed with anticipated enemy actions, an awareness of the terrain, and an understanding of his own capabilities, the platoon leader immediately seized the initiative as the 3-21 IRP assaulted the terrorist camp. As always happens when facing a thinking opponent, the enemy presented a few surprises as the platoon fought to seize its objective. However, the dismounted infantry squads with their Strykers in direct fire support quickly achieved overmatch and successfully closed with and destroyed the enemy.

This exercise, dubbed Operation Rapid Response, was the first in which U.S. Army Alaska employed Stryker and airborne infantry capabilities working in concert to accomplish multiple objectives in a complex and dynamic tactical environment. Furthermore, Operation Rapid Response supported the CSA’s strategic vision by rapidly employing a force specifically scaled to deal with the threat existing in Baumeister Village. Numerous joint mobility, mission command, and operational goals were achieved during the exercise. For the explicit purpose of this article, the most relevant goals achieved were those that demonstrated the capacity of Stryker units to provide response force commanders with an enhanced strategic package that is rapidly deployable, sustainable, and capable of overwhelming any potential foe.
Rapid Deployability

The Stryker was conceived to fill a capability gap between difficult to deploy heavy forces and inherently vulnerable light forces. Appropriately, the combination of strategic and operational deployability, with tactical mobility and survivability, are critical capabilities that Stryker platforms provide to battlefield commanders.

Weighing about 19 tons each, two combat-loaded Strykers can be transported by a single C-17 cargo aircraft. The Stryker’s relatively light weight also makes it C-130 transportable (excluding double V-hull versions) to a range of approximately 860 miles, which allows for swift intratheater transport to smaller airfields located in remote areas. Finally, the Stryker’s compact size allows it to disembark from aircraft already prepared for immediate combat operations. Thus, unlike M1 Abrams tanks (68 tons) or Bradley fighting vehicles (33 tons), whose weight and size exceed C-130 lift capabilities, the Stryker provides an ideal option to response-force commanders requiring the prompt introduction of mobile packages into any hostile arena.

The key to bridging the gap between strategic aerial deployment and immediate tactical employment of combat-ready Stryker formations is envisioning the efficient assembly of desired combat power upon arrival at the aerial port of debarkation (APOD). 3-21 Infantry assumed the worst case scenario of instant combat employment upon disembarkation (e.g., expand a lodgment scenario) during the initial planning phases of the GRF mission. Consequently, air load chalks (a chalk is a single aircraft load of troops and equipment) were sequenced to enable the arrival of an infantry platoon (the IRP) in the lead aircraft, followed by the sequential arrival of indirect fire capabilities, mobile gun systems, follow-on infantry platoons, and crucial logistical assets spread among several chalks (see figure 2). This combat-power-build methodology supplied the company commander with requisite direct and indirect fire capabilities to achieve near-instant fire superiority. It also ensured the company would receive timely sustainment capabilities to attain self-supportability. Finally, this methodology afforded maximum flexibility of asset arrival to mitigate possible aircraft delays,
unanticipated redirection of aircraft, or any other unforeseen events that inevitably occur once mission execution begins.

The soldiers of 3-21 Infantry staged the vehicles in chalk order within a secure facility for the entire duration of the mission. Additionally, secondary loads were pre-packaged on each vehicle, and ammunition was pre-palletized in accordance with chalk order. Maintaining the GRF equipment package in a constant deployment posture was necessary to ensure the company could depart in accordance with prescribed time lines. This posture also ensured the Stryker company was prepared for immediate combat operations upon disembarkation at the APOD, if required.

The accelerated deployment timeline also required 3-21 Infantry to maintain personnel on a constant six-hour recall status. Maintaining personnel in prolonged states of elevated readiness can quickly exhaust soldiers and overburden families, which can eventually lead to reduced deployability. For these reasons, 3-21 Infantry chose to rotate the GRF assignment among all three infantry companies instead of requiring one company to endure the entire mission alone. Rotations were conducted on a monthly basis with one company assigned as the GRF, one company assigned as push (available to assist the GRF with its outload), one company held in reserve, and the Headquarters and Headquarters Company in a direct support role. The monthly rotation scheme kept companies fresh during their assigned GRF windows because it afforded them opportunities to refit and enjoy hard-earned rest periods when performing duties as the battalion reserve.

The air-load sequence depicted in figure 2 is one way to design the efficient assembly of combat power on both sides of the strategic deployment vs. tactical employment gap. Near limitless combat power build permutations exist for commander selection. However, the important takeaway is that the establishment of a combat power delivery methodology based on an early visualization of the fight is vital in ensuring the Stryker company can accomplish any mission immediately upon arrival.

**Sustainability**

It is well documented that “Stryker brigades do not have sufficient organic assets to self-sustain combat operations beyond a few days.” Stryker brigade limited sustainment capacity was a trade-off the Army consciously made to maximize deployability. Even though Stryker brigades will significantly increase their combat service support capabilities with the fielding of forward support companies during 2015, Stryker units will continue to rely on the integration of external logistical infrastructure to sustain prolonged deployments.
Be that as it may, the purpose of this discussion is not to deliberate the difficulty Stryker brigades have with self-sustainment operations due to limitations imposed by their modified table of organization and equipment. Rather, this discussion focuses on the relative ease of sustaining the Stryker platform, which ultimately complements its deployability. Appropriately, 3-21 Infantry focused GRF planning efforts on tactical resupply to ensure the company possessed adequate capability to fuel, arm, and fix the fleet until able to integrate external logistical support.

Fuel. A Stryker infantry company consumes approximately 1,000 gallons of fuel per day during tactical operations. Comparatively, an M1A2 Abrams tank company consumes approximately 10,000 gallons of fuel per day. Also, compared to the M1A2 tank, the Stryker requires significantly less quantities of other petroleum, oils, and lubricants to sustain operability. Accordingly, the Stryker’s superior fuel efficiency lessens the burden on extended supply lines established to sustain contingency operations. 3-21 Infantry added an M978 fuel tanker to the Stryker fleet to further ease refuel demands. This ensured the company was self-supportable with fuel for the initial 72 hours, thus mitigating the urgency to integrate external logistical assets.

Arm. Lethality is the signature capability the Stryker organization provides to battlefield commanders. However, sustaining lethality requires ready access to ample supplies of ammunition. Again, an early visualization of the fight during initial planning is key to ensuring the right ammunition is available to vehicular and dismounted weapon systems upon arrival at the APOD. 3-21 Infantry accomplished this by matching exact types of ammunition with the specific weapon systems associated with each chalk. For example, Chalk 1 (see figure 2) consisted of an infantry platoon mounted on infantry carrier variants. Accordingly, authorized unit basic loads of .50 caliber ammunition, 40 mm grenades, and vehicle smoke grenades were allocated to support each vehicle’s respective weapon systems. Additionally, Javelin missiles, hand grenades, and various types of linked and ball ammunition were allocated to support the various individual and crew-served weapons assigned to infantry squads. Finally, authorized combat loads of linked and ball ammunition supporting squad automatic weapons and individual weapons were issued directly to soldiers during flight manifest activities. Correct allocation of requisite ammunition for every weapon system associated with each chalk ensured the company had the capacity to gain fire superiority immediately upon disembarkation.

Fix. The several vehicle variants assigned to a Stryker infantry company have common engines, drive trains, suspensions, and tires. Furthermore, the Stryker’s forward unit power pack is a Caterpillar diesel engine also found in the family of medium tactical vehicles. Consequently, Stryker commonality means fewer repair parts and specialty tools are required to maintain the fleet, further lessening the burden on extended supply lines. Appropriately, 3-21 Infantry dedicated an M7 Forward Repair System, a very small aperture terminal, a spare full-up power pack, and various other critical repair parts to the GRF package. These capabilities ensured the company could conduct independent field repairs within their field trains to regenerate combat power levels in a timely manner, allowing the company commander to achieve tactical objectives.

As demonstrated, logistical assets must be included in the GRF Stryker package to ensure the company is self-supportable until they integrate external assets. Furthermore, ammunition stocks must be thoughtfully included in air load plans to ensure the company can gain and maintain fire superiority until resupply is available.

Combat service support considerations are paramount whenever any unit, especially vehicular-based units, are deployed for decisive action. However, unlike mechanized platforms, the Stryker’s economical consumption rates provide response force commanders the advantage of employing an extremely survivable, lethal, and mobile package that is also sustainable in austere locations.

Credible Combat Force

The Stryker’s speed, protection, precision fire power, optics, robust communications suite, and capacity to deliver a nine-man infantry squad to close with and destroy the enemy epitomizes the symbiotic relationship that soldier and machine must attain to survive and win on today’s dynamic and complex battlefield. The Army’s fundamental conception of Stryker brigade combat teams was to create a “unit that could fight like Rangers and think like Special Forces, with better mobility than mechanized and armored forces.” Results from Operation Rapid Response clearly illustrated Stryker organization capacity to realize this innovative vision.

Attaining soldier-Stryker synergy requires a deliberate training program that allows the mounted and
dismounted components to master their respective skill sets, while also integrating cross-training events that bond the two components into a tightly coupled fighting system. Using this philosophy as a guiding principle, 3-21 Infantry designed a training methodology that sought to develop Stryker platoons into unified combined arms teams capable of offsetting each component’s weaknesses by enhancing each other’s inherent strengths.

The battalion chose to focus primarily on offensive tasks from its mission essential task list when designing the training glide path for the GRF mission. This decision was based on an assumption that the Stryker slice would most likely participate in a GRF package scaled specifically for combat operations. As depicted by figure 3, the glide path was divided into mounted and dismounted lines of effort. Each line was comprised of mutually supportive individual, crew/team, and collective-level tasks that hastened skill transfer when the two components combined. The touch points denoted by the stars signify training events that cross-pollination between the two components, and served to validate total team competency.

Figure 3 represents a simplified model describing the overall training construct. The two touch points merely denote larger exercises used to certify overall proficiency via external evaluations. In reality, countless cross-training events executed at crew, fire team, and squad levels in virtual, live, and constructive environments were continually conducted to foster teamwork and develop expertise through constant task repetition. Despite an entire company’s worth of Strykers being sequestered in a secured facility, 3-21 Infantry continued to execute field training and live fire exercises during the entire seven-month mission by creating “training sets” from vehicles belonging to other companies within the battalion. Companies would simply inventory, sign for, and maintain the training set during their iteration of an event. This technique allowed the battalion to continuously hone mounted and dismounted skill sets. Most importantly, 3-21 Infantry’s training methodology ensured the GRF company had the confidence and capacity to successfully overwhelm any potential foe, as evidenced during Operation Rapid Response.

**Key Lessons Learned**

Any undertaking consisting of the length and complexity posed by the GRF mission presents abundant challenges. Overcoming each challenge invariably yields important lessons that must be incorporated in standard operating procedures, tactics, techniques, and procedures, etc. in order to improve efficiency and overall performance. The following three lessons highlighted by this article were chosen because of the operational risk that each one posed toward the overall conduct of the mission.

**Level III vehicle protection.** Cage armor is perhaps the most enduring image of the Stryker during Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom. Cage armor was developed to defeat rocket propelled grenades, quickly followed by the development of hull protection kits which provided better protection against improvised explosive devices. Proof of their effectiveness lie in the number of lives that cage armor and hull protection kits saved.

Not enough sets of add-on armor kits exist to outfit every Stryker brigade. Therefore, add-on armor kits are primarily housed in pre-positioned stocks such as the one located at Auburn, Washington. Due to their limited availability, and the cost associated with transporting sets to different destinations as GRF assignments change, the
decision to outfit Stryker slices with add-on armor will be made upon notification to deploy. Given the accelerated deployment timeline, the most likely course of action is that the add-on armor kits would be installed at an initial staging base en route to the APOD. Then again, the extra weight and size associated with the inclusion of add-on armor significantly increases the amount of aircraft required to transport a Stryker company. Additionally, Strykers with attached add-on armor kits cannot fit in C-130 cargo planes. So, although add-on armor kits enhance Stryker protection and survivability, they also decrease deployability. Consequently, 3-21 Infantry prepared companies to deploy without the benefit of add-on armor.

**Digital interoperability.** History is replete with examples of military ventures seriously hampered by the inability to establish dependable communication networks between multiple units merged together during contingency operations. Modern information technology has in many ways further complicated the ability to establish reliable communications. Fittingly, 3-21 Infantry had to overcome a considerable interoperability problem to ensure the company could establish connectivity with higher headquarters immediately upon deployment.

The 1st SBCT, 25th Infantry Division digital architecture is built on line-of-sight, terrestrial-based communications platforms. Conversely, GRF mission analyses revealed that 2nd BCT, 82nd Airborne Division communications architecture was satellite based, and the two architectures could not communicate with one another. In light of this discovery, 3-21 Infantry submitted an operation needs statement (ONS) for Blue Force Trackers to fully meet 2nd BCT's operational requirements. PM Stryker subsequently installed 22 Blue Force Trackers on the GRF Stryker fleet. Like all requests for finite resources, considerable time elapsed between the ONS approval, sourcing, and eventual equipment installation process. Thus, units must identify equipping gaps requiring ONS fill early in planning processes to successfully mitigate risks prior to assuming the GRF mission.

**Immediate combat employment.** As stated earlier, the Stryker's compact size and relatively light weight
allows it to disembark from aircraft already prepared for combat operations. Additionally, the air load methodology depicted in figure 2 illustrates 3-21 Infantry’s attempt to ensure companies could fight immediately upon arrival at the APOD. However, experiences during Operation Rapid Response revealed that mismatches will invariably exist between air load requirements and combat load requirements.

Incompatible explosive mixtures and weights caused by the comingling of various ammunition types constitute the primary friction between the different load plan requirements. This is especially true when considering how the transportation of main gun rounds for mobile gun systems, mortar rounds, Javelin missiles, and other high explosives can easily violate joint travel regulations. Furthermore, load plans that alter outer vehicle dimensions, such as the affixing of personal bags and other equipment on Stryker bustle racks, often exceed physical constraints posed by tight aircraft cargo bays. Consequently, planners must account for the fact that crews will have to reconfigure load plans upon arrival at the APOD before they are fully prepared to execute combat operations. However, detailed analyses of authorized secondary load plans can mitigate the amount of effort required for reconfiguration, ultimately allowing the company commander to employ his force in a timely manner.

Conclusion
Retaining credible ground forces that can rapidly respond to any situation wherever they may occur around the world is one of the Army’s top priorities. The GRF is the Army’s concept to rapidly project scalable force packages capable of meeting specific mission demands. The Stryker organization is the physical embodiment of a credible ground force. 3-21 Infantry maintained the Stryker slice of the GRF package for seven months, and designed comprehensive training and staging plans that not only ensured the company could deploy immediately upon notification, but was also prepared to fight upon disembarkation at the APOD. Results from a forced entry EDRE conducted at Joint Base Elmendorf–Richardson validated that Stryker formations provide response force commanders with an enhanced strategic package that is rapidly deployable, sustainable, and capable of overwhelming any potential foe.

Notes
3. Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0, Unified Land Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 2012), Glossary-2. Decisive action is defined as “the continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks.”
5. Ibid., 1.
Although many years have passed since German operations at the outset of World War II, academics are still divided in defining the essence of German doctrine: the blitzkrieg. Was it a tactical doctrine that emerged as a response to technological advances, namely mechanized warfare and radio communications? Or, was it a strategic doctrine? Or, was it perhaps a philosophy born of Germany’s geo-strategic state that mandated avoidance of a simultaneous, two-fronted war, thus requiring the quick defeat of one enemy in order to allocate all resources to face a second? Robert Citino, noted Wehrmacht historian, leans toward the latter, asserting that German military philosophy had not changed during the interwar period. Rather, it was an extension of historic tradition of German military theory, dating back to Friedrich II (“the Great”). Either way, the nature of German doctrine...
remains hotly debated among military historians, as can be observed from the vast amount of literature available. The final word on the matter is yet to be said, and this article will not attempt to claim it.4

However, one oft-contested issue stemming from debate and discussion of blitzkrieg is whether the German doctrine was conceived as a construct at the operational level of war. It is this narrower issue which is the subject of this article.

Shimon Naveh, a well-known Israeli military historian, disputes the assertion that blitzkrieg was a manifestation of operational art. Instead he describes it as a concept that “not only lacked operational coherence but ... its actual formation dictated relinquishing a systemic approach to military conduct,” and that between 1933 and 1938 the Wehrmacht underwent a process which systematically destroyed operational awareness.5 He goes on to assert that the essence of the blitzkrieg was mythicized in the wake of the German army’s incredible victories at the outset of the war, which distorts clear analysis. Thus, Naveh maintains, discussion of operational thinking is irrelevant in regard to World War II German military thought.6

This article will attempt to refute Naveh’s misguided (and misleading) thesis by discussing the theory and practice of the German army during the 1920s and 1930s, proving that both operational thinking and emphasis on joint operations were very much existent in German thinking that led to formulation of blitzkrieg. Moreover, the article will clearly show that recognizable operational-based theory was converted into practice during the campaigns to conquer Western Europe.

Operational-Level as Paradigm

One can assert that the very basis for modern campaign planning and execution lies in developing doctrine that requires operational thinking and joint operations. Such doctrine was, in fact, developed during the second half of the 1930s, the very period when, per Naveh, the Germans deserted operational thinking. Before detailing the development of operational thinking in German military philosophy, it is necessary to first provide a short and simple overview of the operational level of war and joint operations as concepts. Later we shall examine the emergence of German doctrine especially during the period between the close of World War I and outbreak of World War II.

Operational Level of War

Definition

The U.S. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines the operational level of war as one at which “campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives” as defined by the political echelon.7 Thus, the operational level can be understood as a methodology of command aimed at executing strategic directives; it is not detached from the strategic level, but rather is subject to it. Moreover, it is at once the bridge between strategy and tactics, as well as a stage within the stages of war. Also, as art, it should be noted that the operational level cannot be analyzed via mathematical or physical means (i.e., the complex systems theory or chaos theory).8

Operational Art as Complex Endeavor within War

War is a national effort that requires coordination from the highest level of policy makers to the lower levels of tactical execution. This coordination is effective when every level of command understands it and does not operate outside the hierarchy, or province, of its own prescribed level.

The strategic level is born of the complex elements of national power that includes political, economic, social, psychological, and technological domains. Under that construct, military strategy should be defined as the art and science of using a country’s military forces to achieve national goals through the use of force, or threat thereof.

In contrast, the tactical level of war narrowly focuses on execution of those actions taken by tactical units or task forces to conduct actual combat. The operational level can be viewed as an intermediary one that links the two others into a coherent process. Concurrently, the operational level can also be defined as the mechanism for focusing the strategic perspective on one geographically defined theater in order to achieve strategic, and, subsequently, national goals by using tactical operations.9
Consequently, for the operational level to be effective, preparation for war requires a thorough understanding of what the strategic objective is and complete understanding of the tactical level, which refers to the intricacies of face-to-face confrontation with enemy forces.

The operational level accomplishes its role of achieving strategic military goals by delegating tactical tasks to the combat forces; its essence is to translate strategic targets into achievable tactical goals. Simply put, management on the operational level boils down to management of a series of battles fought by the tactical forces to achieve a strategic objective. This can be even further simplified. If the strategic level is the art of war management and the tactical level is the art of battle management, then the operational level is the art of campaign management, (i.e., managing a collection of battles).

Additionally, the operational level can be understood as the complex of military actions within a given theater. Therefore, operational thinking provides the theoretical foundation and logic for joint operations, defined as cooperation between two or more of the arms of the armed forces to guarantee optimal operational efficiency. Such cooperation requires unity of all efforts. This logically demands unity of command under one senior headquarters for the purpose of achieving better command, control, and coordination of all forces and efforts, including the non-combat logistics system.

**Operational Art and Joint Operations in the German Military in the Interwar Period**

With the above understanding in mind, analysis of the early World War II German campaigns in conquest of Western Europe has proven valuable for researchers of operational art. Planning and execution of German operations appear to demonstrate the kind of relationship one should expect between the operational and strategic levels, as well as the key importance of joint operations within operational thinking, thereby making them relevant to this day. Thus, attempts to identify the principles behind, as well as the theoretic and practical essence of, German doctrine continue to interest American military theorists who, since the latter half of the 1970s, have been trying to define and delineate future American warfare doctrine. Nevertheless, the theoretical framework asserted for German thinking continues to engender an intense debate—as exemplified by Naveh’s objections—regarding whether there actually was conscious employment of something akin to operational art behind the blitzkrieg concept and the occurrence of joint operations.

**German Operational Warfare in Practice**

During a preponderance of its early World War II campaigns, it is unquestionable that Germany used both its Heer (army) and Luftwaffe (air force) together in combined arms teams, supported by various other support arms, to simultaneously attack a vast number of targets while advancing along several routes. Additionally, in the occupation of Norway (Operation Weseruebung), the Kriegsmarine (navy) was also involved in an integrated scheme of coordinated operations with the air force and army. The German campaigns manifest identification of strategic objectives as they involved intensive planning aimed at identifying a country’s weaknesses, which then became principal targets for the unified German armed forces (Wehrmacht). Additionally, the campaigns themselves were executed using a highly flexible, non-central system of command and control.

Study of these campaigns reveals that a mission-command-like (Auftragstaktik) structure clearly existed within the German system. This contributed to the operational and tactical flexibility accorded to commanders in the war theater, who were required to achieve the general targets defined by the strategic plan, but left in large measure to their own initiative to develop and execute their portion of the campaigns. The concept of a mission-command-like component signifies operational thinking, since conceptually the operational level operates almost independently within the general guidelines defined by the strategic level.

This schematic description of operational thinking illuminates questions such as: Were early German blitzkrieg successes accidental, or were they the outcomes of carefully applied theory put into practice? To elaborate on answers to such questions,
we must examine whether there was something like a concept of operational art involving recognition for the need of coordinated joint operations organized in a campaign plan among German armed forces prior to the campaigns in the West.

**Roots of Operational Art in German Military Theory**

The concept of one campaign manager operating according to a set strategic idea while constantly adapting his actions to the ever changing military-tactical reality of the campaign appears prominently in the observations of Helmuth von Moltke, the Elder. He had come to his conclusions in large part by meticulously studying the campaigns of Friedrich II and Napoleon. He subsequently used his research, while serving as chief of staff of the Prussian army, to adapt management of war in a manner that successfully lead to the unification of Germany.

Following the triumph of the Prussian state in unification of the German states, von Moltke's immense influence on German military thinking continued to spread, and indeed shaped the plans of the German army leading up to World War I as well as those during the war itself.

After World War I, the German army continued to promote operational thinking as one means to effectively rebuild and restructure its forces in the face of strict limitations placed on it by the Treaty of Versailles. In part to circumvent strictures placed upon German armed forces, German Chief of Staff Gen. Hans von Seeckt ordered a systemic study of World War I in an attempt to create a modern warfare theory. A key subject of study was determining the appropriate relationship of aerial forces to land forces: Was the Luftwaffe by its nature an independent arm, or should it be subordinate and subject to the ground forces?

Consequently, he asserted that the air force was not an independent arm, but one which would amplify the overall power of the German army if used appropriately. In this regard, Wever's theory is representative of, and differs little from, broad agreement among military thinkers on the proper role of aerial forces during that period. This view of the Luftwaffe's relationship with the other arms of service had its following, even among German aviation officers.

Such theoretical military thinking, along with "war games" with the Soviet Union, produced Germany's aerial doctrine in 1926. It specified the two main roles of the air force. The first was providing close air support (CAS) in support of the other arms. The second was strategic bombing of enemy cities.

The order to establish the Luftwaffe proves that Germany intended to create a unified military force under one command that would coordinate the operations of all three arms, which were viewed as dependent on each other. According to Luftwaffe Regulation 16, only a joint operation of all three arms could achieve the operational goal (i.e., breaking the enemy's will to continue fighting).

In 1935, the Luftwaffe updated its 1926 doctrine, *Die Luftkriegführung*, incorporating some
additional concepts advocated by Italian theorist Julio Douhet, who asserted that the opening act of a conflict must be the destruction of the enemy’s aerial forces. However, unlike Douhet, who claimed that the aerial arm should exclusively run the war because of its superiority over other arms, German thinking continued to maintain that aerial forces were not superior to the other arms, but coequal, and codependent.27

Between 1933 and 1934, the *Truppenfuehrung*, the official doctrine of the German army for the first years of World War I, was published. It clearly asserted that the aerial forces played a major role in land battles, and that aerial assistance to ground forces would improve the combat efficiency of military operations (synergism). To achieve the requisite mind-set, it enjoined commanders of land forces to obtain a thorough understanding of the different types of aircraft and their capabilities.28 Consequently, the Truppenfuehrung can be generally viewed as a document praising and promoting joint operations.29

Studies examining how the German army progressed during the second half of the 1930s show that the German high command made plans and conducted training that was aimed at ensuring officers from one arm trained with officers of the others to promote familiarity and a penchant for cooperation.30 Additionally, starting in 1937, German armed forces started a series of large-scale maneuvers incorporating the three arms.31

Though the navy was often incorporated into this process, jointness was best practiced between the army and air force. The main reason for this was Germany’s tradition of land force orientation, with the aerial force viewed as merely an extension of ground warfare.

Other reasons can also be found. The first two relate to the Luftwaffe’s officers: the vast majority of them had served in the army prior to being transferred to the air force; additionally, the two arms very early began exchanging senior officers.32 A third reason was that ground force military tactics were taught in Luftwaffe academies. Also, a fourth
reason was that Luftwaffe squadrons were routinely allocated to the ground forces for CAS purposes. This resulted in German training that emphasized cooperation between the Luftwaffe and the Panzers (German armored vehicles).

The link between the army and the air force was further promoted by the emergence of mobile warfare theory, which had a profound influence on German ground warfare theorists. As dictated by British theory—specifically theory developed by Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart—the air force was to act as “flying artillery,” providing assistive fire for rapidly advancing maneuver forces. This was a novel concept when first introduced since it was a time when the majority of maneuver forces were still horse-drawn and unable to keep up with the fast-paced armored units under development. However, as Azar Gat proves, Hart greatly influenced the architects of German armored forces, especially Gen. Heinz Guderian. Guderian agreed with Liddell Hart that the tank was the main war platform when it came to future ground battles, but it could not operate alone. A tank had to be assisted by other mobile forces, especially aircraft.

In his book *Achtung Panzer!* Guderian laid out a vision that incorporated large formations of rapidly advancing tanks, then a new form of warfare, with cooperation and direct support from aerial forces in jointly coordinated attacks. He concluded that such cooperation would enhance combat efficiency in both arms, and neither should be favored over the other to achieve a new level of battlefield superiority. One must look “beyond the interest of an individual arm of the service,” Guderian exhorted.

**Operational and Joint Theories Tested during the Spanish Civil War**

Theories of warfare and training developed in Germany after World War I were tested during the German intervention in the Spanish Civil War. The use of German forces in the Spanish Civil War, specifically the Luftwaffe, demonstrated quite well Germany’s operational thinking and joint operations. Between 1936 and 1939, some 20,000 German soldiers were sent to Spain for periods ranging from six to twelve months. Upon their return to Germany, they imparted their experiences and lessons learned to their home units, which soon incorporated and refined them in practice.

One of the major lessons was the value of providing CAS to ground forces, which was the prime mission of the Condor Legion (the German aerial forces in Spain). While CAS as a concept had been evolving in other militaries worldwide, author and air power historian James Corum dubs it integral to the development of Luftwaffe doctrine. It is salient to observe that German CAS expertise prior to involvement in Spain was due to the Luftwaffe’s early commitment through operational thinking to joint operational planning; the Luftwaffe conducted joint officer training with ground forces as early as 1935. Subsequently, the Spanish Civil War provided the testing grounds for evaluation and adjustment of CAS in actual conflict, and the results were very positive. For example, during the 1937 battles with the Basques, advancing ground forces received highly effective CAS in place of artillery assistance. With practical experience, the accuracy of ordnance delivery by the Luftwaffe greatly improved, and ground forces learned to efficiently use aerial forces to suppress and destroy obstacles to their forward movement. As a result, Germany’s air and ground forces had already obtained significant experience with joint operations tactics before World War II, learning and improving battle abilities on all levels of warfare. By the outbreak of World War II, it was clear that the lessons from Spain were well learned.

The efficient and deadly assistance supplied by the Luftwaffe for the German ground forces that enabled the rapid advance of forces in the campaigns for Western Europe mirrored to a large extent the joint operations practiced in Spain. Robert L. DiNardo, author of *Germany’s Panzer Arm*, singles out the German army as the one force in Europe that, on the eve of the Poland campaign, practiced a doctrine that combined the operations of aerial forces with those of maneuver divisions, specifically the armored forces. Williamson Murray, author of *Luftwaffe*, adds that, on the eve of the Norway campaign, Germany’s armed forces had achieved total joint operations capabilities. He maintains that the manner in which the Luftwaffe was used demonstrated operational thinking, since on top of CAS, the Luftwaffe was also tasked with deep strategic bombing strikes against
enemy targets such as communications lines, recruitment centers, as well as enemy massing of combat and logistics forces. The purpose of these tasks was to simultaneously destroy enemy forces in close proximity or in contact with German ground forces, as well as enemy forces in depth, to allow maneuvering forces to move rapidly to their objectives.

Additionally, the pre-World War II era saw the emergence of a process of feedback that was the forerunner to what we regard as modern lesson-learned processes within operational thinking. The higher command, Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW), required joint operations, which demanded creating a theoretical framework. The resulting theory was tried and tested in training and maneuvers, the lessons from which were used to improve upon joint capabilities, then tested again in maneuvers. During the involvement in Spain and Poland, German units were repeatedly hit by Luftwaffe-delivered friendly fire. Feedback from such events led to steps taken to mitigate command and control problems resulting in fratricide. Moreover, joint operation capabilities continued to improve through joint maneuvers, with the Luftwaffe fully committed to this task while planning attacks on the West.

Apart from training and doctrine production, one can also note an important organizational change, proof of the German will to improve upon the joint concept. When the OKW was established in 1938, a high command headed by Hitler was formed to coordinate all three arms (Heer, Luftwaffe, and Kriegsmarine). Ironically, a school in modern American military thinking alleges that in order to achieve full joint operation capabilities and synergic battle efficiency, all American armed forces should be united to form a single arm, which in a way would mirror the OKW concept. Thus, we can view the OKW as the essence and beginning of joint thinking in Germany that continues to influence modern military theorists concerned with optimal orchestration of all arms in a unified effort to achieve strategic objectives.

**Conclusion**

This article briefly examined salient events in the development of German doctrine in the period prior to World War II, demonstrating that it was grounded in operational-level and joint operations thinking. Such thinking was rooted in German theory and practical experience dating back to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, developed through successive conflicts up through World War I, successfully adjusted and tested during the Spanish Civil War, and then incorporated into the Wehrmacht planning during the first two years of World War II. The observations provided strongly suggest that one of the main causes for the absolute success of the early German campaigns was the use of joint operations as a subset of operational thinking; and, that the speedy conquests during the early part of the war could not have been possible without it.

Moreover, far from lucky improvisation, it was rooted in consciously and carefully constructed doctrine developed prior to the war. This can also be proven by contradiction. After the first two years of the war, massive damages to its aerial forces prevented Germany from conducting joint operations resulting in loss of attack initiative.

Additionally, military historian Dr. Roger A. Beaumont ascribes the Western adoption of joint operation tactics as a response to having observed the successes of German joint operations in the West. In Britain and the United States, joint operations conducted under an operational-level campaign schema developed on a rapid learning curve, beginning with the North Africa campaign and ending with success in the northwestern European Theater. Adoption of such was a key element in the victory over Germany. Similarly, American forces in the Pacific—and to a lesser extent, the Russian army—underwent a like process.

To conclude, examining the German operations in the West by modern-day terms supports the claim that Germany indeed practiced what we recognize as operational thinking that necessarily emphasized the importance of joint operations. Thus, operations in the early stages of the war were founded on a set theoretical basis, the clearest manifestation of which was the incorporation of an aerial force in German joint operations with the army. The essence of such operational thinking did not come into being by accident with Hitler’s command to conquer the West; rather, it was born of theoretical thinking developed since the nineteenth century and updated continuously to accommodate early technological
and theoretical advances in the twentieth century. Therefore, the early success of German operations was not coincidental—it was a result of the development and incorporation of operational thinking in the German army, well established before World War II.

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**Notes**


6. Ibid., 107.


15. Citino, 42.


25. Corum, 94.
27. Douhet argued that command of the air is the key to enemy defeat. He also maintained that the ground forces and navy were to protect during an aerial strike until victory is achieved; Phillip S. Meilinger, “Proselytizer and Prophet: Alexander P. de Seversky and American Airpower,” *Airpower: Theory and Practice*, ed. John Gooch (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), 15-16.
32. Von Seeckt preserved operational knowledge by keeping some 180 experienced aviation officers in the German army. Although upon its establishment as a separate arm in 1934, the German air force had some skilled officers; they were unable to serve as staff officers for a broad army. Many ground officers were therefore transferred to the Luftwaffe.
33. B.H. Liddell Hart, *Thoughts of War* (Stroud Gloucester, UK: Spellmount Publishers (1998), 172 (original published in 1943). One of the primary ideas forming Liddell Hart’s theory is the formation of a heterogeneous division made up of infantry and armored forces (transported by armored platforms) as well as mobile artillery. The combat forces will be joined by mobilized, non-combat logistics units. Liddell Hart expanded on the heterogeneous division theory in a 1924 *Army Quarterly* 9 essay.
36. Ibid., 207.
41. Ibid., 83-85.
45. DiNardo, 62; Corum, “The Luftwaffe’s Army Support Doctrine, 1918-1941”, 76.
47. Beaumont, 85-86.
Spec. David A. Bryan, a combat medic with 2nd Battalion, 506th Infantry Regiment, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, checks an Afghan National Army combat medic’s aid bag during a class provided by U.S. Army medics 27 September 2009 at Combat Outpost Munoz, Afghanistan. Bryan took the time to go through each item in the bag, explained the importance of carrying only the items needed while on patrol, and replenished the medic’s bag with new supplies.

The Advisor and the Brigade Combat Team
Toward an Enduring Solution for an Enduring Requirement

n August 2010, the 4th Brigade Combat Team “Currahees,” 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) deployed to Regional Command–East (RC–East) as one of the first brigade combat teams (BCTs) augmented with additional advising personnel for security force assistance (SFA) in Afghanistan. Using this new model, the Army assigned several dozen personnel—commissioned officers from captains through colonels and senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs)—to the BCT during the intensive training period of Army force generation (ARFORGEN), centrally trained them as combat advisors, then deployed them as an integrated part of the formation. This change represented a shift from the Military Transition Team (MiTT) concept; it is the next evolution of the Army’s approach to organizing units for SFA. In May 2013, 4th BCT again deployed to RC-East, augmented in much the same manner with additional officers and NCOs to serve as the foundation of the brigade’s advising effort. In fact, 4th BCT was the last BCT to advise and assist at the subprovincial or infantry kandak (battalion) level, as the focus was shifted to the Afghan Army, corps level and higher. In this regard, the Currahees have seen the model of the BCT augmented for security force assistance (SFA) through its entire life cycle in Afghanistan. As Army leaders determine how to organize for advising foreign security forces (FSF) going forward while maintaining full-spectrum capability, a closer examination of 4th BCT’s experience is useful.

Having deployed with the BCT in 2010 as an augmenteed combat advisor and again in 2013 as the BCT operations officer, I have had a unique opportunity to gain a variety of perspectives on this topic. Despite the differing roles, however, I have grappled with the same questions every time: Will conventional Army forces retain this type of mission post-Afghanistan? Is a BCT the right formation for advising missions in Afghanistan and elsewhere? If so, how should the BCT organize for SFA or related building-partner-capacity missions? Are we doing the right things to select and train officers and NCOs to be advisors?

This article attempts to address these critical questions, concluding that the mission is here to stay, and the BCT, augmented and task-organized as the mission demands, is still the right approach to SFA. In order to realize the full potential of the model, however, the Army should formalize the process for selecting, training, and managing the careers of advisors. 

Competing Concepts

Discussions of institutionalizing advising capability in the Army often start with mention of John Nagl’s 2007 proposal for a permanent advisor corps. With a 20,000-strong formation commanded by a lieutenant general and organized exclusively for advising FSF, the advisor corps arguably occupies one end of the spectrum of solutions with respect to cost and scale. Another concept, developed by the Army but determined in 2008 not to be an Army requirement, was the Theater Military Advisory and Assistance Group, or TMAAG. The TMAAG concept proposed a smaller organization, tailor-made for advising, and assigned to the geographic combatant commands (GCCs), under the respective Army Service component commands. As an indicator of the direction in which the Army was moving, the desire to retain the BCT as the focus of our advising efforts was cited as the reason for the chief of staff of the Army’s decision to abandon the TMAAG. Published in 2009, Field Manual 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance, established the BCT as the formation of choice for SFA, able to be augmented with advisors but also retaining “the capability to conduct full spectrum operations—offense, defense, and stability.”

Will we ever do this again?

While the United States is unlikely to take on another large-scale, prolonged stability operation in the near future, the tempo of training and advising missions with FSF will likely continue to increase. Witness the sizable training and advising component to coalition operations to defeat ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), Operation Inherent Resolve. Of the 10 primary missions of the U.S. Armed Forces listed in the 2012 Department of Defense strategic guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, three of the missions (counterterrorism and irregular warfare, provide a stabilizing presence, and conduct stability and counterinsurgency operations) explicitly mention either SFA, building partner capacity, or military-to-military cooperation. The guidance does not restrict these activities to the
domain of special operations forces, and the 2013 Army Posture Statement provides further reinforcement to this fact, stating that the regionally aligned forces that will provide these capabilities to the combatant commander will be drawn from the Total Force.6

Is the BCT the right formation, and how should it organize?

Given the current budget-constrained environment and the ongoing reduction in the size of the force, it is not surprising that discussions about creating large, entirely new organizations have all but ceased. Even the regionally aligned forces concept, which allocates and apportions corps, divisions, and brigades to a GCC, retains the BCT as the centerpiece unit—a utility player able to be tailored as the mission dictates. 2nd BCT, 1st Armored Division, supporting United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2013, is one such example. Subsequent to establishment, it has conducted capacity-building missions with units as small as several dozen soldiers in more than 30 nations.7

In Afghanistan, where MiTTs had operated previously under reporting chains separate from the battlespace owner, who was typically a BCT commander, there was a cost in terms of unity of effort. 8 Since 2010, however, BCTs have deployed with their own advisor augmentation. In this way, the commander is able to harness the considerable mission command capabilities resident in a brigade as well as meet other needs of advisor teams, such as logistics and security. This model also lends considerable flexibility to commanders when organizing for the mission. When 4th BCT deployed in 2010, the entire BCT had advisor teams assigned at either the brigade or battalion level, depending on the echelon of Afghan unit being advised.

For the brigade’s next deployment in 2013, the unit was under significant force cap constraints, requiring that several thousand soldiers remain at home. In the intervening years, the mission had also evolved. The decisive operation was now building the capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces. With this new focus in mind, we organized the BCT around our advisor teams, which included both augmentees assigned earlier in the ARFORGEN cycle as well as soldiers organic to the BCT.

Having observed numerous brigades deploy since then, each one has organized its advisors and organic units differently based on its own unique advising requirements. The one constant is the necessity for great flexibility to analyze a complex problem, task-organize accordingly, and then remain flexible as the campaign progresses—a capability that single-use advising formations would be hard pressed to replicate.

How should we select and train advisors?

One solution to the problem of selecting and training FSF advisors is for units assigned such missions to use their organic personnel. In the case of some very limited-scale engagements, this may fit the bill. However, an SFA mission need not be on a large scale, such as that of advising the Afghan Army, to require
that brigades be augmented with additional specialized personnel to serve as advisors.

For example, while a mission-tailored BCT or subordinate unit is well suited to a variety of SFA and other building-partner-capacity requirements, one drawback is the frequent mismatch of ranks and skills needed for the purpose of direct counterpart advising and mentoring. When Army forces are actively participating in combat operations in a partnered rather than advising capacity, as was the case in Afghanistan until several years ago, the organic formation may suit just fine. However, when the mission is primarily advising, as was the case recently with 4th BCT, there exists a much greater focus on one-on-one interaction between advisors and host-nation key leaders and staffs. As a result, such situations call for a more top-heavy organization with larger complements of officers and senior NCOs than are organic to a BCT. This requirement has compelled the Army to augment BCTs with additional officers and senior NCOs, as discussed earlier.

When the Currahees deployed in 2010, the unit was augmented with approximately 40 additional personnel, including myself, to serve as advisors. Some of us volunteered for the assignment. Others were picked by their respective branches based on a variety of factors, of which demonstrated potential to serve as a combat advisor did not appear to be included. The BCT’s deployment was part of the surge of forces to Afghanistan, stressing the personnel system to provide anyone to augment the BCT, much less a carefully selected group arriving early in the ARFORGEN cycle.

Compounding the issue of whether an individual selected for advisor duty actually had the temperament or potential to serve effectively was the short timeline for deployment and the relatively superficial training given. For example, my cohort arrived at Fort Campbell during the BCT’s predeployment block leave with just enough time to attend the two-week Advisor Academy at Fort Polk and to complete other required theater-specific training and administrative tasks before deploying on the BCT’s last main-body flight.

Similar challenges seemed to persist over time. Two years later, in the summer of 2012, the BCT...
was again executing the intensive training cycle of ARFORGEN. With about nine months remaining prior to the next deployment to Afghanistan, the BCT had already begun to receive its complement of advisor personnel. This lead time enabled the formation to integrate the advisor teams at the brigade and battalion/squadron level, train with them at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana, and deploy as units tailored for the mission. However, while this change represented a vast improvement over the previous iteration, much had remained the same. All evidence indicated that the personnel system had used much the same selection process to determine who would augment the BCT as advisors, and, other than training conducted with the unit, the only specialized training remained an updated version of the two-week Advisor Academy.

Despite these challenges, the vast majority of advisors—augmentees as well as those organic to 4th BCT—performed exceptionally well. They endured harsh conditions, shared sacrifices, and put forward a 100-percent effort to accomplish the mission.

**Institutionalizing Advising Capability**

Assuming that SFA and other missions involving engagement with FSF are enduring Army requirements and will continue to be filled by BCTs, there is significant room for improvement in how the Army selects, trains, and manages the careers of soldiers serving as advisors.

The Army’s own SFA doctrine provides extensive guidance regarding the qualities advisors should possess as well as the training required. Of note, many of the sixteen advisor traits listed in FM 3-07.1, such as “tolerance for ambiguity,” “flexibility,” and “perceptiveness” are innate qualities rather than skills that can be taught.19 Not listed, but perhaps more important, is a strong desire to work closely with foreign militaries. Other skills that can be learned, such as foreign language, require a significant investment of resources in an individual. The experience gained serving as an advisor represents another type of investment, which could be lost entirely if advising is just a one-off assignment during an officer’s or an NCO’s career. To mitigate these issues, Army leaders should consider the following recommendations to institutionalize the selection, training, and management of advisors.

- Create a career field for volunteering officers and NCOs who pass advisor assessment and qualification courses. Subdivide the career field by regional orientation.
- Unlike a single-track functional area, manage the advisor career field in a dual-track manner, whereby the officer or NCO continues to serve in key positions within his primary branch or military occupational specialty, including traditional, centrally selected positions such as battalion command. This allows advisors to retain operational proficiency, a critical quality for those advising FSF.
- Expand the training course for advisors at Fort Polk. Include a capstone exercise similar to Robin Sage in the Special Forces Qualification Course but for SFA rather than unconventional warfare.
- Include a language immersion course based on the individual’s regional orientation. In conjunction, consider an abbreviated in-country training portion similar to that which foreign area officers undergo.
- Assign qualified advisors either to augment BCTs for SFA or directly to units preparing for a regional alignment or similar mission. The advisor’s regional orientation and language skills should be a desired but not a required match to the mission.

An example career path of an officer under this model might look as follows. Following company command, Capt. Smith, an infantry officer who has volunteered and been selected for the advisor career field, attends a six-month qualification course at Fort Polk. The course includes several months of language immersion in French and three weeks of in-country training in an African nation. Following completion of training, Smith is assigned to augment a BCT that is entering its intensive training cycle prior to assuming a regional alignment with AFRICOM the following year.

During the BCT’s year in the force pool available to AFRICOM, Smith deploys to Africa twice for eight- to ten-week training missions as part of a task-organized team working with host-nation brigade-and-below units. After attending resident Command and General Staff College, (now) Maj. Smith is assigned as a battalion S-3 (Operations) in another BCT aligned with AFRICOM, where, even if he does not deploy, he is able to leverage his considerable regional expertise to develop relevant training for his unit.
From there, Smith may choose to remain at the same installation to work in the corps G-3/5/7 where he can develop plans and orders in support of the corps’ permanent regional alignment. Alternately, he could take a position instructing future advisors at Fort Polk, attend full-time graduate school, or accept another broadening assignment before competing for battalion command.

While this model does add additional complexity to the personnel assignment system, it is entirely feasible and represents a considerable improvement in the way we manage those soldiers with regional expertise and advising experience.

**Conclusion**

My time with 4th BCT, combined with that from earlier assignments working around MiTT teams in Iraq, has provided me with insight and experience regarding how the U.S. Army can improve the career management of advisors.

In my view, the BCT is the proper formation of choice for SFA and other capacity-building missions due to its inherent mission command strengths and its wide array of tailorible capabilities. In contrast, even if it were desirable, the wholesale creation of specialized units to perform advising missions overseas is not realistic in the current environment.

However, while BCTs have performed admirably in this capacity in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere, the Army can significantly improve its ability to execute this critical mission by institutionalizing the selection, training, and career management of those personnel who are either assigned or serve as augmentees to BCTs at the decisive point of SFA: the advisors. By taking the recommendations in this article, the Army can close the gap between patchwork solutions—which allowed us to “make do” for 10 years—and a future where Army forces are increasingly engaged in advising and capacity-building activities around the world.

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**Notes**

3. Ibid.
8. The term battlespace owner is being used in this case to refer to either an area of operations commander or area of operations supporting commander, the terms currently used within ISAF Joint Command.
9. FM 3-07.1 differentiates partnering and advising whereby partnering is the attachment of partner and host-nation units at various levels to conduct operations, and advising is the use of influence to coach, teach, and advise FSF to accomplish a mission.
10. FM 3-07.1.
Army Civilians and the Army Profession

Lt. Col Robert Hynes, Ph.D., U.S. Army, Retired

One notable difference between the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and previous conflicts was the omnipresence of U.S. government civilians. More than in any conflict past, civilians were everywhere. No, I am not talking about the locals. I refer to the sizable presence of government civilians on nearly every U.S. installation in the war zone. Since the start of combat operations in 2003, civilians from...
various government agencies were instrumental to achieving U.S. objectives. One team, one fight, right?

Fast forward to 2011. The Center for the Army Profession and Ethic (CAPE) showcased the results of its comprehensive assessment of the state of the Army Profession. Pitching the campaign at military installations worldwide, the center sought to promote and reaffirm the Army Profession following the decade-long conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. What was most unprecedented was the center’s revised definition of the Army Profession which, for the first time, included Department of the Army (DA) civilians as a component.1 Civilian membership in the profession was a fait accompli. After all, if the Army declares it so, it must therefore be. Correct? Not exactly.

Given the close civilian-military interaction during the recent conflicts, it is hardly surprising that the Army would feel the need to establish civilians within the profession.2 Senior military leaders may have welcomed the measure as a form of team building, which is a noble enough endeavor. But, does the honorary reception of civilians by Army leaders actually constitute de facto membership in the military profession?

Since civil-military relations emerged as a branch of political science, no mainstream scholar has ever claimed civilians to be members of the military profession. Although the CAPE did, in fact, include established scholars in its committee, the assertion came undeniably from the military establishment itself rather than from an objective academic source. The Army prefaced the study with the foregone conclusion to include civilians as members of the profession. Recognizing the problem with this reasoning, the CAPE sought to modify the definition of the Army Profession in order to accommodate civilians. It stated—

The solution within the campaign was to revise, to broaden, the description of the Army’s expert knowledge/expertise …. By expanding the realm of the Army’s expert knowledge and in-practice expertise to “the design, generation, support, and application” of land combat power, the civilian members of the Army can now rightly see where their expert service fits within the profession.3

The expanded definition, although describing where civilians may “serve” the profession, does not adequately confer professional status on the civilian workforce. The problem with the CAPE’s reasoning is simple: Desire to be part of a profession is insufficient grounds to become part of it. The truth is that DA civilians cannot be members of the Army Profession because the service they provide does not classify them as a profession—even with the broadened language used in the CAPE study.

Neither seeking to discredit the CAPE nor to marginalize the critical role filled by civilians in our nation’s armed conflicts, this article critically examines the qualities that define a profession specifically as they relate to civil-military relations. This article concludes that DA civilians fall short of the definition of a profession. Moreover, there is a substantial difference between serving as a member of a profession and, in the course of colloquial English, merely being a professional or working in a professional manner.

The Army Profession

The notion of the military as a profession grew to prominence in the twentieth century as warfare took on an increasingly technical nature, one that required years of study and practice in order to master. Compounding this technical complexity was that the devastation of war required strict discipline in its application and obedience of the military to U.S. elected leaders. The military gained a high level of trust with the American public that the application of force would be used in a manner consistent with the will of the state. Acknowledging this trust and the unique relationship that the military held with the citizenry, the military acquired conscious awareness of its professional and moral responsibilities. It was the combination of these three components—the technical expertise of warfare, the relationship of trust between itself and the American public, and awareness of the professional responsibilities pursuant to that trust—that collectively established the Army as a profession. Thus, professionalism, as an element of the practice of warfare, also became associated with the core values and core competencies of the Army.4

It is critical here to explain and distinguish between various notions of a profession. The vernacular view, for instance, would suggest that a professional is anyone who derives remuneration from an occupation—any occupation, such as a manager, worker, or clerk; or that
the term professional distinguishes an athlete, actor, or musician who performs an art full-time—from one who practices a hobby. It is likewise possible for anyone to act professionally or to conduct himself or herself in a professional manner by producing quality work. Although all these definitions are found in commonplace usage, they fall short of the concept of a professional as a member of a profession. In this sense, the CAPE study may have intended that DA civilians should be part of the Army Profession by the fact that they produce quality work. However, professional performance is not sufficient grounds to make one a member of a profession, since anyone of experience and competence is capable of producing professional quality work.

Correctly speaking, the Army is not a profession merely because it claims to be. Rather, the Army is a profession because it possesses the qualities that distinguish a profession in the modern sense—qualities that are also found in other established professions, such as medicine, law, and engineering. The prerequisite qualities that as a minimum define a profession include a core competency and ethic, professional certification, and self-regulation. The fact that all three qualities are absent from the Army Civilian Corps indicates that its members cannot qualify as members of the Army Profession.

Core Competency and Ethic

First and foremost, the sine qua non of any profession is a core competency—that is, the unique expertise that defines the profession. The core competency must involve a body of knowledge essential to the practice of the profession. For example, the core competency of the medical profession is medicine or healthcare; for the legal profession, it is law; and for the engineering profession, it is engineering. In the general sense of the Army Profession, its core competency is land warfare or, to use specific the language of the CAPE study, “the design, generation, support, and application of land combat power.” Just as every doctor’s core competency is medicine, and every lawyer’s core competency is law, so too the core competency of every military officer is land warfare.

A core competency requires years of very specific experience and education to master. Notwithstanding any differences in military occupation, branch, or career field, every professional soldier and officer learns a universal set of combat skills and basic tactics. In the same way that a doctor enters a residency for further practice after the completion of medical school, Army officers and noncommissioned officers undergo years of key assignments and follow-on schools in order to develop this professional expertise.

Complementing the Army’s core competency is the code of ethics, which reaffirms the bond of trust between the members of the profession and the client. Although one might argue that a code of ethics is separate from and independent of a core competency, I argue that in the professional sense neither a core competency nor a code of ethics can exist without the other. Whereas, the core competency describes what expertise the profession will dispense to the client, the codes of ethics describe the manner in which the profession will dispense this expertise. The code of ethics represents the base value system that all members of the profession must meet.

The Army code of ethics is embodied in oaths of enlistment and commissioning, academy honor codes, the Code of Conduct for service members, creeds for noncommissioned officers and officers, and in the Army Values and Warrior Ethos. Although these creeds and others appeared in writing at various periods in history, their appearance merely codified those values that already existed in the Army’s professional ethic.

In addressing the question of civilians in the Army Profession, the problem is this: The DA Civilian Corps possesses no core competency and associated code of ethics. Unlike the legal, medical, or military professions, there is not a sole area of expertise that the DA Civilian Corps dispenses. Apart from a number of military retirees who now occupy its ranks, the DA Civilian Corps neither possesses nor pursues the expertise necessary to prosecute land warfare. For those who advocate Army civilians as members of the profession, this is a troubling prospect. What role then do the DA civilians play?

All professions contain a number of associates, people who serve the profession or work in the profession but who are not members of the profession per se. Legal secretaries, clerks, and administrative assistants, for example, may provide specific services to their supported professions, but these services are by no means unique. While lawyers are trained and possess the core
competencies to perform these same services, legal secretaries are not competent to practice law. Once again, this status does not marginalize the contributions any of these occupations may make to the professions they serve. It simply indicates that as associates of a particular profession, they are not members of that profession.

Army civilians are not competent to perform the duties of their uniformed counterparts. Instead, they provide a service to the Army that is neither unique nor defined by any particular core competency. While many DA civilians—such as doctors, engineers, and other specialists—are distinct members of other professions, their technical expertise is only tangentially related to the prosecution of land warfare and is insufficient to qualify them in the Army Profession itself. Therefore, without a core competency, the DA Civilian Corps cannot claim to be part of any profession.

In bolstering the point with regard to DA civilians, the CAPE study directed attention to the governing code of ethics embodied in Title 10 standards of conduct as well as the civilian oath of office and Army Civilian Corps Creed. Pointing out their similarities with military oaths and creeds, the study claimed that these vignettes were sufficient to justify a professional ethic for the Army Civilian Corps. Even if one accepts the CAPE’s claim as valid, a professional ethic also requires a degree of enforcement throughout the self-regulation of the profession, which will be explained further.

Professional Certification

Complementing the definition of a profession is the requirement for certification. Licensure confers the legal authority to practice most professions and certifies the expert knowledge to meet regulatory guidelines. An academic degree is often not sufficient in itself to meet this qualification. The government or licensing agency may require a further assessment to ensure that the aspiring members have achieved sufficient mastery of the skills required to serve in the profession safely and responsibly. Engineers hold in high esteem a professional license that requires years of application and study before one is allowed to take a licensing exam. Lawyers pass a grueling bar exam for the authority to practice law. Such is the case with most other professions.

In the Army, both officers and enlisted soldiers undergo certification multiple times in their careers through specialized schools that simultaneously teach and assess mastery of required knowledge, combat skills, leadership, and fitness—all of which certify the members’ sustained permission to engage in land warfare. The Army’s periodic reassessment of its members parallels that of other professions that require continued education in order to maintain certification.

In a true profession, certification is earned and maintained only upon meeting regulatory requirements, mastering required knowledge, and adhering to standards of conduct, all of which are prescribed in the profession’s core competency and ethic. It is the profession’s self-regulation that oversees the issuance and maintenance of this certification. Although the CAPE study alluded several times to “certification” of civilian employees, it offered little in terms of specific examples. What then exactly certifies a DA civilian? And what happens if the civilian does not adhere to those certification requirements? The CAPE study was a bit vague on this issue. In fact, there exists no certification that distinguishes a DA civilian from any other type of federal employee. Additionally, if a DA civilian fails to meet the regulatory or ethical standards, there exists no process to decertify that person. This point brings me to the last section, that of regulation of the profession, because certification is such an important process through which the Army Profession regulates itself.

Regulation of the Profession

The previously discussed qualities of core competency, ethic, and certification require one final quality to bind them together. This quality is the ability of the profession to regulate itself—to enforce the core competency and ethic and to issue certification on their basis. For example, a state bar association uses certification to enforce legal ethics and determines baseline educational requirements in the legal profession. In the case of engineering, each state’s board of professional regulation manages testing standards and issues engineering licenses. State regulatory authorities draw on the expertise of senior members of each profession to determine certification requirements. It is through the control of standards and licensure in the enforcement of the core competency and ethic that these regulatory bodies provide one more vital service: control of entrance to and exit from the profession.

Entrances to and exits from the profession are crucial to its regulation. The gates of the profession do not
refer to the simple matter of changing jobs but to that of changing professions. When a doctor changes jobs within the field of medicine, does he or she cease being a doctor? Regardless of the specific form of employment, the doctor maintains a certified level of competency and trust with the patient. In cases of malpractice or ethical violations, the doctor may become decertified and thereby removed from the profession. That removal is performed by the governing body of the profession, so it is in this manner that the profession regulates itself.

The Army controls entrance to the profession through its academies and commissioning systems, basic training, and developmental assignments. The control of entrances is crucial to the Army Profession because the Army cannot simply hire an officer or noncommissioned officer off the street—no more than a hospital can hire a doctor who has not graduated from medical school. The core competencies involved in war fighting are so technical that they require a significant level of schooling before one can even begin work at the basic level. This is not the case with the DA Civilian Corps. The federal system is arranged such that an employee can start at virtually any grade if the employee possesses a commensurate level of experience. The requirement for significant technical experience refers only to those civilians who produce technical services such as doctors, engineers, and scientists, and who are by default members of a technical nonmilitary profession.

Exits from the Army Profession are formal procedures involving a discharge, which in extreme cases may be accompanied by a criminal penalty or loss of commission. But otherwise, changing jobs within the Army does nothing to diminish the professional status of the soldier. Departure from the military also occurs at set career intervals during which officers and noncommissioned officers are assessed, and a failure in the assessment may result in exit from the Army Profession. The Army’s “up or out” promotion system requires that its members achieve a specified level of technical and ethical competency within a finite time frame. Those individuals who fail to do so are then removed from the profession.

Once a soldier has been discharged, he or she is no longer a soldier and acquires a very different status in
the legitimate application of warfare. This brings us back to the issue of the DA civilian. The Geneva Convention categorizes DA civilians as noncombatants. They may not employ weapons except in self-defense and, for all practical purposes, may not engage in land warfare. The CAPE study was careful to address this legal distinction by separating the Army Profession into two components: the Army Profession of Arms and the DA Civilian Corps. But by making this distinction, the CAPE study is forced to admit that the DA Civilian Corps is removed from the core competency of land warfare.  

With regard to control of entrances and exits, the DA Civilian Corps has no more controls than any other part of the federal service. The requirements for employment are identical to those of other federal agencies, and DA civilians who transfer into or out of the Department of the Army acquire or relinquish no special status except in title.

For enforcing the core competency and ethic of the DA Civilian Corps, assuming that either exist in the first place, the federal system has no such provisions. This is not to say that federal workers are incompetent or unethical. Rather, the civilian employment system does not manage these qualities nor fire employees for failing in either area. Missed promotions or loss of employment due to poor performance are specific to a job and are neither treated as exits from a profession nor related to the Army Profession's core competency and ethic.

The conclusion, therefore, is that the DA Civilian Corps is indistinguishable from the remainder of the federal workforce. It contains no core competency itself and is unqualified to manage the Army's core competency of land warfare. Even if one accepts the premise that a core competency and ethic for the DA Civilian Corps truly exist, there is no provision in the employment system to enforce either one. In other words, the DA Civilian Corps does not meet the definition of a profession.

**The DA Civilian Corps**

The CAPE's argument that Army civilians now rate as members of the Army Profession simply does not hold up. A desire to be all-inclusive with regard to military and civilian personnel is not a sufficient provision
to become so, and the CAPE’s revised definition fails to remedy the problem.

Essentially, what the DA Civilian Corps lacks are the requisite qualities of a profession—first and foremost, a core competency and ethic. This core competency represents the specific technical knowledge of the field for which all of its members must achieve proficiency. The ethic provides a framework in which to apply that knowledge. In this case, the services provided by government civilians are neither sufficiently unique that the Army cannot provide them for itself nor do they require any specialized knowledge inherent to the Army Profession. With no core competency from which to draw upon, there exists no standard to professionally certify members of the DA Civilian Corps. And even if a standard were to exist, neither the Army nor the federal system controls entrance and exit in such a way as to regulate civilians as members of the profession.13

This is not to say that the DA civilians provide no value to the force. As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown, they most certainly do. But what is key to understanding the relationship between the civilians and military members is that the value civilians provide is routine and not unique. It is more accurate to say that while not strictly members of the Army Profession, DA civilians support the Army Profession through the services they provide.

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Notes


8. Snider, 18. The author makes this distinction between a profession, which works with expert knowledge to complete unique non-repetitive tasks, and that of a simple government organization, which works with nonexpert knowledge to efficiently complete repetitive tasks, such as the management of the Army bureaucracy.


10. The Army Profession, 24-25.

11. Snider, 23. The author provides a discussion on self-regulation.


13. Ibid., 15.
It’s Not About Trust; It’s About Thinking and Judgment


There has been a great deal of talk about trust and trust development recently in and around the military. Gen. Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has made it one of his priorities for the joint force. The issue of trust—or breach of trust—has surfaced because over the past decade or so, there have been numerous breaches throughout the force (to include flag-level officers), most notably with regard to sexual misconduct. Lying and cheating, along with other failures of service members of all ranks to conform to an acceptable standard of professional behavior, have also dominated the press and helped to weaken the trust our nation has in its armed forces. The Army professes that trust is the bedrock of the profession. It identifies it as—

- Trust between soldiers
- Trust between soldiers and their leaders
- Trust between soldiers their families and the Army
- Trust between the Army and the American people

In response to this new focus on trust, we will attempt to investigate and dissect what trust really means and what it looks like in practical and real terms. More importantly, we will propose that the training, educational, and developmental focus should not be on trust; it should instead be continuously focused on self-awareness, critical thinking, and judgment (or reasoning).

Trust

Soldiers gain trust by exhibiting high levels of competence and character.

Trust in competence. In day-to-day activities, soldiers primarily elicit competence-trust by being proficient in their military occupational duties—pilots, mechanics, clerks, snipers, divers, ammunition specialists, cooks, and medics are just a few examples.

Gaps or weaknesses in competence are relatively easy to see and can normally be remedied by extra training or practice. For example, if Spc. Smith, a mechanic, does not know how to fix a transmission, this is a competency gap. Smith’s supervisor, Staff Sgt. Jones, can easily identify Smith’s shortcoming and develop a training plan to remedy the deficiency.
Smith trusts that Jones will not have him fix a transmission until Smith can safely and properly complete the task. Unit leadership trusts that Jones will apply his expert knowledge and judgment (either conscious or unconscious) of Smith’s abilities and train his subordinate accordingly. In this example, Jones demonstrates that competence-trust is the result of expert knowledge, critical thinking, and reasoning.

**Trust in character.** Issues of trust become much more complex when concerning character. Thinking, judging, and reasoning become even more necessary and discerning as they relate to character-trust.

Rightly or wrongly, character can be seen as being very malleable and situational. Person X can be trusted in one situation or context but might not be trusted in another. This idea will make many uncomfortable because the military is a profession, has a professional ethic, and ideally should not have leaders whose character is malleable, or situational, or susceptible to working outside of the accepted professional norm or ethic. True enough, but humans are humans—each is flawed and weak in certain areas.

History is rife with examples where common human weaknesses are exposed by sex, money, power, and alcohol or drugs. Those in the military are not immune from these temptations, but increasing our awareness (consciousness) of how we view these temptations and how we judge them will result in more thinking and judgment—which can only help to mitigate their effects.

The aforementioned temptations often result in what many would characterize as moral or ethical character flaws. However, how people both in and out of an organization view these flaws is a mixed bag—even in professions like the military. For many, lying about and having affairs are seen as private matters that have no effect on one’s professional behavior or competence-trust. Former President Clinton’s relationship with Monica Lewinsky appears to be a shining example of these conflicting points of view. Did Americans elect a president, expecting that person to be morally perfect and upstanding? Or, did they elect the person whom they believed would be the best chief executive and policy maker for the country?

Similarly, does the military select officers for flag-level command knowing their characters or assuming they possess the appropriate character traits (knowing how flawed we all are)? Or, do we select military leaders because of their demonstrated capability to command at the levels for which they have been selected?

It is important to note here that we are not taking sides or subscribing to any specific behavioral ethics. We also are not challenging or questioning the military’s professional ethic or the importance of upholding it. We are merely presenting real-world topics and issues that affect trust and trust building.

**Thinking, judgment, and trust.** In a given situation, personal morals and beliefs, as well as professional values and ethics, all work together to influence a person’s thoughts and judgment—resulting in some level of trust in those involved. In order to move the conversation forward, we need to bring up some uncomfortable aspects of what trust is all about—how to gain it, how to lose it, and how it can (or cannot) be regained.

The case of Brig. Gen. Jeffrey Sinclair provides numerous examples of issues of trust, transparency, power, fraternization, sex, and professional ethics. Anecdotal evidence suggests that his extramarital activities were common knowledge, perhaps for years and years, in and around his units, but nothing was said or done. Why not? Is this a case of his unquestioned warrior and leadership competencies usurping and clouding the thinking and judgment of those serving in and around him? It appears likely. This appears to be a classic example of those who knew and served with Sinclair having unquestioned and complete trust in his competence and not spending any time considering or reasoning through their trust in his character.

The spike of high-profile incidents over the past few years seems to suggest that other senior officers (for example, Gen. David Petraeus, Gen. Kip Ward, Gen. Kevin Byrnes, and Col. James Johnson who have gotten into trouble, also had the unqualified trust in their competence from their subordinates and peers while trust of character was rarely, if ever, questioned. And, if it was questioned, it was either dismissed or rationalized away. Of note, we acknowledge and understand the risk to a soldier’s career if a soldier questioned or challenged a senior officer’s character. Yet this cost-benefit analysis, and perhaps a professional discussion with others, is an example of the thinking, reasoning, judgment we are speaking to.
A reflective analysis of character-trust and competence-trust suggests one can trust people in some areas and not in others. In the military, one might trust someone to properly conduct an arms room inventory but not necessarily trust the person to safely run a range or to stay sober on a Friday night. Or, one might trust someone to properly conduct a tactical rehearsal and yet not trust the person to fairly and impartially write a counseling statement or fitness report. Examples of trusting someone in one area and not in another are infinite, and they highlight the variability associated with the concept of trust and, correspondingly, the importance of thinking, judgment, and reasoning.

Use of the word trust is fraught with the possibility of error and mistaken meaning. If one was to say “I trust Col. Brown,” what does that exactly mean? Is he trusted tactically? To keep his word? Does it mean to trust him to be fair in adjudicating punishment? To trust him to babysit one’s children? To trust him to not steal? To trust him to be on time? The potential list is endless. As such, when we use the word trust, we need to be specific about what we are talking about; we need context. To do that, we have to think, use our judgment and reason.

What should be clear now is that the questions are not really about Brown at all. Instead, they center on one’s interpretation of Brown, conceived by one’s thinking, value system, moral barometer, ability to reason, and emotional intelligence. In short, Brown is only a reflection of one’s understanding of trust as it relates to a particular situation. Someone may very well trust the colonel as a combatant leader but not to provide care for the person’s child. In fact, when interpreting, thinking, and judgment are applied, one may be able to explain much more clearly the differences that context and situation play in the decision to confer competence- or character-trust. But, no matter what trust one chooses to give or withhold, the important consideration is that it generates from an interpretation of Brown, not from what the colonel may or may not have done. In short, it is not what Brown does, it is how much weight is given to what Brown does.

We often hear that “trust is earned,” but do we consider from what perspective that trust is being given? Trust comes from how I judge you, what I think about you, and how I perceive you—all of which are based on my experiences with you. But, what if you are a complete stranger? What am I relying on in that instance? What alerts me that I may or may not trust you in the initial interaction? At that moment, my ability to think critically, judge, and reason are all I have to guide me.

Interestingly, in the military, trust—both in terms of character and competence—is considered the starting point. For example, in an overseas joint operation, where a member of the Air Force meets a member of the Marine Corps for the first time, the start point of their working relationship is competency-trust and, much less so, on character-trust beyond the commonly held ideas of service, national pride, commitment, and professionalism. That trust will remain until there is a reason for it not to, based on an event where one of the two in the relationship shows a gap or weakness in competence or character. Importantly though, it is not the gap or weakness itself that matters as much as whether or not one party or the other gives it any positive or negative value as a result of the party’s thinking, judgment, and reasoning.

Implicit, immediate, and unthinking trust can be problematic, especially as people move up the ranks. Just because someone is a four-star-level officer or command master chief, does it mean that person is perfect in terms of character and competence? Clearly not. But here, we hypothesize that this kind of thinking is the norm in the military. In fact, it is the very nature of how a chain of command works that reinforces this thinking every day through the hierarchical design and, at times, overreliance on “that’s just the way it is.” This is the exact kind of thinking that needs to be overtly challenged.

It can be argued that as people become more senior, those around them should become more conscious and sensitive to the possibility of character and (to a lesser extent) competency flaws in their boss. The selection of a person to a senior-level position implies that the person has demonstrated a high degree of competency. However, we are left to learn and assess our level of trust, through our level of value, of that individual’s character based on our observations of what we see and hear.

We propose that the focus of training, education, and development to build trust needs to be on thinking, with a goal of improving one’s judgment and reasoning ability in order to make wise and informed decisions. In short,
to develop and improve trust across the military, military members need to improve their self-awareness, critical thinking, judgment, and ability to reason. These skills are critically important, as the importance of character—trust in leadership cannot be overstated or overlooked.

Thinking and Reasoning

Trusting another person, like many other cognitive activities, can occur at the conscious or unconscious level—meaning one can be aware of one’s thinking (meta-cognition) or not be aware (mindlessness). Either way, it still occurs. As such, there needs to be much more emphasis placed on unaware thinking, or mindlessness, that which we do or interpret without consideration of why we do it. This point cannot be overstated. Humans can choose to consider how and why they think about something, or not.

The high school football team in Steubenville, Ohio, that filmed a gang rape of a girl who had passed out from too much alcohol is a classic example of not thinking, or mindlessness. Was every student at the party evil? Was every young man in the group guilty of serious character flaws? While the crime is heinous and, for a thousand reasons, should not have occurred, the more serious question that should be asked is what conditions beyond alcohol (which is too easy a scapegoat here) existed that so many people would not stop to think, reason, and critically decide to intervene to stop the criminal event? There are numerous examples of mindless, unthinking behaviors, and research suggests that mindlessness is not uncommon.

Mindfulness, on the other hand, addresses the quality of the attention given to something or someone, resulting in some level of trust. Weick and Sutcliffe note that mindfulness is “a rich awareness of discriminatory detail.” They write,

When people act, they are aware of context, of ways in which details differ (in other words, they discriminate among details), and of deviations from their expectations (mental models). Mindful people have the “big picture,” but it is a big picture of the moment. This is sometimes called situation awareness, but we use the concept sparingly. Mindfulness is different from situation awareness in the sense that it involves the
combination of ongoing scrutiny of existing expectations, continuous refinement and differentiation of expectations based on new experiences, willingness and capability to invent new expectations that make sense of unprecedented events, a more nuanced appreciation of context and ways to deal with it, and identification of new dimensions of context that improve foresight and current functioning.4

Our goal must be to make thinking a conscious activity. To teach people how to think versus what to think requires enhancing their self-awareness—making a priority of being aware of what they are thinking and feeling and asking why. This competency can be taught and practiced. Noted scholar on leadership development, Bruce Avolio, succinctly states, “we want the brains to come into work, and not to hang outside the door.”5

Nathaniel Branden reminds us that humans have, “Free will: the choice to turn consciousness brighter or dimmer.” He goes on to state, “The essence of our psychological freedom may be summarized as follows:

- We are free to focus our mind, or not to bother, or to actively avoid focusing.
- We are free to think or not to bother, or to actively avoid thinking.
- We are free to strive for greater clarity with regard to some issues confronting us, or not to bother, or to actively seek darkness.
- We are free to examine unpleasant facts or to evade them.”6

Branden also writes, We must choose to think. At the conceptual level, we must guide and monitor our mental processes. We must check our conclusions against all available evidence—that is, we must reason. Reason is an evolutionary development. It is the instrument of awareness raised to the conceptual level. It is the power of integration inherent in life made explicit and self-conscious.7

Thinking is a subset and a requirement to be able to reason. One cannot reason if one does not think. Thinking often results in what, while reasoning gets to why. Thinking can disregard emotions and other rational or irrational factors—reasoning includes and takes emotions and all factors into account. You can teach people what to think, but when you teach them how to think, they are starting to learn how to reason.

We hypothesize that people who are self-aware and can think and reason often have a higher and more informed level of trust in themselves and others—as a result of their thinking and reasoning. They are practiced and skilled at this competency. They have learned to trust—to believe in their own understanding of a situation or event or personal interaction over any outside influence. An experiment at Columbia University in the 1960s demonstrates the power of self-awareness, thinking, and reasoning.8

In the experiment, a person is in a room alone and told to fill out a clip board. Smoke is then pumped into the room. On average it took 20 seconds for person to react to the “emergency.” Next, the room has five people in it, with four who were told to not react when the smoke comes in. On average, it took 45 seconds for the fifth person to react. Why did this person surrender his or her judgment of right and wrong? Essentially it is because they did not trust themselves. They were not self-aware enough to trust their own thinking and judgment and reasoning, so they surrendered it to the group. Group-think, peer pressure, social desirability, and other social-psychological constructs all are in play in this experiment, but each of these is a consequence or result of individual thinking, judgment, and reasoning.

In the military, structural hierarchy, expected roles and competencies, rank, and station in life all play an important part in why people will surrender their judgment relatively quickly. This can have important consequences for the profession when a service member has to make a competency- or character-trust judgment in an instant. When a private makes a threat determination and decides to engage or not engage someone on the battlefield, what he or she is doing is trusting his or her own thinking and judgment over any other. Again, we should put a premium on the development of that critical thinking, judgment, and self-trust, as an individual’s actions may have very large implications.

From a training or developmental perspective, simply asking a soldier “Why do you think that way?” is developing the soldier’s ability to reason. In terms of trust, there is great developmental value in asking someone, “Why do you trust Sgt. Smith? … Be specific. In what areas do you trust her? Are there areas in which you would not trust her? Why?” Besides developing reasoning skills, a conversation like this raises the awareness and importance of trust in the ranks.
Finally, reasoning is a higher level of conscious thought and intentional thinking that includes explanation and often leads to a decision or conclusion—a greater level of self-trust and a greater understanding of why they judged something good or bad, or trustworthy or not. Leaders often think about things (organizational culture, operations, personnel decisions, training, etc.), but they reason when they make decisions. Reasoning requires critical thinking, creative thinking, moral reasoning, challenging assumptions, and challenging mental models. Reasoning includes being open to errors in our thinking or judgment. Emotional intelligence and empathy should play a part in one’s reasoning. To improve our ability to reason often requires getting out of our cognitive and affective-emotional comfort zone. The ability to reason includes understanding, learning, and adapting.

**Conclusion**

For the complex operating environments that we have been in and will, in all likelihood, operate in for the foreseeable future, thoughtful and reasoned trust is what the military wants and needs, not mindless trust. A much more in-depth conversation is also needed on what types of leader the military requires. Do we require competency-trust over character-trust? Or, the other way around? Either way, real and thoughtful trust, self-trust, is a result of self-awareness, intentional thinking, sound judgment, and analytical reasoning.

The ability to improve one’s thinking ability and the ability to reason can be accomplished through education, training, and practice. It requires harnessing one’s cognitive strengths and reducing and mitigating one’s cognitive limitations (both skills borne of self-awareness and self-management—emotional intelligence). The conversation we need to have about trust development is not about whether we trust another soldier, or leader, or the Army. The real conversation is about developing our ability to trust ourselves, our judgment, and our reasoning. It is in that place that we will freely give our trust to others.

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William Thayer

Is a greater Russia really so bad? Well, at least part of the answer depends upon who you are. If you are living in New Jersey, there is no immediate threat. If you are living in Ukraine or the Baltics, the answer is quite different. Ukrainians remember the Stalin famine, the Holodomor (Ukrainian for “extermination by hunger”), in which three to eight million Ukrainians perished. The Baltics remember the Soviet occupation of their countries, and the mass executions and deportations. Consequently, there is a very real threat associated with a greater Russia. The situation today is very analogous to the Czech situation in 1938. At the time, it was decided that Czechoslovakia was a “faraway country.” Instead of countering Hitler at the time, the decision was made to appease him.

Dr. Michael makes very valid points which I entirely agree with. China covets the Russian Far East for its resources, especially its geography and water. The United States and Russia should work toward being allies, not enemies. I think this is even more important from the Russian point of view since it is on a demographic decline.

The dilemma is how do we stop Russia from expanding while not threatening the Russian homeland? Currently, we are trying economic sanctions, which certainly weaken the Russian economy, but it is also helping Putin isolate Russia from the West. While I would like to hope that economic sanctions will work, I do not think they will. Russia is prepared to go into a Stalingrad/Leningrad-type mentality. What will make the Russians stop? To prevent the Russians from contemplating an attack on the Baltics, they must be stopped in Ukraine. Present casualties in Ukraine are about 5,000 total, compared to the 10,000-15,000 mentioned by Dr. Michael in the North Caucasus. It is going to take severe losses by the Russians to convince them to stop.

How can this be accomplished? There is no easy way, but I believe it can be done. In the Battle of Kursk (1943), the Russians delayed and damaged important elite German armor divisions with massive minefields. This was with 1940s pressure mines. Today, remotely fired improvised explosive devices (IEDs) exist that can be much more effective. Furthermore, all Russian armor has big, flat...
bottoms, which are easy targets. We have many methods of observation and many ways to fire the IEDs. The Russian armored forces number around 10,000 (tanks plus armored vehicles). Losses in the thousands of Russian armored vehicles would get the message across to both Putin and the Russian people. This would take millions of IEDs and emplaced sensors. This is just one technique. Excalibur artillery rounds and small, fast-attack unmanned aerial vehicles firing Hellfire missiles would be other options. None of these methods could be construed as a threat to the Russian homeland such as NATO air forces.

We have to be prepared for a long struggle. I do not think Putin is going to change his mind. We will have to wait for the next generation of Russian leaders. In the meantime, it is imperative to stop the Russian advance.

William Thayer, San Diego, California

Ray Finch

I am curious as to why Military Review would publish such an apologetic and biased portrayal of Russia’s current foreign policy (“Is a Greater Russia Really so Bad?” by George Michael, Ph.D.). As one who spends most of his waking hours monitoring developments within Russia, particularly within the realm of security, I found the author’s argument both dangerously specious and one-sided.

The author claims that Russia’s aggressive acts against Ukraine (and other countries) are “actually acts of increasing desperation and are destined to be relatively short lived.” He bolsters this claim by suggesting that Russia’s demographics are so perilous that the country may soon get gobbled up by China or be transformed by its increasing Muslim population into an Islamic state. Many of the sources he quotes to support his arguments are outdated and tendentious. (Check out, for instance, note 43 and the not-too-objective Strategic Culture Foundation.) Dr. Michael appears to suggest that Russia’s poor demographics should justify thuggish behavior.

While certainly not yet robust, Russian demographics have actually improved slightly over the past five years, and there is simply zero evidence that “Beijing [is] to become the de facto overlord of Russia’s resource rich Far East in the not too distant future.” The notion that Russia will someday become an Islamic state is yet another canard, perhaps designed to convince the reader that while Putin’s Russia may be corrupt and aggressive, it is far preferable to what might transpire in the future.

He then goes on to assert that the United States has largely been responsible for “turning Russia from ally into enemy” by not only appointing a “strident Kremlin critic, Michael McFaul, to serve as the U.S. ambassador to Russia,” but also by allegedly supporting separatist elements within Russia. This represents the typical argument found within much of the Kremlin-supported media today. In this “Russia-as-innocent-victim” rendition, the evil leaders in Washington have been secretly plotting to weaken Russia by enlarging NATO and sponsoring color revolutions in countries around Russia’s periphery. President Putin subscribes to, and frequently advertises, this anti-American trope, claiming that the United States wants to neuter Russia so it can steal its abundant natural resources.

In this Kremlin-sponsored narrative, Russia is always the innocent, peace-loving nation which would never undertake surreptitious or aggressive actions to disturb or steal from its neighbors. Of course, the author fails to make any mention of Russia’s determined efforts over the past six years to modernize its military and other security structures. Similarly, he completely avoids examining the Kremlin’s role in the August 2008 conflict with Georgia or the protests and cyber-attack against Estonia in 2007.

The author reviews some of the aggressive ideology which serves as window dressing for Putin’s actions, then attempts to dismiss or justify the Kremlin’s expansionist tendencies by claiming that “such expansion may likely be seen as a matter of national survival.” According to Dr. Michael, such Kremlin hostility should not be regarded “as indicators of emerging Russian strength but rather acts that mask festering Russian decrepitude.” Following this absurd logic, Western leaders should ignore further Russian aggression in Ukraine or perhaps into the Baltics because such belligerence indicates that the Kremlin is acting
out of weakness. The author chides Secretary of State John Kerry for remarking that confronting “Russia over Ukraine could lead to a nuclear war.” Dr. Michael is apparently unaware of the Kremlin’s repeated aggressive and casual mention of using nuclear weapons over the past year. Indeed, in early March 2015, President Putin remarked that he was ready to place the country’s strategic nuclear forces on high alert after Russia’s “polite green men” seized key locations in Crimea.

The author concludes that despite the current chilly relations, Russia and the United States ought to be working together in the face of common threats (e.g., Islamic extremism, Middle East instability, a resurgent China, nuclear proliferation, etc.). That this cooperation has been stymied, Dr. Michael again points his finger at officials in Washington, claiming that the United States is responsible for “treating Russia as an international pariah.” He appears oblivious to the harsh rhetoric preached by some Kremlin officials and their general unwillingness to honestly and openly cooperate on mutual security issues.

The author is quick to point out Western mistakes vis-à-vis Russia and Ukraine. The United States and other Western countries may have been at fault for promising to help Ukraine in their desire to create an economically prosperous and law-based state. Instead of working with Russia to improve the Ukrainian economy and political system, an “either-or” approach was adopted which indeed hampered mutual cooperation. However, it takes two to tango, and the author has simply ignored Russia’s negative role in escalating tensions with the West.

Over the past year, the Kremlin has invaded and annexed a portion of their neighbor’s territory. It continues to support separatist forces in Eastern Ukraine with both military and humanitarian aid. It has so poisoned and distorted the Russian information space that a large majority of Russians now view the United States as their primary military threat and sincerely believe that they can fight and defend against this “enemy” by defending and seized more territory in Ukraine. The Kremlin continues to flex its military and informational muscle, in an often irresponsible and provocative manner. To suggest that to find common ground upon which to work with the Kremlin leadership the United States should somehow overlook this persistent and harmful Russian aggression borders on the delusional. To answer Dr. George’s question, “Is a greater Russia really so bad?” Yes, if it is based upon an ideology which thumbs its nose at treaties and international law and which advocates the creation of a greater Russia irrespective of national borders.

Ray Finch, Lawrence, Kansas

EDITOR’S RESPONSE: To answer the reader’s question specifically, Military Review has a long history of publishing articles that may not get a forum elsewhere because they may provide an unpopular alternative view with which many may disagree. The article in question went through a board process in which several members personally disagreed with the author’s conclusions, but were impressed by the author’s research effort and agreed that the article merited publication in order to provide an alternative view on a matter of vital interest to our military readership to stimulate debate and research.

“Is a Greater Russia Really So Bad?,” George Michael, Ph.D.

The author contends that the United States and Russia share similar threats to their long-term security and their national identities. Therefore, it would be in the best interests of both countries to resist a resumption of the Cold War, to reconcile differences, and to make a greater effort to understand their respective points of view and interests.

The original article can be found in our January-February 2015 issue on page 99 by clicking on the link for the electronic version or by clicking on the article cover for the Joomag version. 

I Heard My Country Calling
A Memoir


Lt. Col. Tom J. Tracy, U.S. Army, Retired

I Heard My Country Calling: A Memoir is James Webb’s deeply moving recount of his life as a “military brat” and as a Naval Academy midshipman, from the immediate post-World War II period through the height of the Vietnam era. It was during this time that an insecure America, entrenched in a deepening ideological cold war with the Soviet Union, adopted and maintained a large standing peacetime military. Webb shares experiences from his childhood and early adult years on growing up in a military environment. The real purpose of his book, however, is less about storytelling—although the stories he tells are mesmerizing—and more about sharing what it truly means to grow up and serve in the military.

The book, as seen through the eyes of a young, innocent child who matured well beyond his age, is about the emergence of a whole new societal sector—the American military family. As Webb points out, that new permanent sector now encompasses a part of the all-volunteer fighting force, complete with family members, a unique basing and housing infrastructure system, robust family support programs and entitlements and, most noteworthy, the development of a new American subculture. His book could not come
at a more appropriate time as the military enters into another budgetary drawdown phase.

Having lived the part of a military brat, the author remained in the insular military environment after being accepted to, and attending, the United States Naval Academy. Webb—a combat veteran, noted author, former U.S. Senator, and Navy Secretary—is expertly qualified to speak about life as a military brat, which is actually a term of endearment for those of us who have lived that life.

Although the brats can be easily overlooked, they are an absolutely essential part of the Nation’s all-volunteer force. His message is loud and clear—as the government squabbles on how to downsize its military force, it would be an abhorrent shame to make military families the bill payers through the dismantling of the hard-fought support programs and entitlements that took so long to develop. These are programs and entitlements military families not only deserve but also have truly earned. And, they serve as important retention tools geared toward retaining our more experienced military members.

Although some may consider it to be extravagant, Webb asserts the military support apparatus should not be disassembled. The truth of the matter is, the all-volunteer force does not serve “voluntarily.” The nation’s service men and women, many of whom are married, work extremely hard and deserve their benefits. Those who serve knowingly sacrifice certain personal freedoms; they serve at the discretion and the needs of the service; and they cannot simply quit their jobs. In fact, some enter into contracts lasting a minimum of eight years. Service members must serve where told—including at various locations throughout the globe—and serve to fight our Nation’s wars. Ultimately, for those with families, family members can either be a willing part of the experience, or their disagreeing actions can lead to warriors leaving the service.

In his memoirs, Webb recounts a stressful time when, as a child in St. Joseph, Missouri, he, his mom, and his siblings were separated from his father, who was serving overseas during the Berlin Airlift, and again, later, when his dad served an unaccompanied tour in Texas at a base that had no family housing. The challenge was further exasperated by the fact that although St. Joseph was his father’s home of record, the family had limited ties to the area. The reader can grasp an inkling of what the author went through, especially those who were brats during this era when military families were often left to fend for themselves while the Soldier went away on deployment.

He details a time of his father’s return following a lengthy deployment and the excitement little James felt knowing that his father would soon be home—and the sudden induction of fear as he realized his dad could be leaving again. The awkward return episode was reminiscent, as I am sure it has been for countless family members, of similar events when their parents returned from war or deployments—or, for the unlucky few, of the excruciating pain when told their parent or friend was not coming home. I remember the day I was playing badminton in Heidelberg, West Germany, when my parents told me that Sgt. Eddy Mello, 19, was killed in Vietnam. Eddy was our next-door neighbor at Fort Dix, New Jersey. In fact, as a teenager, Eddy built a model B-17 airplane for me and tacked it to my bedroom ceiling.

Fellow military brats form an immediate bond with the author as he recounts his experiences while growing up, to include the eventual efforts by the military to attempt to accommodate families, such as the building of on-post housing. Unfortunately, it took a tragedy—the Gander plane disaster, during President Reagan’s tenure—before families that lost direct ties to a base could still remain in on-base housing. Most will recall the entrances or stairwells many of us came to know, love, or hate. Webb also shares stories about attending on-base schooling in an old troop barracks. The classes were separated by wall dividers, which reminded me of my days at Fort Dix, when I had to lean forward in my seat in order to hear my teacher over the sounds of the other classrooms that were collocated in the bay.

The sense of what it means to live the life of a brat is emotionally evident throughout the book. Dependents, which later evolved to the term family members, grew up with the fear of never knowing when a parent would be called away. Many experienced a feeling of not knowing where they really belonged since most really had no real “hometown” but perhaps several former hometowns. They also faced the prospect of how international news of the day would impact them as parents deployed to Vietnam, Iraq, or Afghanistan, or the families moved for overseas assignments to areas such as South Korea or Europe. Among the challenges Webb spoke of was the role military members and their families played in serving as “America’s ambassadors” and the importance
of not creating an “ugly American” image. Webb and his family accompanied their father on an assignment to the United Kingdom in the early 1950s. By their nature, young people, to include servicemen, tended to “swagger” in their ways and “boast” during conversations, Webb observed. He goes on to say that it is important for Americans to be sensitive and empathetic toward others as he recounts a story in the British Isles. The people there, as in other places around the globe, suffered horribly from past wars to an extent very few Americans have ever experienced.

The author also details his experience at the Naval Academy and some of his life lessons from that time period. Although cynicism may be a term many military leaders would prefer to supplant, it is perhaps one that is appropriate for his experiences. He speaks of the Academy’s focus on strict, exacting discipline, which can, at times, be overly stifling and unnecessary. In exchange for the free education, he said the Nation is provided leaders who can see past politics and partisanship and are able to guide the nation through its hardships. Ironically, however, Webb served as a U.S. Senator for only one term, dismaying many who may view him as a quitter.

Webb also addresses ethics during his Academy experiences, adding his view that West Point’s honor code is somewhat unrealistic, and the no toleration clause is unreflective of how people really behave and act in the real world. Why enforce a principle that is simply non-existent beyond the academy’s walls? He also presents a stinging argument advocating the academies’ need to relook their honor code expulsion policies, pointing out that people can turn their lives around for the better.

Webb elaborates upon an interesting issue, which some may find uncomfortable, that arose during a confrontation Webb had with a civilian academy professor. The question was whether career military officers should seek “safe,” low-risk bureaucratic jobs even if it meant receiving “less pay” upon leaving the service as they continue their comfortable lifestyles during their peak productive years? Shouldn’t career military leaders continue taking risks and resume challenging leadership ventures after serving in the military? The philosophic question, then, is: Are America’s retiring officers, with their wealth of experience, many of whom are still in their late forties, letting their nation down by assuming “safe” and quiet existences in semi-retirement while they could still be contributing and helping solve the Nation’s problems? By mentioning the episode in his book, and cleverly protecting himself from criticism by mentioning how insulted he felt by the civilian professor’s words, Webb’s account makes one contemplate whether the professor’s arguments should be relooked even today. In fairness, as Webb recalls his father’s retirement from the Air Force at age 51, he observes that there may be little recourse or opportunity for those who would still like to face post-military challenges in the private and public sectors. Reflecting upon this as a recent military retiree, I often wonder myself how valued my military experiences really are in the private sector.

Perhaps the most emotional part in the book is when Webb’s father passes the proverbial generational baton on to his serving son as he departs to Vietnam. The symbolic gesture occurs as one generation of honorably serving veterans ends their careers and hands over the reins to the new, awaiting, and invigorated future generation of military leaders. This passing of the colors within the family—often acted out by a simple salute or some soft words at a father’s retirement ceremony or a son’s induction—is repeated over and over again throughout the country. It always remains a painful but proud moment in the lives of military families.

_I Heard My Country Calling: A Memoir_ is a delightful, mentally therapeutic, and engulfing book. Anyone who lives, or has lived, the life of a military brat can quickly relate to the author’s experiences. The book provides a sigh of relief in knowing that there are others who really understand the unique life brats live or have lived.

Lt. Col. Tommy J. Tracy, U.S. Army, retired, currently serves as chief of operations branch, Combined Arms Training Center, Joint Multinational Training Command, U.S. Army Europe, Vilseck, Germany. An Army brat who graduated from West Point, he holds a master’s degree in National Security Affairs from the Naval Postgraduate School. He and his wife, Christine, raised six Army brats.
The liberal order that arose following the devastation of World War I, exemplified by the League of Nations, was primarily concerned with preventing another global conflagration. However, ensuring that the Great War remained “the war to end all wars” would prove far more complicated than the victorious allies had anticipated. The power vacuum created by the collapse of Europe’s old empires undermined the wartime political-military cooperation of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and the Empire of Japan. Allied military elites, politically strengthened during the war, pressured their governments to contest the power of former allies, threatening postwar rearmament.

The threat of an international naval arms race rivaling the antebellum Anglo-German antagonism, which many contemporaries considered a prime causation of the Great War, alarmed allied civilian governments. This menace of naval rearmament, combined with the desire of allied treasuries to reduce inflated postwar defense budgets, led to a liberal regime of naval arms control treaties, which sought to implement a system of counter proliferation across the major powers. At the Crossroads between Peace and War examines the London Naval Conference of 1930, the last significant interbellum naval conference, amidst the turmoil of this collapsing liberal world order. The work, the first since 1962, explores the growing political-military collaboration between the United States and Britain, and the end of Italian and Japanese cooperation with the West. It “fills an important gap in our understanding of ... why achievement was fleeting.”

London sought corresponding limits on auxiliarieships, which would complement the Washington Conference’s restrictions on battleships in 1922. The 5:5:3:1.75:1.75 ratio set in Washington for the Britain (5), the United States (5), Japan (3), France (1.75), and Italy (1.75) respectively, formed the basis for efforts to primarily limit cruisers but also submarines and carriers. However, evolving geopolitical considerations—including an American drive for naval parity with Britain, Japan’s view of the United States as its principle threat, and Franco-Italian competition over Mediterranean hegemony—ultimately undermined its successful implementation.

Given their influence on major-power naval strategy, it is surprising that the “minor” naval powers are not expanded upon in this otherwise thorough work. Aside from Paul Halpern’s examination of French and Italian strategic concerns, the work seems to suggest that the United States, Britain, and Japan gave absolutely no consideration to “minor” naval powers. Why the conference excluded the Soviet Union and Germany, which had begun major shipbuilding programs in the 1920s that later led to the breakdown of the arms limitation regime, warrants further examination.

Ultimately considered a failure for its inability to curb the naval arms race that came to dominate the 1930s, the London Conference provides historical parallels of the consequences and limitations of arms control regimes. Russia’s recent invasion of Crimea and China’s maritime expansionism seemingly reinvent the challenges the Western allies faced during similar periods of significant budgetary constraints.

For the authors, force reductions embolden potential adversaries and may compel erstwhile allies to seek independent defense policies, further destabilizing the international world order. At the Crossroads provides a cautionary historical analogy for contemporary policy makers on the perils of arms limitation.

Viktor M. Stoll, University of Cambridge, United Kingdom
CULTURE IN CONFLICT: Irregular Warfare, Culture Policy, and the Marine Corps
Paula Holmes-Eber, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 2014, 272 pages

More than 50 years ago, two theoreticians proffered very different models of military professionalism. Samuel Huntington believed the military professional should focus on the management of violence and avoid incorporating non-military factors into an individual's intellectual processes. Morris Janowitz fervently believed the opposite. In a period of constant semiconflict, he opined that military professionals needed to incorporate nonmilitary factors in order to effectively perform their duties.

These two views as to the nature of the military profession have been implicitly or explicitly the basis for a whole host of debates within the military community and are the foundation for a fascinating book by Paula Holmes-Eber, *Culture in Conflict: Irregular Warfare, Culture Policy, and the Marine Corps*, although ironically, she never mentions Janowitz or Huntington in her text. As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan evolved into counterinsurgency, the Marine Corps, as well as the other services, began to appreciate the necessity for the troops on the ground to understand the unique cultural environment within which they operated. Winning the population’s “hearts and minds” became relevant again.

Holmes-Eber, an anthropologist by profession, was brought into the Marine Corps to help organize and facilitate the assimilation of this cross-cultural competence. She continues in that role today as a professor of operational culture at the Marine Corps University.

The first half of her book is a professional anthropologist’s view of the Marine Corps subculture. This subculture epitomizes Huntington’s manager of violence, primarily focusing on the Marines’ warrior ethos and eschewing touchy-feely concerns in favor of the Corps’ real mission—“killing and destroying” things. The small size of the Corps, along with its entire focus on its expeditionary combat role, creates an environment that requires maximum flexibility in order to accomplish the mission. While this section of the book may not offer a great deal of new insights, it is fascinating to see how a military organization appears under such intensive anthropologic field observation.

It is the second part of Holmes-Eber’s book, however, that makes this book important and relevant to today’s military. During this portion, she discusses how the Marine Corps came to grips with the necessity to expose its officers and enlisted Marines to cultural awareness so they could more effectively operate in the combat arena. Yet, this Janowitzian approach conflicted with Marine Corps’ warrior ethos. The result is a wonderful case study of an organization trying to merge two conflicting professional paradigms.

After a number of failed efforts, in part because of direction from the Department of Defense, the Marines have institutionalized a unique approach called “operational culture.” This concept integrates the operational skills of the manager of violence with the cultural appreciation and awareness that are necessary to operate in the ongoing Global War on Terrorism, which requires a combination of skills—from nation building, to counterinsurgency, to conventional military operations.

The author does an excellent job of explaining how the different skill sets brought into the Corps by Marine reservists fit into this concept.

Whether the Marines’ approach will become a template that other services can implement as they endeavor to enhance their cross-culture competence, only time will tell. But for anyone interested in professional military education and operating in the varied cultural environments that the Global War on Terrorism is going to demand, this book is a must read.

*John C. Binkley, Ph.D., Annapolis, Maryland*

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When people imagine the Vietnam War, they typically envision infantrymen stalking through restrictive jungles or warplanes dropping bombs and incendiaries. It is generally not appreciated as a conflict where armored or mechanized forces played an important role in fighting
the North Vietnamese army (NVA). William C. Haponski, a retired Army colonel, aims to correct this perception with a well-written and balanced memoir about his time as the commander of the 1st Squadron, 4th U.S. Cavalry Regiment, north of Saigon in the wake of the Tet Offensive.

*Danger’s Dragoons* arrives as a detailed read that civilians may find difficult to follow due to dense military terminology, but one that service members and military historians will likely find engaging. Complementing Gen. Donn Starry’s foundational 1982 work, *Armored Combat in Vietnam*, Haponski defines the work simply as “the story of an armored cavalry task force in Vietnam.” Yet this statement actually encapsulates two complex emphases that drive the narrative arc: it is principally a richly informed memoir of Haponski’s wartime command in a challenging and sometimes dispiriting combat environment, but it also serves as a means to draw attention to the little known, but actually highly effective, performance of armored combined arms teams in the war.

Divided into eight chronological chapters that diligently incorporate primary sources, both friendly and enemy, the former armor officer immerses the reader into 1st Squadron’s tour in Vietnam from late 1968 to mid-1969. Beginning with Haponski’s initial assignment as a staff officer in the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, the work soon centers on the author’s objective of getting “the division’s most potent ground combat force,” with its tanks and armored cavalry assault vehicles, transferred to its “proper role” of “combat against large main-force units.” After spending his first months in command conducting low-intensity area security operations near Saigon, Haponski eventually gets his task force moved north to the Michelin Rubber Plantation area of Binh Duong Province, where they prove, though at a cost, the lethality of armored cavalry against the NVA’s feared 7th Division in a jungle environment.

Aside from galvanizing interest in his own journey and personalized accounts of individual soldiers on each side, *Danger’s Dragoons* holds additional interest for military professionals at the tactical level. Throughout the memoir, which is combined arms focused, Haponski never actually employs “a pure cavalry squadron” but rather leads “a task force of armored and air cavalry with armor, infantry, mechanized infantry, and engineers” with support by “artillery and other U.S. or South Vietnamese ground and air units.” With this kind of multifaceted formation, 1st Squadron conducts a variety of missions, including patrols, route security, convoy escort, ambushes, police functions, and ultimately, attacks.

The author includes a pragmatic assessment of armor utility in restrictive environments as he readily admits the futility of employing his tracks in stealthy ambushes while discussing limitations of mechanized movement. Despite aggressively using enemy killed in action as his primary measure of effectiveness during his command tenure, Haponski is careful to offer an otherwise balanced portrayal that regards the NVA as opponents to be understood and respected—but not hated.

**Capt. Nathan A. Jennings, West Point, New York**

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**INTO THE DARK WATER: The Story of Three Officers and PT-109**


The naval vessel PT-109 is fully ensconced in popular culture, given the aura of its final and most famous skipper—John F. Kennedy. Baby boomers may recall the 1963 movie, its enduring images of the doomed patrol torpedo (PT) boat, and its heroic young skipper amongst a backdrop of tropical islands, messages on coconuts, coast watchers, and a largely unseen but insidious enemy.

While JFK’s rescue narrative has been told often and in great detail, author John Domagalski takes a
unique approach in an insightful and well-written new work that pays homage not only to PT-109 but to the patrol torpedo community as a whole. Lt. j.g. John F. Kennedy, one of three skippers in the short life of PT-109, is preceded in command by Lt. Rollin Westholm and Ensign Bryant Larson. Each skipper is given equal time, and Kennedy himself does not appear until about midway through the book. The author effectively interweaves the story of all three, to include their accession into the Navy, their training, their deployment, and their experiences under fire. In this manner, PT-109 is a microcosm of the many boats and their crews that made the journey from training at Melville, Rhode Island, and in Panama, to combat in the distant South Pacific.

The author is clearly at his best in his vivid descriptions of night combat—the Dark Water of his title—and the perils faced by PT-109 and other PT boats as they confronted the vaunted Tokyo Express—the Japanese Navy’s destroyers and escorts that provided the vital lifeline to its forward bases in the lower Solomon Islands. He effectively captures the dark days of the early South Pacific campaign, when maritime supremacy was profoundly in question and the U.S. Navy was unable to maintain a permanent presence of larger surface craft. Hence, PT boats like PT-109 took on the Tokyo Express at great risk, facing darkness, a superior night fighter, poor weather, faulty torpedoes, unreliable radar, and, last but not least, sharks.

The author effectively bookends his saga of PT-109 and its three skippers with very useful context that puts the history and legacy of the PT boat in perspective. He traces its roots in naval history, marking its zenith during World War II with maximum industrial production and deployment in large numbers to the South Pacific. He then closes the loop by noting the influences of the PT boat on today’s Navy as evidenced in modern, multipurpose small craft, such as the littoral combat ship.

At only 280 pages, the book may seem superficial to some. As an example, character development of the skippers other than Kennedy is based largely on historical efficiency reports—and reads as such. However, it will appeal to general readers with its crisp, solid storytelling, effective photographs, and useful diagrams. In 2002, the Navy positively identified the remains of the original PT-109 in a well-publicized search sponsored by National Geographic. It was decided to leave the remains intact and undisturbed. With this new offering, John Domagalski brings PT-109 and her crew back to life once again and, in doing so, honors all who served in the patrol torpedo service.

Mark Montesclaros, Fort Gordon, Georgia

WORLD WAR II FROM ABOVE: An Aerial View of the Global Conflict
Jeremy Harwood, Zenith Press, Minneapolis, 2014, 208 pages

Jeremy Harwood provides a concise narrative about the rise of Western Allied airpower during World War II. He begins with the initial development of air forces during World War I and the interwar years, when drawdowns and traditionalists checked the evolution of air power in Great Britain and the United States. Harwood describes the consequences in 1939–1941, when Germany swept most of Europe and western Soviet Russia, with its Luftwaffe controlling the skies, and Japan initiated its Pacific offensive with the audacious air raid against the U.S. Navy at Pearl Harbor. When Germany and Japan appear to have the upper hand, the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union rebound with air
forces that reverse the tides of power in World War II. Throughout his book, Harwood’s three themes are the evolution of photoreconnaissance, air supremacy, and strategic bombing. The third is driven home when the U.S. Army Air Force destroys two cities in Japan—each by a single bomber dropping an atomic bomb.

The book is of the coffee-table variety, written for readers interested in learning about the significant developments of aerial warfare without excessive detail. It is well illustrated with numerous photographs and features some remarkable overhead imagery, such as German shipping assembled for Operation Sea Lion, as well as battle damage assessments of strategic bombing missions. Key aircraft of opposing sides are highlighted, such as the Messerschmitt ME 109, which served as the main fighter of the Luftwaffe throughout the war, and the North American P-51D Mustang, which enabled the U.S. Army Air Force to protect its bombers deep into Germany. Also provided are graphic illustrations that enable readers to visualize the concepts and events of major operations featured in the book. Overall, it is an attractive format that will engage readers.

While concise, Harwood provides a comprehensive account of the Allies’ successes and the Axis powers’ failures in airpower. The British are credited with pioneering aerial photoreconnaissance during World War I. It is a skill Britain virtually had to reinvent in 1939 after development lapsed during the interwar years. However, Britain and the United States build the capability into a robust system that enables effective planning for air and ground operations. The Luftwaffe is noted for its early success in controlling the air during 1939-1940 but falls into a slow decline due to its inability to prosecute strategic targets or sustain operations as Allied and Soviet air forces increase in strength.

Japanese airpower also diminishes after Japan loses its naval carrier fleet at the Battle of Midway in 1942, which forces it to wage the rest of the war in a defensive posture. The Allies themselves almost falter in their initial attempts at strategic bombing in 1943, when their bombers are savaged by the Luftwaffe, but resurge after fielding long-range fighter escorts, inflicting devastating raids that erode the industries and national will of the Axis powers.

Harwood’s overview of World War II airpower works well for those with limited knowledge of the subject, and he provides an encouraging message to investigate the extensive bibliography provided in the book. Unfortunately, Harwood gives a limited account to the Eastern Front and the Pacific War, and he ends the book abruptly after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki without any final thoughts on the rise of airpower during this period. Nonetheless, Harwood inspires readers to reflect on the concepts of military airpower and to learn more about the subject.

Lt. Col. Dirk C. Blackdeer, U.S. Army, Retired, Tonganoxie, Kansas

CORINTH 1862: Siege, Battle, Occupation
Timothy B. Smith, University of Kansas Press, Lawrence, Kansas, 2012, 464 pages

Timothy Smith has produced a well-documented and researched history of Corinth, Mississippi, during the American Civil War. He articulates the vital strategic importance the town had during the war—a major intersection of two major railroad lines bisecting the Southern states. Smith inserts numerous personal accounts from Corinth residents, soldiers, and leaders who either fought or were impacted by the events in this town during the war. Early in the war, Corinth became an assembly area for newly raised Mississippi regiments and served as the base of operations for Gen. Johnston’s advance to Pittsburg Landing, Tennessee, in April 1862, which culminated with the Battle of Shiloh.

The author vividly describes the living conditions in the city, not only from the soldier’s perspective but also from the residents, leading up to and following the April battle. The Confederates, led by their new leader, Gen. Beauregard, spent countless hours fortifying approaches to Corinth in anticipation of a Union Army advance from Pittsburg Landing. On the Union side, Smith brings to light the optimism and overconfidence Gen. Hallack had in his plans to capture Corinth. After taking command from Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, he boasted to the War Department in Washington that his forces would be in Corinth within days. After a month of entrenching, minor skirmishing, and an eventual evacuation of the city, the Confederate command faced the dilemma of what to do with its Army of Mississippi. In a twist of irony, the Union leadership was in the same
quandary after their capture of Corinth; at that time, it had to determine what to do with 40,000 soldiers living in an area that could not sustain an army of that size.

In late summer 1862, the Confederacy conducted a three-pronged advance into the border states of Maryland, Kentucky, and western Tennessee. To secure the western approach, Confederate Gen. Van Dorn was convinced the strategic and fortified town of Corinth needed to be taken. Smith articulates in great detail the September-October campaign in northern Mississippi, which resulted in the battles of Iuka and Corinth against the Union forces of Gen. Rosecrans. Smith vividly describes the two-day battle at Corinth through first-hand accounts and maps to illustrate each phase of the battle.

Following one of the most intense battles in Mississippi, garrison life and the continuous construction to improve fortifications consumed the Union soldiers stationed in Corinth until early January 1864, when they were directed to other fronts. The author discusses the governance and living conditions endured by soldiers and residents during 1863 and the return of Confederate forces in 1864. Although Union forces returned late in the war, the scars of 1862 could still be witnessed throughout the town and the surrounding countryside.

Corinth 1862: Siege, Battle, Occupation is a great read and is a must for the Civil War enthusiast.

R. Scott Martin, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

FIRST SEALs: The Untold Story of the Forging of America’s Most Elite Unit

Over the past decade, Patrick O’Donnell has firmly established himself as one of the world’s preeminent military historians. It is a reputation developed by many factors, but two stand out for me. First, O’Donnell selects subjects that have received little or no prior scholarship, or he puts a different perspective on these subjects. Second, he is incredibly gifted in transforming his exhaustive research into a highly readable narrative. In the author’s latest volume, First SEALs, both of these factors are evident.

Within First SEALs, O’Donnell details the origins of the Navy SEALs and those men who figured so prominently in its beginning. He addresses the significant planning that led to the creation of the Maritime Unit—the eventual SEALs—and the subsequent training the unit conducted in preparation for entering World War II in November 1943. This discussion sets the conditions for O’Donnell to highlight the extraordinary missions the Maritime Unit was involved in during the closing period of the war and the years prior to the activation of SEAL Teams One and Two in January 1962.

Certainly, the origin of the unit is a critical component of the volume, but the true focus of First SEALs is on those who formed the unit and those who served with it. In particular, O’Donnell emphasizes the service of Jack Taylor and the significant role Taylor had in the formation of the Maritime Unit. The author continues with Taylor’s service with the unit and the time he spent as a POW in a German concentration camp. Taylor’s incredible story itself is truly worthy of its own book.

O’Donnell’s past books were characterized by exhaustive research, and First SEALs is no different. The author began conducting research on this book in 2001, which included personally interviewing the few living members of the Maritime Unit and those associated with it. The vast majority of his research consisted of sifting through thousands of the pages of material tied to the unit. Interestingly, many of these documents were mislabeled and misfiled, and O’Donnell painstakingly searched and found them in the National Archives.

What sets the author apart from many of his peers is his ability to utilize his research. He converts interviews and documents into pages that readers
enthusiastically turn. Having read many of O’Donnell’s past volumes, I was looking forward to a book that would inform and entertain—one that would gain and maintain my attention. *First SEALs* did not disappoint. Because of the public’s great interest in the U.S. Navy SEALs, this book will have great appeal to those unfamiliar with O’Donnell’s previous works. They will read it purely for the content. Those who have read other volumes he has crafted will be drawn to the book because of the author. *First SEALs* will clearly add to his sterling reputation and his superb body of work. 

Rick Baillergeon, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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**BLOODY SPRING: Forty Days that Sealed the Confederacy’s Fate**

*Joseph Wheelan, Da Capo Press, Boston, 2014, 448 pages*

In *Bloody Spring: Forty Days That Sealed the Confederacy’s Fate*, the reader is confronted with a campaign, the author asserts, that never lodged as deeply into the Nation’s collective memory as had other battles and campaigns of the American Civil War: The Wilderness, Spotsylvania Court House, and Cold Harbor are detailed as the bloody, grinding affairs they were, using frequently quoted contemporary sources. This recounting of Gen. Grant’s 1864 Overland Campaign relies heavily on participants’ accounts to reinforce the author’s premise that Grant’s strategy of attritional warfare, and his determination to maintain the offensive, were the key factors that sealed the fate of the Confederate States.

The hallmark of the campaign was, without doubt, the bloody, nearly constant fighting from 5 May through 18 June 1864. Wheelan relies heavily on participants from both sides to recount the horror of fighting in the wooded country of the Wilderness and the grisly trench fighting that followed. Soldiers and officers recount conditions that most readers would more likely associate with the Western Front in Europe a half century later. The recounting lends a feeling of hopelessness to the narrative of the soldiers’ expectations of impending death—from days and then weeks of constant combat. What is today referred to clinically as combat stress has always haunted soldiers in combat and is made apparent to the reader.

Wheelan also examines Grant’s and Lee’s decision-making processes as a decisive factor in the outcome of this grueling campaign as he contrasts the gritty tactical detail with the accounts of senior commanders. The often disconnected nature of the operational-level decision making contributed to uneven performance by the armies at different, often critical moments. While the Union Army’s leaders, particularly Grant and Meade, commanded from considerable distances, issuing orders they never witnessed in execution, Confederate leaders were often exposed to grave danger, which resulted in many senior leaders being killed or wounded. This placed further stress on Robert E. Lee at crucial moments during the campaign.

The book provides a fine overview of the 1864 Campaign; however, the lack of maps that would allow a reader to follow the movements of various units across the Virginia countryside can be frustrating at times. This is perhaps similar to the frustration the Union Army experienced at various times during its movements south around Richmond. Compared to earlier phases of the Civil War in Virginia, many of the locations are likely to be unfamiliar to readers without such an aid. Another criticism is the easy manner in which the author jumps from tactical- to strategic-level topics.

Overall, *Bloody Spring* is an easily digested work, which explores the challenges experienced by the men who fought a critical campaign during the supreme
contest in American history. Although Wheelan makes a fine case to support his premise, his narrative seems rushed to completion in the epilogue. And yet, it remains a fine entry point for readers unfamiliar with the later battles of the Civil War in the eastern United States. It also makes a fine study in command and is well worth adding to any military library.

**Maj. John Sackman, U.S. Army, Afghanistan**

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**THE ROCKET MODEL:** Practical Advice for Building High Performing Teams  

The book *The Rocket Model: Practical Advice for Building High Performing Teams* gets to the point quickly by providing the reader solid examples of the importance of leadership and the role it plays in building successful teams.

Early in the book the authors, Curphy and Hogan, reveal their strategy and give the reader “The Top 10 Reasons Why Groups and Teams Fail.” They provide an easy-to-follow road map on what it takes to succeed as well as areas in which many fail.

The concepts in this book almost seem too simple; but upon further reading, the authors bring to light how many people fail not only in the leadership role but in the followership role as well. Written in greater detail are topics ranging from decision making to differing levels of commitment, each giving the reader an easy-to-understand and solid plan that is valuable at any level of responsibility.

What stands out in this book is its format. Each chapter lays out a topic in a way that explains the issue but then also contributes ideas for possible solutions to improve the situation.

A helpful diagram that aids the reader in understanding the concepts is, of course, *The Rocket Model*, which is divided into six areas: mission, talent, norms, buy-in, morale, and power. While the outside of the model is surrounded by context, the top of the model is capped with results. Chapters are dedicated to explaining and providing further detail on each part of the rocket model.

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**BEHIND THE FRONT:** British Soldiers and French Civilians, 1914-1918  
**Craig Gibson, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2014, 472 pages**

If left to their own devices, most military professionals would prefer a “clean” battlefield. This wondrous engagement area would consist of open terrain and would be peopled only by a readily identifiable enemy. Most importantly, the battlefield and its general environs would be devoid of pesky civilians. As the Nation’s recent military operations have shown, this vision of a “clean” battlefield is an exceptionally rare thing, and we were forced to relearn how to coexist with noncombatants and local governments.

Craig Gibson demonstrates that these facts have long challenged armies. In *Behind the Front*, he offers a well-researched and well-written examination of the myriad official and unofficial relationships that governed how the British army and its soldiers interacted with the French civilians living within its area of operations during World War I.

In theory, the interactions between the French and the British should have been relatively easy and cordial. The two nations were allies and close neighbors, with shared Western European cultural identities and values. However, as Gibson notes, even the most friendly and sympathetic of foreign militaries can quickly come to be seen as an intrusive occupying army by the locals. Although the two groups shared certain commonalities, most importantly a desire to defeat Germany, differences in language, customs, and norms made the *Entente Cordiale* a difficult thing to maintain in the towns and villages of northern France.
Gibson highlights how the British military’s operational demands for billeting, fodder, discipline, and training areas often clashed with the French civilians’ demands for making a living and trying to maintain as much of their personal freedom of action as possible. As much as it would have wanted a clean battlefield, the British army needed the support of the French population and was dependent on the goodwill of the locals to make the British military machine run.

Gibson uses the records of unit provost marshals, accounts of payments to French civilians for damage done by British and Commonwealth soldiers, and a host of other primary sources to help explain this complex environment. He covers the vast gamut of business, legal, personal, and even sexual interactions that occurred between the two groups. In the process, Gibson brings to light—and to life—the multifaceted relationships that simultaneously united and divided the French civilians and the British soldiers of the Great War.

Given the recent difficulties in understanding and working together with Iraqi and Afghan civilians, this book would be a welcome addition to the reading lists of all civil affairs officers and those military professionals who wish to understand the challenges of operating in the “human terrain.”

Lt. Col. Richard S. Faulkner, U.S. Army, Retired, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

PREDATOR: The Secret Origins of the Drone Revolution

This is a big deal. The U.S. military has a new toy, and it’s the Predator. It can attack from above—without enemy detection. In Predator, Richard Whittle details the machinations, development, frustrations, setbacks, eventual success, and a cast of characters responsible for this effective, modernized instrument of war. A noted author, Whittle meticulously guides the reader from the vision of Karem Abraham, an Israeli drone pioneer, to trigger-pulling Ginger Wallace, the first female to fire a Hellfire missile, in detailing the origin of the Predator.

Whittle delivers a brilliant narrative. He provides rich anecdotes and personal accounts, which ratchet up the suspense and angst to the point where readers feel as if they are in the story—or on the front lines themselves.

We learn the Predator was born out of necessity, during the Operation Allied Force operations in Kosovo, to detect the enemy without risking the lives of pilots. Easy sell, right? No. Although you could not tell today, the program was not well received at its inception. The Air Force objected, and Washington officials outright disregarded the program. Despite those hurdles, today, it is an indispensable terrorist-killing machine. Ironically, civilian and military leaders can’t seem to get enough of them.

Approaches to technological advancements are never easy, and the Predator was no exception. Through extraordinary detail, Whittle recounts exchanges, confrontations, and predictions, ensuring readers comprehend the bureaucratic nature of the American defense system. Through his insights, readers will perhaps ascertain that the system is dysfunctional—which is sad to say because the resulting paralysis is perhaps the department’s number-one enemy.

Next, the author sets his sight on Afghanistan as the development of the Predator nears completion. As a result of 9/11, Whittle surmises that defense and intelligence officials were determined to use it to hunt for and, ultimately, kill Osama bin Laden. Interestingly, one riveting account describes how bin Laden could have been killed long before the war started—with a drone. Instead, bureaucracy took hold and the opportunity slipped away. Blame, however, could be spread evenly across the defense and intelligence agencies.

Despite significant drone accomplishments, President Obama’s use of the Predator has propelled drone warfare to the forefront of military, political, and social debate. Many are uncomfortable
with its use overseas as well as its use here. We are witnessing drone encroachment in American lives; nonprofessionals are using drones for recreational purposes, and law enforcement agencies and private corporations are employing the technology as well. The use of drones raises both moral and ethical questions. For better or worse, drones have revolutionized U.S. warfare capabilities.

I highly recommend *Predator* for defense professionals interested in a detailed account of the Predator’s development and deployment. It’s an exhilarating read and is filled with anecdotes as recounted by those involved.

**Maj. John L. Hewitt III, U.S. Army, Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina**

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**KNIFE FIGHTS: A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice**


John Nagl describes his memoir, *Knife Fights*, as “an intellectual coming of age” story, but the book is only briefly that. Nagl came of age so quickly, solidifying his belief in the importance of counterinsurgency (COIN) in American warfighting doctrine, that the majority of Nagl’s memoir chronicles his advocacy of COIN—not the intellectual struggle that brought him there.

Counterinsurgency proponents will read *Knife Fights* as a history of counterinsurgency’s golden era and lament that myopic politicians weren’t willing to fully implement its principles. Detractors of COIN will find *Knife Fights* anachronistic and arrogant in the face of muddled outcomes in Iraq and Afghanistan. But instead of using *Knife Fights* to argue the efficacy of COIN—a question better answered by an academic study or military history—Nagl’s memoir is better read to understand the military community’s increasingly cohesive narrative of its relationship with politicians—and who bears more fault for the failures of the last decade.

The author spent the years before Iraq and Afghanistan preparing for a time when asymmetric threats were seen as relevant to military affairs. *Knife Fights* recounts these formative years with a deft, if somewhat hurried, pen. The bulk of the book focuses on the now familiar “Global War on Terrorism.” After September 11, the military was slow to adapt to low-tech threats. During this time, Nagl and a small but influential cadre built a case for applying counterinsurgency techniques from colonial-era wars. The COIN proponents waged their own insurgency, bringing in academics, journalists, and think-tankers to convince the Army to change its strategy. The military’s acceptance of COIN principles coincided with a dramatic decline in violence in Iraq, vindicating COIN in the eyes of some. COIN advocates were rewarded with greater influence in Washington, D.C. For Nagl, this meant a move from tanker to think-tanker at the Center for New American Security and finally on to The Haverford School.

While the book’s narrative ends there, the wars, of course, did not. The now-famous “Surge” may have delayed Iraq from slipping into civil war, but subsequent developments—including the rise of the Islamic State—preclude a clear assessment of COIN’s efficacy. However, *Knife Fights* is, after all, a memoir, and it would do the book a disservice to read and review it as anything else.

Nagl uses an occasionally blunt “villains and victims” theme when recalling the relationship between military men and politicians, which mirrors an increasingly common narrative in the military community. He describes the military as a loyal, well-intentioned soldier—occasionally fumbling as he strives to serve his country. Politicians, however, are often portrayed as incompetent and cowardly, and Nagl’s commentary seems to lay much of America’s recent military failures solidly at their feet.

For example, he writes that the Gulf War was “a military triumph without a political victory.” In the 2003
Iraq War, the military was given a “horrible start that was largely bequeathed to it by its political leadership.” In Afghanistan, Obama’s simultaneous announcement of surge and a timetable was “a disaster of the first order.”

Although the avid reader of contemporary military history may not find much new material in *Knife Fights*, the memoir is worth reading as it offers the intellectual history of COIN, which makes for a particularly interesting read today considering all that ISIS and European terrorism have added to the narrative.

While *Knife Fights* provides ample opportunities to reflect on whether COIN’s employment has advanced American interests, the memoir’s portrayal of civil-military relations can also prompt a less common question: Does the current state of relations between soldiers and their civilian masters threaten the very security both seek to uphold?

Capt. Roxanne Bras, U.S. Army, Fort Bragg, North Carolina

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**THE WAR OF 1812 AND THE RISE OF THE U.S. NAVY**

Mark Collins Jenkins and David A. Taylor, National Geographic Society, Washington, D.C., 2012, 280 pages

This is a gripping and stirring story that delves into the first truly global conflict that the United States was involved in. The author presents an all-encompassing look at the conflict, from the political and economic backgrounds to the operational status of the U.S. Navy, starting with its actions against the Barbary pirates. It discusses the drawdown after that action, its reconstitution just prior to the War of 1812, and the Navy’s actions in all theaters during the war.

The book is divided into five chapters, which basically provides a chronological story and explains the incidents that led to the war as well as the legacy after the confrontation. The authors delve into the role of the fledgling U.S. Navy against the Barbary pirates as well as the actions of the British government—its Navy—that continued to keep tensions high between the two countries.

The authors also discuss the practice of impressment, wherein men were forced to serve in the British navy, and the early actions conducted by the U.S. Navy to protect American sailors and ships. The book follows an easy-to-understand progression of battles and results that affected both sides in the naval conflict.

One of the most interesting aspects of the book is the inclusion of numerous illustrations and personal memoirs from a wide variety of sources, to include wives, ship captains, spies, and ship surgeons. Of particular interest are the various professional and family relationships that helped to form the fledgling U.S. Navy. The authors also discuss the method in which prize (captured) vessels and cargo were disposed of through auctions.

*The War of 1812 and the Rise of the U.S. Navy* describes the sea-going conflict as well as the battles on the Great Lakes and the attacks on Washington, D.C. and Baltimore. The epilogue skips over the saving of the *Constitution* but, instead, addresses ships being demolished and broken up. The book provides a good summary of the significance of the war and the rise of the Navy. The authors place emphasis on the ships and, importantly, also on the men who sailed and fought on them.

I would recommend this book for the maritime history enthusiast and anyone interested in general U.S. history. The book is well written and well researched.

Lt. Col. David Campbell Jr., U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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**SPARE NOT THE BRAVE: The Special Activities Group in Korea**

Richard L. Kiper, Kent State University Press, Kent, Ohio, 337 pages

This book provides a detailed account of the Special Activities Group (SAG), a little-known special operations unit during the Korean War. The author, Richard L. Kiper, has conducted extensive research of U.S. Army historical records and also met with surviving SAG members, to include first-hand accounts of the unit’s short-lived tenure. In the book, the author chronicles the authorization and formation of the unit, its deployment from Japan in 1950, the constant challenge it faced due to a lack of proper resources,
and its battles against North Korean and Chinese forces during harsh winter weather conditions.

The Special Activities Group was activated for only eight months, from August 1950 through 31 March 1951, before it was deactivated and its members were reassigned to other units or returned to Japan for reassignment. Through the author’s research and witness interviews, the book describes everything from the mundane day-to-day operations, such as straightening out newly assigned soldiers’ pay, to harrowing accounts of being low on ammunition and surrounded by enemy forces during winter combat. In essence, it provides readers with an understanding of what it takes for units to operate while deployed to combat zones.

Of particular interest is the author’s discussion of the continuous struggle by higher commands to determine the unit’s exact purpose and mission. Originally constituted as a descendant of the World War II Marine Corps Raiders (Special Forces) concept, the SAG and its subordinate companies were originally conceived to be a ship-to-shore, littoral raiding force that conducted behind-the-lines operations. The SAG wound up performing primarily anti-guerrilla security missions in rear areas.

Perhaps one of the most overwhelming challenges facing the units arose when they were temporarily attached down to X Corps’ subordinate divisions and regiments, which often resulted in the gaining commanders wanting to assign the unit missions normally assigned to traditional infantry units—thus negating their unique skill sets. Eventually the unit would return to corps-level control, where it would perform anti-guerrilla patrolling in the rear areas. Even this, however, was not necessarily an ideal mission profile, because the troops were never trained on how to distinguish North Korean infiltrators from the South Korean refugees.

The author introduces a topic that continues to elicit great discussion today: how to best resource and utilize special operating forces. The book is well written, flows well and, without a doubt, provides the most thorough analysis and records of a unit that received relatively little recognition during “The Forgotten War.”

I recommend this book to anyone who is interested in the Korean conflict, the history of special operating forces, and those in the conventional forces who have yet to work with special operating forces. Lt. Col. George Hodge, U.S. Army, Retired, Lansing, Kansas

MANASSAS: A Battlefield Guide
Ethan S. Rafuse, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, Nebraska, 2014, 274 pages

Manassas, or Bull Run as it’s known to the North, holds a special place in the nation’s history. The first Battle of Manassas was the first large-scale battle of the Civil War. Fought in July 1861, it produced approximately 5,000 casualties, with less than 1,000 killed. However, by the second Battle of Manassas, which retraced similar ground and resulted in the same conclusion, the battle produced an astounding 26,000 casualties—and of those, more than 3,200 killed. This fivefold increase in casualties in just a year’s time highlights a significant shift in tenacity that now defined the forces and stratagem.

This evolution in the opposing forces’ determination and willingness to stand their ground, coupled with the maturation of their leadership, increased the lethality of Civil
War battles. In one example of tactical adjustments, a Union cavalry squadron rushed a Confederate brigade at Thoroughfare Gap and was allowed to pass through them—only to find that it now faced two reinforced brigades in the rear. It was forced to return the same way it came, exposing its soldiers to rear, flank, and frontal fire. As a result, a mere dozen returned to their own lines. More often, however, the units continued to battle in close proximity, reducing each other’s forces through simple, brutal attrition.

The fight at Brawner Farm during the second Battle of Manassas provides another notable example of the increasing deadly and effective tactics employed by the belligerents. The battle showed that although a superior force may hold a position, that force can only bring so many guns to bear in a confined space. Here, two brigades held off more than two divisions of “available” Confederate soldiers.

The combatants killed each other in droves for several hours, firing into each other’s lines from 80 yards apart until darkness finally made it impossible to see, thus forcing a withdrawal. However, even as the forces withdrew, they continued to fire at any observed muzzle flashes. It was a ferocious, if futile, conflict.

The Guide is a valuable complement for those visiting the site and provides an unbiased account of the battle. It not only covers the possible angles and locations of the units but also provides a concise history of the combatant actions. Without it, it would be very difficult to visualize and truly appreciate the details of this battlefield.

My organization took advantage of an opportunity to use the Guide during a staff ride in November. Standing at the preserved battlefield locations provides visitors with an awesome visual and physical manifestation of what combat must have been like for the belligerents. All of the stops and directions were addressed in the text, and the listed activities were based on the vignettes provided in the narrative. Manassas: A Battlefield Guide was a great addition to other supportive literature we used. It gives great credence to the work of Ethan Rafuse.

Col. Thomas S. Bundt, Ph.D., U.S. Army, Fort Lee, Virginia

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Mike Magner’s A Trust Betrayed: The Untold Story of Camp Lejeune and the Poisoning of Generations of Marines and Their Families takes readers through the sordid saga of the pain and suffering of unsuspecting Marine families, to the unbelievable lack of action by the U.S. Marine Corps in response to a contaminated water supply, and then the incredible efforts by the Corps to deny contamination while also obstructing efforts to detail its severity. He begins with the story of Maj. Tom Townsend, Marine Corps, retired, his death, and the death of Christopher, the third child of his wife, Anne, in 1967. Magner provides a brief history of Camp Lejeune and the issue of a marginally sufficient water supply that would play into decisions made for decades at the camp.

Magner walks the reader through the initial indications of contamination, the struggle for data, and the lack of records that would continue for years. Victims of the contamination eventually realized they were, indeed, collective victims and not solitary individuals with bad luck and poor health. The author documents the fight between government bureaucracies and the continual fight by the Marine Corps to not acknowledge its culpability. His epilogue briefly recaps the status of the story as his book went to print.

Magner details the many families dealing with babies born with birth defects and those babies who died...
shortly after birth—within a day to a few months—throughout the 1960s and 1970s. There were so many baby burials in the Jacksonville, North Carolina City Cemetery, just outside of Camp Lejeune, that a section of the cemetery came to be known as “Baby Heaven” by Jacksonville residents and former Camp Lejeune residents. It was not until the late 1970s that the Environmental Protection Agency cited Camp Lejeune as a major polluter.

Magner documents the Marine Corps’ efforts to avoid responsibility. There were so many opportunities missed by those in authority to acknowledge the issue that it boggles the reader’s mind. The author quotes former Sen. Elizabeth Dole, who in January 2012 said: “Much of the human suffering caused by this problem could have been avoided if, years ago, some educated soul had picked up the phone and requested a water analysis, if only to err on the side of caution.” Clearly it would not have taken an educated soul, but rather just a concerned soul, to investigate the link between the baby deaths, birth defects, and general health issues of the Marines, family members, and civilian employees of Camp Lejeune—dating back from the 1950s to the present.

Magner does not explicitly state that there was a concerted effort by the Marine Corps to avoid acknowledging the contamination and the responsibility that would go with that acknowledgement. However, the length of time from the first official notification of the leadership at Camp Lejeune to the present spans a time period longer than the career length of most Marines—even those who are most senior. Therefore, the recalcitrance of the Marine Corps to investigate itself, or to cooperate with those seeking answers as to the severity of contamination, would seem to be an aggregate Marine Corps culpability rather than that of a single base commander turning a blind eye.

The book is essentially a documentary that traces the story of contamination at Camp Lejeune and the efforts of victims—many of whom died of health issues related to that contamination before the book was published—to force the Marine Corps to live up to its slogan: “Semper Fidelis,” Latin for “Always Faithful.” A Trust Betrayed is well written and has a page-turning quality. Readers will be surprised—and dismayed—again and again, by the Marine Corps’ lack of accountability.

I chose to review this book because my wife, a former military police drill instructor at Fort McClellan, Alabama, told me she suspected her daughter’s birth defect (cleft lip) was due to contamination. Therefore, I chose a book dealing with the legendary Marine Corps base in my home state of North Carolina—Camp Lejeune. I find that I am more disturbed each time I read Magner’s book.

Readers will want to read this book to possibly learn if they, or any of their friends or family, may have health issues due to time spent at Camp Lejeune.


THE COUNTERINSURGENT’S CONSTITUTION: Law in the Age of Small Wars

Ganesh Sitaraman’s book tackles the complex issue of the application of law, not only during small wars in the modern age, but also during the development of said law from the ground up. He approached his subject via three distinct “gates” in which each provides background and structure for the next; this method presents and develops his arguments. His sections: “The Law of War,” “From War to Peace,” and “The Reconstruction of Order,” are in and of themselves incredibly complex and worthy of comprehensive individual examination.

The author’s central theme throughout the book focuses on the critical interdependence between the three pillars of his Counterinsurgency Constitution: legitimacy, law, and war. While undertaking counterinsurgent operations, all three of these aspects must be approached concurrently if conditions are to be achieved whereby the counterinsurgent can revert responsibility back to the central government, police, and national
The ideas are presented to the reader in a linear fashion but with multiple “lanes.” That is to say, the author identifies a concept and pursues it to a logical and linear conclusion, facilitating understanding for the reader. However, he does so with multiple concepts concurrently in order to better clarify the interdependence of his ideas or, as he suggests, the organic nature of the law, war, and society. His concepts are not new, nor are they particularly recent in development, but they are unique to a Western population, government, and military steeped in traditions of symmetric war and relatively quick fixes to issues. This is an engaging and challenging read both for the concepts it espouses and the nature of its presentation. It is definitely a “thinking” book, and he uses it to focus attention on what is, for many in the West, a new and difficult way of war—one that is specifically suited to the asymmetric arena. He acknowledges that he does not have the definitive answers and, certainly, that international law has not kept pace with the changing nature of warfare. Additionally, he alludes to, but does not speak specifically about, the fact that not only has the nature of war changed in and of itself but also the level of tolerance amongst society—both within the conflict zones and the domestic populations of the engaging militaries. As an aspect of law and conflict, the counterinsurgent has to manage expectations in a world of instant information and sound-bite attention spans. This book is strongly recommended.

Maj. Chris Buckham, Royal Canadian Air Force, Stuttgart, Germany

In Uncertain Times: The American Foreign Policy after the Berlin Wall and 9/11

Leffler and Legro edit a fascinating book about U.S. foreign policy development from after the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 to 9/11—an ambiguous period of time in U.S. history. In doing so, they provide historical insight and critical analysis of American strategic thinking and planning as they relate to these and other significant events during this noteworthy period in time. These events include the end of the Cold War, the break-up of the Soviet Union, the 1991 Gulf War, and Operations Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, all of which have shaped the formulation of U.S. foreign policy.

The editors’ aim is to provide a better appreciation of the challenges that exist in designing and adapting strategy under uncertainty, and it is their hope that these shared lessons from the past will lead the way for future foreign policy development.

The book is divided into events-based chapters. Each event is presented chronologically, so the reader inherently experiences the evolution of strategic thought and its shaping of policy. The book reads like a “Who’s Who” of academics and former U.S. policy makers of the time—from Melvyn Leffler and William Wohlfarth to Paul Wolfowitz and Robert Zoellick.

The invaluable perspective provided by the authors, both of whom actually participated in the strategic policy building of the time, as well as the detailed research and rigorous analysis contributed by the academic scholars, is beyond reproach or comparison to any other works on this subject. The authors highlight the failures or inadequacies of strategic planning by various presidential administrations. These include nearsighted vision, faulty planning assumptions, competing domestic priorities, bureaucratic infighting, and procedural shortcomings. They also address the reluctance of planners to suggest or make real strategic changes to existing foreign policy—instead defaulting to the status quo—in spite of monumental events that would seemed to necessitate policy revision. Scholars
writing during this tumultuous period were critical of missed opportunities, such as failing to seize the moment by reshaping NATO and the UN upon the collapse of the Soviet Union. In light of the uncertainty of the time, purposeful and effective strategic plans and foreign policy development did occur.

Among Lefler’s and Legro’s many significant observations and reflections, two stand out. First, strategy under uncertainty may be shaped as much by domestic politics as by the evolving international landscape. This can obviously prove problematic in developing effective foreign policy. Second, because of their varying perspectives and planning time horizons, there is a role for former officials and nongovernment experts in preparing strategic responses to crises as well as to shifts in the international landscape. The authors convincingly demonstrate how these views, if taken into consideration, could have positively contributed to effective strategy formulation and policy improvement.

The book is a must read for those interested in U.S. foreign policy and its development. It is also an informative read for mid-grade to senior-level military officers and government officials, who may find themselves involved in policy shaping activities.

Dr. David A. Anderson, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

STRATEGY IN ASIA: The Past, Present, and Future of Regional Security
Edited by Thomas G. Mahnken and Dan Blumenthal, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 2014, 320 pages

This short volume on a very large subject might best be thought of as the Pacific Pivot Primer. Readers without extensive practical military planning or academic experience in this subject would do well to start their regional familiarization with this book. One of the editors claims in the preface that this work examines “whether, and to what extent, strategic studies remain valid for Asia of the twenty-first century.” If that was the goal, the individual chapters do not—in general—seem to be oriented in that direction. Indeed, the editors admit in the concluding chapter that the best this book could do was raise as many questions as could be answered in this vein. The book should best be considered an initial effort to marry strategic and Asian studies. Despite falling short of their idealized goal, the editors render good service in compiling a worthwhile series of essays outlining the challenges to American strategy in the Pacific.

The first third of the book, chapters 1 through 5, should be considered a basic orientation to the strategic issues and geographical aspects of the region. The essays are useful for those not already familiar with the subject. However, Pacific “old hands” will breeze right through most of them. Most of the discussion deals with “the tyranny of distance” and maritime issues. Bruce Ellerman’s 14-page “The Cyclical Nature of Chinese Sea Power” offers a most insightful interpretation of its subject, is thankfully heavily sourced, and is well worth a slow read for all but the China expert. Land-power advocates should savor his section on “external threats affecting sea power,” as continental issues of environment and threat of invasion historically have trumped seafaring ones. The basic knowledge gained in these first chapters set the stage for remaining two-thirds of the work, which deals with higher-level strategic considerations and problems.

The reader will discern a noticeable change with chapter 6, “Strategy and Culture,” by Colin Gray. This is the best piece in the book. It is not concerned with strategy in Asia but, rather, the idea of cultural influences on strategy. Gray provides a nuanced discussion as a stage-setter for interpreting the following chapters on the Chinese, Japanese, and Indian “ways of war.” The essays in the middle third of this anthology are heavily documented and provide readers with numerous signposts to guide further research.

The last third of the book deals with predominantly military aspects of strategy;
only chapter 11, Bradford Lee’s “The Economic Context of Strategic Competition,” is focused primarily on non-military instruments of national power. The remaining chapters deal with military modernization, nuclear deterrence, arms races, and irregular warfare. While informative, one might wish for more on the diplomatic and political, informational, and legal aspects of strategy analyzed in a more explicitly discrete way.

The concluding chapter, aptly titled “Towards a Research Agenda,” selectively summarizes some of the preceding chapters and occasionally adds additional information. It does not attempt to integrate the body of work.

While this Pacific Pivot Primer is well suited for officers headed for U.S. Pacific Command for the first time, it is also useful to the “old hands” in that it helps to articulate those pressing strategic questions necessary in formulating—and executing—American strategy in this critical part of the world.

Col. Eric M. Walters, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired, Fort Lee, Virginia

THE DEVIL’S ALLIANCE: Hitler’s Pact with Stalin, 1939-1941

In The Devil’s Alliance, Roger Moorehouse has produced a highly readable, engaging and, for the most part, a well-informed account of the events leading up to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939— and the consequences that resulted from it. Perhaps because it is not a scholarly work, this book should attain a fairly wide readership among World War II buffs. The author makes good use of historical anecdotes involving key players, has a flair for capturing dramatic moments, and seldom withholds an opinion. Above all, the author captures the many implications of the pact, including the burst of public revelations during the Gorbachev era of glasnost immediately preceding the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Still, Moorehouse opens his introduction with the questionable assertion that the Molotov-Ribbentrop is virtually absent from Western histories of the war when he writes, “It is frankly scandalous that this grim chapter does not find a place in the Western narrative of World War II.” Thus, the author establishes immediately that his audience does not include the scholarly community, among whom the pact and its many consequences have been well-known for decades. While a case can be made that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact has still not received the attention it warrants, the same observation can be made about most of the events involving the Eastern Front.

As for the substance of Moorehouse’s narrative, his sources are wide-ranging but hardly all-inclusive. For example, there is almost no use of sources by Russian authors aside from a few works available in translation. Thus, he relies heavily on standard primary and secondary accounts available in English and German. To be sure, he employs these to good effect. However, he is sometimes quick to dismiss the Russian point of view.

Moorehouse has little patience for the Soviet interpretation, still popular among contemporary Russian historians, that Stalin made the pact primarily for defensive reasons. In this instance, the author’s focus on Soviet exploitation of the secret protocol of the pact—to seize the Baltic states or to invade Finland—over-shadows entirely the reasonable Soviet interest in creating a buffer in advance of the overwhelmingly likely eventual German invasion. Moorehouse rightly notes the terrible injustices and sufferings inflicted on civilian populations in these subjugated states. He also notes the massacre of Polish officers at Katyn, an event cynically attributed by the Soviets to the Nazis. However, Moorehouse gives only passing consideration to the larger strategic context from Stalin’s point of view.

Stalin had good reason, following Anglo-French concessions to Hitler at Munich, to expect that he could not
 depend on strong support from the West. Moreover, having badly purged his own armed forces, Stalin knew he was not ready for a decisive conflict with Germany. The obvious move in that case was to buy time, a step that was achieved with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. To acknowledge the defensive aspects of Stalin’s logic is not to condone his actions as just.

At his best, Moorehouse provides rich depictions of personal encounters and picks up well on the evolving public and private positions of Stalin and Hitler as war approached. Moreover, once Hitler’s invasion was underway, the author guides the reader through early strategic perceptions or, frequently, misperceptions on both sides. In summary, even taking into account its limitations, this book is nevertheless worth reading.

Dr. Robert F. Baumann, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

A FEW LAWLESS VAGABONDS: Ethan Allen, the Republic of Vermont, and the American Revolution

David Bennett’s *A Few Lawless Vagabonds* may be the best American Revolutionary War era book to come out in years. It is an account of the three-way relationship between Ethan Allen, the Republic of Vermont, and the British during the American Revolution. Bennett’s Allen is far more complex than the larger than life American Patriot myth that has been perpetuated in previous biographies. Allen is far more focused on Vermont’s sovereignty than independence from Great Britain.

Disputed land grant claims originating from Crown representatives in neighboring New York, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts threaten Vermont’s existence in the years prior to the American Revolution. The dispute became violent when New York decided to tax Vermont claims and evict New Hampshire land claim owners off disputed lands. Thus, Allen organized the Green Mountain Boys in resistance to New York.

The author’s exhaustive research challenges many previous researchers, who downplay Allen’s role—in secret negotiations with British officials—to restore Vermont as a sovereign entity under the Crown. His research uncovered a variety of British records and letters that indicates Allen and British representatives engaged each other for years, going back to when Allen was a British prisoner of war following the failed attempt to capture Montreal in 1775. Bennett states Allen had no intention of seeking Continental Congress recognition of Vermont, and that he feared that the Continental Congress would acquiesce to the desires of New York, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts.

Any hope of a reunion between Vermont and Great Britain ended, however, with the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown in October 1781. Bennett describes the secret negotiations that continued between Allen and British representatives in Canada, with Allen declaring: “I shall do everything in my power to render this state a British province.”

The Peace Treaty of April 1783 placed Great Britain in a position where it could not aid Vermont without violating the treaty. Vermont was on its own, and Allen’s influence declined as a result.

The Republic of Vermont maintained its independence amid all of the threats to its existence before eventually becoming the 14th State of the United States in 1791—two years after Ethan Allen’s death in 1789.

Ethan Allen is rightly celebrated as the principal founder of the State of Vermont. Historians and biographers alike will be impressed with the author’s depiction of Allen and his efforts to ensure Vermont’s sovereignty. *A Few Lawless Vagabonds* is a must read for those with an interest in the period of the American Revolutionary.

Jesse McIntyre III, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
LINCOLN’S CODE: The Laws of War in American History
John Fabian Witt, Free Press, New York, 2013, 512 pages

While visiting the former Confederate Richmond following its seizure by Union forces, President Lincoln counseled operational commander Gen. Weitzel: “If I were you, I’d let ‘em up easy.” Along with political intuition and foresight for life after war, Lincoln articulated an ethic about the use of force—he focused on the ends. Ethical norms later took shape in the Hague and Geneva conventions. For anyone invoking these conventions or the laws of war, Lincoln’s Code is highly recommended.

John Fabian Witt, Yale historian and law professor, presents an account of U.S. moral and legal perspectives during the Civil War. Heroes in Witt’s account are Lincoln and Francis Lieber—one a great president; the other, a barely known, itinerate academic. Lieber, after being requested by Secretary of War Stanton and Henry Halleck, Stanton’s general-in-chief, produced a code of 157 epigrammatic articles linking conduct (ways) with the aims of war (ends).

Lieber’s Code is “a working document for the soldier and layman, not a treatise for the lawyer or statesman.” Issued by Lincoln as General Order 100 before the spring 1863 fighting season, it was not moral philosophy in a vacuum. These were lessons learned during conflict: “Laws of war typically come in the dismayed aftershock of conflict, not in the impassioned heat of battle.”

General Order 100 established four red lines—prohibiting assassination, use of poison, torture, and perfidy in violation of truce or treaty. It sharply distinguished combatants and noncombatants. Lieber passionately contended the aim, the ends, and the purpose of war form the final measure of ethical conduct. He constrained war, emphasizing proportionality, and outlawing “destruction greater than necessary.” While specifying red lines, Lieber prioritized ends—seeking justice, preserving and protecting the nation.

From December 1862 through early 1863, Lincoln used Lieber’s Code to shift military thought and practice, which was inherited from Swiss diplomat Emmerich de Vattel. Vattel’s The Law of Nations (1750) long guided ethics and law in military practice, including teaching ethics at West Point and Annapolis. Vattel’s Enlightenment framework emphasized proper conduct. Lieber subordinated conduct to the goal, purpose, or end of war. Thus, swift and extensive destruction was acceptable only if necessary to advance a legitimate war aim. Lieber adapted Clausewitz’s definition of war, a fight “to compel him [an enemy] to peace at my will.” For Lincoln, such a peace was an intact nation without slavery. To rebuild a nation after civil war, Lincoln counseled: “Let ‘em up easy.”

Witt shows how law and ethics shape practice in war. The law of war was central in debates about American policies and practices toward al-Qaida and affiliates under Presidents Bush and Obama. Critics argue the United States violated the law of war or improperly cited it as support for policies. Witt’s account of Lincoln and Lieber presents dynamics of squaring national practice with application of international law. By deepening our conversation with voices from the past, Witt helps us to consider the ethical aims of war and to move beyond a “checklist” mindset that blunts moral thinking about using force.

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Call for Papers: American Use of Strategic Landpower Since 9/11

The U.S. Army War College seeks papers for a conference on “American Use of Strategic Landpower since 9/11” to be held at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, from 2-4 December 2015.

In the decade following America’s involvement in the War in Vietnam, Col. Harry Summers—a researcher in the War College’s Strategic Studies Institute—analyzed the Army’s performance in that conflict. His On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context (1982) was a controversial landmark study of the use of military force, particularly landpower. In the spirit of On Strategy, the War College now seeks to examine the American use of landpower since the terror attacks of 11 September 2001 through multiple strategic perspectives.

Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0 defines landpower as “the ability—by threat, force, or occupation—to gain, sustain and exploit control over land, resources, and people.” The employment of strategic landpower thus seeks to accomplish these tasks in pursuit of policy ends.

There are many possible paper topics associated with strategic landpower. They include: the evolving nature of war; strategic analysis of Operation Enduring Freedom or Operation Iraqi Freedom; perspectives of regional combatant commands and theater armies; landpower issues associated with the reserve components and institutional army; ground force modernization and transformation; civil-military relations; roles of the interagency and non-governmental organizations; and law and ethics of war. This is far from an exhaustive list, and the War College welcomes all serious proposals on relevant topics.

DETAILS RELATED TO SUBMISSIONS: Panels are preferred, but individual papers will be considered for acceptance. Panel presentations will last 90 minutes and consist of 20-minute (each) presentations from three panelists, a 10-minute synthesis from the moderator/commentator, and a 15-minute question-and-answer period. Panel abstracts must include an abbreviated curriculum vitae (no more than 3 pages) for all participants. The War College will announce the accepted panels and papers no later than 30 September. Selected participants will submit their fully annotated final papers of 3,000-5,000 words to the below email address one week prior to the conference.

DEADLINE FOR SUBMISSION: Submit an abstract (no more than 250 words) for a proposed panel or individual paper by 15 August 2015 to Maj. Jason Warren, Ph.D., at jason.w.warren.mil@mail.mil.