



(Photo by Sgt. William Gore, 40th Public Affairs Detachment)

Ghanaian troops practice individual squad movements 17 June 2014 with soldiers from Company A, 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry Regiment, 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, during Exercise Western Accord 14. The exercise, a partnership between the United States and the Economic Community of West African States, is sponsored by U.S. Africa Command and hosted by U.S. Army Africa. The purpose is to increase interoperability of military forces and ensure the common ability to conduct peace operations throughout West Africa.

The First Regionally Aligned Force

Lessons Learned and the Way Ahead

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In April 2013, U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) designated the 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team (2nd ABCT), 1st Infantry Division, based at Fort Riley, Kansas, as the first regionally aligned force to support United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM), the unified command responsible for engaging with nations on the continent of Africa. The 2nd ABCT performed the mission for one year, supporting myriad taskings under policies established by the U.S. Congress, the Departments of State and Defense, and USAFRICOM. It operated directly under U.S. Army Africa/Southern European Task Force (USARAF/SETAF), the Army Service component command of USAFRICOM, to support U.S. national commitments aimed at developing theater security cooperation bilateral and multilateral relationships. Tasks included numerous military training engagements with diverse African states.

The 2nd ABCT supported USAFRICOM objectives by strengthening relationships with its key allies and training its partnered nations. Small-unit leadership adapted to changing conditions across a broad range of military operations, enabling the first regionally aligned force to achieve success.

The unit, together with the U.S. Army Center for Army Lessons Learned at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the Asymmetric Warfare Group at Fort Meade, Maryland, captured many of the ABCT's achievements, helping to lay a knowledge base for future regionally aligned force operations. This article offers some of the most salient lessons learned to assist other commands preparing for similar missions and to recommend improvements to the overall process for supporting regionally aligned force deployments to Africa. These lessons are intended to contribute to the future success of both the operating force and the generating force when preparing for similar regionally aligned missions.

Development of Regionally Aligned Forces

The *regionally aligned forces* concept emerged in 2013 in response to a perception that more than a decade of experience with prolonged conflict in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere had shown that U.S. armed forces were not always prepared to manage the cultural challenges associated with many relatively nonpermissive and complex operational environments. The concept also emerged in response to requests from combatant commanders for additional capabilities to support their individual requirements. Additionally, the national military strategy began to place a greater emphasis on political, economic, and informational engagement elements with a collective focus on preventing wars in volatile areas by mitigating causes of conflicts before situations degenerated into social collapse and open warfare.

The African continent has become an area of special concern. It is three times the size of the United States, and it includes the following complexities: fifty-four nations; approximately one billion people divided into more than four hundred ethnic groups; thirty-five major languages, not including hundreds of local and regional dialects; and seven of the world's fastest growing economies. In addition, it has vast untapped natural resources in an era of increasing global competition for vital commodities.¹

Moreover, instability in many nations on the African continent has attracted terrorist and global insurgent groups with implacable hatred of the West. These groups are attempting to find new bases in remote locations for mounting continued attacks against U.S. interests at home and abroad.

As a result, the Department of Defense established USAFRICOM as a geographic combatant command in 2007, with a keen awareness of the sociopolitical sensitivity of African states toward engagement with the armed forces of nations from outside the African continent.² This sensitivity is due in part to a history of Western colonization, slavery, exploitation, and a bitter legacy of anticolonial wars.

The initial objectives of USAFRICOM included establishing a high-level system of engagement in order to develop long-term cooperative relationships and contingencies for managing international crises of mutual concern to the United States and African nations. The command was tasked with providing support to

nations requesting help in professionalizing their armed forces. It was understood such help would be offered on the U.S. model, which not only provides skills training but also emphasizes at every stage the responsibility of professional military members to support democracy, democratically elected leaders, and human rights.

To carry out engagement missions, the regionally aligned forces concept allocates specific Army forces to geographic combatant commanders under concepts outlined in numerous documents, starting with the 2010 *National Security Strategy*.³ Additionally, the 2012 defense strategic guidance outlines ten priority missions for regionally aligned forces, including the ability to provide a stabilizing presence abroad allowing for regional access.⁴ The *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020* also states the future joint force will be prepared to conduct globally integrated operations with its mission partners.⁵ Finally, the 2012 *Army Strategic Planning Guidance* provides greater detail as to intent by stating that "Regional alignment provides an effective approach for non-traditional threats in an increasingly interdependent security environment."⁶

Regionally aligned forces are intended to provide combatant commanders with dedicated capabilities, oriented to sociocultural and political aspects of specific geographical areas, that can rapidly task organize to execute a range of missions and contingency operations. As such, regionally aligned forces are supposed to provide quickly tailored capabilities to meet the needs of diverse nations with clearly articulated and appropriate authorities for employment.⁷

The 2nd ABCCT operated under the direction of USARAF, performing missions aimed at achieving overall U.S. strategic goals in Africa. Initial missions included conducting senior leader engagements and host-nation security cooperation missions to build partnering relationships.⁸ The missions either fulfilled or complemented ongoing theater security cooperation agreements, security force assistance, or Army National Guard State Partnership Program initiatives. According to a U.S. Army War College research paper by Col. Kristian Matthew Marks in 2013, these missions strengthened defense relationships within the Army's strategic framework of *prevent, shape, and win* by employing in various roles both Active and Reserve Component Army elements.⁹

Six Lessons Learned From the First Regionally Aligned Units

The yearlong 2nd ABCT experience provided numerous lessons regarding the Army infrastructure that supports regionally aligned forces. Six of the most significant lessons related to support systems follow:

- ◆ A standardized assessment system is needed to enhance planning and objective measurement of mission accomplishment.
 - ◆ Tailored and streamlined administrative personnel processes are needed to make complex predeployment activities more efficient.
 - ◆ Life-cycle personnel management procedures aimed at assigning and retaining personnel with specialized skills are needed to improve continuity.
 - ◆ Efficient business rules are needed to facilitate timely allocation of forces and ongoing adequate and timely support arrangements for missions.
 - ◆ Army sustainment channels allocated specifically for regionally aligned units are needed to ensure units can obtain support during missions.
 - ◆ Revised budgeting models and a higher priority of funding are needed to provide for operations, maintenance, and training costs.
- These lessons learned are discussed below to contribute to the future success of both operating and generating forces when preparing for similar regionally aligned force missions.

A standardized assessment system is needed to enhance planning and objective measurement of mission accomplishment. First, USAFRICOM, USARAF, and staff members of regionally aligned forces need an end-state-driven assessment system, using outcome-based training for measuring mission effectiveness and generating quantifiable results that can be compared, tracked, and analyzed over time. The 2nd ABCT supported more than one hundred eight missions across

thirty-four African countries within its first six months of employment.¹⁰ The majority of these missions consisted of two- and three-soldier teams deploying to the African continent for approximately one-week increments to train African soldiers. Examples included sniper training in Burundi and engineer and mobility training in Malawi.¹¹ Additional missions included advising Guinea, Chad, and Niger security forces; participating in the Shared Accord 13 Live Fire Exercise; and supporting the Eastern Accord 14 Command Post Exercise.¹²

Small-unit leaders of the 2nd ABCT displayed great personal initiative to ensure the intent of each mission was accomplished to standard. However, the validity of assessments left much to be desired. Missions tended to be subjectively assessed by participants without benefit of a coherent system for collecting, analyzing, and comparing data over time in a systematic way.



(Photo by Sgt. Takita Lawery, 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team PAO, 1st Infantry Division)

Pfc. Cody Anderson speaks with a Senegalese soldier as Spc. Lassana Traore translates 25 June 2014 during Exercise Western Accord 14 at Camp Thies, Senegal. Traore, a food service specialist, and Anderson, a wheel mechanic, both serve with Company E, 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry Regiment, 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division.



(Photo by Mollie Miller, 1st Infantry Division PAO)

Capt. Ritchie Rhodes, 1st Battalion, 7th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, works with an African role player 10 May 2013 during the field training portion of Dagger University at Fort Riley, Kansas. Dagger University is a weeklong course that prepares teams from 2nd ABCT deploying to Africa by educating them on basic language and cultural skills. The brigade combat team, aligned with U.S. Africa Command, is the first to be tasked with a regionally aligned mission.

As a result, USARAF's ability to assess mission effectiveness was inadequate. Trip reports were not quantitative, nor even qualitative, in nature. According to the 2014 "CALL [Center for Army Lessons Learned] Interim Report on Regionally Aligned Forces in U.S. Army Africa," assessments of the missions were, at best, educated staff judgments based largely on the past training experiences of trainers in Iraq and Afghanistan.¹³ Assessments were made based on host-nation feedback and limited first-hand observation on host-nation performance. Such a process lacks standardization and quality management required to track progress and effectiveness of training accurately over time.

Regionally aligned forces would benefit from a more structured trip report system that enforces a uniform, disciplined, and systematic reporting methodology for conducting after action reviews and capturing lessons learned. This would enable valid and reliable measures of performance and effectiveness for analysis over time. Equally important, according to the Asymmetric Warfare Group's 2014 *Analysis of Support to the Regionally Aligned Force*, units need an easy-to-use and accessible knowledge management database where trip report results are archived.¹⁴

Tailored and streamlined administrative personnel processes are needed to make complex predeployment activities more efficient. A second lesson learned is that deployment to the remote areas of regionally aligned force missions requires significantly more administrative paperwork and preparation than locations to which units are generally accustomed to being sent. This results from a lack of status-of-forces agreements with the many nations to which units are sent, as well as a lack of forward regional support bases to provide support at remote locations. Consequently, units prepar-

ing to deploy to these areas have a number of additional administrative requirements unique to each location. According to a 2013 interim lessons learned report from the Army Irregular Warfare Center, these requirements include diverse requirements for authorization to enter countries and planning challenges for support once in country, requests for passports and visas, and unique medical readiness challenges.¹⁵

This means that units must begin a detailed process of working administrative requirements for deployments earlier than they are used to, including establishing contingency plans and anticipating the need for resources not readily available once in country. Planning also needs to include making requests for area-specific cultural training early in the process through the Asymmetric Warfare Group.

Notwithstanding, in the preparation stage, unit mission-essential tasks, decisive action tasks, and theater security cooperation common training tasks under the modified Army force generation rotational cycle seemed adequate. These should remain the standard tasks for upcoming rotations of regionally aligned forces.

Additionally, administrative tasks should be incorporated into a predeployment program to ensure

soldiers can prepare on short notice. The 2nd ABCT developed a useful preparation tool known as *Dagger University* to facilitate soldier administrative preparedness for deployment. The design of a predeployment program for all regionally aligned forces would be well served by being based on this model.

Life-cycle personnel management procedures aimed at assigning and retaining personnel with specialized skills are needed to improve continuity.

The Army needs to adjust its human resources system significantly to focus on carefully managing personnel with special skills for specific geographical areas. Such management should focus on ensuring soldiers with skills such as languages or experience with the repair and maintenance of foreign equipment and weapons are assigned and retained in regionally aligned units. Additionally, personnel with specialized skills should be able to remain assigned to regionally aligned units for longer periods than policy now allows. This would help ensure the life-cycle personnel management system optimally supports regionally aligned rotations. It would ensure soldiers with invaluable skills or experience related to the designated geographical areas were properly assigned to increase host-nation confidence and trust through the continuity of long-term relationships.

Changes to the human resources system would also give units designated as regionally aligned forces time to adjust and reset as personnel with less common skills rotated out in a slower, more deliberate manner.

Efficient business rules are needed to facilitate timely allocation of forces and ongoing support arrangements for missions. The fourth, and most difficult, challenge is the need to meet short-term mission requests in a timely manner and to provide units with an adequate support base over the duration of their tour of duty. To do this, Department of Defense and Army planners need to improve the business rules for allocating regionally aligned forces to increase efficiency and improve tasking and synchronizing alignment of supporting forces to a region.¹⁶

Foremost among issues adversely affecting the regionally aligned forces process is the current system for assignment and allocation of forces. It is complicated, inconsistent, and sometimes illogical, which inhibits efficient management of the regionally aligned forces process. For example, the 2nd ABCT was allocated to USAFRICOM but assigned to 1st Infantry Division at Fort Riley, Kansas.

This led to a host of issues related to command and control, funding for operations, and establishing effective communication across all units involved.

With available resources, 2nd ABCT was efficient in responding to short-notice taskings from USAFRICOM. Successful missions occurred in this order: first, 2nd ABCT was available; second, 2nd ABCT received a general administrative message from USARAF; third, one to two weeks of email traffic passed between the two headquarters; and finally, troops boarded an airplane to Africa to perform the mission.¹⁷ USARAF staff worked directly with 2nd ABCT and its headquarters on such deployments and kept FORSCOM fully informed.

However, meeting short-notice taskings became problematic when USARAF lacked the means to reach back to the generating force for augmentation. Much of the difficulty was caused by a complex process for requesting forces.

The process for requesting forces works for larger, programmed missions forecast well in advance. However, challenges can arise when attempting to respond to requests on short notice, and short-notice taskings are the main mission of regionally aligned forces. The business rules typically used to initiate and approve a request for forces make the process lengthy. This leads to challenges of preparing for deployment by the time the task is assigned to the designated unit.¹⁸

The request for forces process and the regionally aligned forces process support the needs of the Department of State and host-nation requirements. USAFRICOM; USARAF; Headquarters, Department of the Army; and the Department of State can request a regionally aligned unit for a specific mission. The mission must be accepted and the specific requirements agreed upon by the nation in which forces will serve. In the case of USAFRICOM, if the action is best suited for the Army, it is tasked to USARAF. After analysis of requirements, USARAF prepares and forwards additional requests for forces through USAFRICOM to the Pentagon, which, on approval, are forwarded to FORSCOM for tasking. FORSCOM then reviews and approves the tasking and designates a unit to be tasked with the mission. This process can take six months or more.¹⁹ This is a problem when the unit tasking is only one year.

The long process for requesting additional support for operations apart from what was originally forecast

involves numerous command-level approvals, up to the Secretary of Defense. Many missions, however, are time sensitive due to the importance of timeliness when executing missions that have to be timely if they are to be successful. The long administrative delays of the current system can interfere with mission accomplishment.

Since regionally aligned brigades are allocated one year in advance, it is their internal selection that is inefficient as many activities are developed from 120 to 150 days before execution—rather than eighteen months. Consequently, USARAF and USAFRICOM struggle with determining which short-notice missions are critical to operational objectives. This places unnecessary stress on the system and the soldiers performing the missions. (Most of the 2nd ABCT's short-notice missions were not critical but resulted from overly ambitious commitments made by ill-informed country representatives or action officers.)

Army sustainment channels allocated specifically for regionally aligned units are needed to ensure units can obtain support during missions. Another key lesson learned was that regionally aligned units supporting USAFRICOM in Africa need much greater support than Army planners at all levels initially forecast. Africa is an austere setting and does not maintain permanent U.S. Army bases where supplies might be stockpiled or other support services obtained. This, together with the relatively small budget and limited on-hand resources, created significant problems for 2nd ABCT.

One central issue was a lack of enablers and resources needed to accomplish missions. When 2nd ABCT soldiers deployed to work in small teams and in austere environments, they often had to find additional resources outside of the regionally aligned brigade.²⁰ While USARAF was able to provide some support, such as communication equipment, it could not make up for the 2nd's organic shortfalls in other areas due to its own equipment requirements and budget constraints. Thus, shortages in communications equipment and medical support, as well as insufficient funding for equipment and deploying personnel, were just a few of the major challenges.

In the future, units providing reach-back support could be directly aligned with and allocated to regionally aligned



units for dedicated support during rotations. Business rules for theater security cooperation missions should be changed to encompass the allocation or alignment of supporting units and capabilities that can be accessed in an identical manner. Such support commands could provide resources, equipment, and sustainment support not now readily available on short notice at the brigade level without significant additional administrative work. There are Army support commands already providing global support to Army operating units. However, the current business rules for regionally aligned forces do not support an effective way to allocate such supporting units.²¹

In part to fill support gaps, USARAF created an informal relationship with the 1st Infantry Division, which helped fill intelligence gaps—such as gaps in human intelligence, imagery intelligence, and counterintelligence. Other identified resource and capability gaps from the first regionally aligned force included medical evacuation and medics, as well as signal, logistics, and maintenance support.²²

Preparing for medical contingencies during deployments was a particularly worrisome challenge for the 2nd ABCT. In Africa, medical evacuation takes twenty-four hours or more, which fails to meet the *Golden Hour* standard mandated by the secretary of defense (referring to the critical one-hour limit for evacuating a casualty from the incident to a proper treatment facility to preclude death). Fortunately, the 2nd ABCT had no occurrences of any injured soldier being affected by this rule.

The 2nd ABCT also had significant difficulty with signal and communication support. There is no established signal infrastructure in remote African nations to support U.S. military operations. Consequently,



(Photo courtesy of U.S. Army Africa)

U.S. Army trainers teach reflexive firing techniques to Burkinabe soldiers of the 25th Regiment Parachutist Commando Counterterrorism Company 5 May 2014. U.S. Army Africa's regionally aligned force—1st Battalion, 63rd Armor Regiment, 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division—conducted classroom and field exercises during a train and equip event, part of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership supported by U.S. Army Africa and Special Operations Command–Africa.

sophisticated fixed-point signal support to regionally aligned missions was almost nonexistent. USARAF provided support with satellite communications, Iridium, and cellular phones in limited quantities. Thus, regionally aligned units had to rely on cell phone service, Internet, and any other local means to communicate.

Similarly, USARAF was able to provide limited sustainment in other areas. Often, it did not have all the enablers needed to support USAFRICOM missions. For example, maintenance of nonstandard equipment is problematic for African armies. USARAF expressed concern that without appropriate enablers, it would be difficult to assist effectively with equipment maintenance.²³

Integrating the generating force and units such as the Army Sustainment Command could contribute greatly to the efficiency and effectiveness of such missions. The 2nd ABCT's regionally aligned force experience highlights the need for a specific Army support command to be allocated to support regionally aligned units.

Revised budgeting models and a higher priority of funding are needed to provide for operations, maintenance, and training costs. According to a U.S. Army War College research paper by John R. Bray, the chief of staff of the Army has directed developing innovative ways of funding the operations of regionally aligned forces.²⁴ The Army budget for regionally aligned forces draws mainly from operations and

maintenance, Title 10, and Title 22 funds (referring to Titles 10 and 22 of the United States Code). The challenge for USARAF is obligating funds before the end of the fiscal year. However, regionally aligned units receive lower priority for funding compared to other units.

Therefore, Army leaders at all levels should consider evaluating and assessing the level of preparedness desired of regionally aligned units, including the cost, and commit to it. The question is whether regionally aligned forces are worth the effort required. Is the bang of regionally aligned forces worth the buck? How can the Army and Department of Defense afford to continue to support regionally aligned forces in the increasingly resource-constrained environment mandated by Congress?

Another challenge is how a regionally aligned unit can receive the specific regional training needed. During the first rotation to Africa, the 2nd ABCT developed several creative solutions to meeting training requirements. For example, the team created a *one-stop shop* for mission preparedness within its Dagger University. Local colleges, professions, and other military groups such as Special Forces and the Asymmetric Warfare Group assisted as well, though at a limited level due to minimal funding.

The 2nd ABCT incurred expenses in transportation of personnel, equipment, and sustainment.²⁵ According to a *Parameters* article by Kimberly Field, James Learmont, and Jason Charland, the Fiscal Year 2015 Program Objective Memorandum for theater security cooperation missions shows that the Department of the Army planned for a 25 percent increase in Title 10 funding.²⁶ This should allow for more efficient use of capabilities and enablers in future force rotations. Once sequestration is resolved and the drawdown from Afghanistan is complete, planners should be able to improve funding for regionally aligned forces.

Simply put, the first regionally aligned force was not adequately funded for its mission. However, Headquarters, Department of the Army quickly recognized this and set aside some additional funds for regionally aligned forces starting in fiscal year 2015. Whether it will be enough is unknown, but if 2nd



(Photo by Staff Sgt. Michael R. Noggle, Special Operations Task Force-103 PAO)

Senegalese special operations soldiers conduct close-quarter battle drills during a military training engagement with U.S. special operations advisors 11 May 2010 in Bamako, Mali, part of Exercise Flintlock 10. U.S. Africa Command sponsors annual exercises with partner nations in northern and western Africa. Exercise Flintlock 10 focuses on military interoperability and capacity building.

ABCT's experience is an indicator, at current budget levels one combat brigade cannot manage all the resources and expenditures required. Both operating and generating forces need to be assigned or allocated to support regionally aligned forces unconditionally in accordance with revised business rules.

Summary of Recommendations

Based on the experiences of the 2nd ABCT, six major improvements should be considered to support regionally aligned forces: a standardized assessment system, tailored and streamlined administrative personnel processes, life-cycle personnel management procedures for assigning and retaining personnel with specialized skills, more efficient business rules, Army sustainment channels allocated for regionally aligned units, and a higher priority of funding.

The Asymmetric Warfare Group assessed that 2nd ABCT should have had additional support in planning, preparing, employment, and recovery for missions of regionally aligned forces.²⁷ USARAF recommended an assigned or allocated expeditionary support command be established to provide direct logistic support to regionally aligned units.²⁸ In addition, other organizations, such as the Army Sustainment Command and Army Surface Deployment and Distribution

Command, should be tasked to support overseas operations of regionally aligned forces. These designated support commands would align with USAFRICOM and USARAF, providing essential material, equipment, and technical expertise for missions in Africa.

Barring availability of support units, additional support gaps might best be filled by contractor support. Similarly, contractors for satellite communication and strategic network should be considered.

There is no need to create additional organizations or commands. The commands already exist to support units like the regionally aligned forces, but they have not been aligned with them for support. The Army Sustainment Command is one of them. Army leaders should determine how such units can best support regionally aligned forces, and what is the best way to assign them (assigned, allocated, or service-retained command aligned).²⁹ These supporting commands should be allocated to USAFRICOM as part of the regionally aligned forces.

In conjunction, additional support for urgent equipment fielding for regionally aligned units should be provided by the U.S. Army Rapid Equipping Force. Finally, the Army should consider adopting budgeting models that could ensure regionally aligned units are properly included into funding plans for operations, maintenance, and training. ■

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Notes

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7. *Ibid.*, 14-19.
8. Col. Gus Benton, U.S. Army, "Memorandum: 2/1 ABCT RAF [Regionally Aligned Forces] Interim Lessons Learned Report" (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Irregular Warfare Center, 31 October 2013).
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10. U.S. Army G-3/5/7 [Operations and Plans], "Regional Alignment of Forces. Purpose: Discuss RAF Way Ahead and Address Concerns from ASCCs [Army Service component commands]," Army Staff, Pentagon (Washington, DC, 25 October 2012), 6-7, quoted in Col. Kirk Dorr, U.S. Army, "Dagger on Point: Assessing the Regionally Aligned Brigade" (research paper, U.S. Army War College, April 2013), 13-14, <http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA592824> (accessed 7 April 2015).
11. U.S. Army Africa (USARAF), USARAF Trip Reports April-June 2013, "Sniper Training in Burundi, 15 April-24 May 2013" and "Engineers in Support of Mobility Operations in Malawi, 10-14 June 2013."
12. 2nd ABCT, 1st Infantry Division, "Dagger Brigade 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division: Consolidated RAB AAR [Regionally Aligned Brigade After Action Review]," slides 1 to 25 of packet presented 21 May 2014 to incoming unit, Fort Riley, KS. The Shared Accord 13 Live Fire Exercise, South Africa, 25 July to 4 August 2013, was one of several major operations supported by 2nd ABCT. The Eastern Accord 14 Command Post Exercise, Uganda, 27 March to 14 April 2014, was a major partnered training operation. It included the RAF battalion command, and corps leaders from the Uganda military. The operation involved the entire battalion staff, forty-eight people including the command group, from 2nd ABCT. Tasks included establishing a command post and tactical operations center, four days of academic study, four days of practical exercises, an after action review, and redeployment.
13. Thomas H. Roe, "CALL Interim Report on Regionally Aligned Forces in U.S. Army Africa," (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 19 March 2014), 9.
14. Asymmetric Warfare Group, *Analysis of Support to the Regionally Aligned Force* (Fort Meade, MD: Asymmetric Warfare Group, June 2014), 3-4.
15. Benton, "Memorandum," 7-8.
16. The institutional Army, including staff at the Pentagon, the combatant commands, and below, apply business rules to the work and responsibilities at each level. The rules maintain processes and standards for accomplishing specific tasks, leading to orders and plans. The regionally aligned forces business rules nest with Army (Pentagon) business rules and are shaped to best practices and procedures for the current mission. The rules ensure that units are properly assigned, allocated, or aligned with the combatant command and in accordance with the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG) business rules.
17. Roe, "Call Interim Report," 2-3.
18. *Ibid.*, 1-3.
19. *Ibid.*, 2.
20. Asymmetric Warfare Group, *Analysis of Support*, June 2014, 3-4.
21. Roe, "CALL Interim Report," 8.
22. *Ibid.*, 4-7.
23. *Ibid.*, 5-9.
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29. FORSCOM 121700Z OCT 13 FY14/15 Mission Alignment Order for Assigned, Allocated, and Service Retained Command Aligned (SRCA) Forces and GFMIG [Global Force Management Allocation Plan], Joint Staff Business Rules, GFMIG and FY NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act, Public Law 113-66, Section 513(a), 26 December 2013].