Spc. Josh Guderian (left), Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Team, and Staff Sgt. Matthew Hoffman, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 448th Civil Affairs Battalion, discuss a patient who collapsed during a Medical Civic Action Program, or MEDCAP, in Lunga Lunga, Kenya, 24 August 2012. Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa was involved in the MEDCAP, one of many it participated in across East Africa, aiming to strengthen the capabilities of community health workers, enhance overall community health, provide medical care to underserved communities, and develop trust and confidence with partner nations.

Civil-Military Engagement Program
Enhancing the Mission of Regionally Engaged Army Forces

Maj. Christian A. Carr, U.S. Army

Insurgents, transnational terrorists, criminal organizations, nation states, and their proxies exploit gaps in policy developed for the more predictable world of yesterday. The direct approach alone ultimately only buys time and space for the indirect approach and broader governmental elements to take effect. Less well known but decisive in importance, the indirect approach is the element that can counter the systemic components of the threat.

—Adm. William H. McRaven, Posture Statement to Congress 2013

Ineffective governance create areas that terrorists and insurgents can exploit. CA [civil affairs] forces address these threats by serving as the vanguard of DOD's support to U.S. government efforts to assist partner governments.

—Quadrennial Defense Review Report

Insurgent organizations, similar to the Islamic State (IS), arguably present the United States with its most serious challenge today. The aggressive tactics and ambitious objectives of IS threaten both U.S. foreign policy and global security. After more than ten years of involvement in Iraq by the United States and its allies, how did this threat grow so rapidly? Perhaps oversimplified, but accurate nonetheless, IS grew as a result of ineffective, negligent, and sectarian governance in Syria and Iraq.[1] Generally speaking, a government's inability to demonstrate legitimate governance enables the development of nonstate terrorist and criminal organizations. The challenge to U.S. security is magnified because these organizations are able to project power transnationally and lack political accountability.[2]

Those organizations exploit vulnerabilities that local governments are unable to mitigate. As the vulnerabilities persist, the population begins to shift its support toward organizations capable of addressing their needs, thus weakening the legitimacy of the government. Ineffective governance is not always synonymous with a lack of security forces; rather, it may result from an increase in governance infrastructure that is not state sponsored. For example, the government in Sri Lanka has a robust presence throughout its territory, but it lacks historical legitimacy in much of the country because of sectarian differences. As a result, the nonstate Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam developed an informal infrastructure that was arguably more legitimate in the eyes of much of the populace and competed with the established government.[3] That phenomenon is demonstrated globally and is one of the key contributors in the creation of undergoverned territories. Those threats are so significant to U.S. security, the

U.S. Army Operating Concept (AOC) lists transnational terrorist and criminal organizations as key harbingers of future conflict.[4]

The AOC calls for regionally engaged Army forces to establish a global landpower network, shape security environments, and proactively prevent conflict.[5] Given this view of the future operating environment, this article introduces the U.S. Special Operations Command Civil-Military Engagement (CME) Program and recommends that the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) adopt the CME program to increase both the effectiveness of the regionally aligned forces and address the threats found in undergoverned areas. The CME program can use humanitarian assistance to gain access into ungoverned areas, while potentially providing presence and situational awareness. It can also enhance the unity of effort among Department of State (DOS) and Department of Defense (DOD) activities in support of unified land operations. However, the greatest value of the CME program is its ability to spearhead local governance into targeted, undergoverned regions of interest to the commander, addressing the governance conditions that allow threats to thrive.

This article will first review studies and strategic guidance describing military operations in undergoverned areas. Then it will provide an overview of the CME program and its objectives. Finally, this article presents historical examples of CME missions in Pakistan and Sri Lanka that will demonstrate the value provided to special operations forces (SOF) commanders. Those examples, combined with strategic guidance, demonstrate that the CME program has been critical in the accomplishment of Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) objectives and should

be replicated by FORSCOM and the geographic combatant commanders (GCCs).

Military Operations in Undergoverned Areas

Security cooperation and support to governance are not new Army concepts. In 1961, the secretary of the Army tasked Brig. Gen. Richard G. Stillwell to study activities in underdeveloped countries short of declared war. The study's focus was how the U.S. government should support political stability, conduct paramilitary activities in support of counterinsurgency, and conduct foreign internal defense (FID) in underdeveloped areas. Stillwell concluded that, in an environment possessing characteristics of ineffective governance, activities conducted by U.S. Army personnel would only be effective if done in cooperation with all the elements of national power.[6] In the current environment, regionally aligned forces must remain closely synchronized with the DOS mission in order to be effective.

In 2007, the RAND Corporation published a study on military operations in areas lacking effective governance. This study, titled "Ungoverned Territories," defines ungovernability and provides three recommendations for how the United States may address current threats in undergoverned territories.[7] It first recommends that

the U.S. government reevaluate the role of development assistance. While the United States tends to emphasize security cooperation and military assistance in dealing with the security problems that undergoverned territories generate, the DOD should also strive to extend the reach of government into the targeted regions.

A second recommendation made by the study is to promote competent government practices.[8] Providing expert advice to officials on how to coordinate their actions across departments and minimize bureaucratic competition is an important step in strengthening public-sector capabilities. Joint doctrine also outlines nation assistance and humanitarian-civic actions as tasks that strengthen public-sector capabilities.[9] Finally, the RAND study found that policy prescriptions aimed at addressing ungovernability must also reduce a region's conduciveness to terrorist activities, for example, building the capacity of the local military and counterterrorism forces.[10]

Building military capacity is a task that the DOD performs in many locations around the globe and appears to be the focus of regionally aligned forces. Joint doctrine calls for the use of FID and counterterrorism activities to address a region's conduciveness for terrorist activities.[11] However, this study emphasizes that while FID may enhance the capability of the government, it must be conducted in conjunction with other programs that address the perceived ungovernability.[12] This suggests that FID should expand its scope from merely training foreign militaries to training governance organizations; this requires greater synchronization with the DOS.

Regarding the future operating environment, the AOC proposed that the Army, with unified action partners, is equipped to win in the future complex world. To accomplish this, the AOC describes the need for regionally engaged Army forces to shape security environments.[13] However, the description of the threats created by ineffective governance, along with the U.S.

(Photo by Tech. Sgt. Ian Dean, U.S. Air Force)

Capt. Clemeunt Douglass, team chief of Team 0733, Company C, 407th Civil Affairs Battalion, listens as a Djibouti navy sailor briefs his leadership on a mock assessment during the Civil-Military Cooperation Training Course 11 December 2014 at Bat Hill 2, Arta, Djibouti. Members of the Djibouti army and navy participated in several scenarios to test what they had learned in the classroom.

Army strategy to counter those threats, suggests that the regionally aligned forces require a capability to synchronize DOD and DOS activities. This capability does not currently exist programmatically; commanders must either possess the ability to synchronize objectives, or they require an organization with this capability working for them.

Based on the nature of security cooperation, these regionally aligned mission sets are likely to take place in Phase 0 (Shape) environments.[14] This environment

(Photo by Pfc. Roy Mercon, 172nd Cavalry Regiment PAO)

Capt. Terrance McIntosh, a civil affairs officer from Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 1st Squadron, 172nd Cavalry Regiment, distributes supplies during a humanitarian aid mission 25 August 2010 in the village of Bashikal in Parwan Province, Pakistan. The village was affected by damaging floods, and the aid included bags of rice and cooking oil.

is commonly referred to as a Title 22 zone, which signifies that the DOS and the U.S. ambassador assumes the lead for promoting U.S. interests, and the DOD is the supporting organization.[15] As the U.S. Army seeks to become regionally engaged, in order to deter threats derived from undergoverned areas, it appears critical that DOD objectives remain nested within the DOS strategic plans.

Optimal Solution

In 2013, then commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), Adm. William McRaven, presented Congress with a SOF capability that focused on preventing the emergence of conflict by projecting governance into undergoverned areas. He stated, "through civil-military support elements (CMSE) and support to public diplomacy, SOF directly supports interagency efforts to counter violent extremist ideology and diminish the drivers of violence that al-Qaida and other terrorists exploit."[16] McRaven went on to describe CMSE efforts that help prevent terrorist radicalization, recruitment, and mobilization. The CMSE is the element of the CME program of record, executed by civil affairs (CA) soldiers. These elements provide commanders with a valuable way of accomplishing DOD objectives in a Title 22 environment. CMSE efforts are persistent and differ from traditional military campaigns by proactively identifying insurgent ideology and mitigating insurgent abilities to spread that ideology, while synchronizing DOS and SOF activities, and emphasizing engagements and relationship building.

USSOCOM Directive 525-38 formalized the CME program in 2014 (which had been in execution for several years) and provided program direction. CMSE's are scalable, modular, and they deploy at the request of a combatant commander, a chief of mission, or a TSOC in support of theater campaign plans. Unlike the Army-funded Major Force Program 2 (MFP-2), which supports conventional forces, CME is a baseline MFP-11 program that supports SOF forces. However, if adopted by FORSCOM and funded through MFP-2, the core activities of CME could enhance the FORSCOM mission.[17]

The core activities of CME are population-centric within a specific country, region, or area of interest. Core CME activities include:

1. Gain and maintain access to areas of interest.

2. Establish enduring relationships and networks with populations and key stakeholders.

3. Address critical civil vulnerabilities, which could be exploited by destabilizing factors or groups.

4. Plan, coordinate, facilitate, and execute SOF specific programs, operations, and activities, synchronizing short-to-midterm objectives with mid- to long-term U.S. government (USG) objectives.

(Photo by Master Sgt. Dawn M. Price, U.S. Air Force)

Capt. Jill Lynn, a veterinarian assigned to the 402nd Civil Affairs Battalion Functional Specialty Team, Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF–HOA), conducts an examination of a donkey 6 June 2011 during a veterinary civic action project in the rural village of Kagamongole, Uganda. The visit occurred during the first of a three-phase veterinary civic action program sponsored through the collaborative efforts of CJTF–HOA, the Ugandan government, and the U.S. Embassy in Uganda.

identifying and mitigating sources of instability. This training allows CA to be much more palatable to a U.S. ambassador because it provides a solution that is not traditional and, moreover, directly assists the ambassador in gaining access for governance programs. When the *National Security Strategy* seeks to apply the skills of our military, diplomats, and development experts in order to prevent the emergence of conflict, the Army has already equipped CA to bridge all three domains through human interaction.[20]

CA soldiers do not have to confine their activities to permissive or semipermissive areas. As a component of SOF, CA soldiers receive survivability and force protection training consistent with SOF standards. Each member of a CA team, deployed on a CMSE, goes through a full pre-mission training that includes survival, evasion, resistance, and escape; force protection; and counter-surveillance; as well as other regionally specific training. Each team has an organic medic, allowing them to survive injury in hostile or denied areas for short periods of time.[21]

Since 2006, CA soldiers have conducted CMSE operations in over twenty countries that can be categorized as either undergoverned or containing regions that lack central governance.[22] Theoretically, the CME program is a doctrinal and policy solution to achieve SOF and national objectives in undergoverned regions. In addition to CA's Title X directives, the CA regiment's doctrinal tasks of civil reconnaissance, civil information management, and support to civil administration allow them to become the solution for a force that requires a diplomatic soldier, capable of operating in a politically sensitive environment with a small footprint.[23]

All active-duty CA soldiers share SOF as their branch proponent. However, CA soldiers who are assigned to the 95th CA Brigade support SOCOM and

5. Conduct activities by, with, and through host-nation authorities, USG partners, intergovernmental organizations, and NGOs, private entities, or international military partners to deny support to violent extremist organizations or networks.

6. Increase USSOCOM, GCC, TSOC, U.S. country team, and USG situational awareness. Provide understanding of key areas and populations to enable future operations planning through civil information management.[18]

CA is a component of Army SOF, and is specifically tasked by Title X to enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities, coordinate with government agencies, and, if needed, apply the functional specialty skills that normally would be the responsibility of civil government to enhance the conduct of civil-military operations.[19] The CME program, combined with congressional direction, highlights that CA forces have the license to be a primary role player for regionally aligned force commanders.

CA soldiers receive education in language, cultural analysis, vulnerability assessment, mediation, and interagency collaboration. Where a typical soldier focuses on defeating an enemy, CA soldiers train and focus on

TSOC objectives, while those assigned to the 85th CA Brigade support FORSCOM and geographic combatant command objectives. Because the CME program is funded with MFP-2, only those soldiers assigned to the 95th are allowed to conduct activities associated with the CME program.[24] Given the vision found in the AOC, FORSCOM should adopt the CME program to support all of the GCC's regionally aligned forces. This would allow FORSCOM to enhance DOD-DOS interoperability, gain greater situational awareness in targeted regions, and address ineffective governance that leads to insurgent growth.

Pakistan

Pakistan has experienced governance challenges ever since the British government established the Pakistani boundaries between 1871 and 1873. Analysts have noted that undergoverned territories comprise nearly 60 percent of Pakistan's territory. This lack of governance has negative consequences for regional stability and impacts neighboring Afghanistan, Iran, and India. The main regions in Pakistan that exhibit this are the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Baluchistan, and the Southern Punjab.[25]

The RAND studies depict Pakistan as a country that meets every definition of an undergoverned territory. Pakistan historically lacks government infrastructure in its rural and border areas, transforming these areas into undergoverned areas. Those regions along the border created a governance vacuum, which no one was ready to fill.[26] As we have examined, undergoverned territories are the best places for harboring terrorists and criminals, and have the conduciveness for violent extremist organizations to grow.

Interviews with SOF and DOS personnel who operated in Pakistan between 2007 and 2009 provided insight into how SOF was able to meet their counterterrorist objectives. Initially, the CMSE element was very successful at gaining access into the undergoverned regions utilizing

wheat drives and addressing local needs. The entire SOF element was able to capitalize on this access by initiating FID and intelligence programs, along with the traditional targeting process. However, as time passed, the short-term access was no longer the priority for DOS, and the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan began questioning the effectiveness of SOF programs.[27] As with all undergoverned areas, the ultimate goal should be enabling the host-nation governance to penetrate the local societies.

Recognizing this potential failure, the SOF element changed the mission of the CMSE. The new mission

(Map by Michael Hogg, *Military Review*, Visual Information Specialist)

Pakistan

was to work in the U.S. embassy and ensure that all SOF programs were properly synchronized with the Mission Strategic Resource Plan.[28] In this capacity, the CMSE worked daily with U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), DOS, and some of their implementing partners to project Pakistani governance into the targeted regions. As a result, the Pakistani government was able to gain a greater foothold into the FATA region.[29] For example, as the CMSE gained access and began to conduct FID with the local governance and militias, governance infrastructure was created that USAID and DOS could work with. Supporting this

growth, USAID and DOS solidified the governance relationships that were identified by the CA team.[30]

While the CMSE was able to gain access into the FATA and expand DOS support to governance, their actions were intended to support SOF objectives. The Special Operations Command (Forward)-Pakistan commander stated that the CA team's ability to gain access into a targeted region was the most significant capability that they possessed. However, the value to the commander was magnified when they utilized the access gained to identify the source of the insurgent growth, and develop DOS supported governance programs. The CME proved extremely capable of meeting their obligations.[31]

In 2010, a nongovernmental study conducted by the New America Foundation outlined the U.S. and Pakistani responses to insurgent activities in the FATA.[32] The responses include the actions taken by SOF, which are identified in the study as counterinsurgency programs. The most interesting aspect of this study is a survey conducted in the FATA region. This is the first time a survey was conducted in that area and it focused on identifying local perceptions of the United States, Pakistani governance, insurgent groups, corruption, and the judicial system. The results showed that while the SOF programs were initially effective, it was ultimately the governance infrastructure and reforms that led to increased governance in the FATA. The reforms, which began in 2009, allowed secular political parties to compete in Pakistani elections, thus increasing political participation, and reform in the judicial processes that the local militias perceived to be unfair.

The CME in Pakistan was very valuable to SOF, and similar programs could provide similar value to FORSCOM and GCC commanders. Their value was initially confined to gaining access into the FATA by providing essential services. This access—considered a vital capability—was possessed only by the CA unit and supported several SOF objectives. It enabled the identification and targeting of the insurgent networks, and allowed the SOF element to conduct FID with the local militias and the Frontier Corps, the acting government. Those were tactical and operational successes that led to the accomplishment of strategic objectives when the team enabled the Pakistani government to expand into the FATA region, evidenced by the independent, non-USG study. The Pakistan mission provides a great example of how the CME program provided a critical capability to achieve both SOF and DOS objectives.

Sri Lanka

A similar example of the effectiveness of the CME program is found in the mission to Sri Lanka. In 2009, Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa declared victory over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. However, while the Tamil insurgency may have gone underground in the short term, without addressing the root causes of conflict, the possibility for long-term violence remains. The Sri Lankan government still lacks a clear political ability to stabilize the country and enhance government legitimacy.[33] The lack of legitimacy facilitates the many pockets of undergoverned territories in Sri Lanka.

Despite the occupation by Sri Lankan military and an increasing presence of Sinhalese in the north, the Tamil minority feel that "Jaffna is being invaded by Sinhalese. We are losing our culture."[34] Continued media censorship, illegal detention, and human rights abuses inhibit the freedom of Tamil citizens. The Sri Lankan government is working to decrease its military presence with tangible improvements to Tamil's populated regions. This often occurs in the form of infrastructure development, increased economic aid, and inclusionary measures designed to increase Tamil participation in both local and national governance. Without government implemented nonmilitary measures, the Tamil insurgency is likely to remain dormant, only waiting for the right opportunity to reemerge.[35]

The CMSE in Sri Lanka understood the strategic importance of their mission in Sri Lanka, and being able to consistently synchronize SOF and DOS activities. The training and education of the CMSE in Sri Lanka, along with the Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC) directives ensured they understood the Title 22 environment. Their program synchronization and unity of effort built trust with the ambassador and DOS contingent. The CMSE was able to demonstrate their value by ensuring that each of the SOF programs directly supported a DOS or USAID program. As a result, the ambassador expanded the SOF element operating in Sri Lanka, thus increasing SOF capability to successfully combat the extremist organizations.[36] The Sri Lanka mission has endured for over five years and is quickly becoming a mature mission in one of SOCPAC's priority regions.[37]

Like other CMSEs, the element in Sri Lanka was able to provide access for SOF into undergoverned territories and produced a tremendous amount of civil information that drove the information cycle. However, the primary reason for SOF success in Sri Lanka was the CMEs ability to synchronize SOF and DOS objectives.[38] As regionally aligned commanders begin conducting their missions, they would be served well by having a presence in country, focused on synchronizing their missions with the DOS plans.

Conclusion

It is well documented that ineffective governance creates the conditions for terrorist and extremist organizations to find safe haven and grow in power that jeopardizes global stability and U.S. security. In response, USSOCOM developed a campaign to counter those threats, placing emphasis on legitimizing local governance and mitigating sources of instability that fuel insurgent growth and provide insurgents with safe haven. Critical to this campaign is the CME program, which provides the commanders access and information in targeted regions, but perhaps more importantly, can serve as a vanguard for DOS efforts in assisting host-nation governance in order to marginalize terrorist organizations.

While the CME program has provided tremendous value to USSOCOM, the potential advantages it provides should not end there. Given the Army's concept of unified land operations, FORSCOM may also benefit from utilizing the CME program in support of GCC objectives. The CME program has a strong potential to benefit the regionally aligned forces if the GCC's choose to fund

it through an MFP-2 source. This program should support stability tasks and enhance local governance; at a minimum, this program is capable of increasing communication between DOD commanders and DOS in their targeted regions. ■

(Map by Michael Hogg, *Military Review*, Visual Information Specialist)

Sri Lanka

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