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Military Review

THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF THE U.S. ARMY

January-February 2016



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COMBINED ARMS CENTER, FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS



Happy New Year!

As I compose this letter and reflect on the last twelve months, I marvel at how quickly the year has passed and how much we have accomplished. While combining *Military Review* and the Combat Studies Institute into one organization, we managed to reorganize personnel, develop new approaches to familiar processes, and welcome many more professionals into the fold. We transformed a thirteen-person staff into a robust team of forty-one writers, researchers, historians, instructors, editors, and web administrators. I am immensely proud to be the director of one of the Army's newest organizations—the Army Press.

So, why the Army Press? Writing is one of the most important things we can do across the force to document and share best practices, develop new ideas, and debate issues important to the Army. The Press serves as the point of entry and the Army's hub for identifying, encouraging, and coaching prospective authors to write and publish articles or book-length works.

The Army Press allows for the publication of more products due to the partnerships we share with many Army center-of-excellence and Department of Defense publications, as well as our ability to publish manuscripts and articles in print and online under the Army Press imprint. This means more publication opportunities for authors and increased information sharing across the force.

Although the Army Press officially became a reality in August, it continues to evolve. For example, the recent activation of our website has greatly enhanced

our functionality. And, the Press will continue to grow over the next several years. The *NCO Journal* will soon join the Army Press; it is scheduled to transition its team from Fort Bliss, Texas, to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, later this year. We are looking forward to adding the *NCO Journal's* very talented staff of noncommissioned officers and civilians to the Army Press family.

Due to recent global events, we approached this edition of *Military Review* a bit differently by republishing an article by the chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, Gen. Valery Gerasimov. He offers his perspective—and the prevalent view in Russian security circles—of the recent past, present, and expected future of warfare.

You will also find comments made by Russian President Vladimir Putin during a speech given to the UN General Assembly 28 September 2015 addressing his view of the future, including the future of war.

We juxtaposed these articles with a discussion by Charles K. Bartles. He puts Gerasimov's article, written for a Russian audience, in context for U.S. readers by explaining references that could be missed or easily misunderstood.

I feel this edition of *Military Review* is one of the most powerful to date; I hope you agree, and I invite you to provide your perspectives on the very important topic of The Future of War through a letter to the editor or through our various social media platforms found at <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/militaryreview/index.asp> or <http://armypress.dodlive.mil/>. Thank you for your continued support, and please have a safe and prosperous new year! ■



An 82nd Airborne Division soldier returns after completing a jump during the 18th Annual Randy Oler Memorial Operation Toy Drop, hosted by U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne), 4 December 2015, on Sicily Drop Zone at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

(Photo by Sgt. Destiny Mann, 450th Civil Affairs Battalion Airborne)

Announcing the 2016 General William E. DePuy Combined Arms Center Writing Competition

This year's theme is Educating the Force—What is the right balance between training and education?


Possible topics include but are not limited to—

- Do soldiers really need higher education? If so, to what level?
- Are the Army's professional military education (PME) programs teaching the right objectives; and, if so, are graduates applying them? How should it ensure PME reflects the force's needs?
- How should the Army measure the effects of Army education on the conduct of Army operations? What metrics should it use?
- How should the Army measure the effects of Army education on soldiers' careers?
- How well is the Army taking advantage of any educational opportunities it provides soldiers?
- How well are the civilian study programs the Army pays for benefitting the force or the careers of soldiers? What fields of study does the Army need most?
- How should the Army change the way it uses the expertise soldiers gain through civilian study?

Contest Closes 11 July 2016

1st Place	\$1,000 and publication in <i>Military Review</i>
2nd Place	\$750 and consideration for publication in <i>Military Review</i>
3rd Place	\$500 and consideration for publication in <i>Military Review</i>

For information on how to submit an entry, go to <http://militaryreview.army.mil>



Maj. Chris Sturm, coordinator for the U.S. Army Cadet Command's Culture and Language Program, and eleven Reserve Officer Training Corps cadets assigned to temporary duty with U.S. Army Africa ride camels 13 June 2014. The cadets completed a variety of missions in Africa and Europe over a two-month period.

(Photo courtesy of the U.S. Army)

Themes for Future Editions

with Suggested Topics

Global Insurgencies

March-April 2016

- ◆ Quranic concept of war
- ◆ Updates on regional conflicts
- ◆ Regionally aligned forces reports from the field

Army Firsts

May-June 2016

- ◆ The importance of land power and its part in national security (including national defense and foreign relations): A hundred years ago, today, and a hundred years in the future
- ◆ Past wars—What worked/what did not work; what is and is not working now
- ◆ Weapon systems, an operational approach, right/wrong implementation
- ◆ Females in combat military occupational specialties
- ◆ Status of openly gay and lesbian servicemember acceptance
- ◆ A comparison of male and female posttraumatic stress disorder

The Future of Innovation in the Army

July-August 2016

- ◆ How much innovation is just right? Can you have too much?
- ◆ Historical examples of institutionally fostered innovation
- ◆ Institutional and cultural obstacles to innovation in the U.S. Army of the twenty-first century

Dealing with a Shrinking Army

September-October 2016

- ◆ Lessons from post-Civil War, post-World War I, post-World War II, post-Vietnam, and post-Cold War
- ◆ Training to standard with limited resources
- ◆ Quality retention during forced drawdowns
- ◆ The good, bad, and ugly of distance learning

Tides of History: How they Shape the Security Environment


November-December 2016

- ◆ Mao's three stages of revolutionary warfare and the rise of ISIL and Boko Haram; winning by outgoverning
- ◆ Collisions of culture: The struggle for cultural hegemony in stability operations. Can a nation survive without a common national narrative?
- ◆ Armies as a cultural leveler—Are armies key to developing a national narrative and identity?
- ◆ Open borders—Is North America evolving toward European Union-style governance: implications for the U.S. military if North America becomes a borderless continent
- ◆ Case studies: Histories of illegal immigration and how such have shaped national development in various countries
- ◆ Does the military have a role in saving democracy from itself? Compare and contrast the military's role in the life of the Weimar Republic and Mohamed Morsi's Muslim Brotherhood rule of Egypt
- ◆ How can the Department of Defense better leverage international military education and training (IMET) to support U.S. Army activities in geographical regions?

"Sacred Cows"—What should go away but won't

January-February 2017

- ◆ Army institutions, processes, customs, or doctrine that are anachronistic and impede needed change and progress
- ◆ How social change is having an impact on the Army
- ◆ Relevance of the Uniform Code of Military Justice: What is the state of military justice and military policing, including corrections? What crimes do soldiers commit, not just against detainees but also against other soldiers, their families, civilians, or unified action partners? How well do people accused of crimes receive due process? Is military justice applied fairly and equitably across all ranks? Is racism or excessive force an issue of concern for military police? How well trained are military police as compared to civilian counterparts?



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How Globalization is Changing the Security Paradigm

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U.S. Army**

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President Vladimir Putin

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(Composition by Michael Hogg, Original photo by Staff Sgt. Jim Greenhill, US Army National Guard)

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An aerial view of the Ebola treatment unit (ETU) in Zorzor, Liberia, 10 January 2015. The facility was among the final two of ten ETUs completed in the West African nation by U.S. and international agencies engaged in Operation United Assistance.

(Photo courtesy of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers)

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Mark A. Milley—General, United States Army Chief of Staff

Official: 

Gerald B. O'Keefe—Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army

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A soldier of 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry Regiment, scans the area for opposing forces while conducting defensive operations training 31 October 2015 during exercise Combined Resolve V at the U.S. Army's Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany. Exercise Combined Resolve V was designed to exercise the U.S. Army's regionally aligned force to the U.S. European Command area of responsibility with multinational training at all echelons. The exercise trained U.S. participants and their NATO allies to function together in a joint, multinational environment.

(Photo by Spc. John Cress Jr., U.S. Army Europe PAO)



(Illustration by Michael Hogg, Army Press)

The Future of War

How Globalization is Changing the Security Paradigm

Capt. Johnny Sokolosky Jr., U.S. Army

2nd Place, 2015 DePuy Contest Winner

Things aren't where we left them when we headed off into the mountains after 9/11.

—David Kilcullen

On 11 September 2001, the world experienced a cataclysmic event that has since defined U.S. national security policy. While the United States shifted its focus to the increasing threat of transnational terrorism, globalization continued to wield its influence.

At the most basic level, globalization is the integration of trade, ideas, services, information, technologies,

and communications. A gradual movement toward globalization has existed since the birth of civilizations, but in the past few decades the phenomenon exponentially progressed with advances in communication and transportation technologies.

The range of modern globalization's effects is quite significant. At the local level, globalization allows citizens to drink relatively inexpensive coffee from

Ethiopia at Starbucks. At the strategic level, globalization is responsible for rapid growth in emerging economies such as China and India.

While the effects of globalization are widely contested and not fully understood, what is becoming clear is that globalization is a force that is significantly changing how the world works. Predicting the future of war is a fool's errand, but an examination of global trends provides insightful clues to the security environment that will shape how the United States conducts war in the future.

As a result of globalization, the security environment the United States now faces is shifting away from interstate conflict. Therefore, its military strategy must reflect this change by enhancing its capacity to project power in a future dominated by intrastate conflict, transnational terrorism, and urbanization.

The following sections will address these global trends and provide recommendations for how we can face the challenges that stem from them despite the fiscal realities at home.

Decline of Interstate Conflict

*The world has entered the era of permanent great power peace.*¹

—Christopher J. Fettweis

Since 1945, the number of interstate conflicts has declined precipitously despite the number of states in the international community tripling.² In comparison to intrastate conflict, interstate conflicts are quite infrequent. In most years, less than three conflicts are ongoing at any time, and from 2004 to 2010, zero interstate conflicts existed.³ This declining trend in interstate conflict is remarkable, and yet the trend is mostly unacknowledged in the U.S. military. Undoubtedly, many variables contribute to this trend, such as the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons or the advance of democracy across the globe. But, a number of studies attribute the decline of interstate conflicts to globalization.⁴ Kristian Gleditsch and Steve Pickering best describe the pacification effect of globalization: “States with more trade and more extensive economic relations are likely to have higher opportunity costs from escalation to war and may have more opportunities to signal intent and reach resolution by means other than

force.”⁵ The interconnectedness of states is, in effect, limiting the benefits of conventional war and promoting other means to achieve political ends.

While the decline of interstate conflict is a positive trend, it is important to note two things. First, although the incidence of interstate conflict remains low, the risk of conflict between states still exists, particularly among neighboring nations with increasing populations competing for declining resources. Second, states are increasingly inclined to support proxy wars rather than engage in direct conflict themselves in an effort to achieve political or strategic gains. Russia's material support to the separatists in Crimea and eastern Ukraine highlights such a strategy. While an all-out conventional invasion would be unacceptable to the international community, Russia's strategy of plausible deniability enables it to violate Ukraine's sovereign borders, instigate instability, and seize strategic territory.

To further illustrate the reluctance of the international community to resort to conventional war, consider the following example. On 17 July 2014, Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 was shot down over Ukraine, killing 298 people.⁶ Shooting down an airliner flying at 32,000 feet is clearly beyond the normal capacity of a guerrilla fighter, and evidence points to Russian-backed separatists.⁷ Yet, despite Russia's indirect involvement in an attack that killed citizens from several different countries, the international community chose to respond with an investigation and economic sanctions.

These are powerful examples of how states are inclined to behave in the era of globalization—and they raise the question: What would be the threshold for the United States to commit to a large-scale conventional war again, given the recent drawdown from our longest period of war?

Rise of Intrastate Conflict

*U.S. strategic culture has a long tradition of downplaying such atypical concerns in favor of a focus on more conventional state-based military power.*⁸

—Audrey K. Cronin

While irregular warfare accounts for approximately 83 percent of all conflicts in the past two centuries of war, globalization creates conditions that will further encourage irregular warfare and intrastate conflict



(Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

A man carries a sign endorsing Facebook as "the Egyptian social network" during a protest 1 February 2011 in Egypt. Social networks played a vital role in the uprising that eventually forced the resignation of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.

as opposed to interstate conventional warfare.⁹ As observed in the previous section, states that are integrated into the global economy appear less likely to use conventional military force. Rather, the rise in opportunity costs is forcing states to use proxy forces to achieve political goals. Iran's support of the Houthis in Yemen and U.S. support for the mujahideen during the Soviet-Afghan War are two examples.

In addition, the potential of cyber warfare is expanding, as evident by the Stuxnet virus that caused physical damage to the Iranian nuclear facility in 2009–2010.¹⁰ While this event was allegedly carried out by Israel and the United States, the capacity of nonstate actors to eventually achieve an attack of similar scale on critical infrastructure or global networks should not be underestimated.

Another global trend influencing intrastate conflict is the process of democratization. While conflicts between developed democratic states are practically nonexistent in modern times, the path to democracy is often through intrastate conflict because

globalization provides greater avenues and tools for people seeking democratic freedoms.

Consider the revolutionary movements that swept across the Middle East and North Africa, which began with the self-immolation of a 26-year-old street vendor named Mohamed Bouazizi in 2011.¹¹ The video of his death spread rapidly among the populace and ignited mass demonstrations calling for democracy, which eventually led to the fall of multiple regimes in the region.

The effect of globalization as a source promoting dissatisfaction among populations for their governments cannot be understated. The interconnectedness of people through technology gives ways for the oppressed to have a voice where no avenue existed previously. For example, when Egypt's Mubarak regime cut off Internet access during the early protests in 2011, Google and Twitter established a service that enabled protesters to post messages to Twitter by calling and leaving a voicemail.¹² In this incredible development, two multinational corporations influenced the affairs within a country in an unprecedented way.

The rapid expansion of the Islamic State, also known as ISIS, also illustrates the capability of globalization to enhance the power and influence of nonstate actors. ISIS has proven to be remarkably effective at using social media to inflict terror, seize territories, raise funds, recruit members, and propagate its agenda.

Additionally, using social media and modern transportation capabilities, ISIS exploited the poor governance and weak governance of Syria and Iraq in order to establish territorial control over broad expanses of territory in a very short time span. While a substantial number of immigrants entered Afghanistan during the Soviet-Afghan War, the rapid movement of tens of thousands of ISIS supporters in a short period is very revealing of globalization's influence today.

These examples show the potential for greater intra-state conflict and irregular warfare as nonstate actors grow in influence and become increasingly involved as competitors in internal state affairs. With respect to such developments, U.S. strategy must take into consideration that modern communications and transportation capabilities provide adversaries with more tools and incentives for conducting asymmetric warfare.

Effect on Transnational Terrorism

States experiencing high degrees of state failure are indeed more susceptible to transnational terrorist attacks and disproportionately contribute to transnational terrorism that targets other countries.¹³

—James A. Piazza

Prior to 11 September 2001, the U.S. counterterrorism strategy treated terrorism largely as a criminal activity rather than as a form of warfare. The lethality and sophistication of the 9/11 attacks demonstrated that al-Qaida and other terrorist organizations were capable of projecting their power and influence on a global scale and at a level of intensity well above what had commonly been viewed as mere criminality before the 9/11 events. Audrey Cronin contends that globalization is partly responsible for this change, as terrorists

now “have access to more powerful technologies, more targets, more territory, more means of recruitment, and more exploitable sources of rage than ever before.”¹⁴

As a result of globalization, the improved availability of various goods, technologies, and transportation at cheaper-than-ever costs is providing a greater range of options and tools for terrorist organizations to leverage control. Advances in global technologies and communications also enable terrorists to share ideas, exchange techniques, coordinate activities, and connect with a larger audience beyond their local communities. An important question is whether their access to asymmetric weaponry will eventually extend to weapons of mass destruction or catastrophic cyber attacks.

The effect of globalization on transnational terrorism, however, is more complicated than simply aiding terrorist organizations. Economic development resulting from globalization also has a notable effect on terrorist activity, particularly between any two well-integrated economies. A 2004 study examined 112 countries between 1975 and 1997, and the results suggested, “a 1 percent increase in the average GDP per capita of the country’s top eight export destination countries decreases the expected number of transnational terrorist incidents within this country by 47.5 percent.”¹⁵ This important finding highlights that states with economic ties are influencing terrorist activity within and between their countries,



(Photo courtesy of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine) Ukrainian heavy weaponry withdraws 4 March 2015 from the Donbass region, Ukraine.

and the strength of a state's economy affects whether terrorism is exported to an economic partner. Therefore, the greater the economic integration (and the economic prosperity), the less likely the terrorist activity occurs.

To further illustrate this point, areas where the economic benefits of globalization have yet to fully materialize, such as in failing or failed states, are more vulnerable to terrorist activities. James A. Piazza explains that these areas of weak governance "are easier for terrorist movements to penetrate, recruit from, and operate within."¹⁶ States with strong economies have a greater capacity to provide essential security and law enforcement functions to counter the activities of terrorist organizations. For example, a developed nation such as Germany enjoys a robust law enforcement and intelligence apparatus, because it can afford it. On the other hand, al-Qaida exploited the lawless areas of Afghanistan prior to 9/11, just as the Islamic State filled the void in poorly governed areas of Iraq and Syria.



(Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

A teenager gestures for the camera during a demonstration 21 January 2011 to protest election fraud in Albania.

Growth of Urbanization

The continuing urbanization and overall growth of the world's population is projected to add 2.5 billion people to the urban population by 2050, with nearly 90 percent of the increase concentrated in Asia and Africa.¹⁷

—United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs

Globalization is also influencing the security environment by encouraging the global phenomenon of urbanization. Populations are gravitating toward urban centers, as they are the principle beneficiaries of the increased trade, foreign direct investments, and economic development that globalization promotes. For the past six decades, the world has undergone a period of exceptional urban growth. In 2007, the world's urban population surpassed the global rural population. By 2050, two-thirds of the world will reside in urban areas.¹⁸ The world is not just transforming villages into cities; some cities are expanding to simply staggering numbers.

Today, the world's six largest megacities have populations that range from twenty-one million to thirty-eight million inhabitants.¹⁹ By 2030, the world is expected to have forty-one megacities with more than ten million residents populating each.²⁰ To put this in perspective, the war in Iraq was fought in a country with approximately twenty-four million people (as of 2014).²¹ Today, the world's largest city is Tokyo, which has fourteen million more people than Iraq, concentrated in an urban area.²²

For much of the world, the effect of globalization with respect to urbanization is mostly positive in that the increased economic development provides employment, raises the standards of living, and promotes education opportunities.²³ This trend, however, also creates significant strain on governance, essential services, education, health care, and the energy sector. For example, Egypt recently announced plans to build an entirely new capital in order to alleviate the infrastructure stressors caused by Cairo's eighteen million residents.²⁴ These stressors are further compounded on a global scale, as illustrated by a 2011 study that found that by 2050 more than one billion people living in urban centers will be

without adequate water.²⁵ The scenarios that could draw the United States into these areas are equally daunting. Megacities beset by natural disasters, epidemics, or a failed government would present immense humanitarian and security challenges for the international community.

Two geographical areas in particular will face increasing problems and strain due to rapid population growth. Minh Dao explains, “many cities in Africa and the Middle East are rapidly growing even in the absence of industrial development, which brings concerns about increasing underemployment and unemployment in those areas.”²⁶ Lack of employment opportunity, especially among young men of military age, leaves developing countries more susceptible to intrastate conflict, criminal activity, and terrorism. David Kilcullen further describes these underdeveloped areas as “the poorest equipped to handle it: a recipe for conflict.”²⁷

The Way Ahead

*The Department of Defense will continue to have a critical role to play, but we cannot kill or capture our way out of this problem.*²⁸

—John A. Nagl

To be best postured to handle these global trends and future security conditions, the United States must rethink its current national security strategy. Change in strategy begins with the U.S. military’s acknowledgement that intrastate conflict and irregular warfare will likely dominate our operating environment, and that we can no longer afford to be fixated on large-scale conventional warfare. It is imperative that U.S. national security policy shift its emphasis



(Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

Photo: Shacks sit on stilts 1 November 2010 in the Makoko slum in Lagos, Nigeria. Originally a fishing village, its population has been estimated between 85,000 and 250,000 residents.

Top Left: A child begs for food as his brothers play near an open sewer 20 July 2005 in the Kibera slum district of Nairobi, Kenya. (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

Bottom Right: Skilled workers hold placards offering temporary employment services 7 October 2010 in Glenvista, south of Johannesburg, South Africa. (Photo by Themba Hadebe, Associated Press)

toward using nonmilitary elements of power (diplomacy, information, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement) to promote greater international security and stability.²⁹ As U.S. Army Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster observes,

Winning in war, of course, is not a military-only task. Achieving sustainable outcomes consistent with vital interests is an inherently civil-military task that requires integrated planning and execution of political, diplomatic, military, economic, informational, intelligence, and, increasingly, law enforcement and rule-of-law efforts.³⁰

McMaster recognizes that conflicts are not won solely by air strikes or offensive operations but through a balanced application of elements of national power to create conditions for sustainable stability and security.

For example, an inadequate stabilization effort or an overreliance on air strikes leaves an area vulnerable to a power vacuum, as evident with the post-Qaddafi era in Libya.

We can best facilitate national security strategy through two approaches. First, the expansion of military alliances through the regionally aligned forces initiative is an exceptional opportunity for promoting security cooperation, facilitating stable conditions for economic development, and deterring aggressive actions abroad, while reducing the economic burden of maintaining a large conventional army.³¹ U.S. Army Gen. Joseph Votel explains, “globalization has created networked challenges on a massive scale. Only by working with a variety of security powers can we begin to address these issues.”³² Networked challenges will require networked solutions since the United States simply cannot afford to pursue this strategy alone.

Second, the United States needs the capacity to rapidly deploy a joint force with enhanced training and expertise in stabilization tasks. Moreover, this deployable force cannot be solely military; it needs robust interagency representation. Provincial reconstruction teams in Iraq and Afghanistan—when they were fully resourced—provide good examples of the successful organization and employment of interagency units. The United States must develop, fully fund, and resource forces of similar conception and capability as a standing national strategic asset. John A. Nagl, scholar and former soldier, explains why such organizational and strategic planning measures are needed:

Victory in this long struggle requires changes in the governments and educational systems of dozens of countries around the globe. This is the task of a new generation of information warriors, development experts, and diplomats.³³

Although critics will dislike the return of peacekeeping missions, the consequences of allowing states to fail or failed states to remain ungoverned will continue to undermine our efforts to root out

transnational terrorism. Pre-9/11 Afghanistan as well as current-day eastern Syria, northern Iraq, and Yemen are examples where ungoverned space created the opportunity for terrorist groups to find sufficient sanctuary to gather and organize. In fact, international peacekeeping efforts have a solid historical record of success, with a 2004 study concluding that the probability of civil war returning to countries was reduced by 84 percent due to the presence of peacekeepers.³⁴

Such a refined national security strategy would provide the United States with critical assets for promoting international security and conflict mitigation, while reducing the economic burden of a large conventional army.

Conclusion

*By complementing its military and economic might with greater investments in its soft power, the United States can rebuild the framework it needs to tackle tough global challenges.*³⁵

—Joseph S. Nye Jr.

This article is by no means intended to serve as a prophetic declaration on the future of war but rather as a way to encourage deep thought and discussion on our changing security environment. The decline of interstate conflict and rise of intrastate conflict reflect changes that are mainly fueled by the forces of globalization and other global trends, perhaps the most notable of which is urbanization in the form of megacities. If we choose to ignore these trends, we are destined to maintain a force that will be largely ill-prepared for the challenges associated with future intrastate conflict and irregular warfare. It is time to accept that the future of war will likely not be fought how the U.S. military has historically preferred to fight (i.e., stand-up battles between nation-state conventional forces), but it will nonetheless remain very familiar as a profoundly human endeavor that will be as ugly as ever. ■

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(Photo courtesy of the Russian Presidential Press and Information Office)

Russian President Vladimir Putin during his annual Question and Answer Conference, 4 October 2008.

Comments by Russian President Vladimir Putin to the UN General Assembly

Editor's note: This is the official transcript of a speech given by Russian President Vladimir Putin 28 September 2015 to the UN General Assembly as released by the office of the Russian president.¹

This speech is provided in conjunction with the next two articles in an effort to acquaint our readers with the perspectives of senior Russian leaders on the subject of future war and should not be construed as an effort to promote their views.

Mr. President, Mr. Secretary-General, distinguished heads of state and government, ladies, and gentlemen,

The seventieth anniversary of the United Nations is a good occasion to both take stock of history and talk about our common future. In 1945, the countries that defeated Nazism joined their efforts to lay a solid foundation for the postwar world order. Let me remind you that key decisions on the principles defining interaction between states, as well as the decision to establish the UN, were made in our country at the Yalta Conference of the leaders of the anti-Hitler coalition.

The Yalta system was truly born in travail. It was born at the cost of tens of millions of lives and two world wars that swept through the planet in the twentieth century. Let's be fair: it helped humankind pass through turbulent, and at times dramatic, events of the last seven decades. It saved the world from large-scale upheavals.

The United Nations is unique in terms of legitimacy, representation, and universality. True, the UN has been criticized lately for being inefficient, or for the fact that decision-making on fundamental issues stalls due to insurmountable differences, especially among Security Council members.

However, I'd like to point out that there have always been differences in the UN throughout the seventy years of its history, and that the veto right has been regularly used by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and the Soviet Union, and later Russia. It is only natural for such a diverse and representative organization. When the UN was first established, nobody expected that there would always be unanimity. The mission of the organization is to seek and reach compromises, and its strength comes from taking different views and opinions into consideration. The decisions debated within the UN are either taken in the form of resolutions or not. As diplomats say, they either pass or they don't. Any action taken by circumventing this procedure is illegitimate and constitutes a

violation of the UN Charter and contemporary international law.

We all know that after the end of the Cold War the world was left with one center of dominance, and those who found themselves at the top of the pyramid were tempted to think that, since they are so powerful and exceptional, they know best what needs to be done and thus they don't need to reckon with the UN, which, instead of rubber-stamping the decisions they need, often stands in their way.

That's why they say that the UN has run its course and is now obsolete and outdated. Of course, the world changes, and the UN should also undergo natural transformation. Russia is ready to work together with its partners to develop the UN further on the basis of a

broad consensus, but we consider any attempts to undermine the legitimacy of the United Nations as extremely dangerous. They may result in the collapse of the entire architecture of international relations, and then indeed there will be no rules left except for the rule of force. The world will be dominated by selfishness rather than collective effort, by dictate rather than equality and liberty, and

instead of truly independent states we will have protectorates controlled from outside.

What is the meaning of state sovereignty, the term which has been mentioned by our colleagues here? It basically means freedom, every person and every state being free to choose their future.

By the way, this brings us to the issue of the so-called legitimacy of state authorities. You shouldn't play with words and manipulate them. In international law, international affairs, every term has to be clearly defined, transparent and interpreted the same way by one and all.

We are all different, and we should respect that. Nations shouldn't be forced to all conform to the same development model that somebody has declared the only appropriate one.

We should all remember the lessons of the past. For example, we remember examples from our Soviet past,

We should all remember the lessons of the past. For example, we remember examples from our Soviet past, when the Soviet Union exported social experiments, pushing for changes in other countries for ideological reasons, and this often led to tragic consequences and caused degradation instead of progress.

when the Soviet Union exported social experiments, pushing for changes in other countries for ideological reasons, and this often led to tragic consequences and caused degradation instead of progress.

It seems, however, that instead of learning from other people's mistakes, some prefer to repeat them and continue to export revolutions, only now these are "democratic" revolutions. Just look at the situation in the Middle East and northern Africa already mentioned by the previous speaker. Of course, political and social problems have been piling up for a long time in this region, and people there wanted change. But what was the actual outcome? Instead of bringing about reforms, aggressive intervention rashly destroyed government institutions and the local way of life. Instead of democracy and progress, there is now violence, poverty, social disasters, and total disregard for human rights, including even the right to life.

I'm urged to ask those who created this situation: do you at least realize now what you've done? But I'm afraid that this question will remain unanswered, because they have never abandoned their policy, which is based on arrogance, exceptionalism, and impunity.

Power vacuums in some countries in the Middle East and northern Africa obviously resulted in the emergence of areas of anarchy, which were quickly filled with extremists and terrorists. The so-called Islamic State has tens of thousands of militants fighting for it, including former Iraqi soldiers who were left on the street after the 2003 invasion. Many recruits come from Libya whose statehood was destroyed as a result of a gross violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1973. And now, radical groups are joined by members of the so-called "moderate" Syrian opposition backed by the West. They get weapons and training, and then they defect and join the so-called Islamic State.

In fact, the Islamic State itself did not come out of nowhere. It was initially developed as a weapon against undesirable secular regimes. Having established control over parts of Syria and Iraq, Islamic State now aggressively expands into other regions. It seeks dominance in the Muslim world and beyond. Their plans go further.

The situation is extremely dangerous. In these circumstances, it is hypocritical and irresponsible to make declarations about the threat of terrorism and at the

same time turn a blind eye to the channels used to finance and support terrorists, including revenues from drug trafficking, the illegal oil trade, and the arms trade.

It is equally irresponsible to manipulate extremist groups and use them to achieve your political goals, hoping that later you'll find a way to get rid of them or somehow eliminate them.

I'd like to tell those who engage in this: Gentlemen, the people you are dealing with are cruel but they are not dumb. They are as smart as you are. So, it's a big question: who's playing who here? The recent

incident where the most "moderate" opposition group handed over their weapons to terrorists is a vivid example of that.

We consider that any attempts to flirt with terrorists, let alone arm them, are short-sighted and extremely dangerous. This may make the global terrorist threat much worse, spreading it to new regions around the globe, especially since there are fighters from many different countries, including European ones, gaining combat experience with Islamic State. Unfortunately, Russia is no exception.

Now that those thugs have tasted blood, we can't allow them to return home and continue with their criminal activities. Nobody wants that, right?

Russia has consistently opposed terrorism in all its forms. Today, we provide military-technical assistance to

It seems, however, that instead of learning from other people's mistakes, some prefer to repeat them and continue to export revolutions, only now these are "democratic" revolutions. ... But what was the actual outcome? Instead of bringing about reforms, aggressive intervention rashly destroyed government institutions and the local way of life. Instead of democracy and progress, there is now violence, poverty, social disasters, and total disregard for human rights, including even the right to life.

Iraq, Syria, and other regional countries fighting terrorist groups. We think it's a big mistake to refuse to cooperate with the Syrian authorities and government forces who valiantly fight terrorists on the ground.

We should finally admit that President Assad's government forces and the Kurdish militia are the only forces really fighting terrorists in Syria. Yes, we are aware of all the problems and conflicts in the region, but we definitely have to consider the actual situation on the ground.

What we propose is to join efforts to address the problems that all of us are facing, and create a genuinely broad international coalition against terrorism.

Dear colleagues, I must note that such an honest and frank approach on Russia's part has been recently used as a pretext for accusing it of its growing ambitions—as if those who say that have no ambitions at all. However, it is not about Russia's ambitions, dear colleagues, but about the recognition of the fact that we can no longer tolerate the current state of affairs in the world.

What we actually propose is to be guided by common values and common interests rather than by ambitions. Relying on international law, we must join efforts to address the problems that all of us are facing, and create a genuinely broad international coalition against terrorism. Similar to the anti-Hitler coalition, it could unite a broad range of parties willing to stand firm against those who, just like the Nazis, sow evil and hatred of humankind. And of course, Muslim nations should play a key role in such a coalition, since Islamic State not only poses a direct threat to them, but also tarnishes one of the greatest world religions with its atrocities. The ideologues of these extremists make a mockery of Islam and subvert its true humanist values.

I would also like to address Muslim spiritual leaders: Your authority and your guidance are of great importance right now. It is essential to prevent people targeted for recruitment by extremists from making hasty decisions, and those who have already been deceived and, due to various circumstances, found

themselves among terrorists, must be assisted in finding a way back to normal life, laying down arms and putting an end to fratricide.

In the days to come, Russia, as the current president of the UN Security Council, will convene a ministerial meeting to carry out a comprehensive analysis of the threats in the Middle East. First of all, we propose exploring opportunities for adopting a resolution that would serve to coordinate the efforts of all parties

that oppose Islamic State and other terrorist groups. Once again, such coordination should be based upon the principles of the UN Charter.

We hope that the international community will be able to develop a comprehensive strategy of political stabilization, as well as social and economic recovery in the Middle East. Then, dear friends, there would

be no need for setting up more refugee camps. Today, the flow of people forced to leave their native land has literally engulfed, first, the neighboring countries, and then Europe. There are hundreds of thousands of them now, and before long, there might be millions. It is, essentially, a new, tragic Migration Period, and a harsh lesson for all of us, including Europe.

I believe it is of utmost importance to help restore government institutions in Libya, support the new government of Iraq, and provide comprehensive assistance to the legitimate government of Syria.

I would like to stress that refugees undoubtedly need our compassion and support. However, the only way to solve this problem for good is to restore statehood where it has been destroyed; to strengthen government institutions where they still exist or are being reestablished; to provide comprehensive military, economic, and material assistance to countries in a difficult situation; and certainly to [assist] people who, despite all their ordeals, did not abandon their homes. Of course, any assistance to sovereign nations can, and should, be offered rather than imposed, in strict compliance with the UN Charter. In other words, our organization should support any measures that have been, or will be, taken in this regard in

I'm urged to ask those who created this situation: do you at least realize now what you've done? But I'm afraid that this question will remain unanswered, because they have never abandoned their policy, which is based on arrogance, exceptionalism, and impunity.

accordance with international law, and reject any actions that are in breach of the UN Charter. Above all, I believe it is of utmost importance to help restore government institutions in Libya, support the new government of Iraq, and provide comprehensive assistance to the legitimate government of Syria.

Dear colleagues, ensuring peace and global and regional stability remains a key task for the international community guided by the United Nations. We believe this means creating an equal and indivisible security environment that would not serve a privileged few, but everyone. Indeed, it is a challenging, complicated, and time-consuming task, but there is simply no alternative.

Sadly, some of our counterparts are still dominated by their Cold War-era bloc mentality and the ambition to conquer new geopolitical areas. First, they continued their policy of expanding NATO—one should wonder why, considering that the Warsaw Pact had ceased to exist and the Soviet Union had disintegrated.

The people of Donbas [eastern Ukraine] should have their rights and interests genuinely considered, and their choice respected; they should be engaged in devising the key elements of the country's political system, in line with the provisions of the Minsk agreements.

Nevertheless, NATO has kept on expanding, together with its military infrastructure. Next, the post-Soviet states were forced to face a false choice between joining the West and carrying on with the East. Sooner or later, this logic of confrontation was bound to spark off a major geopolitical crisis. And that is exactly what happened in Ukraine, where the people's widespread frustration with the government was used for instigating a coup d'état from abroad. This has triggered a civil war. We are convinced that the only way out of this dead end lies through comprehensive and diligent implementation of the Minsk agreements of February 12, 2015. Ukraine's territorial integrity cannot be secured through the use of threats or military force, but it must be secured. The

people of Donbas should have their rights and interests genuinely considered, and their choice respected; they should be engaged in devising the key elements of the country's political system, in line with the provisions of the Minsk agreements. Such steps would guarantee that Ukraine will develop as a civilized state, and a vital link in creating a common space of security and economic cooperation, both in Europe and in Eurasia.

Russia has consistently opposed terrorism in all its forms. Today, we provide military-technical assistance to Iraq, Syria, and other regional countries fighting terrorist groups. We think it's a big mistake to refuse to cooperate with the Syrian authorities and government forces who valiantly fight terrorists on the ground.

Ladies and gentlemen, I have deliberately mentioned a common space for economic cooperation. Until quite recently, it seemed that we would learn to do without dividing lines in the area of the economy with its objective market laws, and act based on transparent and jointly formulated rules, including the WTO [World Trade Organization] principles, which embrace free

trade and investment and fair competition. However, unilaterally imposed sanctions circumventing the UN Charter have all but become commonplace today. They not only serve political objectives, but are also used for eliminating market competition.

I would like to note one more sign of rising economic selfishness. A number of nations have chosen to create exclusive economic associations, with their establishment being negotiated behind closed doors, secretly from those very nations' own public and business communities, as well as from the rest of the world. Other states, whose interests may be affected, have not been informed of anything, either. It seems that someone would like to impose upon us some new game rules, deliberately tailored to accommodate the interests of a privileged few, with the WTO having no say in it. This is fraught with utterly unbalancing global trade and splitting up the global economic space.

These issues affect the interests of all nations and influence the future of the entire global economy. That is why we propose discussing those issues within the framework of the United Nations, the WTO, and the G20. Contrary to the policy of exclusion, Russia advocates harmonizing regional economic projects. I am

referring to the so-called “integration of integrations” based on the universal and transparent rules of international trade. As an example, I would like to cite our plans to interconnect the Eurasian Economic Union with China’s initiative for creating a Silk Road economic belt. We continue to see great promise in harmonizing the integration vehicles between the Eurasian Economic Union and the European Union.

Ladies and gentlemen, one more issue that shall affect the future of the entire humankind is climate change. It is in our interest to ensure that the coming UN Climate Change Conference that will take place in Paris in December this year should deliver some feasible results. As part of our national contribution, we plan to limit greenhouse gas emissions to 70–75 percent of the 1990 levels by the year 2030.

However, I suggest that we take a broader look at the issue. Admittedly, we may be able to defuse it for a while by introducing emission quotas and using other tactical measures, but we certainly will not solve it for good that way. What we need is an essentially different approach, one that would involve introducing new, groundbreaking, nature-like technologies that would not damage the environment, but rather work in harmony with it, enabling us to restore the balance between the biosphere and technology upset by human activities.

We propose convening a special forum under the auspices of the UN to comprehensively address issues

related to the depletion of natural resources, habitat destruction, and climate change.

It is indeed a challenge of global proportions. And, I am confident that humanity does have the necessary intellectual capacity to respond to it. We need to join our efforts, primarily engaging countries that possess strong research and development capabilities, and have made significant advances in fundamental research. We propose

convening a special forum under the auspices of the UN to comprehensively address issues related to the depletion of natural resources, habitat destruction, and climate change. Russia is willing to co-sponsor such a forum.

Ladies and gentlemen, dear colleagues. On January 10, 1946, the UN General Assembly convened for its

first meeting in London. Chairman of the Preparatory Commission Dr. Zuleta Angel, a Colombian diplomat, opened the session by offering what I see as a very concise definition of the principles that the United Nations should be based upon, which are good will, disdain for scheming and trickery, and a spirit of cooperation. Today, his words sound like guidance for all of us.

Russia is confident of the United Nations’ enormous potential, which should help us avoid a new confrontation and embrace a strategy of cooperation. Hand in hand with other nations, we will consistently work to strengthen the UN’s central, coordinating role. I am convinced that by working together, we will make the world stable and safe, and provide an enabling environment for the development of all nations and peoples.


Thank you. ■

What we actually propose is to be guided by common values and common interests rather than by ambitions. Relying on international law, we must join efforts to address the problems that all of us are facing, and create a genuinely broad international coalition against terrorism.

Vladimir Putin served as president of Russia for two terms from 2000 to 2008, and was reelected to the presidency in 2012. He previously served as Russia’s prime minister.

Notes

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How should professional military education change in the twenty-first century? *Innovative Learning: A Key to National Security*, the newest publication from the Army Press, answers this question by offering proposals from some of today's most original thinkers on transforming teaching and learning. The solutions offered in this book range from sweeping curriculum reforms to the more radical idea of classrooms with neither teachers nor structure of any kind. To download a copy of this collection, go to: <http://armypress.dodlive.mil/2015/12/01/transforming-traditional-military-education/>.



(AP Photo by RIA Novosti, Alexei Nikolsky, of the Russian Presidential Press Service)

Russian President Vladimir Putin and General of the Army Valery Gerasimov, chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, observe military exercises 17 July 2013 near Baikal Lake in Russia. The military maneuvers were the largest since Soviet times, involving about 160,000 troops and 5,000 tanks across Siberia and the far eastern region of Russia.

The Value of Science Is in the Foresight

New Challenges Demand Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying out Combat Operations

General of the Army Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the
Russian Federation Armed Forces

This article is provided to acquaint our readers with the perspectives of senior Russian military leaders on the subject of future war and should not be construed as an effort to promote their views.

In the twenty-first century we have seen a tendency toward blurring the lines between the states of war and peace. Wars are no longer declared and, having begun, proceed according to an unfamiliar template.

The experience of military conflicts—including those connected with the so-called color revolutions in North Africa and the Middle East—confirms that a perfectly thriving state can, in a matter of months and even days, be transformed into an arena of fierce armed conflict, become a victim of foreign intervention, and sink into a web of chaos, humanitarian catastrophe, and civil war.²

The Lessons of the Arab Spring

Of course, it would be easiest of all to say that the events of the “Arab Spring” are not war, and so there are no lessons for us—military men—to learn. But maybe the opposite is true—that precisely these events are typical of warfare in the twenty-first century.

In terms of the scale of the casualties and destruction, the catastrophic social, economic, and political consequences, such new-type conflicts are comparable with the consequences of any real war.

The very “rules of war” have changed. The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness [see figure 1].

The focus of applied methods of conflict has altered in the direction of the broad use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other nonmilitary measures—applied in coordination with the protest potential of the population.

All this is supplemented by military means of a concealed character, including carrying out actions of

informational conflict and the actions of special operations forces. The open use of forces—often under the guise of peacekeeping and crisis regulation—is resorted to only at a certain stage, primarily for the achievement of final success in the conflict.

From this proceed logical questions: What is modern war? What should the army be prepared for? How

should it be armed? Only after answering these questions can we determine the directions of the construction and development of the armed forces over the long term. To do this, it is essential to have a clear understanding of the forms and methods of the application of force.

These days, together with traditional devices, nonstandard ones are being developed. The role of mobile, mixed-type groups of forces, acting in a single intelligence-information space because of the use of the new possibilities of com-

mand-and-control systems, has been strengthened. Military actions are becoming more dynamic, active, and fruitful. Tactical and operational pauses that the enemy could exploit are disappearing. New information technologies have enabled significant reductions in the spatial, temporal, and informational gaps between forces and control organs. Frontal engagements of large formations of forces at the strategic and operational level are gradually becoming a thing of the past. Long-distance, contactless actions against the enemy are becoming the main means of achieving combat and operational goals. The defeat of the enemy’s objects [objectives] is conducted throughout the entire depth of his territory. The differences between strategic, operational, and tactical levels, as well as between offensive and defensive operations, are being erased. The application of high-precision weaponry is taking on a mass character. Weapons based

The very “rules of war” have changed. The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness.

Change in the Character of Warfare

Achievement of Political Goals




Figure 1. Graphic from Gerasimov article in *Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kurier*, 26 February 2013, translated by Charles Bartles

on new physical principles and automatized systems are being actively incorporated into military activity.

Asymmetrical actions have come into widespread use, enabling the nullification of an enemy's advantages in armed conflict. Among such actions are the use of special operations forces and internal opposition to create a permanently operating front through the entire territory of the enemy state, as well as informational actions, devices, and means that are constantly being perfected.

These ongoing changes are reflected in the doctrinal views of the world's leading states and are being used in military conflicts.

Already in 1991, during Operation Desert Storm in Iraq, the U.S. military realized the concept of "global sweep [global reach], global power" and "air-ground operations." In 2003 during Operation Iraqi Freedom, military operations were conducted in accordance with the so-called Single Perspective 2020 [Joint Vision 2020].

Now, the concepts of "global strike" and "global missile defense" have been worked out, which foresee the defeat of enemy objects [objectives] and forces in a matter of

hours from almost any point on the globe, while at the same time ensuring the prevention of unacceptable harm from an enemy counterstrike. The United States is also enacting the principles of the doctrine of global integration of operations aimed at creating—in a very short time—highly mobile, mixed-type groups of forces.

In recent conflicts, new means of conducting military operations have appeared that cannot be considered purely military. An example of this is the operation in Libya, where a no-fly zone was created, a sea blockade imposed, and private military contractors were widely used in close interaction with armed formations of the opposition.

We must acknowledge that, while we understand the essence of traditional military actions carried out by regular armed forces, we have only a superficial understanding of asymmetrical forms and means. In this connection, the importance of military science, which must create a comprehensive theory of such actions, is growing. The work and research of the Academy of Military Sciences can help with this.



(Photo by Mstyslav Chernov, Unframe)

Protesters throw Molotov cocktails in the direction of troop positions 19 January 2014 during the Dynamivska Street "Euromaidan" (Euro Square) protests in Kiev, Ukraine. The protests led to the ousting of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich and his pro-Russian government on 23 February 2014.

The Tasks of Military Science

In a discussion of the forms and means of military conflict, we must not forget about our own experience. I mean the use of partisan units during the Great Patriotic War and the fight against irregular formations in Afghanistan and the North Caucasus.

I would emphasize that during the Afghanistan War, specific forms and means of conducting military operations were worked out. At their heart lay speed, quick movements, the smart use of tactical paratroops [paratroopers] and encircling forces, which all together enabled the interruption of the enemy's plans and brought him significant losses.

Another factor influencing the essence of modern means of armed conflict is the use of modern automated complexes of military equipment and research in the area of artificial intelligence. While today we have flying drones, tomorrow's battlefields will be filled with walking, crawling, jumping, and flying robots. In the near future it is possible a fully robotized

unit will be created, capable of independently conducting military operations.

How shall we fight under such conditions? What forms and means should be used against a robotized enemy? What sort of robots do we need and how can they be developed? Already today our military minds must be thinking about these questions.

The most important set of problems, requiring intense attention, is connected with perfecting the forms and means of applying groups of forces. It is necessary to rethink the content of the strategic activities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Already now questions are arising: Is such a number of strategic operations necessary? Which ones and how many of them will we need in the future? So far, there are no answers.

There are also other problems that we are encountering in our daily activities.

We are currently in the final phase of the formation of a system of air-space defense (*Voyska Vozdushno-Kosmicheskoy Oborony*, or VKO). Because

of this, the question of the development of forms and means of action using VKO forces and tools has become actual. The General Staff is already working on this. I propose that the Academy of Military Sciences also take active part.

The information space opens wide asymmetrical possibilities for reducing the fighting potential of the enemy. In North Africa, we witnessed the use of technologies for influencing state structures and the population with the help of information networks. It is necessary to perfect activities in the information space, including the defense of our own objects [objectives].

The operation to force Georgia to peace exposed the absence of unified approaches to the use of formations of the Armed Forces outside of the Russian Federation. The September 2012 attack on the U.S. consulate in the Libyan city of Benghazi, the activation of piracy activities, the recent hostage taking in Algeria, all confirm the importance of creating a system of armed defense of the interests of the state outside the borders of its territory.

Although the additions to the federal law “On Defense” adopted in 2009 allow the operational use of the Armed Forces of Russia outside of its borders, the forms and means of their activity are not defined. In addition, matters of facilitating their operational use have not been settled on the interministerial level. This includes simplifying the procedure for crossing state borders, the use of the airspace and territorial waters of foreign states, the procedures for interacting with the authorities of the state of destination, and so on.

It is necessary to coordinate the joint work of the research organizations of the pertinent ministries and agencies on such matters.

One of the forms of the use of military force outside the country is peacekeeping. In addition to traditional tasks, their activity could include more specific tasks such as specialized, humanitarian, rescue, evacuation, sanitation, and other tasks. At present, their classification, essence, and content have not been defined.

Moreover, the complex and multifarious tasks of peacekeeping that, possibly, regular troops will have to carry out, presume the creation of a fundamentally new system for preparing them. After all, the task of a peacekeeping force is to disengage conflicting sides, protect and save the civilian population, cooperate in reducing potential violence, and reestablish peaceful life. All this demands academic preparation [see figure 2].

Controlling Territory

It is becoming increasingly important in modern conflicts to be capable of defending one’s population, objects [objectives], and communications from the activity of special operations forces, in view of their increasing use. Resolving this problem envisions the organization and introduction of territorial defense.

Before 2008, when the army at wartime numbered more than 4.5 million men, these tasks were handled exclusively by the armed forces. But conditions have changed. Now, countering diversionary-reconnaissance and terroristic forces can only be organized by the complex involvement of all the security and law-enforcement forces of the country.

The General Staff has begun this work. It is based on defining the approaches to the organization of territorial defense that were reflected in the changes to the federal law “On Defense.” Since the adoption of that law, it is necessary to define the system of managing territorial defense and to legally enforce the role and location in it of other forces, military formations, and the organs of other state structures.

We need well-grounded recommendations on the use of interagency forces and means for the fulfillment of territorial defense; methods for combating the terrorist and diversionary forces of the enemy under modern conditions.

The experience of conducting military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq has shown the necessity of working out—together with the research bodies of other ministries and agencies of the Russian Federation—the role and extent of participation of the armed forces in postconflict regulation, working out the priority of tasks, the methods for activation of forces, and establishing the limits of the use of armed force.

Developing a scientific and methodological apparatus for decision making that takes into account the multifarious character of military groupings (forces) is an important matter. It is necessary to research the integrated capabilities and combined potential of all the component troops and forces of these groupings. The problem here is that existing models of operations and military conduct do not support this. New models are needed.

Changes in the character of military conflicts, the development of the means of armed engagement and of

The Role of Nonmilitary Methods in the Resolution of Interstate Conflicts

The primary phases (stages) of conflict development




Figure 2. Graphic from Gerasimov article in *Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kurier*, 26 February 2013, translated by Charles Bartles

the forms and methods of applying them, have created new demands for multifaceted support systems. This is yet one more direction for scholarly activity that must not be overlooked.

You Cannot Generate Ideas on Command

The state of Russian military science today cannot be compared with the flowering of military-theoretical

thought in our country on the eve of World War II.

Of course, there are objective and subjective reasons for this, and it is not possible to blame anyone in particular for it. I am not the one who said it is not possible to generate ideas on command.

I agree with that, but I also must acknowledge something else: at that time, there were no people with higher degrees and there were no academic schools or departments. There were extraordinary personalities with brilliant ideas. I would call them fanatics in the best sense of the word. Maybe we just do not have enough people like that today.

People like, for instance, Georgy Isserson, who, despite the views he formed in the prewar years, published the book *New Forms of Combat*. In it, this Soviet military theoretician predicted, “War in general is not declared. It simply begins with already developed military forces. Mobilization and concentration are not part of the period after the onset of the state of war as was the case in 1914 but rather, unnoticed, proceed long before that.” The fate of this “prophet of the Fatherland” unfolded tragically. Our country paid in great quantities of blood for not listening to the conclusions of this professor of the General Staff Academy.

What can we conclude from this? A scornful attitude toward new ideas, to nonstandard approaches, to other points of view is unacceptable in military science. And it is even more unacceptable for practitioners to have this attitude toward science.

In conclusion, I would like to say that no matter what forces the enemy has, no matter how well-developed his

forces and means of armed conflict may be, forms and methods for overcoming them can be found. He will always have vulnerabilities, and that means that adequate means of opposing him exist.

We must not copy foreign experience and chase after leading countries, but we must outstrip them and occupy leading positions ourselves. This is where military science takes on a crucial role. The outstanding Soviet military scholar Aleksandr Svechin wrote, “It is extraordinarily hard to predict the conditions of war. For each war it is necessary to work out a particular line for its strategic conduct. Each war is a unique case, demanding the establishment of a particular logic and not the application of some template.”

This approach continues to be correct. Each war does present itself as a unique case, demanding the comprehension of its particular logic, its uniqueness. That is why the character of a war that Russia or its allies might be drawn into is very hard to predict. Nonetheless, we must. Any academic pronouncements in military science are worthless if military theory is not backed by the function of prediction.

To address the numerous problems confronting military science today, the General Staff is counting on the support of the Academy of Military Sciences, which concentrates the leading military scholars and most authoritative specialists.

I am confident that the close ties between the Academy of Military Sciences and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation will in the future be expanded and perfected. ■

General of the Army Valery Gerasimov is the chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and first deputy defense minister. He is a graduate of the Kazan Higher Tank Command School, the Malinovsky Military Academy of Armored Forces, and the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia. He served in a wide variety of command and staff positions before his current assignment, including commanding the 58th Army during combat operations in Chechnya.

Notes

1. Valery Gerasimov, “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying out Combat Operations,” trans. Robert Coalson, *Military-Industrial Kurier*, 27 February 2013, accessed 27 October 2015, <http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/10/complex-academic-writing/412255/>.

2. The term “color revolutions” refers to the bright colors used as symbols of rebellion by protesting groups employing generally nonviolent civil disobedience as a means to overthrow a government.

Getting Gerasimov Right

Charles K. Bartles

On 26 February 2013, chief of the Russian General Staff Gen. Valery Gerasimov published “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying out Combat Operations” in *Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kurier* (VPK) (*Military-Industrial Courier*). In this article, Gerasimov lays out his perspective—and the prevalent view in Russian security circles—of the recent past, present, and expected future of warfare. This article was published about a year before the Maidan protests that set in motion the events leading to the eventual annexation of Crimea and Russian-sponsored insurrection in eastern Ukraine.¹ The chain of events that followed the Maidan protests could in no way be foreseen by Gerasimov, but his article is often cited in the West as “Gerasimov’s Doctrine” for the way Russian forces conducted its operations.

In this vein of Western thinking, Gerasimov’s article is often interpreted as proposing a new Russian way of warfare that blends conventional and unconventional warfare with aspects of national power, often referred to as “hybrid warfare.” This article will attempt to put Gerasimov’s article, which was written for a Russian audience, in context for U.S. readers to explain some allusions that are sometimes missed or misunderstood.

The Russian Chief of General Staff

For background, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff is often equated with the Russian General Staff, but this is a great understatement of the Russian General Staff’s importance. The Russian chief of the General



(Photo courtesy of the Press Service of the Russian Defense Ministry)
Chief of the Russian General Staff Gen. Valery Gerasimov

Staff has far more authority than any flag grade officer in the U.S. military. He is responsible for long-term planning duties equivalent to both the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense and the unified combatant commanders. In addition, he has oversight of strategic transportation equivalent to that of U.S. Transportation Command, force doctrinal and capabilities development, and equipment procurement for all branches of the Ministry of Defense. He even has an inspector-general-like function for ensuring that General Staff standards and regulations are adhered to.

Also, although the chief of the General Staff does not have operational control of the force, he does have day-to-day control (in peacetime) of the *Glavnoye Razvedyvatel'noye Upravleniye* (Main Intelligence Directorate, commonly known as GRU), which is a directorate of the General Staff, and several strategic assets including the Russian airborne, which functions as a strategic reserve.

In the hierarchy of the Russian government, there are uniformed officers serving in positions technically above the chief of the General Staff, but

arguably none of these assignments are as prestigious.

Elaboration on Strategic Foresight

In general, it is a duty of the Russian general staff to use foresight to develop the theory and practice of future war. This is the context in which Gerasimov's article is written. The use of the term "foresight" in the article's title is not coincidental, and the term has a specific military definition in the Russian lexicon:

Foresight (military) is the process of cognition regarding possible changes in military affairs, the determination of the perspectives of its future development. The basis of the science of foresight is knowledge of the objective laws of war, the dialectical-materialist analysis of events transpiring in a given concrete-historical context.²

In Russian military thought, foresight is directly linked to military science, with military science being the science of future war.³

The General Staff takes a rather academic approach to the endeavor of military science, including the use of a peer-review-like process that functions by opening debates on ideas through the publication of articles in various outlets, including professional journals. There are several often-used outlets for the military's academic discussion and debate, most notably the journal *Voyennaya Mysl* (VM) (*Military Thought*), which is published by the General Staff. Gerasimov chose to publish this article in VPK, a different, but also commonly used journal for such ideas. The VPK is a private newspaper, owned by the quasi-government-controlled Almaz-Antey company, which focuses on the military and military-industrial complex matters. VPK also serves as a frequent venue for top military leaders to inform the force, tout successes, and propose reforms.

This particular article, like other such articles by senior military leadership, was likely published in the VPK in order to reach a much larger audience than the rather dry VM. The intended audience for Gerasimov's article may not even be in the Russian armed forces,



(Photo by Efrem Lukatsky, Associated Press)

Hundreds of thousands of protesters poured into the streets of Ukraine's capital, Kiev, 8 December 2013, toppling a statue of Soviet-era leader Vladimir Lenin and blocking key government buildings during escalating protests against the government. Gen. Valery Gerasimov has stated that the greatest dangers to Russia are so-called "color revolutions."

but instead in Russia's senior political leadership. Russia has powerful militarized intelligence and security services that compete with the Ministry of Defense for resources. Gerasimov's article may have been intended to send a message that the Ministry of Defense can meet Russia's current and future threats, an important message in a resource-constrained environment.⁴ No matter what reason the article was published, it is important to keep in mind that Gerasimov is simply explaining his view of the operational environment and the nature of future war, and not proposing a new Russian way of warfare or military doctrine, as this article was likely drafted well before the start of the Maidan protests.

The Russian Narrative of the United States and Forced Regime Change in the Post-Soviet Era

For U.S. readers, Gerasimov's linking of the Arab Spring and "color revolutions" (and in later comments, the Maidan Movement) with military capability development may seem odd. In order to put his comments in context, it is necessary to look at the Russian view of warfare and forced regime change as it has developed since the end of the Cold War.

In the Russian view, transgressions against the post-Cold War international order began with the partition of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, when Russia was at her weakest. While the Western narrative of




Figure 1. Adapted from a briefing given by Gen. Valery Gerasimov during the Russian Ministry of Defense's Third Moscow Conference on International Security¹³

NATO's Yugoslavia intervention is one of military action to prevent mass genocide, Russia has a much different view. Most Russians generally view the NATO bombing campaign as having been illegal because it was conducted without the approval of the UN Security Council and believe that Serbia was simply being punished for engaging in counterterrorism operations, albeit with some excesses. The most egregious sin, from the Russian view, was the partitioning of Yugoslavia. This action set a precedent for external actors to make decisions about the internal affairs and territorial integrity of sovereign nations alleged to have committed some wrong. It is important to note that Russia was dealing with its own Islamic insurgency at the same time in the North Caucasus. This may have caused Russian concern about a similar NATO action taking place inside Russia. One consequence of Western intervention resulting in the destruction of Yugoslavia

pretext such as to prevent genocide or seize weapons of mass destruction; and finally, launching a military operation to cause regime change (figure 1).

However, Russia believes that the pattern of forced U.S.-sponsored regime change has been largely supplanted by a new method. Instead of an overt military invasion, the first volleys of a U.S. attack come from the installment of a political opposition through state propaganda (e.g., CNN, BBC), the Internet and social media, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). After successfully instilling political dissent, separatism, and/or social strife, the legitimate government has increasing difficulty maintaining order. As the security situation deteriorates, separatist movements can be stoked and strengthened, and undeclared special operations, conventional, and private military forces (defense contractors) can be introduced to battle the government and cause further havoc. Once the legitimate

is that most Russians still resent this U.S./NATO action.

Thus, it is no surprise Russia justified many aspects of its Crimea annexation on the lessons learned and precedents set by the West in Yugoslavia, which led to the eventual independence of Kosovo.⁵ Additionally, post-Kosovo, the most obvious U.S. regime change operations occurred in Afghanistan and Iraq. Russia views those operations as having been very similar to the Kosovo operation. In the Russian view, the pattern of U.S. forced regime change has been as follows: deciding to execute a military operation; finding an appropriate

government is forced to use increasingly aggressive methods to maintain order, the United States gains a pretext for the imposition of economic and political sanctions, and sometimes even military sanctions such as no-fly zones, to tie the hands of the besieged governments and promote further dissent (figure 2).

Eventually, as the government collapses and anarchy results, military forces under the guise of peacekeepers can then be employed to pacify the area, if desired, and a new government that is friendly to the United States and the West can be installed (figure 3).

This theory may sound far-fetched to U.S. ears but is a very common view throughout the former Soviet Union. This narrative also sheds some light on the Russian government's hostility toward NGOs.⁶ Though there are usually no allegations of NGOs being directly or indirectly controlled by foreign governments, most Russian reporting on NGOs purports that they are simply being funded because they have an objective to influence a particular government in a given way, or to just cause general instability. An interesting aspect of these allegations is that the Central Intelligence Agency (a favored scapegoat for any Russian misfortune) is no longer typically mentioned; the usual culprits (in the new narrative) are the U.S. State Department and United States Agency for International Development (USAID).⁷

From a Russian military perspective, this new Western way of war has many implications that can be easily identified in Gerasimov's article and Russia's current military doctrine. In the past, the primary threat of foreign-forced regime change has come from an army storming across the border. In contrast, today,

the threat is coming increasingly from more indirect and asymmetric methods. This change in the nature of the threat to Russia's sovereignty is causing Russian military development to increasingly focus on obtaining improved capabilities to counter those asymmetric and indirect threats.

The means required to implement these capabilities will be as diverse and asymmetric as the threats they are intended to counter and could come in the form of undeclared conventional forces, peacekeepers, special operators, Cossacks, private military companies, foreign legionnaires, biker gangs, Russian-sponsored NGOs, and cyber/propaganda warriors.⁸

Hybrid War, the Nature of War, and Models

Probably the most misunderstood aspect of Gerasimov's article is the idea of "indirect and asymmetric methods" that has been interpreted by the West as hybrid war. Of note, there is a general consensus in




Figure 2. Adapted from a briefing given by Gen. Valery Gerasimov during the Russian Ministry of Defense's Third Moscow Conference on International Security¹³



Figure 3. Adapted from a briefing given by Gen. Valery Gerasimov during the Russian Ministry of Defense's Third Moscow Conference on International Security¹³

Russian military circles that hybrid war is a completely Western concept as no Russian military officer or strategist has discussed it, except to mention the West's use of the term, or to mention the West's use of hybrid warfare against Russia.

The Russian military has been adamant that they do not practice a hybrid-war strategy. Moreover, there have been many Russian commentaries that state this concept is nothing new, that the aspects of hybrid war mentioned by Western analysts have been practiced since warfare began.

However, it is difficult to compare the terms because there is no recognized definition for the terms, either in Russia or the West. Undoubtedly, there is some overlap about what these terms likely mean, but it is clear that hybrid war refers to a much narrower scope of activities than the term "indirect and asymmetric methods." One example that clearly illustrates the difference in the terms is the Russian

understanding of the previously discussed color revolutions and the Arab Spring. The view that NGOs are the means of an indirect and asymmetric method of war makes it very clear that Gerasimov is talking about something very different than the Western notion of hybrid war.⁹

One of the most interesting aspects of Gerasimov's article is his view of the relationship on the use of nonmilitary and military measures in war. The leveraging of all means of national power to achieve the state's ends is nothing new for Russia, but now the Russian military is seeing war as being something much more than military conflict. As the graphic from Gerasimov's article illustrates (figure 4), war is now conducted by a roughly 4:1 ratio of non-

military and military measures. These nonmilitary measures include economic sanctions, disruption of diplomatic ties, and political and diplomatic pressure. The important point is that while the West considers these nonmilitary measures as ways of avoiding war, Russia considers these measures as war (figure 4).

Some analysts in the West, having read Gerasimov's article and viewed current Russian operations in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, have created models for a new Russian way of warfare. Although these models may be useful analyzing past actions, not much stock should be put in them for predicting the nature of future Russian operations. In Gerasimov's own words, "Each war represents an isolated case, requiring an understanding of its own particular logic, its own unique character."¹⁰ He is saying that there is no model or formula for understanding the operational environment or the exercise of national power in every war scenario. Each instance of a problem will be looked upon as a




Figure 4. Graphic from Gerasimov article in *Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kurier*, 26 February 2013, translated by Charles Bartles

unique situation that will require the marshalling of the state's resources in whatever way is necessary.

Although Russia may respond similarly to two different situations, this is not an indicator of a specific formula for action, rather it just means the similarity of the situations required similar responses. At the tactical level, models and formulas are essential for determining the correlation of forces needed for victory, but

at the operational and strategic levels, a much different approach is required (figure 5).


The U.S. Threat to Russian Strategic Deterrence Capabilities

A cornerstone of Russia's national security policy is the concept of strategic deterrence. Russia's theory of strategic deterrence is based upon the premise that

The use of military forces

Traditional forms and methods

- initiation of military operations *after strategic deployment*
- frontal clash of large groupings of line-units*, the basis of which consists of ground troops
- the destruction of personnel and weaponry, and the *consequent possession of lines* and areas with the goal of the seizure of territories
- destruction of the enemy*, destruction of the economic potential and possession of his territories
- the conduct of combat operations on the ground, in the air and at sea
- the command-and-control of groupings of line units (forces) *within a framework of a strictly organized hierarchical structure* of command-and-control agencies



The use of political, diplomatic, economic and other nonmilitary measures in combination with the use of military forces

New forms and methods

- initiations of military operations* by groupings of line-units (forces) in peacetime
- highly maneuverable, noncontact* combat operations of inter-branch groupings of line-units
- reduction of the military-economic potential of the state by the *destruction of critically important facilities* of his military and civilian infrastructure in a short time
- the *mass use of high-precision weaponry*, the large-scale use of *special operations forces*, as well as *robotic systems and weapons based on new physical principles* and the participation of a *civil-military component* in combat operations
- simultaneous effects* on line-units and enemy facilities throughout the entire depth of his territories
- warfare simultaneously *in all physical environments and the information space*
- the use of asymmetric and indirect operations
- command-and-control of forces and assets *in a unified information space*

Figure 5. Graphic from Gerasimov article in *Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kurier*, 26 February 2013, translated by Charles Bartles

the threat of a mass employment of primarily strategic nuclear forces will cause such an amount of damage to an aggressor's military and economic potential under any circumstances that the cost of such an endeavor will be unacceptable to the aggressor. Even in the worst of economic times, Russia has been able to rely on her strategic nuclear forces for such strategic deterrence.

However, after NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia, Russia saw NATO's interference with what it perceived as an internal matter in Yugoslavia as something that might be replicated in its own breakaway region, Chechnya. In response, Russia incorporated the concept into its 2000 Military Doctrine of "de-escalation" that says if faced with a large-scale conventional attack it could respond with a limited nuclear strike.¹¹ In the past, the relatively weak condition of Russia's conventional forces required Russia to change the conditions for the use of strategic nuclear forces as a strategy for deterrence, but the parity and deterrence value of nuclear forces was never questioned. The combination of the United States' development of the anti-ballistic missile defense and Prompt Global Strike (capability to conduct a precision strike on any target in the world in less than hour) programs in the 2000s changed this status quo of

parity for the first time. Russia believes that a combination of these two programs would severely degrade Russia's strategic nuclear deterrent, especially with the addition of hypersonic weapons.¹²

Other Salient Observations of Note

Gerasimov's view of the future operational environment is in many ways very similar to our own. Like us, he envisions less large-scale warfare; increased use of networked command-and-control systems, robotics, and high-precision weaponry; greater importance placed on interagency cooperation; more operations in urban terrain; a melding of offense and defense; and a general decrease in the differences between military activities at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

Interestingly, despite some very similar views, he and his staff are approaching these problems in some very different ways. Russia is experimenting with some rather unconventional means to counter hostile indirect and asymmetric methods, but Russia also sees conventional military forces as being of the utmost importance.

At a time when the U.S. military is cutting back on heavy conventional capabilities, Russia is looking at a similar future operational environment, and doubling

down on hers. While the United States increases its special operations forces (SOF), Russia is keeping her SOF numbers relatively static and is entrusting her conventional forces to perform many SOF functions, not by necessity, but by design.

The biggest difference in how Gerasimov perceives the operational environment is where he sees threat and risk. His article and Russia's 2014 Military Doctrine make apparent that he perceives the primary threats to Russian sovereignty as stemming from U.S.-funded social and political movements such as color revolutions, the Arab Spring, and the Maidan movement. He also sees threats in the U.S. development of hypersonic weapons and the anti-ballistic missile and Prompt Global Strike programs, which he believes could degrade Russian

strategic deterrence capabilities and disturb the current strategic balance.

Conclusion

Gerasimov's position as chief of the General Staff makes him Russia's senior operation-strategic planner and architect for future Russian force structure and capability development. In order to execute these duties, the individual in that position must have the foresight to understand the current and future operating environments along with the circumstances that have created those environments and will alter them. Gerasimov's article is not proposing a new Russian way of warfare or a hybrid war, as has been stated in the West. Moreover, in Gerasimov's view of the operational environment, the United States is the primary threat to Russia. ■

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Notes

1. Gabriel Gatehouse, "The Untold Story of the Maidan Massacre," BBC, 12 February 2015, accessed 5 November 2015, <http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-31359021>.

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13. Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman attended the Russian Ministry of Defense's third Moscow Conference on International Security on 23 May 2014. While in attendance, Cordesman was able to take pictures of Gen. Valery Gerasimov's slide presentation. A few of the presentation's key slides (figures 1, 2, and 3) have been substantially recreated to accompany this article. Cordesman later produced a report on the conference that includes a broader selection of not only the slides presented by Gerasimov, but a selection of materials presented by other participants. The report is titled "A Russian Military View of a World Destabilized by the US and the West." It may be viewed in its entirety at the Center for Strategic & International Studies website, accessed 20 November 2015, <http://csis.org/publication/russia-and-color-revolution>.

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Russia and the "Color Revolution"

A Russian Military View of a World Destabilized by the US and the West (Full Report)

By: Anthony H. Cordesman

CSIS

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INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Burke Chair
In Strategy

May 28, 2014

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Report can be accessed at <http://csis.org/publication/russia-and-color-revolution>



(Associated Press photo)

Demonstrators chant pro-Islamic State slogans as they wave the group's flags 16 June 2014 in front of the provincial government headquarters in Mosul, Iraq.

The Future of Warfare against Islamic Jihadism

Engaging and Defeating Nonstate, Nonuniformed, Unlawful Enemy Combatants

Lt. Col. Allen B. West, U.S. Army, Retired

If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.

-Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*

I remember the mandatory reading list I had as a newly commissioned Army field artillery second lieutenant. Two books on it stood out: Erwin Rommel's *Infantry Attacks* and Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*. Later, as a young captain flying from Fort Riley, Kansas, to the Middle East for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, I reread *The Art of War*. The quote above from that book is one of my favorite quotes (along with the quote sometimes attributed to Alexander the Great, "fortune favors the bold").

The current conflagration in which our nation—actually the world—finds itself in, contending with the issue of Islamic jihadism, makes Sun Tzu's quote seem quite applicable. When we fail to recognize the global Islamic jihadist movement, we lack the ability to understand the history, goals, and objectives of this enemy who consistently articulates its designs, only to be discarded or dismissed by U.S. leadership. Though some feel that identifying the enemy is unnecessary, failing to do so

puts us at a clear disadvantage in achieving victory, as Sun Tzu would postulate. Even the moniker "war on terror" is a horrible misnomer. A nation cannot fight a tactic, which is what terror is—a means to an end. It would be the same as if we referred to World War II as the "war on the blitzkrieg" or the "battle against the kamikaze."

Currently, the world is focused on the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). But, how does the United States face this unlawful enemy combatant on today's battlefield? The United States and its Western allies should consider ISIS their greatest threat. However, we should not discount the threat posed by other groups such as Boko Haram and al-Qaida. Let us use the quote of Sun Tzu to present a policy direction and solution to engage and defeat not just ISIS, but the global Islamic jihad.

Strategic Imperatives

In order to defeat ISIS and the global Islamic jihad movement, the United States must follow strategic

imperatives which, at this time, it lacks. These imperatives are not simply tactical level tasks conducted in a strategic venue; words like degrade, defeat, and destroy have very different definitions to a tactical- or operational-level military planner.

U.S. leadership must understand that the intent of ISIS is to control territory in order to create their own nation. Unfortunately, we are repeating the terrible mistake we made in Afghanistan when we allowed the Taliban to come to power and hold territory. Their local movement allied with the global intentions of al-Qaida and Osama bin Laden. The result was not just the establishment of a savage, barbaric seventh-century state but also the exportation of a vile ideology that espouses terrorist activities.

Deny the enemy sanctuary. The first strategic imperative the United States must follow to defeat our enemy is to deny them sanctuary. This simply means that we must commit to enemy-oriented rather than terrain-oriented operations. The



(Photo courtesy of the U.S. Air Force National Museum)

The U.S. Air Force bombs key points and bridges on the Ho Chi Minh Trail during Operation Tiger Hound, circa 1965. The North Vietnamese used the trail to move troops and supplies into the South. Failure by the United States and South Vietnam to successfully interdict this critical line of communication and deny the North Vietnamese the sanctuary it provided ultimately contributed to the success of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces.

message we must send to the enemy is that we will not be deterred from engaging them if they seek respite within another nation's borders. Our greatest advantage is our strategic mobility; we must use it to take the fight to the enemy, which does not respect borders and boundaries. We must attack Islamic jihadist forces in their base of operations.

We have failed to this point by focusing on nation building without simultaneously conducting strike operations. Consider the early days of Operation Enduring Freedom when our forces, combined with those of the Northern Alliance, were able to dislodge a sixty thousand-man Taliban army from Afghanistan.¹ We must not become burdened down with nation-building tasks when we have not completely denied the enemy a base of operations—allowing them to relocate.

Also, let's be honest: drones are an asset but not a strategic panacea, and they are certainly not a strategy. Drones are a tool that should be employed at the operational or perhaps even the tactical level. The last thing that we need is a repeat of Vietnam when airstrikes were being approved at the strategic level from the White House.²

Interdict enemy lines of communication. The second strategic imperative to achieve victory against ISIS and the global Islamic jihad is to interdict their lines of communication and support. We must cut off their flow of men, materiel, and resources by finding their transit routes and severing them. We should work with our allies to develop a better system to track the movements of jihadists seeking to enter into designated hot zones, such as the Syrian area of operations, which has become the base of operations for ISIS.

Additionally, our focus cannot be just on the belligerents; it must also be on the nation-states that sponsor them and support their activities. We have to follow the money. In the case of ISIS, oil revenues have been integral in sustaining their activities, and we need to identify the sources that are purchasing that oil on the black market.³



(Associated Press Photo by Zia Mazhar)

A Pakistani boy wearing a hat that reads "Allah," or God, holds a toy assault rifle as he surveys the crowd during a pro-Taliban demonstration 19 September 2001 in the Pakistani port town of Karachi.

The venerable DIME model tells us there are four elements to a nation's power—diplomatic, information, military, and economic. We can employ our economic element of national power at the strategic level to cut off the support to jihadist groups such as ISIS, as well as Boko Haram, al-Qaida, al-Nusra, Hamas, Hezbollah, Taliban, al-Aqsa Martyrs, Abu Sayyaf, and all the rest.

Win the information war. The third strategic imperative involves the second element of national power—information. We must win the information war. Our reticence in the West to castigate an enemy such as ISIS is confounding. Our own media sources spent more resources droning on about Abu Ghraib in Iraq than focusing on what ISIS is and the atrocities of Islamic jihadism. We cannot be victorious against this enemy if we lack the intestinal fortitude to simply declare who they are and what they do as evil. Yet, we continue to use the worn out excuse that "we do not want to offend Muslims." We do not have to do that, but we cannot abdicate the responsibility to win the war against extremist propaganda. This means denying the enemy a new sanctuary on the twenty-first century battlefield, the domain of social media.

The most important aspect of an effective information operation against ISIS and others is to

document success on the battlefield. However, when we are reluctant to take the enemy on in this domain, they turn it into positive propaganda for their purposes. In turn, some young people living under the liberty and freedom of the West find the enemy's messages attractive, and they seek to join with jihadist groups. This is unconscionable.

And, let's stop referring to jihadist detainees as "prisoners of war." They are not; they are unlawful enemy combatants and do not deserve either constitutional rights or the rights afforded under the Geneva Convention. An important aspect of the information war is that, while our kindness and benevolence may be in keeping with our principles and values, to the enemy they indicate abject weakness.

Reduce the enemy's sphere of influence. The last strategic imperative necessary to achieve success against ISIS and the global Islamic jihad is to cordon off the enemy and reduce their sphere of influence. We must shrink the enemy's territory. Sadly, we are not effective in disallowing the promulgation and proliferation of Islamic extremist ideology. And, here in the United States, we are mistakenly allowing this ideology a base of operations under the guise of freedom of religion, not wanting to recognize that this ideology is in conflict with America's fundamental principles and values. Case in point: the continued policy characterization of Nidal Hasan's 2009 attack at Fort Hood as "workplace violence," when, in fact, the truth was uncovered during his trial; his attack was clearly jihadism.⁴ If we do not block the exportation of such Islamic jihadism, we will have movements such as ISIS grow even more widespread.

Operational and Tactical Imperatives

These four strategic imperatives easily translate into operational theater imperatives as well. We must understand that we do not have a war in Afghanistan or a war in Iraq; we have one war with combat theaters of operation, and the commanders in those theaters need concise, strategic-level guidance in order to develop their own guidance for their subordinates. Clear strategic- and operational-level imperatives will enable better guidance for tactical-level commanders.

At the tactical level there are five imperatives: find, fix, engage, destroy, and pursue. These imperatives are

nested in the overall strategic- and operational-level objectives. Our intelligence assets must find the enemy and, when the enemy is found, we must use strategic- and operational-level assets to support our tactical-level forces by fixing the enemy in place, interdicting their flow of support, and denying them sanctuary. When these conditions are met, it becomes easier at the tactical level to directly engage and destroy the enemy with immediately available weapon systems. We must then continue to support our tactical-level forces in pursuing the enemy to bring about its complete destruction, not allowing the enemy to escape as happened in 2001 in the mountains around Tora Bora in Afghanistan.⁵

These strategic, operational, and tactical imperatives are enemy-focused, and their success depends on our knowing the enemy—not dismissing their goals, objectives, and declared intentions.

Refocusing Our Efforts and Redesigning Our Army

What must we do to achieve Sun Tzu's maxim of "knowing yourself"? We can no longer become mired down in the business of nation building. We must instead refocus our efforts on conducting simultaneous strike operations across the battlefield. This means we must move toward a power projection force instead of a Cold War-era, forward-deployed force structure. One of our most immediate needs is to restructure our military, not based upon a budget, but rather by our strategic goals and the requirements of each area of responsibility as identified by the geographic combatant commands (Pacific, European, Africa, Southern, Northern, and Central Commands). This regional alignment can be done in a fiscally responsible way, but it must be expeditionary—based upon deployable forces from maritime and aerial platforms. And, we must include the solidification of strategic partnerships. We can work with other nations and bring to bear a unified, potent capability and capacity.

Sadly, we are going in the wrong direction by decimating our armed force structure. We are playing a shell game with our force structure, shifting forces here and there instead of having dedicated forces that are able to conduct operations to deny the enemy establishing itself. We need to construct a twenty-first century military that can contend with the fluid situation created by conflicts between state and nonstate actors across



(Photo by Ishtiaq Mahsud, Associated Press)

Pakistani Taliban spokesman Shahidullah Shahid, flanked by his bodyguards, talks to reporters 5 October 2013 at an undisclosed location in the Pakistani tribal area of Waziristan. The United States and its allies must work to deny organizations like the Taliban sanctuary in regions such as Waziristan and limit their ability to export their ideology through the media.

the combatant commands. Again, this is not about developing large overseas bases but about the ability to launch and strike the enemy with lethal and ferocious force, as we saw in the ninety-day campaign that dislodged the Taliban and al-Qaida from Afghanistan in 2001.⁶ We don't need to show up with a massive one hundred thousand-man force. Remember, our goal is no longer nation building.

The Marine Air Ground Task Force, utilizing brigade/regimental combat task force formations, has become a model for deploying force structures. During my time as an exchange officer at Camp Lejeune with the II Marine Expeditionary Force, I came to realize the potency of that structure. The U.S. Army needs to move toward the same type of structure; it is time to break the phalanx and think differently. An Army brigade task force needs to be fully integrated with readily available Army air support. I believe we should transfer the A-10 Warthog to the U.S. Army to ensure we have timely, close air support for the ground commander; remember the tactical imperative to engage the enemy with immediately available weapon systems. And, Army units must learn to deploy from maritime assets, like the 10th

Mountain Division was prepared to do from an aircraft carrier for a potential operation into Haiti in 1994.⁷ We must be able to project combat power from the littorals and extend it inland.

A final, critical factor in the redesign of our military is the necessity of finding Department of Defense leaders who understand the three levels of warfare and have some combat experience, instead of designating those leadership positions as rewards for political patronage. We have a defense industrial complex that tells the military what it needs based upon the whims of congressional members who are concerned mainly with jobs programs in their respective districts and states. We have a research and development, acquisition, and procurement system that is heavily weighed down and constrains our warfighters' ability to get timely weapon systems. We produce strategic reviews and studies that create mountains of paper that few read and no one implements. What we need are elected officials who understand that not every dollar in Washington, D.C., is equal, and that our military cannot be the bill payer for fiscally irresponsible parochialism.

Conclusion

All the aforementioned recommendations would have an impact on fighting ISIS and the global Islamic jihad. However, as Carl von Clausewitz articulated with his “paradoxical trinity,” the spirit of the American warrior is unmatched but it is the lack of spirit from the nation and from the government that is hindering our victory against this enemy.⁸

Our nation must come to the realization that peace does come through strength, and the ability to have capable forces deployed at the ready is a deterrent to our enemies. I do not subscribe to our being a global police force, but these are extraordinary times where we have an enemy that is beheading and crucifying innocent people. This enemy is forcing a mass migration of people that will have significant domestic ramifications for Western nations. ISIS and the global Islamic jihad can be defeated and its ideology delegitimized, but someone has

to lead, and that responsibility falls to the United States. This enemy must be made to respect strength and might, which we have not displayed. Going forward, national security strategy cannot be determined by campaign promises and rhetoric because the enemy has votes.

I close by repeating Sun Tzu’s quote, “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.” In this current conflagration against ISIS and the global Islamic jihad, our Nation refuses to know the enemy. We struggle to know ourselves, and we are decimating our military capability and capacity. Therefore, we find ourselves losing the battle. We lost in Vietnam, not from the tactical level, but from the strategic level; let us not allow history to repeat itself. ■

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(Photo courtesy of the U.S. State Department)

An aerial view of the Za'atari camp in Jordan for Syrian refugees, 18 July 2013, from a helicopter carrying U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Jordanian Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh.

Jordanian Society's Responses to Syrian Refugees

Capt. Walter C. Haynes, U.S. Army

Syria's civil war is one of the most pressing national security dilemmas facing the United States. It threatens to further engulf an already volatile region and spill over the borders of a NATO ally (Turkey), the closest U.S. ally in the Middle East (Israel), and three fragile Arab states—Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan.

Jordan, in particular, may be in existential peril as a result of the Syrian conflict. It is an important ally with a questionable ability to absorb the over six hundred thousand Syrian refugees now inside its borders. The regional crisis and a further influx of refugees into Jordan could destabilize that country permanently through a deterioration of its national identity.



(Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

The Jaramana refugee camp for Palestinian refugees just outside Damascus, Syria, 1948. Approximately 700,000 Palestinians fled or were expelled from areas that were later incorporated into Israel. A majority of these took refuge in similar tent cities in Jordan.

Understanding the social dynamics at work in the region is vital for helping U.S. policymakers employ the appropriate instruments of national power to advance U.S. interests there. Since the Department of Defense is deeply involved in the U.S. response to the Syrian crisis, questions pertaining to the ability of allied nations to absorb refugees are critically important to military leaders, who must properly align military strategy in support of policy.

This article analyses how the Syrian refugee influx threatens to change Jordan's culture and political structure, and how Jordanian society might respond to the threat of such a rapid change in demographics. It briefly examines Jordanian society and the status of both Palestinian and Syrian refugees there, laying out the current Jordanian response to the refugee influx, as well as announced or rumored future plans for integration or segregation of the refugees. Next, it analyzes models of ethnic tension and discusses examples of conflict-related changes in society as they may relate to the situation in Jordan.

This article adopts an outside observer (etic) perspective and examines ethnic conflict to make a prediction about future behavior to help U.S. policymakers.

Bottom Line Up Front

Given historical trends, the most likely outcome of the current crisis is that Jordanians will self-identify more strongly as an in-group, whereas they will ascribe out-group status to the Syrian refugees. Consequently, Jordanians will seek to limit integration of Syrian refugees into Jordanian society. As the Jordanian state apparatus seeks to mitigate tensions within its society in order to preserve internal stability, the likelihood is that King Abdullah (Abdullah II bin Al-Hussein) will seek greater U.S. involvement and support.

Background

Jordan is a staunch U.S. ally with a fractious society. During World War I, Sharif Hussein bin Ali revolted against the Ottoman Empire with British support. One

of his sons, Abdullah, became the king of Transjordan, a British protectorate created after World War I. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, named after Jordan's royal family, became independent following World War II. (The Hashemites trace their ancestry directly to the prophet Muhammad, providing religious legitimacy to their rule.¹)

After the Arab states' war against Israel in 1948, Jordan annexed the West Bank, adding to its territory and population but also laying the stage for future tension between the original Transjordanian Bedouins and the poorly integrated Palestinians.² "East Bank Jordanians," also known as the Bedouin, comprise the elite of Jordanian society. They serve in the military and government, are exempt from many taxes, and can purchase goods at lower prices than their Palestinian counterparts.³

The dozen or so major Bedouin tribes have, over time, grown increasingly forceful in demanding greater concessions from King Abdullah II and Jordan's government.⁴ The northern tribes supported Syria when it invaded in 1970, and the southern tribes have shown themselves to be very effective at exchanging allegiance for monetary compensation; first from the Turks, then the British, and now the Hashemites.⁵

Relying on them for support, King Abdullah II is keen to curry favor. When the Islamic State captured 1st Lt. Moaz al-Kasasbeh in early 2015, the king hurried to pay his respects to the pilot's tribe, the powerful Bararsheh.⁶ Following Moaz's death, the tribes united behind government policy against the Islamic State.

Status of Palestinian Refugees in Jordan

Palestinians, both the refugees who fled the area now claimed by Israel during Israel's 1948 War of Independence and their descendants, form a large portion of the population in Jordan. In fact, they are a majority, a truth so uncomfortable for the Jordanian government that it refuses to openly admit it.⁷

The history of Palestinians in Jordan has been marred by discrimination and conflict. Notably, the state's first king, Abdullah I, was assassinated by a Palestinian in 1951, and Jordan used military force to expel the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) together with thousands of PLO supporters during the 1970s' Jordanian civil war, known as Black September.⁸

The socioeconomic status and integration of Jordan's remaining Palestinian population today is

uneven and complicated. There are over two million Palestinian-Jordanians registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for Palestine Refugees in the Middle East inside the country, many of whom still live in refugee camps. Jordan's withdrawal from the West Bank in 1988 led to the revocation of citizenship for thousands, rendering them essentially stateless. A Palestinian with only a Jordanian passport, but no national number, is ineligible for state schooling, medical care, state employment, and many other basic provisions necessary for economic advancement.⁹

Consequently, the third Hashemite king, Abdullah II, reigns in a context of historical threats to his kingdom from malcontents within, especially since Jordan made and is now at peace with Israel, its traditional foreign rival broadly despised by Palestinian refugees. Tellingly, Palestinians are not permitted in the Army, and they are very thinly represented in the top ranks of government.

Syrian Prospect for Settling in Jordanian Refugee Camps

Most troublingly for the newly arrived Syrian refugees may be the stark disparity between the status of Palestinians who live in the camps and regular Jordanian citizens, even after having lived in Jordan for decades.¹⁰ The most recent UNRWA report (2013) on the Palestinian refugees in Jordan states, "Camp inhabitants have significantly lower income, larger households, substandard housing, lower educational attainment, perceived poorer health, and heavier reliance on UNRWA and other relief services."¹¹

Currently, Jordan houses Syrian refugees in several large camps and within many population centers. Za'atari, the largest refugee camp, is now the fourth largest city in Jordan. In a country with a population of around 6.5 million, Syrians are now close to a tenth of the population. Approximately 440,000 of these refugees live outside of refugee camps.¹²

Outside of the camps, Syrians compete with Jordanians for work and housing, despite employment being illegal. This leads to the perception amongst Jordanians that Syrian refugees are responsible for difficulty in finding low-skilled employment in Jordan, and also for a drastic rise in housing prices there. The Jordanian government estimates that each refugee costs the state \$3,000 (U.S.) a year (or almost \$2 billion), compared to an annual gross



An overview of Za'atari Syrian refugee camp in Jordan, 21 November 2012.

domestic product of \$33 billion. One consequence is that Syrian refugees are by definition excluded from political representation in Jordan's unicameral legislature.

Popular Response to Syrian Refugees among Jordanians

Although Jordanians were initially welcoming to the Syrians, this response has hardened. As a result, the government limits the inflow of refugees and devotes considerable resources to policing the border.¹³ The Syrians place an additional burden on the health care system as well, such that Jordan's minister of health warned, "The system is dangerously overstretched."¹⁴ More troubling is that many urban refugees are unaware of services available to them, resulting in low vaccination rates, for example.¹⁵ Recently, Jordan's government announced a \$3 billion Jordan Response Plan to meet the needs of both refugees and host communities, but the historical underfunding of aid programs for Syria does not give cause for optimism.¹⁶

In response to the stress caused by the refugee influx, Jordan is considering establishing a "safe zone" in southern Syria. This buffer zone would permit Jordan to halt the refugee influx and also to provide rebel forces with a protected area in which to train and prepare for attacks against the Assad regime. But, as Ala' Arababa'h explained in a July 2015 article, this move poses risks. First, it may encourage the Syrian government to attack Jordan. Second, any buffer zone may also be utilized by extremist groups to foment unrest inside Jordan.¹⁷

Thus, Jordan risks exacerbating the situation with such a drastic remedy, and the willingness to entertain the option shows how worried Jordan's rulers are.

Analysis

Jordan is an ethnically heterogeneous state with the consequence that a sense of national identity and unity is not strong among much of the population. Tellingly, Jordan does not risk using the traditional state institution that many countries use to build a sense of national identity—the armed forces—because it fears providing training and weapons to groups with suspect loyalties. Consequently, Palestinians are excluded from armed service, which actually perpetuates the perception of discrimination, magnifies ethnic differences, and foments bitter resentment.

Therefore, the friction point between Palestinians and Bedouins in Jordan may be primarily viewed as ethnic in nature. Frederik Barth defined an ethnic group as a population

that is largely biologically self-perpetuating; shares fundamental cultural values, realized in overt unity in cultural forms; makes up a field of communication and interaction; [and] has a membership which identifies itself, and is identified by others, as constituting a category distinguishable from other categories of the same order.¹⁸

With the above description in mind, ethnic delineation is especially important because ethnic identity



(Photo courtesy of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees' Photo Unit)

determines benefits derived from and membership within the instruments of state power. Although they have a shared Sunni Arab ancestry, religion, and language, Palestinians and Bedouins in Jordan nonetheless differentiate among themselves in very inflexible ways.

Tribal identity is one such major ethnic discriminator within Jordanian society, especially among the powerful Bedouin tribes. Ethnicity is ordinarily derived in one of two distinctive ways. *Performative* ethnicity defines identity by shared beliefs, cultural characteristics, and actions. Consequently, the ability to adopt belief systems and cultural characteristics (such as adopting a religion, or learning the ethnic group language or dialect) enables outsiders to assimilate with greater ease into a new ethnic identity. In contrast to the more flexible performative concept of ethnicity, Jordanians generally adhere to a fixed *primordialist* one. Primordialism asserts kinship and obligatory fealty to an identity group based on assumed common origin and ancestry—kinship by blood ties. Therefore, the deeply ingrained Jordanian primordialist tribal outlook that derives ethnic identity based on the assumption of common genealogy makes it difficult for outsiders to join the in-group. This primordialist concept serves as a defense mechanism of sorts for the Bedouins who use it to assert their in-group higher status at the expense of first the Palestinians, and now the Syrians.

Conflict as an Agent of Change

Conflict accelerates change, and culture is no exception to this rule. Sharon Hutchinson, for example,

outlined how conflict in the Sudan militarized Nuer ethnicity. She observed, “communities ... have been grappling with an expanding regional subculture of ethnicized violence.”¹⁹ Similarly, emerging circumstances in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon show that Arab states are also increasingly vulnerable in this regard.

Keeping this in mind, there are several possible outcomes for conflict between tribe and state. The Bedouin tribes of Jordan will not willingly cede their privileged position to the Syrians, especially given their documented resistance to Palestinian empowerment. However, the unfolding conflict in the region may limit their choices and compel them to accept socio-cultural change. Choices include assimilation and cooperation, flight, or resistance (or a combination of these choices).

Historically, Jordan's Bedouin tribes tend to cooperate with the state and use the threat of resistance to extract concessions that reinforce their power in society. On the other hand, the Palestinians in Jordan, although not organized on strictly tribal lines, also have utilized all three strategies throughout recent history.

In contrast, the Syrian refugees are actively prevented from assimilating and have no real desire to flee back to war-torn Syria. This means there is a significantly increased chance of the third option in response to change imposed by conflict, resistance.

Analyzing Ethnic Resistance

One useful model of ethnic conflict is provided by Joan Estaban and Debraj Ray, wherein they examine discriminatory government policy and its responsiveness to

various forms of ethnic activism, including violence. The perceived responsiveness by the state “induces individuals to mobilize, often violently, to support their cause.”²⁰

Their model is applicable to Jordan because it accounts for inequality across groups; a victory over an opposing ethnic group that brings with it the possibility of full or partial expropriation of the opponent’s resources. The model suggests that large income differences lead directly to an increased likelihood of ethnic conflict. However, the group with the greater income also has a proportionally greater ability to fund militants.

In Jordan, the Bedouins have the additional advantage of controlling the security services, making any armed resistance a dangerous proposition for the out-groups. Therefore, the greater risk to the Jordanian state in this model is from the armed forces, whose members, despite homogeneity with state structures, may act to preserve the tribes’ prerogative to resources as opposed to the state’s.

Esteban and Ray’s primary conclusion is that within-group distribution of radicalism and income is more important than the simple level of either variable. Here they echo two preeminent experts in the study of ethnic conflict, Donald Horowitz and Robert Bates, by concluding that within-group inequality is an important factor in the beginnings of ethnic conflict.²¹

As such, understanding more about the disparities within Jordan’s Bedouin tribes would be an important next step for assessing risk to Jordan’s government and overall society. Additionally, the state’s demonstrated responsiveness to agitation by the powerful Bedouin tribes may inspire similar activity from the out-groups, whose methods may be more forceful to attract the attention necessary to address their grievances.

Potential Involvement of the Muslim Brotherhood

The Muslim Brotherhood is another powerful force in Jordan with the potential to shape any eventual response to the Syrian refugee crisis. Although its leadership comprises mostly Bedouins, it retains many traits of the organization established by Hassan al-Banna in Egypt. As such, it meets the requirements outlined by Beeman in his analysis of fundamentalism: revivalism, orthodoxy, evangelism, and social action.²²

Unlike in Syria, where Hafez al-Assad destroyed the Muslim Brotherhood in his siege of Hama in 1982, Jordan’s rulers have tolerated the Muslim

Brotherhood.²³ Although some commentators see this as a cynical move to keep an “opposition in waiting” with which to alarm the United States and ensure support for repressive policies, it also poses an existential danger to Jordan’s government and society if the Bedouin decide to support it in lieu of the monarchy. William Beeman was clear about the risk:

Because such movements often objectify the larger society as “Other” and oppressor, they can produce participants who defy civil authority and are difficult to predict or control. They often operate on the edge of the law, creating automatic tension in the society in which they exist.²⁴

Alternatively, the Muslim Brotherhood may decide to champion the cause of Syrian refugees, increasing its own power vis-à-vis the state and drawing the Syrians directly into domestic Jordanian politics.

Conclusions

If the Syrian civil war ended tomorrow, the entire state apparatus of Syria would still be broken. Syria’s formerly tolerant and cosmopolitan culture has been torn apart, and returning to a status quo ante bellum is impossible. There is no realistic outcome in which the majority of refugees might immediately return to Syria absent a forcible repatriation that would draw international condemnation.

With this in mind, the inevitable effects on Jordanian society are of primary interest to the United States. As an ally actively engaged in combat operations in both Iraq and Syria, a stable Jordan is strategically significant.

Despite the difficulty inherent in predicting cultural shifts during a conflict, the evidence and literature make a strong case that Jordanian society will come under increasing strain from the influx of refugees, and that could be perilous. Therefore, the evidence supports the hypothesis that Jordanians are likely to limit Syrian integration into society for fear of both instability and economic losses.

The strain of a sustained Syrian refugee presence in Jordan will threaten political stability as various subcultural groups jockey to protect or advance themselves, forcing the Jordanian regime to seek ways of alleviating the pressure to maintain itself. Since there are at present no options apparent that do not entail significant human suffering or lessening of instability, any action by Jordan will directly impact U.S. military



(Photo by Mustafa Bader, via Wikimedia Commons)

A Syrian refugee girl points at the tented settlement where she lives with her family in Jawa, in the outskirts of Amman, where a mere one hour of rainfall flooded large sections of the camp, 18 November 2013.

and diplomatic efforts. It is truly a matter of deciding carefully which is the best among bad options.

A constant worry in Jordan is that the Palestinians may see the stress created by the Syrian refugees as an opportunity to take what they see as their rightful place at the top of Jordanian society. Even if unsuccessful, such an attempt would have far-reaching ripple effects throughout the region, further distracting both U.S. and Israeli officials. If Jordan were to be preoccupied with internecine conflict, Saudi Arabia would become even more important as an Arab ally to the United States in the anti-Islamic State coalition. This outcome, especially given the current strain on U.S.-Saudi relations, would present even more challenges to military action in Syria and further limit U.S. options.

Consequently, Jordan's primary concern is to limit the emergence of ethnic conflict that might quickly become unmanageable. As Esteban and Ray's model shows, inequality and radicalism provide powerful explanations for ethnic conflict.²⁵ This is particularly worrisome to Jordan because it has a minority in-group with a high level of inequality in comparison to the out-groups. Additionally, the Muslim Brotherhood presents an existing organization with the potential to radicalize discontented and desperate refugees. Moreover, across the border in northern Syria, many of the militias combating the Assad regime are already extremely radical in nature.

There are many questions that remain. Most importantly, what is the risk of radicalization of both Syrian refugees and Jordanians? In this regard, what is the capability of the Muslim Brotherhood chapter in Jordan to ignite a fundamentalist movement that places unbearable stress on King Abdullah's precarious balancing act?²⁶ Further, what are the possibilities that Jordan's Palestinians, long discriminated against by the Bedouins, find common cause with their Syrian counterparts? After all, Jordan still considers the Palestinians refugees to properly belong in the West Bank and Israel, even after over half a century of living in Jordan.²⁷

The one mitigating factor of consequence with regard to organizing refugees to oppose the Jordanian government seems to be the cost of mobilization, which the out-groups do not yet have a demonstrated ability to bear.

In devising a strategy to support the Jordanian state, the United States should first focus its attention on the Jordanian Bedouins to determine how the tribes perceive their own status in society, and how they might support stability in Jordan in the face of a continuing refugee crisis. It is from them that the greatest risk to Jordan's stability could possibly be mounted, or the greatest impetus to preserving Jordan's national integrity as a stable state be cultivated. ■

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(AP photo/Fernando Llano)

Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez (now deceased), dressed in military uniform and surrounded by military officers, attends a celebration 27 June 2000 commemorating the Battle of Carabobo (fought 24 June 1821), which led to Venezuelan independence. Elected to office in 1998, Chávez filled the ranks of government with military cronies who became instrumental in making Venezuela a major conduit for drug trafficking to North America and Europe.

Criminal Networks in Venezuela

Their Impact on Hemispheric Security

Prof. Leopoldo E. Colmenares G.

Following the maturation of its democratic process at the end of the 1960s, Venezuela was a stabilizing force in the Latin American region,

making active contributions to strengthening peace among the nations of the region, promoting democracy and, in general, acting as a positive element for

Latin American development. However, in recent years, the South American nation's actions have threatened the security and stability of the hemisphere. Venezuela has interfered with and destabilized other countries in the region, supported internal and external paramilitary forces, and threatened war with its neighbors—all activities derived from the political-strategic course charted by the regime of Hugo Chávez Frías.

A few years after Chávez rose to power in 1999, he began implementing a political-strategic plan he called the “Bolivarian Revolution,” which threatened Latin American peace. Chávez's plan was characterized by a hostile and confrontational posture toward the United States, actions designed to export Chávez's autocratic, socialist model to other countries of the region, and a foreign policy that embroiled Venezuela in international-level conflicts.

For example, the Chávez government resolutely supported the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and it closely collaborated with actors from outside the region such as Russia. This collaboration led to the presence of nuclear-capable warships and bombers in Venezuelan ports and airports, and, during one exercise, resulted in the violation of Colombian airspace.¹ Similarly, Venezuela has been linked to Iran, helping that nation skirt economic sanctions imposed by the United States and the European Union, and allowing Iranian nationals to enter Venezuela to participate in activities that some authors tie to international terrorism and Iran's nuclear program.²

Following the sudden demise of Chávez in 2013, based on writs of execution ordered by his successor, Nicolás Maduro, almost all of the characteristics of this regional security environment are still in existence. However, it is now instead fueled by two vectors. First, what might be called *ideological inertia* has been sustained by Maduro, which preserves the principal elements of Chávez's foreign policy; in particular, confrontation with the United States. Second, and more importantly, criminal activities are carried out by an ensemble of transnational criminal networks that are closely tied to the national government.

More recently, Venezuela has gained international attention from both accusations and proven actions



of involvement in transnational criminal networks by civilian and military officials. These networks are involved in illicit operations like narcotics trafficking, money laundering, financial crimes, and corruption. Similarly, Venezuela has been tied, directly or indirectly, to support of international terrorism, which together with its participation in illicit networks, represents a clear danger to regional security and stability.³

The participation of high-level officials of the Venezuelan government in transnational criminal enterprises is a direct by-product of the Chavista revolutionary process. Chávez used a crude model to implement what is also known as “twenty-first century socialism” and attempted to export it to the rest of Latin America. This model is characterized by the militarization of most of the state institutions, implicit support for corruption, and the creation of systems—both legal and illegal—that parallel state institutions. Application of this model creates ideal conditions for the formation of criminal networks related to narcotics trafficking and white-collar crime. These networks have a global reach and present a threat to hemispheric security and regional stability.

The aim of this article is to advance a theory of how a political process, considered by Chavistas



(AFP photo/ Juan Barreto)

Nicolás Maduro (left), who succeeded Hugo Chávez as president of Venezuela upon Chávez's death, attends a ceremony 4 February 2014 commemorating the twenty-second anniversary of Chávez's attempted coup against the government of Carlos Andres Pérez. Diosdado Cabello, president of Venezuela's National Assembly, dressed in military uniform, accompanies him. Cabello is a leading target of U.S. drug trafficking and money laundering investigations.

as “revolutionary,” has resulted instead in a state of affairs that allows a partnership between the Venezuelan government and illicit transnational organizations, without radical changes in the social and political environment. This situation has progressed to the point that some authors now qualify Venezuela as a “mafia state,” driven by the increasingly pronounced involvement of civilian and military figures of the government in activities linked to transnational organized crime.⁴

Militarization of the Venezuelan State and the Creation of Illegal Structures

It is no coincidence that the most significant accusations made in the past few years regarding Venezuelan government involvement in illicit transnational activities are directed at active and retired military members who held positions of responsibility within the national government. Chávez's rise to power was accompanied

by the militarization of the most important state institutions through the strategic placement of his comrades-in-arms in a large number of influential government positions.

In his inaugural address in February 1999, the Venezuelan leader referred to the military when he said, “Our brothers-in-arms cannot be locked away in barracks, on naval bases and air bases with their great ability, great human capital, and vast resources as if they were deactivated, as if it were another world separate from an astonishing reality, a cruel reality that clamors for an injection of resources, morale, and discipline.”⁵ Later, Chávez asked the minister of defense for a list of all active-duty military personnel with engineering degrees. He said, “The list surprised both of us: hundreds of active duty officers who are engineers, and starting with nuclear engineers, there are also a number of them in the armed forces, including civil, electronic, and electrical engineers in the different branches.”⁶ He added that, as commander in chief, he had ordered these individuals to integrate themselves in development projects through specialized units. On his first day as head of state, Chávez proclaimed the moral superiority of his military colleagues, who would achieve the long-awaited national development that the previous leaders, those he called corrupt governments of the “Fourth Republic,” could not.

Just twenty-three days after this speech, the Venezuelan president began execution of what he paradoxically called Plan Bolívar 2000. The “plan” had no articulated objectives and was carried out without any type of planning or organization, although it involved more than seventy thousand active-duty military personnel. Under the leadership of some of Chávez's general-officer colleagues, these members of the armed forces would be used in a series of activities totally foreign to their *raison d'être*. In theory, the plan would unfold in three stages: *Pro-Country*, which involved the armed forces in the performance of social services; *Pro-Homeland*, in which the military would empower the communities to solve internal infrastructure problems; and, finally, *Pro-Nation*, in which those in uniform would help the country to become economically self-sufficient.

In this manner, the Venezuelan president set aside state laws and formal organizations that regulated both the actors and the types of activity undertaken—for example, the Constitutional Law of the Armed

Forces—to create an illegal parallel military structure, which lacked the control and accountability normally exercised by state entities charged with those responsibilities. This was the first of many parallel state structures, the majority illegal, installed by Chávez with the actual aim of taking absolute control of power.

Plan Bolívar 2000, which remained in effect until 2001, ended in complete failure. However, in contradictory fashion, the plan had a positive media effect for the president, who was by then advantageously positioned with the military establishment, within the framework of what would be the Chavista project for a civil-military union. Plan Bolívar 2000 not only failed to achieve its nebulous goals, but its execution demonstrated just the opposite of what Chávez had said in his inaugural address: neither his comrades-in-arms who led the project nor the lower-level cadres enjoyed any moral superiority over the rest of the population. They were involved in scores of corruption cases and the misappropriation of immense quantities of allocated resources.

The program that had Gen. Víctor Cruz Weffer as its principal manager had resources on the order of thirty-six billion bolivars in 1999 (roughly \$5 billion USD at the current exchange rate) and thirty-seven billion bolivars in 2000. In currency alone, more than \$150 million bolivars disappeared from the plan without any accountability for expenditures.⁷ Comptroller General of Nation Eduardo Roche Lander began an investigation of the losses in 1999. Among the illicit activities uncovered during the investigation, he detected irregularities in the fiscal management of the military garrisons in Barcelona, Bolívar City, and Maturín, and charges were filed against Cruz Weffer and Gen. Manuel Rosendo, commander of the Unified Command of the National Armed Forces. Despite the evidence in the cases, Chávez publicly declared, “Perhaps it is an administrative oversight that merits a fine; but there is no cause for undue concern.”⁸ Other military members charged were Gen. Jorge Luis García Carneiro, garrison commander in Mérida, and Gen. Mervin López Hidalgo, commander of the division in Guárico, but none were legally disciplined as a result of their alleged criminal actions.⁹



In his efforts to gain complete control of the Venezuelan state, Chávez assigned dozens of active and retired military members to diverse government positions, such as cabinet ministers, vice ministers, and general directors. He appointed them to positions with state-owned

Petróleos de Venezuela (Venezuela Oil, or PDVSA) and as presidents of autonomous institutes. Years later, Chávez selected them as directors of the primary parallel government structures he called “missions” and of other similar organizations with international reach.¹⁰

The approval of a new constitution at the end of Chávez’s first year in office led to an overhaul of all public powers. He assumed control of the new National Assembly, the Government Accountability Office, the National Prosecutors Office and its subsidiary law enforcement arm, the Corps of Scientific, Penal, and Criminal Investigation (CICPC), and a good number of the nation’s courts. Chávez presented various retired comrades-in-arms as candidates in the 2000 elections, and six were elected as governors. More recently, during the 2012 elections for these offices, the government party was victorious in twenty of the twenty-three contested states, with eleven retired military members elected. Among them are the last four ministers of defense under Chávez: Gen. Ramón Carrizález, Gen. Jorge García Carneiro, Gen. Henry Rangel Silva, and Gen. Carlos Mata Figueroa.¹¹

Between 2002 and 2003, there was a series of closely tied events in which the National Armed Forces played a protagonist role; this came as a consequence of their active participation in government activities under the Chavista regime. The first event occurred at the beginning of April 2002, when PDVSA workers called a work stoppage that was supported by the Venezuelan Workers Confederation (CTV) and the general population in protest of what had already been perceived as an authoritarian government. Because of his attempts to forcibly put down the street protests against him, the military high command deposed Chávez. However, only forty-eight hours later, military members loyal to his cause returned him to power. The president undertook a purge of those military members who had participated in the coup d’état and “reorganized the Armed Forces to isolate or force the retirement of the military insurrectionists,” thereby increasing his power and control inside the national military structure.¹²

In October of that year, a group of approximately 130 military members, including a considerable number of the highest ranks, decided to relinquish their posts and declare themselves in a state of civil disobedience. They took control of the Altamira Plaza in Caracas just days after the beginning of a national work stoppage


2003**2006**

(Source: White House's Office of National Drug Control Policy)

Figure 1. Suspected Drug Trafficking Flights, 2003 and 2006

2012

20% of the illicit flow is via air conveyances



Radar data collected by the United States government shows what are believed to be illicit drug flights, mostly between Venezuela and Central America. Country names have been added.

Figure 2. Suspected Drug Trafficking Flights, 2012

Waging War against Drug Trafficking from Venezuela

When Hugo Chávez became the president of Venezuela in 1999, he assumed leadership of the most affluent country in Latin America, with an economy largely based on the sale of oil. However, Chávez's policies, including his integration of the military into nearly every aspect of the government and civilian sectors, combined with an unexpected glut of oil on the world market, had a devastating effect on the Venezuelan economy. One result was that cash-strapped Venezuela soon became an easy target for exploitation by powerful drug cartels, who enticed much of the Venezuelan civilian and military leadership into entering the world of drug trafficking to the United States and Western Europe.

Prior to Chávez's election, the vast majority of Latin American-produced drugs were transported by sea and air to the United States and Europe

from remote locations inside Venezuela's neighbor, Colombia. However, starting in the early 2000s, Venezuela's lax enforcement of drug laws and tacit support for illicit drug trafficking by the Chávez regime, along with more vigorous law enforcement by the Colombians, soon made Venezuela the country of choice for air transport of illegal drugs. The comparison of suspected air trafficking flights in figure 1 shows that in 2003, most suspected drug flights originated in Colombia, while by 2006 most originated in Venezuela. Moreover, in 2006, Venezuelan drug trafficking by air reached its peak, with an estimated 180 metric tons of illicit drugs departing from that country and flowing mainly to and through the Dominican Republic. Figure 2 illustrates that, by 2012, Venezuelan participation in drug trafficking was even more pronounced, with virtually all suspected drug trafficking aircraft originating in Venezuela. (2012 was the last year the U.S. government made public release of such tracking maps.)

To combat the flow of illicit drugs through the air, the United States followed a strategy of working through regional security partnerships to interdict drug movement. Through such programs as the Sovereign Skies aerial interdiction program, drug trafficking flights have been greatly reduced. The success of the Sovereign Skies program is illustrated by figure 2, as participation in the program by that country resulted in a dramatic shift of drug-trafficking destinations from the Dominican Republic to Central America. And, for fiscal year 2015, Joint Interagency Task Force-South detected just thirty-eight suspected illicit air events from Venezuela

to Central America, as compared to 121 in 2012. Air trafficking now accounts for 3 percent of the total flow of cocaine leaving South America for destinations in North American and Europe.

Unfortunately, the overall quantity of drugs trafficked has stayed fairly constant. In large part, because of the effectiveness of aerial introduction by cooperating countries, drug smugglers have turned to maritime means such as fast boats and mini-submarines to move the product to its final destination—*Editor's note with input provided by the Joint Interagency Task Force South and U.S. Southern Command Public Affairs Office.*

that included active participation by PDVSA workers.¹³ By the beginning of 2003, Chávez had successfully controlled both situations. He discharged the military members and took complete control of PDVSA, which had previously functioned with a marked independence from the executive branch of the national government. Chávez fired fifteen thousand people—managers and workers—and replaced upper and middle management with trusted civilians and military.¹⁴ These events had the effect of consolidating Chávez's power as president and politicizing the Venezuelan military, since the meritocracy and professionalism of both institutions had been cast aside, leaving loyalty to Chávez as the only requirement for occupying the highest levels of the armed forces and the petroleum industry.

As the Venezuelan leader expanded his control over the state, he promoted various military members into strategic positions with the Venezuelan government, including PDVSA. However, the high number of charges of corruption, illicit opportunism, and criminal activities demonstrated that, more than simply supporting Chávez and the “revolution,” a good number of those individuals sought personal gain.¹⁵ To that end, they began to participate in corrupt, illicit activities associated with organized crime; chief among them were smuggling operations in and out of the country, influence peddling to allow criminal activities in their areas of authority, and physical control of the infrastructure of the institutions under their direction for criminal purposes. Ultimately, the environment of complete impunity and support provided by the Venezuelan leader created a “criminal

snowball” effect within the group of Venezuelan public administration members and the military establishment. Criminal activities progressed with the formation of more sophisticated criminal networks, some of a transnational nature, in which many of those assigned to high-level posts in the government also took part.

Toward Continental Leadership: the Revolution Finds Narcotics Trafficking

One of the primary objectives of Chávez was the export of his revolutionary model to Latin America, with the aim of forming a “greater homeland.”¹⁶ For this purpose, the Venezuelan caudillo employed multiple legal and illegal strategies.¹⁷ For example, while he sought greater regional influence through the development of the oil alliance PetroCaribe, which provided Venezuelan crude oil to Caribbean countries at discount prices, he also incited street unrest in Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia.¹⁸

One of the key decisions made by Chávez to help attain this objective—and one that contributed greatly to the development of criminal networks later implicated in drug trafficking within the Venezuelan government—was to become involved with and support the narcoterrorism group FARC, one of the principal drug cartels in the region.¹⁹ The Venezuelan president calculated that with his support, and given the weakness of neighboring Colombia in 1999, his ideological partners would somehow gain control, and Colombia would fall under the cloak of the Bolivarian Revolution.

To coordinate Venezuelan government logistical support to FARC, Chávez formed a team comprised of a select group of military officers, headed by co-leaders Navy Capt. Ramón Rodríguez Chacín, named in January 2002 as minister of domestic relations, and Army Gen. Hugo Carvajal, later assigned as chief of national military intelligence.²⁰ (These officers were later accused of participating in transnational criminal activities.) From that moment, what Douglas Farah called the “franchising” of Venezuelan territory began, with FARC using Venezuelan soil as a base of operations to conduct their illicit activities.²¹ As a result, in 2008, experts estimated that at least one-third of all cocaine originating in Colombia was smuggled through Venezuela to the United States and Europe.²² More recently, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) estimated that 40 percent of all cocaine produced annually in the world passes through Venezuela.²³ In this same vein, a 2010 report from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime claimed that most of the cocaine entering Europe flowed from Venezuela.²⁴

Proof of the collusion between FARC and Venezuelan military members comes from the statements provided by Venezuelan ex-justice and retired Col. Eladio Aponte Aponte. While serving on the Supreme Court of Justice, Aponte fled the country under the protection of the DEA after he had found himself involved in a war between two criminal networks.²⁵ The Venezuelan judge exposed a document drafted by then Minister of Defense Raúl Baduel for Chávez in 2007 that linked Gen. Rangel Silva to a narcotics trafficking case. In this particular case, more than two tons of cocaine belonging to the FARC was being guarded in Army barracks in a border area adjacent to Colombia and was being transported by a military convoy when it was interdicted.²⁶ Ironically, Rangel Silva was named minister of defense in 2012.

Álvaro Uribe Vélez’s rise to power in Colombia (he was president from August 2002 to August 2010), implementation of his Democratic Security Policy, and activities associated with the U.S. “Plan Colombia” seriously weakened FARC, diminishing its operational capabilities and narcotics distribution efforts.²⁷ It was then that Chávez’s government and his comrades-in-arms became involved in the narcotics trafficking business and ultimately created their own criminal networks to replace or compensate for the absence of



FARC in the international drug trade, particularly in the transport and sale of cocaine. It is unlikely that FARC is responsible for the large shipments of drugs that have continued to depart Venezuela in the past few years, giving credence to the premise that these Venezuelan criminal networks may have assumed total control of the illicit activities once performed by the narcoterrorism organization. Furthermore, it is possible that these Venezuelan criminal groups are in contact with other drug suppliers, whether Colombian or from other Latin American nations, including Mexican cartels.²⁸

In 2008, U.S. authorities made an announcement to the international community regarding Venezuelan military involvement in narcotics trafficking rings. The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) placed sanctions on Carvajal and Rangel Silva, as well as against Chacín for, among other illicit activities, collaboration with the FARC in preventing the seizure of narcotics caches.²⁹ The group became known as the “Narco Suns” or the “Cartel of the Suns,” in reference to the military rank insignia of a general in Venezuela.³⁰ However, it was readily apparent that the group was not acting alone. The large quantities of narcotics seized when attempting to



(AP photo/Ricardo Mazalan)

Former Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, left, and Interior Minister Ramón Rodríguez Chacín in a meeting with governors 18 April 2002 during a federal council held at Miraflores Palace, Caracas, Venezuela.

introduce them in Europe and others nations in Africa and the Americas was greater than what could be attributed to the military groups that led the illicit operations. The only possible conclusion is that there is a complex criminal web within diverse Venezuelan government agencies and institutions, including the judicial branch, which allows these deliveries and legitimizes the money they produce.

Transnational Criminal Networks

The existence of Venezuelan transnational criminal networks that included past and present members of the Venezuelan government, and in which military members played a fundamental role, became internationally manifest in 2010, when the Colombian

government, in collaboration with agents for the DEA, arrested Venezuelan citizen Walid Makled García. Since 2002, Makled had been closely linked to members of the Venezuelan executive branch and, in particular, with Gen. Felipe Acosta Carlez, governor of the state of Carabobo and an important associate of Chávez.³¹

Makled, who along with Carlez contributed greatly to ending the aforementioned national work stoppage in 2002, was rewarded with administration of the primary national port, Puerto Cabello, and was allowed to acquire a major airline in the country; he used both as instruments for narcotics trafficking to Central America and West Africa.³² Makled's intricate web also included many other entities that acted as parallel structures to state institutions. He had concessions with Venezuelan Food Production and Distribution (PDVAL), a subordinate organization of PDVSA, and ties to the Agricultural Supply and Services Corporation (CASA), a subordinate entity of the Ministry of Food. He also had a contract for urea distribution with Pequiven, a subsidiary of PDVSA and overseer of petrochemical dealings. Urea is "a fertilizer used in the manufacture of cocaine."³³ The extradition request for the Supreme Court of Justice to the Colombian government showed that Gen. José Gregorio Montilla Pantoja and Carlez had interceded on behalf of Makled to conduct business with that company.³⁴



(AP photo/Fernando Vergara)

Police escort suspected Venezuelan narcotics trafficker Walid Makled García (center) during a press conference at Colombian National Police headquarters in Bogotá, 20 August 2010. García was arrested by police in Cúcuta, Colombia, near the border shared with Venezuela.



(AP photo/Pedro Famos Diaz)

Hugo Carvajal, ex-chief of Venezuelan military intelligence, arrives at Queen Beatriz International Airport 27 July 2014 after being released by authorities in Oranjestad, Aruba. Carvajal, who was nominated as consul general of Venezuela in Aruba, was arrested at the request of U.S. prosecutors at the airport of the Caribbean island. U.S. authorities allege that Carvajal is one of a number of high-level government and military officials who have harbored Colombian narcotics traffickers and helped them transport cocaine bound for the United States through Venezuela.

On 10 December 2006, Makled was accused by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York for attempting to introduce 5.5 tons of cocaine into Mexico aboard a DC-9 aircraft from Maiquetía International Airport in Venezuela.³⁵ Then, in November 2008, Venezuelan authorities searched a farm belonging to the Makled family in the state of Carabobo, where they seized 392 kilograms (approx. 864 pounds) of cocaine, bringing three of Makled's brothers to justice while he slipped into hiding.³⁶

Makled later accused Gen. Cliver Alcalá Cordones of being involved in the drug trade and planting the drugs at the farm.³⁷ Makled also claimed that other high-ranking Venezuelan military members participated in his criminal network, arguing that he could not have carried out the drug trafficking operations—in particular, the delivery of drugs to Mexico—by himself. For this, he claimed to have the support of uniformed

Venezuelans whose payoff reached \$1 million.³⁸ Makled pointed out that on his staff, there were “forty generals, but there are many more, there are colonels, majors.” Furthermore, he recounted having made payments to Carvajal, director of military intelligence, along with other military associates, saying, “I provided a weekly quota of two hundred million Bolívars, one hundred million of which went to Carvajal.”³⁹ Among those receiving payments, Makled also included then chief of strategic operations Rangel Silva, and Feraz el Aissami, brother of Interior Minister Tareck el Aissami, who might have been paid to ensure the nomination of members assigned to the CICPC.⁴⁰

With regard to the Makled's allegations, it is plausible that that someone might have planted the drugs on his farm, or that the search was instigated by a rival criminal network, as was pointed out by Justice Aponte Aponte. Evidence cited by various authors indicates

that there are a number of organizations within the Venezuelan military establishment that are competing for narcotics trafficking supremacy.⁴¹ Furthermore, Alcalá Cordones was placed on the OFAC list in September 2011 for providing protection to the FARC.⁴²

The complicity in drug trafficking of government entities charged with state security is unquestionable, since inspection points on the border, in Venezuelan ports, and at airports are under close supervision of the National Guard and other agencies like the Bolivarian Intelligence Service (SEBIN). Additionally, Chávez himself helped facilitate drug distribution operations in Venezuela by his decision to cancel all antidrug cooperation agreements with the United States, beginning with the expulsion of members of the DEA from the country in 2005.⁴³

White-Collar Crime

Besides narcotics trafficking, the transnational criminal activities carried out by corrupt subordinates of Chávez (and later those of Maduro) included white-collar crimes, such as money laundering. These operations were integrated with Venezuelan state institutions that had the capability and responsibility to operate within the framework of international finance. This situation came to light in 2014 and early 2015, when an investigation revealed the involvement of state-owned PDVSA in money laundering, conducted in some cases with the complicity of international financial institutions. The facts of the case demonstrate the formidable reach and offshoots of the criminal networks formed in diverse Venezuelan government institutions during the Chávez presidency.

Only a few years ago, PDVSA was listed as one of the top petroleum companies in the world. It has a complicated, versatile organizational and financial structure, with multiple subsidiaries that are actively associated with international financial institutions. Its technological platform provided it with the tools to conduct money laundering operations without any type of suspicion.⁴⁴ However, illicit operations carried out by white collar networks within the state-owned petroleum company PDVSA were reported in 2007, when the director of the *Reporte Económico* newspaper declared in statements to a Spanish newspaper that “PDVSA has become a nest of corruption, money

laundering, and narcotrafficking.”⁴⁵ A subsequent investigation conducted by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), an anti-money-laundering unit of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, revealed that nearly \$2 billion had been laundered through PDVSA and the Banca Privada d’Andorra (BPA).⁴⁶ This laundering operation operated through ghost companies with the assistance of a high-level BPA executive, who ran the operations with money “derived from corruption,” according to a FinCEN communiqué.⁴⁷ Three former vice ministers, a former director of the intelligence services, and one executive of PDVSA were involved in this illicit activity.⁴⁸

In 2010, the investigation led to the arrest of Commissioner Norman Puerta, former chief of the Counterdrug Division of the CICPC. Puerta was accused by Andorran authorities of money laundering with proceeds from narcotics trafficking. Furthermore, officials linked to the Ministry of Economy and Finances were accused of using diplomatic passports that allowed them use of diplomatic pouches to transfer money to open accounts in BPA, in Andorra as well as in its subsidiaries in Panama and Madrid, Spain, to legitimize the vast amounts of money produced by suspicious operations.⁴⁹

Among those implicated during the investigation was Rondón. This former vice minister of citizen security had control of two telecommunication satellites that monitored telephone movement in the country, a power that allowed him very close access to the Venezuelan president.⁵⁰ Another of the accused was Javier Alvarado, former vice minister of electric development. Alvarado directed Bariven and Intevep, subsidiaries of PDVSA, and was the human resources manager of PDVSA. He was also in charge of the government enterprise Caracas Electricity, where he became immersed in a controversy regarding the purchase of a U.S. company’s debt.⁵¹

Others accused in this case included retired Navy Capt. Carlos Aguilera, former director of the national intelligence service, currently at SEBIN; Rafael Jiménez, PDVSA director; and Nervis Villalobos, former vice minister of energy and mines, responsible for investments in the area of natural resources.⁵²

This investigation is still ongoing, but it seems unlikely—given the magnitude of the sums of money involved—that all of the generated assets are solely from

narcotics trafficking. Rather, it appears to be the result of a series of money laundering operations springing from different criminal activities that include drug trafficking. For example, in 2012, a PDVSA bond issue initiative, designated in dollars, was partially aborted when it appeared to be designed for the laundering of narcotics trafficking proceeds.⁵³

Implications for Hemispheric Security

Starting in 2011, Chávez's progressive physical deterioration, brought on by his battle with cancer, also had debilitating effects on the government and gave rise to the de facto compartmentation of power between the two groups in contention within the Chávez camp. The principal goal of the first group, the current Chavista civil elite under Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro, has been to cling to power and weather the country's social and economic crises; their initiatives to export the revolution and play a significant role in international affairs have been relegated to second or third tier in importance. Maduro, who was chosen by Chávez to continue his political project, was compelled to comply with the second group—the military that support the regime, shaping the so-called political-military directorate of the revolution—in a type of co-government arrangement, to try to stabilize the regime and attain permanence as head of the executive branch of Venezuela.⁵⁴ As explained by Carlos Malamud: “Nicolás Maduro lacks the charisma and leadership of Chávez. His control of the government is incomplete and Chavismo faces a formal two-head [system], where Maduro shares power with Diosdado Cabello.”⁵⁵ Cabello, a former military officer, is the president of the National Assembly of Venezuela, yet another Chávez crony with strong military ties.

Strong-arm tactics. This division of power in Venezuela between Maduro and a faction of high-ranking Venezuelan military members drives the influence and decision-making capability within the government that Chávez gave to the military, and it also puts the president in the position of needing to support them in any of the situations in which they are jeopardized, including accusations of participation in illicit activities.

For example, in July 2014, Aruban authorities detained Carvajal at the request of the United States, which had accused Carvajal of involvement in

narcotics trafficking and of supporting the Colombian guerrilla group FARC. Carvajal had travelled to Aruba to become Venezuela's consul general to that country, which is an autonomous insular territory of the Netherlands.⁵⁶ Maduro wholly supported Carvajal, accusing the U.S. government of trying to pressure the Venezuelan military to turn them against him.⁵⁷ Venezuela used all elements of power available to try to free their official and, ultimately, he was released. The attorney general of Aruba, Peter Blanken, denounced Venezuela for exerting military and economic pressure on the country, as well as on Curaçao (a neighboring Dutch Caribbean island), to force the Netherlands to liberate the general. Blanken explained that Venezuelan warships had circled both of the islands for two days, as Amsterdam debated what to do with Carvajal.⁵⁸ This incident exemplifies the kind of actions taken by the Venezuelan government that could destabilize the region, disturb regional peace and security, and potentially lead to hostilities with other nations of the hemisphere that are simply abiding by international law.

Narcotics trafficking. The proven presence of Venezuelan narcotics trafficking networks that distribute large amounts of cocaine throughout the hemisphere has created serious tension between the governments of the United States and Venezuela. Since 2005, the U.S. State Department has decertified Caracas's antinarcotics efforts, noting that Venezuela does not live up to its international obligations in this respect.⁵⁹ However, the United States, like many others nations, is directly affected by the flow of cocaine that departs Venezuela. Approximately sixty-five of the eighty tons transported by air to the United States annually comes through Honduras from Venezuela. This figure represents 15 percent of the total amount of cocaine that enters the United States.⁶⁰ The United States could apply a wide array of unilateral sanctions against the Venezuelan government or against the officials involved in these acts should it choose to do so.

International terrorism. A troubling and potentially damaging prospect for regional security is the presumed relationships and transactions that some Venezuelan leaders maintain with elements associated with international terrorism—in particular, Hezbollah. There is grave concern among U.S. security analysts that Venezuelan territory could be used for the

preparation and launch of terrorist attacks against the United States or against its interests in the region.⁶¹ A Venezuelan diplomat of Lebanese origin, Ghazi Nasr al-Dine (also spelled Nasseredine), has been suspected of being the head of Hezbollah's network in South America and of being involved in narcotics trafficking for that network.⁶² The U.S. Department of the Treasury has already included this Venezuelan on the OFAC list for his support of terrorism and his ties to the Lebanese extremist group. In January 2005, the FBI placed him on its wanted terrorist list, and some link him directly to drug trafficking "with the para-state Cartel of the Suns."⁶³

Criminal networks. From a wider perspective, the efforts of criminal networks in Venezuela could be at the root of the rise in violence in the region. Subject matter experts explain that "bad neighbors" can increase the risk of violent conflict because armed nonstate groups, weapons, and historic animosities tend to easily cross borders. Criminal groups can exacerbate existing divisions between neighboring countries, reigniting old tensions or creating new conflicts with the intent of maximizing the proceeds from their criminal endeavors.⁶⁴

Conclusion

The strategy used by the Venezuelan government in the near future to address incidents related to

transnational criminal networks will have serious implications for Venezuelan peace and stability, as well as for regional security. One can agree with the U.S. Department of State when it points out that support of narcotics trafficking is not an official policy of the Venezuelan government.⁶⁵ However, the actions of the Venezuelan executive branch have demonstrated that it lacks the willingness to investigate internally or cooperate with foreign intelligence and security agencies in attempts to identify the heads and structures of the criminal enterprises that ship massive amounts of cocaine to the rest of the world and launder money in the international financial system.

Venezuela's transnational criminal networks are a by-product of an unsuccessful strategy of Chávez to achieve internal and external political objectives. These networks represent an endogenous power within the Venezuelan state itself, which gives them the rare quality of being nonstate actors who leverage national power for the achievement of their objectives and for their survival. Eliminating these criminal enterprises and the pernicious effects they have on the security of the Latin American hemisphere will require a joint response from the international community, potentially led by Maduro himself, based upon the international legal system. ■

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(U.S. Army photo by Maj. Lindsey Elder, USARPAC PAO)

Gen. Vincent K. Brooks, commanding general of U.S. Army Pacific, tours a training area 18 January 2015 with Gen. Xu Fenlin, commanding general of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Guangzhou Military Region, during the tenth annual 2015 Pacific Resilience Disaster Management Exchange at Macun Barrack in Haikou, Hainan Province, People's Republic of China. The security cooperation event emphasizes hands-on, side-by-side interaction with the PLA during training for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.

The Army, Engagement, and America's Pacific Century

Lt. Col. Daniel Gibson, U.S. Army

Capt. Jon Cheatwood, U.S. Army

With the Pacific Ocean spanning 63.8 million square miles of open water, it is easy to lose sight of the importance of U.S. land power in the region. While much has been written in recent years regarding the significance of

the Nation's rebalance to the Pacific, many leaders in the Army may question what role their land forces will play in this strategic theater. At risk are forces that are singularly focused on cultivating combined arms maneuver competencies at the expense of their ability

to adequately train and advise host-nation forces. This myopic view could stymie efforts toward achieving operational and strategic objectives in the Pacific.

This article argues that security force assistance (SFA) activities, a subset of overall Department of Defense (DOD) security cooperation initiatives, are critical in shaping the security environment in the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) area of responsibility (AOR). It will examine the USPACOM strategic theater, while describing the Army's role in security cooperation, reviewing lessons from SFA missions, and making recommendations about how the Army should organize, train, and equip itself for its strategic role in the USPACOM AOR. SFA *done well* in the region holds incredible potential for achieving U.S. strategic objectives.

Examining the USPACOM Strategic Theater

President Barack Obama's vision for a renewed focus on the Asia-Pacific became clear during his first term. In November 2011 remarks before the Australian parliament, Obama reminded the audience that "the United States has been, and will always be, a Pacific nation."¹ This vision was reinforced in the 2015 *National Security Strategy* and the Department of Defense *Quadrennial Defense Review 2014*, which describes the DOD's goal to "continue our contributions to the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific ... a region that is increasingly central to U.S. political, economic, and security interests."² Military commanders in the Pacific understand this guidance and are adapting forces to meet strategic requirements.

USPACOM's strategy outlines the command's approach for implementing defense strategic guidance outlined in *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* (upon which the *Quadrennial Defense Review* builds).³ Adm. Harry B. Harris, commander of USPACOM, lists the need to "modernize and strengthen alliances and partnerships" as one of his guiding principles; his command guidance also

calls for a line of operation focused on strengthening relationships as part of the rebalance.⁴ Within this strategy, the development of partner-nation capacity to conduct defense and provide for deterrence is a goal inherent to security cooperation.⁵ Despite the maritime nature of the region, security cooperation is conducted predominantly within the land and human domains, thus requiring unique army-to-army interactions. The ability to control the land domain and influence the human domain are land component tasks.⁶ As the joint force land component command within the USPACOM area of responsibility, these tasks fall to the U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC). However, the Army is not adequately prepared to contribute to the achievement of the USPACOM commander's theater objectives in either domain.

Indicative of this inadequate preparation is an assigned force that is better structured to fight Operation Desert Storm than to execute security cooperation in the region and to conduct what Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, designates as "Phase 0, Shape."⁷ While initiatives are underway to facilitate forward presence through the bilateral and multilateral exercises, building ally and partner-nation capacity is often treated as an ancillary task.

The Army's Role in Security Cooperation

The Army's role in security cooperation deserves further analysis. Currently, the spectrum of engagement in the region spans activities ranging from senior




Figure. Spectrum of Engagement

leader engagements to theater security cooperation program exercises, as depicted in the figure.

The time required for individual senior leader engagements, represented on the far left side of the spectrum, is relatively short. They focus on a small, albeit influential, audience; the number of participants is relatively few. They are usually general officers who typically have the ability to build and leverage relationships for two to three years before they move to subsequent assignments. On the far right of the spectrum are theater security cooperation program exercises. These exercises last longer, involve many more troops, and focus on building relationships with much larger audiences.

Between these two ends of the spectrum fall numerous activities that can facilitate achievement of the USPACOM commanders' strategic objectives. Most of these midspectrum activities generally fall into the category of expert academic exchanges or agreed-to-action exchanges.⁸ These could be planned, coordinated, and executed by midlevel leaders and could produce long lasting effects because the relationships established should last much longer, potentially a decade or more. These activities deserve specific attention and specialized training for would-be practitioners. The Army is moving with haste to distance itself from operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, which risks losing hard-won, human-dimension lessons learned associated with face-to-face relationship building that apply directly to the execution of these type of exchanges.

The force's value increases through the retention of these capabilities and skills for future use. Drawing on these lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq and adapting a SFA approach can help to win in Phase 0 and mitigate the possibility of having to conduct these tasks in a future irregular conflict. Accordingly, it would be short sighted to cut the resourcing for SFA training as a cost-saving measure.

Lessons Learned in Iraq and Afghanistan

The rebalance to the Pacific follows deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, where SFA missions were numerous, and essential to operations. Initial research regarding whether lessons from those deployments can be applied across combatant commands has occurred to a limited degree. A 2013 RAND report, *Leveraging*



Observations of Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan for Global Operations, notes, "Canvassing the vast network of current SFA advisors and collecting their insights is relatively easy. The harder task is determining which of those lessons learned are actually implementable and sustainable for SFA operations in the future."⁹

This report proposes many qualitative conclusions with relevance to conducting future Army operations. Of note, the report explores the role that staffing should play, stating, "Morale and enthusiasm for the advising mission will continue to be closely linked with the performance and delivered results of advisors."¹⁰ The report also notes the role that training must play



(U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Angel Serna)

U.S. Marines with Company B, 1st Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment, Marine Rotational Force–Darwin, conduct patrol-based operations and engage in platoon-level attacks 9–11 September 2015 with troops from His Majesty's Armed Forces of Tonga, the New Zealand Defence Force, the French Army of New Caledonia, and the Tongan Royal Guards during their culminating event for Exercise Tafakula 15 on Tongatapu Island, Tonga. The rotational deployment of U.S. Marines in Darwin affords unprecedented combined-training opportunities such as Exercise Tafakula and improves interoperability between the involved forces.

in developing competent advisors, highlighting that the time and emphasis placed on training for SFA tasks across the conventional force is inadequate. The value of these conclusions should be debated in greater detail among Army leaders as they apply to preparing regionally aligned forces.

The Army's effort to capture SFA lessons and establish doctrinal principles led to the publication of Field Manual (FM) 3-22, *Army Support to Security Cooperation*,

in early 2013. This FM contains important sections on the skills advisors should develop and the role that culture plays in advising, as did its predecessor, the now-obsolete FM 3-07.1, *Security Force Assistance*.¹¹ Numerous articles published in Department of the Army publications and other sources provide guidance on how SFA can be conducted effectively. These works, in addition to the current doctrine, should frame how units in the Pacific think about their regional engagements.



(U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Antonio Turreto Ramos)

Lt. Zach Feenstra, navigation officer, teaches Royal Cambodian Navy sailors navigation techniques 17 November 2015 aboard the USS *Fort Worth* during Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) Cambodia 2015. CARAT is a series of annual, bilateral maritime exercises between the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Marine Corps, and the armed forces of nine partner nations, including Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Timor-Leste.

In the last decade, we have seen the rebirth and evolution of SFA as an operating concept as the Army grappled with how to select and train for the mission at the institutional level. Organizing for SFA evolved from military transition teams and police transition teams to larger advise-and-assist brigades in Iraq. In Afghanistan, embedded training teams evolved to security training teams, which were later replaced by SFA teams and brigades. At present, with the decline of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army is at an institutional crossroad similar to its experience at the close of the Vietnam era. It must ask, “What level of commitment should the Army place on the SFA mission relative to its other responsibilities?”

With the recent reduction of the Army’s Advisor Academy at Fort Polk, Louisiana, and the stand down of the Army’s Irregular Warfare Center, the institutional foundation for future advisory efforts is at risk. Lack of institutional knowledge could lead to units adopting

ad hoc approaches to security force assistance. As Army forces become increasingly engaged in multilateral exercises across the Pacific, it would seem critical for these formations to take advantage of appropriate lessons from recent conflicts in order to properly train forces to conduct SFA across the theater.

Using SFA to Achieve Strategic Results: What is Required?

It is useful to examine organizing principles for SFA before setting forth recommendations for consideration by the land force in the Pacific. While the need for a persistent SFA capability is apparent, the cost of maintaining it could be perceived as too high. Consequently, it must be weighed in terms of trade-offs against overall force reductions.

Currently, the Army is conducting military-to-military engagement in the Pacific with a force that has nominally trained on SFA tasks, but that force retains

the advantage of extensive operational experience from ten years of SFA missions. However, as time passes, the Army's institutional memory is fading. New soldiers and leaders entering the Army in 2015 and beyond will have never known the significance of what can be achieved through SFA done well, or the costs of doing it poorly or not at all.

To combat this atrophy, training for SFA missions could be conducted simultaneously and in conjunction with other mission-essential tasks, supporting the combined arms maneuver core competency.¹² Indeed, advisors must be experts in their craft before they can adequately train partnered forces. However, for units assigned to and aligned with USPACOM, modifications should be made to standing mission-essential task lists, manning policies, and modified tables of organization and equipment (MTOEs) to allow for optimal implementation of SFA in order to support the Army's role in engagement.

It is essential to recognize the requirement for SFA skills in USPACOM and to prioritize and resource development of capabilities accordingly. To facilitate prioritization and resource development, the Army and units assigned to USPACOM must also make institutional changes.

At the height of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, there were calls for institutionalizing the Army's advisory efforts into a single advisor command. Notably, in his 2008 *Military Review* article entitled "Institutionalizing Adaptation: It's Time for an Army Advisor Command," John Nagl advocated that "rather than focusing exclusively on conventional wars that may or may not occur in the future, the Army might better serve our Nation by building the most effective capabilities to win the wars of today."¹³ While numerous USPACOM entities and institutions focus on building various capabilities for conducting traditional operations, there remains no organization focused on training leaders and soldiers to a recognized standard in language, regional expertise, or cultural skills (LREC) to effectively engage with and advise their regional counterparts. To address USARPAC requirements, we recommend the following changes:

Manning for SFA. Manning policies should be updated to provide specially trained SFA practitioners in units assigned to USARPAC. Billets should be created to meet SFA requirements at the brigade combat team

(BCT) level; more precisely, these formations should be supplemented with the addition of SFA cells. The structure of the SFA team could be loosely based on previous SFA manning concepts used during deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. Led by a field grade officer who has completed intermediate-level education and advisor training, the SFA cell would have the lead within the BCT for planning and coordinating SFA training and deployments.

Ideally, members of the SFA cell will have previously served in USPACOM assignments, will be well versed in the various linguistic and cultural aspects of the region, and they will have conducted the type of SFA missions they will be helping plan and coordinate. The formations frequently taking part in regional exercises need a small cadre of professionals who are comfortable with the SFA mission and understand the importance of engaging partners within the region.

In line with the Army's emerging concept for the engagement warfighting function, the nucleus of the cell should be a BCT's MTOE-authorized S-7 (inform and influence) and S-9 (civil affairs) sections.

Emphasis on language capability. A second priority should be to staff SFA cells with individuals having language and cultural competencies specific to their areas of operation. While the Army should not necessarily send all soldiers with a specific language proficiency to a region where that language is spoken, it makes sense to assign a certain percentage of U.S. soldiers with Filipino, Japanese, or other appropriate language skills and, perhaps, cultural heritage to units within USARPAC.

In examining what languages units assigned to USARPAC units should identify as a basis for manning, it is useful to start with the languages of treaty allies, i.e., Japanese, Korean, Tagalog (for the Philippines), and Thai. Mandarin Chinese would likely prove valuable as well. Expanding regional language and cultural competency through manning will undoubtedly enhance security cooperation in the USPACOM AOR.

Selection and proper recognition for SFA assignments. Not everyone has the personality or aptitude for SFA duties. Therefore, formations should select individuals who have traits compatible with the SFA mission-set and then dedicate time to training those soldiers for SFA. In addition, the institutional bias the Army saw against SFA assignments and

SFA-assigned officers in the last decade will have to be addressed by commanders at all levels from the start. Often advisors were viewed less favorably than those operating in traditional combat roles. A system of identification, training, and management should be established to ensure that the right individuals are attracted, selected, and rewarded for their service according to their contributions to achieving the desired engagement effects.

Further, since SFA instruction by outside agencies has been reduced, USARPAC should look to develop its own course or *advisor academy*, perhaps by leveraging the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) as the DOD's Asia-Pacific-focused regional studies center that specializes in leader development and education. Specifically, leaders designated for SFA positions should attend the APCSS advanced security cooperation course at the beginning of their assignment. The course would expose these leaders to a network of over one hundred international leaders from up to forty Asia-Pacific countries and establish relationships that could be leveraged throughout their tour, indeed throughout their career.

In addition to external courses, units should develop their own courses. An example of where this could occur would be in the 25th Infantry Division's *Lightning Academy* and specifically, the *Lightning Leader Course*. This recently developed course is aimed at junior officers and noncommissioned officers who will be taking part in regional engagements during their time assigned to USARPAC. Such courses should evolve to train the skills necessary for the SFA mission.

Personnel assignment policies. Finally, units in the Pacific should look to extend the time that service members are assigned to the region. The USARPAC engagement profile is robust with units executing numerous exercises with host-national partners annually. The Army should consider whether the current policy of an enforced thirty-six-month *date eligible for return from overseas* (DEROS) across certain USARPAC assigned forces is necessary. Another means of retaining institutional knowledge would be to develop a means of consecutively reassigning individuals within USARPAC units. To capitalize on lessons learned from regional exercises aimed at building and reinforcing better relationships with

partnered forces, soldiers assigned to a combatant command in the capacity of SFA should have longer utilization tours.

Training for an Advisor Role in the Pacific

Bringing in the right people is effective only if those individuals are properly trained to succeed in SFA missions. The U.S. Army describes the distinction between training for traditional, decisive-action missions and training for employment of regionally aligned forces: "Training focused on Unified Land Operations Standard METL [mission-essential task list] prepares our forces to excel during the 'seize the initiative' and 'dominate' phases of an operation. The RAF [regionally aligned forces]-focused training, particularly [LREC] combined with advise-and-assist skills training, prepares Army forces for the 'shape' and 'deter' phases of an operation."¹⁴ This guidance, extrapolated beyond regionally *aligned* forces and applied to *assigned* forces, and coupled with the USPACOM commander's emphasis on Phase 0 tasks, points to the necessity of training forces assigned to and aligned for USARPAC to manage the intricacies of SFA in the AOR.

Regional exercises with partners in the Pacific will only succeed if units see the requirement to train for SFA as a decisive operation. In providing guidance to units on training priorities, SFA activities are captured within the "Conduct stability operations" essential task as a subtask below the "Coordinate essential services for host nation" task group.¹⁵

Despite this formalization, many BCTs across the Army have assumed risk by forgoing fostering these SFA skills and focusing their training instead on refreshing and building core *combat* tasks. This focus is largely warranted as we restore and revitalize our core conventional competencies. However, within USPACOM, the probability of executing some type of SFA activity is almost certain and thus deserves proper attention. Therefore, units must seek a balance to achieve and sustain proficiency at advisor tasks while maintaining core combat-related competencies.

Equipping and Supporting Expeditionary Teams

Another vital factor to consider is how to best equip and sustain SFA elements in USPACOM. Despite

budgetary constraints, equipping and sustaining formations conducting numerous regional efforts cannot be undervalued. One of the first simple facts is that units need equipment tailored for the operational area they will be entering. For example, Pacific formations must be equipped to succeed in jungle environments. Unit acquisition priorities should, within budget constraints, field equipment that will ensure small units about to deploy can effectively support exercises across the Pacific.

The current process for funding SFA is extremely bureaucratic and is not responsive to changing and emerging needs. Therefore, USPACOM should consider implementing a funding mechanism similar to the Commanders' Emergency Response Program used during Operation Iraqi Freedom. This would enable operational units to fund short-suspense, emerging activities and initiatives, as well as to have readily available funds to support operations within the partner nations.

A larger, overarching sustainment issue centers on how USARPAC should support itself during regional exercises throughout the Pacific. Currently, units ship equipment to and from their home station when they participate in an exercise. In an October 2014 USARPAC Pacific Pathway exercise, equipment was moved on "contractor-piloted ships," which is an inefficient means of sustaining forces.¹⁶

While the Pacific Pathways program will continue to evolve, the U.S. Marine Corps "Darwin" model

could be useful as a template for developing future Army sustainment models.¹⁷ This model, currently in its infancy, provides Marine Corps elements with a sustainment base that can be leveraged in support of security cooperation exercises. The Army could look to leverage Camp Zama, Japan, as a sustainment node in support of regional exercises by building force equipment-and-sustainment packages there that units could draw from while en route to other nations.

Conclusion

The Army will continue to take part in numerous exercises in support of the USPACOM goal of shaping the theater. To do so effectively, Army units should embrace the advisor mind-set. Properly manning and training formations to advise will not be easy—it will require institutional change within the U.S. Army and other services. Nonetheless, this change will allow teams preparing to partner with forces across the USPACOM AOR to capitalize on the time they have together to achieve national strategic Phase 0 objectives. ■

The ideas and opinions presented in this paper are those of the authors and do not represent an official statement by the RAND Corp., the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Army, or any other government entity.

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
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(Photo courtesy National Archives)



(Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons by Fabio Rodrigues Pozzebom, Agencia Brasil)

(From left to right) Paraguayan President Fernando Lugo, Bolivian President Evo Morales, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Ecuadoran President Rafael Correa, and Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez attend the World Social Forum 29 January 2009 in Belem, Brazil, as participants on the Latin American panel.

The Rise of Leftist Populism—A Challenge to Democracy?

Maj. Jonathan Bissell, U.S. Army

Over the last seventeen years, the number of democracies that have turned to the “left” or “center-left” has increased significantly throughout Latin America. In the early 1990s, 64 percent of Latin American presidents were from a “right” or “right-center” political party. However, by the

beginning of 2009, 71 percent—fifteen out of twenty-one countries—had changed to a president from a left or center-left political party.¹ After more than thirty years of varying types of conservative leadership styles, this trend of political change has affected a large majority of the countries in North, Central, and South

America.² This has caused many scholars and international relations experts to wonder if Latin America is in danger of trending away from democracy and reverting to governments of authoritarian rule.

After reviewing the causal reasons, however, it appears the rise of “leftist” populism in Latin America does not present a serious challenge to democracy in Latin America with the exceptions of those states that substantially changed their constitutions such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Instead, the rise of democratically elected left-wing populist leaders can be attributed to several related issues that permeate Latin America including historical social inequality and class-based injustice, a desire for political reversal from previously failed conservative administrations, and widespread displeasure with national economic policies. This article will briefly analyze the impacts these factors had on recent elections and possible strategies for U.S. foreign policy adjustments.

Impacts of the Trend to the Left

The future impacts of democratically elected leftist governments in the region will place more focus on investment in domestic and social programs and less on military expenditures. Unlike the old regimes, the new governments will concentrate on solutions to the domestic issues highlighted by their campaign platforms. While this is happening, the United States will likely feel continued political backlash from newly elected governments because of the anti-imperialist rhetoric commonly used by leaders throughout the region to galvanize public support for their policies by exploiting pervasive anti-U.S. sentiment. Much of this anti-U.S. sentiment is predicated on the perceived intrusion into Latin American internal affairs by the United States throughout the twentieth century, especially during the Cold War. However, the United States can minimize the lasting impact of such backlash and adjust politically to the rise of new left populist governments by effectively using its foreign policy soft-power tools.³

Renowned international relations scholar Joseph Nye describes soft power as “carrots” in the form of payments and its opposite, hard power, as “sticks” in the form of threats.⁴ Nye postulates that soft power is essentially “a soft or indirect way to exercise power

... getting others to want what you want.”⁵ Soft power can be exercised through the following:

- ◆ practice of diplomacy
- ◆ effective use of international institutions
- ◆ adherence to international law and other binding and nonbinding agreements such as treaties and trade pacts
- ◆ promotion of American entrepreneurship and the American way of life
- ◆ espousal of democratic values and human rights
- ◆ contribution of foreign aid
- ◆ accentuation of the substantial remittances by U.S. immigrants back to their native countries
- ◆ proliferation of U.S. information and communication technology around the globe

However, foremost among the diplomatic tools at its disposal to ensure it maintains credibility and influence in the region is U.S. observance of policy that respects the democratic decisions of the voters and a true commitment to continue to work with their newly elected, left-of-center governments on areas of common interest.

The Rise of Populist Leaders

The beginning of the rise of populist leaders and the political left throughout Latin America began with the 1998 election of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela.⁶ He was successfully elected by denouncing Venezuela’s institutions as corrupt instruments of a “rancid oligarchy.”⁷ Chávez’s success was followed by the election of several more leftist heads of state over the next fifteen years including Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil in 2002, Néstor Carlos Kirchner in Argentina in 2003, Tabaré Vázquez in Uruguay in 2004, Evo Morales in Bolivia in 2005, Rafael Correa in Ecuador in 2006, and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua in 2006. Others, using similar populist campaigns, soon followed such as Ollanta Humala in Peru and Enrique Peña-Nieto in Mexico in 2011.⁸

It is important to consider that democracies in Latin America have historically been weak, with only a few being true “consolidated democracies” with full human rights, true freedom of the media, and effective law enforcement capabilities over time.⁹ With this in mind, though the United States



(AP Photo/Natacha Pisarenko)

A "bird's-eye" view of La Cava slum (above) and a gated suburban community (below) in the outskirts of Buenos Aires, Argentina, 12 April 2003. The photo underscores the glaring divide between rich and poor in Argentina today. La Cava's jumble of ramshackle plywood homes have grown swiftly during the five-year-old recession, outpacing the growth of middle-class suburbia.

recognized each of these new governments, bureaucrats and scholars within U.S. foreign policy circles became concerned for the future of democracy in the region.¹⁰ However, whether or not the U.S. government agreed with the policies of the new governments, it did not dispute the legitimacy of the democratic process that had placed these heads of state and new governments into power.

Support for Left-Wing Governments—Reaction to Social Injustice and Inequality

Polls among the citizens of Latin American nations that elected leftist leaders showed frustration with historical social injustices and inequalities in their countries. Historically, Latin America has been fraught with discrimination and biases based on ethnicity, race, and, above all, social standing. The recent elections throughout Latin America reportedly "sparked increased mobility of indigenous

populations" among those who voted for candidates promising to remedy past racial and ethnic repression.¹¹ This tendency was clearly manifested with Chávez in Venezuela, who claimed to provide an alternative to the Free Trade Area of the Americas in order to block American hegemony in the region.¹² With effective campaign rhetoric and mobilized indigenous voters, the "hard-left" was able to successfully win the majority of votes from the lower class.

Political Reversal from Failed Policies

Many of the previous administrations in the affected Latin American states were conservative and adhered to the fiscal and structural reforms dictated by the Washington Consensus.¹³ Among these administrations were autocratic and authoritarian governments, many indirectly or directly supported by the United States.¹⁴ The populations living under such previous regimes—many of which were democratically



(AP Photo/Juan Karita)

Voters line up at a voting station during presidential elections 18 December 2005 in El Alto on the outskirts of La Paz, Bolivia. Voters were deeply divided between leftist Evo Morales and conservative former President Jorge "Tuto" Quiroga.

elected—had given their capitalist-minded leaders several years to fix the traditional problems of Latin America, such as elitism, authoritarianism, hierarchicalism, corporatism, and patrimonialism, but with poor results.¹⁵ Irrespective, voters overwhelmingly continued to express a desire for democratic forms of government in lieu of autocratic ones, at rates as high as 80 percent.¹⁶ However, they also wanted comprehensive social changes and a leveling of the socio-economic playing field. Several years after the fall of the Soviet Union, the populace no longer felt that a vote for the left would trend their nation toward totalitarian communism.¹⁷ When leftist candidates advocating a populist form of democracy stepped in with alternative visions of a broadly representative popular government, voters elected them in droves.

Savvy politicians seized on the opportunity to reflect newly empowered voters' desires. They filled their campaigns with rhetoric that blamed the United States for the rigid economic policies of structural

reform, reminded their citizenry of repeated United States involvement in coups throughout the region, and blamed their nations' problems on their political opposition with close relationships with the United States. In states like Argentina, the poor fiscal situation was blamed on the Washington, D.C.-based International Monetary Fund, and thus on the United States.¹⁸

Similarly, although not blaming the United States directly for all their domestic problems, historically marginalized voters readily identified with the campaign rhetoric that blamed the political elite classes in large part due to their relationships with the United States. In concert, left-wing campaigns made promises to the large, historically disadvantaged populations that they would get a "fairer shake" in the days ahead because the "gringos" would not be permitted to interfere in their domestic politics through their schemes. Such reputed schemes included trade agreements, which sounded to many like the traditional dependency-theory prevalent in the region where profits flowed north

while the Latinos did all of the work but realized little or no benefit. Accordingly, voters who were promised a better system of wealth redistribution and equal opportunities to take part in the positive attributes of globalization voted for change.

Domestic Displeasure with Economic Policies

The rise of the left in Latin America is partly because conservative governments found themselves in the unfortunate situation of holding power during times of economic distress and global market fluctuations over which they had little influence or control.¹⁹ Displeasure with national fiscal policies is another prime reason Latin American democracies have recently voted for leftist policies that promised change. Voters appear to have punished incumbent presidents if they served during a period of high inflation or poor economic growth. Macroeconomic indicators such as past inflation and economic growth heavily influenced voter preference as well.²⁰

However, though faces changed in government, fewer changes may actually have resulted than one might expect with regard to the actual content of the policies adopted to solve economic issues. Although several of these new left-wing administrations were democratically elected after promising dramatic economic reform, their economic and financial policies aimed at improving growth and fiscal balance remain surprisingly centrist. This actually appears to reflect predominant voter preferences. Polling in one case study showed a “moderate policy mandate” in which voters were unhappy with some forms of capitalism, but did not support a total rejection of it.²¹ Thus, the principal cause of the “pink tide”—the emergence of leftist governments—in Latin America may be attributed to failed economic policies of previous governments as opposed to anti-Americanism. Consequently, the election of leftist chief executives does not of itself mean the end of democracy, but rather a general consensus of unhappiness with the conservative governments and the failed economic policies they replaced.

A Vulnerability of Concern

Under the current circumstances, it appears the only true danger to these functioning democracies may be the apparent temptation among some voters to give

leaders unprecedented presidential powers that eventually could be used to usurp what the United States traditionally considers true constitutionally based democratic ethos based on the adherence to the rule of law, strong institutions, transparency, and free speech. Nations where these are eroding include Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Though Cuba has been a communist state for several decades, the rise of Chávez was seen by many as dangerous to democracy because of the radical changes he enacted, which made Venezuela an increasingly illiberal democracy evolving toward the Cuban model.²²

Bolstered by immense oil revenues the country possesses as the fifth-largest producer of petroleum in the world, Chávez rewrote his nation's constitution, authorized his own reelection, and replaced the legislature with a constitutional congress dominated by his own handpicked supporters, principally from the military.²³ With this new level of support and empowered by his specially selected legislature, he extended his own term limits and enacted laws that eroded the traditional freedoms of democracy, politicized Venezuelan governmental institutions, and began to suppress freedom of the press with state-controlled media. In this way, he slowly chipped away at private enterprises and individual freedoms in exchange for entitlements to those he appointed and increased his personal power.²⁴ Subsequently, the rhetoric espoused by other leaders in Bolivia and Ecuador seemed to support their own nations following suit, exchanging social reforms for a more autocratic form of government.

Nevertheless, a closer look at the actual policies of some of these states reveals they are not nearly as radical as they profess to be. While leaders such as Correa in Ecuador have publicly announced support for Chávez's socialism, and regional organizations like his *Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América* (ALBA), Ecuador only recently began to experience economic decline, and still appears to be economically viable. Though heavily influenced in his politics by his radical foreign affairs minister, Ricardo Patiño, it is important to bear in mind that Correa has a PhD in economics from the University of Illinois and understands the free market. He continues to receive high approval ratings from Ecuadorians despite the changes to their constitution and the increasing loss of the freedom of the press.

Bolivia is another example of a nation that has shifted to the hard left. The ethno-linguistic diversity (varieties of languages and ethnicities) is very high in Bolivia, and indigenous groups make up a large part of its population.²⁵ Researchers were able to directly link the election of Morales in Bolivia to his ability to tap into widespread discontent with the Bolivian elitist political groups among indigenous groups.²⁶ Many of the indigenous community were historically marginalized in the political arena and thus more likely to vote for a candidate with whom they ethnically identified who offered a break from the past.²⁷ However, concern for the future of democracy in Bolivia has emerged due to the radical reforms Morales has enacted since his original election in 2005, which have included rewriting the constitution.²⁸ Critics of the Morales government fear the politics of constitutional reform may take it down the same path as Venezuela, where the democratically elected officials and their political appointees have changed the constitution and institutions of their nation so dramatically it is no longer recognizable as a truly democratic nation.²⁹

By suppressing or regulating freedom of the press, enacting reforms that reward individuals over the welfare of the entire population, and assigning key positions in government to cronies and political allies, these countries become increasingly autocratic and illiberal in nature.

Rhetoric or True Political Change?

While liberal democracy may indeed be at risk in Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela, and other states such as Nicaragua, the majority of Latin American states subscribe to the liberal democracy model prevalent in Western Europe. The key difference between the two models is that although European states distribute high levels of social entitlements, they do not routinely change their constitutions to appease individual politicians. The long-lasting branches of government in the judiciary, the head of state, and the legislature exceed the importance of any single person. The countries of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Uruguay, and several Central American states are modern, democratic, globalized, and market-friendly.³⁰ Moreover, never before in the history of Latin America has it been so generally well-off, as both sustained economic growth and representative democracies are reducing

poverty and inequality.³¹ Consequently, as Latin America looks forward to the future, it has good prospects of continuing its trend toward further development of social democracies.

Additionally, regional integration in the recently established intergovernmental institutions, such as ALBA, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), and the Andean Community of Nations (CAN), all championed by the left, promises to take the region further toward addressing social concerns and improving the quality of life for many Latin Americans than the former right-wing political systems. Moreover, the new economic policies in most of the countries afford them with a greater degree of autonomy to pursue their developmental goals than the previous economic models based on the rigidity of the Washington Consensus.³²

It is also important to observe that these policies, while more socialistic in practice, are still democratic in nature. In fact, public support for centralized party rule and politburo-style government espoused by Marxism and Leninism are both in decline in Latin America.³³ Most democracies in Latin America appear to be developing closer in style to European types of social democracies than the U.S. republic model. They normally have more centralized authority in the executive branch and relatively less authority exercised by their judicial and legislative branches in contrast to the broad distribution of power and authority in the United States.³⁴ However, they are still true democracies in the sense that the government officials are publicly elected in elections generally regarded as being free from corruption.

The Relationship of Leftist Governments with the United States

Having suggested that the rise of the left in Latin America does not represent a significant threat to democracy in the region, it is important for the United States to analyze how these changes will affect U.S. relations with nations in the Western Hemisphere. Primarily, economic reform and social program enhancement make it likely there will probably be less military expenditures by these new governments. For example, the reformist government in Peru capitalized on its economic growth to spend huge surpluses on

social improvement programs while maintaining low military budgets.³⁵ This has had the effect of reducing poverty to historic lows in that country. Additionally, the largest international dispute Peru had with Chile over fishing waters appears to have been settled by the International Court of Justice, giving a boost to Peru's economy while also promising more stable relations between the two countries; both countries are key members of a new trade bloc called the Pacific Alliance.

Additionally, many of the governments in Latin America have continued to work together in areas of economic integration such as MERCOSUR, CAN, and UNASUR.³⁶ The U.S. government at present views this integration and collaboration positively, especially with groups such as the Pacific Alliance, which supports free trade and globalization.³⁷ Over the long term, the positive impacts to the Latin America region from such developments appear to outweigh some relatively short-term negative impacts commonly posed by the initial policies of new left-wing governments that often begin by curtailing individual liberties and nationalizing property.

The United States' Tentative Path Forward

While the United States has felt a political backlash from the anti-imperialist rhetoric espoused by many of the new leaders of these emerging left-wing democracies, the overall negative impact on the United States in terms of political and economic links has been minimal. With a view to the future, by using its foreign policy instruments of persuasion instead of coercive power, whatever residual negative impact from such political changes in government should be negligible. This soft power, executed through free trade agreements, cooperation in areas of common interest, and diligent work by the United States to improve how it is perceived throughout the region can be much more effective than the application of hard power through military intrusions, arm twisting in intergovernmental forums such as the United Nations, and rumored support for coups that seems to proliferate the entire region.

Additionally, much of U.S. popular culture is still loved throughout Latin America and is psychologically very influential. Furthermore, the indigenous voters of Latin America yearn for something like the traditional "American Dream"—the ability to have upward mobility

and achieve a higher standard of living. This is often difficult to achieve in Latin America where a common frustration with corruption and political favoritism is summed up in the adage "the rich get richer and the poor get poorer." With the recent advances and rapid spread of communication technology, populations of the entire hemisphere can now clearly see the lifestyles of the massive middle class in the United States, thanks to vastly improved information availability and the widespread use of social media and global communications.³⁸

Taking advantage of American soft power, along with other traditional tools of positive U.S. influence in the developing world, such as the Peace Corps, the United States can capitalize on the positive appeal of its popular culture while continuing to keep its hard-power presence in Latin America nearly invisible.

At present, the Department of Defense's footprint is relatively small in Latin America, mostly relegated to security cooperation operations and shared areas of mutual interest such as disaster assistance and humanitarian relief exercises, and it should remain so. The United States can also continue to reduce its hard-power presence by working with traditional allies such as Colombia to establish trilateral agreements with other nations such as Mexico and Peru. These nations have developed increasingly close defense ties with the United States based primarily on partner-nation capacity-building goals, especially when dealing with controversial issues in other Latin American states such as security cooperation.³⁹ By taking advantage of a favorable collaborative environment, the United States can continue to capitalize on advancing its own interests without causing undue anxiety to the citizens and governments of Latin America.

Prudent Measures to Cultivate U.S. Influence

To ensure it maintains influence in the region, the United States should continue to respect the decisions of the voters in countries who have elected left-wing governments to represent them, and to work with these new governments on areas of common interests. These include areas such as institutional stability in government agencies such as ministries or departments (e.g., the ministry of interior, the ministry of defense, and the ministry of foreign affairs), and initiatives relating to the enforcement of the rule of law and the reduction

of corruption—arguably the two most important issues that negatively affect all of Latin America.⁴⁰ This includes dramatically improving the transparency of judicial and law enforcement organizations.

An example of how this is already happening is the work the United States is currently doing with Mexico. Under the Merida Initiative in Mexico, a bilateral security cooperation agreement between Mexico and the United States to combat transnational crime, the United States is working on improving Mexico's law enforcement capacity through programs based on enhancing the rule of law and improving crime prevention measures, with programs such as the Commission for Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies.⁴¹

In this way, not only does the United States use its soft power to enhance its goals of improved institutional stability in a fellow democracy, but it also uses multilateral agreements with a partner nation, in this case Mexico, to export this knowledge to Central American countries, such as Guatemala.⁴² Mexican law enforcement authorities work with U.S. Department of Justice authorities for training to make institutional improvements. At the execution level, Mexican police forces leave Mexico to train with police in partner cities such as Nogales, Arizona, which reduces U.S. visibility in Mexico, always a sensitive issue amongst Mexican nationals.⁴³ With the added benefit of Mexico raising its own stature by being an exporter of training and knowledge, it is a win-win-win for all participants. It is exactly the kind of model the United States needs to continue to use in its relations with the new governments of Latin America.

Patience is the Key Virtue

Given time, relationships with leftist governments that have chosen to estrange themselves from the United States can mend, while relationships with those that have sustained their relationships with the United States may well continue to flourish.

For example, at present, many voters in states with hard-left agendas, such as Venezuela and Argentina, are seeing the damage their protectionist economic policies that have excluded relationships with the United States have caused. Against this background, the neglected relationships with the United States these governments have imposed on themselves have certainly not improved their financial prosperity, as their economies

have run into hard times due to falling global prices in raw commodities and the advent of new technologies, such as fracking, which has flooded the global markets with new sources of oil. The Latin American governments that have taken on socialist policies supported by extractable resources may conclude that U.S. economic consumption power would be helpful to them in the future if they choose to diversify their internal economies.

The tentative normalization, or at least thawing, of diplomatic relations with Cuba announced recently by the Obama administration should also do much to lower regional anti-American rhetoric, and take a proverbial arrow out of the would-be anti-U.S. politician's quiver throughout the region. Although this diplomatic change could be viewed as a victory for the Castro regime, it has become a political thorn in the side of several U.S. administrations over the past two decades as populist leaders in Latin America point out the hypocrisy in U.S. foreign policy between China and Cuba, both autocratic powers. By removing this controversial point of friction from the agenda in hemispheric intergovernmental organizations such as the Organization of American States, the United States takes this straw man out of the bag of perceived injustices that Latin American politicians have traditionally used to criticize the United States. Additionally, states that continue to have close security relationships with the United States, such as Chile, Colombia, and Mexico, help dispel the Cold War mentality that the United States will still patronizingly intervene in Latin American domestic affairs to enhance its own interests.

Conclusion

The changes that have given rise to widespread support for leftist governments can be attributed to several historical issues in Latin America, including a history of deeply entrenched social and economic stratification that resulted in persistent class injustice, and social and economic inequality over centuries. This history has led to broad and deeply seated popular resentment against conservative administrations that often supported the status quo for their own benefit, and a desire to reverse previously failed conservative social and economic policies that favored the privileged classes. Not surprisingly, the regional security impact will probably be fewer military expenditures in deference to more social spending.⁴⁴ However, the larger threat to democracy would come not from spending less on Latin American militaries, but from failing to address



(Presidencia de la Nación Argentina)

Argentina's President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner meets with Chinese President Hu Jintao 12 July 2010 in Beijing, China. Kirchner was elected to the presidency in October 2007 on a platform of continued efforts to provide social welfare programs to the poor.

the greatest issues of public concern by spending less on rectifying historic social and economic inequities.⁴⁵ Left unaddressed, the instability caused by festering public bitterness over economic and social inequities together with large-scale real poverty in an age of globalization would pose a significant threat to U.S. interests.

It is imperative to remember that styles of democracies vary around the globe based on the experiences and history of each state. Hence, although the democracies of Latin America have become more socialistic with the rise of leftist populism in

Latin America, they do not present a grave challenge to democracy itself. Their new style can instead be seen rather as a boon to the spread of democracy, as the greater participation by the previously disenfranchised populations continues to grow. As each nation tailors the development of its internal democratic institutions according to its own history, culture, and needs there will be continuous changes to the style of governance. There are indeed a few exceptions among Latin American nations with regard to the direction of government development

that may be placing democracy at risk, but generally this is not happening.

To provide visible support and encouragement for the development of indigenous democracy in Latin America, U.S. leaders can counter anti-American rhetoric by using foreign policy instruments of soft power such as increased use of international trade agreements, worker-visa programs, the Peace Corps, mutual peacekeeping operations, judicial reform enhancement, combating corruption, educational exchanges, effectively targeted foreign aid, and trilateral and multilateral agreements where possible, especially in the security cooperation arena. However, above all, U.S. leaders should continue to respect the decisions of the Latin American voters and work with the new governments that represent those voters on areas of common interest.

Deeper and sustained engagement enhancing the use of soft power and reducing hard power will serve best in this time of change in the Western Hemisphere. The rise of the left presents new challenges and opportunities to the United States but does not necessarily constitute a challenge or threat to democracy.

Secretary of State John Kerry summarized this strategy in a speech in November 2013, when he challenged the leaders of the Western Hemisphere to continue the use of democratic governments to deliver development, overcome poverty, and improve social inclusion. He went on to assert that the United States recognized the democracies of Latin America and declared that the era in which the United States would readily impose its interests on Latin American nations through military power to be over.⁴⁶ ■

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
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Action Research

A Systematic Approach to the Social Component of the Human Dimension

William Hardy

Joseph Rodman

Deployments can often make a person feel as if he or she is living the 1993 movie *Groundhog Day*. In the movie, an arrogant weatherman named Phil (played by actor Bill Murray) finds himself reliving the same day over and over again in soul-crushing repetition until he develops a sense of humanity and compassion through the daily reproduction of myriad personal interactions.¹

While many of us have used the movie as a recurrent theme to describe the unpleasant day-to-day monotony in the pattern of our own activities and personal interactions while deployed, this article proposes that the multinational partners of U.S. military forces likely have similarly discouraging “Groundhog Day” experiences when U.S. forces work with them in a manner that may be perceived as careless or even disdainful.

In today’s operating environments, individuals and units that allow themselves to lapse into patterns of careless indifference with regard to the duty of developing personal relationships with partners place their mission effectiveness in jeopardy. Ignoring the need

to develop personal relationships as an important dimension of a deployment can, at best, result in partner relationships remaining static; at worst, it will become destructive with regard to accomplishing the mission. The partner whom a soldier does not engage on a personal level begins to see that soldier as just another uniform in an endless line of uniforms. This results in little incentive to make progress toward established partner objectives. Individual friends and allies whom soldiers treat in an impersonal manner eventually see no reason to waste time and effort being committed partners because in a few months a new uniform will be starting the entire “Groundhog Day” process again. This shortcoming

in how soldiers conduct operations will have serious implications in any rapidly changing operating environment where forces increasingly rely on mutual support from multinational partners and local populations. Good relationships with those individual partners and members of communities are critical to mission success.²

Some members of the U.S. military already possess—

or, through experience, are able to develop—the self-awareness necessary to engage effectively with multinational actors to achieve mission success.

“Individual friends and allies whom soldiers treat in an impersonal manner eventually see no reason to waste time and effort being committed partners.”

These individuals endeavor to improve the quality of their social interactions with local or multinational partners, to learn from them, and to refine relationships with them throughout the duration of their deployments. While soldiers and leaders of this caliber are invaluable, they remain too few. To achieve success in both the cognitive and social components of the human dimension in current operations, it is necessary for the U.S. Army to empower soldiers with systematic tools and skills that will help them improve how they interact on a personal level with critical partners.³

The Problem of Social Continuity

Consider the information typically discussed between two units during a relief-in-place/transfer-of-authority operation (when one unit replaces another and assumes control of a specific operational area). It is standard for an outgoing unit to brief the incoming unit on combat lessons learned and enemy tactics, trends, and procedures.

A record of social interactions. Now imagine that, as part of your predeployment workup, you simulate real-world scenarios, based on a careful log of interactions developed by the unit you are replacing. The log chronicles key social interactions between soldiers and local people with whom you will be working. Additionally, during the handover process, the outgoing unit presents the incoming unit with further in-depth records of social interactions pertinent to the unit's area of responsibility, including a journal full of observations and analyses recorded by key leaders and others you are succeeding. The records detail interactions with specific local individuals.

Better handovers. Such a systematic approach to developing personal relationships through deliberate and documented social interactions by members of the U.S. military would foster more efficient and productive unit-to-unit handovers. Furthermore, it would greatly flatten the learning curve of incoming units adjusting to the new area of operations by facilitating more focused and rapid acculturation. This would enhance the compatibility of the new unit with local partners and, ideally, limit partners' "Groundhog Day" experience that would impede relationships and mission success.

Action Research as a Solution to the Problem of Social Continuity

This article recommends *action research* as a potential solution to the specialized problems associated with social interactions between U.S. military personnel and multinational partners and local communities. Action research has the potential to do the following:

- ◆ Improve how soldiers respond to ambiguity in complex social situations
- ◆ Create a systematic means for self-improvement along with improved self-awareness
- ◆ Increase the probability of operational success when operations depend on social interactions
- ◆ Provide for better transfer of information during unit turnover
- ◆ Increase the realism and accuracy of predeployment training scenarios

To paraphrase a well-known proverb, action research does not give soldiers fish, but instead it teaches them an effective method for catching fish.

"The experiences of teachers mirror the problem of discontinuity experienced by soldiers during extended deployments."

The problem of social continuity in the field of education. The concepts underlying action research originate from the education field, where teachers work in complex and often-ambiguous environments. In some ways, the experiences of teachers mirror the problem of discontinuity experienced by soldiers during extended deployments. Teachers are required to adjust to cyclical changeovers of new classes and different students every nine months, while soldiers are expected to adapt to new areas of responsibility and local partners in rotations of six to twelve months.

An approach to social continuity developed by educators. Educators' success, much like that of contemporary soldiers, largely depends on enticing individuals over whom they have relatively little coercive




Figure 1. Action Research Cycle Model

control to take specific actions toward a goal. In the case of teachers, this often means helping students acquire knowledge and modify behavior; in the case of soldiers, this might mean convincing partners to cooperate with former adversaries. These similarities suggest that it may be instructive for the U.S. military to look to the education field for lessons about the human dimension relevant to fostering and stimulating desired behaviors through personal relationships, in situations that do not require violence.

The Concept of Action Research

Kurt Lewin, regarded by many as the founder of social psychology, developed the concept of action research in 1946 while teaching at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Action research is generally defined in two ways: (1) research initiated to solve an immediate problem, and (2) a reflective process of progressive problem solving that focuses on initially improving the way issues are identified and addressed.⁴

Action research was developed with practitioners, rather than researchers, in mind. It was designed to be simple enough to conduct while still focusing on a primary task, but flexible and scalable enough to be

applied in as complex a manner as the practitioner chooses.

Simplified, action research is a systematic form of everyone's favorite problem solving technique: guess and check. In social interactions during deployed operations, many soldiers and leaders already employ this strategy, but in an unsystematic manner. Action research provides a framework for military personnel to more methodically and effectively apply a strategy they are likely already familiar with.

To keep action research methodology simple, it can be expressed in four steps—*planning, action, observation, and reflection*. In some ways, action research is comparable to steps within retired Air Force Col. John Boyd's "OODA [observe, orient, decide, act] loop" or Dr. W. Edwards Deming's "PDSA [plan, do, study, act] cycle."⁵ However, while the OODA loop and PDSA cycle represent, respectively, a rapid decision-making tool and a quality-control measure, the action research process (depicted in figure 1) focuses on social interaction and acts primarily as a problem-solving tool for informing a decision-making process.

The steps of the action research process are simple, and they continue in a cycle until a solution is effective.

Once practitioners identify a problem, they can enter the action research cycle at whichever step makes the most sense for the situation and progressively repeat steps until achieving success. The steps the practitioner takes are as follows:

Planning. Identifies and limits the scope of problem, then gathers background information and develops a course of action. The course of action selected should have a specific and achievable end state.⁶

Action. Implements concrete steps of the selected course of action.⁷

Observation. Makes detailed observations (mentally or in writing, depending on the situation) concerning the consequences and reactions to the course of action. This step can occur simultaneously with the “action” step.⁸

Reflection. Reflects upon the observations and decides to continue the previously identified course of action or to plan a new course of action if the initial action did not solve the problem.⁹

Action research is a deliberate and methodical examination of a practitioner’s actions within the context of a specific environment. It is valuable not only for achieving situational awareness and understanding but also for increasing the ability to influence the actions of others. The practitioner can develop appropriate actions, based on better understanding, to improve social influence efforts.

Sometimes one can plan and take an action, immediately observe the results, reflect on the consequences, and then plan and implement a new course of action, as appropriate, during the course of a single conversation. At other times, the observation step may last several days or even weeks before the results become evident.

Examples of action research can range from interactions with a single individual to large-scale projects such as changing and testing the format of an information operations campaign in order to influence an entire community. As one might expect, the wider the scope, the longer it may take to progress through the steps of the cycle.

Action Research Applied in Afghanistan

A real-world example of action research conducted by one of this article’s authors, William Hardy, is detailed below. During Hardy’s 2013–2014 deployment

as a social scientist with the Army’s Human Terrain System, he had the opportunity to directly support a district stability platform (DSP) in southeastern Afghanistan for almost ten months, during Operation Enduring Freedom. DSPs were small bases established by the U.S. military within local communities. U.S. special operations forces would conduct village stability operations from DSPs in partnership with Afghan National Army Special Forces and local security elements such as the Afghan Local Police (ALP) or organized anti-Taliban militia fighters. While supporting a DSP, Hardy became the single point of continuity during near-simultaneous relief-in-place transitions between two Navy SEAL (sea-air-land team) platoons and two Army civil affairs teams.

Similar to most DSPs, the primary mission included promoting security and cooperation between government officials and civilian entities at the local level. The bureaucratic structure of the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) in the area compounded numerous challenges, particularly in the case of a certain AUP lieutenant who controlled the flow of supplies to nearly all local security forces.

Complex and precarious relationships. To fully appreciate the complexities of working with this individual, some background information is needed. Members of the local community reported to DSP members that during the Afghan-Soviet War, individuals in the lieutenant’s family had ties with, or were members of, the communist regime’s secret police force, Khadamat-e Aetla’at Dawlati (KHAD). According to members of the local community, KHAD was responsible for a number of atrocities in the area during the communist era. While conducting research, the team encountered locals who claimed that during the 1980s, KHAD facilitated the massacre of over two hundred men and boys suspected of being mujahedeen, and that in the early 1990s, before the fall of President Mohammad Najibullah, KHAD was thought to have contributed to the disappearance of countless members of the community who opposed the communist government.

As the communist Afghan government fell, it was believed that members of the local mujahedeen groups caught the lieutenant’s father trying to flee, and they burned him alive in his vehicle. At the time of Hardy’s deployment, the younger brothers and sons of the mujahedeen allegedly involved in killing the lieutenant’s

father made up the ranks and leadership of the local security forces. These events ultimately led to a precarious relationship between the AUP lieutenant and the men he was tasked to coordinate and supply.

Complex behavior. Among the many personal attributes the lieutenant displayed was a penchant for being easily provoked and becoming quickly angered and threatening. However, the DSP observed that this penchant for anger may have been carefully calculated for effect. The lieutenant appeared to use displays of anger and interpersonal drama as a tool for intimidation and a means to exercise control. For example, he would often storm out of meetings following the formal greetings and introductions, presumably to highlight his importance and, presumably, to demonstrate to all present that the meeting could not occur without him. On one occasion, he punched a senior district official in the face; on another, he angrily brandished his pistol in a room full of district officials, waving it around in a threatening manner before setting it on a table.

To complicate matters, he also controlled the flow of supplies (including uniforms, ammunition, rations, and water) to nearly all local security forces. The organizational chart in figure 2 illustrates the degree to which this individual's cooperation (or lack thereof) could influence wide-ranging district security coordination.

No end in sight. Unfortunately, seemingly erratic and menacing behavior did not result in his dismissal. Family ties to senior government officials prevented him from being fired. After failing to get him removed from his position, the local officials changed their tack and were able to get him promoted to a position in the provincial capital. However, this promotion lasted only a few weeks before he was able to get himself demoted and placed back into his previous position at the district level (the "AUP officer in charge of ALP" shown in figure 2). The DSP members believed he preferred this because his position at the head of the district ALP had the potential to be more personally lucrative than the provincial post with only nominally higher rank.

Consequently, it was clear to the DSP members that they were stuck with him. Moreover, the DSP members were resigned to accepting that no matter what they did, they would never be able to control the AUP lieutenant's actions. The unit was faced with either having to find a way to work through him or having to risk failing one of its primary missions—promoting local security.

How the DSP built a cooperative working relationship. Upon analysis, the DSP members determined they could only control their own actions while trying to understand the AUP lieutenant's responses. They decided it would be necessary to keep a record of his responses over time to inform future personal engagements. This determination presented an excellent opportunity for utilizing action research.

Subsequently, the DSP members defined the problem as "How do we influence a man over whom we have no control?" With this, they began to review and assess their actions. They also began to record the AUP lieutenant's interactions with other Afghans. The unit initiated the process with *reflection*, and dissected its previous interactions. On careful study, the DSP noticed small details that were as simple as the time of day an interaction took place. The DSP also noticed the lieutenant's intense focus on perceived status. For instance, any time someone he perceived as beneath him was in the room, he would actively seek to establish his superiority—even if that person's official position was above his. In such circumstances, he would use aggressive body posture—and even violent gestures—to impose his dominance over those around him.

Additionally, the DSP members noted that the lieutenant never missed an opportunity to demonstrate his influence in front of a group of local police or anti-Taliban militia commanders. To his subordinates, he portrayed himself as someone who always fought for their cause as long as they supported him. Whether he intended to follow through is of little consequence; instead, the DSP concluded that he was very concerned with how he was perceived by others. Consequently, the unit began to notice that in every interaction he aimed to amplify his influence. He was keenly aware of opportunities to reinforce his status, while at the same time he was hypersensitive to perceived insults for which he was unforgiving and even vindictive.

After careful *reflection*, the DSP developed plans for future interactions. One of the initial decisions was never to enter a meeting in an emotional state that might antagonize the lieutenant. This made it less likely that members of the DSP would come into direct and open conflict with him during a meeting. Even if members of the DSP had reason to be angry with him, they would not allow themselves to show their anger, on the well-grounded assumption that doing so would




Figure 2. District Security Power Structure

only escalate the situation. Additionally, the DSP *took action* to present its members as open and empathetic, as much as possible, to his point of view.

The DSP also began experimenting with scheduled meeting times. It *observed* that he was often busiest in the mornings, and if the DSP scheduled a meeting with him in the morning, he would rapidly become impatient and blame members of the DSP for interrupting his day and slowing his work. The DSP also realized that late afternoon meetings were equally ineffective because he considered afternoons an important personal time—for certain recreational diversions. Thus, if DSP members wanted to have a successful meeting with him, it would have to be scheduled in the evening

after dinner, when he would most likely offer his full attention. By evening, he had usually regained his mental focus and concentration while retaining a sense of composure, presumably from his afternoon indulgences.

Over several months, and numerous setbacks, the DSP members developed a sophisticated understanding of the AUP lieutenant's self-perception and motivation. This understanding, ultimately, helped the unit develop a method aimed at influencing him by accentuating the role the unit could play in helping him achieve his aspirations.

Eventually, based on *reflection* through many iterations, and failed actions, of the action research cycle, the DSP members perceived that he loved the rush

of adrenaline that accompanied an argument. They also determined that he respected and formed a bond with others who enjoyed engaging in lively arguments. Thus, the DSP members came to recognize that their relationship with the lieutenant needed some measure of friendly conflict to be productive. In contrast, if the DSP members engaging with him were overly deferential and anxious to please, he would become less cooperative and more prone to anger. Eventually, the DSP members found a balance between what they considered the substance, as opposed to the social displays, of their interactions with the lieutenant.

Consequently, members of the DSP unit learned to manage their own emotions during arguments. Regardless of what happened during meetings, they would end them with a firm handshake, and both parties would say, “we have had a good argument today, and we look forward to arguing again tomorrow.”

Members of the DSP also began to realize they could play a relatively small but significant role in helping him appear influential, which appeared to be one of his goals. If the DSP members did their part, he would,

typically, reciprocate and use his influence to help the Americans. For example, as the spring turned into summer and the days grew hotter, the DSP began giving him extra bottles of water, which he would then distribute among the local

security forces. The DSP quickly learned that while the idea of giving him water was theirs, it was important that everyone else, most notably his colleagues and subordinates, understood he had arranged for the exchange (and, by inference, had the influence to do so). He would then deliver the water to the various ALP checkpoints, as well as to families living around the checkpoints. This small act not only improved the unit’s relationship with him but also improved his fragile relationship with the ALP leaders.

As the months went on, the DSP developed a practical and predictable working relationship with the lieutenant. He no longer viewed his American counterparts as adversarial. Instead, if they ever needed his

cooperation, they had a reasonable chance of achieving positive results because of the relationship they were able to develop with him through action research. This is not to assert that the unit’s relationship with him became perfect, but compared to the starting point, it became in some measure cooperative, predictable, and manageable as the lieutenant and the DSP members came to know each other.

Outcomes of Action Research in Operations and in Training

In this example, the learning processes derived from action research greatly facilitated the DSP’s relief-in-place/transfer-of-authority operations even as the events mentioned were unfolding during transitions. Irrespective, the incoming SEAL platoons and the civil affairs teams benefitted from the lessons learned by their predecessors. Throughout the transitions, the DSP continued the action research process, attempting to make even more progress toward mission success by cultivating other relationships.

Lessons learned from these experiences with a DSP

could also be applied to training scenarios for the U.S. Army. In how many training events have the role players, at best, come from the region where soldiers were to be deployed, but the role players lacked experience performing the

jobs they were role-playing? Alternatively, how many times have role-players merely been other soldiers dressed in costume and pretending to be sheikhs or tribal elders without having any real understanding of the culture they were supposed to be simulating? Notes taken during the action research process from a given area of operations could inform and help shape realistic training scenarios in both such cases that would help accurately reflect the environment into which a unit would be deployed.

Such a methodology should be applied to pre-deployment preparations for units designated as regionally aligned forces. Units conducting an action research process to chronicle the development

Operating environments of the future will need soldiers at every level who can analyze and evaluate unfamiliar, dissimilar, and changing social surroundings.

of social relationships with host-nation personnel could improve unit transitions by having role players portray the specific individuals that soldiers would encounter on their deployment. This would further the goal of realistic training, one of the pillars of the Army's human dimension goals.

Conclusion

As U.S. Army forces prepare for anticipated operating environments of 2025 and beyond, one thing will likely remain true: success in operations will become increasingly dependent on the ability to understand the social complexities of partners and populations with whom U.S. forces will be working. Consequently, future operating environments will need soldiers who can do more than just recall information, understand functions, or apply doctrine.

Operating environments of the future will need soldiers at every level who can analyze and evaluate unfamiliar, dissimilar, and changing social surroundings.

As such, the Army must, through appropriate training and tools, provide soldiers with a systematic intellectual framework for developing this capability. As illustrated here, one possible tool to address some of these challenges is action research. Providing soldiers with material solutions rather than cognitive processes to solve problems may answer certain challenges, but it will not solve the root problems causing those challenges. Solutions such as action research, which address the underlying issues that perpetuate ongoing challenges in the field, can help soldiers develop the cognitive mechanisms needed to not only cope but also to thrive within complex and ambiguous operating environments. ■

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Joseph Rodman is a social science research analyst for the U.S. Army's Human Dimension Task Force at the Mission Command Center for Excellence in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He earned a bachelor's degree and a master's degree from Indiana University's Department of Geography. He worked as a social scientist with the U.S. Army's Human Terrain System in Afghanistan and with the U.S. Agency for International Development in southern Afghanistan in support of a number of community development and governance projects. He also served for over two years as a Peace Corps volunteer in Uganda.

Notes

1. *Groundhog Day*, directed by Harold Ramis (Columbia Pictures, 1993).

2. Army Capabilities Integration Center, *Army Vision-Force 2025 White Paper* (Fort Eustis, VA: Army Capabilities Integration Center, 23 January 2014), accessed 9 September 2015, http://www.arcic.army.mil/app_Documents/USArmy_WhitePaper_Army-Vision-Force-2025_23JAN2014.pdf.

3. Department of the Army, *The Army Human Dimension Strategy 2015: Building Cohesive Teams to Win in a Complex World*, 2015, accessed 1 October 2015, http://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/publications/20150524_Human_Dimension_Strategy_vr_Signature_WM_1.pdf. This report provides an in-depth description of the three human dimension lines of effort.

4. Kurt Lewin, "Action Research and Minority Problems," *Journal of Social Issues* 2(4) (November 1946): 34–46.

5. John Richard Boyd, "Destruction and Creation," *A Discourse on Winning and Losing*, prepared for the U.S. Marine Corps, 3 September 1976; W. Edwards Deming, *The New Economics for Industry, Government, Education* (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Advanced Engineering Study, 1993).

6. Craig Mertler, ed., *Action Research: Teachers as Researchers in the Classroom* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2009), 32.

7. *Ibid.*, 39.

8. *Ibid.*

9. *Ibid.*, 40.



(Photo by Staff Sgt. Kimberly Lessmeister, 69th Air Defense Artillery Brigade PAO)

Soldiers from 69th Air Defense Artillery Brigade intervene during a sexual harassment scenario in which a senior noncommissioned officer sexually harasses a private first class 29 April 2015 on Fort Hood, Texas. The scenario was a part of the brigade's training for Sexual Assault Awareness Month.

Winning the Fight on Sexual Assault in our Army

Starting in Basic Combat Training

Col. Bryan Hernandez, U.S. Army

The rise in reported sexual assaults within the military has caused concern amongst senior military leaders and lawmakers—as well as parents contemplating allowing their sons or daughters to serve in the armed forces.¹ These concerns have translated into policy changes and increased scrutiny

of how the military approaches sexual harassment and sexual assault, and the culture of personal conduct, within its ranks.

Over the past few years, the focus on preventing sexual assault and harassment has led to new training programs, reporting processes, and engagement by

military leaders at all levels. As the former commander of a basic combat training (BCT) brigade at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, responsible for gender-integrated initial entry training (IET) for thousands of new soldiers every year, I have seen a positive change occurring in combating this critical issue within our Army. Although the campaign to rout this problem fully from our formations will be long, every day our soldiers and leaders are winning small battles in this fight through a series of actions to prevent sexual assault and harassment and, when such incidents do occur, with methods to respond more effectively.

In IET, we have the primary mission to transform civilians into soldiers. It is within this transformative process that setting the proper conditions and culture for the prevention of sexual assault and harassment begins. In BCT, there is a critical window of opportunity to turn the tide against sexual assault by establishing a proper moral foundation for the newest soldiers in our Army. However, this can only be successful if there is a collective group of professional cadre enforcing proper systems and procedures, operating within a healthy, disciplined organization, and climate. Further, commanders cannot solve this problem on their own; they need partnerships with key supporting organizations on their installations, such as Medical Command, the Criminal Investigation Command, and Army Community Services, as well as local civilian hospitals and universities, to fully leverage critical resources in their Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) campaigns.

By utilizing multiple lines of effort, commanders, senior noncommissioned officers, drill sergeants, and instructors can be successful in reducing sexual assaults and harassment in their organizations. This requires carefully taken steps to create a professional climate focused on respect, standards, discipline, and trust. The process of combating sexual misconduct must be holistic and deliberate, with a body of engaged leaders at every level.

At Fort Jackson, we achieved encouraging results from the intensive efforts across our installation and within our units to tackle this issue. During my tenure in a BCT command, I found that focusing our organization's efforts on its culture, reception and integration processes of new soldiers and cadre, systems and processes, and engaged leadership was instrumental

in reducing sexual misconduct.² Although not fully inclusive or applicable to every unit, the following points may assist others in charting their own paths to addressing this complex problem.

Indoctrination

The IET environment, as the first experience of the Army for new recruits, must imbue them with the highest standards of professionalism and conduct. New soldiers will emulate what they see their leaders say and do; therefore, IET leadership and cadre must exemplify those standards in all their actions.

Recruits enter the military with a wide variety of moral and ethical beliefs based upon their childhood, education, and culturally accepted behaviors of their previous social groups. Many times their individual value system is not congruent with Army values or the military's accepted norms. In BCT, the majority of SHARP reports involve trainee-on-trainee incidents related to acts of unwanted physical contact, inappropriate sexual comments, unacceptable "gym locker room" horseplay, and fraternization. Many of these incidents occur during the early stages of basic training as young men and women are put together into an integrated, controlled training environment for the first time in their lives.

The range of reports and their earliness in basic training are symptomatic of cultural variances and the divide between previously assumed tolerable behavior back home for some trainees and those of the Army. Therefore, it is paramount to introduce them to the Army's norms of behavior and values very quickly after their arrival.

Closing the gap between the Army's value system and that of the new recruits requires both a short-term and long-term plan of adjustment. Within a trainee's first twenty-four to forty-eight hours of arrival at our BCT, he or she is assigned a battle buddy and given instruction on SHARP.³ This immediate training establishes acceptable and nonacceptable behavior, together with standards of personal and professional conduct, and provides education about sexual assault and harassment. The intent is to rapidly expunge previous perceptions regarding acceptable norms of civil behavior derived from trainees' past backgrounds and to indoctrinate the soldiers with the Army's values and standards of conduct.

Soldiers were also integrated into the battle-buddy system in order to teach them how to work together as a team and how to look out for fellow soldiers at all times. The expected values and standards of conduct were then reinforced and demonstrated consistently throughout the ten-week training cycle in order to establish the appropriate ethical foundation for new soldiers.

Reporting

A critical aspect of an effective SHARP program is training and enforcing proper reporting procedures. Reporting a SHARP-related incident must be more than encouraged; it must be demanded by all within the unit. Reporting timeliness, standards, and requirements must be understood by everyone in the organization, and commanders and supervisors must emphasize an adherence to those standards. When a soldier comes forward with an accusation or report, he or she must be treated with an appropriate level of respect by the other members of the unit rather than being stigmatized. Soldiers, regardless of rank and gender, must feel that their unit and its leadership promote an open system of reporting.

Although recent media attention on increased reports of sexual assaults in the military seems to suggest an increase in actual assaults, the increase may instead be indicative of improving confidence by soldiers in the reporting system because of increased efforts by leaders and units to support the SHARP program.⁴ Results from numerous brigade- and battalion-level surveys and meetings with soldiers in basic training over the last year of my command made it clear that they were well educated on SHARP and how to report incidents of sexual misconduct—and they felt confident in the process. However, this confidence needs to continue throughout their military careers.

SHARP Battle Drills

One of the underlying precepts of an effective SHARP program is taking the appropriate steps when an incident occurs. Unfortunately, some units fail to do so due to a lack of standardized operating procedures, minimal leader awareness, or personnel untrained in their requisite responsibilities. When it comes to sexual assault or harassment, there is little room for failure. Therefore, unit battle drills for SHARP must be

established with clear directions for both required reporting (informal, formal, restricted, and unrestricted) and actions to execute upon notification of an incident.⁵ Developing a standardized format—understood by all, consistently reinforced by members of the unit, and taught to new members upon their arrival through a formalized training and reception process—is critical.

The battle drill format must be clear, with written instructions and graphical step-by-step directions. Further, these instructions must be placed in every unit's staff duty officer or charge-of-quarters book. After arriving at the brigade, this became a priority for me based upon the disparity I found in reporting across the battalions, incorrectly perceived required tasks from commanders and cadre, and improper actions taken by subordinates following an incident. Consequently, we quickly formalized a brigade standard for several different types of incidents beginning with those involving sexual misconduct, which clarified proper reporting procedures, protocols, and leader actions. More importantly, through its implementation and reinforcement, the battle drills eliminated confusion and missteps amongst the units and made the organization more responsive and effective.

A Culture of Accountability and Transparency

One of the most crucial aspects of developing an environment free of sexual assaults or harassment is establishing a climate of individual accountability and unit responsibility to maintain the highest standards of personal and professional conduct. Commanders must create an atmosphere where all unit members are held accountable for their actions. It is essential for creating discipline and mutual trust between the unit's leadership and its subordinates.

Concurrently, commanders and units need to be absolutely transparent when allegations or incidents occur and must follow proper reporting and legal protocols. Commanders must remain neutral when an allegation is made, and they need to ensure they follow proper investigatory procedures once notified of an incident. There is nothing worse than a unit or commander that attempts to downplay an allegation, suppress a report, or hide the unit's "dirty laundry."

Unfortunately, some leaders attempt to discount an allegation because of the perceived negative impact on

their organization, cronyism, or because it involves an accusation against one of their *best* soldiers. Therefore, it is vital to reinforce professionalism over personal relationships among the cadre. If an allegation is made, the leadership must choose the hard right over the easy wrong. If the allegation is substantiated, then the leadership must take the appropriate action without any prejudice or parochialism. Leaders who fail to act, or who employ double standards and fail to hold culpable individuals accountable for their actions, are a detriment to their units. Rest assured that soldiers are always watching to see if their leaders do the right thing.

The First Right of Refusal Principle

In our unit, we had a policy of informing the sexual assault response coordinator, Criminal Investigation Command, or the military police first when an allegation was made by a soldier within the unit, depending on the type of report. Although this policy followed the Army's appropriate regulations and procedures, it addressed what I saw as an opportunity for failure by inexperienced or misguided leaders who, through poor decision making, had chosen not to take action or investigate the incident.

Allowing outside-of-the-unit organizations to review cases alleging sexual misconduct first and either taking the lead in the investigation or returning the responsibility back to the unit created a greater level of transparency and accountability for the unit and its leadership. We specifically adopted this method to ensure all units contacted the appropriate agencies when a report was made and to eliminate cases of subordinate units conducting cursory investigations and too quickly determining that *nothing happened*. This *First Right of Refusal* principle dramatically improved our unit's transparency, promoted fair and just treatment of both victims and alleged offenders, and ensured



(Photo by Capt. Edward Brown, First Army Division East PAO)

Soldiers from the 158th Infantry Brigade and sexual assault response coordinators rehearse scenarios that train proper response to reports or observation of sexual harassment or sexual assault 8 November 2015 on Fort Meade, Maryland, during SHARP Program Summit 1.

proper procedures were being followed at the lowest levels of the brigade.

Assessing the SHARP Climate within a Unit

Because the SHARP program involves a myriad of variables within a unit, we used several tools to assess our organizational effectiveness at combating sexual assault and sexual harassment. At the IET-soldier level, the brigade conducted anonymous surveys with focused questions about SHARP in conjunction with end-of-cycle proficiency testing. These surveys provided feedback from the individual soldiers on their SHARP training, enforcement within their companies, and their general assimilation of Army values.

Within the BCT battalions, battalion commanders and command sergeants major conducted sensing sessions with their soldiers after each phase of training. These forums provided firsthand feedback on training, standards, and discipline, along with commentary on the conduct of their leaders and cadre. These sessions were mirrored at the company level by company commanders, first sergeants, and SHARP/unit victim advocate representatives to ensure leaders were engaged and constantly assessing the performance of their unit and its commitment to preventing sexual harassment and sexual assault.

Additionally, in order to ensure the organization was taking timely and proper legal and administrative

actions, the brigade command sergeant major and I met with our brigade staff judge advocate weekly to conduct a review of all current legal actions within the brigade. A few key areas we focused on were the status of open legal cases and SHARP unrestricted reports: where these cases were in the adjudication or investigatory process; what administrative actions were required, such as flags or suspension packets for cadre; and, what the way ahead was for the cases. This review also provided a snapshot of any trends across our organization that we could then address with unit leadership. The staff judge advocate also consolidated data on the cases for a more formal analysis of our unit's operational climate on a quarterly and an annual basis. At the conclusion of each meeting, we followed up with commanders and key staff sections to check on the status of their respective actions on cases discussed. Through this process, we saw more timely results on unit actions and investigations with all stakeholders properly involved in the process.

The Importance of Sexual Assault Review Boards

Monthly installation- or post-level sexual assault review boards (SARBs) are critical to the success of a

comprehensive SHARP program. SARBs provide the optimal forum for installation and key leaders to collectively review newly reported SHARP cases (retaining the appropriate level of confidentiality), evaluate reporting and required actions, identify trends and best practices, and most importantly, synchronize resources and victim care support.

Although each post may vary in the conduct of its SARB, the SARB is an integral part of leader engagement in the process of reducing and eliminating sexual assault and harassment. Leaders can share lessons they learned in this meeting and coordinate support assets from the multiple agencies on their installation and within the local community. At Fort Jackson, we were able to bring in local hospital providers, university representatives, and other community agencies to discuss ideas and establish mutually supportive plans to prevent and respond to assaults.

Additionally, every year we conducted a SHARP forum, bringing in several guest speakers, supporting agencies, and many others to discuss sexual assault and harassment from the barracks to the university campus. These venues produced greater partnerships between our organizations as well as allowed leaders to share ideas and plans to improve their programs. In many instances, we found that the military was not

alone in tackling this complex problem, and being able to discuss issues with our civilian counterparts produced new insights and strategies.

Establishing a Culture of Professionalism

The most critical focus area to reduce or eliminate sexual assault or harassment is the culture of the organization and the personnel within it. Soldiers will adapt to the level of conduct to which they are either required or allowed to conform. If a unit has a universal climate of high standards for both the personal and professional conduct of its soldiers, there is less chance of misconduct. Conversely, if low standards and indiscipline are permitted by its leaders, incidents of maltreatment will tend to permeate a unit's ranks.



(Photo by Staff Sgt. Ryan Hohman, 89th Military Police Brigade PAO)

Sgt. James Cancienne, a military police officer with the 410th Military Police Company, 720th Military Police Battalion, 89th MP Brigade, shares his thoughts regarding a scenario involving two soldiers of opposite gender working out at a gym 21 November 2014 at Howze Auditorium on Fort Hood, Texas. Brigade soldiers between the ages of seventeen and twenty-five observed and reacted to different scenarios during interactive SHARP training.

Appropriate soldier behavior stems from an underlying unit culture based on dignity and respect. The formation of culture starts with the small things, such as the language we allow to be used by our cadre towards their soldiers and the way in which soldiers are taught to treat their fellow comrades and their leaders. In BCT, this is complicated by the drill sergeant and soldier-in-training dynamic. However, treating soldiers with demeaning behavior and language does not create the professional climate necessary to inculcate our values as an Army—nor does it provide our young recruits with role models to emulate.

Therefore, in an effort to foster the proper unit culture of mutual respect among soldiers for each other, we applied an approach of treating soldiers with dignity and not disdain. This did not discount making training and the BCT environment both rigorous and stressful in order to prepare soldiers for the realities of combat, but it required our cadre—from company commander to drill sergeant—to ensure their conduct and their unit climate were professional. This process has not been easy, but by focusing on the culture of our organization, we saw a decline in both personal and professional misconduct.

Conclusion

As the entry point of every newly enlisted soldier, BCT is the ideal starting point to dramatically reduce sexual assault and harassment throughout our Army. Winning this campaign requires a multifaceted approach to address the underlying causes that allow for such misconduct to occur in our ranks. Solutions can only come through engaged leaders at all levels who establish the necessary conditions of a professional force committed to the highest standards and our Army values. Sexual assault and harassment are a cancer to the good order and discipline of any unit, not to mention the strategic implications those crimes have on the credibility and pride of our force.

Fortunately, we have made great strides toward reducing this problem through concerted efforts across the Army. As a former commander, I look forward to the day when such incidents are extremely rare or no longer exist in our units. However, until then, we must continue step-by-step to shape the environment and culture of our Army to develop soldiers and future leaders who will stand ready not only to win our nation's wars, but to treat their fellow soldiers with dignity and respect. ■

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Notes

1. Department of Defense Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office, *Department of Defense Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military: Fiscal Year 2013*, 15 April 2014, 1–5, accessed 17 August 2015, http://www.sapr.mil/public/docs/reports/FY13_DoD_SAPRO_Annual_Report_on_Sexual_Assault.pdf.

2. 165th Infantry Brigade [the author's brigade] substantiated cases of illegal association and cadre abuse declined 35 percent from July 2013 to April 2015.

3. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Regulation (TR) 350-6, *Enlisted Initial Entry Training Policies and Administration* (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 7 November 2013), para. 3-21a. The regulation states, "By congressional mandate, the initial SHARP instruction in BCT and OSUT must be presented during the first fourteen days of accession into training. Therefore, BCT/OSUT companies must ensure this training is scheduled during the first ten days of training. This takes into account the time the soldier spends in the reception battalion."

4. Jamie Crawford, "Reports of Military Sex Assault up Sharply," Cable News Network (CNN), 1 May 2014, accessed 6 August 2015, <http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/01/politics/military-sex-assault/>.

5. TR 350-6, *Enlisted Initial Entry Training*, para 2-7e. The paragraph highlights actions to be taken by commanders following an unrestricted report of trainee sexual assault. These include: "determine if the victim desires/needs emergency medical care;" "notify law enforcement as soon as victim's safety is assured and medical treatment procedures elected by victim are initiated;" "notify SARC [sexual assault response coordinator];" "provide victim with emotional support and monitor victim's well-being, particularly if there are indications of suicidal ideation, and ensure appropriate intervention occurs as needed;" and "determine the need for temporary reassignment of victim or alleged offender giving, to the extent practicable, preferential consideration to the victim's desires."



(Photograph by Lance W Clayton, Wonderful Machine)

Former soldier Justin Watt sits on a park bench 8 March 2013 in Salt Lake City. Watt exposed the gang-rape and murder of a 14-year-old Iraqi girl together with the murder of her family by members of his unit. The crimes occurred 12 March 2006 near Mahmudiyah, Iraq.

Lessons from Yusufiyah From Black Hearts to Moral Education

Maj. Saythala Lay Phonexayphova,
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On 16 June 2006, Pvt. Justin P. Watt sat on a green cot in a dusty tent on Forward Operating Base Mahmudiyah. As he sat there in the middle of Baghdad, Iraq, inhaling the dust, he felt certain of two things: insurgents were torturing two missing members of his squad, and he was going to die.¹

Nothing, though, prepared him for the conversation he was about to have with his team leader, Sgt. Tony Yribe. As they talked about the ongoing search for their two squad members, Yribe told Watt that a member of their platoon, Pvt. Steven Green, had single-handedly murdered four members of an Iraqi family a few months earlier.² Watt questioned how an inept and physically diminutive soldier could carry out such an act alone, and Yribe replied, “[The] less you know about it ... the better. Just forget I said anything.”³ But Watt could not forget about it.

For the next few days, he obsessed over Yribe’s revelation. He became certain he had to report the war crime. When he did report it, he subjected himself

to a storm of criticism and threats. However, instead of withering under pressure that might have crushed other people, he stood strong behind his conviction that he had done the right thing. After leaving the service in January 2009, Watt received numerous threats to his life. Critics called him a snitch and asked how he could have turned in his “band of brothers.” He answered with a rhetorical question: “How could I live with myself?”⁴

Spurred, perhaps, by Jim Frederick’s 2011 book *Black Hearts: One Platoon’s Descent into Madness in Iraq’s Triangle of Death*, the Army is attempting to learn from the 2006 massacre at Yusufiyah so that similar tragedies can be prevented.⁵ From the story of Watt, this article offers key lessons about how the Army can teach its soldiers the moral obligations they have to other human beings, and the choices for which soldiers must be accountable. It tells not only of Watt’s moral courage and imagination but also of how he applied *moral agency*—making ethical decisions and taking ethical actions based on right and wrong. Watt’s decision to report the crime would help wronged people whom he

had never met obtain justice, and it would lead to four of his platoon members going to prison.

The Challenge of Service: Welcome to the Meat Grinder

After a bad breakup with a girlfriend, Watt followed his father's example by joining the Army.⁶ Because he received high scores on his military aptitude examinations, he could have chosen any occupational specialty. Influenced by Stephen Ambrose's book *Band of Brothers: E Company, 506th Regiment, 101st Airborne from Normandy to Hitler's Eagle's Nest*, which portrays infantry soldiers' heroic exploits in World War II, Watt volunteered to be an infantryman in the 101st Airborne Division.⁷

Walking out of the recruiter's office with a cool \$20,000 for signing his enlistment contract, Watt finally felt his life had direction, and he looked forward to the challenges ahead. Though he knew he was going to combat in Afghanistan or Iraq, Watt thought the Army's training would prepare him for the challenges of war, as did the training given those brave men who confronted Hitler's military. However, Watt would realize less than a year from his enlistment that nothing could have adequately prepared him for the events that unfolded in Iraq's "Triangle of Death." Frederick puts the deployment of Watt's unit in perspective:

The Triangle of Death was a meat grinder, churning out daily doses of carnage. During their yearlong deployment, soldiers from the battalion either found or got hit by nearly nine hundred roadside IEDs

[improvised explosive devices]. They were shelled or mortared almost every day and took fire from rifles, machine guns, or rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) nearly every other day. Twenty-one men from the battalion were killed. ... More than 40 percent of the battalion were treated for mental or emotional anxiety while in-country and many have since been diagnosed.⁸

One statistic gives an even better understanding of Watt's situation. After one year, "51 of Bravo company's

approximately 135 soldiers had been killed, wounded, or moved to another unit."⁹ Almost halfway into their deployment and after the death of their first platoon leader, the casualties in Watt's platoon were so numerous that his platoon sergeant at one point declared the unit "combat ineffective."¹⁰

The Circumstances Surrounding the Attack

Watt's belief that he was going to die in Iraq turned out to be wrong. On 16 June 2006, he was right, however, that insurgents were torturing the two missing members of his platoon, Pfc. Thomas Tucker and Pfc. Kristian Menchaca. On 19 June, the unit found their mutilated bodies near a power plant. After examining the bloody remains for IEDs, the soldiers returned them to their base near Baghdad.¹¹

However, apart from agonizing over the two kidnapped members of his platoon, Watt also found himself in a severe moral dilemma—he had to report a war crime that he was sure at least one of his friends had committed in March, or he had to "just forget about it." Watt's deliberations consumed him for days until he concluded that he was morally obligated to report the crime. His internal critical reflections and resulting actions bring to light a person properly employing moral agency.

On 12 March 2006, three months before Menchaca and Tucker were abducted, four soldiers from Watt's platoon—Spc. Paul Cortez, Spc. James Barker, Pvt. Steven Green, and Pfc. Jesse Spielman—had already concocted a plan to attack a certain Iraqi family's home in the local vicinity,

in part, to exact vengeance for other comrades killed by insurgents they believed were supported by locals. Sitting at a traffic control point (TCP) in the middle of Yusufiyah, a small farming town on the southern outskirts of Baghdad, the four soldiers sat around playing cards and getting drunk from alcohol they had confiscated from the local Iraqis. As the night wore on, their intoxication reached the level of six or eight beers each. Bored from card playing, and drunk, Cortez mulled over their plan with the other three soldiers (Barker, Green, and

"The Triangle of Death was a meat grinder, churning out daily doses of carnage."

Spielman) and then declared that the time had come to put it into action. They intended to find an “Iraqi girl who lived nearby and they were going to go out and ... [rape] her.”¹²

Giving scant information to Pfc. Bryan Howard (a new soldier in the unit) about their plans and leaving him with another soldier at the TCP, Barker, Cortez, and Spielman took off their uniform tops, while Green kept his entire uniform on, and all four covered their faces.¹³

The men grabbed their weapons, traveled a few hundred meters from their checkpoint, broke into an Iraqi family’s home, separated its members, and began to gang-rape their fourteen-year-old daughter, Abeer Qassim Hamza al-Janabi, in a bedroom at the back of the house. Her parents, father Qassim Hamza Raheem and mother Fakhriyah Taha Muhasen, were cordoned off in the front part of the home. They must have heard Abeer’s screams. But with guns pointed at their heads, they were helpless to stop the rape. In addition to gang-raping and murdering Abeer, the soldiers murdered her parents and her six-year-old sister Hadeel Qassim Hamza Al-Janabi.¹⁴ They then desecrated Abeer’s body, burning it to create the appearance of an insurgent attack, and they tried to burn the house down to destroy any remaining evidence.

In an act of supreme cynicism, several hours after the attack, two of the four perpetrators—Cortez and Spielman—returned to the house as members of a patrol lead by Yribe, ostensibly to investigate the crime scene. However, when returning to the checkpoint later to drop off Cortez and Spielman, Green nonchalantly confessed to Yribe, “That was me. I did it. I killed that family.”¹⁵

Yribe later stated he found the situation puzzling: finding a shotgun shell in the home where the murders took place (a shell of the type used by his unit) and seeing Cortez in tears, pleading to go to Combat Stress (to seek mental health care).¹⁶ However, rather than reporting the crime for further investigation, Yribe initially did nothing. He simply told Green, “I am done with you. You are dead to me. You get yourself out of this Army, or I will get you out myself.”¹⁷

The Moral Deliberation of a Good Soldier

While Yribe clearly failed in his duties as a non-commissioned officer, Watt, a young soldier one year

removed from basic training, could not forget about Yribe’s revelation or take his advice to “just let God sort it out.” Watt could not stop himself from thinking about the Iraqi family, and, unlike Yribe, Watt could not forget about Green’s confession. “I could’ve never thought

that anyone can do that ... I couldn’t imagine what it would have been like, hearing everyone screaming,” was Watt’s response when asked if he could have predicted the events of 12 March 2006.¹⁸

Additionally, Watt had suspicions that there was more to the story than Green’s simple confession. Watt felt Green’s account of the night’s events, by itself, did not add up. Although he could imagine that Green was of a sort that *could* murder a family in cold blood, he could not imagine how it was physically possible for one man to kill four people without anyone at the TCP noticing.

“I was on radio guard, and I had logs of gun shots. It just made no [tactical] sense,” Watt later recounted.¹⁹ Watt remembered the exact night of the incident and used his practical reasoning and imagination to figure out that it was nearly impossible for Green, the runt of the platoon, to murder four people by himself under the known circumstances. He tried to imagine how it could have been possible for only Green to enter a home less than two hundred meters from the checkpoint, hold four people hostage, rape one of them, kill them all one by one, and then return to the checkpoint without anyone hearing screams or shots only meters from the TCP. To Watt, it was not plausible that only one soldier—particularly Green—was involved in this scenario.

While deliberating on the circumstances, Watt exercised great personal courage by not submitting to Yribe’s instruction that he simply forget about Green’s confession. Watt recognized he had a moral duty to help ensure justice would be done. He would not allow someone of higher rank—even someone he highly respected—to

"I couldn't imagine what it would have been like, hearing everyone screaming."

deter him from his personal and professional obligation to pursue the matter to an honorable conclusion.

As Watt's unit mourned the deaths of Tucker and Menchaca, he grew more anxious about Yribe's revelations. To assure himself that he was correct in his suspicions, he felt he had to get confirmation of more of the incident's details. So, around 19 June, he came across Howard, who had been at the checkpoint on 12 March with four of the soldiers responsible for the murders.²⁰ To gain his confidence, Watt convinced Howard that he knew all about the incident. From Howard, Watt received confirmation of his suspicions. "Howard filled in many of the missing pieces about Cortez and Barker ... about how he still didn't really believe them until they returned, with the blood-stained clothes."²¹ While Watt was still uncertain about all the details of the event, he was sure that he would not be morally justified to keep it a secret. He started to think about the Iraqi family and, as a man, he thought about it from the Iraqi father's perspective. Watt explains,

Just imagine if it was you. You're at home with your wife and this happens. What that dude [the father] went through. What he was feeling. That had to have been the worst thing to have to watch that happen ... the rape of your daughter and watching them get killed.²²

Watt reflected on Howard's revelations, desperately trying to make sense of his own feelings and experiences so he would not lose his mind. He thought about the horrific scene as it must have unfolded, and he put himself vicariously in the Iraqi father's position: helpless, listening to the desperate cries of his daughter. In empathizing with another person in this manner, Watt maintained his personhood. He acted in accordance with his moral convictions and professional ethical standards.

Asked whether it was a black-and-white case to report the crime once he confirmed the whole story, Watt straightforwardly admitted,

The truth of the matter was that I was going to die. For me, the difference was dying rightly and righteously without anything on my conscience. It was black and white for me. But, I was scared to death ... I was thinking about the honor of what we were doing ... If you saw our Purple Heart ceremony when we came home, you wouldn't

believe it! We were taking a lot of casualties, but we were doing a lot of good work. I had to think about the people we lost. [If I didn't report it], every person we protected, every school supply we handed out, ... all that would have been for *nothing*.²³

Like many soldiers in war, Watt took a fatalistic approach to life and to his decision to report the crime. However, he maintained an authentic sense of who he was as a person. That is, he kept intact his true values, commitments to others, and desires to come back from combat as a morally whole person. Watt thought about his fellow soldiers who had died throughout the deployment, and he simply asked himself, "What would they think if it came out later that these murders had happened and no one (especially, those that knew) said anything about it?"²⁴ Watt would not have been able to face the families of the dead, or his own family, including his father, who had been a combat engineer in Vietnam. Nor would he have been able to look at himself in the mirror. Watt would have had no answers for his inaction. If he did not report the crime, he came to believe his life would become one of lasting regret, denial, compartmentalization, or fragmentation. The consequences of failing to act morally would have been a life not worth living.

Considerations for the Army Profession

The Center for the Army Profession and Ethic (CAPE) uses a quote from Sir John Hackett to clarify the Army's professional military ethic: "What a bad man cannot be is a good soldier."²⁵ While, historically, as judged by Western standards of moral conduct, there have been "bad" or immoral men who have been good or competent soldiers, Hackett's definition of good is a normative one: a bad man cannot be a moral soldier. Recent findings in moral psychology support CAPE's claim; researchers suggest people who "display moral courage often perceive themselves to be 'strongly linked to others through a shared humanity' and feel a sense of responsibility that is not limited to intimates."²⁶ On the other hand, people who stand idly by doing nothing to prevent or stop wrongs done to others do not often feel moved by this universal connection. This research brings up a question: how can the Army train its soldiers to make ethical decisions and take ethical actions based on right and wrong? A study of the case

of Watt suggests two approaches the Army can incorporate into an effective moral education program.

First, the Army should improve soldiers' communication skills by training them to use language to express feelings, values, needs, and desires that otherwise might seem inexpressible, in verbal (group) discourse and in each soldier's inner dialogue. In conjunction, before, during, and after deployments, the Army's moral education program should encourage discussion about moral issues (a dialectical method) to allow soldiers to question, reinforce, and improve their ability to conduct dialogue. A repeating training and education process would lead to soldiers knowing how to express their values to others while reaffirming them to themselves. An affirmation of values reinforces the professional ethic and enables soldiers to resist the pressures of misplaced loyalties—like the one Yribe attempted to impose on Watt.²⁷

The civilian world offers examples of this type of moral education. For example, following the Rodney King beating in 1992, which led to widespread race riots in Southern California and elsewhere, California's Department of Justice developed a program to teach police officers how they could intervene when they feared a fellow officer was about to use too much force.²⁸ Similarly, the Army should design a moral education program to educate and train its soldiers about when they should intervene or report if another soldier violates, or is about to violate, the laws of armed conflict and the professional ethic. The Army has taken the right steps to address some of these issues by requiring all soldiers, as part of their annual training, to complete law of war training with an officer of the Judge Advocate General's Corps, and ethics training by an Army chaplain. However, the Army must recognize that expertise and responsibility for moral education should not be relegated to a select few but are the responsibility of Army leaders who have the proper experience, education, and motivations.

Karl Marlantes, a Vietnam veteran, recommends changing the common social practice among warfighters of not expressing and processing painful emotions

openly. His ideas could point the Army in the right direction. Marlantes writes,

During combat tours, time must be carved out in which to reflect. I wish that after each action the skipper could have drawn us all together, just us. In ten or fifteen minutes of solemn time, we could have asked forgiveness and said good-bye to lost friends.²⁹

Such an approach recognizes the value of reflection for developing soldier resilience, and for coping with the


act of killing or the deaths of comrades. Regular periods of collective and private reflection could be used to reaffirm that it is acceptable for soldiers to kill an enemy combatant under proper conditions and rules of engagement, and, further, that this very act of killing does not mean they are terrible people.³⁰

Second, the Army should promote mentorship and coaching, using moral exemplars to develop soldiers' reasoning skills. This will show them that it is possible to be moral agents.

Using exemplars like Watt, the Army can help soldiers improve their ability to recognize those within their formations who are good and bad examples of the professional ethic. However, the Army should be cautious about elevating super-meritorious acts as the paradigm for right action, which confuses valor for morality.³¹

Watt recognized that not reporting the crimes of his fellow platoon members would have been a grave wrong, one almost as harmful as committing the crime itself. He weighed the consequences of his options by using his moral imagination to determine the right action, an action that would transcend individual loyalties and the wants of his guilty platoon members. In contrast to a choice that might have been expedient in the short term, Watt felt an obligation to respond in a manner consistent with the Army's professional military ethic.

Moral exemplars like him can help soldiers improve their emotional responses and respect themselves in new ways. That is, exemplars can convince young soldiers that it is possible to do what the profession requires of them when they are soldiers at home or fighting in the heat of battle. For example, the Army, on CAPE's initiative, has taken the right steps in allowing



The Army should be cautious about elevating super-meritorious acts as the paradigm for right action, which confuses valor for morality.

Watt to talk to soldiers about his experiences. Watt's insights and actions, which embody the Army's professional values, will help other soldiers realize that it is possible to act autonomously and morally, irrespective

of one's rank and position. More important, by using dialogue and moral exemplars, the profession demonstrates that it practices what it preaches: mission first, people always. ■

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Notes

1. Justin P. Watt, personal interview with the author, 14 March 2013. This article is dedicated to the memories of Rick Watt and Jim Frederick, who both passed away in 2014. Without these two transformative figures in Justin's life, I would not be able to share these lessons from Yusufiyah. Rick taught Justin his morals, and Jim gave Justin a voice and ear when no one wanted to talk and listen.
2. Jim Frederick, *Black Hearts: One Platoon's Descent into Madness in Iraq's Triangle of Death* (New York: Random House, Inc., 2010), 305–6. Most news sources have identified this incident as occurring in Mahmudiyah, the closest major town in the area, but the location of the murders was Yusufiyah.
3. Ibid.
4. Watt, personal interview.
5. Frederick, *Black Hearts*.
6. Watt, personal interview.
7. Stephen E. Ambrose, *Band of Brothers: E Company, 506th Regiment, 101st Airborne from Normandy to Hitler's Eagle's Nest* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 6 September 2001).
8. Frederick, *Black Hearts*, xvi–xvii.
9. Ibid., xvii.
10. Ibid., 166. My West Point class graduated about 900 members in 2004, less than a quarter of the new officers commissioned in the Army that year. Of my three classmates who were in Watt's battalion, two were killed and one was severely injured during the deployment. These facts speak of the type and frequency of violence that Watt's unit faced in Baghdad from 2005 to 2006.
11. Ibid., 314.
12. Ibid., 260–61.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., 258–70.
15. Ibid., 269.
16. Ibid., 268. It was very rare for insurgents in Iraq to use shotguns. Shotguns are almost exclusively used by American soldiers. Also, "Combat Stress" was a term used by soldiers for the trained psychologists typically located in major forward operating bases to help soldiers deal with the trauma of combat and other deployment-related issues.
17. Ibid., 270.
18. Watt, personal interview.
19. Ibid.

20. Frederick, *Black Hearts*, 312.
21. Ibid.
22. Watt, personal interview.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Center for the Army Profession and Ethic, *An Army White Paper: The Profession of Arms* (8 December 2010), accessed 28 July 2015, <http://cape.army.mil/repository/ProArms/Profession-White%20Paper%208%20Dec%2010.pdf>.
26. David Bornstein, "Where Does Moral Courage Come From?" *New York Times* online, 18 December 2014, accessed 28 July 2015, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/12/18/where-does-moral-courage-come-from/?_r=4.
27. I want to acknowledge the Army's commendable efforts to implement the Ready and Resilient Campaign and the Master Resilience Training program. These initiatives reflect an institution that aims to address the issues I have presented in this essay, but the Army still needs to develop a more coherent strategy that aligns its institutional requirements and empowers its leaders to better educate and train soldiers in order to meet the moral demands of the military experience.
28. Jason Marsh and Dacher Keltner, "We Are All Bystanders," Greater Good Science Center at the University of California, Berkeley website, 1 September 2006, accessed 28 July 2015, http://greatergood.berkeley.edu/article/item/we_are_all_bystanders/.
29. Karl Marlantes, *What It Is Like to Go to War* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2011), 77.
30. To prepare soldiers for some of the emotional ill effects that killing will have, military leaders should talk about the moral permissibility of killing. This practice trains soldiers to reflect on their professional duty and the moral context in which they act.
31. Moral exemplars are people, military or civilian, who display personal courage by standing up for and acting upon honorable values. A personally courageous and moral soldier feels a need to respond to and for others because the soldier is accountable to them. This makes the soldier feel an obligation to act for the right reasons and in the right ways, maintaining the trust of those he or she is appointed to command or subordinated to follow.

Military Operations in Megacities

A Linguistic Perspective

Jeff R. Watson, PhD

The challenge of conducting future military operations within megacities (cities with populations over ten million) lies in understanding the dynamic and multidimensional complexities of these urban areas. Military operations in megacities, whether combat-oriented or otherwise, will be similar to those in other urban environments but will be complicated by factors unique to the megacity environment.¹ These factors include geographic sprawl, population volume and density, sociocultural and socioeconomic diversity, governance challenges, varying qualities of infrastructure, and regional and global (inter)connectedness.

The analytical framework proposed by the chief of staff of the Army's Strategic Studies Group (SSG) provides a solid foundation for studying the multiple dimensions of megacities from a military perspective.² Accordingly, megacities are complex and dynamic environments that require a holistic view of their interrelated parts. In order to encourage "new thinking" and "focus efforts," the SSG identifies five central components (context, scale, density, connectedness, and flow) that help view megacities as loosely, moderately, or highly integrated systems.

While this approach rightly encourages a holistic approach to the analysis of megacities, one element is notably absent from the suggested framework: language. Although this aspect of the human terrain might be implied in the component of context, the linguistic diversity of megacities will have implications for multiple components in this framework including context, connectedness, scale, and flow. This essay will discuss

the dynamic linguistic characteristics of megacities and how an appreciation of this linguistic landscape can help visualize future military operations and apply the suggested framework.

Multilingual Characteristics of Megacities

First and foremost, megacities are largely multilingual. While this can be said of large cities in general, the scale of multilingualism in megacities magnifies its effects. For instance, in New York City (NYC)—a metropolitan megacity of over eighteen million—nine foreign languages are spoken by communities of one hundred thousand or larger.³ Language also plays a role in determining one's identity and the larger language community in which one decides to live. For example, the majority of Russian speakers in NYC tend to live in south Brooklyn and Staten Island, while Chinese speakers tend to cluster in Manhattan and Sunset Park.⁴ In megacities, language, culture, and regional context go hand in hand and often reach beyond ethnic identities.⁵

In order to fully understand the context of a megacity, we must understand the role of the languages used in its communities. How do language communities interact in megacities? What tensions are caused by multiple language communities in urban space? What role does language play in the power structures (government or otherwise) of megacities? What challenges are caused by multilingualism in gathering and disseminating information, providing social assistance, or responding to disasters?



Although this essay can't fully answer all of these questions, it will demonstrate why the linguistic landscape of megacities is an important consideration for decision makers in the military community.

Beyond Language Policy

Implementing an official language policy allows a nation to regulate which language or languages it uses to interact with its constituents. While these policies might provide us with decent insight into the linguistic environment within a country, it is often not enough to fully understand the multilingualism unique to a megacity.

The official languages of India, for example, are Hindi (first) and English (subsidiary).⁶ In Mumbai, however, a coastal megacity with a metropolitan population of over twenty-one million spread across 230 sq. miles, Marathi serves as a third official language.⁷ For many in Mumbai, Marathi, the indigenous language of the Maharashtra state, is the language spoken at home, while English and Hindi are often taught only as second languages and may or may not be used in official capacities.⁸ Moreover, as more and more Indians migrate into Mumbai, they bring their

regional languages with them, making Mumbai a microcosm of Indian multilingualism.

Therefore, in India, multilingualism must be embraced not only on an abstract level but also on an administrative one. Figure 1 provides a graphic representation of India's diverse language groups. Responding to the challenge, India's constitution administratively divides India into ethnolinguistic states and gives each state the freedom to add their own regionally significant language to the list of official languages, thereby institutionalizing regional languages into the Indian national identity.⁹

Consideration of Language for Predeployment Preparation

Whether military operations in megacities focus on intelligence gathering, disaster response, or combat, interaction with locals within various regional language communities will be necessary to build the relationships necessary for mission success. Understanding the regional languages within a megacity will have practical implications for creating appropriate predeployment language and culture familiarization training, identifying reach-back capabilities, and building effective military and host-nation interpreter cadre.

Language and Power Structures

Language also plays a role in the power structures that operate and hold influence within and across language communities in megacities. Analyzing how those power structures (e.g., government, educational, religious, tribal, or social organizations) operate and interact within megacity communities can shed light on the operational challenges the Army might face in those environments.

For example, in Lagos, Nigeria, another coastal megacity where English is the official language, many Lagosians speak Yoruba, an indigenous language with



(Photo by Hitesh Ashar via Wikimedia Commons)

A typical, crowded street in Mumbai, 31 January 2006. Mumbai is the capital city of the Indian state of Maharashtra and is the most populous city in India, having an estimated population of 18.4 million. Though the official language of Mumbai is Marathi, sixteen major languages are used throughout the city together with multiple dialects and pidgin derivatives (mixtures of languages).


strong historical and cultural ties to the region.¹⁰ While English is used in official capacities by governmental and educational organizations, not speaking Yoruba is looked down upon by many.¹¹ Religious organizations in Lagos also promote the use of indigenous languages with some influence from the primary foreign languages affiliated with each religion (e.g., Arabic in Islamic groups and English in Christian groups).¹²

In many megacities, the contact among multiple languages within the urban space causes unique challenges for power structures. In Lagos and Mumbai, megacities in countries with what might be considered developing economies, much of the growth of megacities is due to migration from within the same country. Because the languages that come in contact within these megacities are similar to one another (often dialects of one or more regional languages), much cross-learning of these languages takes place.¹³ In NYC, however, a highly integrated megacity from a country with a well-developed economy, a significantly larger percentage of growth occurs through immigration from foreign countries.¹⁴ This has led to a more diverse multilingualism. As a result, power structures have to work harder to ensure cooperation among and across linguistic groups. Social organizations such as the Shorefront Community Center in Brighton Beach, a large Russian-speaking community in south Brooklyn, or the Chinese Community Center in Manhattan provide access to language-specific services and assistance to those with limited English proficiency.¹⁵

Additionally, those organizations often serve as vital links between language communities and both local and

federal government organizations. FEMA's Recovery Center for South Brooklyn after Hurricane Sandy was located in the Shorefront Community Center and relied on the center's expertise to coordinate their disaster response with the Russian-speaking community.¹⁶

Another example of partnership between government and public organizations is seen in the New York City Police Department (NYPD), which recently formally recognized the Russian-American Officers Association (RAOA) as a fraternal order within the Department.¹⁷ The NYPD, who has recognized thirty-one such fraternal organizations, relies on the RAOA to reach out to the Russian-speaking community and "promote cooperation with law enforcement."¹⁸



(Data from the Indian National Census (2001) via Mapsofindia.com)

Figure 1. Language Groups in India

New York's Twitter Languages

8.5 million tweets Jan 2010-Feb 2013

English: 8,071,571

Spanish: 228,534

Portuguese: 47,646

Japanese: 28,330

Russian: 21,324

Korean: 20,865

French: 19,034

Arabic: 17,072

Italian: 10,278

Turkish: 8,698

Figure 2. Ten Most Common Languages in New York City Mapped Using Twitter

(Map illustration by James Cheshire)

Understanding how power structures operate within megacities can provide vital information to military decision makers. While it is important to understand the official administrative areas of a megacity (the five boroughs of NYC, the sixteen local government areas of Lagos, or the twenty-three municipal wards of Mumbai), it is just as important to identify where the language communities are located within or across these areas. This will assist in building effective partnerships with relevant power structures (both governmental and otherwise) at various levels of megacity society.¹⁹

Language, Connectedness, and Information Flow

How energy and materials flow through megacities is an important part of understanding a megacity's

metabolism. In addition to these physical commodities, the flow of information can shed light on how connected and integrated a megacity might be. How well does information flow between power structures and their constituencies? How is information shared within and among communities? What is the role of social and mass media? How accessible are communication technologies (e.g., cell phones, computers, Internet)?

At the heart of these questions lie the communication and language practices within a megacity. The multilingual information flow of a megacity can be a difficult data point to analyze, especially remotely. While statistics on mobile telecommunication use and the increase of broadband Internet coverage can be used to discuss general information flow, these data points do not provide much insight into the multilingual nature of flows across

these networks. Language use on television, radio, or news media, as well as the proliferation and use of social media in targeted megacities might prove more insightful.

To illustrate, in Mumbai, print media is published in Hindi, Marathi, English, and other local languages. Readers of news sources in Hindi and other local languages outnumber those of English-language media.²⁰ Alternatively, in Lagos, print news is largely published in English.²¹ Radio and television stations in both cities also broadcast in multiple languages. Interestingly, in Lagos, while print media feature a strong focus on English, radio stations seem to vary their broadcast language with a stronger focus on regional languages.²²

Additionally, in recent years, Twitter, the popular microblogging social network, has become a powerful sociolinguistic tool for analyzing urban language dynamics and flow. Tweets can be posted to the Twitter network in almost any language and geotagged with a user's geographic location. To date, Twitter language studies have ranged from mapping world languages to identifying dominant languages in urban environments.²³

According to the market research firm, SemioCast, four of the five most active cities on Twitter are megacities: Jakarta, Tokyo, Sao Paulo, and New York.²⁴ While this could be due to the large population of the cities, these data might also provide some insight into the connectedness of the megacity (both locally and globally). As neither Mumbai nor Lagos made SemioCast's list of the top twenty, it would be interesting to see the correlation between Twitter activity and Internet or cell phone access in these cities. Furthermore, Twitter's geolocation feature coupled with machine recognition of language can also provide insight into the multilingual communication environment in megacities.²⁵ According to a study by the Centre for Advanced Spatial Analysis, NYC users tweeted in thirty-six different languages over a three-year period.²⁶ Using geotags embedded in tweets, researchers overlaid the tweets (the ten most common are color-coded by language) on a map of the city (see figure 2).²⁷ These data

not only show the linguistic geography of NYC but also provide insight into the language density of communication hotspots (e.g., the theater district of Manhattan).

Strategic Considerations of Language Mapping

A clear understanding of the multilingual information flows within a megacity will help military decision makers better understand how language communities prefer to receive and share information. These data will provide insight into how to most effectively communicate with friendly forces or interrupt and manipulate the communication of enemy forces. Intelligence gatherers and analysts can use these data to focus and assess their initiatives. Infrastructure and logistics operators can use these data to better understand other flow data such as energy and supply flows.

Conclusion

The complex and dynamic environment of megacities is further complicated by the equally complex linguistic landscape therein. As part of the cultural and regional context of megacities, language affects multiple components of a holistic approach to studying megacities. In contrast to the multilingual features of other large cities, the scale of multilingualism and its effects in megacities demands particular attention. While the linguistic landscape of each megacity is unique, the overarching processes described in this article can serve as a launch pad for customized study into individual megacities.

From counterinsurgency and intelligence gathering to infrastructure and disaster response, military operations will be affected by the unique multilingual operating environment of megacities. Whether building effective relationships with strategic forces and power structures, mitigating ethnolinguistic tensions among megacity communities, or using existing communication practices to our advantage, the Army will benefit from a deeper understanding of the linguistic landscape of megacities. ■

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BASE NATION

How U.S. Military Bases Abroad Harm America and the World

David Vine, Metropolitan Books, New York, 2015, 432 pages

AMERICA INVADES

How We've Invaded or Been Militarily Involved with Almost Every Country on Earth

Christopher Kelly and Stuart Laycock, Book Publishers Network, Bothel, Washington, 2014, 396 pages

The United States is a military behemoth—and has been for decades. The scale of American military actions is nicely captured by *America Invades: How We've Invaded or Been Militarily Involved with Almost Every Country on Earth*, by Christopher Kelly and Stuart Laycock; and *Base Nation: How U.S. Military Bases Abroad Harm America and the World*, by David Vine. These books catalog the tremendous influence the U.S. military has had across the world. The United States has used kinetic force in almost half of the nations on Earth

and has been militarily involved with virtually all of the rest. As part of this influence, our vast network of military bases has enabled millions of servicemen to live abroad—a uniquely American way of spreading American culture and influence.

Vine, Kelly, and Laycock ask the questions: Is American military involvement with the world beneficial? If so, to whom? If not, who suffers? In any case—why, and what should we do? Kelly and Laycock generally emphasize the good that the military has done over the years, pointing anecdotally to successes

and inspiring stories. By contrast, Vine systematically catalogues the damage that U.S. bases, and by extension military policy, have done to the world and argues that it would better from moral, security, and economic standpoints to end overseas basing.

America Invades gives the reader a whirlwind tour of American military exploits across the world. There's even a handy list that indicates whether or

not the United States has invaded a country or not. Every country from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe gets a few pages summarizing the sometimes bizarre ways American servicemen and adventurers have influenced them. These range from independent invasions of Nicaragua and Honduras in the 1850s by adventurer William Walker, to George Patton's protection of Austria's famous Lipizzaner stallions as "wards of the U.S. Army." The style is informal, even chummy, and the book abounds with amusing stories. This makes it highly readable and relaxing, but it also has some drawbacks. For example, Finland is the victim of several egregious fish puns.

While the book is organized simply—alphabetically by country—several themes emerge. The first is the long reach of the U.S. Navy. Many African countries' first contact with the U.S. military was during counterslavery actions in the 1850s and later. Another theme is the United States' persistent interference in Latin American countries. It seems like the U.S. Marines have been sent into Central America every couple of months. Finally, *America Invades* drives home the explosion of American influence in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Virtually every country in the world has been invaded, or otherwise influenced militarily, by the United

States during World War II, the Cold War, and the Global War on Terrorism.


Several critiques I have with *America Invades* are inevitable in a work of popular history and reference. For example, two pages is simply not enough to cover a country like Ireland, and the book suffers from excessive hand waving and oversimplification. I think that Kelly and Laycock do a major disservice by not pro-

viding sources or a guide for further reading. They demonstrate a remarkable knowledge of the minutia of American military history—their recommendations for reading would presumably be excellent. I also quibble with some of their definitions. They list Poland as having been invaded by the United States, but the only real kinetic operations in Poland were bombing raids during World War II.

The main problem is a lack of an explicit argument. Kelly and Laycock have an impressive variety of anecdotes and stories, but they don't really have a point to it all other than that we should

support the troops and that American servicemen have built a "solid foundation of bravery, daring, and sacrifice" in our actions overseas. That is true, but it doesn't really tell us much about trends in American action overseas or draw actionable conclusions from our history.

Vine's *Base Nation* has a similarly impressive breadth—Vine examines the surprisingly large network of more than eight hundred U.S. military bases worldwide. While *America Invades* pointedly avoids analyzing U.S. military actions, Vine forcefully argues that our network of overseas bases has wasted vast sums of money, harmed the economies of the United States and our allies, resulted in corruption, propped up dictators, encouraged a



poisonous military culture of sexual assault, violated environmental and humanitarian standards, and ultimately made the world less secure. I admit to being skeptical as I started this book—I grew up on Robinson Barracks in Stuttgart, Germany, and still benefit from the friendships and cross-cultural interactions that I had there. I suspect many of *Military Review's* readers have had similar positive experiences thanks to service abroad. However, Vine's exhaustive and well-reasoned research brings more than enough cold facts to challenge the warmest anecdotal experiences.

The United States has bases ranging from huge enduring communities to tiny lily pads across the world. We generally think that these help to prevent Russia, North Korea, China, or Iran from starting trouble. The problem is that this is ultimately a counterfactual argument, one that requires stronger proof. While they may indeed serve a deterrent function, military bases also demonstrably escalate military tension in a region. To illustrate, Vine asks, what would happen if North Korea or China opened up a base in Mexico? We know what happened when the USSR opened a base in Cuba—we almost started a nuclear war in response. Perhaps the Russians, North Koreans, Chinese, and Iranians feel similarly when we station troops next door. At least some of their rhetoric and military spending is to counter our military dominance brazenly demonstrated by our bases next door.


While security is the main justification for overseas bases, there are many others, including economic benefits to the host country, creating model “little Americas,” and spreading American values. Sadly, Vine shows that our bases abroad have been less beneficial than we would like to think. The U.S. military has a distorting and

corruptive effect on local economies. In many cases, construction has also directly supported criminal organizations like the mafia. For example, new bases in Gricignano, Italy, are built on land rented from, and by construction companies owned by, the Camorra mob family. More fundamentally, military bases prevent economic diversification, absorb potentially productive land, and prove far less effective at creating jobs than infrastructure or education spending. Many studies have shown that our bases provide little benefit to host nation economies. Germany experienced no significant effect to its economy during the base drawdown of the 1990s. One closed Army base in Okinawa was turned into a shopping and entertainment complex, drawing a million visitors annually and producing more than two hundred times the revenue than the base did. Base realignment and closure in the United States has had similar effects—closing a base rarely has a negative effect and often

have positive effects on local economies.

Bases are also damaging to the U.S. economy and government efficiency. Servicemembers stationed even in friendly host nations cost, on average, \$20,000–\$40,000 more per person than servicemembers stationed stateside. The overall financial cost of bases is somewhat difficult to track down as Pentagon accounting is notoriously muddled, but Vine demonstrates that in 2012, excluding Iraq and Afghanistan, bases abroad cost more than \$70 billion. This is an obvious burden to U.S. taxpayers, and since these funds are spent abroad, it limits the

economic benefits to the U.S. economy. The main beneficiaries of these funds are contracting companies like KBR, Supreme Group, and Agility Logistics, which have at times been accused of accounting fraud, overbilling, and contract violations. Contract



norms like “cost-plus” have also created an atmosphere of fiscal irresponsibility that has cost taxpayers further billions.

Vine’s most provocative chapters deal with the cultural and moral damage that overseas basing does to Americans and our hosts. Vine lists eighteen instances where indigenous populations were forcibly removed from sites without compensation of any kind in order to make room for a new or expanded U.S. military facilities. Displaced people from Diego Garcia still struggle in poverty thanks to their expulsion in the 1950 and 1960s. Overseas bases create a mindset of imperialism and immunity to local and U.S. law. Vine gives numerous examples of military personnel feeling free to “do what we want here” in Guam, Okinawa, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, Panama, Greenland, and Diego Garcia, destroying archeological, historical, environmental, and cultural sites while dismissing the locals.

Most seriously, Vine suggests that overseas bases help to create the poisonous culture of militarized masculinity and sexual assault. Sexual exploitation is rampant around military bases, with thousands of sex workers taken advantage of. Vine argues that this is inescapable when dealing with bases abroad. Servicemembers overseas are in a highly unusual culture dominated by extreme masculinity, where the role of women is “overwhelmingly reduced to one role: sex.” Sexual assaults, both on and off bases, show a

fundamental failing of military culture, one that we are still failing to deal effectively with.

In the introduction, *America Invades* points to the U.S. military as a force for “principled action” with the ability to respond to humanitarian crises around the world, for “if not us, than who will?” I think that is certainly the ideal that soldiers and Americans hope for. However, the United States has not always acted with benign intentions. Worse, even when well intentioned, the military has a long and large impact on the people we interact with. These impacts are often negative.

Ultimately, Americans and American service-members need to be more skeptical of our military involvement and basing abroad. *Base Nation* and *America Invades* show that the record of American military involvement abroad has been mixed at best. The memorable and truly heroic interventions like the World Wars are countered by shameful crimes, forced evictions, wasteful spending, and corruption.

America Invades gives a truly staggering catalog of U.S. military involvement across the world, but *Base Nation* goes further and shows that many of our actions are antithetical to our values as well as our interests. America’s role in the world is changing. Understanding our history of overseas involvement and skeptically analyzing our current footprint is the first step to making that change a positive one. ■

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
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Mein Kampf by Adolf Hitler



A Review by George Orwell

It is a sign of the speed at which events are moving that Hurst and Blackett's unexpurgated edition of *Mein Kampf*, published only a year ago, is edited from a pro-Hitler angle. The obvious intention of the translator's preface and notes is to tone down the book's ferocity and present Hitler in as kindly a light as possible. For at that date Hitler was still respectable. He had crushed the German labour movement, and for that the property-owning classes were willing to forgive him almost anything. Both Left and Right concurred in the very shallow notion that National Socialism was merely a version of Conservatism.

Then suddenly it turned out that Hitler was not respectable after all. As one result of this, Hurst and Blackett's edition was reissued in a new jacket explaining that all profits would be devoted to the Red Cross.

Nevertheless, simply on the internal evidence of *Mein Kampf*, it is difficult to believe that any real change has taken place in Hitler's aims and opinions. When one compares his utterances of a year or so ago with those made fifteen years earlier, a thing that strikes one is the rigidity of his mind, the way in which his world-view doesn't develop. It is the fixed vision of a monomaniac and not likely to be much affected by the temporary manoeuvres of power politics. Probably, in Hitler's own mind, the Russo-German Pact represents no more than an alteration of time-table. The plan laid down in *Mein Kampf* was to smash Russia first, with the implied intention of smashing England afterwards. Now, as it has turned out, England has got to be dealt with first, because Russia was the more easily bribed of the two. But Russia's turn will come when En-

gland is out of the picture—that, no doubt, is how Hitler sees it. Whether it will turn out that way is of course a different question.

Suppose that Hitler's programme could be put into effect. What he envisages, a hundred years hence, is a continuous state of 250 million Germans with plenty of "living room" (i.e., stretching to Afghanistan or thereabouts), a horrible brainless empire in which, essentially, nothing ever happens except the training of young men for war and the endless breeding of fresh cannon-fodder. How was it that he was able to put this monstrous vision across? It is easy to say that at one stage of his career he was financed by the heavy industrialists, who saw in him the man who would smash Socialists and Communists. They would not have backed him, however, if he had not talked a great movement into existence already. Again, the situations in Germany, with its seven million unemployed, was obviously favourable for demagogues. But Hitler could not have succeeded against his many rivals if it had not been for the attraction of his own personality, which one can feel even in the clumsy writing of *Mein Kampf*, and which is no doubt overwhelming when one hears his speeches....The fact is that there is something deeply appealing about him. One feels it again when one sees his photographs—and I recommend especially the photograph at the beginning of Hurst and Blackett's edition, which shows Hitler in his early Brown-shirt days. It is a pathetic, dog-like face, the face of a man suffering under intolerable wrongs. In a rather more manly way it reproduces the express of innumerable pictures of Christ crucified, and there is little doubt that that is how Hitler sees himself. The initial, personal cause of his grievance against the universe can only be guessed at; but at any rate the grievance is here. He is the martyr, the victim, Prometheus, chained to the rock, the self-sacrificing hero who fights single-handed against impossible odds. If he were killing a mouse he would know how to make it seem like a dragon. One feels, as with Napoleon, that he is fighting against destiny, that he can't win, and yet that he somehow deserves to. The attraction of such

a pose is of course enormous; half the films that one sees turn upon some such theme.

Also he has grasped the falsity of the hedonistic attitude to life. Nearly all western thought since the last war, certainly all "progressive" thought, has assumed tacitly that human beings desire nothing beyond ease, security and avoidance of pain. In such a view of life there is no room, for instance, for patriotism and the military virtues. The Socialist who finds his children playing with soldiers is usually upset, but he is never able to think of a substitute for the tin soldiers; tin pacifists somehow won't do. Hitler, because in his own joyless mind he feels it with exceptional strength, knows that human beings don't only want comfort, safety, short working-hours, hygiene, birth-control and, in general, common sense; they also, at least intermittently, want struggle and self-sacrifice, not to mention drums, flags and loyalty-parades. However they may be as economic theories, Fascism and Nazism are psychologically far sounder than any hedonistic conception of life. The same is probably true of Stalin's militarised version of Socialism. All three of the great dictators have enhanced their power by imposing intolerable burdens on their peoples. Whereas Socialism, and even capitalism in a more grudging way, have said to people "I offer you a good time," Hitler has said to them "I offer you struggle, danger and death," and as a result a whole nation flings itself at his feet. Perhaps later on they will get sick of it and change their minds, as at the end of the last war. After a few years of slaughter and starvation "Greatest happiness of the greatest number" is a good slogan, but at this moment "Better an end with horror than a horror without end" is a winner. Now that we are fighting against the man who coined it, we ought not to underrate its emotional appeal.

Original review published in the New English Weekly, George Orwell (March, 1940). Reprinted by permission of Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Press and A.M. Heath.

Previous page left: George Orwell at the microphone of the British Broadcasting Company, 1940. (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

Previous page right: Cover of English-language edition of *Mein Kampf* published by Hurst and Blackett Ltd, 21 March 1939. (Stock photo)

**THE NEW SPYMASTERS: Inside the Modern
World of Espionage from the Cold War to
Global Terror**

**Stephen Grey, St. Martin's Press, New York, 2015,
368 pages**

The New Spymasters is a look inside the dark world of spying, its shades-of-gray ethical challenges, and its never-ending complexities. Author Stephen Grey poses three questions up front. First, how has spying changed in the twenty-first century? Second, when can spying be effective? Third, what kind of spying is needed to help deal with the specific threats of today and of the future?

To answer each question, Grey provides a lengthy background discussion of personalities and events, which gives the reader a context to support his examples and conclusions. His examples are drawn from first-hand interviews as well as verified public knowledge. The majority of his research is on Western spy agencies, such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), known more commonly as MI6.

Grey's book chronicles the early days of British spying during the Russian Revolution. Then it progresses through the formal development of various national spy services—such as the Cheka (a nickname of the original Soviet secret security organization) and the NKVD (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, a Soviet agency that came after the Cheka); the SIS; and the OSS (Office of Strategic Services, a U.S. intelligence agency created during World War II) and its descendant, the CIA. The author describes the roles each of them played for their respective countries up to present day. Here is where he begins to provide examples of how spy activities easily proceed into gray areas. Although the agencies make their living on deceit and half-truths, some type of transparency is necessary to keep them “in check” with their governments. The reader will immediately see the dilemmas caused by

balancing the need for secrecy and open accountability. Grey continues to show the evolution in the spy business up through the end of the Cold War. He talks of the concern the agencies had for their own futures following the collapse of the Berlin Wall. He explains their shifts in focus from East-versus-West spying to a new focus on the drug and crime trade.

Yet, Grey shows that within only a few years, the Global War on Terrorism, basically, caught all the Western spy agencies flat-footed. At that time, the potential rise of radical Islamic terrorism was pretty far down their collective “watch lists.” He then focuses on the catch-up game the Western spy agencies have been playing ever since, as well as the ethical gray areas that spying involves.

Grey brings to light many of the challenges and complexities of the spy trade, such as the stress of living a life based on deceit and cover stories, as well as the ethical challenges that many spies encountered during their time undercover. In fact, some of those situations required the spies to be parties to crimes in order to maintain their credibility and to develop a greater intelligence picture. The author provides numerous examples of challenges the individual spies faced. He also delves into the challenges of the spy agencies themselves. He explores how, as bureaucratic organizations, they faced the difficult tasks of attempting to operationalize very broad-state strategies and to integrate and synchronize technology, cultural, and human resources to obtain information to make a real difference.

The book is an interesting read, and the author appears to have conducted valid research. He provides a glossary of modern spy terminology as well as a list of the various known spy agencies of major countries—and the particular roles each agency plays. These two sections are great additions in helping the reader understand the spy culture. This is an excellent book for the military professional, and it is a good introduction to the world of spy operations.

**Lt. Col. George Hodge, U.S. Army, Retired,
Lansing, Kansas**

AMERICAN WARLORDS: How Roosevelt's High Command Led America to Victory in World War II
Jonathan W. Jordan, NAL Caliber, New York, 2015,
624 pages

American Warlords is a popular biography of four key American World War II leaders: President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, Gen. George Catlett Marshall, and Adm. Ernest J. King. Author Jonathan Jordan examines the impact of these leaders, or warlords, as he often refers to them, on the American war effort. This book spans from 1940 to 1945 and tends to focus on the strategic level. That is not to say that it is an impersonal, dull look at strategy; rather, it examines the men who made American strategy and how they overcame the monumental challenges they faced, including the mistakes they made. In this regard, Jordan does an admirable job providing a vivid account of the daily pressures these men endured, with the fate of the Nation, and even the world, in the balance.

Jordan organizes the book into a prologue, three chronological parts, and an epilogue. The prologue sets the stage by recounting one of America's tragedies—the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. The initial installment of the three major parts of the book is titled “Bringing the War Home: 1940–1941.” This section not only discusses the events leading to American involvement in World War II but also provides background on the strategic leaders upon whom the author later concentrates his narrative. While the state of American politics and the lack of American military strength take center stage in the early reading, Jordan provides great insight into each of the four key leaders. For example, he highlights Roosevelt's statement that “if war does come, we will make it a New Deal war.” Jordan continues his portrayal of Roosevelt by giving many examples of the president's deft political abilities.

The author also details Marshall and Stimson's organizational capabilities, such as when they worked to get the Selective Service Act passed. Jordan similarly describes the abilities and rise of King, including his leadership of the undeclared naval war in the Atlantic.

In addition to the four warlords, Jordan incorporates many important characters into his narrative, including Winston Churchill, Henry Morgenthau, William Franklin Knox, Harold L. Stark, Dwight Eisenhower, Harry Hopkins, and others. The first third of the book ends with two events of 1941: the Anglo-American conference to discuss defeating Germany, at Placentia Bay, Newfoundland, in August, and the day of infamy—the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December.

Jordan's second part is titled “A New Doctor: 1942–1945,” and it is the longest part of *American Warlords*. It begins in the immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor. The title is a nod to Roosevelt's famous radio fireside chats in which he sometimes referred to himself as “Dr. New Deal,” while he sought to cure the U.S. “patient” of the “disease” of the Great Depression. During World War II, Roosevelt changed his persona to “Dr. Win-the-War.” Jordan recounts the uniting of the American people, their politicians, and their military leaders, although he also points out areas of friction. A great example of friction is when Harry Truman's efforts to ensure proper spending practices had him questioning the program to develop the atomic bomb—although Truman backed off quickly when Stimson hinted at the criticality of the highly classified project.

Strategically, Jordan tells a story of balance between Europe and the Pacific, despite that “Germany first” was the stated Anglo-American policy. Rather, strategic reality demanded much more effort in the Pacific in the early days of the war, effort for which King appropriately advocated and argued. On a more personal level, Jordan continues to paint a portrait of each of the warlords, covering details that make them seem very real, such as vivid descriptions of Roosevelt's White House Map Room. Other characters continue their supporting roles, such as the brilliant Churchill and Douglas MacArthur; however, much of their effort proved challenging to the American warlords and the Allied strategy.

Jordan goes on to demonstrate that American politics and domestic issues played important roles. Examples include the 1942 elections that affected the decision making for Operation Torch, Roosevelt's push for the Navy to integrate African-Americans, and Stimson's approval of relocating Japanese-Americans in the American West. The

second part of *American Warlords* concludes with the passing of Roosevelt.

The third and final part of *American Warlords* focuses on the final year of the war, and this part is appropriately titled “Swords, Plowshares, and Atoms: 1945.” It is the culmination of the story of the American warlords, especially with the passing of Roosevelt. This is the time of President Truman and his efforts to lead the United States and to establish a postwar order, with Stimson, Marshall, and King continuing their roles to conclude the war based on the policy Roosevelt had promulgated.

The book is clearly the product of much research and labor, and Jordan does a great job making it both factual and accessible to a general reader. More specifically, Jordan peers behind popular views of “the greatest generation” and “the good war.” He demonstrates that while the United States pulled together to win the war, there were interpersonal feuds, domestic political machinations, military service rivalries, and postwar political considerations at play, too.

American Warlords is well written and enjoyable, although the tone is sometimes too informal, with many clichés. The bottom line is that if you are looking for something to read that examines World War II, the role of America’s strategic leaders, and American strategy—in a book that is also a fun read—this is it.

Lt. Col. Jonathan P. Klug, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

**THE 104th FIELD ARTILLERY REGIMENT
OF THE NEW YORK NATIONAL GUARD,
1916-1919: From the Mexican Border to the
Meuse-Argonne**

**Pamela A. Bakker, McFarland & Company,
Jefferson, North Carolina, 2014, 228 pages**

The unrest along the southern United States border related to the 1910 Mexican Revolution and subsequent civil war eventually involved the U.S. Army and National Guard. For the bulk of the soldiers and guardsmen, service on the border involved living and training in a harsh environment more than it did conducting combat missions.

The time spent on the border provided the soldiers and the guardsmen essential experience in everything from caring for horses to maneuvering divisions, which later paid dividends during the expansion of the Army for World War I, its deployment to Europe, and its service on the Western Front.

In *The 104th Field Artillery Regiment of the New York National Guard, 1916-1919*, Pamela Bakker follows a single National Guard artillery regiment from mobilization for the Mexican border in 1916, through combat on the Western Front in World War I, to its eventual discharge. The author argues that the strenuous service and training the regiment underwent while on the border hardened it so that it was able to provide skilled and courageous service on the Western Front, including fighting in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive.

The focus of the book is the 1st Field Artillery Regiment, New York National Guard, which became the 104th Field Artillery Regiment under the reorganization of the National Guard following the entry of the United States into World War I. While the author’s background is in music and theology, her grandfather’s service in the regiment during the period, chronicled in this work, inspired her to preserve the record of the regiment’s service in both wars.

Bakker recounts myriad details of life on the border and at the front. In conveying who commanded what unit, where elements were on certain days, and what they were doing, the book excels. The problem with it is not the thoroughness of the research but of larger context and historical detail. Bakker brings her passion to the topic, but she is not a trained historian. The book is littered with errors that suggest a lack of familiarity with the subject. A brief sampling of errors will suffice: The United States did not send troops to the Philippines from 1901 to 1904 to help the Filipinos in their revolution against Spain, and John Pershing was not a brigadier general at that time (page 15); a captain in the regular army could not simultaneously have been a colonel in the national guard (page 26); Germany did not share a border with Serbia (page 62); Germans were not descended from the Huns (page 121); colonels did not command batteries (page 152); the United States and France did not demand “unconditional surrender” from Germany in 1918 (page 162); and President Woodrow Wilson’s

fourteen points were hardly unknown to the Allies before the end of the war (page 170). The author would have been well served to work with a historian to avoid the errors that pepper the book.

The book is at its best when describing the small details of life for the men in the regiment. It covers an especially important period of American military history—when the Army transformed from its nineteenth century form to one it would retain throughout the twentieth century. This work would mostly appeal to laypersons with an interest in the 104th Regiment or the New York National Guard.

**Barry M. Stentiford, PhD,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

SILENT AND UNSEEN: On Patrol in Three Cold War Attack Submarines

**Alfred Scott McLaren, Naval Institute Press,
Annapolis, Maryland, 2015, 256 pages**

Reading *Silent and Unseen* brought back a flood of memories. In this autobiography, Alfred Scott McLaren writes of his experiences as a junior officer on his first three submarines, encompassing seven years at sea from 1958 through 1965. He paints a colorful picture of the life of a submarine officer during the Cold War, as the U.S. Navy was making the leap from diesel-powered to nuclear-powered submarines. The autobiography likely has a limited audience in the security community, and security concerns limit detailing the classified portions of the Cold War missions or special operations this era was known for. The book is a deck-plate-level story of how one man succeeded in one of the military's most independent and mysterious occupations.

Initially, McLaren was assigned to USS *Greenfish*, a modified World War II-era diesel submarine. Just like submarine officers today, his first onboard qualification was to become the battery charging line-up officer. From this lowest of qualifications, he recounts taking on more responsibility and learning how to thrive in a submarine force loaded with World War II combat veterans who worked hard and played hard. Stories meander from the amusing cockroach races in the control

room to a chilling story of seeing a drifting horned mine looming out of a fog bank that narrowly misses the boat.

Nearing the end of his tour on the *Greenfish*, McLaren was selected by Adm. Hyman Rickover to participate in the fledgling nuclear power program. He was assigned to USS *Seadragon*, which was only the sixth nuclear submarine to join the fleet. Unlike his former diesel submarine, his new nuclear submarine existed largely independent from Earth's atmosphere. This enabled the boat and its crew to embark amid a new arctic world of exploration. The author recounts the submarine's trips through iceberg-filled Baffin Bay, transiting under the ice in the Northwest Passage, and finally arriving at the North Pole itself. I have fond memories of these exact same voyages. At the North Pole, his crew played baseball, just as my crew eventually did, and I played football and drove golf balls there twenty-six years later.

Finally, McLaren transferred to USS *Skipjack*, his third boat. He took on the mantle of field-grade leadership (head of a department). The description of this tour is also replete with humor and danger. He recounts a story of one oddball shipmate who unloaded twenty-five pounds of M&Ms candy on the mess deck—just to see what they would look like. The author shares another story of becoming so drunk in Toulon, France, that he passed out in an opera house and had to be carried out by stretcher. In yet another experience, he recounts going through a full psychological evaluation after shooting a .45-caliber pistol—inside the ship's steel conning tower. What makes his stories all the more entertaining is that many readers likely will recall having at least one shipmate like these.

The stories are good, and they are amazingly familiar for submariners. I was quite surprised at how little has changed since 1958, when McLaren began sailing, to when I began sailing in 1982. One notable difference was the apparent drop in the quality of food on submarines. McLaren certainly seems to have eaten better food than we did in the 1980s. Overall, it is an interesting read for submariners or for those interested in life on submarines.

**Lt. Cmdr. Harold A. Laurence, U.S. Navy,
Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

MAKING AND UNMAKING NATIONS: War, Leadership, and Genocide in Modern Africa
 Scott Straus, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 2015, 400 pages

Scott Straus's *Making and Unmaking Nations* is a very good book, although it may not be of much direct use for the operational artist. The author explores the phenomenon of genocide from a very interesting perspective. Instead of solely exploring cases of genocide, he also examines *near genocide*—cases where the environment was ripe for genocide but it did not occur. Straus uniquely approaches genocide from a lens of pseudocomplexity. While he clearly and correctly indicates that genocide is a complex political phenomenon, he only somewhat embraces complexity theory and never references or uses any of the rich literature on that subject. This is a minor shortcoming in such a novel work on genocide and state formation.

Some might take umbrage with the small number of cases Straus examines, but that would be a mistake; he intentionally focuses on African cases of genocide and near genocide so he can compare similar cases. They are from a similar period, which means they arose in a comparable strategic context. The cases studied where genocide was considered likely but did not occur involved the Ivory Coast from 2002 to 2011, Mali from 1990 to 1995 and 2011 to 2012, and Senegal from the late 1980s to 2011. Conversely, the author also studied Sudan from 2000 to the present and Rwanda in 1994, as the cases where genocide did occur. It is clear that Straus is interested in honestly exploring why genocides occur—and do not occur—rather than selecting favorable cases to promote a preconceived policy or theoretical agenda.

Straus's studies of Mali and Rwanda, which are very similar cases—provide very different results. In both countries, the same precursors and interethnic or interreligious animosities were present. However, a key difference was that the Malians shared a common nationalist history that the tribes embraced; their culture embraced “specific values of humility, tolerance, patience, justice sharing, and solidarity,” which were

instrumental in preventing genocide. Further, the political elite were more prone to a dialogue of unity and shared cultural history despite the animosity that existed between different tribal and religious groups.

In contrast, Straus notes that the predominant narrative about Rwandan state formation was laid on a foundation of animosity, and the Hutu political elite were particularly vitriolic in their narrative that the Tutsi minority had mistreated the Hutus during colonization. While parallel governmental institutions arose in Mali, the elite there sought to constrain their influence. In Rwanda, the political elite supported some of these very same parallel governmental institutions, especially local militias. The more radical genocide proponents were given a great boon to exploit when President Juvenal Habyarimana was assassinated, an event that generated fear among Hutus, and the more radical politicians argued more forcefully for genocide. For Straus, it is not only political elite ideology but also the important link between political elite and local populations that allows genocide to occur.

The analysis of these cases leads Straus to conclude that “the strongest commonality among violence in cases, and the factor that the negative cases lack, is the ideological dominance among the political and military elite of a hierarchical, nationalist founding narrative.” Given Straus's earlier assertion that genocide carries heavy political and economic costs by dragging large numbers of people out of production, the narrative and ideology must be very strong indeed to motivate a group of people to perpetuate genocide against others.

However, if Straus is correct, the implications for the mass-atrocity-response-operations camp and the responsibility-to-protect camp are staggering. It is hard to imagine military operations to prevent or respond to genocide or other mass atrocities. Straus notes that one of the best preventive measures to genocide is to construct a narrative of inclusion in African states. He also notes that economic diversity and development—and avoidance of armed conflict—are good preventive measures.

Unfortunately, none of this falls under the purview of an operational artist. You could argue that the regionally aligned forces program might, in part, serve toward this end, in that professionalizing African

militaries may reduce the likelihood of these militaries resorting to genocide. In terms of responding to genocide, Straus notes that military interveners have successfully established demilitarized zones and helped end genocidal conflict. However, unless the foreign armies intervening are willing to enforce these zones permanently, there is no evidence that intervention is a long-term solution to mass atrocity.

Straus's work fits nicely into a larger literature on state formation in Africa as well. In the final analysis, this is a great book for anyone interested in studying genocide, state formation in Africa, the power-of-elite narrative, and policy responses to genocide. There is little of direct importance to the operational artist, but it would serve as an interesting primer for anyone deploying to Africa.

Dan G. Cox, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

CLIMAX AT GALLIPOLI: The Failure of the August Offensive

**Rhys Crawley, University of Oklahoma Press,
Norman, Oklahoma, 2014, 384 pages**

Last year marked the centennial anniversary of the Gallipoli Campaign, a failed attempt by the British and their allies to break the stalemate in World War I by launching an amphibious landing on a narrow strait in northwestern Turkey known as the Dardanelles.

As progress on the Western Front ground to a halt, from the perspectives of the Allies and the Central Powers in 1915, both sides looked for ways to break the deadlock, to reintroduce maneuver, and to conduct decisive battles. Once thought too risky of an operation by Great Britain's War Office and Admiralty, the idea of an attack on the Dardanelles started to build momentum as a possible solution that could accomplish three objectives: knock the Ottoman Empire out of the war, convince neutral countries such as the Balkan states and Bulgaria to join the Allies or at least to stay out of the war, and secure a line of communication with Russia through the Black Sea. With prodding from Russia, the Allies embarked on a nearly yearlong campaign to bring the strategy to fruition.

The Allies made three major attempts to force the Dardanelles Strait. The first try was a naval campaign that started 19 February 1915 and lasted a little more than a month. Fourteen British and four French capital ships slugged it out with Ottoman shore batteries. With losses amounting to three warships sunk and three more out of action, the Allied naval campaign was called to a halt by the admiral commanding the expedition.

The Gallipoli Campaign, as distinct from the naval campaign, was the second attempt to force the straits. Beginning 25 April 1915, an Allied operation initiated the second attempt, which featured main British landings on the southern Gallipoli Peninsula, and Australian and New Zealand landings just north of Gaba Tepe, located halfway up the Gallipoli Peninsula. The last British action in the south, which concluded 12 July 1915, gained very little ground before the Allies shifted the main effort to the landings at Gaba Tepe. This second attempt by the Allies to break through the Ottoman defenses resulted in battles reminiscent of those fought on the Western Front: hard fighting over difficult terrain with the use of machine guns and artillery on troops concentrated in a very small space.

It is in the third Allied attempt to break out—and through—the Ottoman defenses that author Rhys Crawley focuses his scholarship in *Climax at Gallipoli: The Failure of the August Offensive*. Crawley claims that the historiography of the Allied efforts at Anzac Cove has been distorted by nationalistic sentiment as well as an attempt by the campaign's leading figures to downplay mistakes and to protect reputations. To be sure, there is no shortage of individual or unit bravery on the part of the combined Australian and New Zealand Corps at Anzac. One only has to read Crawley's accounts of the actions at Lone Pine, the Nek, and Sari Bair to get an idea of the determination and heroism of the combatants on all sides. Rather, the author evaluates the operational elements of the Allied August Offensive and asserts that this third attempt to push across the middle of the Gallipoli Peninsula—a distance of eight thousand yards—was not even a "viable" operation.

Climax at Gallipoli divides the August 1915 offensive into six operational elements: planning, mobility, fire support, combined operations, lines of

communication, and supply and transport. Although Crawley does not claim that any one shortfall caused the August Offensive to fail, he does assert that the cumulative effects of biased thinking, antiquated artillery, inadequate ammunition, inaccurate maps, a shared command rather than a unified one, a 3,500-mile line of communication, difficult terrain that favored the defenders, and supply and transport shortages would have made impossible any objective beyond the immediate capture of the initial objective—the beachheads at Anzac Cove and the first ridgeline beyond.

Crawley's thorough research of individual soldier accounts; unit reports; military archives in England, Australia, and New Zealand; and the Dardanelles Commission's report, which investigated the Gallipoli Campaign, lend considerable authority and support to the author's thesis that the operational capabilities of the Allies were simply not enough to carry out a prolonged campaign in the Dardanelles. The usefulness of this book is that it avoids much of the national rhetoric associated with the Gallipoli Campaign and "objectively evaluates the real military limitations and operational potential of the August Offensive."

Mark Hurley, Fort Belvoir, Virginia

ENEMY IN THE EAST: Hitler's Secret Plans to Invade the Soviet Union

**Rolf-Dieter Müller, I.B. Tauris, New York, 2015, 320
pages**

This English translation of Rolf-Dieter Müller's 2011 work brings to light a number of controversial interpretations regarding Nazi Germany's plans for war against Soviet Russia. While the book's last half will be familiar to scholars of Russia's Great Patriotic War, its real value is in the first 145 pages. The author goes beyond the preparations for Operation Barbarossa; he uncovers evidence of war planning by the German military against the Soviet Union as early as 1938, well before Hitler's invasion of Poland—which launched World War II in Europe.

The book starts with Germany's conquest of much of European Russia in 1918; it also describes Poland

besting the "Red Napoleon," the twenty-seven-year-old Soviet Northwestern Front commander Mikhail Nikolayevich Tukhachevsky, in 1920. According to Müller, these experiences laid the groundwork for perceptions regarding favorable German chances for victory against the communists after Hitler came to power in 1933.

Most intriguing is the circumstantial case the author builds to convince the reader that Hitler aimed at aggressive war against the Soviet Union in partnership not only with Japan but also with Poland. Müller does not dismiss the contentions between Berlin and Warsaw over their shared boundary and the imposed "Polish corridor" to Danzig that severed East Prussia from the rest of Germany. Despite this significant obstacle, he shows that a number of senior Nazi officials felt they could work with Poland's militarist leader, Józef Piłsudski—the man who beat Tukhachevsky at the gates of Warsaw—in going against their common foe.

This relationship culminated with a nonaggression pact between the two countries on 26 January 1934; and yet, after Piłsudski died the following year, the Polish government grew distant and evasive. In the spring of 1939, Poland explicitly turned down German offers to join the Anti-Comintern Pact against the Soviet Union; it also simultaneously accepted British guarantees of its neutrality. Only then did Hitler give up his notion of achieving cooperation; he no longer saw Poland as a potential partner but rather as the next target to be subdued.

Müller relates evidence from speeches and officially documented interactions showing that Hitler, when he was in power, never wavered from his original ideas in his book, *Mein Kampf*, regarding waging a war against communism and obtaining land and resources in the east. While the author makes suggestions that actual military plans to do these things existed prior to World War II, explicit sources to back these up have been lost, save for the navy plans and the war games of 1938. These shed light on German military perceptions about prospects for a war against the Soviet Union at that time, and they resemble the 1917 offensives that choked off Russian access to the Baltic Sea. If such moves helped precipitate the Bolshevik Revolution in Saint Petersburg back then, might not a repetition bring down the Stalinist regime in

Moscow? Of course, this assumed a Polish partnership; once Poland sided with Britain to guarantee its neutrality, that notion—and these plans—went out the window.

In a dramatic reversal, Hitler made a deal with Stalin—the infamous Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact—aimed squarely at Warsaw. Of course, we know that Hitler was surprised by the declarations of war made by Britain and France after German troops invaded Poland. Once that conquest was completed, he turned his attention back to the west. The German general staff duly made plans to establish a defensive security zone in occupied Poland against any sort of Soviet incursion, but its importance was greatly eclipsed by Hitler's obsessive concern with defeating the Allies so he could eventually turn to the east.

In the last third of the book, Müller begins building his case that Hitler cannot solely bear the responsibility for offensive war against the Soviet Union. The author convincingly demonstrates that, even after the fall of France in June 1940, the German leader remained fixated on bringing the British to terms. He did not order plans to be made against the Soviet Union at that time. The German general staff, on its own initiative, nevertheless commenced planning without such an order under the direction of its chief of staff, Col. Gen. Franz Halder. This is significant in light of the assertions by German general staff members to the contrary in their postwar memoirs, which the author recounts and refutes in detail.

The remainder of the text details the transformation of military plans from a strategic spoiling attack and preventive war to Operation Barbarossa as a total war of annihilation. Estimates and planning were already well underway when Hitler first told his military on 21 July to “make theoretical preparations” to handle “the Russia problem,” all the while publicly proclaiming two days earlier that any hopes by anyone for new tensions between Germany and the Soviet Union were “childish.” Most controversial is Müller's contention that the 31 July 1940 Berghof meeting—usually interpreted by historians as the point where Hitler gives birth to the concept for Operation Barbarossa as a war of annihilation—is best understood as the German leader's reaction to Halder's conceptions of preemptive, preventive blows. It was not until 3 March 1941—more than two months after he

issued *Directive 21* ordering Operation Barbarossa—that Hitler rejected the traditional military conceptions offered by his generals. Hitler then provided the definitive guidance to his military staffs regarding the brutal nature and all-encompassing character of the massive war he intended to wage.

Not only is this a terrific book for students of World War II, challenging conventional wisdom about the origins of Nazi plans for the Russo-German War as it does, but also it is a marvelous case study for professional military planners. Müller well describes the influence of politics and political leaders on military strategic planning. He also persuasively argues that the German general staff were not completely under Hitler's sway and that the staff members did more self-starting homework than many postwar accounts gave them credit for.

**Col. Eric M. Walters, U.S. Marine Corps,
Retired, Fort Lee, Virginia**

AS I SAW IT IN THE TRENCHES: Memoir of a Doughboy in World War I

**Dae Hinson, McFarland & Company, Jefferson,
North Carolina, 2015, 188 pages**

As I Saw It in the Trenches is a first-person memoir written by Dae Hinson, a soldier in the First World War. His original memoir was saved by his nephew, who published the text with the intent of bringing Hinson's experiences during the World War I to the historical record. Reading this book will prove valuable to any reader of military history.

Hinson's memoir is new to the historical record and adds additional understanding, from an interesting perspective, to the history of this war. As with any memoir written by a soldier, this one offers great value to the reader. It stands out because the range and depth of Hinson's wartime experience span three years, from the time of his enlistment in Louisiana through to his last engagement in battle. As an infantryman, his combat experience was extensive. It included fighting in both the Second Battle of the Marne in July and August 1918, and the Battle of Saint-Mihiel in September 1918.

With the exception of an introduction by Hinson's nephew, the book is void of any other narrative. It is an authentic reflection of Hinson's experiences—even with an occasional missing page. His writing style is very descriptive and frank, and he does a very good job describing the indescribable. With little emotion, he conveys what he sees, feels, and experiences. He describes the destruction and death that occurred on such a vast scale that they are incomprehensible today. It took Hinson thirteen years to complete his memoir after the war. Even though this provided him ample time to reflect on his experiences, he chose to describe them with few, if any, judgments or embellishment.

Although his writing style is that of an ordinary person, his ability to describe his experiences for readers is unique. Most will find that his style provides a vivid insight into combat and soldiering in the First World War. His matter-of-fact and detailed descriptions of death, and the deaths of his fellow soldiers, is perhaps not for the casual reader. This narrative, however, serves to illuminate the perspective of a combat-experienced and hardened soldier. There is not the slightest hint of self-promotion in his writing. This characteristic alone makes it a great work.

I highly recommend this book to anyone. As we celebrate the centennial of many events in World War I, it is a poignant and a timely work. A century later, Hinson's memoir makes it possible to view this historically significant point in time through the perspective of a soldier who experienced it—thoroughly—in all aspects.

**Lt. Col. Thomas G. Meara, U.S. Army, Retired,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

**THE UNITED STATES AND THE ARMED
FORCES OF MEXICO, CENTRAL AMERICA
AND THE CARIBBEAN, 2000–2014**

**Rene De La Pedraja, McFarland & Company,
Jefferson, North Carolina, 2014, 332 pages**

The United States and the Armed Forces of Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean, 2000–2014 examines the internal role of the armed forces or constabularies of Colombia,

Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, and Venezuela, and the external influence of the United States. *Armed Forces* presents diplomatic, political, and military history through an uncompromising dependency theory framework.

De La Pedraja makes three major contributions. Foremost, he analyzes nation-states often ignored by writers and provides rich detail on their twenty-first century security and political environments. Next, his descriptions expose the central role of the selected armed forces in *domestic* security. The analysis usefully expands the perspective of those mostly familiar with transnational military roles. Finally, De La Pedraja weaves the raw data of classified WikiLeaks diplomatic cables into the construction of straightforward prose.

Despite its real contributions, *Armed Forces* contains substantive flaws. First, the book rests on two premises: that the United States exploits problems to increase its influence and control, and that the George W. Bush administration was particularly destructive to development. These premises are proffered in the preface and validated through several chapters, with the consequent fallacies affirmed in the final chapter. The intervening fourteen chapters do not systemically analyze these propositions. They are inconsistently addressed in the first chapter on Venezuela and episodically supported through what appears to be selectively biased evidence thereafter. A fair reading of the book might conclude just the opposite—the United States reacts to solve problems, effectively or not, and the Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama administrations have been relatively consistent in policies toward Latin America and the Caribbean.

Second, *Armed Forces* does not explain, or weakly explains, its own evidence. De La Pedraja writes in the final chapter that the United States collaborated with people who were little more than local bit players to engineer the 2002 Venezuela coup, and then quickly sabotaged it. In several chapters, he writes that the United States “controls” the government, and yet is unable to make it comply with its desires. *Armed Forces* contains several assertions of popular will and aid dependency yet does not cite data that in many

cases is publicly available through newspapers, the U.S. State Department, or academic institutions. Many propositions are undermined by the straight-jacketed use of the U.S. foreign policy establishment as the sole explanatory variable.

Last, *Armed Forces* neither disconfirms nor offers alternative explanations for several major assertions. One example of these assertions is that Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez appointed military officers to key cabinet and governmental positions due to the shortage of qualified civilians. A second example is that due to popular governance, the Cuban military was never needed to prevent internal disturbances. And, a third assertion is that because of American military influence, the application of quantification metrics created widespread false positives—deliberate noncombatant killings—in the Colombian counterinsurgency campaign.

Addressing alternative explanations would strengthen these hypotheses. In the final analysis, *Armed Forces* undercuts its own value.

**Richard E. Berkebile, PhD,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

THE BALTIC: A History

Michael North (Translated by Kenneth Kronenberg), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2015, 448 pages

What impact does a more assertive Russia have on the Baltic region? Recent events in the Ukraine and Eastern Europe have drawn attention to former Soviet Union, Soviet Bloc, and other regional states, including Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and Poland—many of which are now NATO members. As such, much of our understanding of this region requires us, as professionals, to reexamine these areas.

The Baltic, a chronological history of the Baltic region originally written in German, is an engaging study of the region. This book is the cumulative result of doctoral and graduate studies by the author and several contributors and was thirty years in the making. The original work, *Geschichte der Ostsee (History of the East Sea)*, was published in Germany in 2011. It was so well received that fellow scholars encouraged the author not

only to translate the original into English but also to add to it with up-to-date research and data.

The author, Dr. Michael North, is the chair of modern history at Greifswald University in Germany. North was also the Fulbright distinguished chair in modern German studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara. Kenneth Kronenberg, the book's translator, is from Cambridge, Massachusetts.

An expertly researched scholarly work, *The Baltic* takes the reader on a journey through the history of the region that all will enjoy. The author explores the era of Vikings (circa 793) and the medieval times to the beginning of the new millennium using selected events, geographical focus areas, and vignettes. North covers economics, politics, military subjects, art, and architecture, following national and transnational ethnicities. The author also skillfully highlights the current and historic influences of the region's inhabitants on one another and their immediate neighbors, including Russia.

The Baltic covers a broad range of subject matter over an expansive amount of time in just 325 pages of text. This approach demands brevity. As a result, some events that military and political historians would focus on as key to European history are not covered in depth. The author, however, covers economic trends, culture, and art in detail and broadens our knowledge and understanding of those aspects in the region.

This book is relevant to all military professionals, scholars, and historians who want to reframe their understanding of the Baltic region outside of the Cold War paradigm. *The Baltic* is important for readers wishing to better understand the region culturally, economically, and politically, and it is instructive on what drives and motivates people and leaders in this region.

Lt. Col. Jacob A. Mong, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE MEDITERRANEAN AIR WAR: Airpower and Allied Victory in World War II

Robert S. Ehlers Jr., University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas, 2015, 536 pages

The *Mediterranean Air War* examines the impact of the air war in the Mediterranean theater and its effects on the larger war

effort. Robert Ehlers presents both the Allied and Axis sides of the equation. The author examines not only the military aspects of the air war but also the political aspects, as well as the critical natural resources and the interplay between the military and civilian leadership. He covers the theater from the prewar strategic situation through the shaping of the air campaign that ultimately led to the Axis defeat in the Mediterranean and beyond.

The book opens with an assessment of the prewar Mediterranean theater. This assessment emphasizes the ways in which strategic choices, strengths, and weaknesses set the theater and shaped the air campaigns that centered on the Mediterranean Sea. Starting with the invasion of Abyssinia by Italy, the developing international crisis is examined—at first between Britain and Italy, and, finally, involving France, Vichy France, Germany, the United States, Greece, and the Balkan countries.

The Mediterranean air war is examined in detail, with an in-depth analysis of the turning points, joint and combined operations, and the air campaign's impact on the larger Allied war effort—not only in the Mediterranean theater but also on the Eastern Front, in France, and in the Middle East. The analysis is not limited to the strategic level; it also examines the operational and tactical levels and how the successes and failures of Allied airpower in the Mediterranean theater were critical in establishing the foundation for combined-arms tactics.

The book does a credible job of explaining the battle of logistics and transportation—and their impact on the battlefields. The author also addresses the deep-reaching impact that this second aerial front had on the Third Reich. It was in the Mediterranean theater that the allied air forces learned how to provide air support for large naval landing forces. In this capacity, the Mediterranean theater proved critical as a strategic and tactical testing ground for the Allies. Moreover, it was a critical theater of operations in its own right.

Without the lessons learned in the Mediterranean, Operation Overlord—and perhaps the war itself—could have ended in a dramatically different fashion. This book tells the vital role of airpower during the three-year struggle for control of the Mediterranean Sea.

I would recommend *The Mediterranean Air War* to anyone interested in the air perspective of World War II and in the development of combined-arms warfare. The book is well written, and the subject remains relevant to this day.

Lt. Col. David Campbell Jr., U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

HELL FROM THE HEAVENS: The Epic Story of the USS *Laffey* and World War II's Greatest Kamikaze Attack

**John Wukovits, Da Capo Press, Boston, 2015,
336 pages**

John Paul Jones famously stated, “I wish to have no connection with any ship that does not sail fast for I intend to go in harm’s way.” In *Hell from the Heavens*, John Wukovits tells the gripping story of USS *Laffey*, a fast ship that spent almost all of World War II in dire harm’s way.

Three figures are central to a story, which reads like a thrilling war novel. The first is the *Laffey* itself, a Sumner-class destroyer commissioned in 1944. The second is Ari Phoutruides, a crew member whose extensive recollections are primary among those of many sailors presented. Finally, there is the *Laffey*’s captain, Navy Cmdr. F. Julian Becton, who skippered the ship through combat action around the world, from the Normandy landings to the battle of Okinawa.

Wukovits begins with a detailed description of the design of the *Laffey*, one of the first of a class of destroyers built to provide maximum firepower and survivability. His description of the ship’s physical plant, as well as excellent photos and drawings provided, furnish the reader with a valuable perspective of both the strengths and the limitations of the vessel.

Next, the author takes the *Laffey* and her crew from commissioning, to shakedown cruise, to combat action off Normandy on D-Day. Becton, winner of a Silver Star Medal in the South Pacific earlier in the war, is an exemplar of inspired leadership as he relentlessly drills his crew, mostly young reservists, to prevail in combat at sea. For students of joint operations, the description of the close interaction of Army

units and Navy fire support ships on the beaches of France is inspiring.

The book truly shines in its final chapters detailing the *Laffey's* ordeal at the hands of kamikazes while stationed on the outermost defense ring around Okinawa. Attacked by no fewer than twenty-two suicide aircraft in less than two hours, the *Laffey* was struck by six kamikazes and a 500-pound bomb. Wukovits's account of this action is spellbinding in its drama and detail. He describes each of the aircraft attacks as discrete actions and delineates the inspiring actions of Becton and his crew—first in fighting, and then in saving, their ship.

While this book presents a personal, brutal account of war at sea, it also ably succeeds in laying out the strategic situation in the Pacific theater and explaining why Becton and his crew were at Picket Station One off Okinawa on 16 April 1945. Commendably, Wukovits also describes the mindset and philosophy of the kamikaze pilots and their commanders, rendering them as human, thinking actors instead of suicidal robots. *Hell from the Heavens* is richly documented with primary sources, from interviews with Phoutruides and other surviving crew members to official combat reports and deck logs.

This outstanding book sheds light on numerous subjects: ship design, the battle of Okinawa, and U.S. Navy anti-air tactics at war's end. But, most important, it focuses on the human aspects of war at sea: how, through training, experience, and mutual trust, Becton and his crew emerged victorious. While the events described are seven decades old, this book holds priceless lessons for men and women who today take fast ships into harm's way.

Robert M. Brown, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

**VIGNETTES FROM VIETNAM: Brief Moments
of Sanity and Belated Notes of Gratitude**

**Brice H. Barnes, Outskirts Press, Denver, Colorado,
2014, 258 pages**

They are known by several names. Some people call them sleepers. Others may label them hidden gems. In essence, these labels both refer to things that are of high quality—yet are known

only by a small group of people. Readers of military history feel a sense of duty to share with other readers any book that could be categorized as a sleeper or a hidden gem. Thus, in honoring my obligation, I would like to highlight a book which will likely be underpublicized but is truly worthy of extensive readership—Brice Barnes' superb *Vignettes from Vietnam*.

Within his volume, Barnes has assembled a collection of vignettes focused on his two tours in Vietnam. He served as a platoon leader, company commander, and psychological warfare/political warfare advisor to the South Vietnamese army. These positions certainly afforded Barnes a wide variety of experiences. He has selected nearly three dozen of these to share with readers.

The group of stories Barnes has selected is certainly eclectic. Obviously, many of them are focused on the direct combat situations in which he was involved. In particular, he spends the last portion of his book addressing his vivid recollection of the 1968 Tet Offensive, principally the battle for Widow's Village. In his discussion, he highlights the incredible heroism exhibited by the soldiers in his battalion, the 2nd Battalion, 47th Infantry Regiment. Additionally, he shares with readers the profound impact the battle had on the rest of his life.

Barnes perfectly blends his accounts of combat with many vignettes centered on far less serious topics. These range from rest and relaxation excursions, to escapades in the officers' club, to the things soldiers did during their down time. With vignettes titled "My Introduction to Victoria Bitter," "Convoy Permits? We Don't Need No Stinkin' Permits," and "The Purloined Peanut Mill and other Larcenies," it is obvious Barnes has provided readers with many light-hearted stories.

One characteristic the vignettes share is that each is extremely well written. Obviously, there is an art to telling stories in verbal or written form. The author has clearly mastered the written art form, and this mastery is prominently displayed within the pages of *Vignettes from Vietnam*. Barnes writes in a highly conversant style (an obvious must for this volume), which is very energetic and descriptive. Just as important, he is succinct and not overly verbose in detailing each vignette. These qualities combine to create a volume that is incredibly engaging and readable.

A unique aspect of *Vignettes from Vietnam* is the concluding sentences Barnes adds to many of the vignettes. Readers will find Barnes utilizes these conclusions to pay his gratitude to various people who figure prominently in each vignette. In several cases, they are soldiers who made the ultimate sacrifice while serving in Vietnam. Barnes decision to include his thanks is powerful and adds tremendously to the vignettes.

In his introduction, the author states, "My purpose in this writing is to convey a bit of humanity into what sometimes were inhuman circumstances, to add personal touches, and to offer anything that I can to aid in the healing of old wounds. As the title also suggests, I want to extend some long overdue thanks to certain individuals whose contributions to the vignettes made this entire book possible." Barnes has, unquestionably, achieved his purpose. In addition, he has written a superb book that is well worth anyone's valuable reading time.

Rick Baillergeon, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

**THE CAUSE OF ALL NATIONS: An
International History of the American Civil War**
Don H. Doyle, Basic Books, New York, 2014,
400 pages

The Civil War is an unending fascination for most Americans. Don H. Doyle presents the American Civil War in its international context. In *The Cause of All Nations*, he shows how the meaning of the war evolved in parallel ways for European and American opinion makers—the ways they perceived the war reflected their hopes and fears, which revolved around the issues of freedom and liberty. The first issue was expressed in terms of abolishing slavery, the latter in terms of republicanism and democracy.

In the broadest sense, the war originated in two competing visions of white man's democracy. The first was based on the concepts of free soil, free men, and free labor. Those concepts posited a relatively fluid social structure founded on individual merit and mass democratic politics, a structure buttressed by national government policies emphasizing the

indissoluble nature of a federal union acting for the common good.

The other vision was based on a relatively rigid social structure based on the dominance of an agrarian upper class posited on a form of mass politics. The lower orders followed the political lead of their social betters, in a structure buttressed by a minimalist local and national government and emphasizing state autonomy—except when federal action would serve to support agrarian upper-class interests.

Doyle sets this American crisis in a global context, showing how the potential dissolution of the American union gladdened conservatives (who were hostile to democracy and republicanism and believed in a social order based on aristocratic hierarchy) and dismayed liberals (who believed in republicanism or constitutional monarchy and freedom of conscience).

For the most part, European aristocratic elites could not openly approve of slavery but were excited about the imminent failure of the Great Republic. For these interests, the federal Union's dissolution would destroy the republican political experiment and open the path to increased imperial European domination of the Caribbean Basin and Mexico, as well as the continued existence and extension of slavery. The more radical hoped for a continued fracturing of the United States into several regional confederations dominated by European powers. Thus, the American Civil War was a conflict shaped by European interests. The end of democracy in North America would allow the Europeans to triumph over their own reformers and revolutionaries. Doyle shows how the public opinion battle was shaped by these beliefs.

The book is organized in three parts: "Only a Civil War," "The American Question," and "Liberty's War." In the first part, the author poses what he calls Garibaldi's question: Was the Civil War only about the preservation of the federal Union, or was it about something greater, that is, human liberty? He shows how this question was answered unequivocally by the secessionists and how the United States tried to sidestep the issue. The southerners aimed for independence in order to preserve slavery, while the Union promised Britain and France it would set the world ablaze if they interfered in American internal affairs.

In “The American Question,” the writer explores the question of liberty versus tyranny and shows how Union and Confederate agents communicated their governments’ ideas to the various European publics, relying on local agents to stress the benefits of either social hierarchy or democracy. He stresses the ways in which Northern advocates tapped into the idealism present in European societies to force their governments to remain neutral. In addition, he shows how Northern advocates aided recruiting soldiers to the Northern cause, soldiers who fought for their own reasons, one of which was the furthering of democratic values for their own societies. In the final part, “Liberty’s War,” Doyle shows the ways in which the logic of the war led to emancipation and the abolition of slavery—and the effect this had on European opinion. The choice between Union and Confederacy came down to one’s belief in the morality of slavery and the possibilities inherent in unleashing human potential—which would eventually lead to societies based on equality.

At the end, Doyle presents a different interpretation of the significance of the Statue of Liberty, or “Liberty Enlightening the World.” She faces east, and the iconography suggests American liberty broke the chains of slavery and serves as a beacon and an example to the world. The figure of Liberty, and liberty itself, is moving toward Europe. While in a narrow sense, the statue is a monument to Franco-American friendship, it also shows the worldwide significance of the American Civil War, which not only decided the fate of slavery but also of democracy and democratic ideals.

Lewis Bernstein, PhD, Woodbridge, Virginia

**AFTER ETHNIC CONFLICT: Policy-making
in Post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina
and Macedonia**

**Cvete Koneska, Ashgate Publishing, Burlington,
Vermont, 2014, 187 pages**

The unrest in the Balkans during the 1990s—fueled in part by a failed communist system, opportunistic nationalist political elites, historical grievances, and interethnic

divisions—exposed to the world one of the most brutal ethnic conflicts in contemporary history. Not only did this conflict have an effect on all the former Yugoslav countries, but it also had a major impact on the region and Europe as a whole. It has been nearly twenty years since the signing of the Dayton Accords that ended this conflict. Much of the recovery work continues today, but ethnic issues still impede progress in the region.

Cvete Koneska’s small volume on a very complex subject is part of a broader Southeast European Studies series on the Balkans. The book focuses on answering the question, why do political elites in postconflict ethnically divided states choose to accommodate or resist each other across ethnic lines? Koneska looks beyond the violence and the immediate postconflict environment within Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, an environment created by external powers. The author examines the internal political processes and explores the factors behind the different policy outcomes that sustain or undermine peace and ethnic cooperation in ethnically divided societies.

The book is divided into four major sections, with multiple chapters providing subject and research context, historical and institutional background, postconflict successes, and continuing challenges in these former Yugoslav countries. Each chapter is organized chronologically, and each alternates perspectives between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. This approach enables the reader to understand the research methodology, variables, and analysis. The author skillfully reviews relevant academic literature on ethnic accommodation, showing how the relationships between institutions, power-sharing mechanisms, political elites, and group identity help shape policymaking in ethnically divided populations.

Of particular interest is Koneska’s in-depth discussion and analysis of domestic factors within each country that influence the political actors and the decisions they make. Her analysis identifies four key drivers of postconflict cooperation—cross-cutting identities, minority veto powers, territorial autonomy, and informal practices—to explain interethnic political accommodation. Although accommodation exists in both countries, Koneska convincingly demonstrates

that the degree of accommodation greatly depends on the policy area, domestic political context, and existing power-sharing arrangements. The author's insights and perspectives on aspects of ethnic conflict are intriguing.

Written in a style that is both educational and easy to read, *After Ethnic Conflict: Policy-making in Post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia* provides an opportunity for researchers, and government and military professionals, to better understand the challenges and opportunities of postconflict reconciliation and state building. Well documented and organized, this book is an excellent example of a comparative study, balancing both history and political science discipline methodologies. I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in ethnic conflict in the Balkans and postconflict policymaking in ethnically diverse societies. This book would make an excellent companion to Steven E. Lobell and Phillip Mauceri's *Ethnic Conflict and International Politics: Explaining Diffusion and Escalation*.

**Lt. Col. Edward D. Jennings, U.S. Army,
Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas**

**KAITEN: Japan's Secret Manned Suicide
Submarine and the First American Ship It Sank
in WWII**

**Michael Mair and Joy Waldron, Berkley Publishing
Group, New York, 2014, 363 pages**

Historians have written a great deal about kamikaze aircraft in World War II. The fanatical pilots used their aircraft as missiles in an attempt to destroy as many American ships and to kill as many American service members as possible. Yet, despite public fascination with these suicide weapons, historians have, for the most part, neglected the Imperial Japanese Navy's employment of suicide submarines. Michael Mair and Joy Waldron's *Kaiten: Japan's Secret Manned Suicide Submarine and the First American Ship It Sank in WWII* addresses this void.

The book serves as a dual history of the *kaiten* (heaven shaker) suicide submarine program in Japan and the career of USS *Mississinewa*, a Navy oiler.

The narrative shifts between the two stories, culminating at Ulithi Harbor on 20 November 1944, when the first *kaiten* suicide submarine—actually a manned torpedo—struck and destroyed the “Mighty Miss.” Michael Mair's father, John, served aboard the *Mississinewa* at the time, and before passing away, he motivated his son to chronicle these events.

Mair and Waldron weave numerous interviews with both American and Japanese participants, as well as action reports and deck logs, into a very compelling narrative. The authors chronicle the twenty-month-long development of the Japanese *kaiten* program, which involved adapting the famed Long Lance torpedo and recruiting and training pilots for manned operations. Mair and Waldron also painstakingly identify which *kaiten* and pilot from the *Kikusui* mission—the first Japanese manned torpedo mission of World War II—corresponded with which documented explosions in and around Ulithi on 20 November 1944. Similarly, Mair and Waldron provide a fascinating look at the operations of a U.S. Navy oiler, a ship that usually receives little attention from historians. The individual experiences of members of the *Mississinewa* crew significantly enhance the narrative.

In places, however, the authors' storytelling becomes overly dramatic, perhaps even slightly fictionalized. For example, as Sekio Nishina is piloting his *kaiten* toward the *Mississinewa*, Mair and Waldron relate that he “fought to concentrate,” that “he felt his hands slippery on the wheel,” and that “the warrior's band around his brow was damp with sweat.” They even add that his “craft weaved through a school of striped orange fish,” all while on a mission from which Nishina had no ability to communicate and from which he, obviously, did not return.

Rather than exaggerating the drama of the events, it might have been more useful to address the larger issues pertaining to the psychology of suicide weapons. What toll did this level of devotion to one's nation exact on those who survived? The authors mention a high suicide rate after the war among the surviving *kaiten* pilots yet choose not to examine this any further.

Still, the book tells a fascinating and engaging story about a largely neglected World War II episode. It is recommended for a popular audience interested in

naval history, World War II in the Pacific, or Japanese suicide weapons.

Derek R. Mallett, Fort Gordon, Georgia

**THE OXFORD ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF
THE FIRST WORLD WAR: New Edition**

**Hew Strachan, Oxford University Press, Oxford,
United Kingdom, 2014, 400 pages**

My grandfather fought in the First World War, but he would not talk much about it. This absence of information generated within me a deep interest in the conflict; thus, on my shelf are autobiographies, biographies, atlases, general histories, and specific histories on the Great War. Each provides insights into the conflict that initiated the “modern age.” Missing from my shelf was an illustrated history of the topic, but the *Oxford Illustrated History of the First World War* fills that void nicely.

The *Oxford Illustrated History* is an anthology that fills a niche both for generalists and for military historians seeking concise information on the war. Although ordered strangely—maneuver warfare in 1914–1915 comes between the chapter on strategy of the Central Powers but before the chapter on the strategy of the Entente Powers—the chapters cover topics from the game plan for each side. These include the politics of the Balkans and Turkey, air and naval strategies, the role of women in the war, statecraft on the home fronts, mutinies and military morale, and the peace settlement.

In the era of the Internet, Instagram, and YouTube, it is easy to forget the importance that simple illustrations and graphics played in the struggle between combatants for the “hearts and minds.” The *Oxford Illustrated History* does a brilliant job demonstrating public relations campaigns of the era as well as providing a feel for the conflict. For example, a photo of Imperial German Army Gen. Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck (famous for frustrating the Allies in East Africa for years) riding atop a mule, while his rag-tag but undefeated army of whites and Africans stretches into the far distance on the African plain, provides a better sense of the campaign in German East Africa than text alone could accomplish.

Among the many black-and-white illustrations are twenty-six color images that provide a sharp and vivid reminder that not all was bleak during the war. Additionally, they demonstrate the skill of the artists employed during the war, in tasks such as developing and painting various camouflage patterns. Such work can only be portrayed effectively in pictures.

From an academic perspective, the *Oxford Illustrated History* lacks footnotes or endnotes. This likely was done to improve readability. The first edition was published in 1998, but the editor strengthens the value of the book with this new edition by adding new illustrations, including an excellent further reading list and new material.

Two things would have made the book better. First, the illustrations are more ancillary than the engine that drives the story. The book would have benefited from making the illustrations the star—allowing the reader to flip through the pictures, absorbing the ebb and flow of the war—and limiting the text to captions. Second, the maps are very poor quality, and they are placed at the back of the book. They do not provide the reader with a feel for the conflict, and they provide little of the information that is vital to an understanding of the unfolding of the war, such as terrain features or scale.

Overall, despite these flaws, the *Oxford Illustrated History* is well worth a place on any security professional's bookshelf.

Karsten Engelmann, PhD, Stuttgart, Germany

**MEN OF WAR: The American Soldier in Combat
at Bunker Hill, Gettysburg, and Iwo Jima**

**Alexander Rose, Random House, New York, 2015,
460 pages**

Widely published author and historian Alexander Rose has delivered another outstanding book with *Men of War: The American Soldier in Combat at Bunker Hill, Gettysburg, and Iwo Jima*. Rose examines three iconic battles from the perspective of the participants, in answering the question, what is it like being in battle? Inspired by John Keegan's *The Face of Battle*, Rose goes beyond a general description of the battles. He includes

historical accounts and vignettes that provide the reader with an overview of the individual soldier's experience at these battles, and with an understanding of the ever-evolving nature of war.

Rose's description of each battle's aftermath provides insight on how the experience affected individuals. Two of the more interesting insights are on the psychological scarring of combatants and the looting of the dead. The traumatic experiences associated with warfare often result in psychological scarring of combatants. Assigning diagnoses of posttraumatic stress syndrome to veterans of earlier wars is difficult, partly due to changing standards and definitions. Rose, however, refers to a sophisticated statistical analysis of the postwar medical records of 17,700 American Civil War veterans that found a strong correlation between the percentage of regimental soldiers killed and an increased incidence of postwar gastrointestinal and cardiac problems, nervous disorders, and depression among survivors. Rose concludes that the number of a man's friends killed stands as an index for the effects of psychological stressors, such as experiencing intense combat, handling corpses, witnessing death and dismemberment, killing others, and realizing the probability of one's own death.

Rose finds looting of the dead, like psychological scarring, common among combatants at the three battles. Looting goes beyond the collecting of equipment and personal items of dead enemy combatants for souvenirs. Rose describes accounts of British soldiers looting their own after the Battle of Bunker Hill. In several instances, looting included the plundering of wounded on the battlefield and of buried corpses. The opening of tombs and graves by off-duty British soldiers reached a point that caused Gen. William Howe to announce that anyone caught doing so would be severely punished. Looting took a twist at Gettysburg when the Union Army's Medical Museum sent doctors out to collect specimens for study, and in Iwo Jima, where marines were reported to have collected gold teeth and Japanese skulls. Rose states that soldiers justified the plundering of the dead to help make up for the privations experienced and the risks they ran for modest wages.

Rose challenges Keegan's assertion that the phenomenon of combat is immutable throughout time.

He counters that while American soldiers throughout time have shared similar experiences, their psyches and behaviors have differed. Americans who fought at Bunker Hill viewed war as a brief interruption of their daily lives as farmers; this contrasts those who fought at Fallujah or Afghanistan, who sometimes viewed it in more exhilarating terms. Rose supports his argument in reminding readers that American patriots at Bunker Hill engaged British forces for only a few hours, while marines on Iwo Jima engaged Japanese army forces thirty-five days straight.

The strength of *Men at War* is Rose's ability to capture the detail and brutality of each of these battles into a fascinating study of men in combat. Rose's *Men of War: The American Soldier in Combat at Bunker Hill, Gettysburg, and Iwo Jima* is a great choice for anyone interested in history or the psychological experience of combat. It is highly recommended addition to the literature of American military history.

Jesse McIntyre III, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

RING OF STEEL: Germany and Austria-Hungary in World War I

**Alexander Watson, Basic Books, New York, 2014,
832 pages**

The one hundredth anniversary of the Great War has unleashed a drumfire barrage of new books on the conflict. While the duds in this barrage will be quickly forgotten, the books of lasting value will expand and enhance our understanding of the war. Alexander Watson's *Ring of Steel* is a very solid entry in this second category.

In an earlier work, *Enduring the Great War*, Watson provided a thoughtful comparison of the war as experienced by German and British soldiers on the Western Front. In this new book, Watson's more ambitious goal is to examine and compare the war experience of the two societies: the German Reich and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, together the most important of the Central Powers. Within that goal, the author's focus is on the mobilization of the two societies to support a *total war* unlike any seen before. He finds that although Germany was far more modern and ethnically homogeneous than

its multinational ally, both empires were initially successful in unifying their people for the war effort. However, over time, the enormous bloodletting on the battlefield, along with political and economic mismanagement, would have a disintegrating effect on social and political unity in both countries. Germany seemed more resilient; however, Watson contrasts how in the last two years of the war, Hindenburg and Ludendorff's military dictatorship continued to seek vast conquests while seeming to ignore the great longing for peace among German people. Meanwhile, in Austria-Hungary, military incompetence and the harsh repression of the subject nationalities—southern Slavs, Czechs, Ruthenes, and Poles—worked with growing starvation in wicked synergy to unravel the bonds that held the Habsburg union together. In comparing the social and political fragmentation of the two empires, Watson reminds us that both of the monarchical states proved incapable of meeting the challenge of a long, costly war against an enemy alliance with powerful advantages such as geography, population, and industrial capacity.

The scope of Watson's wide research is impressive. His work offers the reader a scholarly update on much of the modern historiography of World War I while adding his own lucid insights. Though his primary focus is on the second subtitle of this book, "The People's War," he is equally adept at covering the military and diplomatic aspects of the war. All that said, praise for this book should be tempered with a warning. Watson's *Ring of Steel* is a very long book on a very complex topic (with the endnotes and bibliography together running to a hundred pages). It is a book that demands an investment of time and attention. This book is worth the investment.

Scott Stephenson, PhD, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

WAR ON THE SILVER SCREEN: Shaping America's Perception of History

Glen Jeansonne and David Lührssen, Potomac Books, Dulles, Virginia, 2014, 200 pages

If one were asked to recall the visage of Gen. George S. Patton Jr., what image would come to mind first? Would it be the real Patton? Or, would it be George C. Scott, the actor who portrayed

him in the epic film *Patton*? If the answer is the latter, then *War on the Silver Screen* may be worth a closer look. In it, historian Glenn Jeansonne and film critic David Lührssen combine disciplines to select the war films they argue best reflect public perceptions and attitudes of the conflicts they portray, having stood the test of time and scrutiny.

Arranged chronologically into four chapters, *War on the Silver Screen* spans the First and Second World Wars, the Cold War, and the War on Terror, leading to the present day. Selected for their enduring impact and their ability to shape today's conversations, the films are placed into their chronological context, given a historical fact check, and judged in terms of cinematic merit and enduring legacy. Most received critical acclaim, garnering one or more Academy Awards. They range from the 1930 film *All Quiet on the Western Front* to *Zero Dark Thirty* in 2012.

One of the book's strengths is that readers of *Military Review* will be intimately familiar with many of the films; indeed, *Twelve O'clock High* remains a part of the current Army Command and General Staff College's leadership curriculum. Others, like *Lawrence of Arabia*, found new life and eager audiences as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq transitioned into counterinsurgency-based conflicts. Military professionals seeking additional depth will be pleased with the authors' inclusion of many more titles—recommended but not reviewed in detail—representing perhaps lesser-known or foreign-made films that nonetheless accurately depict war from their respective eras.

Some may disagree with the inclusion of films such as *The Hurt Locker*, given its gritty portrayal of an unconventional explosives ordnance detachment team chief, or *Zero Dark Thirty*, with its visceral depictions of prisoner torture that ostensibly produced direct intelligence leading to the raid that killed Osama bin Laden. This is not the authors' point, however, as the films were selected neither for their military nor historical veracity but for their lasting ability to shape current discussion on the conflicts they portray.

War on the Silver Screen is not without its flaws. At times, the historical context seems to overshadow the review of films; this is the case particularly with the final chapter on the War on Terror, where the

2006 film *United 93* seems to be given short shrift. Additionally, the book ends too abruptly with a two-paragraph summary following the review of *Zero Dark Thirty*. It would benefit from a stand-alone conclusion to tie the book's themes together and end the discourse more smoothly.

Despite these shortcomings, *War on the Silver Screen* will certainly enhance one's understanding and enjoyment of the selected films, whether seen for the first or tenth time. Perhaps better suited for the novice, and offering less for the military professional, the book is, nonetheless, concise and highly readable. It would seem right at home sitting next to one's videos of *Gallipoli* and *Dr. Strangelove*.

Mark Montesclaros, Fort Gordon, Georgia

GENERAL LESLEY J. MCNAIR: *Unsung Architect of the U.S. Army*

**Mark T. Calhoun, University Press of Kansas,
Lawrence, Kansas, 2015, 432 pages**

Most people studying World War II have only heard of Lt. Gen. Lesley McNair because of his death by friendly fire in Normandy. For some, McNair is not recognized as one of the great World War II generals and, thus, is not considered worthy of a detailed study. With author Mark Calhoun's book, however, this may no longer be the case. Calhoun provides a detailed study of McNair—justifying his inclusion as one of the key leaders of World War II—and points out that many historians may have been unfairly critical of him.

In conducting his research, Calhoun had a daunting task. Conventional wisdom suggested that there were "insufficient archival records to support a detailed analysis" of McNair's career. Through diligent research, the author managed to uncover a large collection of papers that provide compelling evidence of McNair's achievements and enhance the historical understanding of both the man and his contributions.

Calhoun succeeds in his goal to provide an objective assessment of McNair's performance, and readers will gain an appreciation for McNair as an innovator and a loyal professional. Known for his

dedication and selfless service, he had no interest in fame or notoriety. The author connects how McNair's early experiences shaped his later ideas and decisions regarding how to organize and train the army that won World War II. In his analysis, Calhoun provides a balanced assessment of McNair. He candidly addresses his strengths and his weaknesses, and how they shaped him as a leader. The author also provides context for critical times and events to help the reader understand not only what was going on but also the conflicting sides of any dilemma McNair confronted.

Because of the many predicaments McNair had to confront, he has his critics. Calhoun addresses the often-cited criticisms, and his evidence and assessment show that many of those criticisms may be unwarranted.

The author's additional goal is to highlight the importance of studying the often-overlooked staff officers. He shows how McNair made significant contributions while serving on the staffs of various commanders, most notably as the chief of staff for General Headquarters and as the Army Ground Forces commander for Army Chief of Staff Gen. George Marshall. Calhoun shows how McNair's role in implementing Marshall's vision is key to understanding why the U.S. Army was so successful in World War II. Although some critics contend that McNair made some poor decisions in doctrine application and organization, Calhoun reminds us that, as a staff officer, McNair was responsible for implementing the decisions of his commander. He writes that although Marshall trusted McNair, "Marshall reviewed and commented on even minor administrative issues that fell under McNair's jurisdiction—not the sort of oversight one would expect for a commander given free hand to carry out his duties."

The title of Calhoun's book, *General Lesley J. McNair: Unsung Architect of the U.S. Army*, is appropriate. McNair's contributions to the Army's victory in World War II may not have made headlines, but they were vitally important. I recommend this book for readers interested in World War II and the biographies of great leaders. McNair deserves a place among the great leaders of World War II, and this book helps put him there.


Robert J. Rielly, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas



Master Sgt. Joshua L. Wheeler, 39, assigned to Headquarters, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, was killed in action 22 October 2015 while deployed in support of Operation Inherent Resolve.

(Department of the Army photo)

Sine Pari (Without Equal)



The return of U.S. forces to Iraq to fight against the Islamic State (IS) was highlighted by the death of Master Sgt. Joshua L. Wheeler on 22 October 2015 in Kirkuk Province, Iraq. Wheeler was killed while participating in a rescue of seventy hostages from an IS prison north of the town of Hawija where, according to Department of Defense officials, they faced “imminent mass execution.”

About forty Kurdish and two dozen U.S. special operations troops participated in the raid. The immediacy of the mission was due to intelligence that included the observation

of mass graves being dug at the prison site, according to Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter.

Wheeler, a native of Roland, Oklahoma, was wounded by small arms fire during the raid, but later died while receiving medical care. Wheeler’s numerous awards include eleven Bronze Star medals, four with Valor Device. He deployed twelve times in support of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Wheeler was the first U.S. soldier killed in Iraq since 2011. He is survived by his wife, four sons, and his grandmother and grandfather.



Defense Secretary Ash Carter and Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mark A. Milley honor fallen U.S. Army Master Sgt. Joshua L. Wheeler during a Dignified Transfer ceremony 24 October 2015 at Dover Air Force Base, Delaware.

(Department of Defense photo by Air Force Senior Master Sgt. Adrian Cadiz)