
**THE NEW SPYMASTERS: Inside the Modern
World of Espionage from the Cold War to
Global Terror**

**Stephen Grey, St. Martin's Press, New York, 2015,
368 pages**

The *New Spymasters* is a look inside the dark world of spying, its shades-of-gray ethical challenges, and its never-ending complexities. Author Stephen Grey poses three questions up front. First, how has spying changed in the twenty-first century? Second, when can spying be effective? Third, what kind of spying is needed to help deal with the specific threats of today and of the future?

To answer each question, Grey provides a lengthy background discussion of personalities and events, which gives the reader a context to support his examples and conclusions. His examples are drawn from first-hand interviews as well as verified public knowledge. The majority of his research is on Western spy agencies, such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), known more commonly as MI6.

Grey's book chronicles the early days of British spying during the Russian Revolution. Then it progresses through the formal development of various national spy services—such as the Cheka (a nickname of the original Soviet secret security organization) and the NKVD (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, a Soviet agency that came after the Cheka); the SIS; and the OSS (Office of Strategic Services, a U.S. intelligence agency created during World War II) and its descendant, the CIA. The author describes the roles each of them played for their respective countries up to present day. Here is where he begins to provide examples of how spy activities easily proceed into gray areas. Although the agencies make their living on deceit and half-truths, some type of transparency is necessary to keep them "in check" with their governments. The reader will immediately see the dilemmas caused by

balancing the need for secrecy and open accountability. Grey continues to show the evolution in the spy business up through the end of the Cold War. He talks of the concern the agencies had for their own futures following the collapse of the Berlin Wall. He explains their shifts in focus from East-versus-West spying to a new focus on the drug and crime trade.

Yet, Grey shows that within only a few years, the Global War on Terrorism, basically, caught all the Western spy agencies flat-footed. At that time, the potential rise of radical Islamic terrorism was pretty far down their collective "watch lists." He then focuses on the catch-up game the Western spy agencies have been playing ever since, as well as the ethical gray areas that spying involves.

Grey brings to light many of the challenges and complexities of the spy trade, such as the stress of living a life based on deceit and cover stories, as well as the ethical challenges that many spies encountered during their time undercover. In fact, some of those situations required the spies to be parties to crimes in order to maintain their credibility and to develop a greater intelligence picture. The author provides numerous examples of challenges the individual spies faced. He also delves into the challenges of the spy agencies themselves. He explores how, as bureaucratic organizations, they faced the difficult tasks of attempting to operationalize very broad-state strategies and to integrate and synchronize technology, cultural, and human resources to obtain information to make a real difference.

The book is an interesting read, and the author appears to have conducted valid research. He provides a glossary of modern spy terminology as well as a list of the various known spy agencies of major countries—and the particular roles each agency plays. These two sections are great additions in helping the reader understand the spy culture. This is an excellent book for the military professional, and it is a good introduction to the world of spy operations.

**Lt. Col. George Hodge, U.S. Army, Retired,
Lansing, Kansas**

AMERICAN WARLORDS: How Roosevelt's High Command Led America to Victory in World War II
Jonathan W. Jordan, NAL Caliber, New York, 2015,
624 pages

American Warlords is a popular biography of four key American World War II leaders: President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, Gen. George Catlett Marshall, and Adm. Ernest J. King. Author Jonathan Jordan examines the impact of these leaders, or warlords, as he often refers to them, on the American war effort. This book spans from 1940 to 1945 and tends to focus on the strategic level. That is not to say that it is an impersonal, dull look at strategy; rather, it examines the men who made American strategy and how they overcame the monumental challenges they faced, including the mistakes they made. In this regard, Jordan does an admirable job providing a vivid account of the daily pressures these men endured, with the fate of the Nation, and even the world, in the balance.

Jordan organizes the book into a prologue, three chronological parts, and an epilogue. The prologue sets the stage by recounting one of America's tragedies—the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. The initial installment of the three major parts of the book is titled “Bringing the War Home: 1940–1941.” This section not only discusses the events leading to American involvement in World War II but also provides background on the strategic leaders upon whom the author later concentrates his narrative. While the state of American politics and the lack of American military strength take center stage in the early reading, Jordan provides great insight into each of the four key leaders. For example, he highlights Roosevelt's statement that “if war does come, we will make it a New Deal war.” Jordan continues his portrayal of Roosevelt by giving many examples of the president's deft political abilities.

The author also details Marshall and Stimson's organizational capabilities, such as when they worked to get the Selective Service Act passed. Jordan similarly describes the abilities and rise of King, including his leadership of the undeclared naval war in the Atlantic.

In addition to the four warlords, Jordan incorporates many important characters into his narrative, including Winston Churchill, Henry Morgenthau, William Franklin Knox, Harold L. Stark, Dwight Eisenhower, Harry Hopkins, and others. The first third of the book ends with two events of 1941: the Anglo-American conference to discuss defeating Germany, at Placentia Bay, Newfoundland, in August, and the day of infamy—the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December.

Jordan's second part is titled “A New Doctor: 1942–1945,” and it is the longest part of *American Warlords*. It begins in the immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor. The title is a nod to Roosevelt's famous radio fireside chats in which he sometimes referred to himself as “Dr. New Deal,” while he sought to cure the U.S. “patient” of the “disease” of the Great Depression. During World War II, Roosevelt changed his persona to “Dr. Win-the-War.” Jordan recounts the uniting of the American people, their politicians, and their military leaders, although he also points out areas of friction. A great example of friction is when Harry Truman's efforts to ensure proper spending practices had him questioning the program to develop the atomic bomb—although Truman backed off quickly when Stimson hinted at the criticality of the highly classified project.

Strategically, Jordan tells a story of balance between Europe and the Pacific, despite that “Germany first” was the stated Anglo-American policy. Rather, strategic reality demanded much more effort in the Pacific in the early days of the war, effort for which King appropriately advocated and argued. On a more personal level, Jordan continues to paint a portrait of each of the warlords, covering details that make them seem very real, such as vivid descriptions of Roosevelt's White House Map Room. Other characters continue their supporting roles, such as the brilliant Churchill and Douglas MacArthur; however, much of their effort proved challenging to the American warlords and the Allied strategy.

Jordan goes on to demonstrate that American politics and domestic issues played important roles. Examples include the 1942 elections that affected the decision making for Operation Torch, Roosevelt's push for the Navy to integrate African-Americans, and Stimson's approval of relocating Japanese-Americans in the American West. The

second part of *American Warlords* concludes with the passing of Roosevelt.

The third and final part of *American Warlords* focuses on the final year of the war, and this part is appropriately titled “Swords, Plowshares, and Atoms: 1945.” It is the culmination of the story of the American warlords, especially with the passing of Roosevelt. This is the time of President Truman and his efforts to lead the United States and to establish a postwar order, with Stimson, Marshall, and King continuing their roles to conclude the war based on the policy Roosevelt had promulgated.

The book is clearly the product of much research and labor, and Jordan does a great job making it both factual and accessible to a general reader. More specifically, Jordan peers behind popular views of “the greatest generation” and “the good war.” He demonstrates that while the United States pulled together to win the war, there were interpersonal feuds, domestic political machinations, military service rivalries, and postwar political considerations at play, too.

American Warlords is well written and enjoyable, although the tone is sometimes too informal, with many clichés. The bottom line is that if you are looking for something to read that examines World War II, the role of America’s strategic leaders, and American strategy—in a book that is also a fun read—this is it.

Lt. Col. Jonathan P. Klug, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

**THE 104th FIELD ARTILLERY REGIMENT
OF THE NEW YORK NATIONAL GUARD,
1916-1919: From the Mexican Border to the
Meuse-Argonne**

**Pamela A. Bakker, McFarland & Company,
Jefferson, North Carolina, 2014, 228 pages**

The unrest along the southern United States border related to the 1910 Mexican Revolution and subsequent civil war eventually involved the U.S. Army and National Guard. For the bulk of the soldiers and guardsmen, service on the border involved living and training in a harsh environment more than it did conducting combat missions.

The time spent on the border provided the soldiers and the guardsmen essential experience in everything from caring for horses to maneuvering divisions, which later paid dividends during the expansion of the Army for World War I, its deployment to Europe, and its service on the Western Front.

In *The 104th Field Artillery Regiment of the New York National Guard, 1916-1919*, Pamela Bakker follows a single National Guard artillery regiment from mobilization for the Mexican border in 1916, through combat on the Western Front in World War I, to its eventual discharge. The author argues that the strenuous service and training the regiment underwent while on the border hardened it so that it was able to provide skilled and courageous service on the Western Front, including fighting in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive.

The focus of the book is the 1st Field Artillery Regiment, New York National Guard, which became the 104th Field Artillery Regiment under the reorganization of the National Guard following the entry of the United States into World War I. While the author’s background is in music and theology, her grandfather’s service in the regiment during the period, chronicled in this work, inspired her to preserve the record of the regiment’s service in both wars.

Bakker recounts myriad details of life on the border and at the front. In conveying who commanded what unit, where elements were on certain days, and what they were doing, the book excels. The problem with it is not the thoroughness of the research but of larger context and historical detail. Bakker brings her passion to the topic, but she is not a trained historian. The book is littered with errors that suggest a lack of familiarity with the subject. A brief sampling of errors will suffice: The United States did not send troops to the Philippines from 1901 to 1904 to help the Filipinos in their revolution against Spain, and John Pershing was not a brigadier general at that time (page 15); a captain in the regular army could not simultaneously have been a colonel in the national guard (page 26); Germany did not share a border with Serbia (page 62); Germans were not descended from the Huns (page 121); colonels did not command batteries (page 152); the United States and France did not demand “unconditional surrender” from Germany in 1918 (page 162); and President Woodrow Wilson’s

fourteen points were hardly unknown to the Allies before the end of the war (page 170). The author would have been well served to work with a historian to avoid the errors that pepper the book.

The book is at its best when describing the small details of life for the men in the regiment. It covers an especially important period of American military history—when the Army transformed from its nineteenth century form to one it would retain throughout the twentieth century. This work would mostly appeal to laypersons with an interest in the 104th Regiment or the New York National Guard.

**Barry M. Stentiford, PhD,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

SILENT AND UNSEEN: On Patrol in Three Cold War Attack Submarines

**Alfred Scott McLaren, Naval Institute Press,
Annapolis, Maryland, 2015, 256 pages**

Reading *Silent and Unseen* brought back a flood of memories. In this autobiography, Alfred Scott McLaren writes of his experiences as a junior officer on his first three submarines, encompassing seven years at sea from 1958 through 1965. He paints a colorful picture of the life of a submarine officer during the Cold War, as the U.S. Navy was making the leap from diesel-powered to nuclear-powered submarines. The autobiography likely has a limited audience in the security community, and security concerns limit detailing the classified portions of the Cold War missions or special operations this era was known for. The book is a deck-plate-level story of how one man succeeded in one of the military's most independent and mysterious occupations.

Initially, McLaren was assigned to USS *Greenfish*, a modified World War II-era diesel submarine. Just like submarine officers today, his first onboard qualification was to become the battery charging line-up officer. From this lowest of qualifications, he recounts taking on more responsibility and learning how to thrive in a submarine force loaded with World War II combat veterans who worked hard and played hard. Stories meander from the amusing cockroach races in the control

room to a chilling story of seeing a drifting horned mine looming out of a fog bank that narrowly misses the boat.

Nearing the end of his tour on the *Greenfish*, McLaren was selected by Adm. Hyman Rickover to participate in the fledgling nuclear power program. He was assigned to USS *Seadragon*, which was only the sixth nuclear submarine to join the fleet. Unlike his former diesel submarine, his new nuclear submarine existed largely independent from Earth's atmosphere. This enabled the boat and its crew to embark amid a new arctic world of exploration. The author recounts the submarine's trips through iceberg-filled Baffin Bay, transiting under the ice in the Northwest Passage, and finally arriving at the North Pole itself. I have fond memories of these exact same voyages. At the North Pole, his crew played baseball, just as my crew eventually did, and I played football and drove golf balls there twenty-six years later.

Finally, McLaren transferred to USS *Skipjack*, his third boat. He took on the mantle of field-grade leadership (head of a department). The description of this tour is also replete with humor and danger. He recounts a story of one oddball shipmate who unloaded twenty-five pounds of M&Ms candy on the mess deck—just to see what they would look like. The author shares another story of becoming so drunk in Toulon, France, that he passed out in an opera house and had to be carried out by stretcher. In yet another experience, he recounts going through a full psychological evaluation after shooting a .45-caliber pistol—inside the ship's steel conning tower. What makes his stories all the more entertaining is that many readers likely will recall having at least one shipmate like these.

The stories are good, and they are amazingly familiar for submariners. I was quite surprised at how little has changed since 1958, when McLaren began sailing, to when I began sailing in 1982. One notable difference was the apparent drop in the quality of food on submarines. McLaren certainly seems to have eaten better food than we did in the 1980s. Overall, it is an interesting read for submariners or for those interested in life on submarines.

**Lt. Cmdr. Harold A. Laurence, U.S. Navy,
Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

MAKING AND UNMAKING NATIONS: War, Leadership, and Genocide in Modern Africa
 Scott Straus, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 2015, 400 pages

Scott Straus's *Making and Unmaking Nations* is a very good book, although it may not be of much direct use for the operational artist. The author explores the phenomenon of genocide from a very interesting perspective. Instead of solely exploring cases of genocide, he also examines *near genocide*—cases where the environment was ripe for genocide but it did not occur. Straus uniquely approaches genocide from a lens of pseudocomplexity. While he clearly and correctly indicates that genocide is a complex political phenomenon, he only somewhat embraces complexity theory and never references or uses any of the rich literature on that subject. This is a minor shortcoming in such a novel work on genocide and state formation.

Some might take umbrage with the small number of cases Straus examines, but that would be a mistake; he intentionally focuses on African cases of genocide and near genocide so he can compare similar cases. They are from a similar period, which means they arose in a comparable strategic context. The cases studied where genocide was considered likely but did not occur involved the Ivory Coast from 2002 to 2011, Mali from 1990 to 1995 and 2011 to 2012, and Senegal from the late 1980s to 2011. Conversely, the author also studied Sudan from 2000 to the present and Rwanda in 1994, as the cases where genocide did occur. It is clear that Straus is interested in honestly exploring why genocides occur—and do not occur—rather than selecting favorable cases to promote a preconceived policy or theoretical agenda.

Straus's studies of Mali and Rwanda, which are very similar cases—provide very different results. In both countries, the same precursors and interethnic or interreligious animosities were present. However, a key difference was that the Malians shared a common nationalist history that the tribes embraced; their culture embraced “specific values of humility, tolerance, patience, justice sharing, and solidarity,” which were

instrumental in preventing genocide. Further, the political elite were more prone to a dialogue of unity and shared cultural history despite the animosity that existed between different tribal and religious groups.

In contrast, Straus notes that the predominant narrative about Rwandan state formation was laid on a foundation of animosity, and the Hutu political elite were particularly vitriolic in their narrative that the Tutsi minority had mistreated the Hutus during colonization. While parallel governmental institutions arose in Mali, the elite there sought to constrain their influence. In Rwanda, the political elite supported some of these very same parallel governmental institutions, especially local militias. The more radical genocide proponents were given a great boon to exploit when President Juvenal Habyarimana was assassinated, an event that generated fear among Hutus, and the more radical politicians argued more forcefully for genocide. For Straus, it is not only political elite ideology but also the important link between political elite and local populations that allows genocide to occur.

The analysis of these cases leads Straus to conclude that “the strongest commonality among violence in cases, and the factor that the negative cases lack, is the ideological dominance among the political and military elite of a hierarchical, nationalist founding narrative.” Given Straus's earlier assertion that genocide carries heavy political and economic costs by dragging large numbers of people out of production, the narrative and ideology must be very strong indeed to motivate a group of people to perpetuate genocide against others.

However, if Straus is correct, the implications for the mass-atrocity-response-operations camp and the responsibility-to-protect camp are staggering. It is hard to imagine military operations to prevent or respond to genocide or other mass atrocities. Straus notes that one of the best preventive measures to genocide is to construct a narrative of inclusion in African states. He also notes that economic diversity and development—and avoidance of armed conflict—are good preventive measures.

Unfortunately, none of this falls under the purview of an operational artist. You could argue that the regionally aligned forces program might, in part, serve toward this end, in that professionalizing African

militaries may reduce the likelihood of these militaries resorting to genocide. In terms of responding to genocide, Straus notes that military interveners have successfully established demilitarized zones and helped end genocidal conflict. However, unless the foreign armies intervening are willing to enforce these zones permanently, there is no evidence that intervention is a long-term solution to mass atrocity.

Straus's work fits nicely into a larger literature on state formation in Africa as well. In the final analysis, this is a great book for anyone interested in studying genocide, state formation in Africa, the power-of-elite narrative, and policy responses to genocide. There is little of direct importance to the operational artist, but it would serve as an interesting primer for anyone deploying to Africa.

Dan G. Cox, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

CLIMAX AT GALLIPOLI: The Failure of the August Offensive

Rhys Crawley, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, Oklahoma, 2014, 384 pages

Last year marked the centennial anniversary of the Gallipoli Campaign, a failed attempt by the British and their allies to break the stalemate in World War I by launching an amphibious landing on a narrow strait in northwestern Turkey known as the Dardanelles.

As progress on the Western Front ground to a halt, from the perspectives of the Allies and the Central Powers in 1915, both sides looked for ways to break the deadlock, to reintroduce maneuver, and to conduct decisive battles. Once thought too risky of an operation by Great Britain's War Office and Admiralty, the idea of an attack on the Dardanelles started to build momentum as a possible solution that could accomplish three objectives: knock the Ottoman Empire out of the war, convince neutral countries such as the Balkan states and Bulgaria to join the Allies or at least to stay out of the war, and secure a line of communication with Russia through the Black Sea. With prodding from Russia, the Allies embarked on a nearly yearlong campaign to bring the strategy to fruition.

The Allies made three major attempts to force the Dardanelles Strait. The first try was a naval campaign that started 19 February 1915 and lasted a little more than a month. Fourteen British and four French capital ships slugged it out with Ottoman shore batteries. With losses amounting to three warships sunk and three more out of action, the Allied naval campaign was called to a halt by the admiral commanding the expedition.

The Gallipoli Campaign, as distinct from the naval campaign, was the second attempt to force the straits. Beginning 25 April 1915, an Allied operation initiated the second attempt, which featured main British landings on the southern Gallipoli Peninsula, and Australian and New Zealand landings just north of Gaba Tepe, located halfway up the Gallipoli Peninsula. The last British action in the south, which concluded 12 July 1915, gained very little ground before the Allies shifted the main effort to the landings at Gaba Tepe. This second attempt by the Allies to break through the Ottoman defenses resulted in battles reminiscent of those fought on the Western Front: hard fighting over difficult terrain with the use of machine guns and artillery on troops concentrated in a very small space.

It is in the third Allied attempt to break out—and through—the Ottoman defenses that author Rhys Crawley focuses his scholarship in *Climax at Gallipoli: The Failure of the August Offensive*. Crawley claims that the historiography of the Allied efforts at Anzac Cove has been distorted by nationalistic sentiment as well as an attempt by the campaign's leading figures to downplay mistakes and to protect reputations. To be sure, there is no shortage of individual or unit bravery on the part of the combined Australian and New Zealand Corps at Anzac. One only has to read Crawley's accounts of the actions at Lone Pine, the Nek, and Sari Bair to get an idea of the determination and heroism of the combatants on all sides. Rather, the author evaluates the operational elements of the Allied August Offensive and asserts that this third attempt to push across the middle of the Gallipoli Peninsula—a distance of eight thousand yards—was not even a "viable" operation.

Climax at Gallipoli divides the August 1915 offensive into six operational elements: planning, mobility, fire support, combined operations, lines of

communication, and supply and transport. Although Crawley does not claim that any one shortfall caused the August Offensive to fail, he does assert that the cumulative effects of biased thinking, antiquated artillery, inadequate ammunition, inaccurate maps, a shared command rather than a unified one, a 3,500-mile line of communication, difficult terrain that favored the defenders, and supply and transport shortages would have made impossible any objective beyond the immediate capture of the initial objective—the beachheads at Anzac Cove and the first ridgeline beyond.

Crawley's thorough research of individual soldier accounts; unit reports; military archives in England, Australia, and New Zealand; and the Dardanelles Commission's report, which investigated the Gallipoli Campaign, lend considerable authority and support to the author's thesis that the operational capabilities of the Allies were simply not enough to carry out a prolonged campaign in the Dardanelles. The usefulness of this book is that it avoids much of the national rhetoric associated with the Gallipoli Campaign and "objectively evaluates the real military limitations and operational potential of the August Offensive."

Mark Hurley, Fort Belvoir, Virginia

**ENEMY IN THE EAST: Hitler's Secret Plans to
Invade the Soviet Union**

**Rolf-Dieter Müller, I.B. Tauris, New York, 2015, 320
pages**

This English translation of Rolf-Dieter Müller's 2011 work brings to light a number of controversial interpretations regarding Nazi Germany's plans for war against Soviet Russia. While the book's last half will be familiar to scholars of Russia's Great Patriotic War, its real value is in the first 145 pages. The author goes beyond the preparations for Operation Barbarossa; he uncovers evidence of war planning by the German military against the Soviet Union as early as 1938, well before Hitler's invasion of Poland—which launched World War II in Europe.

The book starts with Germany's conquest of much of European Russia in 1918; it also describes Poland

besting the "Red Napoleon," the twenty-seven-year-old Soviet Northwestern Front commander Mikhail Nikolayevich Tukhachevsky, in 1920. According to Müller, these experiences laid the groundwork for perceptions regarding favorable German chances for victory against the communists after Hitler came to power in 1933.

Most intriguing is the circumstantial case the author builds to convince the reader that Hitler aimed at aggressive war against the Soviet Union in partnership not only with Japan but also with Poland. Müller does not dismiss the contentions between Berlin and Warsaw over their shared boundary and the imposed "Polish corridor" to Danzig that severed East Prussia from the rest of Germany. Despite this significant obstacle, he shows that a number of senior Nazi officials felt they could work with Poland's militarist leader, Józef Piłsudski—the man who beat Tukhachevsky at the gates of Warsaw—in going against their common foe.

This relationship culminated with a nonaggression pact between the two countries on 26 January 1934; and yet, after Piłsudski died the following year, the Polish government grew distant and evasive. In the spring of 1939, Poland explicitly turned down German offers to join the Anti-Comintern Pact against the Soviet Union; it also simultaneously accepted British guarantees of its neutrality. Only then did Hitler give up his notion of achieving cooperation; he no longer saw Poland as a potential partner but rather as the next target to be subdued.

Müller relates evidence from speeches and officially documented interactions showing that Hitler, when he was in power, never wavered from his original ideas in his book, *Mein Kampf*, regarding waging a war against communism and obtaining land and resources in the east. While the author makes suggestions that actual military plans to do these things existed prior to World War II, explicit sources to back these up have been lost, save for the navy plans and the war games of 1938. These shed light on German military perceptions about prospects for a war against the Soviet Union at that time, and they resemble the 1917 offensives that choked off Russian access to the Baltic Sea. If such moves helped precipitate the Bolshevik Revolution in Saint Petersburg back then, might not a repetition bring down the Stalinist regime in

Moscow? Of course, this assumed a Polish partnership; once Poland sided with Britain to guarantee its neutrality, that notion—and these plans—went out the window.

In a dramatic reversal, Hitler made a deal with Stalin—the infamous Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact—aimed squarely at Warsaw. Of course, we know that Hitler was surprised by the declarations of war made by Britain and France after German troops invaded Poland. Once that conquest was completed, he turned his attention back to the west. The German general staff duly made plans to establish a defensive security zone in occupied Poland against any sort of Soviet incursion, but its importance was greatly eclipsed by Hitler's obsessive concern with defeating the Allies so he could eventually turn to the east.

In the last third of the book, Müller begins building his case that Hitler cannot solely bear the responsibility for offensive war against the Soviet Union. The author convincingly demonstrates that, even after the fall of France in June 1940, the German leader remained fixated on bringing the British to terms. He did not order plans to be made against the Soviet Union at that time. The German general staff, on its own initiative, nevertheless commenced planning without such an order under the direction of its chief of staff, Col. Gen. Franz Halder. This is significant in light of the assertions by German general staff members to the contrary in their postwar memoirs, which the author recounts and refutes in detail.

The remainder of the text details the transformation of military plans from a strategic spoiling attack and preventive war to Operation Barbarossa as a total war of annihilation. Estimates and planning were already well underway when Hitler first told his military on 21 July to “make theoretical preparations” to handle “the Russia problem,” all the while publicly proclaiming two days earlier that any hopes by anyone for new tensions between Germany and the Soviet Union were “childish.” Most controversial is Müller's contention that the 31 July 1940 Berghof meeting—usually interpreted by historians as the point where Hitler gives birth to the concept for Operation Barbarossa as a war of annihilation—is best understood as the German leader's reaction to Halder's conceptions of preemptive, preventive blows. It was not until 3 March 1941—more than two months after he

issued *Directive 21* ordering Operation Barbarossa—that Hitler rejected the traditional military conceptions offered by his generals. Hitler then provided the definitive guidance to his military staffs regarding the brutal nature and all-encompassing character of the massive war he intended to wage.

Not only is this a terrific book for students of World War II, challenging conventional wisdom about the origins of Nazi plans for the Russo-German War as it does, but also it is a marvelous case study for professional military planners. Müller well describes the influence of politics and political leaders on military strategic planning. He also persuasively argues that the German general staff were not completely under Hitler's sway and that the staff members did more self-starting homework than many postwar accounts gave them credit for.

**Col. Eric M. Walters, U.S. Marine Corps,
Retired, Fort Lee, Virginia**

**AS I SAW IT IN THE TRENCHES: Memoir of a
Doughboy in World War I**

**Dae Hinson, McFarland & Company, Jefferson,
North Carolina, 2015, 188 pages**

*A*s *I Saw It in the Trenches* is a first-person memoir written by Dae Hinson, a soldier in the First World War. His original memoir was saved by his nephew, who published the text with the intent of bringing Hinson's experiences during the World War I to the historical record. Reading this book will prove valuable to any reader of military history.

Hinson's memoir is new to the historical record and adds additional understanding, from an interesting perspective, to the history of this war. As with any memoir written by a soldier, this one offers great value to the reader. It stands out because the range and depth of Hinson's wartime experience span three years, from the time of his enlistment in Louisiana through to his last engagement in battle. As an infantryman, his combat experience was extensive. It included fighting in both the Second Battle of the Marne in July and August 1918, and the Battle of Saint-Mihiel in September 1918.

With the exception of an introduction by Hinson's nephew, the book is void of any other narrative. It is an authentic reflection of Hinson's experiences—even with an occasional missing page. His writing style is very descriptive and frank, and he does a very good job describing the indescribable. With little emotion, he conveys what he sees, feels, and experiences. He describes the destruction and death that occurred on such a vast scale that they are incomprehensible today. It took Hinson thirteen years to complete his memoir after the war. Even though this provided him ample time to reflect on his experiences, he chose to describe them with few, if any, judgments or embellishment.

Although his writing style is that of an ordinary person, his ability to describe his experiences for readers is unique. Most will find that his style provides a vivid insight into combat and soldiering in the First World War. His matter-of-fact and detailed descriptions of death, and the deaths of his fellow soldiers, is perhaps not for the casual reader. This narrative, however, serves to illuminate the perspective of a combat-experienced and hardened soldier. There is not the slightest hint of self-promotion in his writing. This characteristic alone makes it a great work.

I highly recommend this book to anyone. As we celebrate the centennial of many events in World War I, it is a poignant and a timely work. A century later, Hinson's memoir makes it possible to view this historically significant point in time through the perspective of a soldier who experienced it—thoroughly—in all aspects.

**Lt. Col. Thomas G. Meara, U.S. Army, Retired,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

**THE UNITED STATES AND THE ARMED
FORCES OF MEXICO, CENTRAL AMERICA
AND THE CARIBBEAN, 2000–2014**

**Rene De La Pedraja, McFarland & Company,
Jefferson, North Carolina, 2014, 332 pages**

The United States and the Armed Forces of Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean, 2000–2014 examines the internal role of the armed forces or constabularies of Colombia,

Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, and Venezuela, and the external influence of the United States. *Armed Forces* presents diplomatic, political, and military history through an uncompromising dependency theory framework.

De La Pedraja makes three major contributions. Foremost, he analyzes nation-states often ignored by writers and provides rich detail on their twenty-first century security and political environments. Next, his descriptions expose the central role of the selected armed forces in *domestic* security. The analysis usefully expands the perspective of those mostly familiar with transnational military roles. Finally, De La Pedraja weaves the raw data of classified WikiLeaks diplomatic cables into the construction of straightforward prose.

Despite its real contributions, *Armed Forces* contains substantive flaws. First, the book rests on two premises: that the United States exploits problems to increase its influence and control, and that the George W. Bush administration was particularly destructive to development. These premises are proffered in the preface and validated through several chapters, with the consequent fallacies affirmed in the final chapter. The intervening fourteen chapters do not systemically analyze these propositions. They are inconsistently addressed in the first chapter on Venezuela and episodically supported through what appears to be selectively biased evidence thereafter. A fair reading of the book might conclude just the opposite—the United States reacts to solve problems, effectively or not, and the Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama administrations have been relatively consistent in policies toward Latin America and the Caribbean.

Second, *Armed Forces* does not explain, or weakly explains, its own evidence. De La Pedraja writes in the final chapter that the United States collaborated with people who were little more than local bit players to engineer the 2002 Venezuela coup, and then quickly sabotaged it. In several chapters, he writes that the United States “controls” the government, and yet is unable to make it comply with its desires. *Armed Forces* contains several assertions of popular will and aid dependency yet does not cite data that in many

cases is publicly available through newspapers, the U.S. State Department, or academic institutions. Many propositions are undermined by the straight-jacketed use of the U.S. foreign policy establishment as the sole explanatory variable.

Last, *Armed Forces* neither disconfirms nor offers alternative explanations for several major assertions. One example of these assertions is that Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez appointed military officers to key cabinet and governmental positions due to the shortage of qualified civilians. A second example is that due to popular governance, the Cuban military was never needed to prevent internal disturbances. And, a third assertion is that because of American military influence, the application of quantification metrics created widespread false positives—deliberate noncombatant killings—in the Colombian counterinsurgency campaign.

Addressing alternative explanations would strengthen these hypotheses. In the final analysis, *Armed Forces* undercuts its own value.

**Richard E. Berkebile, PhD,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

THE BALTIC: A History

Michael North (Translated by Kenneth Kronenberg), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2015, 448 pages

What impact does a more assertive Russia have on the Baltic region? Recent events in the Ukraine and Eastern Europe have drawn attention to former Soviet Union, Soviet Bloc, and other regional states, including Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and Poland—many of which are now NATO members. As such, much of our understanding of this region requires us, as professionals, to reexamine these areas.

The Baltic, a chronological history of the Baltic region originally written in German, is an engaging study of the region. This book is the cumulative result of doctoral and graduate studies by the author and several contributors and was thirty years in the making. The original work, *Geschichte der Ostsee (History of the East Sea)*, was published in Germany in 2011. It was so well received that fellow scholars encouraged the author not

only to translate the original into English but also to add to it with up-to-date research and data.

The author, Dr. Michael North, is the chair of modern history at Greifswald University in Germany. North was also the Fulbright distinguished chair in modern German studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara. Kenneth Kronenberg, the book's translator, is from Cambridge, Massachusetts.

An expertly researched scholarly work, *The Baltic* takes the reader on a journey through the history of the region that all will enjoy. The author explores the era of Vikings (circa 793) and the medieval times to the beginning of the new millennium using selected events, geographical focus areas, and vignettes. North covers economics, politics, military subjects, art, and architecture, following national and transnational ethnicities. The author also skillfully highlights the current and historic influences of the region's inhabitants on one another and their immediate neighbors, including Russia.

The Baltic covers a broad range of subject matter over an expansive amount of time in just 325 pages of text. This approach demands brevity. As a result, some events that military and political historians would focus on as key to European history are not covered in depth. The author, however, covers economic trends, culture, and art in detail and broadens our knowledge and understanding of those aspects in the region.

This book is relevant to all military professionals, scholars, and historians who want to reframe their understanding of the Baltic region outside of the Cold War paradigm. *The Baltic* is important for readers wishing to better understand the region culturally, economically, and politically, and it is instructive on what drives and motivates people and leaders in this region.

Lt. Col. Jacob A. Mong, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE MEDITERRANEAN AIR WAR: Airpower and Allied Victory in World War II

Robert S. Ehlers Jr., University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas, 2015, 536 pages

The *Mediterranean Air War* examines the impact of the air war in the Mediterranean theater and its effects on the larger war

effort. Robert Ehlers presents both the Allied and Axis sides of the equation. The author examines not only the military aspects of the air war but also the political aspects, as well as the critical natural resources and the interplay between the military and civilian leadership. He covers the theater from the prewar strategic situation through the shaping of the air campaign that ultimately led to the Axis defeat in the Mediterranean and beyond.

The book opens with an assessment of the prewar Mediterranean theater. This assessment emphasizes the ways in which strategic choices, strengths, and weaknesses set the theater and shaped the air campaigns that centered on the Mediterranean Sea. Starting with the invasion of Abyssinia by Italy, the developing international crisis is examined—at first between Britain and Italy, and, finally, involving France, Vichy France, Germany, the United States, Greece, and the Balkan countries.

The Mediterranean air war is examined in detail, with an in-depth analysis of the turning points, joint and combined operations, and the air campaign's impact on the larger Allied war effort—not only in the Mediterranean theater but also on the Eastern Front, in France, and in the Middle East. The analysis is not limited to the strategic level; it also examines the operational and tactical levels and how the successes and failures of Allied airpower in the Mediterranean theater were critical in establishing the foundation for combined-arms tactics.

The book does a credible job of explaining the battle of logistics and transportation—and their impact on the battlefields. The author also addresses the deep-reaching impact that this second aerial front had on the Third Reich. It was in the Mediterranean theater that the allied air forces learned how to provide air support for large naval landing forces. In this capacity, the Mediterranean theater proved critical as a strategic and tactical testing ground for the Allies. Moreover, it was a critical theater of operations in its own right.

Without the lessons learned in the Mediterranean, Operation Overlord—and perhaps the war itself—could have ended in a dramatically different fashion. This book tells the vital role of airpower during the three-year struggle for control of the Mediterranean Sea.

I would recommend *The Mediterranean Air War* to anyone interested in the air perspective of World War II and in the development of combined-arms warfare. The book is well written, and the subject remains relevant to this day.

Lt. Col. David Campbell Jr., U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

HELL FROM THE HEAVENS: The Epic Story of the USS *Laffey* and World War II's Greatest Kamikaze Attack

John Wukovits, Da Capo Press, Boston, 2015, 336 pages

John Paul Jones famously stated, “I wish to have no connection with any ship that does not sail fast for I intend to go in harm’s way.” In *Hell from the Heavens*, John Wukovits tells the gripping story of USS *Laffey*, a fast ship that spent almost all of World War II in dire harm’s way.

Three figures are central to a story, which reads like a thrilling war novel. The first is the *Laffey* itself, a Sumner-class destroyer commissioned in 1944. The second is Ari Phoutruides, a crew member whose extensive recollections are primary among those of many sailors presented. Finally, there is the *Laffey*'s captain, Navy Cmdr. F. Julian Becton, who skippered the ship through combat action around the world, from the Normandy landings to the battle of Okinawa.

Wukovits begins with a detailed description of the design of the *Laffey*, one of the first of a class of destroyers built to provide maximum firepower and survivability. His description of the ship's physical plant, as well as excellent photos and drawings provided, furnish the reader with a valuable perspective of both the strengths and the limitations of the vessel.

Next, the author takes the *Laffey* and her crew from commissioning, to shakedown cruise, to combat action off Normandy on D-Day. Becton, winner of a Silver Star Medal in the South Pacific earlier in the war, is an exemplar of inspired leadership as he relentlessly drills his crew, mostly young reservists, to prevail in combat at sea. For students of joint operations, the description of the close interaction of Army

units and Navy fire support ships on the beaches of France is inspiring.

The book truly shines in its final chapters detailing the *Laffey's* ordeal at the hands of kamikazes while stationed on the outermost defense ring around Okinawa. Attacked by no fewer than twenty-two suicide aircraft in less than two hours, the *Laffey* was struck by six kamikazes and a 500-pound bomb. Wukovits's account of this action is spellbinding in its drama and detail. He describes each of the aircraft attacks as discrete actions and delineates the inspiring actions of Becton and his crew—first in fighting, and then in saving, their ship.

While this book presents a personal, brutal account of war at sea, it also ably succeeds in laying out the strategic situation in the Pacific theater and explaining why Becton and his crew were at Picket Station One off Okinawa on 16 April 1945. Commendably, Wukovits also describes the mindset and philosophy of the kamikaze pilots and their commanders, rendering them as human, thinking actors instead of suicidal robots. *Hell from the Heavens* is richly documented with primary sources, from interviews with Phoutruides and other surviving crew members to official combat reports and deck logs.

This outstanding book sheds light on numerous subjects: ship design, the battle of Okinawa, and U.S. Navy anti-air tactics at war's end. But, most important, it focuses on the human aspects of war at sea: how, through training, experience, and mutual trust, Becton and his crew emerged victorious. While the events described are seven decades old, this book holds priceless lessons for men and women who today take fast ships into harm's way.

Robert M. Brown, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

**VIGNETTES FROM VIETNAM: Brief Moments
of Sanity and Belated Notes of Gratitude**

**Brice H. Barnes, Outskirts Press, Denver, Colorado,
2014, 258 pages**

They are known by several names. Some people call them sleepers. Others may label them hidden gems. In essence, these labels both refer to things that are of high quality—yet are known

only by a small group of people. Readers of military history feel a sense of duty to share with other readers any book that could be categorized as a sleeper or a hidden gem. Thus, in honoring my obligation, I would like to highlight a book which will likely be underpublicized but is truly worthy of extensive readership—Brice Barnes' superb *Vignettes from Vietnam*.

Within his volume, Barnes has assembled a collection of vignettes focused on his two tours in Vietnam. He served as a platoon leader, company commander, and psychological warfare/political warfare advisor to the South Vietnamese army. These positions certainly afforded Barnes a wide variety of experiences. He has selected nearly three dozen of these to share with readers.

The group of stories Barnes has selected is certainly eclectic. Obviously, many of them are focused on the direct combat situations in which he was involved. In particular, he spends the last portion of his book addressing his vivid recollection of the 1968 Tet Offensive, principally the battle for Widow's Village. In his discussion, he highlights the incredible heroism exhibited by the soldiers in his battalion, the 2nd Battalion, 47th Infantry Regiment. Additionally, he shares with readers the profound impact the battle had on the rest of his life.

Barnes perfectly blends his accounts of combat with many vignettes centered on far less serious topics. These range from rest and relaxation excursions, to escapades in the officers' club, to the things soldiers did during their down time. With vignettes titled "My Introduction to Victoria Bitter," "Convoy Permits? We Don't Need No Stinkin' Permits," and "The Purloined Peanut Mill and other Larcenies," it is obvious Barnes has provided readers with many light-hearted stories.

One characteristic the vignettes share is that each is extremely well written. Obviously, there is an art to telling stories in verbal or written form. The author has clearly mastered the written art form, and this mastery is prominently displayed within the pages of *Vignettes from Vietnam*. Barnes writes in a highly conversant style (an obvious must for this volume), which is very energetic and descriptive. Just as important, he is succinct and not overly verbose in detailing each vignette. These qualities combine to create a volume that is incredibly engaging and readable.

A unique aspect of *Vignettes from Vietnam* is the concluding sentences Barnes adds to many of the vignettes. Readers will find Barnes utilizes these conclusions to pay his gratitude to various people who figure prominently in each vignette. In several cases, they are soldiers who made the ultimate sacrifice while serving in Vietnam. Barnes decision to include his thanks is powerful and adds tremendously to the vignettes.

In his introduction, the author states, “My purpose in this writing is to convey a bit of humanity into what sometimes were inhuman circumstances, to add personal touches, and to offer anything that I can to aid in the healing of old wounds. As the title also suggests, I want to extend some long overdue thanks to certain individuals whose contributions to the vignettes made this entire book possible.” Barnes has, unquestionably, achieved his purpose. In addition, he has written a superb book that is well worth anyone’s valuable reading time.

Rick Baillergeon, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

**THE CAUSE OF ALL NATIONS: An
International History of the American Civil War**
Don H. Doyle, Basic Books, New York, 2014,
400 pages

The Civil War is an unending fascination for most Americans. Don H. Doyle presents the American Civil War in its international context. In *The Cause of All Nations*, he shows how the meaning of the war evolved in parallel ways for European and American opinion makers—the ways they perceived the war reflected their hopes and fears, which revolved around the issues of freedom and liberty. The first issue was expressed in terms of abolishing slavery, the latter in terms of republicanism and democracy.

In the broadest sense, the war originated in two competing visions of white man’s democracy. The first was based on the concepts of free soil, free men, and free labor. Those concepts posited a relatively fluid social structure founded on individual merit and mass democratic politics, a structure buttressed by national government policies emphasizing the

indissoluble nature of a federal union acting for the common good.

The other vision was based on a relatively rigid social structure based on the dominance of an agrarian upper class posited on a form of mass politics. The lower orders followed the political lead of their social betters, in a structure buttressed by a minimalist local and national government and emphasizing state autonomy—except when federal action would serve to support agrarian upper-class interests.

Doyle sets this American crisis in a global context, showing how the potential dissolution of the American union gladdened conservatives (who were hostile to democracy and republicanism and believed in a social order based on aristocratic hierarchy) and dismayed liberals (who believed in republicanism or constitutional monarchy and freedom of conscience).

For the most part, European aristocratic elites could not openly approve of slavery but were excited about the imminent failure of the Great Republic. For these interests, the federal Union’s dissolution would destroy the republican political experiment and open the path to increased imperial European domination of the Caribbean Basin and Mexico, as well as the continued existence and extension of slavery. The more radical hoped for a continued fracturing of the United States into several regional confederations dominated by European powers. Thus, the American Civil War was a conflict shaped by European interests. The end of democracy in North America would allow the Europeans to triumph over their own reformers and revolutionaries. Doyle shows how the public opinion battle was shaped by these beliefs.

The book is organized in three parts: “Only a Civil War,” “The American Question,” and “Liberty’s War.” In the first part, the author poses what he calls Garibaldi’s question: Was the Civil War only about the preservation of the federal Union, or was it about something greater, that is, human liberty? He shows how this question was answered unequivocally by the secessionists and how the United States tried to sidestep the issue. The southerners aimed for independence in order to preserve slavery, while the Union promised Britain and France it would set the world ablaze if they interfered in American internal affairs.

In “The American Question,” the writer explores the question of liberty versus tyranny and shows how Union and Confederate agents communicated their governments’ ideas to the various European publics, relying on local agents to stress the benefits of either social hierarchy or democracy. He stresses the ways in which Northern advocates tapped into the idealism present in European societies to force their governments to remain neutral. In addition, he shows how Northern advocates aided recruiting soldiers to the Northern cause, soldiers who fought for their own reasons, one of which was the furthering of democratic values for their own societies. In the final part, “Liberty’s War,” Doyle shows the ways in which the logic of the war led to emancipation and the abolition of slavery—and the effect this had on European opinion. The choice between Union and Confederacy came down to one’s belief in the morality of slavery and the possibilities inherent in unleashing human potential—which would eventually lead to societies based on equality.

At the end, Doyle presents a different interpretation of the significance of the Statue of Liberty, or “Liberty Enlightening the World.” She faces east, and the iconography suggests American liberty broke the chains of slavery and serves as a beacon and an example to the world. The figure of Liberty, and liberty itself, is moving toward Europe. While in a narrow sense, the statue is a monument to Franco-American friendship, it also shows the worldwide significance of the American Civil War, which not only decided the fate of slavery but also of democracy and democratic ideals.

Lewis Bernstein, PhD, Woodbridge, Virginia

**AFTER ETHNIC CONFLICT: Policy-making
in Post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina
and Macedonia**

**Cvete Koneska, Ashgate Publishing, Burlington,
Vermont, 2014, 187 pages**

The unrest in the Balkans during the 1990s—fueled in part by a failed communist system, opportunistic nationalist political elites, historical grievances, and interethnic

divisions—exposed to the world one of the most brutal ethnic conflicts in contemporary history. Not only did this conflict have an effect on all the former Yugoslav countries, but it also had a major impact on the region and Europe as a whole. It has been nearly twenty years since the signing of the Dayton Accords that ended this conflict. Much of the recovery work continues today, but ethnic issues still impede progress in the region.

Cvete Koneska’s small volume on a very complex subject is part of a broader Southeast European Studies series on the Balkans. The book focuses on answering the question, why do political elites in postconflict ethnically divided states choose to accommodate or resist each other across ethnic lines? Koneska looks beyond the violence and the immediate postconflict environment within Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, an environment created by external powers. The author examines the internal political processes and explores the factors behind the different policy outcomes that sustain or undermine peace and ethnic cooperation in ethnically divided societies.

The book is divided into four major sections, with multiple chapters providing subject and research context, historical and institutional background, postconflict successes, and continuing challenges in these former Yugoslav countries. Each chapter is organized chronologically, and each alternates perspectives between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. This approach enables the reader to understand the research methodology, variables, and analysis. The author skillfully reviews relevant academic literature on ethnic accommodation, showing how the relationships between institutions, power-sharing mechanisms, political elites, and group identity help shape policymaking in ethnically divided populations.

Of particular interest is Koneska’s in-depth discussion and analysis of domestic factors within each country that influence the political actors and the decisions they make. Her analysis identifies four key drivers of postconflict cooperation—cross-cutting identities, minority veto powers, territorial autonomy, and informal practices—to explain interethnic political accommodation. Although accommodation exists in both countries, Koneska convincingly demonstrates

that the degree of accommodation greatly depends on the policy area, domestic political context, and existing power-sharing arrangements. The author's insights and perspectives on aspects of ethnic conflict are intriguing.

Written in a style that is both educational and easy to read, *After Ethnic Conflict: Policy-making in Post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia* provides an opportunity for researchers, and government and military professionals, to better understand the challenges and opportunities of postconflict reconciliation and state building. Well documented and organized, this book is an excellent example of a comparative study, balancing both history and political science discipline methodologies. I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in ethnic conflict in the Balkans and postconflict policymaking in ethnically diverse societies. This book would make an excellent companion to Steven E. Lobell and Phillip Mauceri's *Ethnic Conflict and International Politics: Explaining Diffusion and Escalation*.

**Lt. Col. Edward D. Jennings, U.S. Army,
Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas**

**KAITEN: Japan's Secret Manned Suicide
Submarine and the First American Ship It Sank
in WWII**

**Michael Mair and Joy Waldron, Berkley Publishing
Group, New York, 2014, 363 pages**

Historians have written a great deal about kamikaze aircraft in World War II. The fanatical pilots used their aircraft as missiles in an attempt to destroy as many American ships and to kill as many American service members as possible. Yet, despite public fascination with these suicide weapons, historians have, for the most part, neglected the Imperial Japanese Navy's employment of suicide submarines. Michael Mair and Joy Waldron's *Kaiten: Japan's Secret Manned Suicide Submarine and the First American Ship It Sank in WWII* addresses this void.

The book serves as a dual history of the *kaiten* (heaven shaker) suicide submarine program in Japan and the career of USS *Mississinewa*, a Navy oiler.

The narrative shifts between the two stories, culminating at Ulithi Harbor on 20 November 1944, when the first *kaiten* suicide submarine—actually a manned torpedo—struck and destroyed the “Mighty Miss.” Michael Mair's father, John, served aboard the *Mississinewa* at the time, and before passing away, he motivated his son to chronicle these events.

Mair and Waldron weave numerous interviews with both American and Japanese participants, as well as action reports and deck logs, into a very compelling narrative. The authors chronicle the twenty-month-long development of the Japanese *kaiten* program, which involved adapting the famed Long Lance torpedo and recruiting and training pilots for manned operations. Mair and Waldron also painstakingly identify which *kaiten* and pilot from the *Kikusui* mission—the first Japanese manned torpedo mission of World War II—corresponded with which documented explosions in and around Ulithi on 20 November 1944. Similarly, Mair and Waldron provide a fascinating look at the operations of a U.S. Navy oiler, a ship that usually receives little attention from historians. The individual experiences of members of the *Mississinewa* crew significantly enhance the narrative.

In places, however, the authors' storytelling becomes overly dramatic, perhaps even slightly fictionalized. For example, as Sekio Nishina is piloting his *kaiten* toward the *Mississinewa*, Mair and Waldron relate that he “fought to concentrate,” that “he felt his hands slippery on the wheel,” and that “the warrior's band around his brow was damp with sweat.” They even add that his “craft weaved through a school of striped orange fish,” all while on a mission from which Nishina had no ability to communicate and from which he, obviously, did not return.

Rather than exaggerating the drama of the events, it might have been more useful to address the larger issues pertaining to the psychology of suicide weapons. What toll did this level of devotion to one's nation exact on those who survived? The authors mention a high suicide rate after the war among the surviving *kaiten* pilots yet choose not to examine this any further.

Still, the book tells a fascinating and engaging story about a largely neglected World War II episode. It is recommended for a popular audience interested in

naval history, World War II in the Pacific, or Japanese suicide weapons.

Derek R. Mallett, Fort Gordon, Georgia

**THE OXFORD ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF
THE FIRST WORLD WAR: New Edition**

**Hew Strachan, Oxford University Press, Oxford,
United Kingdom, 2014, 400 pages**

My grandfather fought in the First World War, but he would not talk much about it. This absence of information generated within me a deep interest in the conflict; thus, on my shelf are autobiographies, biographies, atlases, general histories, and specific histories on the Great War. Each provides insights into the conflict that initiated the “modern age.” Missing from my shelf was an illustrated history of the topic, but the *Oxford Illustrated History of the First World War* fills that void nicely.

The *Oxford Illustrated History* is an anthology that fills a niche both for generalists and for military historians seeking concise information on the war. Although ordered strangely—maneuver warfare in 1914–1915 comes between the chapter on strategy of the Central Powers but before the chapter on the strategy of the Entente Powers—the chapters cover topics from the game plan for each side. These include the politics of the Balkans and Turkey, air and naval strategies, the role of women in the war, statecraft on the home fronts, mutinies and military morale, and the peace settlement.

In the era of the Internet, Instagram, and YouTube, it is easy to forget the importance that simple illustrations and graphics played in the struggle between combatants for the “hearts and minds.” The *Oxford Illustrated History* does a brilliant job demonstrating public relations campaigns of the era as well as providing a feel for the conflict. For example, a photo of Imperial German Army Gen. Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck (famous for frustrating the Allies in East Africa for years) riding atop a mule, while his rag-tag but undefeated army of whites and Africans stretches into the far distance on the African plain, provides a better sense of the campaign in German East Africa than text alone could accomplish.

Among the many black-and-white illustrations are twenty-six color images that provide a sharp and vivid reminder that not all was bleak during the war. Additionally, they demonstrate the skill of the artists employed during the war, in tasks such as developing and painting various camouflage patterns. Such work can only be portrayed effectively in pictures.

From an academic perspective, the *Oxford Illustrated History* lacks footnotes or endnotes. This likely was done to improve readability. The first edition was published in 1998, but the editor strengthens the value of the book with this new edition by adding new illustrations, including an excellent further reading list and new material.

Two things would have made the book better. First, the illustrations are more ancillary than the engine that drives the story. The book would have benefited from making the illustrations the star—allowing the reader to flip through the pictures, absorbing the ebb and flow of the war—and limiting the text to captions. Second, the maps are very poor quality, and they are placed at the back of the book. They do not provide the reader with a feel for the conflict, and they provide little of the information that is vital to an understanding of the unfolding of the war, such as terrain features or scale.

Overall, despite these flaws, the *Oxford Illustrated History* is well worth a place on any security professional’s bookshelf.

Karsten Engelmann, PhD, Stuttgart, Germany

**MEN OF WAR: The American Soldier in Combat
at Bunker Hill, Gettysburg, and Iwo Jima**

**Alexander Rose, Random House, New York, 2015,
460 pages**

Widely published author and historian Alexander Rose has delivered another outstanding book with *Men of War: The American Soldier in Combat at Bunker Hill, Gettysburg, and Iwo Jima*. Rose examines three iconic battles from the perspective of the participants, in answering the question, what is it like being in battle? Inspired by John Keegan’s *The Face of Battle*, Rose goes beyond a general description of the battles. He includes

historical accounts and vignettes that provide the reader with an overview of the individual soldier's experience at these battles, and with an understanding of the ever-evolving nature of war.

Rose's description of each battle's aftermath provides insight on how the experience affected individuals. Two of the more interesting insights are on the psychological scarring of combatants and the looting of the dead. The traumatic experiences associated with warfare often result in psychological scarring of combatants. Assigning diagnoses of posttraumatic stress syndrome to veterans of earlier wars is difficult, partly due to changing standards and definitions. Rose, however, refers to a sophisticated statistical analysis of the postwar medical records of 17,700 American Civil War veterans that found a strong correlation between the percentage of regimental soldiers killed and an increased incidence of postwar gastrointestinal and cardiac problems, nervous disorders, and depression among survivors. Rose concludes that the number of a man's friends killed stands as an index for the effects of psychological stressors, such as experiencing intense combat, handling corpses, witnessing death and dismemberment, killing others, and realizing the probability of one's own death.

Rose finds looting of the dead, like psychological scarring, common among combatants at the three battles. Looting goes beyond the collecting of equipment and personal items of dead enemy combatants for souvenirs. Rose describes accounts of British soldiers looting their own after the Battle of Bunker Hill. In several instances, looting included the plundering of wounded on the battlefield and of buried corpses. The opening of tombs and graves by off-duty British soldiers reached a point that caused Gen. William Howe to announce that anyone caught doing so would be severely punished. Looting took a twist at Gettysburg when the Union Army's Medical Museum sent doctors out to collect specimens for study, and in Iwo Jima, where marines were reported to have collected gold teeth and Japanese skulls. Rose states that soldiers justified the plundering of the dead to help make up for the privations experienced and the risks they ran for modest wages.

Rose challenges Keegan's assertion that the phenomenon of combat is immutable throughout time.

He counters that while American soldiers throughout time have shared similar experiences, their psyches and behaviors have differed. Americans who fought at Bunker Hill viewed war as a brief interruption of their daily lives as farmers; this contrasts those who fought at Fallujah or Afghanistan, who sometimes viewed it in more exhilarating terms. Rose supports his argument in reminding readers that American patriots at Bunker Hill engaged British forces for only a few hours, while marines on Iwo Jima engaged Japanese army forces thirty-five days straight.

The strength of *Men at War* is Rose's ability to capture the detail and brutality of each of these battles into a fascinating study of men in combat. Rose's *Men of War: The American Soldier in Combat at Bunker Hill, Gettysburg, and Iwo Jima* is a great choice for anyone interested in history or the psychological experience of combat. It is highly recommended addition to the literature of American military history.

Jesse McIntyre III, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

RING OF STEEL: Germany and Austria-Hungary in World War I

**Alexander Watson, Basic Books, New York, 2014,
832 pages**

The one hundredth anniversary of the Great War has unleashed a drumfire barrage of new books on the conflict. While the duds in this barrage will be quickly forgotten, the books of lasting value will expand and enhance our understanding of the war. Alexander Watson's *Ring of Steel* is a very solid entry in this second category.

In an earlier work, *Enduring the Great War*, Watson provided a thoughtful comparison of the war as experienced by German and British soldiers on the Western Front. In this new book, Watson's more ambitious goal is to examine and compare the war experience of the two societies: the German Reich and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, together the most important of the Central Powers. Within that goal, the author's focus is on the mobilization of the two societies to support a *total war* unlike any seen before. He finds that although Germany was far more modern and ethnically homogeneous than

its multinational ally, both empires were initially successful in unifying their people for the war effort. However, over time, the enormous bloodletting on the battlefield, along with political and economic mismanagement, would have a disintegrating effect on social and political unity in both countries. Germany seemed more resilient; however, Watson contrasts how in the last two years of the war, Hindenburg and Ludendorff's military dictatorship continued to seek vast conquests while seeming to ignore the great longing for peace among German people. Meanwhile, in Austria-Hungary, military incompetence and the harsh repression of the subject nationalities—southern Slavs, Czechs, Ruthenes, and Poles—worked with growing starvation in wicked synergy to unravel the bonds that held the Habsburg union together. In comparing the social and political fragmentation of the two empires, Watson reminds us that both of the monarchical states proved incapable of meeting the challenge of a long, costly war against an enemy alliance with powerful advantages such as geography, population, and industrial capacity.

The scope of Watson's wide research is impressive. His work offers the reader a scholarly update on much of the modern historiography of World War I while adding his own lucid insights. Though his primary focus is on the second subtitle of this book, "The People's War," he is equally adept at covering the military and diplomatic aspects of the war. All that said, praise for this book should be tempered with a warning. Watson's *Ring of Steel* is a very long book on a very complex topic (with the endnotes and bibliography together running to a hundred pages). It is a book that demands an investment of time and attention. This book is worth the investment.

Scott Stephenson, PhD, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

**WAR ON THE SILVER SCREEN: Shaping
America's Perception of History**

**Glen Jeansonne and David Lührssen, Potomac
Books, Dulles, Virginia, 2014, 200 pages**

If one were asked to recall the visage of Gen. George S. Patton Jr., what image would come to mind first? Would it be the real Patton? Or, would it be George C. Scott, the actor who portrayed

him in the epic film *Patton*? If the answer is the latter, then *War on the Silver Screen* may be worth a closer look. In it, historian Glenn Jeansonne and film critic David Lührssen combine disciplines to select the war films they argue best reflect public perceptions and attitudes of the conflicts they portray, having stood the test of time and scrutiny.

Arranged chronologically into four chapters, *War on the Silver Screen* spans the First and Second World Wars, the Cold War, and the War on Terror, leading to the present day. Selected for their enduring impact and their ability to shape today's conversations, the films are placed into their chronological context, given a historical fact check, and judged in terms of cinematic merit and enduring legacy. Most received critical acclaim, garnering one or more Academy Awards. They range from the 1930 film *All Quiet on the Western Front* to *Zero Dark Thirty* in 2012.

One of the book's strengths is that readers of *Military Review* will be intimately familiar with many of the films; indeed, *Twelve O'clock High* remains a part of the current Army Command and General Staff College's leadership curriculum. Others, like *Lawrence of Arabia*, found new life and eager audiences as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq transitioned into counterinsurgency-based conflicts. Military professionals seeking additional depth will be pleased with the authors' inclusion of many more titles—recommended but not reviewed in detail—representing perhaps lesser-known or foreign-made films that nonetheless accurately depict war from their respective eras.

Some may disagree with the inclusion of films such as *The Hurt Locker*, given its gritty portrayal of an unconventional explosives ordnance detachment team chief, or *Zero Dark Thirty*, with its visceral depictions of prisoner torture that ostensibly produced direct intelligence leading to the raid that killed Osama bin Laden. This is not the authors' point, however, as the films were selected neither for their military nor historical veracity but for their lasting ability to shape current discussion on the conflicts they portray.

War on the Silver Screen is not without its flaws. At times, the historical context seems to overshadow the review of films; this is the case particularly with the final chapter on the War on Terror, where the

2006 film *United 93* seems to be given short shrift. Additionally, the book ends too abruptly with a two-paragraph summary following the review of *Zero Dark Thirty*. It would benefit from a stand-alone conclusion to tie the book's themes together and end the discourse more smoothly.

Despite these shortcomings, *War on the Silver Screen* will certainly enhance one's understanding and enjoyment of the selected films, whether seen for the first or tenth time. Perhaps better suited for the novice, and offering less for the military professional, the book is, nonetheless, concise and highly readable. It would seem right at home sitting next to one's videos of *Gallipoli* and *Dr. Strangelove*.

Mark Montesclaros, Fort Gordon, Georgia

GENERAL LESLEY J. MCNAIR: *Unsung Architect of the U.S. Army*

**Mark T. Calhoun, University Press of Kansas,
Lawrence, Kansas, 2015, 432 pages**

Most people studying World War II have only heard of Lt. Gen. Lesley McNair because of his death by friendly fire in Normandy. For some, McNair is not recognized as one of the great World War II generals and, thus, is not considered worthy of a detailed study. With author Mark Calhoun's book, however, this may no longer be the case. Calhoun provides a detailed study of McNair—justifying his inclusion as one of the key leaders of World War II—and points out that many historians may have been unfairly critical of him.

In conducting his research, Calhoun had a daunting task. Conventional wisdom suggested that there were "insufficient archival records to support a detailed analysis" of McNair's career. Through diligent research, the author managed to uncover a large collection of papers that provide compelling evidence of McNair's achievements and enhance the historical understanding of both the man and his contributions.

Calhoun succeeds in his goal to provide an objective assessment of McNair's performance, and readers will gain an appreciation for McNair as an innovator and a loyal professional. Known for his

dedication and selfless service, he had no interest in fame or notoriety. The author connects how McNair's early experiences shaped his later ideas and decisions regarding how to organize and train the army that won World War II. In his analysis, Calhoun provides a balanced assessment of McNair. He candidly addresses his strengths and his weaknesses, and how they shaped him as a leader. The author also provides context for critical times and events to help the reader understand not only what was going on but also the conflicting sides of any dilemma McNair confronted.

Because of the many predicaments McNair had to confront, he has his critics. Calhoun addresses the often-cited criticisms, and his evidence and assessment show that many of those criticisms may be unwarranted.

The author's additional goal is to highlight the importance of studying the often-overlooked staff officers. He shows how McNair made significant contributions while serving on the staffs of various commanders, most notably as the chief of staff for General Headquarters and as the Army Ground Forces commander for Army Chief of Staff Gen. George Marshall. Calhoun shows how McNair's role in implementing Marshall's vision is key to understanding why the U.S. Army was so successful in World War II. Although some critics contend that McNair made some poor decisions in doctrine application and organization, Calhoun reminds us that, as a staff officer, McNair was responsible for implementing the decisions of his commander. He writes that although Marshall trusted McNair, "Marshall reviewed and commented on even minor administrative issues that fell under McNair's jurisdiction—not the sort of oversight one would expect for a commander given free hand to carry out his duties."

The title of Calhoun's book, *General Lesley J. McNair: Unsung Architect of the U.S. Army*, is appropriate. McNair's contributions to the Army's victory in World War II may not have made headlines, but they were vitally important. I recommend this book for readers interested in World War II and the biographies of great leaders. McNair deserves a place among the great leaders of World War II, and this book helps put him there.

Robert J. Rielly, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas