I am pleased to share some exciting news with our readers about a significant change coming to our Army education system. With the goal of increasing academic rigor, creating greater opportunities for accreditation, and enhancing the quality of the force, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command is organizing the Army’s professional military education programs into a university system, which will be aptly called The Army University. An explanation of The Army University is provided in this issue of Military Review through a trio of articles that detail the intent and the advantages of this tremendous change. Senator Pat Roberts (Kansas) provides an introduction, followed by substantive articles from Lt. Gen. Robert Brown, Combined Arms Center commanding general, and Command Sgt. Maj. Micheal Clowser, Combined Arms Center–Education.

Also proudly showcased in this edition of Military Review is the first in a series of three articles from Chief of Staff of the Army Gen. Raymond Odierno, focused on leader development and talent management. These articles are a welcome addition supporting the changes to Army professional education.

The July-August issue includes additional articles that support our theme of education in the Army. For example, Col. (retired) Frank Wenzel, the chief of the Army Leader Development Division in the Center for Army Leadership, explains how the Army can effectively enhance leader development through the right combination of training, education, and experience.

Along with the advent of The Army University, Military Review and the Combat Studies Institute will combine their resources to form the Army Press. The intent for this enhanced organization is to be more effective at identifying, encouraging, and supporting authors who want their articles, books, and monographs published in Department of Defense and Center of Excellence publications, such as Military Review or other military-related publications, blogs, or websites. I will include more information on the Army Press in future issues of this journal.

I hope you continue to enjoy reading Military Review through the summer months. You can find it online at http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/. Send us your feedback in a letter, an email, or on Facebook at https://www.facebook.com/#!/OfficialMilitaryReview.
This year’s theme is *The Future of War*. Possible topics include, but are not limited to:

- Changing demographics—what will the world’s population look like and what effect will it have on the Army and the operational environment (e.g., megacities, population growth and displacement, resource distribution)
- Climate change and its threat to security (e.g., water rights, desertification, coastal flooding)
- The impact of regionally aligned forces
- The future of nonstate entities and their relationship to, and impact on, the military
- Army operations on U.S. soil (e.g., the erosion of the Posse Comitatus Act)

**Contest Closes 10 July 2015**

1st Place  $1,000 and publication in *Military Review*
2nd Place  $750 and consideration for publication in *Military Review*
3rd Place  $500 and consideration for publication in *Military Review*

For information on how to submit an entry, go to [http://militaryreview.army.mil](http://militaryreview.army.mil).
Themes for Future Editions
with Suggested Topics

The Human Dimension and Technology
November-December 2015

- Knowing your enemy
- Talent management, putting the right soldier in the right job
- The challenge of sustaining the quality of the all-volunteer force in an era of persistent conflict
- The role of technology in enhanced human dimension capabilities
- How will urbanization and social media affect the already complex operating environment?
- Optimizing human performance: quality vs. quantity? How ethics play a role
- Research in the Army, with contributions across the spectrum (medical, psychological, biological, scientific, and historical)

The Future of War
January-February 2016 (Deputy Topic)

- Megacities—What will the United States look like in the next century? What effect will the future status of the United States have on the military?
- Climate change and its threat to security (water rights)
- Impact of regionally aligned forces—present and future
- Future of nonstate entities and the military’s role in it
- Evolving or eroding the Posse Comitatus Act?

Global Insurgencies
March-April 2016

- Quranic concept of war
- Updates on regional conflicts
- Regionally aligned forces reports from the field

Army Firsts
May-June 2016

- The importance of land power and its part in national security (including national defense and foreign relations): a hundred years ago, today, and a hundred years in the future
- Past wars—What worked/what didn’t work; what is and is not working now
- Weapon systems, an operational approach, right/wrong implementation
- Females in combat military occupational specialties
- Status of openly gay and lesbian servicemember acceptance
- A comparison of male and female posttraumatic stress disorder

A paratrooper with the 82nd Airborne Division’s 1st Brigade Combat Team strides across an open expanse as the sun sets 4 June 2012, Ghazni Province, Afghanistan. The paratrooper is assigned to Company C, 2nd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment. (Photo by Sgt. Michael J. MacLeod, 82nd Airborne Division PAO)
The Future of Innovation in the Army
July-August 2016

- How much innovation is just right? Can you have too much?
- Historical examples of institutionally fostered innovation
- Institutional and cultural obstacles to innovation in the U.S. Army of the twenty-first century

Dealing with a Shrinking Army
September-October 2016

- Lessons from post-Civil War, post-World War I, post-World War II, post-Vietnam, and post-Cold War
- Training to standard with limited resources
- Quality retention during forced drawdowns
- The good, bad, and ugly of distance learning

Tides of History: How they Shape the Security Environment
November-December 2016

- Mao’s three stages of revolutionary warfare and the rise of ISIL and Boko Haram; winning by outgoverning
- Collisions of culture: The struggle for cultural hegemony in stability operations-Can a nation survive without a national narrative?
- Case studies: Histories of illegal immigration and how such have shaped national development in various countries
- Does the military have a role in saving democracy from itself? Compare and contrast the military’s role in the life of the Weimar Republic and Mohamed Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood rule of Egypt
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Soldiers review the curriculum during the first class of the Master Resilience Trainer Course 16 November 2009 at the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia. The course is a component of the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program and is intended to teach the students how to impart resilience skills to soldiers, family members, and Army civilians.

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18 The Army University
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The commander of U.S. Army Africa demonstrates the importance of Army Service component commands and provides valuable lessons learned from his unit’s experiences during a recent humanitarian assistance mission to combat the Ebola outbreak in western Africa.

Previous Page: A soldier assigned to 3rd Platoon, Company F, 2nd Squadron, 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment, walks up a hill during a dismounted patrol near Combat Outpost Mizan, Mizan District, Zabul Province, Afghanistan, 19 August 2010. Members of Provincial Reconstruction Team Zabul and 3rd Platoon spoke with the local population to assess their needs and to inform them of the upcoming provincial parliamentary elections.  

(U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Nathansiel Callon)
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94 Operational Art by the Numbers
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102 The Role of Iraqi Tribes after the Islamic State's Ascendance
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Soldiers assigned to the 18th Combat Sustainment Support Battalion, 21st Theater Sustainment Command, set up an M18A1 Claymore anti-personnel mine during live-fire training 29 September 2010 at Grafenwoehr Training Area in Germany.

(Photo by Gertrud Zach, Visual Information Specialist, U.S. Army Europe)
Leader Development and Talent Management
The Army Competitive Advantage

Gen. Raymond T. Odierno

For 240 years, America’s Army has been a premier institution for developing and providing leaders and soldiers of character who selflessly serve the Nation. We stood for freedom and liberty in 1775. We reaffirmed our commitment to that freedom in 1812, thereby demonstrating to the world that America would endure. We kept this Nation together during the U.S. Civil War. The ingenuity, heroism, and indomitable spirit of our soldiers were displayed in World War I and World War II. Whether in Vietnam, Korea, Panama, the Middle East, or anywhere else our soldiers have been deployed, quality Army leaders have uniquely influenced the world around them and have stood as our Nation’s competitive advantage to meet the many security challenges we have encountered.

Today we find ourselves at a strategic inflection point in the history of the U.S. Army. Despite our depth of experience acquired from almost fourteen years of continuous conflict, we must ensure that our Nation and our Army are prepared for future security challenges. The velocity of instability in the world today is greater than ever, with an increasing number of failing states potentially risking vital U.S. interests. Technology and weapons, once the exclusive tools of states, now find their way into the hands of disaffected individuals and disruptive groups. The volume and speed of information exchange, the rise of megacities, urbanization and demographic trends, and the sheer number of connections between people and societies has led to sudden, unpredictable, and fluid social, political, and security upheavals.

History has shown that we cannot predict the future with any reasonable degree of accuracy, but we can assert with absolute certainty that the Army will be called upon time and time again. Working with our partners and allies, the U.S. Army will continue to do what it has always done—lead the way as the foundation of the U.S. military’s joint force, while bringing together diverse groups to solve seemingly insoluble problems.

As we implement The Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World, our number-one priority must remain the development of our competitive advantage—our leaders.1 The Army must develop leaders who are agile, adaptive, and innovative, who thrive in conditions

Left: Competitors at the 2014 Army Drill Sergeant of the Year and the Advanced Individual Training Platoon Sergeant of the Year competitions prepare to take the stage 12 May 2015 at the awards presentation at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. Staff Sgt. Jonathan Miller, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, was named as the 2014 Drill Sergeant of the Year; Staff Sgt. Christopher Croslin, U.S. Army Reserve, Norman, Oklahoma, as the 2014 Army Reserve Drill Sergeant of the Year; and Sgt. 1st Class Thomas Russell, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, as the 2014 Advanced Individual Training Platoon Sergeant of the Year.

(Photo by Sgt. 1st Class Brian Hamilton, 108th Training Command PAO)
of uncertainty and chaos, and who are capable of visualizing, describing, directing, leading, and assessing operations in complex environments and against adaptive enemies. This will not happen by accident. It requires deliberate, purposeful, and sustained leader development programs, soundly based on our core values and professional ethic. It also requires institutional processes that optimize the performance of Army professionals through rigorous education programs and a superior talent management process. We must then forge these leaders together into cohesive teams through the crucible of tough, realistic training that fully replicates the complexity of the future operating environment.

The Army Leadership Foundation

Many commentators have noted the stark differences between the art and science of leadership. Practitioners will tell you that leadership is an evolutionary process with desired skills evolving over time. But amidst changing demands, our core values remain constant. Our core values and qualities are central to our professional ethic. Over the last four years, I have consistently emphasized the importance of competent leaders of character who are committed to the defense of the Nation. Competence, commitment, and character are the bedrock principles that reinforce trust: trust between soldiers; trust between leaders and the led; trust among soldiers, leaders, and the institution; and, trust between the Army as an institution and the American public.

At its core, the Army’s professional ethic is rooted in the Constitution and the words duty, honor, and country. Our duty is to defend our country and to lead our most precious resource, our soldiers. We must do so with honor and integrity, many times under the most difficult and chaotic of conditions. As soldiers join the military, they raise their right hands and swear an oath to “support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic.” Throughout our Nation’s history, Americans have made tremendous sacrifices to fulfill this commitment. The oath has served as the foundation of leader development practices for generations and will guide us through the myriad complexities that we will encounter in the future.

The Army Operating Concept is the intellectual foundation for an evolutionary undertaking that will drive change and enable solutions across the force. While some solutions may not yet exist, we begin today by changing our mindset. If there is one overarching requirement for the future force, it is that we must remain laser-focused on developing leaders who are skilled at optimizing the performance of individuals, teams, and organizations. These Army leaders must think critically and creatively, embrace innovation and change, and foster focused collaboration to drive future force development.

Leader development is the most important contributor to shaping the Army of the future. To put this into perspective, many of tomorrow’s Army leaders—the sergeants, lieutenants, and captains that will be making their mark in the coming decade—are still in middle school and high school, and today’s captains will lead battalions and brigades in the next decade. We are continuing to adapt our professional military education and to develop the tactics, tools, and techniques they will need. So, the most important task today is to form the processes and management strategies to enable our leaders of tomorrow to thrive in the uncertain, ambiguous, and complex world they will undoubtedly face.

The Army Leader Development Strategy

The Army Leader Development Strategy (ALDS) 2013, provides a roadmap to develop Army leaders for the challenges our Nation faces. Leader development is a deliberate, continuous, and progressive process that grows soldiers and Army civilians into competent, committed professional leaders of character. The ALDS identifies the competencies and attributes expected of every leader—active and reserve officers, warrant officers, and noncommissioned officers (NCOs), as well as civilians—through the Army Leadership Requirements Model. Leader development is achieved through the career-long synthesis of training, education, and experience. It is fostered in the institutional (schools and courses), operational (duty assignments), and self-development (selected activities) domains, supported by peer and developmental relationships. This strategy must begin by attracting those with leadership potential; by identifying and assessing unique talents, skills, attributes, and behaviors early on; and then by providing a career-long synthesis of training, education, and experience acquired in our institutions and operational units. We must foster talent to ensure that the Army
retains, challenges, and inspires its best, brightest, and most battle-tested young officers and NCOs to lead the service in the future, and we must complement these efforts by encouraging and supporting our leaders to continuously self-develop.

The Institutional Domain

The institutional domain represents a powerful element of the Army’s leader development program. It is where we set expectations and a foundation of understanding for our leaders. As stewards of the profession, we must always strive to improve and adapt, and we are instituting several new initiatives to support this endeavor. Our strategy begins with precommissioning for officers and continues all the way through the general officer ranks. Similarly, our NCO Corps develops leaders from initial entry training and intermediate NCO development through the Sergeants Major Academy.

We are evolving and transforming this process as we prepare for a more complex future. One of the ways we are doing this is by launching The Army University, which will apply rigorous academic standards and credentials to our existing professional military education programs. While The Army University will have many impacts on the educational enterprise, one of its most important features is to provide full college-level accreditation to many existing Army education programs and to record those credits in a universal transcript for every soldier and civilian. This will allow Army professionals to pursue their educational goals while they serve the Nation and give them full credit for the work they have already completed.

The Army University is the next logical step in the continued professionalization of the Army that began with the creation of the all-volunteer force in 1973. This effort organizes all U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command’s (TRADOC’s) existing educational programs into a single university structure to promote greater academic rigor, improve internal integration, and enhance external collaboration with many of the Nation’s best universities and colleges. The Army University expands the ability of soldiers to integrate their military and civilian education and to receive valid academic credit for their educational investment.

Army Chief of Staff Gen. Raymond Odierno provides feedback 26 February 2015 during the 2015 Captain’s Solarium discussion at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

(Photo by Staff Sgt. Mikki L. Spenkle, CSA photographer)
In so doing, it enables growth and development across a career of service. It also supports the Total Army with increased educational opportunities for soldiers in the U.S. Army Reserve and the National Guard. Additionally, the credentialing opportunities generated by The Army University will assist soldiers while they are on active duty and when they transition as “Soldiers for Life.”

Through several Army leader exchange events—from the Army Senior Leader Development Program for general officers, to solarium-style listening sessions for junior officers and NCOs, to town hall meetings throughout the Army—the sergeant major of the Army and I have heard the need to inculcate critical thinking into all Army curricula. As the Army adopts the philosophy of mission command, this kind of learning will grow in importance. Mission command empowers subordinates at every echelon, encouraging them to think critically and creatively and seize the initiative: to understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess. Army leaders create the conditions for the execution of mission command when they build cultures of trust within their organizations and create shared understanding through clearly articulated commander's intent.

As part of our increased investment in education that will encourage this kind of critical thinking, we are expanding access and opportunities for advanced civil schooling, training with industry, fellowships with universities and think tanks, and interagency assignments. We have tripled the number of post-war college fellowships for colonels and have launched the Advanced Strategic Planning and Policy Program, which allows selected officers to pursue a PhD at our country’s best universities. We are identifying and developing strategic-minded leaders early in their careers by initiating junior leader broadening programs for our company and field grade officers, NCOs, and civilians. These programs provide the opportunity to examine strategic issues and apply understanding to current and future problem sets. At each of the TRADOC centers of excellence, we are updating the programs of instruction for our tactical-level leaders and are selecting the very best instructors. The institutional domain is the foundation of our leader development program, and we will continue to invest in it despite budgetary challenges.

**The Operational Domain**

In the operational domain, we are updating our live, virtual, and constructive training to enable junior leaders to achieve tactical and technical competence; mid-grade leaders to hone their skills at commanding units and organizations; and senior leaders to develop and implement strategic plans and policy. We are developing adaptive leaders who can lead change by empowering subordinates while managing risk, and by encouraging mutual trust and shared understanding throughout their formations.

We are not walking away from our experience of the past fourteen years; rather, we are building upon it. The operating force is seeing the implementation of regionally aligned forces, which enables our leaders to remain intellectually and internationally engaged with allies and partners across the globe. We believe that the future will be even more complex, and we are preparing for this future through a comprehensive total force training and leader development strategy.

At the Joint Multinational Readiness Center at Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels, Germany, we are investing in and adapting our training model to increase multi-echelon joint and multinational exercises with our allies and partners, which is especially important at this time for NATO. Our combat training centers in Germany, at Fort Irwin, and at Fort Polk replicate highly complex decisive action environments featuring hybrid threats reflective of the complexities that our Nation faces, including guerrilla, insurgent, criminal, and near-peer conventional forces woven into one dynamic environment. We are including multiple components in rotations to include Special Forces, interagency, multinational, and interservice in order to train our total force to operate in today’s multidomain environment. Combat training centers, as a leadership crucible, improve the leadership skills of our officers and NCOs while assessing their performance and development. By continually challenging them in training to plan for the unknown and the unexpected, we build upon our successes in the operational domain.

**The Self-Development Domain**

As our leaders grow through schooling (the institutional domain), and training and operations (the operational domain), they must always strive to develop themselves (the self-development domain).
to be life-long learners. In the self-development domain, we are incorporating 360-degree assessments into our mentorship and counseling processes. Multidimensional feedback is an important component of holistic leader development. By encouraging input from peers, subordinates, and superiors alike, leaders become more self-aware. A 360-degree approach applies equally to junior leaders at the squad, platoon, and company level, as well as to senior leaders. The willingness to seek honest and candid feedback facilitates leadership growth, and it is the responsibility of every leader, soldier, and civilian to provide candid feedback to those seeking it.

Growth within the self-development realm is also occurring through expanded access to broadening assignments earlier and more frequently throughout leaders’ careers. Leaders, both junior and senior, are encouraged to pursue personal and professional development through interagency assignments, military schooling, civilian credentialing and licensing, and progressive civilian degrees. We are providing our soldiers with necessary tools and resources, such as GoArmyEd and tuition assistance, to seek self-development opportunities.9 In sum, our structured self-development program stimulates individual growth and development while building upon and complementing the institutional and operational domains.

We are implementing this strategy from a position of advantage, with the most combat-seasoned force the Army has ever had. We are harnessing our experience in conducting complex operations with joint, interorganizational, and multinational partners to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives on the ground. Leader development is about investing in our single most precious resource: our people.

**Talent Management**

Talent management and leader development are intrinsically linked. Talent management accounts for the individual skills, knowledge, attributes, and behaviors of Army professionals and the potential that they represent. The Army seeks to select, develop, and effectively employ well-rounded leaders based on the talents they
possess—talents derived not only from operational experience but also from broadening assignments, advanced civil schooling, and professional military education. We will broaden career paths, providing leaders the opportunity to diversify their professional development and increase their value to the organization.

As we build cohesive teams comprised of high-performing individuals with the right talents, we build a stronger Army. At the same time, we are evolving our evaluation and assessment systems to more effectively identify, measure, and track the social, cognitive, and physical indicators required to assess performance and potential. Finally, we value diversity in our workforce and embrace the varied cultural and demographic dimensions of our country. We are deliberately working to attract and retain top talent from the wide range of personal and professional backgrounds and perspectives that arise from our cultural differences, attributes, and experiences.

**Maintaining the Army Advantage**

As we continue moving forward in the years ahead, conflict will evolve, and the Army must evolve with it. While we cannot predict the trajectory of that evolution with certainty, we can be confident that Army leaders of tomorrow must have highly developed critical and creative thinking skills that enable them to make informed and effective decisions in the midst of chaos. These decisions will demand tactical expertise, cultural intuition, and a deep understanding of strategic context. We will synchronize the Army Leader Development Strategy with the new Army Operating Concept, ensuring we continue to build tomorrow’s great leaders. Our Nation continues to send its finest citizens to fill our ranks, and it is our solemn responsibility to be effective stewards of this trust. These soldiers and civilians are talented, courageous, and ethical, and they enable us to accomplish any task, to meet any challenge, and to defend our Nation whenever and wherever asked.

The strength of our Nation is our Army. The strength of our Army is our soldiers. The strength of our soldiers is our families. And that’s what makes us Army Strong!

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Gen. Raymond T. Odierno is the 38th chief of staff of the Army. During more than 38 years of service, he has commanded units at every echelon, from platoon to theater, with duty in Germany, Albania, Kuwait, Iraq, and the United States. He is a graduate of the Army War College and holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Engineering from West Point, a master’s degree in Nuclear Effects Engineering from North Carolina State University, and a master’s degree in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College.

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**Notes**

1. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet (TP) 525-3-1, The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 2014) http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pamst/tp525-3-1.pdf accessed 14 May 2015. In October 2014, the Army published The Army Operating Concept as the foundational framework to enable leaders to adapt at the pace of change. The Army Operating Concept describes how future Army forces, operating as part of the joint force and working with interorganizational and multinational partners, will prevent conflict, shape security environments, and win in a complex world. In this endeavor, a renewed emphasis on leader development is vitally important, as the security challenges facing our Nation multiply.


The Army Leader Development Strategy (ALDS) provides a strategic road map for the development of the next generation of Army leaders in the face of an operational environment that is expected to be complicated and extremely threatening to national interests. Leadership undergirds every aspect of the Army. In an era of shrinking resources, the Army must depend on educating and training its leaders to promote courageous and resourceful analytical thinkers as well as ethical managers, who can prepare for, and operate in, an era of austerity.

The Coming Educational Revolution in the Army

Senator Pat Roberts (R-KS)

Fort Leavenworth has long been touted as the intellectual center of the Army. It is indeed a reputation I have shared proudly with all my colleagues—and with anyone who would listen over the years. Since my days on the Senate Intelligence Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee, I have been working hard to ensure Fort Leavenworth not only remained the Army’s crown jewel but also was able to increase its importance within the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). That is why when I first learned of the installation’s pitch to the Army’s top leadership to establish Fort Leavenworth as a key component of The Army University, I knew the answer would be a resounding yes. Who in the Army could build better leaders for the force of 2025 than the intellectual center of the Army?

And as the Army begins conducting listening sessions at installations across the United States to obtain community feedback on force reduction and restructuring plans, there is no better time for Fort Leavenworth to roll out The Army University concept. With little to critique, bolstering the Army’s intellectual capacity would seem to all but guarantee Fort Leavenworth’s future role in the larger Army structure.

Unfortunately, we are faced with budget constraints that are causing a downsizing of our military even as threats continue to spread across the globe. This will, inevitably, cause the future force to be spread thinly and will necessitate that it do more with less. That is not a situation I take lightly. And, while Congress continues to debate how to best shape, fund, and support future U.S. military posture, I believe TRADOC’s decision to prioritize the training and grooming of the Army’s best and brightest leaders is forward thinking. No matter the tools or training, without competent leadership to bond, inspire, and compel our fighting force to be the best in the world, our warfighters would fall short. The men and women of the all-volunteer force deserve the best leadership possible. Establishing The Army University will provide just that leadership.

The greatest influence in leadership in my life will always be my father, Wes Roberts. He joined the U.S. Marine Corps during World War II. He served honorably with the 27th Marine Division in Iwo Jima and Okinawa. It was his tenacity and will that propelled me to serve my country later on, as both a Marine and a member of Congress.

During my time in the Marine Corps, I was fortunate to be tasked to the Education Center, Marine Corps Development Center, Quantico, to assist in writing and editing the Marine Corps’ Fleet Marine Force Manual 21, Operations Against Guerrilla Units. This manual enabled the Marine Corps to successfully maintain mission responsibility, and it served as a leadership tool for training. While working as an author, I saw firsthand the value of nurturing our military leaders.
As the future force takes shape, it is important that our future learning structure continues to nurture leaders. It is essential that we create and implement an education system that supports the mission to develop agile, adaptive, and innovative uniformed and civilian leaders to lead in an uncertain future. Through unity of effort and a commitment to education, integration, partnering, and networking, The Army University promises to propel our military leaders far into the twenty-first century.

One key principle for success in The Army University construct is partnering. Already, we have witnessed the success and benefits of Fort Leavenworth’s relationships with regional universities such as Kansas State University and the University of Kansas. Through collaborative research, The Army University is efficiently partnering Army research requirements with established and strongly-supported academic resources across the Nation. Establishing innovative ways to benefit the Army and its colleges and universities throughout the United States is a win for all.

As the Nation faces new challenges and threats at home and abroad, it is vital that our Army continues to focus on the intellectual strength and training of its leaders.

Senator Charles Patrick “Pat” Roberts is serving his fourth term as a U.S. senator for the state of Kansas. He is a graduate of Kansas State University, and he served as a member of the U.S. Marine Corps. Before being elected senator, Roberts served as a congressman, representing the 1st District of Kansas for sixteen years.
The Army University
Educating Leaders to Win in a Complex World


We must continue to educate and develop soldiers and civilians to grow the intellectual capacity to understand the complex contemporary security environment to better lead Army, joint, interagency, and multinational task forces and teams. Therefore, we will reinvest and transform our institutional educational programs for officers and noncommissioned officers in order to prepare for the complex future security environment.

- Secretary of the Army John McHugh

Beginning this year, the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is reorganizing the Army’s professional military education programs into a university system to increase academic rigor, to create greater opportunities for accreditation, and to enhance the quality of the force. The Army University aligns the commissioned officer, warrant officer, noncommissioned officer, and civilian education programs across TRADOC under a single academic structure with a consistent brand name. This
alignment streamlines academic governance, reduces stovepipes, facilitates accreditation of educational programs, and provides the opportunity to propagate best practices rapidly throughout the force. This effort is the first major innovation of the Army’s Force 2025 and Beyond initiative. It is also a visible statement that the Army is making a greater investment in our soldiers through improved education to increase their competence, enhance their character, and strengthen their commitment to the Army.

We are executing this change because our current system is inadequate for addressing the growing complexity, volatility, and uncertainty of the twenty-first century security environment, as outlined in the recently published *U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World*. Winning in the future will require “innovative, adaptive leaders and cohesive teams who thrive in those complex and uncertain environments.”

Preparing leaders with the right skill sets to meet the complex world of tomorrow demands change today. The students in our schools today will be leading our Army tomorrow. The command sergeants major of that future force are already filling the seats of our basic leadership courses as young corporals and sergeants.

The brigade commanders of the Army of 2025 enter the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College this year. Building the right educational architecture for them and their peers is the most significant investment we can make to build the Army our nation needs for 2025 and beyond.

Within TRADOC, the Army’s colleges, institutes, schools, and training centers currently provide high-quality education and training to soldiers and civilians worldwide. However, this system is not optimal for developing the critical and creative thinkers the Army will require in the future. If not upgraded, it will gradually become less efficient and less capable of delivering the kind of educational experience our force must have to meet the challenges of the future.

**Defining the Problem**

Five underlying factors currently inhibit the Army educational enterprise from realizing its full potential.

**Industrial Age legacy.** The previous professional military education system emerged more than a century ago when requirements for military leaders were very different. Consistent with the mass-production, industrial mindset of the time, the Army developed an
assembly-line approach to education that focused on conforming to established procedures based around branch-specific expertise.

Army education has evolved in its approach as it has incorporated new learning techniques appropriate for the challenges of emerging operational complexity. However, it still remains unduly constrained by a structural approach to its curriculum development process and a teaching methodology that is too rigid. It does not effectively cultivate or promote the kind of creative thinking and mental agility necessary to overcome the challenges of the future operational environment.

**Incoherent focus.** The education effort within TRADOC today includes at least seventy schools and a large number of independent research libraries. Although there is extraordinary innovation occurring independently in these educational facilities, synchronization and coherence of efforts between them is spotty at best, resulting in tremendous inefficiency and needless duplication of effort. Moreover, bureaucratic stovepipes often inhibit diffusion of innovative best practices across the education enterprise.

**Lack of identity.** Army education lacks identity as a unified institution as well as a widely recognized brand. Individual TRADOC schools and centers collaborate with more than ninety different universities and colleges across the country. The civilian institutions are often enthusiastic about working with the military. However, they often complain that educational partnerships with the Army are too often temporary and localized to specific installations. Due to the creation of The Army University, we now have a centralized “front door” to attract, manage, and optimize such partnerships to meet the needs of the Army, a feature we previously lacked.

Command and General Staff officer course students listen to a lecture on port operations September 1945 in Andrews Hall (now the post museum), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. During World War II, the need to rapidly produce large numbers of Army staff officers resulted in adjustments to the schoolhouse curricula that focused instruction on individual staff-relevant branch specialty requirements and reduced the time of instruction to ten weeks.
Prestige gap in military education. The military community perceives that degrees and credentials from Army academic institutions carry less weight and prestige than those granted by the academic community. Army opinion surveys reflect that many soldiers do not regard professional military education as rigorous, valuable, or prestigious. This perception that Army education lacks the academic rigor of equivalent programs in civilian institutions is due to a misunderstanding of the accreditation process within the military.

Poor accreditation. Agencies recognized by the Department of Education accredit less than one-fourth of existing Army education programs. This generates an enormous hidden cost as soldiers pursue degrees and skill-credentialing, needlessly having to complete courses in civilian institutions similar to instruction they already mastered in the military. It is not uncommon to find career noncommissioned officers with ample credit hours of education for formal recognition but no academic degree because those credit hours were acquired across a career in different programs at different installations. As a result, the Army routinely funds unnecessary and redundant education programs for soldiers because it has heretofore failed to provide them with academic equivalency credit hours for their Army education.

Why the Army Needs a University

Strategists dating back to Sun Tzu have argued that victory in war goes to the society that can best employ its inherent strengths to produce strategic advantage. Winning in a complex world demands that our Army finds and leverages the strengths of the United States to produce a competitive military advantage.

Over the last three decades, the United States led the world into the digital age by fostering a spirit of ingenuity,
creativity, and innovation. Our world-class universities incubated this spirit. Today, the United States has the preeminent graduate-level education programs in the world.\(^4\) Its graduate schools are widely considered the destination of choice for foreign students able to study abroad.\(^5\)

The U.S. advantage in higher education is not an accident of history. Other advanced nations abound with intelligent and dedicated critical thinkers as well as excellent schools of higher learning. However, our advantage stems from a U.S. higher education system that is built upon a proven model: the state university system. While there are many variants, this system organizes the academic efforts of each state into specialized centers of scholarly excellence. This collective approach produces a rate of innovation that is difficult to achieve in smaller, stand-alone programs. Consequently, the state university system produces high-quality critical and creative thinkers at a pace that makes it the envy of the world. Our goal is to apply this proven civilian model to the military education system to produce the agile and adaptive leaders required by the U.S. Army Operating Concept.

**Why Now**

There are two reasons we should act now. First, education is the most reliable strategic hedge in investment that the Army can make in the face of an uncertain future. In July 2014, the secretary of the Army called for a comprehensive strategy, oriented on the time frame of 2025 and beyond, which would "adapt the Army to a rapidly changing global security environment that is volatile, unstable, and increasingly threatening to U.S. interests."\(^6\) Central to this strategy is recognition that the Army will require expert critical and creative thinkers to serve as innovative leaders who thrive in uncertainty and chaos.\(^7\) Those with the potential to become such leaders are already part of our Army today. Consequently, adequately training leaders for the future must begin immediately.

Second, history reveals that some of the best and longest-lasting transformations in military education occur in the aftermath of sustained conflicts. The Army today comprises a veteran force with real-world experience derived from years of sustained combat. Its experience informs our collective judgment, giving us a deeper appreciation for the complex and unpredictable challenges that lie ahead. This wealth of experience provides a fleeting window of opportunity to reevaluate and reorient our approach to education.

**Historical Precedent**

The creation of a university structure to organize the educational efforts of a military department is neither new nor unprecedented. The Air Force established the Air University in 1946, and the Marine Corps activated the Marine Corps University in 1989. Both the Air and Marine Corps universities are useful models, and The Army University benefits from lessons learned in these organizations, such as avoiding the creation of an unnecessary bureaucratic structure.

The idea of an Army University dates back to 1949 when Lt. Gen. Manton Eddy, the commandant of the Command and General Staff College, proposed it to the War Department Military Education Board.\(^8\) Unfortunately, the broad geographic dispersion of the Army’s premier schools and different institutional agendas prevented the development of a university structure at that time. However, advances in digital technology and distance learning now enable the necessary collaboration for a university without requiring physical colocation.

**Strategic Vision**

To remain competitive and relevant in the future, the Army must develop an education enterprise that blends the most effective elements of its existing academic programs with the structure and best practices of America’s premier universities.

To achieve this, TRADOC is organizing its military education programs under a single university structure. Moreover, The Army University is operationalizing the Army’s philosophy of mission command within the education enterprise.\(^9\) The university, led by a board of regents and a chancellor, will design broad educational objectives and standards, but it will allow the colleges the autonomy to develop the programs to implement those standards for their unique student populations.

**Scope**

The Army University integrates all of the schools throughout TRADOC into a single educational structure, modeled after successful state university systems across our nation. This includes all elements of the commissioned officer, warrant officer,
enlisted, and civilian education systems. It also includes educational programs in the active and reserve components, and the Reserve Officer Training Corps precommissioning program.

Army War College. The Army War College is an integral part of The Army University and serves as the enterprise coordinator for strategic education and research—while remaining a separately accredited and governed graduate college. As such, it retains a unique status as a direct reporting unit to the chief of staff of the Army. The commandant of the Army War College, however, also serves as The Army University’s vice chancellor for strategic education, responsible for educating strategic leaders, providing enterprise-level guidance on strategic education across the Army, and conducting research for the Army senior leadership.

Education for the Total Force. The Army National Guard and Army Reserve have long been equal partners in the professional military education system. The two are vital to The Army University and help connect the university with the nation it serves. Both organizations have many academic professionals who serve in both tenured faculty and senior academic administration positions in their civilian careers. They provide a valuable, untapped resource of expertise to help improve the quality of Army education.

Joint professional military education. Title 10 of the U.S. Code mandates specific educational programs for the military services in order to promote greater interservice collaboration and understanding. The Army University will maintain close coordination with the Joint Staff J-7 through its membership in the Military Education Coordination Council in order to uphold these statutory requirements. However, the creation of The Army University also has the potential to improve the objectives of the joint education program. Current practice exposes officers to the
“joint world” first at their intermediate level of education. Experience in the last decade of conflict suggests that some level of joint education may be valuable at the primary level of a commissioned officer’s education as well as for enlisted soldiers, warrant officers, and civilian cohorts. While this concept requires further exploration, The Army University is uniquely structured to promote this change. As an institution that is accredited for joint professional military education with direct academic oversight of military education across all cohorts, The Army University serves as a direct link between the Joint Staff and educational programs.

The Value Proposition

The creation of The Army University is both a symbolic and a substantive change in Army education. It is a visible symbol of the Army’s commitment to education. As The Army University brand grows in stature, it will send a powerful message that all of the Army educational programs carry the prestige of an academically rigorous, nationwide institution, affecting soldiers across the Total Force by accomplishing the following:

- supporting growth and development across a career of service in the Army
- developing agile, adaptive, and innovative leaders through increased academic rigor
- supporting the Total Army with increased educational opportunity for the Reserve and National Guard
- enhancing the ability of soldiers to integrate their military and civilian education through receiving valid academic credit for their educational investment
- reinforcing a soldier-for-life philosophy through improving soldiers’ ability to transition into quality employment opportunities after their service

Additionally, The Army University positively impacts the operating force in the following ways:

- providing operational units with leaders who can improve and thrive in chaos and uncertainty
- increasing the rate of innovation in military education to be more responsive to the needs of operational commanders
- increasing foreign partnerships and regional studies, prioritized by Army service component command, to better prepare leaders to serve in regionally aligned forces
- developing an educational common operating picture to enable shared understanding across the Army
- improving student research alignment with the needs of the operating force

Like its civilian counterparts, The Army University fosters innovation by identifying best practices and...
facilitating pilot programs. This empowers subordinate schools through shared understanding, building a network both within The Army University and with other universities.

Resourcing Strategy

The 2014 Army Strategic Planning Guidance identifies the education of adaptive leaders as the Army’s number-one strategic priority. Achieving this goal will require sustained investment. Recognizing this change is being initiated during a period of fiscal austerity, a phased approach will defer initial costs through internal reprogramming as new ways of operating are tested. After two years of experience with the university concept, we will have a better sense of the minimum essential administrative requirements. The ultimate goal is to improve the overall quality of educational outputs through better use of existing resources.

Promoting Real Change in Army Education

The Army University is more than just a name change and a staff reorganization. As the university matures, it will drive a number of substantive changes in Army education.

World class faculty. Superior teaching quality is a key driver for a university to achieve excellence. The Army University faculty includes a stable core of subject matter experts who are skilled in facilitating adult learning, augmented by military personnel with recent operational experience. While tremendous faculty fill our academic programs today, preserving and expanding that talent in a very competitive labor market requires significant effort. Increasing faculty development will provide substantial benefit to the operating force in other ways as the military faculty return to the force with improved communication, critical thinking, and research skills. The Army University and the Army G-1 are working together to develop policies and regulations that attract, develop, and retain the right mixture of talented and relevant civilian and military faculty. Without an investment in faculty excellence, no amount of restructuring will produce the results we seek.

External collaboration. The Army University leverages external collaboration to promote internal excellence through developing faculty exchanges, combined forums, and joint research. Tremendous opportunity exists with both public and private universities for training, cooperative education, research, internships, and more. At the same time, this network of partnerships connects the Army to an important segment of the society it serves.

Accreditation. One of the most exciting benefits of The Army University is its ability to drive comprehensive, nationwide accreditation for Army schools and training. Rigorous external accreditation improves the quality of our programs, reduces educational expenses, and enables soldiers to leave the military "career ready." Equally important, The Army University also enables Army civilians to receive academic credit for professional military education. Accreditation increases recruitment and retention for both military and civilian cohorts by providing another venue to
achieve educational goals while continuing to serve. It also motivates soldiers and civilians to complete courses important to the Army, which enables them to receive college credit for their efforts. With hundreds of courses in its portfolio and tens of thousands of students, The Army University generates momentum in the accreditation process in ways that were difficult for individual Army schools to manage.

**Academic rigor.** Accreditation of The Army University courses requires rigorous standards for student performance. Much of this rigor is already in place but demands a renewed emphasis. Soldiers will maintain a transcript from The Army University throughout their careers, reflecting their performance in Army educational programs. The transcript will enable better talent management through integrating a soldier’s academic performance into his or her military record. Additionally, TRADOC and the Army G-1 are reviewing ways to improve performance reporting to place greater weight on academic assessment as an element of a soldier’s total performance record.

**Academic research.** The Army University enables faculty to publish, research, and design courses to develop “well-rounded, more-respected professors.”16 Much of this is already occurring, but, too often our institutions do not support or encourage these activities. In addition, these activities promote collaborative research with private industry, academia, and Army institutions such as the Army Research Institute and the Army Research Labs. As part of this effort, The
Army University will pursue congressional authority for the university president to accept grants—similar to the current authority of the commandant of the Army War College.17

The Army University will also empower students to write, debate, and improve the Army profession by actively working to publish their professional research in the broader national security dialogue. To better facilitate this effort, we are combining Military Review and the Combat Studies Institute to form the Army Press. This publishing venue will generate high-quality, peer-reviewed literature from Army scholars.

Increasing the rate of learning innovation. Modern science has learned more about the brain in the last fifteen years than in all of human history.18 Educational science is rapidly evolving with the potential to transform the way we teach. The Army cannot afford to miss out on this innovation. With this in mind, The Army University will become the Army's center of innovation in the learning sciences and will empower and unleash creative educational approaches. It will do this by applying the philosophy of mission command across the educational enterprise to promote decentralized initiative—based on clear intent and trust among teams. To enable this internal networking, The Army University maintains an educational common operating picture to provide comprehensive awareness of every major initiative in Army education. These include best practices, pilot programs, civilian university broadening programs, and faculty exchanges.

**Governing Structure**

Existing models in the Air, Marine Corps, and National Defense universities influenced development of The Army University governing-structure concept. In addition, we developed the structure after collaboration with the leadership of the California, Virginia, and Texas university systems, with the goal of employing common language to enable collaboration with other universities. A discussion of the major new leadership positions follows.

**Board of directors.** An Army-level board of directors led by the Army secretariat and chief of staff provides the strategic vision, strategic ends, and strategic priorities.

**Chancellor.** The TRADOC commanding general acts as university chancellor and provides the strategic direction and institutional policy; in execution, the chancellor reports directly to the chief of staff of the Army and board of directors.

**Executive vice chancellor for training and education.** The commanding general of the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth acts as executive vice chancellor for training and education, providing oversight of academic quality and support programs, university finances, future development of the university system, and public representation for the university.

**Vice chancellor for strategic education.** The commandant of the Army War College acts as the vice chancellor for strategic education and is responsible for the integration of strategic education throughout The Army University. The vice chancellor for strategic education retains academic governance over the War College and reports directly to the chief of staff of the Army.

**Provost.** The deputy commanding general for the Combined Arms Center-Education acts as university provost and is responsible for long-term continuity, excellence, and vitality of the university’s academic programs. The provost also manages the Army Learning Coordination Council to synchronize education activities across the Army.
Conclusion

Every day, tens of thousands of Army soldiers and civilians participate in professional education programs across the globe, making the Army’s educational enterprise one of the largest academic systems in the United States. Transitioning this complex global enterprise into a single university structure may seem daunting. The benefits of doing so, however, are too significant to ignore. Stewarding our profession demands action before rather than during or after a crisis. History shows that periods of significant change after sustained conflict open windows of opportunity. We intend to harness the energy and experience in our force to transform the way we educate Army leaders. Now is the time to seize this opportunity and prepare our profession for the uncertainty of tomorrow.

Lt. Gen. Robert B. Brown, U.S. Army, is the commanding general, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; commandant, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; and deputy commanding general for combined arms, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. He holds a BS from the U.S. Military Academy, an MS in education from the University of Virginia, and an MS in national security and strategic studies as the distinguished graduate of the National Defense University.

Notes


7. TP 525-3-1, 20.


10. U.S. Code 10, Chapter 107, establishes joint professional military education requirements for the military services.


12. The Army University will submit any additional transitional costs in the FY18-22 Program Objective Memorandum.

13. Adams. Rankings of the world's best universities consistently show that those who are at the top of their professional fields are the best teachers.


15. The chief of staff of the Army recently established the Soldier for Life campaign designed to ensure soldiers, veterans, and families leave military service “career ready.” The accreditation efforts within Army University support the goals established in Soldier for Life. See http://soldierforlife.army.mil/, accessed 5 March 2015.


17. The Army War College’s authority to accept research grants is established in 10 U.S.Code § 4417. Ideally, all Army educational institutions will operate under a single universal policy as directed by the Secretary of the Army.

The Army University is coming to you! The Army is rolling out its latest initiative to develop an institution that answers the question: How do we develop agile, adaptive, and innovative leaders of the future? One thing we have learned through the nearly fourteen years of conflict is that our enemies are as complex and as adaptive as any we have faced in our history. They are quick to leverage technology and to capitalize on our weaknesses, and they communicate with their subordinates at a much faster rate than we normally do with ours. In the past, the Army depended on equipment to gain an advantage.
Spc. Anthony Fountain, with the Naval Ophthalmic Support and Training Activity in Yorktown, Virginia, uses a manual lensometer 5 March 2008 at Coast Guard Integrated Support Command Kodiak, Alaska. Fountain is helping to create four hundred pairs of free eyeglasses for patients during Operation Arctic Care 2008, an annual joint-service training event that provides medical, dental, optometry, veterinary, and mechanical services.

(U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. John R. Nimmo Sr.)

over its enemies. As we move toward the “Force 2025 and Beyond” strategy, it is obvious we must invest more in our soldiers; we must tap into their potential to become more agile, more adaptive, and more innovative than our adversaries.1

**NCO 2020 Initiative**

The NCO 2020 initiative is a five-year project involving a survey of more than four hundred thousand soldiers regarding the Army noncommissioned officer (NCO) education system.2 The survey identified several performance gaps in NCO education. Two of those gaps are that institutional learning often comes later than needed and that systems need to be more adaptable. Perhaps The Army University’s biggest challenge will be to become an agile and adaptive institution. In order to accomplish this requirement, The Army University will need to synchronize the learning objectives of all four cohorts in the Army: commissioned officers, warrant officers, enlisted soldiers, and Army civilians. Currently, these processes are performed by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center. Synchronizing these learning objectives will ensure soldiers are trained and educated at the appropriate times in their careers.

Another function of The Army University will be to develop and review the professional military education curriculum to ensure it is standardized and can be quickly exported to the Army’s twenty-two proponents when and where it is needed. In the current process, a proponent can, at times, take several years to develop and implement a curriculum it is responsible for—and that curriculum often is not shared throughout the entire Army. The Army University will be the vehicle that can swiftly push and pull curriculum Army-wide, with the ability to adapt to emerging threats when soldiers need the information quickly.

**Education and Credentialing**

The Army University will not look like any other university in the United States. As a whole, it will leverage eighty-six institutions, with more than 150,000 enrolled students, and it will partner with other universities to provide more opportunities for soldiers through degree participation programs and the credentialing of soldier skills. Several Army proponent schools have relationships with nearby academic institutions close to their campuses. Under The Army University, they will be able to expand these relationships throughout the country to provide more flexibility to soldiers as they pursue higher education and degree completion.

Credentialing is a term used to identify personnel who have established their qualifications as licensed professionals. Currently, there are more than five thousand organizations that credential people in disciplines ranging from emergency medical technician to carpenter. Most of these credentialing organizations can legally certify soldiers in a state or a region in their specialties. The Army University will partner with these organizations to align them universally and to help soldiers who graduate from a military technical school acquire the recognition for their skills—as they deserve—through licensing.

**Army Policy**

Affecting policy can be one of the most daunting tasks in the Army. Generally speaking, changes are frequently conveyed through forums and meetings. In addition to providing a clearer link to decision makers through the forums and meetings, The Army University will have the
voice of twenty-two proponents, eighty-six schools, and 450,000 soldiers as it works to make positive changes for the soldiers’ and Army’s benefit. Sometimes it is easy to ignore one voice, but The Army University will be a voice of many—too loud to ignore.

Talent Management

The Army needs new ways to build agile, adaptive, and innovative leaders. This will require better management of talent throughout the four cohorts. There are talented individuals nested within the force who have potential and aptitude far exceeding that of their peers. To maximize that talent, the Army must develop agile institutions that identify and accelerate development of those talented individuals rather than the old one-size-fits-all process. The Army University will develop models that emphasize career-broadening experiences by offering accelerated education opportunities for its high performers. This will include programs such as strategic broadening seminars and the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy Fellowship Program, which is scheduled to be implemented this year.

Increased nontraditional assignments provide a means to enhance understanding throughout the force of how the Army truly works, while also providing additional career enhancement opportunities to take advantage of the talents and capabilities of the senior enlisted leaders.

Exceptional soldiers identified through this new system of talent management should have the opportunity to experience these specialized assignments for professional growth, which will also serve to improve overall performance across the Army. Development of strategic leaders and thinkers does not happen overnight; it requires identification of talent and exposure to strategic leadership opportunities in order to master skills through firsthand experience.

Transitioning Soldiers

One of the foremost issues for soldiers transitioning out of the military is the translation of their experiences and education from military to civilian language. Ask civilians not associated with the military what they think the Warrior Leader Course is, and you will get a variety of different answers—but typically, you will find that nobody outside the Army knows the right answer. In part, this is due to the fact that less than one-half of one percent of the U.S. population has served in the armed forces at any given time during the past decade, so this lack of knowledge is understandable.

However, this situation is detrimental to the veteran seeking employment after leaving the Army. The Army University will begin rebranding courses and curriculum to make it easier for civilian companies to understand course content and the associated skill sets of soldiers departing the service. You might see the Warrior Leader Course change its name to Basic Leader Course, or it might even become aligned with curriculum that would better reflect the credit the American Council on Education awards soldiers for the classes they take in the NCO Education System. An example might be renaming the leadership block in the Advanced Leader Course to Organization Leadership 101.

Bottom Line

The Army University is not a new concept. Many past commanders have tried to institute a similar model in their organizations because they recognized the need to synchronize efforts and to highlight the world-class education the U.S. Army provides to all soldiers. It will take some time to develop all the necessary processes and efficiencies, but in the end, The Army University will be an institution that develops agile, adaptive, and innovative leaders who are prepared for the complex fight of the future.
Command Sgt. Maj. Micheal Clowser, U.S. Army, is the command sergeant major for Combined Arms Center-Education and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He previously served as the command sergeant major for the 12th Combat Aviation Brigade in Katterbach, Germany. He has served for twenty-five years in the aviation career field. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy and Command Sergeants Major Course. He holds an MBA from Baker College in Flint, Michigan.

Notes


Spc. Michelle Metzger, a motor transport operator with 1487th Transportation Company, Ohio Army National Guard, applies grease to her vehicle 12 August 2013 at Multinational Base–Tarin Kot, Afghanistan. Metzger, a mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicle driver, performs daily maintenance on the vehicle.
Developing Leaders

Col. Frank Wenzel, U.S. Army, Retired

If you asked a dozen Army leaders at various echelons what leader development means, you would probably receive a dozen different answers, including the following:

- unit-level officer and noncommissioned officer (NCO) professional development sessions
- counseling
- career timelines
- professional military education or the civilian education system
- succession planning and leader slating
- combat training center rotations
- self-development, including nongovernment educational institutions
- broadening experiences

This article will answer the question—what is leader development? Although each of the above answers is an example of leader development functions, objectives, or tasks, the answers only scratch the surface in describing how the Army develops leaders.

According to the Army Leader Development Strategy (ALDS) 2013,

Leader development is the deliberate, continuous, and progressive process—founded in Army values—that grows soldiers and Army civilians into competent, committed professional leaders of character. Leader development is achieved through the career-long synthesis of the training, education, and experiences acquired through opportunities in the institutional, operational, and self-development domains, supported by peer and developmental relationships.
The Army leader development model (figure 1) illustrates this definition graphically.\(^2\)

Leader development ranks very high on the priorities list of the chief of staff of the Army (CSA) since it is imperative that today’s leaders develop themselves and their subordinates to meet the current and future needs of the Army. Leader development encompasses different elements at different echelons.

At higher echelons, the Army ensures there are systems in place for developing leaders—this is the purview of general officers. At the unit level, leaders are responsible for personally developing their subordinates. This hands-on work is the purview of unit commanders and NCOs. Though both Army- and unit-level perspectives are focused on meeting current and future needs, a major difference is the developmental period. Unit leaders ensure subordinate leaders are ready to operate in their current and next duty positions. In contrast, the Army as a whole takes a long-term view with the intent of ensuring systems are in place to develop today’s junior leaders into the senior leaders the Army will require during the coming decades. The purpose of this article is to briefly review major features of both the condition-setting Army leader development system and the execution of leader development at unit level. Also discussed are a few potential leader development initiatives for consideration.

**Army-Level (Strategic) Leader Development Systems**

The U.S. Army builds leaders for the Nation. For the foreseeable future, the Army will increasingly need individuals who can operate in complex and ambiguous environments. According to the ALDS 2013, “the number of global and regional actors who can threaten the United States through asymmetric responses and technological advances is increasing.”\(^3\) The ALDS 2013 describes how increasing trends toward globalization through technological advances, which increase uncertainty in the strategic environment, have been well analyzed in recent national strategic and global assessments. These include *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, the Capstone Concept...
for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020, and the National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends 2030. Such key documents describe the challenges tomorrow’s leaders likely will face, and they help Army leaders anticipate those challenges.

Threat analyses in these studies have yielded a description of the attributes and competencies future leaders must possess. These attributes and competencies are included in the Army leadership requirements model, depicted in figure 2, on page 36.

Since Army leader development crosses all commands, agencies, and staffs, the CSA appointed the commanding general of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to serve as the senior responsible official (SRO) for Army leader development. Working closely with the assistant secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, the SRO is the focal point of all Army-level leader development efforts. He is supported in this effort by a wide variety of Army commands and agencies, including the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (G-3/5/7); the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (G-1); and the commanding general, Human Resources Command.

To identify issues and develop recommendations, the Army Profession and Leader Development Forum (APLDF) was established as a key part of the Army Leader Development Program. The SRO uses the APLDF to shape and lead Army-wide leader development efforts. In this forum, leader development initiatives are developed, tracked, and approved for implementation across the Army. To ensure synchronization of implementation efforts, participating organizations share emerging or existing leader development topics, issues, and best practices that are developed in other key Army forums such as the Army Training and Leader Development Conference, the Human Capital Enterprise Board, the Training General Officer Steering Committee, and the Civilian Workforce Transformation General Officer Steering Committee.

The APLDF is a decision-making body chaired by the SRO. The SRO leads and executes the Army Leader Development Program and makes leader development recommendations to the CSA. Consequently, the SRO is vested with the authority to shape and lead efforts to develop officers, warrant officers, NCOs, and civilians. The APLDF membership includes Army commands; Army Service component commands; direct reporting units; the National Guard Bureau; U.S. Army Reserve Command; Headquarters, Department of the Army staff principals; Human Resources Command; and other members as the SRO directs.

APLDF members critically examine leader development initiatives and programs, discuss issues, and draw upon their experience and judgment to advise the SRO. Current initiatives include Regional and Strategic Broadening, Commander 360 Assessment, NCO 2020, America’s Army–Our Profession, and the Advanced Strategic Policy and Planning Program. Successful completed initiatives include the Army Career Tracker, the Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback (MSAF) Program, and the Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) Interagency Exchange Program.

Consistent with the ALDS 2013, the APLDF works to rebalance the three crucial leader development components of training, education, and experience to ensure that leaders are properly trained to meet the challenges of future operating environments. The ALDS 2013 “provides vision and guidance on ends, ways, and means for developing leaders of all cohorts … [Army] leaders must understand the strategic environment, be able to think critically and creatively, visualize solutions, and describe and communicate crucial information to achieve shared understanding, collaborate, and build teams.”

Necessity for Hands-On Training

Leaders are developed at various echelons by planning and participating in training activities. According to the ALDS 2013,

Training is an organized, structured, continuous, and progressive process based on sound principles of learning designed to increase the capability of individuals, units, and organizations to perform specified tasks or skills. The objective of training is to increase the ability of leaders to competently perform in operational situations. Individual task training builds competence and confidence to perform the necessary tasks in support of both collective training and operations.

Classroom Education

The Army University will organize TRADOC’s educational institutions within a university construct
to create the learning environment required to produce agile, adaptive, innovative Army leaders prepared to accomplish the mission and win in a complex world. There are enormous potential opportunities in the education component as yet unrealized. First, fully integrating the CGSOC at the U.S Army Command and General Staff College with additional opportunities to participate in master’s degree programs would expand our officers’ professional vision and capabilities.

Second, by creating a midcommand program, the Army would increase Precommand Course exposure. This would not only benefit the midcommand officer, but would also give incoming commanders an opportunity to interact with their peers.

**Experience**

Looking to the future in the experience component, senior leaders have a number of options available to build and shape a force that best meets the Nation’s demands both today and tomorrow with limited resources. These include changing to a thirty-year career timeline as a standard model. This would ease the time constraints that cause angst for individuals and their Human Resource Command managers as years are

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**Figure 2. Army Leadership Requirements Model**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ATTRIBUTES (Be and Know)</th>
<th>CHARACTER</th>
<th>PRESENCE</th>
<th>INTELLECT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Character</td>
<td>• Army Values</td>
<td>• Military and Professional Bearing</td>
<td>• Mental Agility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Empathy</td>
<td>• Fitness</td>
<td>• Sound Judgment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Warrior/ Service Ethos</td>
<td>• Confidence</td>
<td>• Innovation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Discipline</td>
<td>• Resilience</td>
<td>• Interpersonal Tact</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leads</th>
<th>Develops</th>
<th>Achieves</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Leads Others</td>
<td>• Creates a Positive Environment/ Fosters Espirit de Corps</td>
<td>• Gets Results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Builds Trust</td>
<td>• Prepares Self</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Extends Influence Beyond the Chain of Command</td>
<td>• Develops Others</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Leads by Example</td>
<td>• Stewards the Profession</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Communicates</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
closely managed (often at the expense of the individuals or units) to ensure one gets through all of the wickets to facilitate progression to the next rank. The Army can also consider making promotion after a certain grade dependent on experience and certification rather than time and cohort year groups. Expanding opportunities for breaks in service for family or educational needs, or increasing lateral entry to allow personnel with specific talents and skill sets to enter service would have major positive impacts on retention and expertise available in the ranks.

Unlike large organizations in the private sector, the uniformed Army does not routinely recruit, select, and assign midgrade and senior-level leaders from outside its ranks. The uniformed cohorts are largely dependent upon the Army itself to develop leaders. The process of developing a senior uniformed leader begins twenty-plus years prior to the organization’s need for the individual.

**Talent Management Complements Leader Development**

Talent management is the combination of processes the Army uses to ensure the right leader is assigned to the right job at the right time. The leader development philosophy must align with practice because the right leader might not always be the most qualified individual for a position. Often, the best leader for a position is one who the Army needs to help learn and develop within that assignment, to satisfy immediate organizational needs as well as future Army requirements.

Talent management takes into account the individual preferences and talents of an officer, warrant officer, NCO, or Army civilian—the unique distribution of his or her skills, knowledge, and behaviors, and that individual’s potential. The Army looks to develop and put to best use well-rounded leaders based on the talents they possess—talents that derive not only from operational experience but also from broadening assignments, advanced civil schooling, professional military education, and demonstrated interests.

Leader development and talent management together are built on fundamentals. Army leaders must exemplify the “Be, Know, Do” concept as described in ALDS 2013. They must possess and demonstrate traits such as adaptability, agility, flexibility, responsiveness, and resilience. Mastering these fundamentals is a professional obligation and provides the basis by which Army leaders operate effectively with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners.
To support this, the Army must restructure promotion timelines so that leaders have the opportunity for a broader set of experiences that—together—improve an individual’s leadership skill set. Further use of 360-degree assessments that include input from superiors, peers, and subordinates may someday support talent management and help individual leaders identify in themselves strengths to sustain and weaknesses to overcome.

Developmental programs such as the MSAF program and the Commander 360 program are steps in the right direction because they increase leaders’ self-awareness. These initiatives are developmental programs and do not provide the Army with assessments of performance or potential. Evaluation reports alone are not sufficient for assessing performance or potential. The Army must consider additional ways to evaluate leader potential and the potential of industry-standard assessment centers for selection and promotion in order to truly engage in talent management.

Unit-Level Leader Development

A commander’s first priority is a trained and ready unit. At the lowest level, leader development makes an essential contribution to any unit’s ability to train effectively and accomplish its mission. Efficient implementation is achieved by integrating leader development into day-to-day activities. This develops soldiers and civilians into leaders who are competent, confident, and capable of decisive action. The operational (unit) assignment is the most effective setting for leader development. In leader development surveys, captains and majors ranked leading a unit, personal example, and mentoring as the three most effective ways their leadership qualities are developed.

To effectively develop subordinates, commanders must provide face-to-face counseling and feedback. Timely feedback is essential to capitalizing on the myriad of leader development opportunities that are present in units every day. This ever-present leader development environment allows for quick application and makes it possible to prioritize the practice of developing leaders even in an age of dwindling resources. An essential part of a leader development program is the deliberate face-to-face counseling of subordinates. In these sessions, leaders ask subordinates to develop a personal development plan for the next five years. This plan should address training, education, and experience in all three domains that subordinates identify as necessary to meet their personal and professional five-year goals. This individual development plan is reviewed at subsequent counseling sessions, and it serves as each subordinate’s developmental road map.

Although everyday activities provide a wealth of opportunities for leader development, it is important to stress that leader development does not just happen on its own. To be effective, leaders must develop an effective plan to develop subordinate leaders in their units. Identification of desired outcomes is an essential part of this plan. Essentially, leaders must identify what they are trying to develop subordinates to be, know, and do.

Unit-specific outcomes should consist of the rank-specific leader competencies (knowledge, skills, and abilities) and attributes required of agile and adaptive leaders capable of accomplishing the mission while confronting complex environments and adaptive enemies. Unit leaders develop desired outcomes by analyzing critical task lists—by their career management field or military occupational specialty at the appropriate skill level, unit task lists, and unit training doctrine and leader development resources. The results of this analysis allow the unit leader to bridge the gap between higher-level general learning outcomes and the desired unit-level leader development program.

Aids in this analysis include the Commander’s Handbook for Unit Leader Development and other resources found on the Leader Development Resources page of the Center for Army Leadership website. The handbook translates leader development guidance into application and integrates unit-level leader development into already occurring day-to-day activities. Unit-level MSAF events can provide leaders with aggregate-level information that can be used in identifying areas for additional emphasis as they tailor their leader development programs.

Unit leaders must set conditions—by personally modeling behaviors that encourage leader development, creating an environment that encourages on-the-job learning, and knowing the subordinate leaders within their command. Unit-leader feedback to subordinates does not need to be withheld until formal counseling sessions. Immediate, short bursts of feedback on current leadership actions enhance leader development in operational assignments. Unit leaders should leverage subordinate leaders who are role models in their units.
and encourage mentoring, training, reflection, and study. Learning from other leaders is one of the most effective and efficient methods of development. Finally, unit leaders should strive to create a legacy, being deliberate about the selection and succession of leaders, evaluating effectiveness, and being willing to modify job assignments to challenge subordinate leaders.

Regardless of the type of unit or organization, successful leaders recognize that they must continually develop their subordinate leaders by maximizing opportunities in all three domains of the Army leader development model: operational, institutional, and self-development.16 Today’s leaders guide their units and organizations through today’s challenges, but their subordinates are the ones who will guide tomorrow’s units and organizations through the challenges of tomorrow. As leaders in all domains develop their subordinate leaders, those subordinate leaders reciprocate with an investment of their own efforts. Leaders at all levels will model this desire to learn and strive to inculcate it in subordinates.

In the operational domain, conditions should include leaders who communicate, listen, and care. Leaders should create a mission command climate and a learning environment where subordinate input is valued. In this type of environment, a sense of shared responsibility and trust yield candor and open dialogue at all levels. This environment fosters a freedom to exercise initiative where honest mistakes are forgiven and from which lessons are learned and applied. Leaders provide their subordinate leaders with active role modeling as coaches, counselors, and mentors, providing honest developmental feedback during relevant, challenging, and complex education and training. Leaders give appropriate levels of thought to their goals for developing leaders when planning organizational assignments and extra duties. This will aid in developing leaders to succeed in their current and future duty assignments as well as at their next level of education.

Finally, operational leaders must allow their subordinates adequate time to pursue educational and self-developmental opportunities. In the institutional domain, leaders create conditions for quality leader development by providing clear plans to promote achievement of desired learning outcomes, assessing individual readiness to learn before classroom experiences commence, and providing opportunities for “sense-making” and reflection. The classroom must
be manned by qualified and inspirational instructors who are prepared to teach and facilitate learning in an adult learning environment. These instructors must use challenging, relevant, and timely curricula that promote critical and creative thinking, interpersonal skill development, and communication development. The institution should provide a robust capacity to create, archive, and deliver digitized learning products. These must be available in all three domains and accessible by the individual, the classroom, and the field.

A completely revised Field Manual 6-22, ‘Leader Development,’ is scheduled to be published in June 2015. This manual will fill a void by codifying doctrine for what the Army expects organizations and leaders to do in order to develop subordinate leaders.

The required conditions in the self-development domain follow lifelong learning models. An individual must develop a personal commitment to gain knowledge and to learn. Ideally, there should be few or no boundaries regarding topics of personal and professional interest. The Army must continue to make appropriate resources available that are meaningful, engaging to use, and accessible when needed and as needed. Resources such as the Virtual Improvement Center are useful guides as leaders plan their self-improvement. Leaders must limit their desire to direct subordinates to pursue fields of study for self-development, and then encourage and expect that subordinates seek knowledge on a topic or field of study that interests them.

**Conclusion**

Training, education, and experience each contribute to development in a unique way. The ALDS 2013 describes training as “an organized, structured, continuous, and progressive process based on sound principles of learning designed to increase the capability of individuals, units, and organizations to perform specified tasks or skills.”

While training teaches skills (i.e., what to do and think), education teaches how to think. The ALDS describes education as “the process of imparting knowledge and developing the competencies and attributes Army professionals need to accomplish any mission the future may present. ... Education focuses on intellect and the moral character of leaders to improve judgment and reasoning, and hone the habits of the mind: agility, adaptability, empathy, intellectual curiosity, and creativity.”

Experience is where it all comes together—this is where and when all the training and education are put into practice. The ALDS 2013 describes experience as the continuous progression of personal and professional events. ... Experience includes war and peace; the personal and the professional; the private and the public; leading and following; [and] training and education. Career-long learners reflect on all experiences, develop lessons learned from those experiences, and apply those lessons in future experiences. The Army uses assignment progression, development and broadening opportunities, and outside influences to provide leaders with the experiential opportunities required to reach full potential.

In today’s resource-constrained environment, it is important to note that investments in leader development can often mitigate other budget-induced shortcomings. If the leaders at the tip of the spear are properly developed adaptive thinkers, they can overcome almost anything. While fourteen years of combat have yielded a tremendous wealth of valuable combat experience in our formations, it is important to remember that the Army must...
continue rebalancing the three components of leader development: training, education, and experience. The valuable experience the Army gained in Iraq and Afghanistan must be complemented by the education and training necessary to develop the leaders the Army needs for its complex future—including the ability to lead Army and joint enterprises. The Army has done this well in the past and will develop leaders in order to do so again in the future.

According to the ALDS 2013, the Army continually examines past paradigms and assesses their relevancy to prepare leaders for the operational and strategic challenges of the future. Leaders at all levels embrace both their direct responsibilities for developing leaders as well as understand and support the “big picture” of how the Army deliberately, continuously, and progressively develops leaders.21

Leader development is essential to the Army’s success today and in the future. The Army’s strategic leaders of tomorrow are serving in entry-level ranks and positions today. The Army’s senior leaders have charted the course by publishing the ALDS 2013. To maintain an Army of competent and committed leaders of character with the skills and attributes necessary to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century, leaders must train, educate, and provide experiences to progressively develop subordinate leaders so the Army can prevail in Unified Land Operations using Mission Command in a 21st century security environment. … Leader development is a mutually shared responsibility between the institutional Army (education or training institution), the operational force (organization or unit), and the individual.22 ■

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Notes

2. Figure reconstructed from the Army leader development model, illustrated in ALDS 2013, 8.
7. ALDS 2013, 23.
8. AR 350-1, 6.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., 11.
13. Ibid., 4.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid., 12.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid., 6.
Our organizations will be judged by the performance of leaders serving in areas where critical thinking skills are essential. We must ensure our leaders possess the ability to understand the security environment and the contributions of all elements of national power; lead effectively when faced with surprise and uncertainty; anticipate and recognize change and lead transitions; and operate on intent through trust, empowerment, and understanding.

—Army Leader Development Strategy 2013

The U.S. Army finds itself once again in the familiar circumstances of uncertainty and ambiguity that seem to occur every decade or so. The recurring pattern begins with engagements in extended military operations, then restructuring of the force based on lessons learned, and then projections regarding future threats and the capabilities needed to deal with them. However, the projections have often
proven to be wrong. Several senior military leaders have acknowledged the U.S. military’s poor record of predicting future conflicts, as our Army has repeatedly found itself engaged in military operations in ways that it had not envisioned.1

Comparatively recent examples of such challenging periods include the transition out of the Vietnam War in the 1970s, the resurgent Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union in the 1980s, combat and peace operations in Iraq and the Balkans in the 1990s, and the Global War on Terror in the first decade of the twenty-first century. In each of these decades, the U.S. military was called upon by our nation to commit American service members across a range of military operations to secure U.S. interests.

During these periods, successive service chiefs of staff across the Department of Defense have lamented the lack of senior leaders who understand how to sustain the force of the day while preparing to meet the demands of the future. Experience has shown that senior military officers must be as adept at advising their political masters on national policy, developing long-range military strategy to support policy, and managing the defense enterprise as they are at leading service members in actual military operations.

Such senior leader competencies, apart from military skills, are even more important now in the face of inevitable fiscal reductions and ambiguous mission requirements. As a professional force, this means the military needs to assess whether it is properly developing its officers to be successful at its most senior levels.

Accordingly, as the military service most commonly assigned to lead joint and combined operations, the U.S. Army must more effectively develop officers to successfully lead and manage the Army of the future—both operating and generating forces. The Army has made advances in how it fights, from using technology to developing innovative operational concepts and fighting formations, but the critical enabler remains effective leader development.

The Army has achieved hard-won successes over the past decade by providing Army officers with tremendous tactical and operational experience in joint and coalition operations. However, as executive coach Marshall Goldsmith’s book title asserts, ‘What Got You Here Won’t Get You There’, meaning that Army leaders cannot rely on old habits for future success, especially as they gain higher-level responsibilities.2

Moving forward to Army 2025—the future of land power within the joint force—it is essential that we select, develop, and retain leaders within the officer corps with a great potential for high levels of responsibility. A well-known statement attributed to champion hockey player Wayne Gretzky serves as a metaphor for future-oriented leader development. According to Roy MacGregor, Gretzky “liked to say he didn’t skate to where the puck was, but to where it was going to be.”3 Like a hockey player who anticipates the movement of a puck and adapts quickly, the Army leader development effort must anticipate the need for vital senior leadership in the Army of 2025. While the present regimen of senior officer education may put future leaders in the “good” leader category, to make them great, the Army profession as a whole must embrace many new competencies.

A former chief of staff of the Army, retired Gen. Gordon R. Sullivan, wrote a leadership book together with Michael V. Harper in which they describe “three kinds of skills … necessary for success [in strategic leadership]: good management, working effectively with people, and creating the future.”4 While Sullivan and Harper’s text addresses business leaders, their principles come from their military experience and remain relevant to Army leaders who are creating the future of the force. Army leaders, understandably, want to retain the warfighting edge in the face of budget reductions and downsizing, but the Army must not forget the importance of leading the generating force to accomplish the Army’s Title 10 functions to man, organize, train, and equip the force.5

Many officers are familiar with the adage “amateurs talk tactics; professionals talk logistics.” A more appropriate statement would be, “warriors talk operations; soldiers talk enterprise.” Over its history, it has become clear that the Army must be effective in both Title 10 and warfighting functions. Former Army Lt. Gen. Richard G. Trefry describes how officers tend to think of themselves as warriors: “Generally speaking, a warrior is ‘one engaged or experienced in battle,’ while a soldier is ‘a man of military skill or experience.”6 He emphasizes that “soldiers not only fight, but they understand the multitude of internal missions of the Army, … the business of provisioning, sustaining, maintaining, training, organizing, and resourcing the Army.”7 The business of the Army
requires leaders of the entire enterprise. The Army’s culture must reflect this.

The Army’s organizational culture is a legitimate source of pride; nevertheless, it is important to understand what organizational culture is and to attend to its implications. Renowned scholar Edgar Schein defines organizational culture as “a pattern of shared basic assumptions learned by a group as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, ... taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think about, and react to organizational problems.” Schein’s notion of culture development provides a systematic and validated approach to changing a culture. He identifies five embedding and five reinforcing mechanisms. Embedding mechanisms change the root assumptions held by people, which they use, often unquestioningly, to inform action. Following the call to action that acknowledges the need for change, embedding mechanisms challenge previously unquestioned assumptions and replace them with new assumptions—creating a new norm that undergirds the new way of doing business—thus, a new culture. Reinforcing mechanisms support the embedding mechanisms by realigning the physical, more tangible aspects with the new culture—often referred to as artifacts. Reinforcing mechanisms are easier to implement, and they are often thought to be sufficient. However, in and of themselves, they do not create enduring cultural change.

The Realities of Army Cultures

Elevating the notion of soldier over that of warrior is likely to meet resistance. This is a new and necessary cultural change. The current Army culture emerged from embedding and reinforcing mechanisms that have served current members well. For the Army, however, the cultural legacy of muddy boots, anti-intellectualism, and egalitarianism hinder the effective development of senior leaders.

The muddy boots legacy rewards troop time, rarely permits off-track assignments, and results in a narrow experience base. The anti-intellectual legacy focuses almost exclusively on warfighting competence and disdains intellectual pursuits, both for self-development and for advanced professional military and civilian education. The egalitarian legacy, while essential to providing opportunity for all members, sometimes hinders the Army’s support for the further development of high performers who show potential for senior leadership. Perhaps similar cultural impediments exist in the other armed services, especially following more than a decade of deployments.

Muddy boots. Shaped by the past twenty years and reinforced with two long wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, this aspect of Army culture re-emerged with the downsizing of the Army after Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Sullivan appropriately sought to protect the Army’s core competency of warfighting in a turbulent era. Accordingly, he emphasized training for combat in major wars or major regional contingencies. “No more Task Force Smiths!” became the clarion call for the Army to maintain clear tactical and operational focus. The current cohort of Army general officers were company grade officers raised on this idea; they would not serve in a “hollow Army.” Throughout their careers, they have been combat arms leaders—high performers with high potential—developed through the crucible of command in operating forces. Their career timelines rarely permitted off-track broadening assignments.
The words written by retired Army Col. Lloyd J. Matthews in 2002 still ring true: “For today, ... time with troops has become the ultimate measure of worthiness for promotion to the highest ranks. Many of today’s generals are thus very good with troops, but, lacking a broader repertoire, they often find it difficult to adapt at higher staff and ancillary positions.”

Anti-intellectualism. In 1992, Trefry noted, “warriors have a tendency to dismiss or deride formal schooling … . The soldier understands that formal schooling is continuing education and … a hallmark of a profession.”

A decade later, Matthews offered the following anecdote: A distinguished Army four-star general, now retired, once boasted to me that he never read anything but the contents of his in-box. The Army culture that produced this sort of swaggering, know-nothing complacency simply has to give way to a tough insistence that our senior leaders be whole men and women.

More recently, the Army culture has embraced deferring school assignments during over a decade of conflict. Professional military education became unnecessary for promotion and selection to key assignments for majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels.

Egalitarianism. The Army views itself as a meritocracy, but an egalitarian aspect of its culture evolved after the Cold War drawdown and as a consequence of Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) III, which was designed to provide functional branch officers a path to career advancement. In the 1990s, then Chief of Staff Gen. Sullivan decided not to target specific individuals for separation or retention. With the expansion of the force in the twenty-first century under the “Grow the Army” initiative, there was an increased requirement for personnel at specific grades. Therefore, retention of gross numbers was more important to meet downstream requirements of the officer pipeline. This coincided with near-term staffing of operational and joint headquarters as well as tactical units (brigade combat teams). To meet operational demands, higher-than-traditional promotion rates to field-grade ranks became the norm. With OPMS III, the warriors became first among equals with officers in the functional areas and non-operations career field designations.

The consequences of this Army culture aligning with operational requirements must be examined. The current cohort of field grade officers has very limited experience with management of training, with command supply discipline, with administration, and with budgeting. Consequently, this generation of officers does not have the base of knowledge—through experience or education—to develop enterprise-level management skills. The report of the 2006 Review of Education, Training, and Assignment of Leaders (RETA) Task Force reflects the officer development trend that continued to develop during the Global War on Terror, with a focus on warriors.

Supporting warriors across the range of military operations demands soldiers capable of leading large and complex organizations, processes, and systems to produce the capabilities that achieve mission success in future operations. The Army must develop soldier-officers who can forecast, design, build, field, and sustain the force—the enterprise.

Enterprise Management

According to Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 8000.01, the term ‘Department of Defense enterprise-level means “relating to policy, guidance, or other overarching leadership provided by OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] officials and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in exercising authority, direction, and control of their respective elements of the Department of Defense on behalf of the Secretary of Defense.” Since 2007, the civilian deputy chief management officer has managed enterprise-level business integration for the Department of Defense.

The Army aligns its enterprise-level business functions, such as human resource management, weapon system lifecycle management, and financial management, with the Department of Defense business enterprise. Uniformed officers assist in developing policy and strategies as they execute the specific functions within the joint force. The Army prepares an annual report on business transformation that explains how it is “improving ... processes and ... systems that support business operations.” According to the 2014 Annual Report on Army Business Transformation, the Army

1. scopes to the size of a Fortune 5 Company;
2. [is the] fourth largest enterprise in the world by aggregate manpower;
3. [possesses a] vehicle fleet exceeding the world’s largest delivery companies; and
4. [operates] more than seven hundred enterprise-level business systems, which exceed $2 billion annually.
These data illustrate that Army enterprise-level business management, guided by the Army business management strategy, is the right idea. The Army business management strategy includes a goal to “provide better alignment between business operations and operational forces.” However, while Army operational doctrine clearly addresses tactical- and operational-level leader development, the word enterprise is noticeably scarce in its text. This suggests that the Army still needs to improve its enterprise alignment.

Serving as a warrior is a noble calling; the warrior’s identity supports the Army’s core mission to fight and win the nation’s wars. However, the muddy boots culture is not supportive of developing the professional soldier for responsibilities at senior levels, a cultural dissonance further compounded by dysfunctional anti-intellectualism and supposedly egalitarian practices. Change is needed.

Acknowledging that Army culture is misaligned with needs of the profession, Chief of Staff of the Army Gen. Raymond T. Odierno has taken appropriate action. Two senior leader development courses have been established to fill the education gap at the senior officer level. These courses are designed to prepare leaders to manage the Army enterprise. Each course targets officers serving in critical assignments within the institutional Army, known as the generating force. The first course, Senior Leader Seminar Phase I, began in September 2011 and has graduated approximately eight hundred post-Military Education Level 1 officers and senior civilians. In March 2014, the U.S. Army War College’s Center for Strategic Leadership and Development piloted the second course, Senior Leader Seminar Phase II, comprised of brigadier generals and promotable colonels. It has twenty-eight graduates from the three sessions conducted thus far.

In November 2013, based on the success of the two Senior Leader Seminars, the Sergeant Major of the Army directed the development of a similar program for newly selected nominative-level command sergeants major. The Executive Leader Course is for those who will serve as senior enlisted advisors at one- and two-star level command. At the time of this article’s publication, the course had met twice and produced thirty-eight graduates.

All of these courses help shape the Army culture by creating cohorts of senior Army professionals who can guide and sustain enterprise-wide change. Leadership expert John P. Kotter warns us, however, that “new practices … not compatible with the relevant cultures … will always be subject to regression.” In the Army’s case, the relevant cultures are muddy boots, anti-intellectualism, and egalitarianism.

Application of Schein’s embedding and reinforcing mechanisms is useful for shaping improvements to the Army culture. Recent efforts, such as the improved 2014 Officer Evaluation Report (OER) and the Army Leader Development Strategy 2013 (ALDS) represent steps in the right direction—first, to change systems and processes and, second, to present formal statements of organizational philosophy and creeds.

However, as reinforcing mechanisms, the revised OER and the ALDS 2013 are insufficient to sustain change. They usefully describe the desired change, but to influence the change effort, the Army needs accompanying actions through embedding mechanisms. The guiding coalition of leaders who deliberately role model, teach, and coach the cohorts of senior company grade and junior field grade officers must endorse and support the change. These cohorts must be developed to serve as enterprise-level leaders for the Army of 2025. Their development must
be incentivized by established, unambiguous criteria for selection and promotion.

The change initiative must be supported by a commensurate allocation of resources that clearly demonstrates the importance of enterprise management to the entire Army. A new norm must emerge: leading and managing the enterprise must become part of the professional officer’s ethic, much as the Warrior Ethos of the Soldier’s Creed has been.24

Conventional wisdom holds that changing a culture takes time. The Army must leverage the impact of OER changes by creating the systems that support change. Synchronizing officer developmental assignments will require patience and perseverance to align with the new norm. To influence and shape the Army of 2025, the Army should focus on the officer cohorts commissioned between 2002 and 2007. These current company and field grade officers will direct and manage the Army enterprise of 2025. The Army’s leader development effort must support their growth through well-considered training, experience, and educational opportunities. These cohorts will be the colonels graduating from senior-level colleges and ultimately serving as advisors to the most senior defense leaders. They will run the institutional schools, manage Army facilities, and lead Pentagon directorates. In these capacities and others, these officers will shepherd the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution processes to enable the operating forces.

These officer cohorts will have extensive tactical and operational experience. They should also understand and embrace their professional responsibility to learn how the Army enterprise works. It is their duty to lead and manage it, just as they have led in the operating force. Concomitantly, the Army must provide them with developmental assignments so they can acquire new skills and perspectives through broadening experiences as outlined in the ALDS 2013 (see the figure showing the Officer Career Timeline on page 46).25 For the force of 2025, the Army must identify specific enterprise-focused broadening assignments in which selected officers from the various career field designations are immersed—such as operations, operations support, and institutional support.

The ALDS 2013 provides a comprehensive approach; it appropriately addresses ends, ways, and means, as well as near-to mid-term guidance for programming and budgeting. Nevertheless, it does not go far enough; it misses an important mark by not defining enterprise

Montgomery Cunningham Meigs was a career U.S. Army engineer officer who was selected to serve as the Quartermaster General of the U.S. Army during the American Civil War. He was among the first senior Union commanders to recognize the vital necessity of building a logistics system on a vast and unprecedented scale to support operational military planning for the contemplated war effort. Under his leadership, a logistics system was built that kept supplies moving forward with increasing efficiency to support attacking troops even as the length of supply lines stretched into the thousands of miles. Some later historians have concluded that without Meigs’ strategic foresight and genius for energetic execution in building the necessary logistics system to support the Union forces, the campaigns of such luminaries as Generals Grant and Sherman would simply not have been possible. Speaking of Meigs’ wartime contributions, Secretary of State William H. Seward said, “that without the services of this eminent soldier the national cause must have been lost or deeply imperiled in the late Civil War.”

Sources: David W. Miller, Second Only to Grant (Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Publishing Company, 2001); See also text of Seward letter in Henry Benjamin Meigs, Record of the Descendants of Vincent Meigs: Who Came from Dorsetshire, England, to America about 1635 (Baltimore, Maryland: J.S. Bridges & Company, 1901), 258.
responsibilities future senior officers must be prepared to assume. The stated goal in the strategy is to create strategic-level officers who “lead and inspire change, [and who] are high-level thinkers, accomplished war fighters, and geopolitical military experts.”26 The document makes limited mention of the enterprise, which implies, unfortunately, that enterprise-wide responsibilities belong mainly to civilian leaders.27

Broadening assignments that emphasize enterprise-focused activities should be on par with the programs already designed to provide broadening perspectives in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational arenas. Established programs such as the Army Acquisition Corps’ Training with Industry Program could be renamed “Training with the Enterprise.” Some selectees should have broadening enterprise-related assignments; others could earn academic degrees, work with business, or participate in joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational experiences (e.g., with the State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development, or Central Intelligence Agency).

The impact of these assignments on the officer culture will become clear when those completing enterprise-related activities are promoted and selected on par with peers within their operational branches. The officer corps will then perceive the program as a viable path for career success—and a new culture will emerge. The tension between warrior and soldier identities will then be no more than a part of Army history.

Between World Wars I and II, when resources had dwindled and the Army largely sat idle, officer education and development took precedence—some through institutional programs and others by way of inspired self-development. Some of the Nation’s greatest warriors, such as Dwight D. Eisenhower, George S. Patton, and Omar Bradley, served in World War II under the enterprise leadership of then Chief of Staff of the Army Gen. George Marshall. One unsung Army hero played a critical role by leading a ninety-day planning effort in 1941: Albert C. Wedemeyer. Then a mid-level officer with considerable knowledge of the Army enterprise, he led a small staff’s planning effort in the Army War Plans Division. Their Victory Plan developed accurate estimates of the nation’s economic capability and power. The Victory Plan then led to additional detailed planning that supported the rapid mobilization of manpower and industry, which subsequently generated war material and equipment needed to defeat the Axis powers.28 Acknowledging his distinguished accomplishments as a soldier and patriot, President Ronald Reagan presented then retired Lt. Gen. Wedemeyer with the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1985.29

In the three decades since that award ceremony, the Army has answered myriad calls across the range of military operations. The Army’s culture has produced warriors to protect the Nation’s interests and, by happenstance, the soldiers who have led the enterprise to enable their success. It is essential that the Army culture now realign to develop professional warriors and soldiers competent to manage the enterprise into the future.


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Notes


5. Title 10, United States Code, Armed Forces (July 2011), §§3001–5000 et seq.


7. Ibid., 225.


9. Task Force Smith refers to the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, under the command of U.S. Army Lt. Col. Charles Smith. This was the first U.S. unit to engage in ground combat at the onset of the Korean War. After the U.S. drawdown following the end of World War II, the unit was woefully unprepared to repel the better-equipped and surprisingly resolute North Korean forces; Smith’s unit was routed.


16. The Department of Defense began business transformation in 2005. Enterprise business integration continues under the Deputy Chief Management Officer, but the original Business Transformation Agency has been disestablished.


18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. The Senior Leader Seminar Phase I is a one-week leader development course for select senior Army colonels (about 23–26 years of service), GS-15 Army civilians, and nominative positions for sergeants major and command sergeants major who are assigned or projected for assignment to key positions as advisors and staff officers for general officers and senior civilian leaders. The experience is broadening and educational, focused on preparation for national-level service. The program offers two courses a year for 112 participants per course.

21. The Senior Leader Seminar II (SLS II) is a chief-of-staff-of-the-Army directed intensive course designed for select promotable colonels and brigade generals. The intent is to improve strategic-level skills. The bulk of the course is conducted at the U.S. Army War College with several off-site engagements at think tanks, government agencies, media outlets, and universities. The course is expected to occur twice annually and include twenty participants per session.


26. Ibid.

27. Ibid., 18. While the ALDS 2013 refers to Army 2020, it also supports Army 2025.


Command Sgt. Maj. Dennis Green, Virginia National Guard senior enlisted leader, speaks with soldiers from Troop C, 2nd Squadron, 183rd Cavalry Regiment during a visit 13 December 2013 to Camp Pendleton, North Carolina. As the eyes and ears of the adjutant general of Virginia, Green visits each of the Virginia National Guard facilities and readiness centers across the state to gauge their levels of readiness.

Mentoring, Coaching, and Counseling
Toward A Common Understanding

Col. Jim Thomas, U.S. Army, Retired, and
Lt. Col. Ted Thomas, PhD, U.S. Army, Retired
There is an old joke describing how a soldier, a Marine, a sailor, and an airman each responded differently to the command to “secure the building.” The soldier quickly assembled his platoon, posted a guard mount, and controlled all entrances and exits. The Marine mobilized his force, outlined the plan, engaged the building with indirect fire, assaulted on line, cleared the building, sequestered survivors, and prepared to repel counterattacks. The sailor leisurely walked in; unplugged all the coffee pots; turned off the lights, computers, and printers; locked the doors; and left. The Air Force officer immediately contacted a real estate agent and negotiated a multi-year lease with an option to buy.

Similar confusion often occurs when talking with joint and interagency colleagues about how to help junior leaders progress. As military leaders, we help others develop through various means, including offering advice, providing support, allowing mistakes, and setting the stage for career advancement. When discussing leader development with our peers in partnering organizations, we often share insights and exchange techniques. It is important to establish a common understanding of the words mentoring, coaching, and counseling to help define the role of a leader.

A leader’s tool kit to develop others contains three main tools: mentoring, coaching, and counseling. These terms have different meanings between the military services and government agencies, and among leaders within a service as well. To add to this confusion, different generations of Army leaders often use the terms differently. Just what do we mean by mentoring, coaching, and counseling?

The meanings of these words have been evolving in military doctrine as each of the services attempts to define them. The Army took a hard look at leader development and tweaked its use of the words of mentoring, coaching, and counseling in the latest leadership doctrine (Army Doctrine Reference Publication [ADRP] 6-22, Army Leadership).1 Perhaps the biggest difference in how the Army and other services and agencies view these functions is reflected in the concept of mentoring.

Mentoring

One of the challenges in discussing mentoring is that people usually use the word in ways that reflect their own environments. Army Regulation 600-100, Army Leadership, defines mentorship as the “voluntary developmental relationship that exists between a person of greater experience and a person of lesser experience that is characterized by mutual trust and respect.”2

ADRP 6-22 uses this definition and further expounds upon the doctrinal view of mentoring relationships. A key point highlighted in ADRP 6-22 is that “mentoring relationships are not confined to the senior-subordinate relationship. They may occur between peers and often between senior NCOs [noncommissioned officers] and junior officers.”3 This distinction expands the mentoring relationship beyond one of rank. It also focuses on the aspect of a mentor as someone with more experience helping to develop someone of less experience based on individual developmental needs. In the Army’s view, a mentor is usually a person who specializes in the same occupational field as the mentee. For example, a more experienced artillery noncommissioned officer may serve as a mentor for a young artillery lieutenant. This doctrinal view shifts the emphasis of the action of mentoring from an inclusive view of a leader serving as the wise and trusted counselor for every soldier in the command to the view of a person exercising leadership as a wise and trusted counselor to an individual.

From the Army’s perspective, the interactions between a mentor and mentee are at the personal level. An informal relationship reflects a personal commitment from both parties to improve the mentee. This shift in the doctrinal construct does not abrogate the responsibility of leaders to develop their subordinates but instead adds a responsibility for each leader to devote time to be a mentor to a select few. The Army’s doctrinal approach to mentoring does not mandate or assign duties, nor does it establish a formal program requiring a mentor be assigned to each officer. Rather, the approach reflects the preferences of soldiers for voluntary relationships, which usually extend outside the chain of command, with experienced and trusted persons. Mentoring can be beneficial, both for the mentee and the mentor, producing positive organizational and developmental outcomes. Effective mentoring can increase retention, morale, and productivity, in addition to enhancing personal and professional development.4 Establishing an informal professional nurturing relationship with another promotes an environment of leadership development within the Army. Such
relationships not only strengthen the individuals involved but also contribute significantly to the improvement of the profession.

Members of the current junior ranks of the armed forces bring a significantly different view of life than older generations. Soldiers entering the force today come increasingly from the “Millennial Generation.” Compared to the midcareer leaders in the Army that come mainly from “Generation X” and the senior leaders who are from the “Baby Boomers,” the Millennials tend to be more trusting and more team-player oriented. They “appear to be receptive to advice, willing to work hard, and extremely focused on accomplishment.”

With a generation in the force that welcomes advice and is motivated to work hard toward goals, mid-career Army leaders need to approach professional development in a different manner than what they experienced during their careers. Senior leaders often offer insufficient assistance in helping their subordinates understand mentoring, coaching, and counseling. For example, the Army Leader Development Strategy 2013 speaks to assigning three- and four-star mentors for each U.S. Army War College Fellow. This assignment of mentors does not comport with the doctrinal intent of mentoring being a voluntary relationship. Other Army senior leaders speak about mentoring as a commander’s action, not as a voluntary personal developmental relationship. This confusion may hinder senior leaders in helping their subordinate leaders understand the informal, nurturing intent of mentoring.

The Dark Side of Mentoring

Despite all the advantages of effective mentorship in transferring knowledge, supporting development, and improving performance, a mentoring relationship can sometimes have undesired ramifications. As an advantage, mentors may serve as advocates for their mentees. A mentor, due to greater experience and a broader network of colleagues, can often open doors to opportunity for a mentee. A good word from a mentor to a senior officer can result in an inside track to a career-enhancing job for the mentee. However, such mentoring within the chain of command can have detrimental outcomes for the organization. In fact, it may be best to not develop a close, exclusive mentoring relationship with those directly under the mentor’s supervision since this could easily foster a perception of favoritism or cronyism among those in the command with whom the mentor does not share as close a relationship.

Another negative aspect of mentorship results from a mentor sabotaging a mentee by providing inaccurate or irrelevant career advice. Negative organizational ramifications can develop when a conflict occurs and a formally assigned mentor engages in a bullying or a revenge-seeking behavior with a mentee. Perhaps the worst thing a mentor could do is to exploit a mentee to further the mentor’s personal agenda.

Who Does Mentoring?

As we have noted, there is some confusion in the Army as to just what is mentorship. The confusion increases as we look at the other services and how they view this issue. Moreover, our increasing interaction involving leader development with other government agencies brings real potential for substantial misunderstanding.

Government agencies have attempted to establish some common definitions. For example, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) describes mentoring as a formal or informal relationship between a senior person, usually outside the chain of supervision, and a junior protégé. The importance of having effective and capable mentors for the federal workforce is evident in the Federal Workplace Flexibility Act of 2004, which mandates federal agencies, in coordination with OPM, establish training for supervisors on mentoring employees. This implies mentoring is a function of leaders and managers, not necessarily a voluntary relationship with subordinates.

Even between the military services, there are differences and overlaps in use of the term mentoring. For example, the Navy’s policy views mentoring as formal or informal but most effective when conducted as a voluntary relationship between a subordinate and an experienced superior—not the first- or second-level supervisor. The Navy program links employees with experienced professionals for career development. These experienced workers advise on the personal and professional growth of the employees by sharing the knowledge and insights they have learned through the years. The Navy mentee selects a mentor based on the mentee’s developmental needs. Conversely, the mentor oversees the career development of another, usually junior, person. However, in July 2013, the chief of naval operations issued instructions that peer-to-peer...
mentoring was critical to helping sailors avoid making destructive decisions involving possible sexual harassment, sexual assault, and suicide. The chief of naval operations recognized that “fellow shipmates have the greatest influence in mentoring our next generation of leaders,” thereby changing the meaning and intent of mentoring.10

Since 2006, the U.S. Marine Corps has taken a more formal and mandatory approach to mentorship, requiring all Marines to be mentored by the Marine senior to them in the chain of command. The Marine Corps mentoring program casts a mentor as a role model, teacher, guide, and coach. The Marine Corps defines mentoring as encompassing all aspects of development in a Marine’s life, not just duty performance. The importance placed on the mentorship program is reflected in the commandant’s guidance that the skills and effectiveness of a leader as a mentor are to be considered when completing fitness reports.11

The U.S. Air Force takes an approach similar to the Marine Corps. Air Force Manual 36-2643, Air Force Mentoring Program, defines mentors “as advisors and guides who share knowledge, experiences, and advice in helping mentees achieve their career goals.”12 This manual indicates that the key to the mentoring process is the direct involvement of commanders, directors, and supervisors in the development of their people. The Air Force manual states that mentoring promotes a climate of inclusion.

We can see from these excerpts that OPM, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps view mentoring as a function of the direct supervisor. The Navy is attempting to come to an understanding on whether mentorship is between a subordinate and a superior or between peers. The designation of the supervisor as the mentor of all of the leader’s subordinates differs significantly from Army leadership doctrine in ADRP 6-22,13 which describes voluntary mentoring that goes beyond the chain of command. Thus, when Air Force, Marine, Navy, and Army officers discuss their responsibilities in leader development through mentoring, they will use the same word but intend different actions. More important, Army officers supervised by officers of another service
or supervising members of another service will need to clearly understand how this affects the expectations they set for leader development responsibilities. These differing perceptions present yet another challenge to building the joint, interagency team.

**Coaching**

The use of the term mentoring in the Air Force and Marine Corps may be more in line with the Army’s use of the word coaching. Confusion between mentoring and coaching often arises due to the perceived overlap of functions. Florence Stone, a scholar in this field, stated that, “one of the functions of a mentor is to coach the protégé or mentee. But whereas mentoring uses many of the same techniques as coaching, mentoring involves going above and beyond.”¹⁴ A mentor, using the Army definition, will not necessarily be in a position to observe the mentee’s daily performance and thus not be in a position to coach the mentee on task performance. However, the mentor should help the mentee develop a plan for professional and personal growth and to support the mentee in implementing that plan.

Army doctrine in ADRP 6-22 describes coaching as “a development technique” used by experts to improve “a skill, task, or specific behaviors.”¹⁵ From the Army’s doctrinal perspective, coaching relies on teaching and guiding to bring out or enhance existing capability. This manual goes on to list several steps in the coaching process: focusing goals, clarifying self-awareness, uncovering potential, eliminating developmental barriers, developing action plans and commitment, and following up. In the Army’s view, a coach helps identify short- and long-term goals, and discusses strengths and weaknesses in reaching those goals. Once again, mentoring one’s subordinates could involve all or only some of those steps. The difference is that mentoring focuses on what occurs outside the chain of command. A mentor probably would not supervise job-specific skills or tasks, but should look at the long-term development of the mentee through helping with self-awareness, uncovering potential, developing action plans, and following up. One method of following up is for the mentor to provide feedback to mentees on their progress toward their goals. Here again we see what may be an overlap in actions between developmental functions.

**Counseling**

ADRP 6-22 states that “counseling is central to leader development. … Counseling is the process used by leaders to guide subordinates to improve performance and develop their potential.”¹⁶ By Army doctrine, leaders should expect subordinates to be active participants and seek constructive feedback. It is clear in this portion of Army doctrine that counseling is a senior-subordinate relationship focused on performance and potential as part of a comprehensive program to develop subordinates. Army doctrine

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Developmental Activities Over Time

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encourages the use of standard formats to organize a counseling session.

In Army Techniques Publication 6-22.1, The Counseling Process, three types of counseling are delineated: performance, event, and professional growth counseling. The categories are not exclusive; a counseling session may include all three. However, the focus of each category is different. Event counseling focuses on helping a subordinate with a specific situation or event and could be associated more with coaching. On the other hand, performance counseling, which focuses on reviewing a subordinate’s duty performance during a specific period, could either be part of coaching or mentoring. Adding to the confusion, professional growth counseling is an aspect of mentoring, but could be a part of coaching, depending on whether the focus is on personal or organizational goals. However, in the Army, supervisors have a responsibility to conduct professional growth counseling of their subordinates. There is so much overlap and confusion in the three terms that one needs to take a bigger picture view of the intent behind each concept.

**Various Perspectives**

From a macro perspective, ADRP 6-22 tells us that mentoring is a developmental tool for developing professional expertise, maturity, conceptual skills, and team-building skills. It uses advice and feedback linked to the actual experience of the mentor. Coaching focuses on helping someone through a set of tasks or with general qualities. Counseling is conducted on a routine basis to improve performance and identify potential.

Using Army doctrine as a lens, we can examine the relationship between these three developmental activities through their relationship in time. Counseling looks at the past and how to improve for the future, coaching looks at the present and how to improve to a future state and is more skill focused, and mentoring looks at the future and at potential.

Another way to view these terms is in light of who is the active participant. Counseling is primarily conducted by supervisors with their subordinates. Think of raters and senior raters counseling a ratee on performance and potential as part of their evaluation process. Coaching may be performed by a superior, but more frequently will be performed by a technical expert,
peer, or teacher. Mentoring is probably a better fit for someone of considerable experience, outside the chain of command.

Yet another view is from the developmental interaction. Counseling focuses on demonstrated job performance, coaching focuses on performing specific tasks or skills, and mentoring focuses more on developing the capabilities and competencies required for future positions. There is overlap in the functions associated with each term, but each term has its place in leader development.

Mentor is often used in the sense of the verb to mentor—to give wise counsel and advice as one who is trusted. In ADRP 6-22, the Army clarifies the meaning of mentor, aligning it with the noun usage of mentor—a wise and trusted counselor or teacher. With this emphasis in meaning, leaders should not and cannot be a mentor to all of their subordinates. This responsibility is too time consuming and important for a leader to try to do, as this relationship extends beyond the immediate supervisory role and beyond the chain of command. Taking this to extremes, the more people a leader supervises, the greater the potential that the number of mentees could run into the hundreds or even thousands over time. On the other hand, leaders have a coaching role with all their subordinates as well as the responsibility to counsel them on their performance and professional growth. Through their roles as coaches and counselors, leaders interact with subordinates and provide them a great opportunity to identify a potential mentor; this new relationship could last a career and possibly beyond.

Conclusion

When using the words mentoring, coaching, and counseling, it is important to understand one’s audience and the context in which the words are used. These terms have different meanings to each service, other federal agencies, business leaders, and academics as well and may be a source of confusion among Army leaders.

Mentoring, coaching, and counseling are at the heart of leader development and are key
instruments for improving organizations. Different people may approach the functions in a dissimilar manner, but the desired results are not that different. One of the key tasks of leaders is to develop subordinates, and they should apply their knowledge and experience to develop others—both within and outside their chain of command as appropriate. Effective leaders are committed to leader development as a critical part of making their organizations better. Our challenge is to understand our various roles in developing leaders and to be able to explain them to those we work with, those we work for, and those who work for us, so that the concepts of mentoring, coaching, and counseling become more than words.

Now, how do I secure that building??

Notes

3. ADRP 6-22, 7-11.
13. ADRP 6-22, 7-11.
15. ADRP 6-22, 7-11.
16. ADRP 6-22, 7-10.

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Caution Required
Multirater Feedback in the Army

Maj. Gregory G. Lee, U.S. Army

In response to several highly publicized cases of leader misconduct, the Army has made removing toxic leaders from its ranks a priority. Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) Gen. Raymond T. Odierno states, “We are relieving people, battalion and brigade commanders, for toxic leadership, and we will continue to do that. The units know, and to me that’s what it’s about. We’re taking action against commanders who are creating environments that are not acceptable.”

The Army should screen for toxic leaders—but how? Several books and news articles address the
issue; some propose solutions. Many, such as Tim Kane's *Bleeding Talent*, suggest the solution lies in 360-degree feedback, or multirater feedback, with proposals to incorporate those types of feedback into officer evaluation reports (OERs), promotion boards, and even central selection list (CSL) boards. Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, seems to agree. *Army Times* reporter Andrew Tilghman reports that Dempsey said, "as time passes and the force grows more comfortable with 360-degree reviews, they may ultimately be integrated into the command screening process." However, Odierno, in an April 2013 address to students at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, rightly said the Army must be careful about how it proceeds with implementing multirater feedback into evaluation and leader development processes.

Multirater feedback has been one of the fastest growing assessment instruments in business for leaders, managers, executives, and employees alike, so why not use it in the Army as well? This paper examines multirater feedback, its validity and reliability, appropriate uses for it, and its pitfalls.

An understanding of this assessment instrument—how it performs effectively under certain conditions and how it can be damaging to an organization under other conditions—supports the conclusion that multirater feedback should be used only for development purposes. Using multirater feedback directly for performance evaluations, promotion boards, and CSL boards would lead to improper selection of future leaders and could needlessly damage Army leader development, while failing to address toxic leadership.

### Development of Multirater Feedback

Over time, organizations and employees have sought more fair appraisal and assessment systems, other than the traditional top-down formal assessments typically prepared by managers about their subordinates. Well-documented cases of unfair, inaccurate, or low-quality top-down reports have demonstrated the need for bottom-up feedback from subordinates. Feedback from multiple raters was intended to counter the subjective nature of top-down ratings, yielding a “fairer and possibly less biased view than simply relying on superior’s ratings.” However, according to Clive Fletcher, Caroline Baldry, and Nicole Cunningham-Snell, unless feedback systems are constructed and evaluated along the lines associated with psychometric tests, they may produce misleading assessments.

Multirater feedback instruments request data from the target individual; the individual’s supervisors, peers, and subordinates; and if applicable, customers or others. The organization categorizes the behaviors required for performing the job and usually asks respondents to rate the individual’s behaviors as observed along a Likert scale, sometimes also including a qualitative portion that allows short-answer input. The number of observable behavioral competencies varies between instruments, normally tailored to the job type and the organization. The intent of the survey is to present the target individual with a complete picture of his or her behavioral subordinates, and multirater feedback may or may not involve subordinates. Although the number of reports and levels surrounding the individual varies, the concept remains the same. When used properly, this instrument can benefit the target individual and the organization as a whole. From 1982 to 1992, the number of off-the-shelf 360-degree instruments being sold quadrupled. Companies spent $152 million on multirater feedback systems in 1992, with 90 percent of Fortune 500 companies using a form of multirater feedback in 2003. Although powerful as an assessment instrument, multirater feedback requires certain conditions: a safe learning environment, experienced coaches or counselors, and a longitudinal development plan.

### What is Multirater Feedback?

Multirater feedback, 360-degree feedback, multisource assessment and feedback, and similar assessment approaches share the common characteristic of providing individuals (leaders, managers, or anyone that interacts with more than one level of the organization) with feedback on their behaviors from the perspectives of others. For the purposes of this article, 360-degree feedback and multirater feedback will be used interchangeably, with the understanding that 360-degree feedback involves
competencies from multiple perspectives. The respondent data are collated and compared against each category, to include the self-rating by the individual. The comparison demonstrates to the target individual areas where he or she needs to improve, promotes self-awareness, and, with a trained counselor or coach, can identify unexpected discrepancies between the self-report and the respondent reports.9

Multirater feedback assessment instruments come in a variety of styles and formats, ranging from web-based surveys with instant output reports to paper-and-pencil surveys scored by hand.10 Although not recommended, multirater feedback can be used for a one-time developmental assessment. Most commonly, however, the assessments are longitudinal studies conducted over time to allow the target individual the opportunity to demonstrate improved ratings through a developmental program. Feedback can be formatted graphically or numerically, plotted over time, and even accompanied by coaching from trained professionals. The key is that the feedback reaches the target individual, who is allowed time for reflection and self-improvement based on the results. Although some organizations are shifting toward using multirater feedback in performance appraisals, the literature does not support its use without a developmental plan of action. Performance appraisal can be tied into a developmental plan, but an appraisal should not be based on multirater feedback because it has limitations and inaccuracies that are exacerbated by tying them to the appraisal process.11

**Psychometric Support—Validity and Reliability**

The psychometric support for the various multirater feedback instruments varies greatly depending upon how the instrument is constructed. It is important to assess multirater feedback from the view of validity and reliability. Validity is the degree to which an instrument measures what it claims to measure. If we are using multirater feedback to measure a leader’s toxicity, does it do that? If not, the assessment lacks validity.

Reliability, also called consistency, is the extent to which a measurement gives consistent results over time. An instrument with high reliability gives consistent or comparable results over time and under similar conditions. An instrument that lacks reliability gives inaccurate results. An instrument that lacks validity does not measure what it claims to measure.

The most successful multirater feedback instruments incorporate Likert scales with enough range (no fewer than five choices) to enable respondents to describe the behavior accurately. Too large a range of choices, on the other hand, may reflect trivial distinctions, resulting in less valid data when collated. This is important because respondents must be able to score the behaviors accurately to produce some type of statistical relevancy. Another best practice of multirater feedback instruments is to have a portion that allows for qualitative comments about the rated individual. These are often the most powerful in changing behaviors when used in a developmental forum with a third-party coach.12

The validity of multirater feedback tends to be inconsistent. According to D. Theron and G. Roodt, “Blue-collar and service jobs have a higher consistency, based on the fact that these jobs are relatively routine and performance is well defined, compared with managerial and professional jobs with low consistency due to the fact that these jobs are not as easy to define.”13 Despite an inconsistent record of validity for these types of assessments, effective feedback instruments can be customized for most job types. This requires a thorough job analysis and understanding of the organization’s culture (hierarchical organizations will differ from flatter organizations). An administrator of a multirater feedback instrument can design it to create an internal consistency (alpha coefficient of 0.98) when careful attention is paid to the type of questions, number of questions, wording, and scale.14

Another weakness that can undermine the validity of multirater feedback, according to Caroline Bailey and Clive Fletcher, is “that direct and indirect subordinate [or out-of-department] personnel not of managerial level (whereas targets and their bosses were) ... may not have clear and/or appropriate schema for managerial behavior.”15 In other words, the respondents might have insufficient experience and knowledge of individuals and the job requirements to rate them effectively, reducing the accuracy and reliability of the instrument.16
Subjects receiving multirater feedback generally consider the reliability more accurate, fairer, and less biased than traditional assessments due to the numerous sources of the feedback. Statistically, this may not be true because halo effects can skew the data, with raters sometimes scoring the individual as all good or all bad. Increasing reliability in multirater feedback requires reducing rater errors and improving rater agreement. This can be done by clearly defining the rated behaviors with examples in order to establish a common frame of reference for all raters, enabling the comparison of scores across raters. This reduces the ambiguity in the frame of reference and minimizes halo effects.

According to Fiona Dent and Judy Curd, the “360-degree assessment] is completely dependent on collecting data from others about an individual and therefore a highly emotive process that must be handled both in a professional manner and with care.” Some typical emotional reactions by employees receiving feedback are denial, shock, anger, and rejection. Some raters use anonymity or working relationships to score the target employee too high or too low, to prove a point. Again, the emotional aspect of the instrument for raters and target employees can affect its accuracy and reliability, calling into the question the validity of the results. In order to preserve the face validity of the data, organizations should educate, coach, and counsel target individuals before they receive feedback. This is important because as overall ratings became less positive (further from the best), leaders become less likely to accept the feedback as accurate. Emotional involvement in the ratings, and how they are reported to the target individual, can affect that person’s perception of the accuracy of the results. According to Theron and Roodt, egocentric biases are common in perceptions of ratings—people may inflate or deflate them as a defensive measure, or they may attribute good performance to their own behavior and poor performance to environmental factors. The target may reject the results as invalid and seek external sources to blame for perceived failures. Avoiding this kind of situation depends on integrating third-party coaching and a longitudinal development plan.

**Appropriate Uses of Multirater Feedback**

Before any multirater feedback assessment instrument can be used, the organization must create a psychologically safe learning environment that values individual development and feedback for development. This environment leads to managers and employees accepting the feedback as valid and using it to improve their behaviors—which

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**Multirater Feedback Diagram**

![Multirater Feedback Diagram](image-url)
increases the organization’s effectiveness. According to Manuel London and James W. Smither, by valuing feedback for improving performance, the organization allows the target individual to associate feedback with critical events, make meaning, and assimilate the feedback into developmental goals. According to Mark D. Cannon and Robert Witherspoon, without a conducive and safe environment, the multirater feedback has the potential to negatively affect performance by reducing morale, increasing suspicion, increasing negative competitiveness, and reducing organizational citizenship behaviors.

The most heralded benefit of multirater feedback comes from the analysis of the difference between the self-ratings and the ratings from the other respondents. Allan H. Church defines self-awareness as the congruence between how managers view themselves and how others view them. This delta reflects the level of self-awareness that the target individual possesses; it is a crucial element in leader development and leadership. Research shows that the more self-aware individuals are about their actions and their effect on others, the more leadership potential they have, and self-aware leaders tend to outperform others. There is much argument over how to measure self-awareness statistically and track its change over time in a longitudinal study. Caroline Bailey and Clive Fletcher assert that a theory relating the effects of multirater feedback on self-awareness and performance is needed to establish the validity of the instrument.

It is important to use multirater feedback for developmental purposes, rather than for summative appraisals. Making employees more aware of the behavior competencies the organization rewards will enable managers to align an individual’s “performance schema and the performance criteria of the organization.” When employees’ behaviors move closer to the organization’s values through self-awareness, their job performance improves. In addition, Facteau et al. report that “leaders reacted more favorably to evaluations from subordinates if those evaluations were used for developmental and not for administrative purposes.” This is because the leaders felt psychologically safe from results that could have caused poor performance evaluations—shielding their income and promotion potential. Even if the target individual believes the feedback is inaccurate, a coach or counselor can use the results to help increase the individual’s perception of his or her performance. Leaders do not necessarily have to change their behaviors to please any respondent group (except, possibly, the superiors that rate them administratively). Instead, when they understand that others rate some of their behaviors as needing improvement, they can set personal goals for better performance in those areas. For an organization to be effective at fostering individual development, management should hold individuals accountable for creating development plans and provide the resources people need for improvement.

Additionally, research shows that ratings by subordinates, peers, supervisors, self, and others overlap only modestly; self-ratings correlate weakly with other rater perspectives, with greater convergence between peer and supervisor ratings. This leaves the coach or mentor with varying perspectives on the person rated that must be interpreted for development. The divergence of the perspectives can make it difficult to evaluate behavior for performance assessment. This evidence reinforces the use of multirater feedback for development only—for individuals to improve their behaviors—but not for performance incentives.

**Inappropriate Uses of Multirater Feedback**

Much multirater feedback research cautions against using it as part of the appraisal process because it may lead to the target individual becoming too focused on pleasing others, especially subordinates, and not performing leader or managerial behaviors necessary for the job. Theron and Roodt state, “ratings used to determine employee reward and promotability are more prone to leniency bias,” meaning that others will rate the target individual higher than the person truly performs in order to enable that person to be rewarded. In 2003, IBM (International Business Machines Corporation) used multirater feedback as part of employee annual performance reviews, but the practice was halted due to the reviews becoming politically charged and thus unreliable.
It is also possible that using the multirater feedback in the performance appraisal process can create confusion as to a developmental program’s objective and thus hinder its effectiveness. Despite this caution, many organizations are developing systems to incorporate multirater feedback into performance appraisals. The negative effects on the appraisal process could be mitigated somewhat if the organization has established a learning environment that values development, learning, and feedback. However, the risk of negative outcomes outweighs the potential rewards.

Effective multirater feedback has certain characteristics. Employees must receive specific and targeted feedback or they will not develop the insight needed to improve their self-awareness and performance, which results in a waste of the organization’s money, time, and effort. To facilitate effective feedback to the target individual, the instrument should include a debrief by a third-party coach, counselor, or trained administrator. Although costly, organizations cannot expect consistent and valid results without developing a coaching or counseling plan during the careers of the target individuals. Finally, if the multirater feedback is not used for the development of the target individual, then the instruments will have little validity or usefulness—whether tied to performance appraisals or administrative action.

Effective Multirater Feedback in Army Organizations

Multirater feedback can be an enormously beneficial instrument to individuals and organizations by providing individuals with specific feedback on their behavior competencies as perceived by superiors, peers, subordinates, customers, and others. By comparing a self-assessment to the reports of others, individuals can improve their self-awareness, create a developmental plan of action, and even align their behaviors with those the organizational values. Without feedback from others, individuals would be hard-pressed to measure self-awareness.

Although the surveys have the potential for error, detailed and well-described behavior competencies can be properly framed to reduce latent error. Multirater feedback can help the organization develop its employees at all levels. Not all toxic leaders are toxic in every job—staff positions will differ.
from command billets. With the Army’s job rotation system of development, using multirater feedback in annual evaluations would require significantly more frequent feedback sessions, overloading our already busy superiors, peers, and subordinates with another survey. Additionally, a single multirater feedback session does not enable behavior improvement in and of itself, but it requires multiple sessions over time to demonstrate real change, a process that eventually uncovers a lack of development or toxicity.40

Now that we understand multirater feedback’s strengths and weaknesses, we can look at how to integrate it with performance evaluations and CSL boards, as noted by Gen. Dempsey and Gen. Odierno.41 Odierno and other senior leaders acknowledge the weaknesses in the Army’s Multi-Source Assessment Feedback (MSAF) system, which includes coaches and which requires an assessment to be started for completion of an OER.42 The current MSAF system is for developmental purposes only and offers optional coaching from a third party outside the chain of command—all supported by research as appropriate use and likely to enhance validity and reliability. However, the focus of this paper is not to evaluate the current MSAF system, but to illuminate issues and conditions that the Army should take into account if implementing multirater feedback into evaluations, promotion boards, CSL boards, or other performance-based assessments.

Where these instruments may work in the civilian business world, the Army is different in both its binding regulations and culture. Commissioned officers, warrant officers, noncommissioned officers, and other enlisted soldiers are all subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which states that soldiers must follow lawful orders. “You do not have to like it—just do it,” is an oft-quoted phrase. The Uniform Code of Military Justice regulates the military profession to ensure good order and discipline; this is an artifact of coercion and authority within the strong culture of the military.43 This hierarchical and authoritative structure drives a strong culture of following orders, even if the subordinate does not agree with or like the order.

Also within the Army culture, as espoused at Army leadership schools, is the idea of “owning” orders that come down the chain of command, which means to avoid shifting blame to superiors for orders subordinates may not like. This results in subordinates not always fully understanding the background of an unpopular order, which can skew how subordinates view a leader. If a leader follows this principle, then subordinates may never know how much the leader corrects, fights, or accepts unpopular taskings or orders. This knowledge could change how subordinates view their supervisor and affect subordinate inputs into multirater feedback.44

Furthermore, even though the Army attempts to prepare leaders for future jobs with increased responsibility, most do not comprehend the jobs of their supervisors fully until they become supervisors. Bailey and Fletcher found that subordinates and peers may have insufficient experience to rate effectively, thereby reducing the accuracy and reliability of any performance rating or developmental feedback.45 Multirater feedback has more consistency, according to Theron and Roodt, in routine and well-defined jobs.46 However, the Army expects innovative and adaptive leaders to perform many complex tasks. Army leaders must solve complex problems rapidly and perform tasks that are not routine or well defined—such as individual counseling, unit evaluations, family support, media engagement, combat functions, and many more. Rating these tasks is unlikely to lead to reliable and valid data. Using these data in a performance evaluation or selection board would not only fail to solve the toxic leader problem but also would damage the reports so that the board would be promoting or selecting the wrong leaders based on faulty data.

The most glaring issue with using any multirater feedback data for a performance evaluation or selection board is that the multirater feedback instrument cannot predict performance, and it cannot guarantee that an increase in self-awareness of behavior will lead to improved performance.47 The ratings, combined with self-assessment, enable comparison against the self-assessment only, illuminating the leader’s self-awareness. The rated leaders can begin to understand how others view their performance. If their self-ratings differ significantly from the feedback, with proper coaching they can determine how to adjust their behaviors toward maximum performance for the organization.

An editorial in the Army Times asserts that multirater feedback “should be for leadership
development . . . . These reviews can be addressed in counseling sessions . . . and [used] to inform an officer’s . . . evaluation. But [360-degree reviews] should not be used as a means of measuring one officer against another for promotion.” Unfortunately, feedback becomes performance-linked as soon as it is viewed by the subject’s supervisor, and if used to inform an “officer’s evaluation,” it is then being used for promotion purposes as the OER will be reviewed by the promotion board to determine if the officer should be promoted to the next rank. The Army Times editorial suggests what the Army needs to understand explicitly: supervisors might—wrongly—use multirater feedback as part of officer evaluations. The Army should not allow this because it would destroy multirater feedback as a means for professional development. It would directly reduce its validity and force officers into an unsafe learning environment while receiving “development” from their superiors—potentially reducing valued leader behaviors in units.

Using quantifiable survey data is hazardous without understanding the data and structure of the survey. For example, on a scale of one to ten, a leader who receives a five from reviewers but overrates himself or herself at a nine could have more issues than a leader who receives a four and self-assesses at four. The latter is much more self-aware than the former—and, is a score of four poor? What is being measured? Moreover, can multirater feedback across year groups or branches be compared for promotion potential? Typical multirater feedback for developmental purposes focuses on the leader and how the leader’s behavior affects others. Self-awareness is a crucial trait for good leaders and should be measured. If the leaders in the above example both increase the scores they receive from others to 10, have they achieved the organization’s goals? Maybe not. Leaders may be getting better ratings over time at the expense of the organization—by managing how others perceive them rather than through true behavior change and job performance.

As Congress reduces the Army’s budget and decreases the size of its force, competition for promotion, or even for retention, will increase. This could result in a zero-defect environment for tolerating failure. A zero-defect environment is not a safe learning environment that supports and encourages
leadership experimentation and behavior change, let alone risk taking and innovation. Furthermore, London emphasizes that the organization must provide those being rated with the resources needed for change, third-party (outside of the chain of command) coaches for development, and organizational education for performance evaluations. All of these requirements are expensive to develop, implement, and maintain. Without serious momentum, the parts of a multirater feedback system would be an easy budget-cut target. Canceling third-party coaches would cripple its use for leader development because the obvious, and already proposed, low-cost solution would be to have supervisors conduct leader development activities with the multirater feedback, immediately converting development into performance appraisal. W. Warner Burke also states a high level of psychological safety is required of the organization to allow leadership experimentation and to build trust among its employees. Using multirater feedback as a performance measure is very hazardous if done improperly and has the potential to erode organizational trust, arguably the most important component of leadership both in and out of the military. Future reduced budgets could impact leader development or even the expansion of multirater feedback into the force.

**Multirater Feedback Potential**

There is a place for multirater feedback in the Army, with the clear choice being a system used only for leader development. If used in the performance evaluation and promotion systems, the multirater feedback instrument would require a completely different survey and considerable educating of the selection boards, raters, and administrative personnel prior to implementation and evaluation. The education of the selection boards and raters would be difficult to sustain since trained coaches, who make meaning of multirater feedback, are expensive and have their own biases. It would be very difficult to take biases and emotive data from respondents and make an objective measure of performance for evaluations or selection for command. The Army created the CSL system under the Officer Professional Management System in 1971 to remove subjective bias from commanders and to create an objective and fair promotion and selection system. By instituting multirater feedback as a direct part of performance evaluations, promotion boards, and command selection, the Army would be inputting subjective bias into an objective system. The Army should not link multirater feedback directly to any performance evaluation or selection process.

**Conclusion**

While it is possible to use several multirater feedback systems to serve different purposes, any such system tied to performance runs the risks of harming the organization. Kenneth Nowack states, “The potential adverse impact or emotional harm from such feedback intervention has often been imprudently overlooked by many coaches, despite a common focus on enhanced insight and self-awareness as major goals of the process.” Using a highly emotive feedback system for performance data can be damaging to a performance-oriented and objective promotion-and-command selection system by reducing the perceived objectivity of the selection process. If the Army links multirater feedback to performance, its most damaging effects could be reducing multirater feedback’s powerful potential as a developmental tool, denying leaders a safe learning environment and, potentially the most damaging, focusing leaders on pleasing others rather than performing leader behaviors effectively. These negative effects are particularly likely when feedback is combined with inflated evaluations and a lack of performance and developmental counseling. For any multirater feedback system to be effective, the organization must hold employees accountable for their improvement, give them the resources required, and create a climate supportive of leadership experimentation and behavior change.
Notes


4. Odierno, "Mission Command" (address, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Officer Class of 13-02, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 9 April 2013).


7. Ibid.


9. Ibid.


16. Ibid.

17. Theron and Roodt "Variability.


19. Ibid.


21. Theron and Roodt, "Variability.


29. Ibid, 854.


31. Ibid.

32. London, Leadership Development.


34. Theron and Roodt, "Variability." 22.

35. Linman, "360-Degree Feedback." 12.

36. London, "Variability."


38. Cannon and Witherspoon, "Actionable Feedback."


40. Bailey and Fletcher, "The Impact of Multiple Source Feedback."

41. Tilghman, "Dempsey: 360-degree Reviews.


44. Bailey and Fletcher, "The Impact of Multiple Source Feedback." 22.

45. Ibid.

46. Theron and Roodt, "Variability." 22.


50. Army Times editorial.

51. London, "Leadership Development."

52. Burke, Organization Change.


54. Kane, Bleeding Talent.

55. London, "Leadership Development."

56. Army Times editorial; London.

57. Burke, Organization Change.

58. Ibid.

59. Kane, Bleeding Talent.


62. Craig and Hannum, "Research Update;" Theron and Roodt, "Variability."

63. London, "Leadership Development."
The phrase “Army leadership” typically evokes images of commanders and noncommissioned officers leading heroic charges or generals directing armies—perhaps an aged Gen. Douglas MacArthur planning the Inchon landing, or MacArthur as a young captain leading his company across a no-man’s land, riding crop in hand. In reality, however, most leadership in the Army is far more benign. In little ways, all day long, across the globe, at all levels of the Army, soldiers lead others.

While the style, quality, and stakes vary widely, every leadership interaction has two universal elements. First, and perhaps most obvious, every exercise of leadership involves a leader and a follower. Second, leadership cannot occur without communication between the leader and the follower.

Army and civilian leadership books use countless adjectives to describe what leaders should be and do while giving little or no attention or thought to the communication aspects of leadership. Normally, the focus

A soldier with 3rd Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, takes cover in high grass at the Grafenwoehr Training Area in Germany during company external evaluations, 24 May 2012. The evaluations assessed the company’s troop-leading procedures and combined arms abilities.
COMMUNICATION PARADOX

is on leader attributes, described with adjectives such as decisive, agile, adaptive, confident, and disciplined. However, while a person could become a great leader without being decisive or adaptive, it would be impossible to become a great leader without being a great communicator.

The Army’s inattention to communication as a leadership skill is particularly acute in light of the abundance of modern communication tools. The means available for Army leaders to communicate are the best they have ever been—PowerPoint, e-mail, Blue Force Tracker, satellite communications, radio, television, social media, SharePoint, and many more. Paradoxically, these increases in communication capacity diminish communication between leaders and those led. The Army is drowning in communications, and the victim is good leadership. The solution is remarkably simple: acknowledge the importance of effective communication and integrate the teaching of communication skills—writing and speaking—throughout the Army officer education system. In addition, the Army should elevate the role of effective communication in the exercise of mission command.

What is Communication in Leadership?

Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-22, Army Leadership, defines leadership as “the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization.” Central to this definition is the idea of influencing, which, according to Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22 (also called Army Leadership), “entails more than simply passing along orders.” Indeed, “all of the Army’s core leader competencies, especially leading others, involve influence.” The ADRP outlines how good leaders, in turn, communicate by listening actively, creating shared understanding, employing engaging communication techniques, and being sensitive to cultural factors in communication. ADP 6-0, Mission Command, describes the importance of communication as far beyond simply exchanging information. Commanders use communication to strengthen bonds within a command. Communication builds trust, cooperation, cohesion, and shared understanding. … Mission command requires interactive communications characterized by continuous vertical and horizontal feedback. Feedback provides the means to improve and confirm situational understanding.

While these doctrinal publications provide a solid foundation for the essential role of communication in leadership, the importance of communication seems neglected within the Army officer education system. Undoubtedly, that system values and addresses communication and leadership in the various courses; however, there is insufficient focus on a competency that “is essential to all other leadership competencies.”

The foundational administrative document for Army institutional leader training and education is U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Regulation 350-10, Institutional Leader Training and Education. This regulation articulates five goals for Army institutional leader training and education:

1. produce leaders who have the ability to execute doctrine and strategy.
2. develop leaders capable of planning and executing worldwide peace and wartime missions in a wide range of operational environments.
3. provide progressive and sequential training that prepares leaders for future operational assignments.
4. incorporate doctrine and strategy changes, as they occur.
5. provide vertically and horizontally aligned training products for institutional, unit, and self-development training.

At best, these goals barely imply developing the communication skills of Army leaders. That is not to say communication is not addressed within this framework—a subordinate goal for developing leaders capable of planning and executing worldwide peace and wartime missions includes developing operational plans “readily understood by all.” It is noteworthy, however, that effective communication is not expressly articulated as a goal. The lack of emphasis on communication skills, as seen in TRADOC Regulation 350-10, seems to have percolated down through all levels of the Army officer education system.

The U.S. Army War College, in describing its capstone program (Military Education Level 1), states, “the School develops strategic leaders by providing a strong foundation of wisdom, grounded in mastery of the profession of arms, and by educating future leaders...
in the theory and practice of strategy, operations, national security, resource management, and responsible command." The Department of Command, Leadership, and Management offers core and elective courses in strategic leadership, defense management, and command. This department teaches two of the five core curriculum courses in the resident program. Neither Strategic Thinking nor Strategic Leadership mentions communication in its course description.

Further, looking at the full curriculum published by the U.S. Army War College Department of Distance Education, none of the courses in the required curriculum mentions "communication" in its course description. A single elective—Strategic Communication: Wielding the Information Element of Power—mentions communication. This elective course, however, concerns strategic communication in the context of foreign relations rather than leadership.

The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) catalog provides a mission, a philosophy, principles, a vision, and strategic priorities. Unfortunately, none of these expressly mentions communication. The college's Advanced Operations Course (AOC) curriculum includes one leadership course in both the core and advanced operations portions. Together, the core AOC courses include twenty-four blocks totaling forty-eight hours of instruction. Of these twenty-four classes, only two mention communication in their course descriptions: once in L100, Leadership—Developing Organizations and Leaders; and once in L200, Leadership. As with the Army War College, there is no core course requirement for a communication-specific course, or a writing or public speaking course.

The U.S. Army Cadet Command manages the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) program, the largest source of commissions in the Army. The Cadet Command "selects, educates, trains, and commissions college students to be officers and leaders of character in the Total Army" and "instills values and a sense of accomplishment ..." The ROTC program accomplishes this mission through a four-year program of instruction in "basic military skills, [and] the fundamentals of leadership." Of these four years of instruction, only one course during the sophomore year expressly includes communications.

Sgt. Jared Wallfrom, 5th Engineer Battalion, 4th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, provides a presentation on the specific capabilities of military working dogs 5 October 2010.
The mission statement of the U.S. Military Academy is similar to that of the U.S. Army Cadet Command: “To educate, train, and inspire the Corps of Cadets so that each graduate is a commissioned leader of character committed to the values of Duty, Honor, Country and prepared for a career of professional excellence and service to the Nation as an officer in the United States Army.” Similarly, the academic goal at the academy is to produce “graduates [who] integrate knowledge and skills from a variety of disciplines to anticipate and respond appropriately to opportunities and challenges in a changing world.” To this end, the academy lists seven subordinate goals, the first of which is communication. Given the relative prominence of communication in the academy’s core curriculum, it is perhaps not surprising that several blocks of core classes concern oral and verbal communication.

How Do Modern Communication Tools Pose Risks to Effective Communication?

In a remarkably farsighted monograph from 1992, which predates the most fundamental tactical modern communications system (the Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System), then Army Maj. John K. Stoner examined the “tension between the science of increased technological control and the art of the demands of command and leadership on the modern battlefield.” Stoner was especially concerned about commanders being able to exert too much control through technology. Twenty years later, his thesis looks remarkably sound. In 2009, defense analyst Peter W. Singer coined the term “tactical generals” to describe the situation that arises when technology allows high-ranking commanders “not only to peer into, but even take control of, the lowest-level operations.”

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Former Army Lt. Col. Pete Blaber, who served as a Delta Force squadron commander, recounts an operation in Iraq in early 2002. His unit’s mission was to conduct a show of force and to avoid becoming decisively engaged with a much larger, stronger, enemy force. When Blaber gave instructions to a subordinate commander to withdraw, his commanding general came on the network and countermanded his order. The general was sitting in a tactical operations center more than three hundred miles away in another country.

A counterpoint can be seen during World War II, in then Army Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower’s restrained communication to his superior, then Army Gen. George Marshall, after the start of D-Day. Eisenhower’s memorandum starts by noting that further communication would come only after the “leading ground troops … [were] actually ashore.” It summarizes the status of the entire operation in less than a page; Marshall evidently did not require more. The order for Operation Overlord itself is an example of succinct communication—the entire base order is five pages. The idea that a major operation could be executed without live, continuous, detailed updates is almost a foreign concept in the twenty-first century. Equally foreign is the idea of summarizing the most complex military operation in history in a single page.

A further difficulty of modern communication is the innumerable nontactical methods of communication. On a typical day, a commander may use any or all of the following technologies to communicate with seniors or subordinates: telephone, text message, e-mail, video teleconference, Facebook, SharePoint, Excel, PowerPoint, and others. While these technologies have the ability to enable communications—and thus leadership—they have downsides.

Some critics point to Army leaders’ use of PowerPoint as deserving special condemnation. New York Times writer Elisabeth Bumiller quotes retired Marine Corps Gen. James N. Mattis, former commander of U.S. Central Command, saying that “PowerPoint makes us stupid.” Bumiller also reports that Army Lt. Gen. Herbert R. McMaster has been known to ban PowerPoint presentations, saying that relying on PowerPoint is “dangerous because it can create the illusion of understanding and the illusion of control.”

Retired Army Col. Thomas X. Hammes, writing in the Armed Forces Journal, describes PowerPoint as “actively hostile to thoughtful decision-making.” Hammes details myriad issues with PowerPoint, including the lack of intellectual rigor in putting together a large pack of slides vice summarizing a complex issue into a short memorandum; the amount of staff time wasted on formatting (font, color, alignment, pictures, and graphs), overwhelming amounts of information on a slide, the negative effect on the decision-making tempo of senior leaders, and the dangers associated
A Washington Post online editorial by Ruth Marcus explains that after the 2003 Space Shuttle Columbia disaster, investigative task forces called out the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA’s) use of the presentation software “for special criticism.” Marcus quotes the final report of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board and Yale researcher Edward Tufte, whose work the board considered. The report identifies a particular slide from an important presentation and states, “it is easy to understand how a senior manager might read this PowerPoint slide and not realize that it addresses a life-threatening situation.” The Board further identifies “the endemic use of PowerPoint briefing slides instead of technical papers as an illustration of the problematic methods of technical communication at NASA.”

Author Thomas E. Ricks, in his book Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2003 to 2005, describes how under then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, combatant commanders were relying on PowerPoint slides as a planning and communication tool. Ricks reports that in 2002, then Army Lt. Gen. David D. McKiernan received planning guidance in the form of PowerPoint slides prepared for Rumsfeld by then Army Gen. Tommy Franks when he was commander of U.S. Central Command. Franks did not provide clear instructions based on normal planning processes:

McKiernan ... couldn’t get Franks to issue clear orders that stated explicitly what he wanted done, how he wanted to do it, and why. Rather, Franks passed along PowerPoint briefing slides that he had shown to Rumsfeld. ... [McKiernan said,] “That is frustrating, because nobody wants to plan against PowerPoint slides.”

Unfortunately, the PowerPoint trend that was developing under Rumsfeld shows little sign of burning out.

How Can the Army Ensure its Leaders Use Communication Tools Effectively?

All levels of the Army officer education system should expressly acknowledge the importance of communication skills in leadership. Bundling communication among other aspects of leadership diminishes the central importance of the concept. Army schools should discuss the concept of developing better communicators in their mission statements, vision statements, and course goals. By way of example, the British Army lists six goals of its officer commissioning course, including “to teach officer cadets how to think and communicate as commanders and to foster a deep interest and care for the individual.”

Further, Army schools should consider offering stand-alone courses of instruction on communication (both speaking and writing) within the leadership curriculum. The U.S. Military Academy’s holistic approach to leader education is perhaps a model to which other institutions can look for guidance—it is not just undergraduates who need to study writing and speaking. This approach may have the added benefit of addressing the communication frictions caused by email, PowerPoint, and other modern media. It is astonishing to think that e-mail is the most common communication tool in the Army, but few have received instruction on how to use it effectively. Similarly, some consideration should be given to the institutional use of PowerPoint. Perhaps commanders should restrict its use, or the Army should better train soldiers in its practical application.

Some write off mission command as a hollow concept, a glossy repackaging of an old idea rather than a substantive doctrine. This is not entirely inaccurate. As ADRP 6-0, Mission Command, readily acknowledges, “mission command has been the Army’s preferred style for exercising command since the 1980s.” Others, such as Clinton J. Ancker, III, have noted examples of the concept dating back to the civil war. The Army’s wholesale change from “command and control” to “mission command” represented a concerted effort on the part of Army leadership to reinforce the “centrality of the commander” and de-emphasize the importance of technology. The other important aspect of mission command is its dependence on communication. During the operations process activities, mission command requires constant communication between commanders and subordinates. Three of the six principles of mission command concern communicative elements almost exclusively: “build cohesive teams through mutual trust, create shared understanding, [and] provide clear commander’s intent.”
A small change to the Army’s definition of mission command could express the central importance of communication. The current definition reads as follows:

Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations. 39

An improved definition would read as follows (bolding added to emphasize the proposed modification):

Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using clear communication and mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.

In addition, the Army’s definition of mission orders could be amended to reflect the importance of communication. According to ADP 6-0, mission orders are defined as “directives that emphasize to subordinates the results to be attained, not how they are to achieve them.” 40 This definition could be strengthened by the addition of a few words: clear and concise directives that emphasize to subordinates the results to be attained, not how they are to achieve them.

Conclusion

Communication forms the core of every leadership interaction in the Army. Robust modern communication tools can support leaders at all levels, but only when used by skillful speakers and writers. When used improperly or overused, these tools can cause important information to be misunderstood, taken out of context, or neglected. Even worse, they can lead to poor leadership practices that are contrary to the philosophy of mission command. Leaders who rely too heavily on communication tools, rather than personal skills honed by study, reflection, and practice, run the risk of failing to apply analytical skills or of relying on technology to the detriment of effective communication.

The key is for the Army to recognize the paradox of modern communication and modify doctrine and the Army officer education system to better equip leaders to harness, rather than be harnessed by, communication technologies.
Maj. Christopher M. Ford, U.S. Army, serves in the Judge Advocate General’s Corps and is currently assigned as an observer, controller, trainer at the Mission Command Training Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Previous assignments include duty staff judge advocate, 7th Infantry Division; legal advisor for the Joint Special Operations Task Force (Philippines); group judge advocate, 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne), Trial Defense Service, Fort Carson, Colorado; Assistant Professor, U.S. Military Academy; brigade judge advocate, 5th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, Iraq; and administrative and operational law attorney, 1st Cavalry Division. Ford holds a BA from Furman University, a JD from the University of South Carolina School of Law, and an LLM from the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School.

Notes

4. Ibid., 6-1.
5. Ibid., 6-14.
7. ADRP 6-22, 6-14.
8. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Regulation 350-10, Institutional Leadership and Education (Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC, 12 August 2002), 8. The second goal has three subordinate goals; refer to the regulation.
9. The word “leadership” appears sixty-six times in TRADOC regulation 350-10, and the word “communication” only three times—all in reference to warrant officer education.
12. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. ADP 6-0, 2.
39. Ibid., 1.
40. ADP 6-0, 5.

Operation United Assistance
The Initial Response—Setting the Conditions in the Theater

Maj. Gen. Darryl Williams, U.S. Army,

Lt. Col. Matthew D. Koehler, U.S. Army,


Maj. Christopher O. Bowers, U.S. Army
At the request of the Liberian government, we’re going to establish a military command center in Liberia to support civilian efforts across the region—similar to our response after the Haiti earthquake.... And our forces are going to bring their expertise in command and control, in logistics, in engineering. And our Department of Defense is better at that, our Armed Services are better at that than any organization on Earth.

—President Barack Obama, 16 September 2014

From December 2013 to mid-September 2014, the Ebola virus had swept through Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone, killing thousands and threatening to spread throughout western Africa and beyond. By order of the president of the United States, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) established Joint Force Command–United Assistance as part of a unified-action approach to combat the growing Ebola threat. Formed with a core of soldiers from U.S. Army Africa (USARAF), the Army Service component command (ASCC) for U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), Joint Force Command–United Assistance reached a combined strength of 686 personnel before transferring responsibility to the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) on 25 October 2014.

The initial phase of Operation United Assistance (OUA) showed that ASCCs play a critical operational role in setting conditions favorable for mission success in a theater (also called setting the theater) and a joint operations area, and in shaping the security environment. This enables joint forces to win in a complex world. USARAF’s experiences can inform DOD and its partners in preparing for future humanitarian assistance operations.

The Growth of the Ebola Threat

The Ebola epidemic evolved over many months. The first case in the outbreak was likely a Guinean boy who died in December 2013. From there, the virus spread to Liberia and Sierra Leone through the populations that straddle these three nations’ porous borders. In March 2014, the deadly virus was identified as Ebola. By September 2014, the virus had spread throughout western Africa, and isolated cases began to appear in other countries.1

President Barack Obama viewed Ebola’s international spread as a threat to U.S. national interests. The epidemic had grown rapidly, and intervention was required to stem the tide of outbreaks and to reinforce the overburdened health-care systems of the three significantly affected nations. If the international community did not act, the results could be catastrophic, eroding security and potentially plunging the region into turmoil.

The Response

In light of these circumstances, the president directed a unified-action approach to combat the Ebola epidemic, with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) designated as the lead federal agency. Additionally, during a 16 September 2014 speech at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta, the president directed the DOD to provide support to the USAID Disaster Assistance Response Team that had been activated on 5 August 2014.2 He specifically tasked DOD to provide command and control (C2), logistics, and engineering capabilities and expertise.

In August and September 2014, USAFRICOM issued a series of warning orders directing component commands to begin planning OUA, focusing planning efforts and directing support to USAID. With the 12 September 2014 warning order in hand, USARAF conducted detailed contingency planning.

Subsequently, the USARAF commander selected a team of thirteen personnel, including much of the primary staff, to travel to Liberia to conduct a leader’s reconnaissance. The team arrived in Monrovia, Liberia, on 16 September 2014, intending to stay only a few days and return to Italy where it would shape USARAF’s plan. The president’s speech at the CDC on the same day accelerated the planning efforts. The joint force command (JFC) also sent an advance party to Liberia.

The notification that USARAF was to stand up a joint task force (soon changed to a JFC) to conduct support operations in Liberia coincided with exercise Lion Focus 14, a joint exercise designed to certify USARAF as a joint task force. As
a result, a number of personnel from the Joint Staff and U.S. Transportation Command’s Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC) were present for the Lion Focus exercise at USARAF headquarters in Vicenza, Italy. Once USARAF received notification to begin planning OUA, the focus quickly shifted from the notional scenario of Lion Focus 14 to real-world planning and execution of OUA. The JECC and Joint Staff personnel rapidly integrated with the USARAF staff, providing critical support, guidance, and subject matter expertise.

Forming the Joint Force

As an ASCC without assigned forces, the first step in leading a JFC was to build one. A theater army’s roles and functions, however, do not normally include acting as a JFC. When USARAF needs to obtain forces for steady-state missions, USARAF requirement managers request allocation of external forces within a rolling two-year window prior to execution. For OUA, this deliberative paradigm would not work. The nature of the crisis required USARAF to organize and resource a JFC by using assigned and allocated forces within USAFRICOM. These were augmented by JECC planners, whose missions were changed through expedited collaboration with U.S. Transportation Command and the Joint Staff in accordance with the broader Global Force Management Implementation Guidance and Procedures.

To accomplish this, USARAF pursued three lines of effort. First, USARAF deployed its expeditionary command post comprising the remnants of the doctrinal contingency command post, which had been cut from ASCCs as part of force structure reductions. Second, USAFRICOM approved integrating the JECC to fill joint manning document positions.
and directed the support of fellow USAFRICOM components. Third, USARAF relied on its main command post in Vicenza, integrating key specialties from across the staff to support forward operations in Liberia and enabling USARAF to act as its own land component command. This impromptu approach allowed USARAF to rapidly build a JFC capable of meeting immediate mission requirements. However, assigned forces would have enabled more detailed planning and reduced operational risk that accrued over time.

**Operational Approach**

From 16 September until the transfer of authority on 25 October, USARAF led the JFC. The mission was to support U.S. humanitarian assistance efforts, led by USAID, in support of the international effort to contain Ebola. USAFRICOM directed the JFC to perform the following key tasks:

- Establish a JFC headquarters for C2 of military activities and to coordinate U.S. government interagency and foreign international relief efforts.
- Establish an engineering capability in Liberia to provide site selection and construction of Ebola treatment units (ETUs), the Monrovia Medical Unit, medical training sites, and logistical support areas.
- Establish a training capability able to train five hundred health-care workers per week.
- Enforce force health and protection measures to mitigate environmental threats and to protect key personnel, equipment, facilities, and infrastructure.
- Establish and sustain an intermediate staging base in western Africa to support operations.
- Transition to civil control after setting the conditions.

Within the context of joint operations under a geographic combatant command such as USAFRICOM, ASCCs are uniquely qualified to set the theater by providing a mix of speed and posture not inherent in other Army organizations. Even with the recent force structure reductions, ASCCs provide the DOD an early-entry capability, including C2, engineering, logistics, and medical capabilities. Our experience on the continent was invaluable in setting the theater and setting the joint operations area. The JFC focused its efforts across four primary lines of
effort: C2, engineering support, medical support, and sustainment.

Command and control. USARAF organized its C2 into three cells: a forward-stationed command cell, a joint operations center split between Liberia and Vicenza, and USARAF’s main command post in Vicenza.

The JFC commander established his forward office in the U.S. embassy in Monrovia, Liberia, with the command sergeant major, political advisor, and a small support staff. The location and composition of the C2 node was chosen to facilitate communication with the U.S. embassy and other interagency partners, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and private industry. He focused his efforts on coordination with senior leaders of partner organizations and worked to develop relationships with U.S. Ambassador Deborah R. Malac and with Bill Berger, the USAID Disaster Assistance Response Team leader. Berger had also established his operations center in the embassy.

The JFC set up offices in a forward joint operations center approximately thirty minutes from the embassy, focused on overseeing engineering, medical, and sustainment efforts on the ground. However, a sizeable portion of personnel on the joint manning document did not push forward to Liberia due to concerns over sustainment capacity in Monrovia. As such, a large portion of C2 and planning capacity remained with the Joint Operations Center–Rear at Caserma Del Din in Vicenza. External to OUA, the USARAF main command post provided reach-back support as needed and continued its steady-state mission overseeing U.S. Army operations for the entire African continent.

This integrated, distributed C2 structure ensured maximum forces forward while retaining flexibility and depth to adapt to the changing conditions in Liberia. Through this structure, USARAF supported the other three lines of effort: engineering support, medical support, and sustainment.

Engineering support. The engineering effort focused on three components: building a twenty-five bed hospital to treat international aid workers, constructing twelve ETUs, and providing sustainment for the JFC.

The first effort was a twenty-five bed hospital, known as the Monrovia Medical Unit. The construction of this hospital was a critical element of the U.S. plan, providing reliable health care for international health workers in Liberian treatment facilities. Staffed by uniformed officers from the U.S. Public Health Service, the Monrovia Medical Unit ensured that international health-care workers would have access to reliable and effective health care if they contracted the Ebola virus.

The second effort was the construction of twelve ETUs, built in coordination with several NGOs. The ETUs were temporary facilities that would receive, triage, and treat suspected Ebola treatment patients. USAID prioritized its construction based on the spread of the virus and rates of contraction. USAID’s strategy was to attack the virus where its concentrations were strongest.

The third engineering effort directly supported the JFC by setting conditions for sustainment. This effort focused on the important task of planning and constructing lodging for JFC service members. It also involved identifying suitable locations to establish sustainment areas and obtaining the real estate agreements to allow construction.

These efforts leveraged interorganizational coordination through established ASCC relationships. Contracting played a major part in all the efforts, particularly with horizontal construction (e.g., roads and airfields). Navy Seabees allocated to Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa arrived in Liberia on 23 September. The Armed Forces of Liberia supported ETU construction in conjunction with U.S. mentors from Operation Onward Liberty, an ongoing program to improve the Liberian military’s professionalism and capability. Liberian participation on the engineer teams demonstrated the Liberian people’s resilience and strength as they worked with us to overcome the challenge of Ebola.

Medical support. The medical effort focused on two key components: JFC health protection and support to international response elements.

Health protection began with educating personnel on the science behind Ebola and its transmission—essential in countering the “fearbola” that was rampant in the press. The greatest threats to the joint force were, in fact, malaria and motor vehicle accidents. Malaria education and prophylaxis were essential in preventing malarial disease. Given the very real threat of trauma from motor vehicle accidents, the JFC leveraged
the Forward Resuscitative Surgical System from the Special-Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force to provide Level II care.\(^8\) MV-22 Osprey aircraft from the same force provided on-call casualty evacuation.

Externally, the JFC rapidly leveraged Navy and Army capabilities to provide six mobile labs that could test for Ebola. Given the paucity of infrastructure in Liberia, it had been taking four to five days for a care provider to get lab results confirming a case of Ebola. The mobile labs allowed for Ebola determination in three to four hours, which significantly changed the rate of detection and, therefore, of containment. These labs’ geographic disbursement provided both direct and regional support to ETUs.

In addition to the labs, the JFC established a five-day training program for Ebola care providers focused on the disciplined donning and doffing of personal protective equipment as well as the clinical assessment of patients. This instruction occurred in a fixed facility in Monrovia and elsewhere through mobile training teams. This training leveraged DOD’s ability to provide a clinically agile and disciplined force able to effectively train a detailed process. Given Ebola’s high mortality rate and the lack of advanced medical treatment, many NGOs had left Liberia, and many Liberian health-care workers were on strike. The Monrovia Medical Unit was established to assure all national and international Ebola responders that care was available to them. Assured access to care at this facility was the most common request from partnering militaries before providing their personnel to support the Ebola fight.

Sustainment. Sustainment efforts focused on enabling medical and engineering tasks and establishing the expeditionary infrastructure needed to sustain the flow of personnel and equipment. Sustainment challenges inherent to operating in Africa include vast distances over a generally inadequate transportation infrastructure. The initial planning guidance only directed the delivery of 2,500 cots, but it rapidly expanded to include directing extensive construction efforts for ETUs, establishing training programs, and delivering supplies across Liberia in the rainy season. Force flow and sustainment quickly became a balancing act between throughput capacity in Monrovia and the forces required to increase that capacity to enable the mission.

Our experience on the continent enabled us to leverage joint logistic capabilities that most operational Army headquarters do not regularly exercise, such as those provided by the Defense Logistics Agency, Air Mobility Command, Surface Deployment Distribution Command, and U.S. Transportation Command. Prior to the mission transition on 25 October 2014, the JFC moved almost seven hundred U.S. service members to the region. This team designed and constructed the Monrovia Medical Unit, mobile labs, and a medical training facility. It fulfilled nineteen taskings from the USAID mission tasking matrix, delivered 106 tents and 4,400 cots, established air and seaports of debarkation in Liberia and Senegal, established an intermediate staging base in Senegal, and executed ninety-four contracts valued at more than $57 million.

**Beyond the Lines of Effort**

In addition to C2, engineering, medical, and sustainment, the JFC also worked to build relationships with partners. The previously established role of USARAF as a trusted and respected partner in both the interagency context and the international context (on the African continent) was critical to the JFC’s success. These efforts were supported by robust strategic communications. They set the conditions for a successful transition with the 101st Airborne Division.

Relationships played a key role in enabling rapid synchronization with the Armed Forces of Liberia and the U.S. embassy team to set the theater and shape the security environment. Working with the U.S. Department of State in Monrovia and the USAID teams in the field, the JFC reinforced their efforts with robust planning capability. The embedded mentors from USAFRICOM’s Operation Onward Liberty bridged initial gaps between the JFC headquarters and Liberian military leaders. The Marine Corps and the Michigan Army National Guard had been working with the Armed Forces of Liberia for five years. The majority of OUA missions were joint and partnered efforts, with the Armed Forces of Liberia supplying personnel and leadership. Immediately on arrival, the JFC commander’s top priority was establishing relationships with Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and Ambassador Malac.

Good support policies for U.S. family members and effective strategic communication were vital. For example, the first indications of a need for controlled monitoring of U.S. service members became apparent
approximately one week before redeployment, and became policy as the first group was leaving Liberia. Given the understandable anxiety many people around the world felt about this frightening disease, it was imperative to communicate these policy changes accurately to nervous family members, the Italian community, and the U.S. population in order to influence the narrative and prevent misinformation.

While an ASCC is capable of rapidly opening and setting the conditions in the theater, retaining command of the Ebola response mission would have come at a cost to other theater army responsibilities. From the outset of mission receipt, USARAF understood that it would not provide the enduring solution to the U.S. government’s Ebola fight.

Transition planning began almost immediately and was facilitated by the 101st Division headquarters sending a planning team to Vicenza early with only a warning order from U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM). After receiving the official unit deployment order, that team was in Liberia the following day. Leading up to the October transition of authority, the two staff headquarters conducted numerous video conferences linking Fort Campbell, Vicenza, and Liberia.

Transition challenges included determining what roles and responsibilities USARAF would continue to execute posttransition. Existing execution orders and doctrine at the time did not address an ASCC’s administrative control (ADCON) responsibilities for the allocated units or attached units. The JFC and deploying units were under operational control of U.S.AFRICOM; neither the Department of the Army nor FORSCOM directed shared ADCON authority. For OUA, FORSCOM and the deployed unit’s higher headquarters continued to exercise functions most often associated with ADCON. To address the ambiguity surrounding ADCON authorities, the USARAF and the 101st Airborne Division headquarters
defined the pre- and post-transition support requirements. USARAF captured and published the roles and responsibilities in the final JFC operation order before the mission transition. These roles include managing the joint integration needed to acquire allocated forces and lift capability. The doctrinal gap has since been filled by Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-93, *Theater Army Operations*.10

**Lessons Learned and Recommendations**

Our observations during OUA can inform DOD and its interagency partners as we prepare for future expeditionary humanitarian assistance operations. These lessons include the following:

- Doctrine and training for humanitarian assistance operations continue to lag. There is a need to develop an interagency “playbook” that guides a whole-of-government approach. This should codify duties and responsibilities of U.S. agency partners for humanitarian assistance operations such as responding to epidemics. The Department of State and DOD must cooperate to conduct planning and exercises focused on a U.S. response to likely future epidemic scenarios.
- To support exercises and actual mission execution, the Army must develop a common operating picture shareable with U.S. agency partners and external partners such as the United Nations and NGOs. USAID’s mission tasking matrix must be focused at the JFC level. The JFC was able to adjust to the mission-tasking process, when needed, during the operation. However, approval for projects in a rapidly changing environment should not be at secretary level.
- The ASCC, with or without assigned forces, plays a key role in enabling full-spectrum U.S. humanitarian assistance response exercises. However, DOD is not the lead agency in humanitarian assistance missions. Joint forces need to exercise this type of scenario together with government partners and with agencies such as USAID in the lead.

**Conclusion**

Operation United Assistance demonstrated the invaluable role an ASCC plays in opening and setting the theater. ASCCs possess inherent expeditionary sustainment and C2 experience at the theater level, providing operational agility and the expertise to tap into resources across the unified action community. Speed was imperative to counter the Ebola disease, and only USARAF had the relationships, skill sets, and capacity already integrated to meet the initial requirements. The Army must continue to maintain these expeditionary capabilities in support of the joint force. Finally, the strength and resiliency of the Liberian people inspire us. Their spirit is the true cause behind the continued success in the fight against Ebola.

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2. President Barack Obama, 16 September 2014 speech (see epigraph).


5. Until sufficient sustainment could be established, JFC personnel were lodged in embassy-approved hotels in and around Monrovia. The JFC quickly overwhelmed this capacity.


8. Level II care consists of surgical resuscitation provided by highly mobile forward surgical teams that directly support combatant units in the field.


10. ATP 3-93, para. 1-23. “The theater army headquarters is responsible for ADCON of all Army forces in the AOR [area of responsibility] in peacetime and wartime. … As an ASCC, the theater army retains these responsibilities regardless of tasks delegated to another component commander or a non-Army JFC.”

Challenging the “School Solution” at Fort Leavenworth

Today’s CGSOC students receive advanced instruction in critical thinking, a process essential to adaptive leadership. As David Jones’ new study demonstrates, critical thinking is not new to Army education. In Perceptions of Airpower and Implications for the Leavenworth Schools, Jones examines how the students in the Command and General Staff School during the interwar period used critical processes to understand the new concept of airpower. The intellectual work of these officers, who would become the architects of victory in the Second World War, reveals how critical thinking shaped their appreciation of airpower’s impact on doctrine, organization, training, and materiel.
The First Regionally Aligned Force

Lessons Learned and the Way Ahead

Capt. Cory R. Scharbo, U.S. Army
In April 2013, U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) designated the 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team (2nd ABCT), 1st Infantry Division, based at Fort Riley, Kansas, as the first regionally aligned force to support United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM), the unified command responsible for engaging with nations on the continent of Africa. The 2nd ABCT performed the mission for one year, supporting myriad taskings under policies established by the U.S. Congress, the Departments of State and Defense, and USAFRICOM. It operated directly under U.S. Army Africa/Southern European Task Force (USARAF/SETAF), the Army Service component command of USAFRICOM, to support U.S. national commitments aimed at developing theater security cooperation bilateral and multilateral relationships. Tasks included numerous military training engagements with diverse African states.

The 2nd ABCT supported USAFRICOM objectives by strengthening relationships with its key allies and training its partnered nations. Small-unit leadership adapted to changing conditions across a broad range of military operations, enabling the first regionally aligned force to achieve success.

The unit, together with the U.S. Army Center for Army Lessons Learned at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the Asymmetric Warfare Group at Fort Meade, Maryland, captured many of the ABCT’s achievements, helping to lay a knowledge base for future regionally aligned force operations. This article offers some of the most salient lessons learned to assist other commands preparing for similar missions and to recommend improvements to the overall process for supporting regionally aligned force deployments to Africa. These lessons are intended to contribute to the future success of both the operating force and the generating force when preparing for similar regionally aligned missions.
Development of Regionally Aligned Forces

The regionally aligned forces concept emerged in 2013 in response to a perception that more than a decade of experience with prolonged conflict in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere had shown that U.S. armed forces were not always prepared to manage the cultural challenges associated with many relatively nonpermissive and complex operational environments. The concept also emerged in response to requests from combatant commanders for additional capabilities to support their individual requirements. Additionally, the national military strategy began to place a greater emphasis on political, economic, and informational engagement elements with a collective focus on preventing wars in volatile areas by mitigating causes of conflicts before situations degenerated into social collapse and open warfare.

The African continent has become an area of special concern. It is three times the size of the United States, and it includes the following complexities: fifty-four nations; approximately one billion people divided into more than four hundred ethnic groups; thirty-five major languages, not including hundreds of local and regional dialects; and seven of the world’s fastest growing economies. In addition, it has vast untapped natural resources in an era of increasing global competition for vital commodities.1 Moreover, instability in many nations on the African continent has attracted terrorist and global insurgent groups with implacable hatred of the West. These groups are attempting to find new bases in remote locations for mounting continued attacks against U.S. interests at home and abroad.

As a result, the Department of Defense established USAFRICOM as a geographic combatant command in 2007, with a keen awareness of the sociopolitical sensitivity of African states toward engagement with the armed forces of nations from outside the African continent.2 This sensitivity is due in part to a history of Western colonization, slavery, exploitation, and a bitter legacy of anticolonial wars.

The initial objectives of USAFRICOM included establishing a high-level system of engagement in order to develop long-term cooperative relationships and contingencies for managing international crises of mutual concern to the United States and African nations. The command was tasked with providing support to nations requesting help in professionalizing their armed forces. It was understood such help would be offered on the U.S. model, which not only provides skills training but also emphasizes at every stage the responsibility of professional military members to support democracy, democratically elected leaders, and human rights.

To carry out engagement missions, the regionally aligned forces concept allocates specific Army forces to geographic combatant commanders under concepts outlined in numerous documents, starting with the 2010 National Security Strategy.3 Additionally, the 2012 defense strategic guidance outlines ten priority missions for regionally aligned forces, including the ability to provide a stabilizing presence abroad allowing for regional access.4 The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020 also states the future joint force will be prepared to conduct globally integrated operations with its mission partners.5 Finally, the 2012 Army Strategic Planning Guidance provides greater detail as to intent by stating that “Regional alignment provides an effective approach for non-traditional threats in an increasingly interdependent security environment.”6

Regionally aligned forces are intended to provide combatant commanders with dedicated capabilities, oriented to sociocultural and political aspects of specific geographical areas, that can rapidly task organize to execute a range of missions and contingency operations. As such, regionally aligned forces are supposed to provide quickly tailored capabilities to meet the needs of diverse nations with clearly articulated and appropriate authorities for employment.7

The 2nd ABCT operated under the direction of USARAF, performing missions aimed at achieving overall U.S. strategic goals in Africa. Initial missions included conducting senior leader engagements and host-nation security cooperation missions to build partnering relationships.8 The missions either fulfilled or complemented ongoing theater security cooperation agreements, security force assistance, or Army National Guard State Partnership Program initiatives. According to a U.S. Army War College research paper by Col. Kristian Matthew Marks in 2013, these missions strengthened defense relationships within the Army’s strategic framework of prevent, shape, and win by employing in various roles both Active and Reserve Component Army elements.9
**Six Lessons Learned From the First Regionally Aligned Units**

The yearlong 2nd ABCT experience provided numerous lessons regarding the Army infrastructure that supports regionally aligned forces. Six of the most significant lessons related to support systems follow:

- A standardized assessment system is needed to enhance planning and objective measurement of mission accomplishment.
- Tailored and streamlined administrative personnel processes are needed to make complex predeployment activities more efficient.
- Life-cycle personnel management procedures aimed at assigning and retaining personnel with specialized skills are needed to improve continuity.
- Efficient business rules are needed to facilitate timely allocation of forces and ongoing adequate and timely support arrangements for missions.
- Army sustainment channels allocated specifically for regionally aligned units are needed to ensure units can obtain support during missions.
- Revised budgeting models and a higher priority of funding are needed to provide for operations, maintenance, and training costs.

These lessons learned are discussed below to contribute to the future success of both operating and generating forces when preparing for similar regionally aligned force missions.

**A standardized assessment system is needed to enhance planning and objective measurement of mission accomplishment.** First, USAFRICOM, USARAF, and staff members of regionally aligned forces need an end-state-driven assessment system, using outcome-based training for measuring mission effectiveness and generating quantifiable results that can be compared, tracked, and analyzed over time. The 2nd ABCT supported more than one hundred eight missions across thirty-four African countries within its first six months of employment. The majority of these missions consisted of two- and three-soldier teams deploying to the African continent for approximately one-week increments to train African soldiers. Examples included sniper training in Burundi and engineer and mobility training in Malawi. Additional missions included advising Guinea, Chad, and Niger security forces; participating in the Shared Accord 13 Live Fire Exercise; and supporting the Eastern Accord 14 Command Post Exercise.

Small-unit leaders of the 2nd ABCT displayed great personal initiative to ensure the intent of each mission was accomplished to standard. However, the validity of assessments left much to be desired. Missions tended to be subjectively assessed by participants without benefit of a coherent system for collecting, analyzing, and comparing data over time in a systematic way.

(Phto by Sgt. Takita Lawery, 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team PAO, 1st Infantry Division)
As a result, USARAF’s ability to assess mission effectiveness was inadequate. Trip reports were not quantitative, nor even qualitative, in nature. According to the 2014 “CALL [Center for Army Lessons Learned] Interim Report on Regionally Aligned Forces in U.S. Army Africa,” assessments of the missions were, at best, educated staff judgments based largely on the past training experiences of trainers in Iraq and Afghanistan. Assessments were made based on host-nation feedback and limited first-hand observation on host-nation performance. Such a process lacks standardization and quality management required to track progress and effectiveness of training accurately over time.

Regionally aligned forces would benefit from a more structured trip report system that enforces a uniform, disciplined, and systematic reporting methodology for conducting after action reviews and capturing lessons learned. This would enable valid and reliable measures of performance and effectiveness for analysis over time. Equally important, according to the Asymmetric Warfare Group's 2014 Analysis of Support to the Regionally Aligned Force, units need an easy-to-use and accessible knowledge management database where trip report results are archived.

Tailored and streamlined administrative personnel processes are needed to make complex predeployment activities more efficient. A second lesson learned is that deployment to the remote areas of regionally aligned force missions requires significantly more administrative paperwork and preparation than locations to which units are generally accustomed to being sent. This results from a lack of status-of-forces agreements with the many nations to which units are sent, as well as a lack of forward regional support bases to provide support at remote locations. Consequently, units preparing to deploy to these areas have a number of additional administrative requirements unique to each location. According to a 2013 interim lessons learned report from the Army Irregular Warfare Center, these requirements include diverse requirements for authorizing to enter countries and planning challenges for support once in country, requests for passports and visas, and unique medical readiness challenges.

This means that units must begin a detailed process of working administrative requirements for deployments earlier than they are used to, including establishing contingency plans and anticipating the need for resources not readily available once in country. Planning also needs to include making requests for area-specific cultural training early in the process through the Asymmetric Warfare Group.

Notwithstanding, in the preparation stage, unit mission-essential tasks, decisive action tasks, and theater security cooperation common training tasks under the modified Army force generation rotational cycle seemed adequate. These should remain the standard tasks for upcoming rotations of regionally aligned forces.

Additionally, administrative tasks should be incorporated into a predeployment program to ensure
soldiers can prepare on short notice. The 2nd ABCT developed a useful preparation tool known as *Dagger University* to facilitate soldier administrative preparedness for deployment. The design of a predeployment program for all regionally aligned forces would be well served by being based on this model.

**Life-cycle personnel management procedures aimed at assigning and retaining personnel with specialized skills are needed to improve continuity.** The Army needs to adjust its human resources system significantly to focus on carefully managing personnel with special skills for specific geographical areas. Such management should focus on ensuring soldiers with skills such as languages or experience with the repair and maintenance of foreign equipment and weapons are assigned and retained in regionally aligned units. Additionally, personnel with specialized skills should be able to remain assigned to regionally aligned units for longer periods than policy now allows. This would help ensure the life-cycle personnel management system optimally supports regionally aligned rotations. It would ensure soldiers with invaluable skills or experience related to the designated geographical areas were properly assigned to increase host-nation confidence and trust through the continuity of long-term relationships.

Changes to the human resources system would also give units designated as regionally aligned forces time to adjust and reset as personnel with less common skills rotated out in a slower, more deliberate manner.

**Efficient business rules are needed to facilitate timely allocation of forces and ongoing support arrangements for missions.** The fourth, and most difficult, challenge is the need to meet short-term mission requests in a timely manner and to provide units with an adequate support base over the duration of their tour of duty. To do this, Department of Defense and Army planners need to improve the business rules for allocating regionally aligned forces to increase efficiency and improve tasking and synchronizing alignment of supporting forces to a region.²⁶

Foremost among issues adversely affecting the regionally aligned forces process is the current system for assignment and allocation of forces. It is complicated, inconsistent, and sometimes illogical, which inhibits efficient management of the regionally aligned forces process. For example, the 2nd ABCT was allocated to USAFRICOM but assigned to 1st Infantry Division at Fort Riley, Kansas. This led to a host of issues related to command and control, funding for operations, and establishing effective communication across all units involved.

With available resources, 2nd ABCT was efficient in responding to short-notice taskings from USAFRICOM. Successful missions occurred in this order: first, 2nd ABCT was available; second, 2nd ABCT received a general administrative message from USARAF; third, one to two weeks of email traffic passed between the two headquarters; and finally, troops boarded an airplane to Africa to perform the mission.¹⁷ USARAF staff worked directly with 2nd ABCT and its headquarters on such deployments and kept FORSCOM fully informed.

However, meeting short-notice taskings became problematic when USARAF lacked the means to reach back to the generating force for augmentation. Much of the difficulty was caused by a complex process for requesting forces.

The process for requesting forces works for larger, programmed missions forecast well in advance. However, challenges can arise when attempting to respond to requests on short notice, and short-notice taskings are the main mission of regionally aligned forces. The business rules typically used to initiate and approve a request for forces make the process lengthy. This leads to challenges of preparing for deployment by the time the task is assigned to the designated unit.¹⁸

The request for forces process and the regionally aligned forces process support the needs of the Department of State and host-nation requirements. USAFRICOM; USARAF; Headquarters, Department of the Army; and the Department of State can request a regionally aligned unit for a specific mission. The mission must be accepted and the specific requirements agreed upon by the nation in which forces will serve. In the case of USAFRICOM, if the action is best suited for the Army, it is tasked to USARAF. After analysis of requirements, USARAF prepares and forwards additional requests for forces through USAFRICOM to the Pentagon, which, on approval, are forwarded to FORSCOM for tasking. FORSCOM then reviews and approves the tasking and designates a unit to be tasked with the mission. This process can take six months or more.¹⁹ This is a problem when the unit tasking is only one year.

The long process for requesting additional support for operations apart from what was originally forecast
involves numerous command-level approvals, up to the Secretary of Defense. Many missions, however, are time sensitive due to the importance of timeliness when executing missions that have to be timely if they are to be successful. The long administrative delays of the current system can interfere with mission accomplishment.

Since regionally aligned brigades are allocated one year in advance, it is their internal selection that is inefficient as many activities are developed from 120 to 150 days before execution—rather than eighteen months. Consequently, USARAF and USAFRICOM struggle with determining which short-notice missions are critical to operational objectives. This places unnecessary stress on the system and the soldiers performing the missions. (Most of the 2nd ABCT’s short-notice missions were not critical but resulted from overly ambitious commitments made by ill-informed country representatives or action officers.)

Army sustainment channels allocated specifically for regionally aligned units are needed to ensure units can obtain support during missions. Another key lesson learned was that regionally aligned units supporting USAFRICOM in Africa need much greater support than Army planners at all levels initially forecast. Africa is an austere setting and does not maintain permanent U.S. Army bases where supplies might be stockpiled or other support services obtained. This, together with the relatively small budget and limited on-hand resources, created significant problems for 2nd ABCT.

One central issue was a lack of enablers and resources needed to accomplish missions. When 2nd ABCT soldiers deployed to work in small teams and in austere environments, they often had to find additional resources outside of the regionally aligned brigade. While USARAF was able to provide some support, such as communication equipment, it could not make up for the 2nd’s organic shortfalls in other areas due to its own equipment requirements and budget constraints. Thus, shortages in communications equipment and medical support, as well as insufficient funding for equipment and deploying personnel, were just a few of the major challenges.

In the future, units providing reach-back support could be directly aligned with and allocated to regionally aligned units for dedicated support during rotations. Business rules for theater security cooperation missions should be changed to encompass the allocation or alignment of supporting units and capabilities that can be accessed in an identical manner. Such support commands could provide resources, equipment, and sustainment support not now readily available on short notice at the brigade level without significant additional administrative work. There are Army support commands already providing global support to Army operating units. However, the current business rules for regionally aligned forces do not support an effective way to allocate such supporting units.

In part to fill support gaps, USARAF created an informal relationship with the 1st Infantry Division, which helped fill intelligence gaps—such as gaps in human intelligence, imagery intelligence, and counterintelligence. Other identified resource and capability gaps from the first regionally aligned force included medical evacuation and medics, as well as signal, logistics, and maintenance support.

Preparing for medical contingencies during deployments was a particularly worrisome challenge for the 2nd ABCT. In Africa, medical evacuation takes twenty-four hours or more, which fails to meet the Golden Hour standard mandated by the secretary of defense (referring to the critical one-hour limit for evacuating a casualty from the incident to a proper treatment facility to preclude death). Fortunately, the 2nd ABCT had no occurrences of any injured soldier being affected by this rule.

The 2nd ABCT also had significant difficulty with signal and communication support. There is no established signal infrastructure in remote African nations to support U.S. military operations. Consequently,
sophisticated fixed-point signal support to regionally aligned missions was almost nonexistent. USARAF provided support with satellite communications, Iridium, and cellular phones in limited quantities. Thus, regionally aligned units had to rely on cell phone service, Internet, and any other local means to communicate.

Similarly, USARAF was able to provide limited sustainment in other areas. Often, it did not have all the enablers needed to support USAFRICOM missions. For example, maintenance of nonstandard equipment is problematic for African armies. USARAF expressed concern that without appropriate enablers, it would be difficult to assist effectively with equipment maintenance.23

Integrating the generating force and units such as the Army Sustainment Command could contribute greatly to the efficiency and effectiveness of such missions. The 2nd ABCT’s regionally aligned force experience highlights the need for a specific Army support command to be allocated to support regionally aligned units.

Revised budgeting models and a higher priority of funding are needed to provide for operations, maintenance, and training costs. According to a U.S. Army War College research paper by John R. Bray, the chief of staff of the Army has directed developing innovative ways of funding the operations of regionally aligned forces.24 The Army budget for regionally aligned forces draws mainly from operations and maintenance, Title 10, and Title 22 funds (referring to Titles 10 and 22 of the United States Code). The challenge for USARAF is obligating funds before the end of the fiscal year. However, regionally aligned units receive lower priority for funding compared to other units.

Therefore, Army leaders at all levels should consider evaluating and assessing the level of preparedness desired of regionally aligned units, including the cost, and commit to it. The question is whether regionally aligned forces are worth the effort required. Is the bang of regionally aligned forces worth the buck? How can the Army and Department of Defense afford to continue to support regionally aligned forces in the increasingly resource-constrained environment mandated by Congress?

Another challenge is how a regionally aligned unit can receive the specific regional training needed. During the first rotation to Africa, the 2nd ABCT developed several creative solutions to meeting training requirements. For example, the team created a one-stop shop for mission preparedness within its Dagger University. Local colleges, professions, and other military groups such as Special Forces and the Asymmetric Warfare Group assisted as well, though at a limited level due to minimal funding.

The 2nd ABCT incurred expenses in transportation of personnel, equipment, and sustainment.25 According to a Parameters article by Kimberly Field, James Learmont, and Jason Charland, the Fiscal Year 2015 Program Objective Memorandum for theater security cooperation missions shows that the Department of the Army planned for a 25 percent increase in Title 10 funding.26 This should allow for more efficient use of capabilities and enablers in future force rotations. Once sequestration is resolved and the drawdown from Afghanistan is complete, planners should be able to improve funding for regionally aligned forces.

Simply put, the first regionally aligned force was not adequately funded for its mission. However, Headquarters, Department of the Army quickly recognized this and set aside some additional funds for regionally aligned forces starting in fiscal year 2015. Whether it will be enough is unknown, but if 2nd
ABCT’s experience is an indicator, at current budget levels one combat brigade cannot manage all the resources and expenditures required. Both operating and generating forces need to be assigned or allocated to support regionally aligned forces unconditionally in accordance with revised business rules.

Summary of Recommendations

Based on the experiences of the 2nd ABCT, six major improvements should be considered to support regionally aligned forces: a standardized assessment system, tailored and streamlined administrative personnel processes, life-cycle personnel management procedures for assigning and retaining personnel with specialized skills, more efficient business rules, Army sustainment channels allocated for regionally aligned units, and a higher priority of funding.

The Asymmetric Warfare Group assessed that 2nd ABCT should have had additional support in planning, preparing, employment, and recovery for missions of regionally aligned forces. USARAF recommended an assigned or allocated expeditionary support command be established to provide direct logistic support to regionally aligned units. In addition, other organizations, such as the Army Sustainment Command and Army Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, should be tasked to support overseas operations of regionally aligned forces. These designated support commands would align with USAFRICOM and USARAF, providing essential material, equipment, and technical expertise for missions in Africa.

Barring availability of support units, additional support gaps might best be filled by contractor support. Similarly, contractors for satellite communication and strategic network should be considered.

There is no need to create additional organizations or commands. The commands already exist to support units like the regionally aligned forces, but they have not been aligned with them for support. The Army Sustainment Command is one of them. Army leaders should determine how such units can best support regionally aligned forces, and what is the best way to assign them (assigned, allocated, or service-retained command aligned). These supporting commands should be allocated to USAFRICOM as part of the regionally aligned forces.

In conjunction, additional support for urgent equipment fielding for regionally aligned units should be provided by the U.S. Army Rapid Equipping Force. Finally, the Army should consider adopting budgeting models that could ensure regionally aligned units are properly included into funding plans for operations, maintenance, and training.
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Notes

6. Office of the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army, 2012 Army Strategic Planning Guidance, Raymond T. Odierno and John M. McHugh, (Department of the Army: Washington, DC, April 2012), 14.
7. Ibid., 14-19.
12. 2nd ABCT, 1st Infantry Division, "Dagger Brigade 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division: Consolidated RAB AAR [Regionally Aligned Brigade After Action Review];" slides 1 to 25 of packet presented 21 May 2014 to incoming unit, Fort Riley, KS. The Shared Accord 13 Live Fire Exercise, South Africa, 25 July to 4 August 2013, was one of several major operations supported by 2nd ABCT. The Eastern Accord 14 Command Post Exercise, Uganda, 27 March to 14 April 2014, was a major partnered training operation. It included the RAF battalion command, and corps leaders from the Uganda military. The operation involved the entire battalion staff, forty-eight people including the command group, from 2nd ABCT. Tasks included establishing a command post and tactical operations center, four days of academic study, four days of practical exercises, an after action review, and redeployment.
16. The institutional Army, including staff at the Pentagon, the combatant commands, and below, apply business rules to the work and responsibilities at each level. The rules maintain processes and standards for accomplishing specific tasks, leading to orders and plans. The regionally aligned forces business rules nest with Army (Pentagon) business rules and are shaped to best practices and procedures for the current mission. The rules ensure that units are properly assigned, allocated, or aligned with the combatant command and in accordance with the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG) business rules.
18. Ibid., 1-3.
19. Ibid., 2.
21. Ibid., 4-7.
22. Ibid., 5-9.
25. Ibid., 3-6.
27. Asymmetric Warfare Group, Analysis of Support, 4.
Operational Art by the Numbers

Lt. Col. David S. Pierson, U.S. Army, Retired

Conventional warfighting is grounded in tactics and techniques; it is part science and part art. Most soldiers and many civilians can intuitively interpret the graphic associated with a conventional brigade attack. Friendly and enemy units, axes, objectives, and tactical mission tasks combine to show the flow of a fight in a single picture. However, ask the same soldiers and civilians how to create a similar graphic for a stability operation, showing the flow of the brigade operation over time with nested tasks leading to objectives, and they will hesitate or even stop cold and ask what you mean.

The science of moving men and machines along routes toward ground objectives is intuitive. It is a logical flow of actions over time and space. Stability operations seem to defy that level of visualization and the corresponding ability to display the operation sequentially and graphically. Yet, we have a method for displaying stability operations in a sequential, graphic manner; we do this through an operational approach,
Operational art and its associated elements can be elusive because they focus much more on art than science. The process of performing operational art is not defined and codified with the same prescriptive techniques and procedures that inform the tactics of conventional warfighting. However, by clarifying the terms and concepts in our doctrine and applying some prescriptive techniques to focus that doctrine, we can simplify the process of operational art into a paint-by-numbers project.

Operational art spans a planning continuum that runs from comprehensive strategic actions down to concrete tactical actions. Both joint and Army elements use operational art, which is defined as the use of creative thinking to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations. Operational art allows commanders and staffs to think through the challenges of understanding their environment and the problem, and then develop a concept that frames and guides detailed planning. These tools include end state and conditions, centers of gravity, lines of effort, phases and transitions, and several other elements that allow commanders to assess and plan long-term operations.

Joint and Army doctrine provides descriptions and basic examples of centers of gravity, problem statements, operational approach, and lines of effort. This doctrine also describes a general sequence of actions that leads from operational art to detailed planning. Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, describes the overall methodology for developing an operational approach with lines of effort consisting of understanding the strategic direction and goals, understanding the operational environment, and defining the problem. This doctrine is not prescriptive; it does not provide specific techniques for developing planning products or an exact sequence for these efforts.

**Applying Operational Art**

The process of conducting operational art can be simplified through the use of plain language to describe key terms and concepts as well as a clearly prescribed sequence of actions. To clarify this process, we will employ a simple example familiar to many military members—the permanent change of station (PCS) move. A PCS move is a complex event that takes place over an extended period of time and lends itself well to planning using operational art and an operational approach. In this example we will use the following scenario:

It is January 2015. Maj. Smith is stationed at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, attending the Command and General Staff Officer Course. Maj. and Mrs. Smith, their two children, and their dog reside in a rental house in Lansing, Kansas. They own two cars. The Smith children attend elementary school in Lansing. There are no special circumstances within the Smith family, such as exceptional family member, joint domicile, etc. Maj. Smith has been notified by Human Resources Command that he will receive PCS orders for an accompanied tour to Hohenfels, Germany, with a report date of July 2015. The unit he will be assigned to is not slated to deploy anywhere for the next eighteen months.

The simplified process of operational art we will employ will follow these four steps:

1. Determine key actors and their desired end states.
2. Develop a problem statement.
3. Determine friendly and enemy centers of gravity and associated requirements.
4. Develop an operational approach with lines of effort.

**Step 1: Determine Key Actors and Their Desired End States**

In both joint and Army doctrine, it is necessary to understand the operational environment and all of the actors within it. The overall goal of understanding the environment is to “produce a holistic view of the relevant enemy, neutral, and friendly systems as a complex whole within a larger system.” This consists of answering several questions. What is going on? Why is it going on? Who is involved? What do they want? In the end, we need to identify the key actors and their desired end states, including the end state of friendly forces. Knowing the end states of all relevant actors will help us determine centers of gravity.

In the PCS scenario, the Smith family represents the friendly forces with an overall end state of smoothly moving all personnel and property from Kansas to Germany. The enemy is a little more difficult to discern in this scenario. The enemy does not always have to be a thinking, hostile force. Sometimes the enemy is environmental, as in the case of Hurricane Katrina. In this scenario, the enemy is the environment that threatens the move.
The environment’s end state is not driven by a personal objective or desire but rather the need to maintain a state of equilibrium or inactivity; its end state is to conserve energy by maintaining the status quo through inertia. These two end states are in conflict; one seeks to make change, and the other seeks to remain as static as possible. This conflict represents the problem.

**Step 2: Develop a Problem Statement**

The problem statement describes the obstacles between our current state and the desired end state—what we must overcome to get from where we are to where we want to be. Developing a problem statement is the key outcome of framing the problem, which consists of understanding and isolating the root causes of conflict. By questioning the difference between the current state and the desired end state, and determining what is preventing you from reaching the desired end state, you frame the problem. In its purest form, the problem statement is a concise statement of the issue or issues requiring resolution. However, by adding a short narrative to the problem statement that also explains how to bridge the gap between current and desired end state, you have a more complete product that begins to inform your operational approach. This is similar to the thesis in an essay, since it guides all other materials in the work. You now have described the obstacles facing you and a broad way of addressing them.

Looking at the PCS situation, we want to develop a problem statement that will describe what the Smith family must overcome to get from where they are to where they want to be. By brainstorming the many obstacles in their path and then focusing on the desired end state, we might come up with this problem statement:

Given PCS orders, limited time, a weight restriction on household goods, and a single vehicle shipping restriction, as well as post out-processing and in-processing support, how do you move a family of four with a pet out of the United States from Kansas to Germany and smoothly settle into a new job, new home, new school, and new community with all property intact?

**Step 3: Determine Friendly and Enemy Centers of Gravity and Associated Requirements**

After analyzing the environment, determining what we want it to look like, and identifying the obstacles standing in the way of our vision, we need to determine the most important elements to both protect and attack as we develop a plan. These become the friendly and enemy centers of gravity (COGs). The term center of gravity is derived from the writings of Clausewitz, who described a center of gravity as, “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends ... the point at which all our energies should be directed.”

The military definition of the center of gravity as defined in doctrine is “a source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act.” There is no set process for determining a COG. Based upon their understanding of the actors in the operational environment, analysts are supposed to develop candidate COGs—how to do this is not specified—and test them against twelve characteristics of centers of gravity found in JP 5-0. Centers of gravity are further analyzed within the framework of three critical factors—capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities. In joint

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**Figure 1. Center of Gravity Worksheet**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Friendly Center of Gravity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Smith family goal: To smoothly move all Smith family personnel and property from Kansas to Germany</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Critical Capability:</th>
<th>Critical Requirements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coordinate all move events with appropriate agencies</td>
<td>Orders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Out processing time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Access to communications</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Critical Vulnerabilities:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inadequate lead time</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Maj. Smith (COG)**

Figure 1. Center of Gravity Worksheet
doctrine, a critical capability is a crucial enabler for a COG to function and is essential to the accomplishment of the adversary’s assumed objective. A critical requirement is a condition, resource, or means that enables a critical capability to become fully operational. A critical vulnerability is an aspect or component of a critical requirement that is vulnerable to direct or indirect attack in a manner achieving significant results. Thus, a COG is characterized by critical capabilities that enable it to function. These capabilities are further enabled by critical requirements, some of which are vulnerable to attack. By identifying these and understanding their relationships, we can describe our adversary as a system susceptible to attack at vulnerable points. The problem with this is that we have to divine the COG in the first place before being able to further describe it using the critical factors. We need a straightforward formula for determining factors. We need a straightforward formula for determining COGs.

A more systematic approach to COG development is proposed by retired Army Col. Dale Eikmeier, who posits that the COG is best discovered by first determining the critical capability. This critical capability is directly aligned with the most important resource, or means of action, in the system—the center of gravity. Eikmeier’s stepped approach looks first at the goal or objective of the friendly or enemy force. After identifying this goal, the next requirement is to determine ways or methods that this goal can be accomplished. These ways are critical capabilities. The next requirement is to select the critical capability that reflects the most likely way to achieve the overall objective. This becomes the primary way and the most important critical capability. Now

Figure 2. Logically Group Actions, Tasks, and Objectives
determine the resources or means that are available to perform this most important critical capability. The resource that most directly performs this critical capability is the COG. Thus, the critical capability is a verb describing the way to accomplish the overarching goal, while the COG is a noun and the thing that performs the critical capability. The resources or requirements that the COG requires in order to perform the critical capability are the critical requirements. Critical vulnerabilities are those critical requirements that are susceptible to attack. This method can be used to determine both a friendly and enemy COG.

Let us look back at the Smith family PCS example and determine the COGs of both the Smith family and the environment. First, we look at the best way (critical capability) that each can accomplish its end state, and then we determine which resource within their respective systems is the source of this action. The source of action that most directly performs the critical capability is the COG.

There are several ways that the Smith family can accomplish its goal of moving the family members and property from Kansas to Germany. A friend with a power of attorney could arrange all aspects of the move. Or, the Smith family could simply hope that agency representatives take the initiative to coordinate the actions of the move. However, the most likely way to accomplish this move is for the Smith family to personally coordinate all move events. Coordinating all move events is the critical capability. If this is the most likely way to do this, which element of the Smith family will perform this critical capability of coordinating the move events? Considering Maj. Smith, Mrs. Smith, the children, and the dog are the resources within the Smith family, Maj. Smith is the resource that will most directly perform the critical capability of coordinating the move. Thus, Maj. Smith is the friendly center of gravity. Now we look at the resources Maj. Smith requires in order to coordinate the move. Some of these might be PCS orders, out-processing time, personal transportation, and access to communications. These are critical requirements. Any of these that are vulnerable to attack could be critical vulnerabilities. Perhaps inadequate lead time is a key factor and thus a critical vulnerability.

When looking at the opposing actor, the environment, we must look at ways that the environment will attempt to accomplish its goal of maintaining the status quo. A rogue actor may target the Smith family and disrupt all of their coordination. Fierce competition for move resources may cancel all actions related to the Smith move. Constant friction by multiple sources involved in the move may slow and disrupt the move. Finally, a catastrophic weather or environmental event may defeat the move. The most likely way of maintaining a state of inertia comes from applying constant friction to the move. Thus, applying friction to the move is the critical capability. Looking at the possible sources of this constant friction, we might consider weather, distressed family members, or apathetic agency workers. While all of these may apply, the resource that most directly performs the critical capability of
creating constant friction is the collection of apathetic agency workers. This makes them the environment’s COG. Some of the resources they employ to accomplish this constant friction are bureaucratic regulations, access control, and perceived legitimacy with superiors. The resource most vulnerable to exploitation might actually be the use of regulations since it not only slows the Smiths but also places requirements on the agency workers themselves. Systems with COGs can be expressed graphically for quick reference as depicted in figure 1. At this point, we have set a foundation that describes where we are, where we want to go, the obstacles in between, the most important elements available to both the friendly and adversarial forces, as well as some of the vulnerabilities of those elements. We are ready to move from the realm of why to the realm of how; we are ready to develop an operational approach.

**Step 4: Develop an Operational Approach with Lines of Effort**

The operational approach describes the broad general actions required to solve the problem. The operational approach serves as the main idea that informs detailed planning and guides the force through preparation and execution. The operational approach describes the broad general actions required to solve the problem. The operational approach serves as the main idea that informs detailed planning and guides the force through preparation and execution. **JP 5-0 provides basic guidelines**
on developing an operational approach. These include considering both direct and indirect approaches as well as arrangement of actions along lines of effort. Army doctrine defines a line of effort as “a line that links multiple tasks using the logic of purpose rather than geographical reference to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions.” Since the tasks or actions along a line of effort are related by purpose, the line provides an overall theme or topic describing the tasks. Actions along these lines of effort may use defeat or stability mechanisms, or both, to create conditions that lead to the desired end state.

Developing the lines of effort and actions along them is a combination of brainstorming and organizing. Start with the desired end state. Write down all of the major actions or tasks that must occur to get you from where you are currently to where you want to go. Attempt to group these actions or tasks by similar topics or themes, and give each grouping or theme a logical name or title. These themes will form the basis of your lines of effort.

Let us use the Smith family PCS again to illustrate this. The desired end state for the Smith family is to smoothly move all personnel and property from Kansas to Germany. Now we brainstorm to determine all of the tasks that must be accomplished in order to meet this end state. This includes official military actions, family actions, and any other event associated with the move. In no particular order write down every action, task, and objective that comes to mind.

Next we want to organize these seemingly random tasks into categories. Tasks that are linked to one another as part of a topic or purpose should be grouped together. Thus, we rearrange the tasks into logical groups and label these groups with intuitive names. Figure 2 provides an example of how to organize these tasks.

Now arrange these groups of tasks in a linear, sequential fashion. You can work on one line at a time, but understand that eventually you will have to synchronize the lines with one another. These groups become lines linking multiple tasks using the logic of purpose; they are lines of effort. Establish an end state for each of these lines of effort. Once you have sequentially ordered the tasks on each line, you will want to display the product in a manner in which you can see all of the lines together. Thus, you have developed an operational approach. It is a graphical representation of actions that you must accomplish over time to go from your current conditions to your
desired end state. It is a picture of your operation or campaign. Figure 3 provides an example of such a graphic representation.

Even though we have each line of effort arranged in sequence, they now need to be aligned in time with each other. Your lines should run horizontally, displaying actions sequentially from left to right. The element of time will run vertically and can be displayed in days, months, or years, depending upon your planning horizon. Once you have a common time schema overlaid on your lines of effort, you can slide your actions and tasks along the lines to the appropriate point in time when they should take place. In most cases this should be when you initiate an action or task.

Once you have all actions and tasks on your lines of effort arranged according to when they should occur, you can begin to see how certain tasks and actions cluster over time. There are themes that exist across all of these lines that characterize the nature of the actions taking place at that time. You can also see logical break points where the overall nature of the actions change. Draw vertical lines between these clustered events along the break points that separate them from one another and organize your operation into logical time zones. These are the phases of your operation that extend across all lines of effort. Give them a title that succinctly describes them. The vertical lines in figure 3 demonstrate the timing for tasks associated with the Smith family PCS.

At this point, you may identify and add in more actions and tasks that need to take place to shape conditions. Look at each phase and determine where the most critical actions are in that phase. In most cases these will be on a single line of effort. Circle these actions as demonstrated in figure 3. This designates your main effort in that phase. Identifying this main effort helps prioritize certain tasks and objectives and directs resources toward these points of concentration.

Conclusion

Analyzing an operational environment, determining centers of gravity, and developing an operational approach are complex tasks requiring intellectual rigor. These tasks can seem even more complex without a systematic approach for accomplishing them. Providing structure to this process through discrete steps and simple techniques allows even novice operational artists to press forward and develop the design products that provide the bedrock for detailed planning.

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Notes

5. Ibid., III-10.
6. ADRP 3-0, 2-9.
8. JP 5-0, III-22.
9. Ibid., III-23.
10. Ibid., III-24.
12. ADRP 3-0, 2-10.
14. ADRP 3-0, 4-5.
The Role of Iraqi Tribes after the Islamic State’s Ascendancy

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, PhD, and Sterling Jensen, PhD

In the midst of a military campaign littered with the bodies of its victims, the jihadist group that dubbed itself the Islamic State (IS) nonetheless managed to shock observers with a series of atrocities it inflicted on the Albu Nimr tribe in Iraq’s Anbar Province during October and November 2014. Following the Albu Nimr’s resistance to IS military advances in Anbar, the first indications of the jihadist group’s intentions came on 27 October,
when IS rounded up the remaining civilian population of 1,500 families in Zuwayrah following its capture of the village. A string of mass executions followed.

The executions began on 29 October when IS militants paraded more than forty captured Albu Nimr fighters through the streets of Hit—and then shot and killed them in the city’s central square in front of residents. The following day, IS publicly executed another seventy-five Albu Nimr tribesmen, forcing dozens of residents to watch as they shot the captives in their heads. On 1 November, the jihadist group executed approximately fifty civilians in Ras al-Maa, while thirty-five bodies were found in a mass grave in Hit. On 2 November, IS publicly executed fifty Albu Nimr tribesmen in Hit and killed sixty-seven more tribe members as they fled from the village of al-Tharthar. On 3 November, IS publicly executed thirty-six Albu Nimr civilians, including women and children, on the outskirts of Hit. On 4 November, IS executed twenty-five more tribesmen, shooting them at close range and dumping their bodies in a well. On 9 November, IS executed seventy Albu Nimr tribesmen in Hit District and then executed sixteen more tribe members on 13 November.

The attempted extermination of the Albu Nimr marked, at the time, IS’s most vicious attack on a Sunni population in Iraq. Overall, IS slaughtered more than seven hundred members of the tribe in less than twenty days. Why did IS commit these massacres? What role did the Sunni tribes play in the current battle for Iraq? What can the United States do to better engage with substate allies?

Answering these questions requires context about the Sunni tribes’ historical relationship with jihadist organizations in Iraq, beginning with the U.S. invasion to topple dictator Saddam Hussein in 2003. Given the disempowerment of Iraq’s Sunnis following Saddam’s ouster, many Sunni tribes initially supported the insurgency against the new Iraqi government and the U.S. occupation. But the excesses of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), which came to play a leading role in the insurgency, pushed many Iraqi Sunni tribes to support the Sahwa (Awakening) movement that stood up against AQI’s power. The Sahwa began in Anbar Province, and that uprising served as a model that was exported to other parts of Iraq. This method of Sunni tribal engagement played an important role in AQI’s defeat in 2007–08.

This defeat did not mean the death of AQI. That organization was reborn as IS and became more powerful than AQI had ever been. The Islamic State could have learned a variety of lessons from AQI’s defeat. One lesson could have been the need to engage with tribes and try to win their loyalty by appearing to be an organic part of them, rather than alienating the tribes by trying to coerce them through the use of force. That is largely the lesson that the al-Qaeda organization, from which IS was expelled in February 2014, took from its affiliate’s defeat during the Iraq War. But IS instead internalized the opposite lesson: it came to believe that the best approach to tribes and other local actors was employing greater force and brutality. The result is that, though Iraq’s disaffected Sunni tribes were initially optimistic about IS’s spectacular June 2014 advance into Iraq—particularly because the jihadist group had worked in a coalition with other Sunni organizations—IS alienated them even faster than AQI had.

This situation presents opportunities for IS’s enemies, including the United States. It is vital, however, that the United States learn the right lessons from the Sahwa and its aftermath, including how the United States and Iraq managed to squander the trust and confidence of the Sunni tribes that were so central to AQI’s defeat. Indeed, as of this writing, IS forces have been involved in an intense fight as they attempt to capture Ramadi, the capital of Anbar. If IS succeeds in capturing the city and is unchecked in slaughtering the tribes that have been resisting its advance, there is a chance that this article could end up a sad epitaph to the idea of an anti-IS tribal rebellion.

Origins of the Sahwa

Sahwa al-Anbar is the name of the tribal uprising against AQI that a number of Anbari sheikhs announced on 14 September 2006 at Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha’s home in Ramadi. The uprising had roots in the evolution of the Sunni insurgency after 2003. As sectarianism grew following the U.S.-led invasion, Iraqis—especially in rural areas—relied more heavily on their tribal ties for security and subsistence than they did the new state. But rather than accepting and working within the tribal structure, AQI and its Jordanian leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi set out to oppose and disempower it. Part of the reason AQI and Zarqawi opposed tribal power was their hardline religious outlook. Many AQI leaders opposed all forms of political participation, even if it was a means to combat the U.S. occupation, because they believed that political affairs should be handled solely by an Islamic shura (consultative council), and that loyalty to any other political or social system was un-Islamic. As a corollary to this belief, Zarqawi...
and his associates tried to delegitimize Iraqis’ strong tribal loyalties, as they thought loyalty to one’s tribe conflicted with submission to religious authority.\(^{11}\)

Zarqawi and AQI felt they had license to condemn and execute anyone they found disloyal to Islam, whether this disloyalty came from participation in the new political process, contact with U.S. forces, or allowing tribal bonds to outstrip one’s dedication to jihad. This extremism conflicted with traditional Iraqi interpretations of Islam, including even the understanding of many Iraqi Islamists, who did not view political participation or tribal loyalties as contrary to religious principles.\(^{12}\) These Iraqi Islamists were keenly aware of local sensitivities and did not attack the defining characteristic of many Sunni Arabs’ identity—their tribe. Tribal loyalties had only grown stronger since the onset of the Iraq War as tribal affiliations became a key social safety net against the anarchic backdrop.

In addition to its position on tribal affiliations, AQI also alienated the local population through its brutality and totalitarian religious governance. In Anbar, where AQI was particularly strong, attacks on civilians increased by 57 percent between February and August 2006.\(^{13}\) A retrospective on the improvements that the Sahwa would later bring to Anbar published in Military Review described AQI as carrying out a “heavy-handed, indiscriminate murder and intimidation campaign” in Ramadi during this period, which alienated the Sunni tribes.\(^{14}\) In the U.S. Marine Corps official history of the Anbari Sahwa, the head of an Iraqi women’s nongovernmental organization recalled AQI committing “the ugliest torture” to intimidate the population. If that did not work, AQI would slaughter people, sometimes decapitating them.\(^{15}\)

AQI further alienated local Sunnis through its costly approach to the 2005 elections. In the run-up to the January 2005 provisional elections, some Sunnis in the insurgency wanted to participate. But Zarqawi’s intimidation campaign, as well as regional pressure from insurgency sponsors, caused Sunni participation in the January 2005 elections to be very low. As the new provisional government formed in May 2005, Sunni insurgent leaders realized that boycotting had been a mistake. The new government was formed by an overwhelming majority of pro-Iranian Shia and Kurdish parties, and it gained an internationally recognized mandate to draft a constitution and form the new Iraqi security forces (ISF).

Zarqawi, flush with money and recruits, moved to consolidate his leadership. He waged an assassination and intimidation campaign against Sunni politicians, tribal leaders, clerics who refused to espouse his extremism, and...
anyone who joined the ISF or had ties to the new Iraqi government. Though Zarqawi had a strong hand at the time, he overplayed it. Vigilante groups that received no U.S. support began waging shadow wars against AQI largely to extract revenge for the jihadist group’s widespread assassinations but also to regain control of the insurgency. These anti-AQI Anbari vigilantes, prior to the creation of the Sahwa, were known as Tribal Revolutionaries.

Tribal rivalries were intertwined with these vigilante efforts. These rivalries were multidimensional, existing at the family, subtribal, and larger tribal levels. Different groups were connected to various tribal patrons, who held clashing positions on the insurgency, the Americans, and Zarqawi. Vigilantes fighting Zarqawi and AQI received assistance from Sunni Islamist politicians who denounced the U.S. occupation but were nonetheless targeted by AQI. Senior tribal leaders who began to fight AQI through these early vigilante efforts included the Abu Mahal in al-Qaim; Abu Nimr in Hit (whom IS would later viciously target); Abu Jugayfa in Haditha; Abu Risha, Abu Thyab, Abu Assaf, Abu Alwan, and Abu Fahad in Ramadi; and the Abu Essa and al-Janabis in Fallujah. Many of these tribal leaders constituted the backbone of the Sahwa al-Anbar that was announced in September 2006.

The Surge-Era Sahwa and Its Aftermath

The tribal revolt in Anbar against AQI that began in 2004, was named Sahwa in 2006, and then was adopted and adapted by U.S. troops in 2007–2008 during the troop surge, has been misunderstood by many Western observers. When the Sahwa was announced in September 2006, the U.S. brigade in charge of operations in Ramadi decided to recognize the legitimacy of the uprising. U.S. companies and battalions in Anbar had supported similar tribal uprisings but were limited in the kind of support they could provide. Sunnis in the area lacked a functioning city council and local police officers, and they faced Iraqi army soldiers who were mainly Shias in a majority Sunni city. Thus, the Sahwa had relatively limited demands, only asking the U.S. brigade to recruit tribesmen into the security forces locally, to allow them to secure their own neighborhoods, and to help the tribal uprising have more political representation in the municipal and provincial councils. The U.S. brigade did not use U.S. funds to pay Anbari tribal fighters’ salaries, but it did work within the rules of Iraq’s ministry of the interior to recruit tribal fighters into the police force. The new recruits’ weapons, training, and salaries were all paid for by Iraq’s Ministry of Interior. In return, the U.S. brigade used its authorized reconstruction funds to finance reconstruction projects in areas from which the local police dislodged AQI.

The Ramadi experiment, in which the United States supported a grassroots uprising against AQI, was an immediate success. Tribal and local government leaders from Sunni areas made their way to Ramadi, asking the Sahwa leadership to help them convince U.S. troops in their own areas to allow them to build police stations and be in charge of their own operations against AQI. It was not until the summer of 2007 that the United States began paying the salaries of tribal fighters claiming to be Sahwa in areas where the interior ministry did not want to hire Sunni tribal fighters (including in areas where Shias made up the majority of security officers, such as in Baghdad and Salahideen).

It is important to distinguish between the Sahwa centered in Ramadi and the Sahwat (also known as the Sons of Iraq program) largely outside of Anbar.16 The Sahwa based in Ramadi, Hit, al-Qaim, Haditha, and the Ramadi–Fallujah corridor were integrated into Iraq’s security institutions from the beginning. There was not much pushback from Baghdad about allowing these local Sunnis to constitute the majority of the ISF in their areas because homogeneous Anbar did not have the same kind of sectarian problems as the mixed areas of Baghdad, Salahideen, Diyala, and Babel.

The Sahwa’s turning of tribes to cooperation with coalition forces made a significant difference on the ground. At its height, more than one hundred thousand predominantly Sunni Iraqis took part in this program. Then Army Gen. David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker presented information about the changes on the ground to Congress in two separate sets of testimony, in September 2007 and April 2008. By the initial testimony in September 2007, the Awakening movement had already helped to significantly improve Anbar, transforming it from the days in which al-Qaida was the dominant actor. Gen. Petraeus said that Anbar had become “a model of what happens when local leaders and citizens decide to oppose al-Qaida and reject its Taliban-like ideology.”17

Despite this success, as the United States drew down its forces in Iraq at the end of 2011 and U.S. leverage over Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s government diminished,
the situation for Sons of Iraq members deteriorated quickly. Though the U.S. government and Sunni politicians tried to promote the Sahwa’s integration into the ministries of interior and defense, starting in 2010 the Baghdad government began taking steps to weaken Sahwa forces. Baghdad stripped fighters of their military ranks, reduced pay, seized weapons, and arrested fighters on the suspicion of supporting terrorist groups. The government also dragged its feet on providing government jobs to Awakening forces. In turn, hundreds of Sons of Iraq members defected to the Sunni insurgents, who adopted a carrot-and-stick recruitment approach: they targeted Awakening members for death but, at the same time, promised larger salaries than the Iraqi government paid if these fighters instead switched sides.18

Those who refused to rejoin the insurgency found themselves increasingly vulnerable to attack by AQI operatives. For example, from July through September 2013, AQI militants killed fifty-four Sahwa members.19 The most notable attack during that stretch came in August when al-Qaida gunmen assassinated Sheikh Hazem Hajem al-Jawali, who had played a critical role in establishing Sahwa in the Kirkuk area in 2008. Shortly before al-Jawali’s assassination, he received a phone call from a man claiming to be an AQI leader, who threatened him if he refused to resign from Sahwa. But al-Jawali refused to be intimidated. On 19 August, his car was cut off by gunmen while he was driving to a souq (open-air market) in al-Rashad. His final act was trying to use his body to shield his three-year-old niece from the hail of bullets, but both were killed.

When U.S. troops withdrew from Iraq in December 2011, the Shia-led government headed by Nouri al-Maliki almost immediately issued an arrest warrant for the bodyguards of then minister of finance Rafi al-Essawi. Like Hashimi, Essawi was a former leader in the Iraqi Islamic Party and a known supporter of the early vigilante groups that had fought AQI in Anbar. With Hashimi in exile, and new efforts made to target al-Essawi, Sunnis in Anbar mounted peaceful protests. They demanded the release of prisoners from the many raids conducted in Anbar by counterterrorism forces controlled by Maliki, and demanded the repeal of the de-Baathification law that Sunnis believed was only enforced against them.

Many tribal leaders who were the symbols of the Sahwa supported these protests, which started in Fallujah and spread throughout Anbar. These leaders included Ahmed Abu Risha, Ali Hatem al-Suleiman, Mohammed Mahmood Latif al-Fahadawi, and others. Tribal leaders funded daily meals for protestors. Speakers would give sermons at the protest sites, encouraging protesters to denounce the use of violence while demanding that their rights be granted. Maliki’s Shia-led government accused protest organizers of inciting sectarianism, violence, and sympathy for al-Qaida, and it pressured the Anbari government to end the protests.

As part of his party’s campaign in Iraq’s provincial elections in April 2013, Maliki continued to denounce the peaceful protests as a Baathist and AQI scheme to destabilize his government in Baghdad. Five Iraqi soldiers had been killed in Fallujah in January 2013, and Maliki blamed the protesters for targeting the ISF. He promised to take on the protestors. The central government then postponed provincial elections in Anbar and Nineveh, claiming the security situation did not permit them. This further enraged the Sunni protesters.

After the postponed Anbari provincial election was held in June 2013, a new provincial government was formed—led by supporters and organizers of the Anbar protests. The new provincial leaders, led by Governor Ahmed al-Thyabi (whose tribe was active in the vigilante efforts against al-Qaida in 2005) said it was time for the protesters to take their demands to Baghdad. Protest organizers became aware that AQI supporters had by now infiltrated protest sites. While the protests remained peaceful, the rhetoric at the protests had shifted in a more militant direction, and there were increasing calls for Sunnis to defend themselves from raids and arrests by forming the Free Iraqi Army and tribal protection forces.

Many Sunni organizers disliked AQI’s presence in the protests but chose not to confront AQI. They knew they would not be protected in any confrontation with AQI.20 Some organizers, mainly those associated with Ahmed Abu Risha, called on protesters to give the political process
a chance as well as to support the ISF’s efforts to remove AQI from the protests. Other leaders, especially those who resented Sheikh Ahmed’s ascent to power in 2006–07, distanced themselves from his proposal and called on the protesters to continue. Ali Hatem al-Suleiman, whose great-grandfather aligned with British forces during the British occupation of Iraq, was a vocal opponent of Sheikh Ahmed. Ali Hatem claimed to head the Tribal Military Council, which was composed of Tribal Revolutionaries.

Tensions between the two camps erupted in December 2013 after Anbari MP (Member of Parliament) Ahmad Alwani was arrested at his home in Ramadi, during which his bodyguards clashed with Maliki’s counterterrorism forces. Clerics supporting the protest movement called on Sunnis to defend themselves, and the remaining protesters came to openly support armed confrontation with the Iraqi security forces. Now Anbar was immersed in an intertribal and intratribal fight, with multiple power centers involved.

The various conflicts brought to the fore by the Anbari protest camps would again manifest in January 2014, when AQI made a lightning advance to capture Fallujah just as the ISF cleared out the protest camps.21 This timing was not coincidental: not only did AQI understand that the ISF would be preoccupied with emptying the protest camps, and thus would have greater difficulty stopping its advance, but this military move symbolically positioned AQI as the defender of Iraqi Sunnis. And the protest camp-related conflicts emerged again with IS’s June 2014 advance from Syria into Iraq.

The Sunni Tribes in IS’s June 2014 Offensive

Some of the tribes that had opposed the ISF during the conflict over the protest camps participated in IS’s broad-based offensive into Iraq in June 2014, which culminated in IS’s capture of Mosul. Those who aligned with IS included members of the Tribal Revolutionaries coalition, which publicly acknowledged in July 2014 that there had been “coordination” between these tribes and IS.22 Most tribes were internally divided, with some members aligned with IS while others remained neutral or allied with the Iraqi government.23 The Islamic State sought to accentuate and capitalize on intratribal generational conflicts by promising
the tribes’ “younger generations that they will replace the older generation” in territories under IS control, according to United Arab Emirates-based analyst Hassan Hassan.24 The Iraqi government pointed to intratribal divisions as a reason that it withheld military aid to Sunni tribes fighting IS, claiming there was a risk that weapons delivered to them would end up in IS’s hands.25

Though the tribes that joined IS’s offensive often disagreed with IS’s extreme interpretation of Islam, many felt alienated by the Maliki regime and saw IS as a bulwark against the Baghdad government’s sectarian agenda.26 Zaydan al-Jibouri, an Anbari tribal leader, explained the decision by some of his tribesman to join IS: “The Sunni community has two options. Fight against IS and allow Iran and its militias to rule us, or do the opposite. We chose IS for only one reason. IS only kills you. The Iraqi government kills you and rapes your women.”27

IS’s relationship with the tribes was always delicate and susceptible to disruption. Even in the early days of IS’s push into Iraq, some tribal leaders publicly stated that their alliance with IS was temporary and could be reversed if changes occurred in Baghdad. For instance, Ali Hatem al-Suleiman claimed, “When we get rid of the government, we will be in charge of the security file in the regions, and then our objective will be to expel terrorism—the terrorism of the government and that of IS.”28

Given this early tribal unease with IS, the jihadist group’s brutal tactics and heavy-handed governance approach created further rifts with its erstwhile Sunni tribal allies. The Islamic State’s decision to declare a caliphate and demand that all Sunnis swear allegiance to the caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, was deeply divisive, and a number of tribal sheikhs refused to pledge allegiance to Baghdadi.

Despite this, IS gained a stronger foothold in Anbar after the fall of Mosul in June 2014 through a powerful offensive that resulted, among other things, in the group’s slaughter of the Albu Nimr. Almost immediately upon gaining ground in Anbar, IS targeted the original Sawha families that had helped fill the ranks of the local Iraqi police during the surge era. This meant that in al-Qaim, the Abu Mahal were targeted; in Hit, the Albu Nimr; in Haditha, the Abu Jugayfa; and in Ramadi, the Abu Risha, Thyabi, and Fahadawi.

**Conclusion**

The Iraq War shaped the way both IS and al-Qaida understand the role of local populations, and the two organizations learned diametrically opposed lessons from the war. Al-Qaida came to believe that AQI’s brutality had alienated local populations and fomented resistance, thus contributing to the organization’s downfall. As a result, al-Qaida instructed its affiliates to be less intrusive
and more patient when dealing with local populations. For instance, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb emir Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud reprimanded jihadists for their iron-fisted governance approach in Mali in 2012, telling them that “our previous experience proved that applying sharia [Islamic law] this way, without taking the environment into consideration, will lead to people rejecting the religion and engender hatred toward the mujahedeen.”

In contrast, the conclusion IS drew from AQI’s defeat is seemingly that AQI had collapsed because it failed to sufficiently stamp out opposition. Rather than viewing the population as a potential ally, IS generally perceives tribes as a potential threat to its supremacy, as well as religiously suspect.

Despite IS’s excesses, Sunnis feel marginalized and targeted by the Iraqi government. They are not equally represented, and the Sunni establishment lacks any consensus that the current political process is a viable means of defending their rights. Further, the Iraqi government has taken pains to avoid arming the tribes. If Iraq armed those vested in the political process, and allowed them to take on IS with ISF support, they would surely win. Instead, the Iraqi government has decided to rely on Shia tribesmen and militias to support the ISF.

But it is becoming increasingly clear that the Iraqi government will have to work with local tribes in Sunni-majority provinces such as Anbar if the ISF is to have any hope of driving IS out. Sending Shia fighters into Anbar risks galvanizing the tribes to bandwagon with IS to prevent what many Sunnis would view as a Shia invasion. Thus, Baghdad’s strategy must include winning the trust of disillusioned Sunni tribes.

In the long term, the best solution to the threat posed by IS is to establish a national army that is perceived by both Shias and Sunnis as nonsectarian. But such a force is unlikely to emerge in the near future, meaning that a shorter-term fix is necessary. The United States should pressure the Iraqi government to provide arms, ammunition, and other material support to individual tribes, like the Albu Nimr and al-Jabouri, who are fighting IS. The Iraqi government could do this by sending arms and supplies directly to the local Iraqi police.

And if the situation looks particularly dire for the Sunni tribes, and the Iraqi government proves unwilling to assist them—as may currently be the case in Ramadi—the United States should be willing directly to provide such support as arms, medical supplies, equipment, and money to the Sunni tribal leadership, bypassing the government of Iraq. In a world where the military landscape is increasingly dominated by nonstate actors, the United States should be willing to ally directly with nonstate actors who have mutual interests. Doing so effectively involves—unlike what occurred in the aftermath of the surge-era Sahwa—maintaining relationships with these nonstate allies rather than garnering a reputation for helping allies when the situation requires—and then abandoning them once short-term U.S. interests are satisfied.

One Awakening leader noted that Sunni tribes tend to back the group whom they believe to be the “strong horse.” The United States needs to demonstrate that the anti-IS coalition is the “strong horse” in this fight. And when IS has been weakened, the United States should make sure that its tribal allies do not view the United States as abandoning them for a second time.

The authors would like to thank Nathaniel Barr for his research assistance.

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Sterling Jensen is an assistant professor at the United Arab Emirates’ National Defense College in Abu Dhabi. From 2006-08, Jensen served in Iraq’s Anbar Province, first as a contract linguist for the U.S. Army, then as a civilian foreign area officer for the U.S. Marines. He has published articles on, and is cited in the major literature about, the Anbar Awakening. Jensen holds a PhD in Middle East and Mediterranean studies from King’s College London, having written his dissertation on Iraqi narratives of the Anbar Awakening.
1. Albu is used to denote a large tribal configuration, but Abu also may be employed as an article for a tribal name. Thus, some sources refer to the Nimr tribe as the Abu Nimr, others as the Albu Nimr.


4. “Islamic State: Militants Kill 50 from Iraqi Anbar Tribe,” BBC [British Broadcasting Corporation], 1 November 2014 (reporting executions in Ras al-Maa); “ISIS Kills 85 More Members of Iraqi Tribe,” Reuters, 1 November 2014 (describing bodies found in Hit).

5. See “Islamic State ‘Kills 322’ from Single Sunni Tribe,” BBC, 2 November 2014 (describing IS’s public execution of fifty tribesmen); “IS Militants Execute 67 Tribesmen in Western Iraq,” Xinhua, 2 November 2014 (describing IS’s killing of sixty-seven tribe members as they fled).


9. AQI would go through several name changes before finally settling on the IS appellation after it announced that it had reestablished the caliphate. See Aaron Y. Zelin, The War between ISIS and al-Qa‘ida for Supremacy of the Global Jihadist Movement (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2014), table 1 (detailing IS’s various name changes). This article refers to the group as AQI up until its expulsion from al-Qa‘ida in February 2014, and calls it IS thereafter.

10. Gary W. Montgomery and Timothy S. McWilliams, Al-Anbar Awakening vol. 2: Tanthim Perspectives (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2009), 46,188.


15. Montgomery and McWilliams, 20.


26. Abdullah. As Sheikh Raad Abdul Sattar Suleiman, a senior member of the Dulaim tribe, said in an interview in which he endorsed IS, “Iraqis are prepared to accept help from any party in order to defeat the gang that is ruling Iraq. We are Iraqis. We can change Maliki and his rule, and we will change the whole political process in Iraq”; Frederic Wehrey and Ala’ Alrababa’h, “An Elusive Courtship: The Struggle for Iraq’s Sunni Arab Tribes,” Syria Deeply (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), 7 November 2014.


A Response to George Michael’s “Is a Greater Russia Really So Bad?”
(Military Review, January-February 2015)

Dear Sir or Ma’am,

After carefully reading this essay, I suspect the author is either misinformed or he is wishfully thinking. The title is a hook to make you read it and start a debate.

The author is trying to empathize with Mr. Putin’s motives for invading other countries. Paraphrasing Mr. Michael’s conclusion, Russia is acting this way out of self-preservation. The fallacy of this argument is simple. It was made by others in history, and it never stood the test of time. Russia is too big to be successfully invaded. It has enough natural resources, and there are no external existential threats to the Russian state.

“The bitterness Russia harbors toward the United States” is the result of a Russian toxic propaganda, through TV, newspapers, social media, or online forums. It is not something that an American administration triggered. It is solely the result of an orchestrated “Mother Russia” versus the “morally corrupt West” mentality that the current Russian leaders have.

It is true that Russia and United States have many common interests. But those are being pushed aside by the blunt force and sheer aggressiveness of Russian behavior. There are more threats involving nuclear power from Russia than threats from North Korea every week. And the author is suggesting to turn the other cheek? We are already in another cold war, like it or not. A new arms race will benefit neither, but the United States can sustain one, while Russia cannot.

The time of trying to give pieces of independent countries to Russia to keep the Bear fed and content has passed. The only way to deal with this is through an intelligent containment policy, maintaining a healthy technological advantage, and (why not) reviving Reagan Star Wars.

Thank you.

Maj. Marius Tecoanta
Oregon National Guard

“Is a Greater Russia Really So Bad?,” George Michael, PhD

The author contends that the United States and Russia share similar threats to their long-term security and their national identities. Therefore, it would be in the best interests of both countries to resist a resumption of the Cold War, to reconcile differences, and to make a greater effort to understand their respective points of view and interests.

The original article can be found in our January-February 2015 issue on page 99 by clicking on the link for the electronic version or by clicking on the article cover for the Joomag version.


I was pleased to see the excellent article on the Anbar Awakening in the March-April issue of Military Review. It did a wonderful job recapping the discussion on how the Awakening unfolded.

Unfortunately, the discussion of the unique conditions which led to the Awakening was left for serious students of the movement who survey literature on the subject. I find such literature hard to find. Thus, I piece together the few bits of information I have received to try to construct a scenario which begs for a serious critique.

The crux of what I have gathered from one Army officer I know who served in 2006 is that Anbar leaders were motivated by the need for income after funds distributed by the American forces for civil affairs-type programs were put under much tighter control. I can believe this could have been the cause since many articles in Military Review have explained conflict in Iraq as arising from economic conditions.

I have a hard time believing Anbar leaders started working with American troops because they were repulsed by the brutality of extremist factions in Iraq, since they seemed to embrace these factions so widely once again in 2014. However, just as former Ba’athist party loyalists reacted violently when their pensions were cut off by the American occupation forces in 2003, they again reacted violently in 2014 after being economically marginalized by their own government.

I also look at who the leaders of the American forces in Iraq were from 2004 until 2006, the year the Anbar Awakening started. Gen. Casey was the senior commander of forces in Iraq for most of this period. I never heard him described as having a strong focus on economic matters in Iraq.

In contrast, Gen. Chiarelli, as the commander over forces in Sadr City in 2004, had a strong focus on economic issues, going so far as to cause a massive reallocation of money for contracted projects in his area of control. He credits these economic measures as critical for his success in suppressing the uprising in Sadr City that greeted him when he arrived with his forces in 2004.

In 2006, Gen. Chiarelli arrived in Iraq to once again be faced with a massive uprising after the bombing of the Golden Mosque. While forces under his command did plenty of fighting, Chiarelli put a great emphasis on expanding employment opportunities for the Iraqis. When the discussion of surge troops came up in late 2006, Chiarelli responded, “I don’t need more troops, I need more jobs.” Of course, jobs are what was created in reaction to the Anbar Awakening as former enemies were put on the payroll.

Once again, this is all conjecture. It would be nice for Military Review to publish a piece describing how much of economic impetus there was for the Anbar Awakening.

Thanks.

John Stettler, Dallas, Texas

“The Anbar Awakening in Context … and Why It Is so Hard to Replicate,” Matthew T. Penney, PhD

The author proposes the Anbar Awakening be used as a template for developing counterinsurgency programs elsewhere as long as the differences in culture and situational context in such efforts are accounted for. The author provides an analysis of the Awakening and explains how its lessons can be applied in the future.

The original article can be found in our March-April 2015 issue on page 106, by clicking on the link for the electronic version, or by clicking on the article cover for the Joomag version.

INSIDE THE BATAAN DEATH MARCH: Defeat, Travail and Memory
Kevin C. Murphy, McFarland & Company, Jefferson, North Carolina, 2014, 328 pages

The surrender of the combined U.S. and Philippine forces following the Battle of Bataan in the Philippines in April 1942 represents the greatest defeat of a U.S. Army. The Bataan Death March, the forcible transfer of sixty to eighty thousand Allied prisoners by the Imperial Japanese army over a distance of more than sixty miles from Bataan to Camp O’Donnell, is viewed by some as the greatest war crime ever perpetuated against American combatants in war. The Bataan Death March marked only the beginning of the great sorrow and travail experienced by thousands of American service members in captivity, aboard hell ships, and in Japanese forced-labor camps. Kevin Murphy, the chair of the Department of Humanities at the University of the Sciences in Philadelphia, provides one of the more comprehensive looks at the Bataan Death March in decades.

Previous research focused primarily on survivor accounts of alleged Japanese barbarity and war crimes against Allied prisoners of war — both during the march and during the prisoners’ subsequent incarceration in the Philippines, China, and Japan. Murphy breaks that mold in his consideration of three aspects of the march. He contends that poor leadership by Gen. MacArthur, in addition to climate and language issues within the Filipino forces, exacerbated the dire situation. Murphy’s experience as an English teacher in Japan provides the author with an insight of Japanese history and the culture that contributed to the Japanese mindset pertaining to military personnel and civilians vanquished in war.

Less compelling is the author’s attempt to marginalize the Japanese brutality against Allied prisoners of war — and the local Filipino populace — by discrediting the eyewitness accounts of survivors and the local populace. While other factors contributed to the suffering by those forced to endure the Bataan Death March, Murphy ignores the fact that almost 40 percent of Allied prisoners died in Japanese confinement. Conspicuously absent are eyewitness accounts from the Japanese soldiers who participated in the Death March. The only Japanese accounts consist of the trial testimony of Japanese army officers at Gen. Homma’s war crimes trial in 1945.

Murphy persuasively tells the story of the Bataan Death March—and those who endured it. Inside the Bataan Death March may be the most comprehensive study of the Bataan Death March in decades. I would highly recommend this book to those interested in the Pacific theater of war or the Imperial Japanese army.

Jesse McIntyre III, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

LINCOLN’S CODE: The Laws of War in American History
John Fabian Witt, Free Press, New York, 2013, 512 pages

While visiting the former Confederate Richmond following its seizure by Union forces, President Lincoln counseled operational commander Gen. Godfrey Weitzel, saying, “If I were you, I’d let ’em up easy.” Along with political intuition and foresight for life after
war, Lincoln articulated an ethic about the use of force—he focused on the ends. Ethical norms later took shape in the Hague and Geneva conventions. For anyone invoking these conventions, or the laws of war, *Lincoln's Code* is highly recommended.

John Fabian Witt, Yale historian and law professor, presents an account of U.S. moral and legal perspectives during the Civil War. The heroes, in Witt's account, are Lincoln and Francis Lieber—one, a great president; the other, a barely known, itinerate academic. Lieber, after being requested by Secretary of War Stanton, and Stanton's general-in-chief Henry Halleck, produced a code of 157 articles linking conduct with the aims of war.

Lieber's Code is "a working document for the soldier and layman, not a treatise for the lawyer or statesman." Issued by Lincoln as General Order 100 before the spring 1863 fighting season, it was not moral philosophy in a vacuum. These were lessons learned during conflict: "Laws of war typically come in the dismayed aftershock of conflict, not in the impassioned heat of battle."

General Order 100 established four red lines: prohibiting assassination, the use of poison, torture, and perfidy in violation of truce or treaty. It sharply distinguished combatants and noncombatants. Lieber passionately contended the aims, the ends, and the purpose of war form the final measure of ethical conduct. He constrained war, emphasizing proportionality, and outlawing "destruction greater than necessary." While specifying red lines, Lieber prioritized ends: seeking justice, preserving, and protecting the nation.

From December 1862 through early 1863, Lincoln used Lieber's Code to shift military thought and practice, which was inherited from Swiss diplomat Emmerich de Vattel. Vattel's *The Law of Nations* long guided ethics and law in military practice—including the teaching of ethics at West Point and Annapolis. Vattel's Enlightenment framework emphasized proper conduct. Lieber subordinated conduct to the goal, or purpose, of war. Thus, swift and extensive destruction was acceptable only if necessary to advance a legitimate war aim. Lieber adapted Clausewitz's definition of war: a fight "to compel him [an enemy] to peace at my will." For Lincoln, such a peace was an intact nation without slavery. To rebuild a nation after civil war, Lincoln counseled, "Let 'em up easy."

Witt shows how law and ethics shape practice in war. The law of war was central in debates about U.S. policies and practices toward al-Qaida and affiliates under Presidents Bush and Obama. Critics argue the United States violated the law of war, or improperly cited it, as support for policies. Witt's account of Lincoln and Lieber presents dynamics of squaring national practice with application of international law. By deepening our conversation with voices from the past, Witt helps us consider the ethical aims of war and move beyond a "checklist" mindset that blunts moral thinking about using force.

**Col. Franklin E. Wester, U.S. Army, Retired, Arlington, Virginia**

HELL'S ANGELS: The True Story of the 303rd Bomb Group in World War II

Jay A. Stout, Berkley Publishing Group, New York, 2015, 464 pages

For a reading public used to hearing a decade's worth of stories about MRAPs (mine-resistant ambush protected vehicles), convoy duty, and desert supply routes, a story about B-17 bomber runs over Nazi Germany might at first seem rather out of date; and yet, Jay Stout draws out a timeless story from the air war over Europe. It is one that highlights the universal themes of modern warfare: young men traveling immense distances in heavily armored machines, the loneliness of desert spaces, the suddenness of death, and the loss of one's closest companions.

Stout, an experienced combat pilot and accomplished author, delves into the history of the 303rd Bombardment Group (Heavy), one of the most storied units among the Allied bomber commands during the Allied air offensive. He uses a balanced mixture of first-person accounts and official military records, providing an account that has a satisfying breadth and depth to it. The story begins with the challenges the United States faced in putting together an air force—when only working with the rawest of recruits and a minimum of equipment. Overcoming delays and politics, the unit grew into its own and eventually made its way to Molesworth in England to begin the U.S. air campaign.
At that point, the narrative takes on its most fascinating dimensions. Stout weaves together the recollections of scores of pilots, enlisted men, and support crews into a multifaceted recounting of the daily life on the base and in the air. This color provides a counterpoint to the serious events that drive the narrative, the recounting of the 303rd’s missions over France and Germany. Stout captures the clichéd truth about the hours of monotony—and the moments of terror—that composed the bombing runs and the return home. He does not romanticize the hardships—shrapnel wounds, vomit, cowardice, and exploding fireballs occur in equal measure with dogged determination and quick-thinking heroics. As the reader follows these young crews along missions, through their disappointments and triumphs, a sort of kinship develops as the reader pulls for the men to make it back across the English Channel one more time. All too often, however, the wrenching realities of death in the sky jar the reader into the realization that air combat was a very personal and deeply tragic assignment. Though seventy years have passed, the reader can still feel some hint of the emotional devastation that was all too often part of the wartime experience.

Stout’s work is a significant accomplishment in that the author manages to tell the story of an entire bomber group in a way that is both comprehensive and intimate. Operations, tactics, arms, equipment, and personnel are all covered in detail, yet without obscuring the larger story. This work will introduce the 303rd’s story to a new generation, telling afresh the sacrifices and duties that thousands of young men faced and, perhaps most importantly, reminding us that wars, even in just causes, can require a high cost.

Jonathan E. Newell, Hill, New Hampshire

BAND OF GIANTS: The Amateur Soldiers Who Won America’s Independence

The book The Band of Giants is an enjoyable, concise coverage of the American War for Independence. At 288 pages, it may seem too concise, but that is not the case. Through Kelly’s coverage, a novice on the American War for Independence becomes well educated. Those knowledgeable on the topic are well reminded of how in doubt the outcome of the war actually was—and the extraordinary personalities that eventually achieved an American victory.

The book covers two main themes rather well. First, it depicts major actions with just enough detail to convey the main idea of how they were joined and why the outcomes evolved as they did. Here, the reader needs a warning: although the main title, Band of Giants, hints of glowing accounts of American successes, the book’s content is at odds with the title. Kelly explains the battles well while making it clear that all ranks of the American forces were, for the most part, pure novices in the art of war.

That leads to the author’s second theme; he shows Americans as something of a bumbling lot. Kelly does not ridicule the Americans but highlights their overall dearth of military experience. For instance, he begins with a rather ghastly account of how George Washington clumsily starts the French and Indian War. He also discusses how Gen. Henry Knox learned about artillery from books in his Boston bookstore; Nathaniel Greene hailed from a Quaker family that ran a foundry; and sharpshooting Daniel Morgan was, in reality, a simple backwoods wagoner. The personal anecdotes and excerpts of letters to family and fellow officers illuminate the very human side of these men—so much so that readers will squirm a little.

Kelly also repeatedly shows British strategists dealing significant blows to the Americans. More squirming will ensue; there are many significant blows. And yet, it is American critical and creative thinking that happily carry the day in some cases. The classic example is Washington’s bold gamble at Trenton. The episode, probably familiar to most readers to some degree, is still a delight to read.

The book is indeed a broad sweep. Details of some major engagements, and the people involved, are condensed or abridged, if not altogether eliminated. For example, Gen. Lee is present during the Battle of Charleston, but little is provided as to what he does there. This writing style results in the book being kept short, interesting, and punchy. The level of detail of both the people and the battles is just about right.

Regarding the title, the word “band” may seem as a play on the recent Band of Brothers series. Toss
that notion. The title’s origin is not apparent until the entrance of the Marquis de Lafayette. This very informative coverage highlights how the critical French support factored in this America-versus-Britain drama. Without divulging too much, it is enough to point out this is where the author derives, aptly, the book’s title.

The “Giants” were in some cases inept and befuddled, but, overall, they were determined.


KRAV MAGA: Real World Solutions to Real World Violence

In Krav Maga, Gershon Ben Keren, who has more than twenty years of martial arts experience, black belts in various forms of judo, and a psychology background, delivers a hard-punching book (pun intended), hoping to “improve [one’s] survival chances in violent situations.” Initially designed as a military self-defense system and used by the Israeli Defense Forces, Krav Maga, founded by Imi Lichtenfeld, has evolved into a full-fledged martial art and is an umbrella term for various fighting systems.

In his book, Ben Keren discusses Krav Maga Yashir, his technique, expanding on Lichtenfeld’s principles. Want to defend against a gun attack? How about against a knife attack from behind while at the ATM? Want to pinpoint someone monitoring your movements in a crowded mall? It’s all here—and more.

First, the author dispels notions that Krav Maga is a collection of moves used to thwart an attack. He’s adamant: “It’s a systematic approach to self-defense, not an encyclopedia of techniques.” While reading, I thought: “Would I be able to do execute these moves? Should I know this already?” Ben Keren attempts to alleviate the stress of unpreparedness; however, a feeling of unease still settled over me.

The book is clear and coherent, spanning three sections: basic skills, self-defense scenarios, and unarmed assaults and dynamic components of assaults. Each section delivers step-by-step, picture-perfect depictions of form and execution of various techniques, allowing the reader to build on the foundational techniques and then move to more complex scenarios, demonstrating and emphasizing Krav Maga’s reliance on natural responses to attacks and its concept of replication. Because the system capitalizes on the body’s natural reaction to stress and assault, it’s one a novice can implement—with practice. To be clear, Krav Maga’s not solely about violence; it discusses steps to avoid or defuse potential assaults. Frankly, one’s goal should be avoiding physical confrontation anyway.

Krav Maga, like any other self-defense system, requires dutiful practice. Read it; then revisit it as often as necessary when a refresher is warranted. By no means will you be an expert after reading this book. What you will be is knowledgeable of natural body movement self-defense techniques, more aware of your surroundings, and capable—if you remember to practice—of protecting yourself in a range of scenarios. From time to time, I put the book down to process what I learned. I would review a move and attempt to re-create it; that was helpful.

I recommend this book for combatant instructors, martial arts enthusiasts, and laypeople with an interest in learning self-defense techniques.


THE ORDEAL OF THE REUNION: A New History of Reconstruction

Stability operations will remain, albeit reluctantly, a central mission of the U.S. military for the foreseeable future, and officers should study the history of such operations as earnestly as they study conventional battles and campaigns. Soldiers can start with no better example than the Civil War and Reconstruction—and with no better book than Mark W. Summers’ The Ordeal of the
Reunion. The author does not intend for this New History of Reconstruction to replace other works, especially Eric Foner’s massive study of the period. However, by focusing primarily on the political aspects of reconstruction and placing them in the context of the events of the era, he outlines the key facts, frustrations, and failures of the “post-war” program for the modern officer.

Summers begins with wartime reconstruction and the evolving policies toward occupying and governing border and rebellious states. Lincoln ultimately adopted a policy to rapidly return states to civil authority by accepting government based on only a loyal 10 percent of the electorate. His critics rightly observed that this was too narrow of a portion of the electorate to be sustained without military support. This proved all too true by the end of 1865. President Johnson required only a grudging acceptance of the Thirteenth Amendment, and a largely insincere profession of loyalty thus enabled the former rebels to quickly use the courts and legislatures to suppress the freedmen and punish Unionists.

Slowly and reluctantly, the Republicans realized the Union victory would be lost if something more drastic were not done. Over the vetoes of the president, Congress passed a series of acts that renewed the military occupation of the South and set requirements for a return to full statehood. The GOP won the fight with Johnson over reconstruction policy and control of the army of occupation but, unfortunately, this did not produce a successful reconstruction of the South nor the acceptance of the civil rights of black Americans.

Summers describes how the spirit of white southern resistance never ended. Their acceptance of congressional requirements was never more than tactical or temporary. The southern Democrats were also quite willing to use intimidation and violence to obstruct and overthrow “reconstruction.” Reflecting Gary Gallagher’s argument in The Union War, the author reminds readers that for the Union generation that fought the war, it was not about ending slavery but was about restoring the Union. Thus, most northerners were more concerned with reconstructing the Union than with reconstructing the social and political landscape of the South—much less guaranteeing equal rights for the former slaves.

Because the nation sacrificed regional “peace” for racial justice, Summers takes the long view in judging the success of reconstruction. The Union was restored and slavery was ended, but it took nearly a century for the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to be enforced as intended. This American story should remind military officers that stability is often fragile, and it can be temporary, and reconstructing a society is a very long-term effort.

Finally, no history can tell the complete story, and Summers’ impressive overview has little room for personal stories of military officers during reconstruction. For the accounts of several largely unsung heroes, such as Adelbert Ames, Lewis Merrill, and even James Longstreet, I also recommend The Bloody Shirt: Terror after the Civil War by Stephen Budiansky.

Donald B. Connelly, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE GREAT WAR AND THE ORIGINS OF HUMANITARIANISM, 1918-1924

In this scholarly monograph, Bruno Cabanes, professor of history at The Ohio State University, argues that the aftermath of the First World War marked “a decisive turning point in the redefinition of humanitarianism” from a form of charity work to an assertion of humanitarian rights. Previously, European and American humanitarians worked to ease suffering and were driven by a Christian-based ethic of empathy. In this effort, the nation-state often played a critical role in delivering aid. But the devastating consequences of World War I—hundreds of thousands of refugees, many veterans suffering from severe psychological or physical distress, famines and epidemics, and the collapse of the German, Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman empires—were so severe that nation-states could no longer solve these problems themselves.

Humanitarians addressed these challenges by emphasizing transnational approaches to activism. Beyond practical considerations, Cabanes argues that the postwar assertion of humanitarian rights “became
a way of turning away from war” and “were an active part of the culture of the post-war transition period, with ... unique aspirations for a lasting peace and for justice.” By turning away from war, rights activists were rejecting the “nationalization of rights” in favor of creating “a shared humanist culture.”

This cultural redefinition of rights occurred at the League of Nations and the International Labour Office as well as among groups of humanitarian activists. Cabanes examines the actions of five humanitarians. Rene Cassin was a French legal scholar and disabled combat veteran who defended the rights of fellow war victims by working with veterans associations and the League of Nations. Albert Thomas ran the International Labour Office and promoted international standards of social welfare and workers’ rights—actions, which he saw as necessary to maintain the postwar peace. Fridtjof Nansen, high commissioner for refugees at the League of Nations, revolutionized the rights of stateless persons by creating a passport for refugees fleeing the turmoil of the Russian Revolution. Herbert Hoover, American businessman and future president, organized humanitarian relief for famine- and epidemic-stricken Belgium, Central Europe, and Russia. Finally, Eglantyne Jebb, British philanthropist, founded the Save the Children Fund to organize relief for starving German and Austrian children.

Although Cabanes identifies the rights politics of the 1920s as primarily concerned with protecting the rights of groups, he detects the seeds of a more radical interpretation of rights—the assertion of universal, individual human rights. In this sense, the “1920s mark a decisive step in the transition from one basic understanding of rights to the other.” Cabanes makes a compelling case that the post-World War I period contributed significantly to the later emergence of claims to individual, universal human rights. His work serves an important function by addressing the influence that wartime experiences had in shaping the assertion of international rights—be they humanitarian rights or human rights—during the twentieth century. It is a thoughtful, scholarly book that should be read by military historians, international lawyers, and rights activists.

Capt. Brian Drohan, U.S. Army, West Point, New York

THE AMERICAN WAY OF BOMBING: Changing Ethical and Legal Norms, from Flying Fortresses to Drones

The book The American Way of Bombing provides an analysis of the American aerial bombing philosophy since it was introduced as a means to wage war; it offers a discourse on the second- and third-order effects that have been created—specifically in the areas of legality, morality, and the establishment of norms. The author and his contributors completed extensive research and analysis on these topics.

The book is arranged in three parts. Part 1 examines the historical and theoretical perspectives of aerial bombing during World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and since 9/11; it goes into detail of how aerial bombing was used and what targets it was used against. The editors also lay out the appropriate international legal frameworks and address the various aspects of the laws that attempted to create acceptable norms for bombing during war.

In part 2, Evangelista and Shue attempt to interpret, and to look critically, at the existing laws governing the use of aerial bombing. They examine the impact of bombing on the civilian population and the geographic infrastructure, and they delve into how the extensive damage done by bombing has an order of magnitude effect on the population for years to come. The editors make numerous claims that the effects of aerial bombing often far outweigh the military necessity cited as the reason for the bombing’s authorization.

In part 3, the editors examine the constructing of new norms with respect to the use of aerial bombing, land mines, cluster munitions, and unmanned drones. Here again, each are measured against existing laws and scrutinized against their effects on populations versus the gains of military advantage. Much of the discussion focuses on the use of drones and their impact on the ever-evolving legal framework. It also includes a discussion on the development of norms for the use of future...
“automated” killing systems (i.e., no human-in-the-loop decision making).

The book is well written. The author provides abundant research notes, cites appropriate legal frameworks, and indicates where the United States stands with respect to each of them. The flow of the information is logical, and most chapters begin with an overview of the issue. It provides a well-documented discussion that uses credible research facts and then usually finishes with a concluding paragraph that elaborates on the friction points.

I highly recommend this book for military officers. It provides discussion of the appropriate legal and moral issues, and it makes the reader consider the second- and third-order effects created by some of our unique weapon systems and how those effects will likely impact our ability to employ such weapons in the future.

Lt. Col. George Hodge, U.S. Army, Retired, Lansing, Kansas

MY LIFE AS A FOREIGN COUNTRY: A Memoir

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have generated many personal memoirs and will continue to do so. Many of these memoirs have clearly captured the human dimension of the wars. Others have been crafted in ways that provide readers with distinctive perspectives of war. To date, I have not found any which combine both of these aspects as well as Brian Turner’s superb memoir, My Life as a Foreign Country.

The foundation for Turner’s memoir is his tour in Iraq from 2003 to 2004. During that period, Sgt. Turner served as an infantry team leader in the 2nd Infantry Division. From this foundation, he expands into various other aspects of his life and those of others. It is a view which readers will find unique in regard to other war memoirs they may have read.

The uniqueness of Turner’s volume lies in many areas. First, Turner is a highly acclaimed poet. He has received much praise for his previously published books of poetry focused on the impact of war. Because of his talents in crafting poetry, every word he utilizes seems to have meaning. Consequently, I found myself slowly digesting each paragraph and page. It is clearly one of the best written volumes I have read in many years.

Second, throughout his memoir, he interweaves the military experiences of his family. He relives the father’s experiences during the Cold War. He retells the stories of his uncle, who fought in Vietnam. He re-creates the actions of his grandfather during World War II. Readers readily discover the influence of Turner’s family in his life. For many, it will also reaffirm that war itself has changed little over the past decades.

Finally, he envisions the thoughts of those he encounters during war. He addresses the Iraqi civilians who try to live their lives through the chaos. Turner strives to understand the bomb makers and suicide bombers who attempt to kill or maim him and his fellow soldiers. He also tries to comprehend the enemies who fought against his relatives. In total, Turner’s decision to intersperse this analysis adds incredible value to the book.

The most powerful portion of the memoir is Turner’s reflections on life after Iraq. As with anyone who has fought in combat, it is an experience that forever changes one’s life. Turner shares how war has affected him and his life. He also reflects on how he copes with the mental aspects of the impact of war. Certainly, one of these ways is to express his emotions and feelings in written form.

Every war has those select memoirs that define that war. In the years to come, My Life as a Foreign Country will unquestionably be one of those select volumes. Brian Turner has crafted a volume that is superbly written, gripping, and clearly unique. It captures a soldier’s perspective of war and war’s inevitable impact on the rest of his life. This is a book that will impact every reader, and its words not soon forgotten.

Rick Baillergeon, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

ARMED STATE BUILDING: Confronting State Failure, 1898-2012

The author is a former White House National Security Council staffer and Deputy National Security Advisor staffer for Iraq and
Afghanistan. He asserts that no widely accepted scholarly theories exist to account for why some international state-building ventures succeed while others fail. He then sets out on a quest to establish a comprehensive theory in order to propose unified practical approaches to future state building. The result is a way of matching the right strategy to the right conflict condition in order to better ensure success.

Miller begins his quest by detailing the history of modern armed state building. Along the way, he challenges the effectiveness of theories, such as “sequencing,” noting that truly no single approach to state building fits all situations. At the heart of his investigation is identifying the relative effectiveness of state-building efforts of the past. In doing so, he analyzes some forty U.S. and international efforts over approximately the last one hundred years to determine their level of enduring success or failure. He also accounts for the relative effectiveness of international institutions in aiding in state building, thus acknowledging the liberalist approach to state building that has dominated the post-World War II period. Part of this process includes defining the traits of a functioning state and a failed state. He synthesizes traditional international-relations theory, characteristics of functional states, and types of state failures, in combination with strategies for state building, into a proposed theoretical model that he surmises will indicate the most suitable approach to state building based upon country-specific characteristics.

Miller applies a cross-section of post-World War II country cases, both successes and failures, to test his theory. The country cases range from West Germany, 1945-1955—a success; to Liberia, 1993-1997—a failure. His analysis is sound and persuasive in spite of the somewhat subjective quality of his defined model criteria and the brevity of his supporting country-case studies. It’s not that his definitions are necessarily wrong, they are just subject to much scholarly debate, which creates reliability concerns. His country case studies would have also benefited from greater substantive rigor, thus leaving less doubt over the validity of his case analysis outcomes.

Although the book reads like a doctoral dissertation, it is nonetheless well-crafted and articulated, with numerous insightfully presented supporting figures, tables, and diagrams. He does a good job deriving resources from across the existing body of literature in framing and supporting his thesis, bringing added credence to his work.

In recognizing the complex nature of the subject matter, the author does a commendable job in advancing the body of knowledge in a meaningful way. His efforts certainly enhance the ongoing debate on how to best address conflict and post-conflict state building. Of special note, in appendix A of the book, Miller does an exceptional job in summarizing all United Nations- and U.S.-led state building interventions since 1898. This appendix alone is of value to a wide array of readers.

As a complete body of work, this book is best read by conflict theory scholars, military and interagency professionals, international relations-affairs scholars and practitioners, development economists, and military historians.

Dr. David A. Anderson, Lt. Col., U.S. Marine Corps, Retired, and William E. Odom, both of Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

ALIEN RULE

The recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have prompted the growth of a vast subfield of scholarship on modern imperialism and intervention into the affairs of other states. Many scholars are heartily opposed to Bush-era instances of state building and use studies of earlier empires as critiques of current or recent U.S. policy. Michael Hechter’s Alien Rule stands out among this field by making the controversial suggestion that, although alien rule—the rule of one group by people not of that group—often is exploitative, alien rule can be beneficial to a subjected people.

Alien rulers can become legitimate and effective if they provide competent, fair, effective government. He finds several examples of successful alien rule throughout history, and even some contemporary examples, though the latter fall mostly in the category of academic receivership, some stepfamilies, and business mergers. His most useful sections
examine how an alien ruler gains legitimacy in the eyes of its subjects.

In the popular imagination, foreign rulers are invariably detested by a unified native population, but this is rarely the case in the real world. Hechter argues that the belief that native rule is always better is misguided. While alien rule is a particularly difficult type of governance, the author correctly points out that all political leaders face the same problems that aliens do. Every leader has to govern fairly, inspire trust, and encourage growth in order to maintain legitimacy and power without resorting to expensive forms of oppression. Alien rulers often replace failed or defeated native rulers and have the highest probability of success when they replace native rulers who are seen as incompetent or unfair.

For a professional military audience, Hechter’s chapter on military occupation is a must read. Military occupations usually cause resentment and resistance from local populations, and occupations themselves can vary greatly in brutality. Popular perceptions of military occupation emphasize brave resistance movements, but Hechter correctly points out that there are often as many collaborators as resisters. Collaborators can have a variety of motivations, ranging from personal gain to a sincere desire to improve governance within an occupied territory. Occupiers can increase the number of collaborators through fair and competent administration; but, for this to happen, occupying forces require significant incentives. Still, the author points to military occupations, such as the post-World War II occupations of Japan and Germany, as examples of occupiers successfully setting up friendly governments with real legitimacy among the occupied population.

While making a clear distinction between exploitative and beneficial alien rulers, Hechter argues that there are real benefits from alien rule. Some of his suggestions may seem outlandish; for example, in his conclusion, he suggests there may be a future for an international market for governance where bureaucrats and politicians can be hired from outside a country. However, considering the necessary multinational responses to failed states, environmental change, natural disasters, and economic collapse, countries may—at times—be justified in inviting foreigners in to govern.

John E. Fahey, Krakow, Poland

**MERCHANT MARINE SURVIVORS OF WORLD WAR II: Oral Histories of Cargo Carrying Under Fire**


If you want to read interesting, first-person stories of civilian seamen as they navigated the perils of World War II—this is the book for you. It is worth your time to briefly set down the Clausewitz and listen to what life was like for the merchant seaman directly from those men.

In a previous issue of *Military Review*, I wrote a review of John Bruning’s *Battle for the North Atlantic: The Strategic Naval Campaign that Won World War II in Europe*. My primary criticism of that book was its dedication to the sacrifices of merchant mariners without actually interviewing any of them to get a description of their struggles. Serendipitously, *Merchant Marine Survivors of World War II* forms the perfect reparation for that omission.

This book is a quick read that provides twenty transcriptions from taped interviews with World War II merchant mariners who recount their personal adventures. Each of the interviews are only a few pages long, and you can easily read one or two and set the book down to read again another time. The author himself is uniquely qualified to record and report on the stories—he is a merchant mariner himself. He graciously provides a photocopy of his own “Merchant Mariner’s Document,” or Z-Card, right inside the front cover. Reader beware; the stories are transcribed with minimal alteration—and the language is quintessential sailor talk—so don’t hand this book to the kids.

The transcriptions are gripping in their details of the perils faced by mariners. The stories include accounts of ship sinkings and their aftermaths, anecdotes that both fascinate and horrify. For example, in one story, men who spent days on a lifeboat in the cold North Atlantic had to have their feet amputated after being rescued. In another instance, a sailor recounts being adrift with a shipmate in a life raft and, after seeing a ship pass nearby without stopping, his companion gives up hope and quietly dies in the far corner of the raft. He reports that his companion died of a “broken heart,” but he maintained hope of rescue and was saved.
Some of the stories are more humorous—in the slightly dark humor of war. One man tells of his ship being chased across the sea by a U-boat. Disastrously, the ship’s steering failed and the rudder jammed, which caused the civilian merchant to accidentally come about to face the oncoming warship! The submarine captain, rather than finish them off quickly with a torpedo, immediately submerged after apparently being unnerved by a merchant bold enough to charge his ship. In another story, sailors stranded in Russia decide to only drink vodka that burned with a blue flame. Upon testing a sample in an ashtray, the resulting explosion shattered glass, and the mushroom cloud it created convinced them they had a bad batch—so they wisely decided not drink it.

All things considered, this book was an enjoyable read and deserves a look. These men took enormous risks and were vital to winning the war yet were denied veterans assistance during and after the war. One sailor described an encounter in Sicily when he entered a Red Cross aid station to obtain clean drinking water, since the city water was unsafe, and was shooed out by the attendant who said, “You can’t come in here; this is for our boys fighting this war!” It is perhaps an apt depiction of the merchant mariner’s battle for respect during and after the war.


FU-GO: The Curious History of Japan’s Balloon Bomb Attack on America
Ross Coen, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, Nebraska, 2014, 296 pages

Following Lt. Col. James Doolittle’s daring raid against select Japanese cities in April 1942, the Japanese Imperial army sought a means of revenge against the U.S. population. In 1944, the Japanese army developed a program codenamed "Fu-go," an abbreviated form of fusen bakuden (fire balloons), that manufactured bomb-carrying balloons. The project sent hundreds of the balloons aloft into the jet stream in late 1944 and early 1945. The Japanese built the balloons to travel across the Pacific Ocean to North America, where they hoped their bombs would start fires in the forests of the western United States and thereby divert American resources that might otherwise be directed against Japan. Moreover, the Imperial army sought a means to boost Japanese morale by demonstrating its ability to strike the U.S. mainland and causing widespread panic among the American populace.

Ross Coen’s monograph FU-GO: The Curious History of Japan’s Balloon Bomb Attack on America traces the development of this program as well as the American and Canadian responses to it. Coen argues that Fu-go “was a failed campaign to be sure.” The balloons caused little damage, claimed only six American lives, and, due in no small part to American and Canadian censorship, failed to incite any kind of panic among the populations of North America. Indeed, Coen notes that the U.S. Office of Scientific Research and Development concluded in early 1945 that the cost of mounting any kind of defense against the balloons would ultimately exceed the cost of any damage they inflicted.

Coen, a historian of the American West, weaves thorough research into a well-written narrative. His description of the technical details of the balloons’ construction and the apparatus that kept each one aloft is both fascinating and easily understood. Furthermore, the book’s appendices chart the locations where all known Fu-go balloons or material were found and provide the date and a description of each recovery. Coen also highlights some important regional differences in the way in which balloon sightings and recoveries were treated in the Western United States, Alaska, and Canada, respectively, ranging from tight censorship in the continental United States to widespread awareness of the events in Alaska.

Yet, Coen struggles to place the Fu-go program in a larger strategic context. He labels the balloons “the world’s first intercontinental ballistic missile” and contends that they were “qualitatively no different from the tons of napalm-filled incendiary bombs dropped by American B-29s over Tokyo and other cities across Japan.” However, Coen does not develop this characterization, leaving both the implications of the comparison and the overall significance of the Fu-go program unexplained. Regardless, the book is highly recommended for a general audience,
especially those with an interest in World War II, although it may not offer anything particularly useful for military professionals.

Derek R. Mallett, Fort Gordon, Georgia

**KAISER WILHELM II: A Concise Life**  

In August 1914, Europe went to war. This war was not like any previous war—it would completely destroy the old order and set the stage for an even greater conflict that would change the world forever. With the arrival of the one hundredth anniversary of World War I, many are looking back on this great event and trying to comprehend its meaning, its impact, and especially what caused it to happen. How could the “civilized” nations of Europe commit the equivalent of suicide? One key factor was the leaders involved, and no leader was more important in the beginning of the war than Kaiser Wilhelm II, the leader of Imperial Germany. In August 1914, no nation was as powerful as Germany or played a more critical role in the events of that time. To understand the origins of the war and the role Germany played requires an understanding of the kaiser.

*Kaiser Wilhelm II* by John C.G. Rohl provides just such an understanding of the title character. The author begins with the birth of the young prince who, at the time of his birth, suffered damage to his left arm—leaving him physically and psychologically scarred. The authors delves into the impacts of the prince’s education and the attempts to repair his damaged arm, as well as his mother’s perceived British liberalism.

Elevated to the kaiser of Imperial Germany at a young age, Wilhelm II proved to be independent and was determined to rule as a king of old—by divine right. His famous dismissal of Prince Otto von Bismarck, the legendary chancellor who had brought about German unification, would set the stage for the kaiser’s personal rule. He, alone, would decide the path the nation would follow—and that path was to Germany’s rightful place in the world. During the years leading up to World War I, the author shows how the kaiser consolidates his personal rule. As a result, Germany transforms from reasoned decision making by experienced cabinet ministers to lackeys who did whatever the kaiser wanted. This led, ultimately, to the reckless challenging of national interests of other nations and, finally, to an unstable alliance system built to deal with the threat posed by Germany.

While *Kaiser Wilhelm II* is a very condensed version of the author’s three-volume set on Wilhelm II, it is a complete and thorough overview of the kaiser and provides valuable insight on how he contributed to the start of World War I. This condensed version is an easy read and well worth the time of those wanting a good understanding of the origins of World War I as well as those desiring an understanding on how the concentration of power into one person leads to poor decision making—and to disaster. Rohl’s narrative of the kaiser also parallels another German leader, Adolf Hitler, who followed in the kaiser’s footsteps merely twenty years later.

Brent A. Stedry, Manhattan, Kansas

**PRESIDENTS & THEIR GENERALS: An American History of Command in War**  

By writing *Presidents & Their Generals: An American History of Command in War*, Matthew Moten, former chairman of the History Department at the United States Military Academy, set himself an ambitious goal: to explain the nature of wartime political-military relations in the United States and to show how that relationship is one of constant negotiations between the commander in chief and his wartime commanders. The fact that there are negotiations does not mean that the parties are equal; only by working together can a synergistic effect result in the best policy decisions. Moten believes that this process is profoundly important to the American public and, consequently, they should understand the dynamics of this relationship.
To explain his theory, Moten created a series of short narratives exploring the relationship of the various presidents with their wartime military leaders. While primarily distilling secondary sources, he has composed a series of well-written narratives addressing wartime political-military relations, starting with the founding fathers and ending with the recent conflicts associated with President Bush and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. According to Moten, trust between the parties is the cement that holds the political-military relationship together. When that trust was absent, as in the case of Lincoln and McClellan, the relationship deteriorated and, consequently, detrimentally affected the execution of the war. When it existed, as in the cases of Lincoln and Grant, or Roosevelt and his chiefs of staff, the relationship flourished and military policy was conducted effectively.

The conclusions that Moten draws, however, are more varied than merely the general concept of trust. He makes the case that there is no impermeable barrier between the political decisions made by the civilian leadership and the military decisions made by the commanders. Instead, soldiers “stray into the realm of policy making, while civilians leaders involve themselves in professional military matters.” In taking this position, Moten squarely rejects Samuel Huntington’s concept of objective civilian control in which policy is entirely the prerogative of the civilian leadership and the military’s professional duty is to mutely execute orders and effectuate the civilian leader’s policy. Implicitly, he argues that the professional military must be part of the public dialogue on military matters, though not necessarily that their ideas should prevail.

In this regard, it is unfortunate that the author did not include the 2006 “Revolt of the Generals” against Secretary Rumsfeld in his narrative. While the “Revolt” did not fit squarely into his analysis of negotiations between the civilian and wartime military leaders, the underlying issues were trust—and to what extent the military should participate in public debate without appearing partisan. Both are central to his conclusions. In the final analysis, the author raised a number of profound issues regarding the relationship between the nation’s civilian leaders and its military commanders and, as such, should be required reading for America’s professional officer corps.

John C. Binkley, Ph.D., Annapolis, Maryland

**DRONE WARS: Transforming Conflict, Law, and Policy**
Edited by Peter L. Bergen and Daniel Rothenberg, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2014, 512 pages

The book *Drone Wars* is an extensive anthology on the current debates surrounding the use of armed aerial drones in contemporary conflicts. The editors compiled a list of twenty-two essays and divided them into four major topic areas: drones on the ground, drones and the law of war, drones and policy, and drones and the future of war. Each topic area provides an in-depth view of the political, ethical, legal, and moral arguments surrounding the employment of armed drones. Contributing authors provide a wide array of opinions and observations detailing both the pros and cons of drone warfare. Many of the authors are subject matter experts in the fields of international law, policy, and strategy development. Others come from academia, media, government, and various think tanks from around the country. This impressive list helps to make the book an authoritative source on drone warfare.

Anthologies are dependent on the quality of their contributing authors, and *Drone Wars* does not lack quality authors. One of the leading experts on the evolution of robotics and drone warfare, Peter W. Singer, who is best known for his book, *Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century*, contributed a compelling essay on what he calls the “five deadly flaws” of thinking concerning emerging drone technology. Singer’s essay describes the emergence of robotic military technologies and how they are fundamentally transforming law, ethics, and our general view of war. A leading defense expert, Rosa Brooks, offers a balanced yet provocative essay, “Drones and Cognitive Dissonance,” on the back and forth arguments among military and policy experts on the employment of armed drones. However, a few essays try to inundate the reader with statistics and
legal jargon while others fail to accurately describe the relevancy of their central points. *Drone Wars* is not for someone with limited knowledge of drones. This is a book for advanced readers with foundational knowledge on defense and policy matters and for those researching authoritative sources.

A major shortcoming of *Drone Wars* is that the book focuses entirely on aerial drones and completely ignores the proliferation of armed maritime and land drones. An astute observer of drones, or military robotic systems, over the past fifteen years knows that drone technology is not limited to the air domain. In fact, all four U.S. military services are heavily invested through the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency to develop armed maritime and land drones. Many of these new unmanned robotic systems are designed to meet the same needs as aerial drones: to save money, reduce risk, and leverage new technologies. If we are to have an open discussion on the political, legal, ethical, and moral issues surrounding the employment of armed drones, then we need to include all drone systems and types—for they will all equally change the nature of warfare no matter what domain they operate within.

**Lt. Col. Andrew P. Creel, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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**THE LONGEST AFTERNOON: The 400 Men Who Decided the Battle of Waterloo**

Brendan Simms, Basic Books, New York, 2015, 208 pages

The *Longest Afternoon* is a historical account of the Battle for the Farm of La Haye Sainte, the precursor to the Battle of Waterloo. The book is cleverly written in a third-person, omniscient narrative form. The author walks the reader through a minute-by-minute account of detailed actions by major and minor characters throughout the battle. Through his clever ability to entwine first-person accounting with historical narrative, Simms allows the reader to explore the many facets of the battle in detailed depth and vivid focus.

The book spans approximately three days. Simms begins on Saturday, 17 June 1815, the day following Wellington’s Anglo-Allied army’s retreat from the Battle at Quatre Bras, and ends two days later, the day after the Battle for the Farm of La Haye Sainte, with the retreat of Napoleon’s French army. The main theme of the book is to account for the significance of this battle and to recognize the overwhelming impact that the bravery and courage of the 2nd Light Battalion of the King’s German Legion—part of the Anglo-Allied army—had on the final outcome.

This is a very authoritative piece. Between the number of powerful first-person accounts and detailed historical events, the book reads as a minute-by-minute eyewitness accounting. The deliberate story line and powerful detailing leaves little room for question.

The greatest attraction of this book is its ability to tell the story of the battle in a very realistic sense. From the prelude to the closing chapter, the reader is left with a keen appreciation of everything from the weather and the environment to the emotions and passion of the soldiers on the battlefield. The reader is drawn into the history and given insight to feel the accountings in a very real and pragmatic fashion.

The major detractor from the book is the frequent references to names and palaces. Since the focus of the book takes place in context of a larger campaign, a lack of knowledge of that campaign, the tactics of 1815, and the relevant participants at specific locations doesn’t allow a Napoleonic era novice to fully appreciate what is happening in the author’s meticulously detailed account. This is definitely not a book for someone that doesn’t already have knowledge of Napoleon, the Battle of Waterloo, or the French conquest of 1815.

The book contains many lessons that make it both worthwhile and relevant to the security community. The lack of precombat checks on the part of the legionnaires almost cost them the battle as they found themselves critically low on ammunition due to a logistical oversight. Also discussed are Napoleon’s lack of tactical patience; his failure to account for the impact of environmental effects on men, weapon systems, and terrain; and, finally, how courage and timing can change the tide of combat. Were it not for the courage and tenacity of the 2nd Light Battalion to occupy and retain the Farm of La Haye Sainte, this battle could have ended much differently.

**Lt. Col. William Rogers, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**
A SCRAP OF PAPER: Breaking and Making International Law during the Great War

There is an intense national and international debate underway over the right way to interpret and apply international law. It echoes, in some respects, a debate during World War I when Germany shrugged off international law, drew the United States into the conflict as a consequence, and eventually lost the war. A century later, U.S. decision makers strive to apply complex rules in challenging circumstances; meanwhile, it is losing ground in the information contest to enemies who have no use for such rules beyond their propaganda value. Professor Hull’s book provides a rare opportunity to examine international law as a factor in past decisions that remain relevant today.

The author has mined an impressive range of English, French, and German archives. She employs them to look at the interplay of international law advisors and civilian and military leaders at crucial decision-making points. Readers will find only limited coverage of tactical and operational implementation of the law. The author, in fact, acknowledges that International Law and the World War, a study published in 1920, is still the best source for a survey of legal issues in that conflict. However, the author sets out to accomplish several key tasks, and does so effectively, with the evidence set forth in her book.

For modern readers, she demonstrates that international law played a much larger role in the war than we now remember in that German violations of international law triggered the war; atrocities committed by German forces enraged popular opinion, and disdain for international law in strategic decision making eventually turned much of the world against the nation. She also favorably compares legal decisions taken by Britain and France with less admirable decisions by Germany. She presents her evidence in a series of detailed case studies.

A Scrap of Paper explores French, British, and German practice in international law as it related to Belgian neutrality, the outbreak of war, atrocities, treatment of civilians, treatment of prisoners of war, maritime blockade, reprisals, and the introduction of new technologies of war, including submarines, poison gas, and air power. In her introduction, the author invites the expectation that this book will similarly explore U.S. legal practice during the war and opines that “I must also admit another motive in writing this book. I have been deeply dismayed by the lawlessness of my own county in its pursuit of the war on terror.” However, U.S. practice is not one of her primary themes, and readers should not pick up the book with that expectation in mind.

This book will be of interest to serious students of World War I. It explores important, long-forgotten decision making that influenced some of the best known and far-reaching operations in military history. A Scrap of Paper is also a source of unusual case studies for practitioners who need to understand how diplomacy, operational design, and strategic communications shape, and are shaped, by international law. This book illuminates challenges facing practitioners today as much as those facing their predecessors a century ago.

Michael H. Hoffman, Fort Belvoir, Virginia

WEST POINT 1915: Eisenhower, Bradley, and the Class the Stars Fell On
Michael Haskew, Zenith Press, Minneapolis, 2014, 224 pages

Was it their time? Or, was it the men themselves that make this such a compelling subject? The Class of 1915 had the highest percentage of U.S. Military Academy graduates reaching general officer ever: 59 of 164. The author details his case why this class is the best in military history based upon “the magnificence of their deeds.” Haskew focuses much of his attention on the brightest stars, such as Dwight Eisenhower and Omar Bradley, but he also candidly includes the accounts of officers who fell short of great expectations. This historical study should be read by Army officers who want to understand the human dimension of their profession—under stress at the highest level.

The book is filled with memorable stories, like one about a medical board unanimously voting against commissioning Cadet Eisenhower because of a knee injury. Ike first injured his knee as a star
running back in football and then compounded the fresh damage during horse riding. His academic record was unimpressive, and he had “a mountain of demerits” before being ranked 95th in overall conduct. Without the extraordinary intervention of the head of the Academy’s medical department to reverse the board and then take its split decision to Washington, Ike may have pursued his dream to Argentina. A fellow classmate, with inside information, related that ultimately Washington considered Eisenhower to be “a good gamble”—but only if he became an infantry officer.

Bradley’s start was also inauspicious. He was a long-shot “Augustine” (a cadet who enters in August) who missed the hell of June at Beast Barracks because of a special late congressional appointment. He scraped his way up from second-class status by lettering in football and baseball. Brad thought he was tarnished, but West Point was “sports oriented to a feverish degree.” The 1914 football team went 9-0, and the baseball team was among the best ever. Athletes got special privileges and their discipline was looser. Haskew allows military icons to be exposed by their peers as flawed individuals.

The book has its share of cautionary tales of folly and tragedy. Ike would choose classmate James Ord to accompany him to the Philippines; while there, Ord would die after leaning out of a plane to drop a note. In World War II, Bradley chose another officer over his cadet first captain for a corps command because Bradley thought he lacked experience with large formations in combat. The former class leader was bitter afterwards. Eisenhower would later be the disciplinarian with Maj. Gen. Henry Miller after Miller was quoted discussing the Normandy invasion date. Miller, as well as other old friends, would not share in the glory of this group of war-hardened leaders.

There are historical nuggets throughout the book that have been overlooked by others, making it well worth the read. Some of these nuggets, however, could be missed in this work because, at times, it jumps quickly from one character to another. The book moves at a fast pace and maximizes the mention of the careers of even the more obscure members of the star-studded class. Haskew mined a great subject—and found some real gold.

James Cricks, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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**HITLER’S WARRIOR: The Life and Wars of SS Colonel Jochen Peiper**

Danny S. Parker, Da Capo Press, Boston, 2014, 480 pages

A highly decorated World War II veteran has difficulty adjusting to peacetime domesticity, can’t connect with his kids, encounters obstacles finding employment, and seeks a retirement home in an idyllic, sylvan locale. Does this sound like a plot line from William Wyler’s cinematic epic The Best Years of Our Lives? Not if the veteran is Col. Jochen Peiper, a member of Germany’s notorious Waffen SS and recipient of a death sentence for his role in the infamous Malmedy massacre of American POWs in December 1944.

Yet, Jochen Peiper did have difficulty adjusting to life after the war, as deftly portrayed in a new book by Danny S. Parker. By not focusing solely on Peiper’s military career, Parker brings a more complete and nuanced view to previous characterizations of Peiper as either a heartless SS automaton and unrepentant war criminal or an audacious and highly decorated combat leader, loved and respected by his men but victimized by politically motivated allegations of atrocities.

Thus, Parker’s strength is his coverage of lesser-known aspects of Peiper’s character and career, as evidenced by numerous primary sources, interviews, and Peiper’s personal notes and letters. One gains greater insight on his close relationships with such diverse figures as Heinrich Himmler, notorious Reichsführer SS and Peiper’s boss during two tours as adjutant, and Willis Everett, Peiper’s U.S. Army defense attorney during the Malmedy trial, with whom he remained in close contact well after the war’s end.

One of Parker’s significant contributions is his portrait of the former SS colonel following commutation of his death sentence and his eventual release after nearly twelve years in prison. If one considers his debt for Malmedy paid, it is possible to develop empathy for Peiper as he seeks to shed his SS past, adjust to daily life with a long-absent family, and chart the course of his future in a post-war Germany with which he does not identify. Here, Peiper seems much like any veteran coming to grips with life after the army; in his case, this entailed haunting memories of grueling service—either
on the front lines with *Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler* (Hitler’s bodyguard), or in the front office with Himmler, number-two man in the Third Reich.

Peiper never could escape his past, as convincingly shown by the author. With Malmedy behind him, new allegations of war crimes cropped up from other places where he and his units served. Additionally, West German political sensitivities in the aftermath of the sensational Adolf Eichmann trial eventually caught up with Peiper, forcing him to leave Germany and seek refuge in a remote part of France. There, Parker paints a picture of an increasingly despondent man who eventually meets his demise at the hands of unknown assailants, possibly French Communists, in July 1976. Insights such as these are invaluable to understanding Peiper’s character and are an obvious strength of the book.

*Hitler’s Warrior* is meticulously researched, contains extensive notes, and reads like a novel. Parker clearly adds great depth to a study of the personal character of Jochen Peiper and shows that there is value in examining such a controversial figure. The book is highly recommended to students of World War II’s European theater, the international military tribunals, and post-war Germany.

*Mark Montesclaros, Fort Gordon, Georgia*

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**ZERO SIX BRAVO: The Explosive True Story of How 60 Special Forces Survived Against an Iraqi Army of 100,000**

*Damien Lewis, Quercus, New York, 2013, 324 pages*

The book *Zero Six Bravo* is the history of sixty British and American Special Operations troops who took on the impossible in Southwest Asia in the days leading to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It was a British mission, manned largely by Special Boat Service and Special Air Service operators. That said, American training, support, and equipment were critical to the mission and eventually to the very survival of those involved in this “Mission Impossible Iraq” that quickly became labeled as “Operation No Return” by those embarking upon it.

The story is one of teamwork, of insurmountable odds, and of highly trained Special Forces who are labeled as cowards by the international media—charges that they cannot refute because they are muzzled by their own nondisclosure rules. It is also the story of sixty men against one hundred thousand. Yes, that is a force ratio of 1,666 to 1.

It gets worse; the unit the men are pitted against is the very unit that Saddam has chosen for his last stand, and it represents one-third of his standing, active army. Can the odds be worse? Yes.

Further enemies are extreme heat in the daytime, murderous cold at nighttime, bad intelligence assessments from headquarters, and logistics that are stretched beyond the breaking point. Adversity, Murphy, and the unexpected become the norm.

Further enhancing things is the presence of the Fedayeen, who drink goats’ blood and then eat the hearts while they are still beating, as well as trackless deserts that are populated when they shouldn’t be in addition to seven hundred miles of harsh terrain with no guaranteed allied support. The odds of survival are not good.

This book will grab you, and you won’t put it down until you’ve turned the last page. The author, Damien Lewis, has written a dozen works of nonfiction, and he knows his craft well. By the end of his narrative, you will be familiar with “dickers,” “gobsmacked,” “TLZ,” “TSM,” “Pinkies,” “sod’s law,” and many other uniquely British terms.

By the end of the book, you’ll also have drawn your own conclusions as to whether or not these warriors were pusillanimous cowards or misunderstood heroes who fought through the Ninewa desert, the Sunni Triangle, and the gates of hell to accomplish a mission with zero chances of success. Are they heroes or villains? You decide.

Regardless, this book is highly entertaining and educational. The only challenge I have is to the accuracy of some of the firefight descriptions. At one point, the author describes T-72 tanks firing illumination. I have found no evidence of the T-72 tank having an illumination round capability. My only explanation is that the author may be referring to the firing of illumination flares off the tank.

No book is perfect. No book will quiet all critics. This book, however, will quell most of the naysayers and cynics, and it will do so while entertaining you and robbing you of sleep.

*Lt. Col. Glenn R. Mosher, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas*
On the Need for Thinking Soldiers

“In England there has long been an idea prevalent in the minds of many persons that the soldier should be a species of man distinct from the rest of the community. He should be purely and simply a soldier, ready to knock down upon word of command being duly given for that purpose, but knowing nothing of the business of building up …. It is needless to say that Charles Gordon held a totally different view of the soldier's proper sphere of action, and with him the building part of the soldier's profession was far more important than the breaking part. The surgeon who could only cut off a leg or amputate an arm, but who knew nothing of binding up the wound or stopping an open artery, could not be of much account in any estimate of men. Gordon understood the fact that nations as well as individuals have pulses, that the leader who would lead to any definite end must know how to count these pulsations, and, in addition to his skill as a sword-cutter, must be able to do a good deal of the binding up of wounds, even though he had himself caused them. To say this is, of course, only to say that Gordon was great, in a sense greater than any merit of action in arms could aspire to. The nation that will insist upon drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by fools and its thinking by cowards.”