

**THE DOLLAR AND NATIONAL SECURITY:
The Monetary Component of Hard Power**
Paul R. Viotti, Stanford University Press,
Stanford, California, 2014, 248 pages

Paul Viotti, professor of international studies at Denver University, writes an insightful book detailing the historical role and importance of the monetary component, of the economic instrument, and of national power in providing for national security. His premise is that sound monetary policy is fundamental to a nation's economy, its participation in international commerce, and the international monetary system. It is also critical to national security because it affords a nation the ability to provide for its defense through military means. In other words, money, the economy, and security are fundamentally interlinked. Currently, the United States is in an advantageous position having the most readily accepted and exchanged currency internationally.

The author begins with a comprehensive contextual overview of the relationship between economic "hard power" components—a descriptive term credited to Joseph Nye. Viotti illustrates relations among such things as U.S. foreign policy, exchange rates, and the privilege and burden associated with the U.S. dollar as the world's principle reserve currency. This introductory chapter sets an appropriate stage for the historical linkages and their impacts as outlined in subsequent chapters.

Beginning with the nineteenth century, the author analyzes the rise and subsequent demise of the British sterling, the primary vehicle and reserve currency of the time. He adeptly uncovers its long-term economic and military defense consequence to Britain. Viotti also accounts for the international geopolitical and economic interplay of rival currencies. Specifically, he focuses on the French franc and the German mark as these nations emerged as economic powers and formed their own political and trade alliances with like-minded nations. He amply addresses the consequences of war on warring nations' gold reserves and fiscal and monetary policy. He

draws a noteworthy example using Germany after World War I—left financially broke and heavily burdened with



war debt, hyperinflation, and a worthless currency. Viotti also highlights the evolution of the most important international currency arrangements that shaped international commerce over the years. He keenly explains the importance of maintaining strong and stable currencies amongst nations in order to facilitate international trade, lending, and debt financing.

The remainder of the book is predominantly focused on the rise and implications of the U.S. dollar's eventual replacement of the British sterling as the primary reserve and vehicle currency for international commerce. Viotti smartly details the critical role the United States played in promoting post-world war economic reconstruction and development through the Marshall Plan, beginning with the adoption of the Bretton Woods regime at the end of World War II. Reestablishing the gold standard—which made the U.S. dollar interchangeable with gold—and establishing the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, were all significant to both the economic success and the security of Western European allies during the Cold War.

Viotti details the subsequent demise of the gold standard due to such things as the prevailing U.S. fiscal and trade deficit and a less-than-ideal monetary policy. He describes how problematic these same issues are to the U.S. economy and national security under the floating exchange system now in place. His analysis includes the effects of the emergence of the euro and the economic rise of China and its currency, the yuan.

Viotti reemphasizes the value of being the most renowned currency internationally and ends by stating

it is critical to the U.S. economy and national security that the dollar remains the primary reserve currency of the world. In order to do so, the United States must get its economic, international trade, and financial house in order or it will go the way of the British sterling.

The book is unique in its subject matter and scholarship. It is superbly researched, persuasive, and thought-provoking. Tables correlating such things as historical currency reserve and trade balances, currency valuations, and interest rates, were very useful and effectively interwoven throughout the book. Finally, Viotti does a noteworthy job in simplifying some very complex topics and issues, making the book easy to read and understand by those outside the field of economics and finance.

This book is a must-read for security studies/affairs professionals and scholars, those involved in state-building, international financial institution professionals, government policy makers, senior military professionals, and anyone else interested in learning about the importance of monetary arrangements in relationship to national security.

Dr. David A. Anderson, Lt. Col., U.S. Marine Corps, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE LAST ESCAPER: The Untold First-Hand Story of the Legendary World War II Bomber Pilot, “Cooler King” and Arch Escape Artist
Peter Tunstall, Overlook Press, New York, 2015,
368 pages

Reflection time is something you do not often see in a personal memoir. Consequently, when someone deliberately takes seventy years to reflect on his life before releasing his memoirs, you take notice. This is the case with Peter Tunstall, who penned his memoirs prior to his passing in July 2013. In his superb volume, *The Last Escaper*, Tunstall focuses on his time as a British Royal Air Force pilot during World War II. It was a period highlighted by his captivity as a prisoner of war—for nearly the entire war.

For those who have read other books focused on the incredible experiences of Allied POWs during World War II, the name Peter Tunstall, a POW for nearly five years, should be extremely familiar. During that time, he attained legendary status for his innovative escape

attempts and his uncanny ability to torment his German captors—both physically and mentally. Tunstall’s passion for escape and intense desire to be an irritant to his captors resulted in his spending more than four hundred days in solitary confinement. It led him to being dubbed “The Cooler King of Colditz,” which was the last camp he was held in prior to his release.

He structures his memoir into three distinct parts. In the initial chapters, he addresses his childhood years, where he developed an intense desire to fly. He then talks about his pilot training in the RAF.


The second part, and the focus of the volume, concerns Tunstall’s years as a POW. The theme of the content is tied to advice he received in his initial RAF training by A.J. Evans, a World War I two-time prison escapee. Evans was emphatic that any POW had two responsibilities: “Your first duty was to try to escape. Your second duty was to be as big a bloody nuisance as possible to the enemy.” Tunstall unquestionably heeded the counsel of Evans, which is clearly evident as he highlights his numerous escape attempts and the ways he irritated his captors.

Interestingly, Tunstall uses his final pages as a dialogue with younger generations as he opines on the Allied bombing offensive during World War II. He strives to clear up misconceptions on the offensive, which he feels are held by younger generations.

The author’s informal writing style is completely engaging; at times, you find yourself believing Tunstall is actually talking to you face-to-face. Personally, it has been quite some time since I had that experience.

In Tunstall’s introduction, he concedes that the market has seen its share of escape books. He also emphasizes that his book is far different than others they may have read. He states “... it’s the product of a lifetime of reflection.

Had I written it fifty or sixty years ago, it would, perhaps, have had the immediacy and fine detail of recent memory and experience. But, it could not have included the sense of perspective or quality of judgment that only comes with age and distance from the events of one’s



own life.” It is this perspective—combined with superb readability and the experiences of a remarkable man—that distinguishes *The Last Escaper* from other books in this genre.

Rick Baillergeon, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE EFFECTS-BASED BOARD: An Effects-Based Approach to the Joint Operations Planning Process

**Colin B. Marcum, American Military University,
Scotts Valley, California, 2014, 104 pages**

This document is not a book but rather a print of the master’s thesis of Army Capt. Colin Marcum, printed for distribution by the American Military University. As such, it is intended to be read by academics to satisfy the requirements for a master of arts in military studies and may not necessarily be of great interest outside academic circles. The author pulls together some historical vignettes to support a case that each combatant command should establish an independent planning group to improve the joint operation planning process (JOPP). He names this new group the effects-based board (EBB). The purpose of the EBB is to ensure that courses of action (COAs) developed by the JOPP will bring about a desired set of effects and a desired end-state.

The author contends that the joint operation planning process may not produce correct orders that lead to the desired end state primarily because it is too focused on military inputs and military outputs to develop anything but limited military solutions to problems. Additionally, he feels the process is focused on the means available to planners, and that focus will limit COAs that are developed. Marcum opines that if the JOPP focused on the ends instead of the means available, it would develop better COAs. He reasons that the primary input to the JOPP is the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE), which may be narrowly concentrated toward military issues, stating: “When the JIPOE helped develop the COA during the JOPP, they created a COA that was focused on military matters instead of a holistic analysis of the operational environment in which all the conditions are interrelated.”

To overcome these perceived JOPP deficiencies, Marcum proposes two solutions. He envisions a way to

create greater certainty and inject nonmilitary inputs for planning operations in the operational environment (OE). This is done through the creation of a sophisticated operational environment link diagram (OELD) system that models the real world in a complex system of linkages. He describes this as looking like a dodecahedron, filled with linkage lines on the inside, connecting elements of the OE in a web-like structure. Once the OELD is up and running, the planner would simply perturbate a link, and the OELD output would show all the ripple effects and second- and third-order effects so planners can make a decision—with certainty—in the operational environment.

Additionally, he recommends every combatant command establishment its own EBB. This board would be comprised of more than seventy people taken from all aspects of the U.S. government—both military and civilian. The goal is to have a group that encompasses the “full breadth of the United States government.” This board would not be composed of planners but would be advisors to the combatant command planners as they vetted COAs through the EBB for advice.

Marcum has worked hard to envision problems with JOPP and to suggest solutions. However the problems he delineates may not be problems at all. The JOPP is not as narrowly focused on military solutions as the thesis implies. One can look at joint publications and see the evidence of this. Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, for example, has an entire appendix devoted to nonmilitary flexible-deterrent options to incorporate into COAs. Initiatives, to include a whole-of-government approach to problems, abound in the current literature. As to the problem of uncertainty in the OE, that is intractable. Development of an OELD modeling tool is unlikely to ensure certainty for planners. Marcum himself recognizes this as he quotes retired U.S. Marine Corps Gen. James Mattis discussing the effects-based approach as requiring an “unachievable level of predictability.” And finally, the addition of a seventy-member board at each combatant command is impractical. The combatant commands are working with interagency partners via existing organizations, such as the Joint Interagency Coordination Group. Although these joint groups are notoriously difficult to staff and to fund, they do accomplish the same functions that are postulated for an EBB.

**Lt. Cdr. Harold A. Laurence, U.S. Navy,
Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

WASHINGTON'S REVOLUTION: The Making of America's First Leader


Robert Middlekauff, Knopf, New York, 2015,
384 pages

Robert Middlekauff's *Washington's Revolution* provides an in-depth examination of George Washington's transformation from a provincial militia officer to the leader of a new nation. According to Middlekauff, Washington was more than the commander of the Continental Army, he was the American Revolution in its truest sense. During the darkest days of the revolution, Washington's strength, vision, and character impelled the perseverance of the cause for freedom.

Washington's formative years as land surveyor, planter, and militia officer were critical in honing his skills as an administrator, manager, strategist, and visionary. The author reminds us that the odds were stacked against Washington when he assumed command of the Continental army following the Battle of Bunker Hill.

The army, more accurately a mob, simply lacked the leadership, equipment, weapons, uniforms, and discipline required to meet the British army in battle. Washington quickly implemented changes in training, discipline, and organization in realizing his vision for the Continental army. It was at Valley Forge that Washington's vision was realized and the Continental army began to develop into the professional army we know today. He was able to transform a mob into a viable fighting force—all the while engaged in combat with the British army and its Hessian mercenaries.

Middlekauff challenges the assertion of other historians that Washington was marginal as a field commander by demonstrating his adroit war of maneuver that enabled him to keep his weak army intact while wearing down his enemy. Washington's audacity and strategic sense are reflected in his victories at Trenton,



Princeton, and Yorktown. The author states that it was Washington's reputation and character that won over the French and led to their joining the Continental army's side. Washington lost more battles than he won—yet he prevailed. Middlekauff states Washington's strong will and belief in the cause of freedom enabled him to endure when Congress and others had lost hope.

The strength of *Washington's Revolution* is Middlekauff's exhaustive research of Washington's correspondence and personal memoirs, coupled with the author's writing style, that breathes life into a man larger than myth. *Washington's Revolution* is more than Washington's transformation as a leader—it describes the birth of our nation and the essence of a people. It is for this reason that George Washington is rightly celebrated as the father of our country. This book is for military professionals and historians; it would be a great addition to any professional leadership reading list.

Jesse McIntyre III, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

A STREET IN ARNHEM: The Agony of Occupation and Liberation

Robert Kershaw, Casemate, Havertown,
Pennsylvania, 2014, 336 pages

Author Robert Kershaw follows up his classic work on the battle of Arnhem, *It Never Snows in September*, with a more detailed examination of the fighting for one critical street—Utrechtsweg—which runs through Oosterbeek to Arnhem. The author concludes that many of the critical moments of the nine-day battle occurred on or around this one street. By examining the battle on and around Utrechtsweg, the author hopes to “unveil aspects of the battle not considered before.” In this goal, the author succeeds. *A Street in Arnhem* offers a perspective of the battle not found in many histories of Operation Market Garden.

The book looks at the battle through three perspectives—Dutch, German, and British. Every event, from the movement to reach the Arnhem Bridge to the final destruction of the Oosterbeek perimeter, is told in graphic and tragic detail. Kershaw manages to provide a clear understanding of the battle, which mainly consisted of confusing

small-unit actions and close-quarters combat. The maps included in the book are an excellent resource to help the reader understand where the events are occurring in relation to each other. He weaves first-person accounts to not only provide a feeling for the events but also to give context to the larger picture. Concentrating on a single street provides a much more personal feel to the fighting and allows the author to avoid having to include the many other facets of Operation Market Garden.

One of the true strengths of this book is the author's analysis. Kershaw, a retired British army officer, uses his military experience to provide a good tactical analysis of the fighting. He lays blame squarely where he sees it. For example, he concludes the British failed to reach Arnhem Bridge because they mounted a series of hasty attacks instead of deliberately planning and conducting their assaults, which are necessary for modern urban combat.

In regards to the airborne drop of the Polish Parachute Brigade, he concludes "They were harshly inserted into a suspected trap. Then they were suddenly launched into a hotly contested perimeter following an ineptly conducted and costly river crossing. Little wonder that the Poles hardly felt reassured that they were part of a considered team enterprise."

The author's admiration for the Dutch people is evident in his writing. He describes, in vivid detail, what it was like to be a civilian caught between the two combatant forces—and also what it was like to live underground.

Many of the Dutch eventually had to move into, and live in, their cellars. Even more telling are the Dutch emotions once the battle is over and they discover what is left of their homes and street. The anxiety, fear, and emotional roller coaster of occupation, liberation, and occupation again is evident in the stories the author shares.

I recommend this book to those readers interested in World War II and in Operation Market Garden because of the insights Kershaw provides. The author promises examining one street will offer new insights—and he delivers. I also would recommend the book to readers interested in modern combat because of the lessons the author reveals about urban warfare.

Robert J. Rielly, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

WATERLOO: Wellington, Napoleon, and the Battle that Saved Europe


Gordon Corrigan, Pegasus Books, New York, 2014, 368 pages

There is no shortage of materiel on the battle of Waterloo, one of the most extensively studied battles in history. With 2015 marking the

battle's bicentennial, the market is flooded with a collection of new works. In *Waterloo: Wellington, Napoleon, and the Battle That Saved Europe*, Gordon Corrigan makes his contribution to this collection. Regrettably, his book contributes nothing particularly new to understanding the battle.

It is a general history, not a well-documented scholarly work useful for further research. Corrigan recognizes the challenge of producing another work on Waterloo. In his introduction, he answers the question of why another book on Waterloo by asserting that the participants "continue to fascinate" and, despite a multitude of research, the interpretations of the battle "vary widely." More importantly, he attempts to demonstrate Waterloo's importance in establishing Britain as a dominant world power.

Corrigan blends a thematic and chronological approach to telling the story of Waterloo. He opens his work with a concise chronological summary of the major events of the Napoleonic Wars leading to the Waterloo Campaign, and then he transitions to a thematic approach discussing the commanders, officers, and soldiers of the major belligerents. He concludes with an account of the battle, which provides a clear narrative of the major activities of all three armies. The highlights of this work include the author's comprehensive discussion of the purchasing system of the British army, his soldier's eye for the influence of the terrain on the battle, and his effective analysis of the influence Wellesley's service in India had on his development. He



also provides a very strong conclusion about the legacy of Waterloo and the Duke of Wellington within the British army.

One of the shortfalls in this book is Corrigan's approach to his sources. He provides only forty-three endnotes to support more than three hundred pages of content, while using explanatory footnotes to provide additional clarity, and the occasional humorous quip, in the body of the book. This is the most serious flaw in the work as far as scholarship and restricts the utility of the book to support further research. Throughout the book, Corrigan raises and attempts to debunk some of the myths of Waterloo but does not provide enough depth in his discussions or evidence in sources to meet this objective. He makes numerous assertions and conclusions throughout the work without citing the sources of his evidence.

Another book about Waterloo should provide something unique to set the work apart—a new perspective, original research, or a comprehensive, well-documented study. This book does not meet that standard. There is not much original here for specialists or serious scholars of the Napoleonic Wars. Corrigan provides a cursory overview of this important campaign, but he does not deliver a major contribution to the field of Napoleonic studies. Despite this shortfall, Corrigan is successful in his stated attempt in providing a general history that describes the importance of Waterloo in establishing Britain as a world power. This work is best suited for the newcomer to the era who wants an overview of the battle. If you are looking for an entry-level book as an introduction to a fascinating period or a casual weekend read, this book serves that purpose.

Col. Ken Turner, U.S. Army, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

**SKY PILOTS: The Yankee Division Chaplains
in World War I**

**Michael E. Shay, University of Missouri Press,
Columbia, Missouri, 2014, 240 pages**

An old adage holds there are no atheists in foxholes. While the accuracy of the statement is debatable, the presence of military chaplains on the battlefield is a certainty. Chaplains fill


a unique and vital role in war that is frequently overlooked in the study of military history. Author Michael E. Shay's latest work, *Sky Pilots: The Yankee Division in World War I*, is a detailed examination of that famed unit's chaplains in the Great War. These men, bereft of earthly weapons, served at the front throughout the 26th Yankee Division's brief but bloody deployment on the Western Front during World War I. Not content to remain in rear areas, the chaplains saw their duties as ministering to the front-line soldiers, facing the same hardships and even accompanying the infantrymen during combat operations. Their bravery came at a cost as several Yankee Division chaplains were wounded, and two were killed during the war.

Sky Pilots opens with a terse overview of the U.S. Army Chaplain Corps; just two paragraphs are dedicated to covering the history of American military chaplains from 1775 to 1917. While focused specifically upon the Yankee Division's chaplains, Shay also provides some detail on the Army's larger efforts to recruit and train ministers for the entire American Expeditionary Forces. Shay's story generally follows the Yankee Division's campaign across France, to the armistice, and the men's eventual return home to America. The penultimate chapter details the chaplains' post-war lives as civilian or military pastors. Shay is a dedicated researcher, and his work is broad in scope and rich in detail. The book's narrative, however, follows a meandering course that too often jumps from subject to subject. The author weaves vignettes on individual

chaplains with randomly interspersed descriptions of life in the trenches. No doubt both are interesting topics, but the book's pacing suffers from the frequent interruptions.

Shay includes numerous black-and-white photographs of the chaplains themselves, often taken during their ministerial duties in the field. While most military history buffs

are familiar with the iconic images of the Great War, these photographs further reveal a hitherto overlooked facet of the conflict. Sadly, there is but one simple map



depicting the Yankee Division's locations and movements across France. While *Sky Pilots* is not a book of commanders and maneuvers, it would benefit from a more detailed set of maps placing the story within the context of the larger war. Given the recent controversies regarding religion in the military, it is worthwhile for professional soldiers to examine the benefits chaplains provide to those in uniform. *Sky Pilots* provide a valuable, and often touching, look into the critical role chaplains fulfill. Shay makes extensive use of personal letters and diaries, citing the chaplains' enormous positive impact on their units—from providing the simple comforts of home at mobile canteen trucks to tending to the men's spiritual needs. This alone makes *Sky Pilots* worthy of professional study and debate.

**Lt. Col. Chris Heatherly, U.S. Army,
Washington State University,
Pullman, Washington**

**COMICS AND CONFLICT: Patriotism and
Propaganda from WWII through Operation
Iraqi Freedom**

**Cord A. Scott, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis,
Maryland, 2014, 224 pages**


Comics and Conflict begins with a brief recapitulation of the history of the comics from the Gilded Age (the late nineteenth century). Then it concentrates on war comics, a category distinct from other subgenres such as action-hero or talking animal comics. This type of comic arose in the World War II era and continues to the present day—or as close as a scholarly work by a scholarly press can get—to the Nation's disillusionment in the aftermath of the Iraq venture. Scott's periodization is the not standard used in general American history—the chapters after World War II span respectively 1945–62, 1962–1991, 1991–2001, 2001–2003, and 2003–2010—but the coverage is comprehensive and appropriate to the topic.

One may wonder why anyone would bother writing a history of war comics. Perhaps it is because American forces read them—and even have special series available only at military facilities. And the services, as well as civilian institutions, still use cartoons and comic books as training devices.

More to the point, as the author argues so ably in this short but tight work, comics are like movies and other popular media in that they reflect not only current events but popular perceptions. Specifically, the “good war” comics were much more patriotic and harmonious than, say, the storylines of the Vietnam era. There is an ebb and flow that corresponds to the fluctuating public support for American military ventures, and the comics reflect the mood.

In fact, like other media, they may even play a role in defining that mood. Furthermore, over time, the comics become more reflective, more realistic, and more grown up. Just as the readership shifts from preteen and teenager to young adult to soldier, the age group of the readership currently stands at late teens to early twenties. There were no comic treatments of shell shock or battle fatigue, but now comics sometimes address posttraumatic stress disorder and the internal conflicts between what combat really entails and what the civilian norm accepts.

What the work could use is more illustrations.



Although the text is clear about the story lines, costuming, and colors, the illustrations consist of covers only, no panels, and the illustrations are black and white. I suppose cost is a consideration, this being a short-run volume that is already relatively expensive rather than a lavish commercial production at half the cover price.

To be clear, this is not a light-hearted romp through everyone's childhood memories but rather a serious scholarly study of one neglected medium—the war comic book; it includes comic strips and graphic novels only in passing. Indirectly, it is a work about America's wars, from World War II on, and about American support or opposition for those wars, or simple questioning. It is also a story indirectly of American GIs and their civilian peers becoming more sophisticated and questioning about their country's military involvement in combat or in support. Although by no means essential to the

warrior's bookshelf, it is a good supplement to the more orthodox studies of America's military ventures over the past seventy years.

John H. Barnhill, PhD, Houston, Texas

SMALL NAVIES: Strategy and Policy for Small Navies in War and Peace

Edited by Michael Mulqueen, Deborah Sanders, and Ian Speller, Ashgate Publishing, Burlington, Vermont, 2014, 247 pages

As *Military Review* is “the U.S. Army’s cutting edge forum for original thought and debate on the art and science of land warfare,” the review of a book such as *Small Navies* on naval forces—insignificant naval forces at that—might appear out of place. However, as the security environment becomes more complex, knowledge of the other warfare domains increases in importance.

The anthology *Small Navies* demonstrates that size really does matter, particularly when it comes to the role and function of navies in global security. This up-to-date compendium includes thirteen of the essays presented at a recent international conference examining small navies, from the past and present, using interdisciplinary approaches. While interdisciplinary, *Small Navies* is more suited towards analysts as the papers that make up the various chapters are focused more on an analytical approach towards naval warfare than an operational one.

Analysts will find that the most valuable section of the anthology is the chapters by Grove, Till, and Germond, which develop classifications for small navies based on quantitative, qualitative, and perceptive data. One of their schemes is a global naval hierarchy with nine rungs—starting with the U.S. Navy, continuing through the navies of the United Kingdom, Japan, and Singapore, and ending with token navies, such as the one in Belize. Another is a six-tier ranking of small navies—with token navies on the first tier, navies capable of performing defensive combat tasks in coastal zones on the third tier, and navies capable of conducting operations in the regional theater on the sixth tier.

Although written primarily for naval professionals, *Small Navies* provides some insight for all members of

the security community on a subject that has received relatively little scholarly attention. For example, an essay by Giacomello and Ruffa, “Small Navies and Border and Immigration Control: Frontex Operations in the Mediterranean,” describes how small navies—similar to U.S. and allied armies—have been expanding their missions beyond traditional warfighting. Further similarities between land and naval forces can be found in issues of logistics, training, equipping, efficiencies, and command and control. Knowledge of these changing missions of another service as described in *Small Navies* primarily helps analysts but is also of value to operators.

Karsten Engelmann, PhD, Stuttgart, Germany

DEMOCRATIC MILITARISM: Voting, Wealth, and War

Jonathan D. Caverley, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 2014, 326 pages

Have you ever wondered why democracies go to war? In *Democratic Militarism: Voting, Wealth, and War*, Jonathan D. Caverley, professor at Northwestern University, distills the answer for the average voter—me and you—in the democratic process. This scholarly, international-relations monograph asserts that median voters are instrumental in a democracy’s willingness to engage in international pugnacity.

Caverley claims it is the median voters’ complicity in enabling civilian and military leaders to engage and execute strategies that produces minimal gains. The book focuses on the “average voter’s assessment of the costs and benefits of arming and aggression.”

The initial chapters provide theories and hypotheses as to why and how democracies fight wars. Overall, the analysis reveals median voters are more likely to accept war when they’re nominally impacted. They prefer capital-intensive militaries—focusing on technology and minimal casualties—rather than labor-intensive forces. This apathy and bellicosity lead to outsourcing wars to natives, futile air-bombing campaigns—Vietnam and bankrupt strategies yielding marginal returns—think most wars.

These assertions undergo rigorous statistical analysis, covering the first five chapters. Final chapters present

case studies across three historical events and describe median voter influence on military strategies.

First, the British Empire is examined in relation to “electoral reform and imperial overstretch.” Caverley investigates median voters influence on the empire’s growth and its use of natives in wars. Next, the Vietnam War is reviewed. He asks why “... a democracy would spend such vast resources to conduct a flawed counter-insurgency.” Spoiler alert: it’s the median voters’ impact on civilian leaders. Decisions made during the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations are analyzed.

Third, Caverley assesses Israel’s Second Lebanon War of 2006. Most notably, in this chapter, cost distribution theory is scrutinized. He emphasizes that “the [Israeli] civilian leaders are more sensitive to public opinion than the Israeli Defense Forces,” which, in this engagement, had significant impact on the strategic gains that could or could not be achieved. Caverley closes with a summary of his findings, some final thoughts, and recommended future analysis.

To be clear, this is a wonky book! It is chock full of graphs, charts, and tables; a quick stats refresher is required. Getting through the initial chapters can be challenging; nonetheless, once beyond the quantitative parlance, readers are able to understand the assertions presented across the case studies.

Because this monograph illuminates the responsibilities, consequences, and impact voting has on war, it’s recommended for defense policy analysts and all military members. Casting a vote may determine whether you cast a bullet.

**Maj. John L. Hewitt III, U.S. Army,
Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina**

NETWORKS OF REBELLION: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse

**Paul Staniland, Cornell University Press, Ithaca,
New York, 2014, 312 pages**


The fundamental question Paul Staniland asks in his book is “why some insurgent groups are unified and disciplined while others struggle with splits and feuds.” Instead of treating the structure of insurgent groups as universal and static, the author provides a detailed and useful theory of how insurgent

groups’ organizational cohesion determines how insurgents use violence, how they fare under counter-insurgent pressure, and their long-term prospects for survival—and even victory.

Networks of Rebellion has sound organization with an opening chapter and three major parts. The first explains Staniland’s theory in detail; the second consists of three case studies that serve as comparative evidence for the theory; and the final part explores implications.

Staniland’s overarching theory is that insurgent cohesion “shapes how wars are fought, how wars end, and the politics that emerge after the war.” Cohesion includes internal insurgent discipline and organizational control, which greatly affects the group’s ability to effectively wage warfare and, ultimately, win a war. Cohesion impacts the conclusion of conflicts as groups with poor cohesion can split due to subgroup objectives, much as coalitions of nation-states can split due to differing national objectives. Staniland’s theory also provides insight into why some victorious insurgent groups become successful post-war regimes and why others fail as ruling governments.

To underpin his theory, the author uses a new



typology of insurgent groups, which has four categories of insurgent organizational structure: integrated, vanguard, parochial, and fragmented. This typology provides insight for examining insurgent groups and understanding their behavior. However, the group’s desired ends, the scope of the insurgency, the level of mass support, cultural

context, and other characteristics can also aid in understanding and predicting insurgent behavior.

“Insurgent groups are born from prewar politics” is another of Staniland’s key points. The origins of insurgent groups matter. For example, were they a politicized opposition group? Or, did they plan on using violence from the outset? The answer to this and similar questions shape both the initial and enduring organization.

Staniland’s three case studies serve as comparative evidence to test the author’s theory. Additionally, the

case studies make valuable contributions to the study of Kashmir, Afghanistan, and Sri Lanka. The author's personal field research supports each of the three case studies, which adds to their overall value and lends support to his argument. The author convincingly evaluated his theory and properly pointed out its limitations.

Although not for the casual or general military reader, serious students of insurgency, irregular warfare, strategy, international relations, and Southern Asia will value this groundbreaking study. Staniland's work is very much worth reading, especially for those who wish to understand insurgent organizations, particularly insurgent organizations in Kashmir, Afghanistan, and Sri Lanka.

**Lt. Col. Jonathan P. Klug, U.S. Army,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

AFRICAN CANADIANS IN UNION BLUE:

Volunteering for the Cause in the Civil War


**Richard Reid, Kent State University Press, Kent,
Ohio, 2014, 320 pages**

African Canadians in *Union Blue* is an excellently written historical monograph exploring the lives of African Canadians who served in the Union army during the Civil War. While the work is a much-needed study that should influence the way that academic historians understand the Civil War, it is still a valuable and readable text for any military professional. His principal argument is that African Canadian soldiers fought for the Union because emancipation “generated new social and economic opportunities for them” rather than the widely believed notion that most African Canadians serving in the Union army were slaves freed through the Underground Railroad. His use of census records and enlistment documents quickly illustrated how Canadians served in the Union army in order to fight for more rights for Africans in North America.

While the book is an excellent contribution to the historiography of the Civil War, it is most useful to members of the U.S. military because of its focus on the motivations for service amongst African Canadian soldiers. His study described how African Canadian soldiers deserted the Union army in large numbers until they were they were used in the combat roles they

volunteered for. All African soldiers would either be executed or placed into slavery upon capture, so their service—regardless of early desertion rates—was highly courageous. Many of the soldiers chose to remain in the U.S. Army and served on the frontier after the war because the United States was offering more rights through military service than Africans could receive in newly confederated Canada.

The last section of Reid's book focused on African Canadian doctors, who served during the Civil War as well as the war's aftermath. This group represent-



ed one of the only cohorts that went to British North America, from the United States, because African doctors were able to practice medicine on indigenous groups in the Canadian West and could officially certify in the British North American system. The role played by African contract surgeons represents

a key addition to an already high volume of literature on woman caregivers in the Civil War.

They were forced to serve as contract surgeons, and when they wore the rank of a major as a result of their contracted commissions, their lives were now endangered to an even greater extent. They were later key physicians for the Freedmen's Bureau, and some played prominent leadership roles in the Grand Army of the Republic. The section on the Grand Army of the Republic was the most uplifting in the book. Although all the soldiers experienced racism, once the Grand Army of the Republic became a veterans group, the segregation of the group provided them the opportunity to become chapter presidents and to assume other major leadership roles. The book's most uplifting message captured how the Civil War's shift towards the ennobled cause of emancipation influenced brave African North Americans to serve—regardless of their national origins.

Joseph R. Miller, Orono, Maine

**THE SECRET WAR FOR THE MIDDLE EAST:
The Influence of Axis and Allied Intelligence
Operations during World War II**

**Youssef Aboul-Enein and Basil Aboul-Enein,
Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland,
2013, 256 pages**


Capturing the hearts of the populace by outlining the plight created by foreign powers seeking to undermine one's own interest may sound like a story from Twitter but, instead, it was heard over radio broadcasts from places such as Berlin and Baghdad in the late 1930s. Harnessing the media of the day—and skillfully embedding messages into propaganda that compared the plight of Germany to that of Palestine—the Axis powers intertwined fascist ideology with the growing Arab Nationalism movement during this period in an effort to influence the population. This history to gain influence and control the Middle East during World War II is exquisitely recounted by Youssef and Basil Aboul-Enein in *The Secret War for the Middle East: The Influence of Axis and Allied Intelligence Operations during World War II*.

The authors detail the saga to gain influence over the masses through in-depth research based on Western and Arab sources, supplemented by first-hand sources that detail the strategies employed by both the Axis and Allied powers. Building on lessons learned from World War I and the Great Arab Revolt of 1916, the Axis powers worked to capitalize on the victimization produced by the 1919 Paris Peace Conference and the growing “Palestine Question.” What started as an attempt by Germany to gain allies in the Middle East in the 1930s, supported by individuals like Haj Amin el-Husseini, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, may have set the foundation that helped inspire the nationalist ideals of individuals such as Nasser Hussein, the Ba’ath Party, and Saddam Hussein, and continue to influence today’s extremists. Saddam, for example, viewed former Iraqi prime minister Rashid Aali al-Gaylani as a national hero for his attempts to overthrow the British in the 1940s.

This book should be required reading for anyone interested in the Middle East as it is laced with sources and references that provide readers an opportunity to conduct their own focused historical research to expand

their knowledge and understanding. Youssef and Basil set out to write a book designed to introduce a nonspecialist to the ideas of how “influence operations, strategic communication, and the use of intelligence in strategic planning” can shape the environment, and they have clearly accomplished this goal.

Insight into these operations illustrate how the Allies secured the region, which allowed them to maintain control of the Suez Canal and the Persian Corridor. This



is in stark contrast to the German war plans, which were never fully acted upon by Adolf Hitler. The reader can easily associate with the locations and operations from the 1930s and 1940s, which correlate with similar operations that have occurred over the past fourteen years. These insights can also be used to scrutinize why insurgent groups today are seeking to control

these same key lines of communication and are using similar messages to inspire the population. It is through the understanding of this historic precedence to gain control of the populations that one can better comprehend the messages being employed today to influence the population.

Lt. Col. Karl Ledebuhr, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

**FIRST TO JUMP: How the Band of Brothers
Was Aided by the Brave Paratroopers of
Pathfinders Company**

**Jerome Preisler, Berkley Publishing Group,
New York, 2014, 288 pages**

Deservedly, a great deal of study has been devoted to the storied paratroopers of World War II. The exploits of the American paratrooper in Normandy and Bastogne, to mention a few, holds a special place in history. In reflection, airborne operations in World War II were truly a revolution in warfare. Merely

thirty years before, Gen. John “Black Jack” Pershing supplied his horse cavalry in new fashion—by motorized vehicles—during the Pancho Villa Expedition. A generation later, rapid advances in aviation, wireless communications, and mass manufacturing gave way to airborne armies vertically enveloping the enemy deep in rear areas. Jerome Preisler adds to the historical narrative in his book *First to Jump: How the Band of Brothers was Aided by the Brave Paratroopers of Pathfinders Company*.

First to Jump is about the Pathfinders Company of the 101st Airborne Division and about the pilots of the IX Troop Carrier Command who flew the pathfinders into battle, as told by the men who manned those units. The book is a series of firsthand historical accounts loosely interwoven around three major battles, each represented by a section in the book.

The first section, “Normandy,” starts off on 5 June 1944. Here, the reader gets a respectable recounting of pathfinder tactics, equipment, and procedures used to establish the drop zones—in the mere one hour prior to the mass jumps. Beyond that, the pathfinder’s story becomes like most of the paratroopers that night: small bands of soldiers joining together into ad hoc units to raise havoc with the enemy and seize the initiative.

The next section, “Market Garden,” recounts the difficulties of getting the eight- to twelve-member pathfinder teams through, in daylight, with only thirty minutes to establish drop zones. From that point on, the stories vary from hard fighting to the soldiers being greeted—with sheer euphoria—by the Dutch people.

The book’s final section: “Bastogne,” is perhaps the most interesting as it describes the chaos, the uncertainty, and the sense of urgency in the early days of the Battle of the Bulge. Here, the story of the Pathfinders Company is entirely its own. From the pathfinders’ risky airborne insertion, to how pathfinders guided allied aircraft laden with critical supplies into extremely tight drop zones, it tells of their finest hour.

First to Jump is an enjoyable, folksy, and informative collection of stories told through the voices of the men who were there on the ground. Preisler succeeds in the telling of their stories as a result of his thorough research of primary sources, which includes interviews with veterans.

A few cautionary notes are warranted. *First to Jump* is not a historical analysis. For starters, it does not contain maps or sketches. Additionally, even though Preisler spins

a good yarn, his over-characterization of the pathfinders as a bunch of misfits doomed to jump into the jaws of death becomes a bit tiresome. Also, beware—it is rife with errors ranging from spelling, grammatical, and narrative inconsistencies to a few historical inaccuracies. Beyond these distractions, *First to Jump* certainly can enrich your knowledge and deepen your respect for the “Beacons” of the Airborne.

**Lt. Col. Ronald T. Staver, U.S. Army, Retired,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

EUROJIHAD: Patterns of Islamist Radicalization and Terrorism in Europe


**Angel Rabasa and Cheryl Benard, Cambridge
University Press, New York, 2015, 246 pages**

Two RAND terrorism experts have produced an important work about how European nations are dealing with the paradox of radical Muslims wishing to put an end to democracy while they are using the benefits of living within this same European democratic society. It is a complex narrative surveying a central theater for Islamic terrorist operations. Rabasa and Benard offer key judgments that may not be obvious to the casual observer. Jihadism is a self-limiting extreme exception in Europe, but it is still a contentious issue in

France and other states struggling with the social integration of an expanding portion of their populations. Although Muslim integration is central to government approaches, the authors realistically assess that alienation is rarely the proximate cause of terrorism.

EUROJIHAD is well documented, especially concerning the United

Kingdom. It dissects patterns, nodes, operations, and tactics of Islamic radicalization in a manner similar to Edwin Bakker and Marc Sageman’s classic studies of terrorist networks. Many of the facts about the importance of personal relationships seem similar:



concentrated urban areas, radical mosques, and prisons ignite extremism. Europe's favorable legal regimes, easy movement across borders, Internet access, community tolerance, and target-rich environment fan the flames.

There are significant differences noted between the movements found in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, and Spain. Young North Africans around Paris, descendants of politicized refugees from earlier Algerian conflicts, have been involved in some high-profile incidents lately. Germany's Turkish community members are usually economic refugees who are also largely not integrated. Although most of the Turkish population have lived in Germany for eight years or longer, Turkey is still a major factor in their lives through the administration of hundreds of mosques on German soil. British Muslims are generally from South Asia and East Africa. Their active faith practices and high birthrate show a vibrancy that alarms and challenges the fading traditional Anglo-Saxon urban culture. Rabasa and Benard conclude radicalization "does not advance uniformly across Europe's diverse Muslim populations."

This book should be studied by U.S. security professionals interested in current major European issues. Its strength is as a detailed examination of European national environments, from a Western perspective, using many intelligence analysts as sources. Its weakness is the lack of insight into high-level security policy despite the extensive connections to Zalmay Khalilzad and others. On balance, it is a strong American contribution to a timely topic. With ISIS inspiring new radicalization among established European populations, the true terrorism problem should be correctly identified before vast resources are paid in attempts to stem it.

James Cricks, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

NEGOTIATING ARMENIAN-AZERBAIJANI PEACE: Opportunities, Obstacles, Prospects

**Ohannes Geukjian, Ashgate Publishing,
Burlington, Vermont, 2014, 286 pages**

In February 2015, mediators from the United States, France and Russia—the so-called Minsk Group co-chairs—warned of a deteriorating situation in and around Nagorno-Karabakh. The cause for this angst?

The loss of approximately sixty lives, the downing of an Armenian helicopter by Azerbaijani forces, and bellicose statements from Baku and Yerevan during 2014. Lost in the world's fixation on Ukraine and ISIS were increasing signs of thawing of this so-called "frozen conflict" between Armenians and Azerbaijanis. The arrival of Ohannes Geukjian's *Negotiating Armenian-Azerbaijani Peace: Opportunities, Obstacles, Prospects* is therefore timely as a reminder of this long-running conflict and the continuing need for creative approaches to its resolution.

Geukjian, of the American University of Beirut, Lebanon, is no stranger to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, having published an earlier book, *Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in the South Caucasus: Nagorno-Karabakh and the Legacy of Soviet Nationalities Policy* (2011). The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh is a part of the author's portfolio as a military adviser to the U.S. delegation to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe from 1998 through 2002.

Geukjian focuses not on a narrative of the conflict but on an understanding of it and the as-yet-unsuccessful efforts at negotiating its resolution. Geukjian approaches the conflict as a case through which to test three hypotheses about protracted social conflicts. The hypotheses have negotiations deadlock as their dependent variable. Their independent variables include best alternatives to a negotiated agreement, bluffing and lying by disputants, and ideas—fairness and justice. The failure of official diplomatic negotiations, primarily by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Minsk Group co-chairs, to achieve resolution of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh points to the need to involve the peoples concerned, and leaders below the national level, to address "basic human needs, like identity, recognition, security, and participation."

Geukjian organizes the book well, opening with two chapters in which he explains his approach and conceptual framework. Readers with an interest in theories of conflict management and resolution will want to devote attention to the conceptual framework in chapter 2. Those less enamored with social science studies, but having an interest in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, may choose to read the comprehensive account of the conflict in chapter one and then proceed to chapters 3 through 7, which describe negotiations from 1991 to 2012. Each chapter consists of a brief introduction, a discussion of the efforts at conflict resolution—to

include the positions of the belligerents and the involvement of outside players like the Minsk Group co-chairs, Turkey, and Iran—and a summary conclusion. Within the discussion, Geukjian presents evidence and assesses his hypotheses. In the penultimate chapter, he returns to the conceptual framework from chapter 2 to provide conclusions about the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh and draw some broader inferences about management, resolution, and transformation of conflicts. The book closes with an epilogue that covers developments in 2013 and 2014, appendices with the texts of key documents, and a detailed bibliography.

Negotiating Armenian-Azerbaijani Peace is a valuable contribution to the literature on conflicts, frozen and otherwise, in the former Soviet Union. It is also a worthwhile read for students and practitioners of conflict management and resolution, particularly those in which territory, ethnicity, and identity are relevant factors.

Mark Wilcox, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

OPERATION STORM: Japan's Top Secret Submarines and Its Plan to Change the Course of World War II

John J. Geoghegan, Crown Publishing Group, New York, 2013, 496 pages

As a writer for the *Huffington Post* and the *New York Times* science sections, John Geoghegan is known for examining technologies that, while innovative, do not pan out in the marketplace. He served as the writer and technical consultant for the PBS documentary *Japanese SuperSub*—the story of the Japanese I-400 class of submarines that carried the specially designed Aichi M6A Seiran attack aircraft.

The book *Operation Storm* came about when the author wrote an article entitled “Japan’s Panama Canal Buster” for *Aviation History* magazine in 2008. This article was the genesis for the PBS documentary in 2010 and, finally, the book *Operation Storm*.

How does a nation in the early to mid-1940s develop an ability to threaten the homeland of a hostile power across the vast Pacific Ocean when it does not expect to have control of the seas? This is the strategic question the Adm. Yamamoto pressed the Japanese navy and industrial base to resolve. The solution chosen


was the development of the I-400 class of submarines and their Seiran attack aircraft.

Geoghegan traces the development of the submarines and the aircraft from the requirement to mass airpower against major American coastal cities through their development and fielding. They were many technological obstacles to be overcome. The Japanese solved each of the challenges with innovative thinking. In the final analysis, while the capability was exceptional, it was developed too late, and with too few submarine-aircraft combinations produced, to have any strategic effect on the U.S. war effort against Japan. Interwoven throughout the I-400 story is a second story of the *USS Segundo*, a Balao-class submarine that captured a Japanese I-401 submarine in August 1945 after Japan’s surrender.

A military officer serving today can learn valuable lessons in reading this book and in examining the Japanese development of the I-400 class of submarine in relation to the tasks for which it was developed. *Operation Storm* can teach readers the criticality of the commander’s understanding and strategic vision of the war in which

the nation is engaged and the challenges that must be overcome to achieve the strategic end state. Second, the book can show readers the importance of the synthesis of requirements to resolve the strategic challenges. Third, it demonstrates the significance of understanding the time required, with competing requirements, to develop and field the operational capabilities required to achieve this strategic vision. Finally, it teaches readers to ask an important question: As circumstances change, do operational capabilities remain viable solutions to the strategic needs of a nation? Or, do they need to change as well?

The book is well researched, organized, and written. Free of difficult military language, it does not require the reader to be an expert in naval warfare. My only criticism of the book is that much of the history of the *USS Segundo* was irrelevant to the story of the



development and fielding of the I-400 submarines. *Operation Storm* is supported by extensive research, which includes many primary and secondary sources. Ninety of the 478 pages document the sources that were used.

Operation Storm has applicability to those studying change in the midst of conflict. This book is also for naval and WWII enthusiasts, novices, and scholar alike.

Lt. Col. Terrance M. Portman, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

**GAME CHANGER: The Impact of 9/11
on North American Security**

**Edited by Jonathan Paquin and Patrick James,
University of British Columbia Press,
Vancouver, British Columbia, 2014, 288 pages**

Game Changer is an assortment of essays by a group of notable scholars, edited by Jonathan Paquin and Patrick James, which provides a good understanding of twenty-first century North American hemispheric security integration. While also addressing the important issues of continuity within North American relations, it examines how and why security changes have taken place since 9/11. The main themes, threaded throughout the book, focus on the different threat perceptions between the United States, Canada, and Mexico, and how the varying degree of differences in both interests and priorities of their respective governments play a vital role in diplomatic relations.

The fateful events of 9/11 changed the landscape in terms of security and trade within the North American continent. The themes of security and sovereignty took precedence over the themes of free trade and integration of economic enhancement between the three countries. The hegemony of the United States within the region allowed it to focus its efforts and policies by transforming the security environment. These efforts have had a pronounced impact on the ongoing North American Free Trade Agreement partners' efforts to coordinate their economic integration. These new security efforts led to cooperation as well as political tensions between the three North American partners.

The book is divided into two parts and is finished off with a conclusion that integrates answers and, at times,

innovative recommendations derived from a number of security questions posed to the writers. The first part provides explanations of the differing changes in state behaviors after the 9/11 events. The second part focuses more on analyzing the primary developments in overall continental security and defense since 2001. The last chapter in part 2 postulates the unique idea of increasing continental cooperation between all three North American countries by integrating Mexico into NATO.

This book adds to current scholarly contributions that highlight a number of North American relationship issues, and it provides possible answers to various subsets of the posed initial questions. These answers focus on international relations theory and continental security, how to avoid future irritants, factors shaping security and trade policies, differing threat perceptions, and how those perceptions relate to linkage politics. Though the topics are well written, they seem to weigh more heavily on a Canadian perspective and less on a Mexican one. One topic that stands out is the inability to establish a trilateral approach in responding to security integration after 9/11. Another topic of interest is the security situation both Mexico and Canada had to negotiate with the United States in order to benefit economically.

Game Changer is highly recommended to all those who are currently assigned or soon-to-be assigned to a joint or combatant command as it highlights the different perspectives of security and trade between NAFTA members and how being politically sensitive to the other members relates directly to achieving one's own political and economic agendas.

Lt. Col. Stephen Harvey, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE FOURTH ARMY

**L. Craig Williams, Xlibris Corporation,
Bloomington, Indiana, 2013, 156 pages**


The *Fourth Army* details the assets Hitler's Germany dedicated for the Holocaust, as well as lessons to be learned from these horrors, through the accounts of a *Shoah* survivor. *Shoah* is Hebrew word for the Holocaust, which translates to "the catastrophe." The title *The Fourth Army* refers to the millions of Jews and other victims of the Nazi

regime—not as combatants, but as a result of labor economics. The author highlights the prioritization, materiel, and manpower utilized by the Third Reich in carrying out the “Final Solution” in lieu of the war effort against the Allies. The book concludes with the main character’s (Max Rosenthal’s) post-war life, living by himself after having lost his entire family during the Holocaust, and his desire to improve mankind through peace and good works.

The story is set in 1991, and Max Rosenthal is a one-hundred-year-old man, the last Holocaust survivor living in the German village of Bovenden, near the university town of Gottingen. Due to Max’s personal experiences, Dr. Kimmeler, on faculty at Gottingen University, encouraged Herwig Braun to write of Max’s personal experiences and insight for Braun’s doctoral thesis. The book’s setting focuses on the numerous meetings between Max and Herwig. Because of Max’s failing health due to old age, the two often met in the mornings when Max was more alert and active.

Max, a gentle, deeply religious man with much wisdom, had previously chosen not to share his experiences; however, Kimmeler convinced him that he needed to share his story for the good of mankind—and for history. Max was a German war veteran of World War I. During the war, he lost a leg at the knee and received the Iron Cross for his heroism. The medal, and the accompanying paperwork, provided some level of protection as Hitler’s Germany and the Nuremberg Laws took effect but, at some point, his heroism was no longer recognized.

The book provides accounts of the experiences of non-Jewish Germans during the war that Max garnered during the post-war years. Among his findings was that German citizens largely understood the real purpose of the camps in the east through the accounts of German soldiers returning home on leave, who passed the purpose of the camps along to families, friends, and clergy. Though labeled as work camps,



the shipments going east did not include the type of materiel for manufacturing but rather for basic concentration camps—along with basic requirements for the guard forces. The author also weaves in the massive rail requirements and manpower needs for the transportation of the Holocaust victims to the east from their point of capture to their final destinations.

In addition to the resources required for the massive undertaking of capturing, holding, and killing millions, Max also provides accounts of the loss of human capital. His stories relate the loss of Jewish store owners who supported local economies as well as the loss of those Jews who worked in the medical profession. Many top doctors, who happened to be Jewish, no longer contributed to the profession due to the Nuremberg Laws; its statutes effectively removed Jews from the work force beginning in 1935. As a result, Germany suffered on the world stage due to the dearth of leadership in its professional fields this caused—and, it continued well after the war’s end due to what the author described as the “brownshirt effect.”

Max’s testimonials include recounting when he and his family were apprehended by the Nazis and how, tragically, after being separated soon after they left their village, he never saw them again. He also shares his experiences of suffering in the concentration camps—the horrific conditions, the treatment within the camps, and how his survival forged the path in which he chose to live the rest of his life.

The remainder of the book explains Max’s views on peace and understanding. Max was a true believer in helping out one’s fellow man in order to better mankind. He was very concerned about how bloodlust sports, violent video games, and action movies negatively influenced the goal for a better world. He also advocated for noncooperation with those state actors that are not in tune with human rights. He believed that a “plowshare” mentality would help a society flourish and that each person must do his or her part in making the world a better place.

In fact, while in his 90s, Max frequently assisted Turkish immigrants in learning German. He volunteered his time, for no charge in the evenings, in the hope of aiding their inculcation into the German society.

As the interviews progressed, Max’s health continued to fail. While the series of interviews regarding his views on how to live a better life concluded, Max was

hospitalized and died several days later—with Herwig at his side.

The book provides a great amount of information seldom seen regarding the cost to the Nazis in carrying out Hitler's plan to capture, transport, clothe, feed, and, ultimately, to eliminate the Jews and other Nazi victims from Europe. The author makes a case that *The Fourth Army* enabled the Allies to reign victorious due to Germany's prioritization of the Final Solution.

Max's viewpoints toward the end help highlight the lessons learned due to the inhumanity displayed throughout the Shoah, a twentieth century tragedy by a Western culture. Though a devout Jew, Max recognized that all religions preach peace and goodwill to mankind in their own ways.

**Lt. Col. Steven C. Wieggers, U.S. Army,
Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

COMBATANT COMMANDS: Origins, Structure, and Engagements

**Cynthia Watson, Praeger, Santa Barbara,
California, 2010; 257 pages**

Writing as part of the Praeger Security International series, Cynthia Watson sets out to fill a "void" in the American public's understanding of U.S. combatant commands. Her goal, as stated in the preface, is "to provide a basic reference in hopes of spurring much greater public debate, as I believe this debate to be not only essential to our form of government, but because parents and loved ones deserve to know who is supporting as well as commanding those women and men who go to war." To these ends, she is successful in analyzing, organizing, and presenting information about the geographic combatant commands.

The author begins with an introductory chapter on the origins of the combatant command "system," including a review of statutory provisions, Department of Defense reorganization efforts, the Unified Command Plan, and trends in the leadership of these organizations.

These passages set the stage for an overview of the six U.S. geographic combatant commands: Pacific

Command, European Command, Southern Command, Central Command, Northern Command, and Africa Command. Using public sources, Watson analyzes each command's history, treaty obligations, mission, structure, engaging institutions, and future challenges.

Watson is at her best in presenting the history and defense obligations associated with each geographic command. She explains how the strategic environment—both historically and contemporarily—influenced the genesis of these commands as well as their most recent challenges.

She shows how each command is uniquely different from others and how the traditional missions of some are evolving into nation-building, humanitarian assistance, counterdrug, and homeland security. Subordinate commands, multinational connections, interagency links, and "hot spots" are also described in some detail.

While one learns much about each geographic combatant command, the reader is left wanting more detail about functional combatant commands, such as Special Operations Command, Transportation Command, and Strategic Command. Watson chose not to analyze these commands. In her words, they "do not engage in operations overseas, themselves, but provide the forces that allow the geographic combatant commands to exercise their operations."

Additionally, her analysis, at times, seems unduly repetitive, albeit in several areas deliberately so. Her work would also have benefited from sharper editing (e.g., "General McArthur's," an endnote missing in chapter 5 text, and "Joint Ask Force").

While these shortfalls somewhat diminish the quality of the work, her greatest challenge would be hard for anyone to overcome: currency. An author who chooses to write on the contemporary commands runs the risk of being outdated at the point of publication. As Watson describes, the geographic combatant commands are evolving organizations, working to adjust and be relevant as the environment changes. As we have seen and experienced, those changes can occur rapidly and can prompt our security institutions to adapt accordingly. Nevertheless, her work is well worth the read for an understanding of each command's history and focus.

**Stephen D. Coats, PhD,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**