
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
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
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
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
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Mao Tse Dong


Isserson


Patton


Rommel


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Military Review

THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF THE U.S. ARMY

May-June 2016

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Greetings!

As I peel away another month from my desk calendar, I am reminded that my time as editor in chief is quickly drawing to a close. This is my last journal letter and, as I write, I find it is with bittersweetness. I am sad to say goodbye to the people who made this assignment a cherished memory and our readers and authors who have so graciously supported *Military Review*, but I am also excited about what lies ahead.

While here, I had the loyal support of the *Military Review*/Army Press staff and a command who granted me the freedom to reestablish the journal as a very relevant and necessary part of Army professional education and as an outlet for scholarly dialogue. I feel the journal has dramatically improved over the last three years, and I look forward to seeing how my successor will take it to even greater heights.

I plan to make the most of the few months I have remaining with *Military Review* and the Army Press by providing our readers with the most engaging and professionally written articles possible. The theme of this edition is "Army Firsts," and as you can see by the cover, we took the liberty of showcasing one of the most exciting Army firsts—The Army Press.

This issue of *Military Review* presents many new approaches to current doctrine and concepts, and how understanding the past can help us understand the future, or the "new." In this edition you will find articles about other Army firsts such as an article by Maj. Brian Hildebrand, who proposes that how well the Army uses decisive action through mission command is contingent on the ability of its leaders to integrate techniques for analyzing different aspects of the human domain into the military decision-making process. He presents a way to analyze the human domain by considering six interrelated social factors.

Another author, Brian Dunn, discusses a novel approach to providing flexible, tailorable, and low-cost support to U.S. Africa Command through the use of containerized mission modules that can be combined into mission-specific packages and transported on civilian container ships. And, Maj. John Bolton puts a unique spin on an old discussion by espousing organic fixed-wing aircraft assigned to Army aviation units to augment Air Force close air support.

Finally, an article I especially like is from Paul Kotakis celebrating the one hundredth anniversary of the Army Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) program. This program has produced two chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, an astronaut, seven Army chiefs of staff, two secretaries of state, and a Supreme Court justice. Kotakis explains how, with over six hundred thousand graduates to its credit, Army ROTC has had a lasting impact on virtually all elements of American society.

Thank you again for your continued support; it's been the best three years of my thirty-one-year career. It is with a heavy heart that I must bid you farewell. Please continue to follow us at http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/militaryreview/index.asp or http://armypress.dodlive.mil/.

A U.S. Army CH-47 Chinook is used to transport soldiers during a combined arms live-fire exercise at Ban Chan Khrem, Thailand, during exercise Cobra Gold, 19 February 2016.

(Photo by Lance Cpl. Eryn L. Edelman, U.S. Marine Corps)

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THE ARMY PRESS

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The Army Press now has an online platform for writers to publish their work. The Army Press Online exists to support the Army University and adds to existing publishing opportunities already available through the Combat Studies Institute (CSI), *Military Review*, and *NCO Journal*.

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Themes and Suggested Topics for Future Editions

Dealing with a Shrinking Army

September-October 2016

- Lessons from post-Civil War, post-World War I, post-World War II, post-Vietnam, and post-Cold War
- Training to standard with limited resources
- Quality retention during forced drawdowns
- The good, bad, and ugly of distance learning
- Institutional and cultural obstacles to innovation in the U.S. Army of the twenty-first century

Tides of History: How they Shape the Security Environment

November-December 2016

- Mao's three stages of revolutionary warfare and the rise of Islamic State and Boko Haram; winning by outgoverning
- Collisions of culture: The struggle for cultural hegemony in stability operations. Can a nation survive without a common national narrative?
- Armies as a cultural leveler: How are armies key to developing a national narrative and identity?

- Open borders: Is North America evolving toward European Union-style governance? What are the implications for the U.S. military if North America becomes a borderless continent?
- Case studies: histories of illegal immigration and how such have shaped national development in various countries
- Does the military have a role in saving democracy from itself? Compare and contrast the military's role in the life of the Weimar Republic and Mohamed Morsi's Muslim Brotherhood rule of Egypt
- How can the Department of Defense better leverage international military education and training to support U.S. Army activities in geographical regions?

"Sacred Cows": What Should Go Away But Won't

January-February 2017

- Army institutions, processes, customs, or doctrine that are anachronistic and impede needed change and progress
- How social change is having an impact on the Army
- Relevance of the Uniform Code of Military Justice: What is the state of military justice and military policing, including corrections? What crimes do soldiers commit, not just against detainees but also against other soldiers, their families, civilians, or unified action partners? How well do people accused of crimes receive due process? Is military justice applied fairly and equitably across all ranks?
  Is racism or excessive force an issue of concern for military police? How well trained are military police as compared to civilian counterparts?

Mission Command Revisited

March-April 2017

- Has the philosophy of mission command taken hold? In what ways has it succeeded or failed?
- Doctrine 2015: Is it working?
- Span of control: How do automated mission command systems impact it?
- Case studies: the use of the Army design methodology on operations
- Modularity ten years after: an evaluation
- Noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and mission command: Are we blurring too much the lines between officer/NCO duties and responsibilities? Are we training soldiers or quasi-commissioned officers? What is the impact of changing NCO evaluation reports, schooling, and the Army University on the enlisted force?



U.S. Army soldiers with 6th Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment, 3rd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, prepare to search Starkats Village, Khowst Province, Afghanistan, 2 April 2011.

(Photo by Pfc. Donald Watkins, Combat Camera Afghanistan)

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About the Cover: *Military Review* pays tribute to some of history's great military thinkers and writers. The Army Press provides a platform for current and future writers to follow in their footsteps.
(Photos taken from sources in the public domain)

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Mark A. Milley—General, United States Army Chief of Staff

Official:

Gerald B. O'Keefe—Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army

LAST CALL!

2016 General William E. DePuy Special Topics Writing Competition

This year's theme is Educating the Force: What is the right balance between training and education?

Possible topics include but are not limited to—

- Do soldiers really need higher education? If so, to what level?
- Are the Army's professional military education (PME) programs teaching the right objectives; and, if so, are graduates applying them? How should the Army ensure PME reflects the force's needs?
- How should the Army measure the effects of PME on the conduct of Army operations? What metrics should it use?
- How should the Army measure the effects of Army education on soldiers' careers?
- How well is the Army taking advantage of any educational opportunities it provides soldiers?
- How well are the civilian study programs the Army pays for benefitting the force or the careers of soldiers? What fields of study does the Army need most?
- How should the Army change the way it uses the expertise soldiers gain through civilian study?

Contest Closes 11 July 2016

1st Place	$1,000 and publication in *Military Review*
2nd Place	$750 and consideration for publication in *Military Review*
3rd Place	$500 and consideration for publication in *Military Review*

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

U.S. Army paratroopers assigned to 1st Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, load a CH-47 Chinook helicopter prior to an airborne operation on Sicily Drop Zone at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 6 January 2016.

(Photo by Sgt. Juan F. Jimenez, U.S. Army)

Old Generation Warfare

The Evolution—Not Revolution—of the Russian Way of Warfare

Maj. Nick Sinclair, U.S. Army

The post-Cold War honeymoon with Russia is over. Russia's seizure of the Crimea and the subsequent conflict to annex the Donbas imperils the legitimacy of the NATO alliance. U.S. allies on NATO's eastern flank foresee the same aggression occurring in their countries and, having endured Moscow's suzerainty for over a half century, these nations prefer freedom to vassalage.

Consequently, U.S. military professionals must reacquaint themselves with the Russian way of warfare. The *U.S. Army Operating Concept* defines Russia as a "competing power" and a "harbinger of future conflict."[1] Moreover, the *National Security Strategy* speaks of the United States leading the effort toward "countering Russian aggression."[2]

Russian Way of War

One element of Russian resurgence that captivates Western defense circles is the emergence of *new generation warfare* (NGW). However, there is evidence to suggest that Russian actions are not new at all, but altogether consistent based on historical precedents. Russia has adapted its traditional methods—not created entirely new ones—based on political, economic, informational, and technological changes in the operational environment.[3] Analyzing the ends, ways, and means of NGW shows historical consistencies with Russian approaches to warfare combined with adaptations based on the current operational environment.

Strategic Ends

In April 2014, Janis Berzins wrote a well-received paper for Latvia's National Defense Academy in which he defined Russian NGW. In his paper, Berzins argues that one aspect of Russia's military strategy is "doctrinal unilateralism, or the idea that successful use of force results in legitimacy."[4] Russian desires for security are manifested by the expansion of their borders into areas where they perceive threats or instability. A few prominent Russian experts note that the Russian mindset is "the best

(Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

Live Bridge: A Scene from the Russo-Persian War (1892), oil on canvas, by Franz Roubaud. This painting illustrates an episode near the Askerna River where the Russians managed to repel attacks by a larger Persian army for two weeks. They made a "living bridge" so that two cannons could be transported over their bodies.

defense is a good offense." George Kennan, deputy chief of mission to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1947 and author of "Sources of Soviet Conduct," notes that Russian feelings of insecurity and inferiority are to blame for their expansionist tendencies.[5] Elsewhere, Timothy Thomas, a former U.S. Army foreign area officer to the Soviet Union and senior analyst at the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth writes how, after years of depression, Russia is eager to reassert itself in the world of geopolitics.[6]

Russian strategic ends appear to include achieving security by dominating the international order. Russian expansionist policy in the "Russian Military Concept: 2010" states that deterring and preventing conflict lies in Russia's ability "to expand the circle of partner states and develop cooperation with them," and that physically incorporating neighboring territory into the Russian Federation itself (e.g., Chechnya) or as vassal states (e.g., South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and the Donbas) is the best route for security.[7] U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, incredulous of Russia's 2014 intervention in the Ukraine, remarked, "You just don't in the twenty-first century behave in nineteenth-century fashion by invading another country on completely trumped up pretext."[8] Unfortunately, Russia's behavior from the ninth century to the present continues to be fairly consistent

and predictable despite the well-meaning objections of Kerry and like-minded individuals.

Strategic Consistencies

Continuous expansion is consistent with the history of the Russian nation. In 862 A.D., Novgorod, the progenitor of the Russian Federation, was about the size of Texas. After almost 1,200 years, Russia is now twenty-four times the size of Novgorod's original borders.

Catastrophic invasions drove Russian leadership to obsess over the need to establish strategic depth. These invasions include the thirteenth-century Mongolian conquest, the sixteenth-century Swedish invasion, the nineteenth-century Napoleonic invasion, and the twentieth-century Nazi invasion. Russia's public persecution complex ignores the fact that before and after those invasions, Russia routinely invaded weaker neighbors and incorporated their territory into the Russian state.

Skillful diplomacy did not expand Russia's borders, but rather an unceasing campaign of conquest and subjugation on the part of Russia's rulers. The Rurik and Romanov dynasties, as well as the Soviet Union, continually expanded the nation's borders. The deeply embedded national psychological mindset that relies on conquest as a means of self-defense stemming from a turbulent and aggressive history helps explain Russian foreign policy today.

Strategic Adaptations

Historically, Russia justified expanding its borders at the expense of its neighbors as a means of seeking security. However, the present-day pretense for why they are doing this is new. Russia's reasons for territorial expansion now have less to do with securing strategic depth and more with securing ethnic Russians outside of its borders.[9] In his book *A History of the Baltic States*, Andres Kasecamp explains how the Soviet Union disrupted ethnically homogeneous areas by forcing large groups of people to relocate from their homes.[10] Kasecamp writes:

> The most dramatic change for Latvia and Estonia during the Soviet era was demographic. Both republics saw [a] massive influx from the East during the post-war years. While Estonia was over 90 percent ethnically Estonian at the end of the war, by 1989 the percentage of Estonians in the population had dropped to 62 percent. During the same time period, the percentage of ethnic Latvians in Latvia dropped from over three quarters of the population to barely half.[11]

Either by accident or design, ethnic Russians colonized key locations within neighboring countries, providing strategic access to Russia, particularly in ports and areas adjacent to Russian borders. However, in 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed. Subsequently, national self-interests reemerged and the Soviet empire dissolved into several nations, leaving pockets of ethnic Russians living as minorities in former non-Russian Soviet nations outside of the newly formed Russian Federation.

The existence of Russian populations outside of Russia's current borders has recently provided the pretext for seizing terrain from the former Soviet states of Georgia and Ukraine. Figure 1 (page 12) shows the regions with the greatest concentrations of Russian citizens, ethnic Russians, and native Russian speakers outside the border of the Russian Federation. In 2005, Vladimir Putin stated that the collapse of the Soviet Union was "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century," and that "tens of millions of our fellow citizens and countrymen [ethnic Russians] found themselves beyond the fringes of Russian territory."[12] After the 2008 conflict with Georgia, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev told the press, "Our unquestionable priority is to protect the life and dignity of our citizens, wherever they are. We will also proceed from this in pursuing our foreign policy. We will also protect the interest of our business community abroad. And, it should be clear to everyone that if someone makes aggressive forays, he will get a response."[13]

Following the seizure of terrain from Georgia in 2008 and seizure of the Crimean district of Ukraine in 2014, this rhetoric has neighboring countries with sizable Russian minorities worried. Ominously, Russia appears intent on meddling in its near abroad as Medvedev said, "Russia, just like other countries in the world, has regions where it has its privileged interests."[14] Berzins observes that Russia learned from Western-led peacekeeping operations in the Balkans. Cynically, Russian leaders will use the international norms of self-determination and an

(Photo by Musa Sadulayev, Associated Press)

A column of Russian armored vehicles move toward the South Ossetian capital Tskhinvali, 9 August 2008. South Ossetia has a large population of Russians, and in 1990 it declared its independence from Georgia. Russian forces invaded South Ossetia in support of pro-Russian separatists after Georgian forces tried to regain control of the territory.

asserted responsibility to protect ethnic Russians in order to justify violating the national sovereignty of their neighbors.

Operational Ways

According to Berzins, Russian NGW favors an indirect approach of influence instead of a direct influence of physical confrontation. "NGW moves from targeting an enemy's physical assets for destruction towards psychological warfare to achieve inner morale decay."[15] Berzins demonstrated the success of the Russian indirect approach in the Crimea, stating that "in just three weeks, and without a shot being fired, the morale of the Ukrainian military was broken and all of their 190 bases had surrendered."[16] As Glenn Curtis points out in his 1989 paper, *An Overview of Psychological Operations,* targeting an adversary's morale is nothing new to the Russian military. The central goal of psychological operations is consistent: "If an opponent's attitude can be influenced favorably, his physical resistance will diminish."[17] He states that Soviet psychological operations were "not invented by the Bolsheviks in 1917; it was used sporadically for centuries by Russian tsars in domestic and foreign relations."[18]

Although psychological operations hold a time-honored place in Russian military tradition, their central role against the West received special emphasis during the Cold War. They were used by Moscow to influence activities in Western domestic politics and to shape outcomes in the Third World. Disinformation, active measures (influencing an opponent through seemingly unrelated third parties) and propaganda represented the front lines between East and West. A few examples include KGB forgeries of "official" U.S. government documents authorizing assassinations and government overthrows as well as the KGB's use of the World Peace Council to petition the U.S. government to make nuclear disarmament terms that were favorable to the USSR.[19] Although Russia lost the Cold War, they did not abandon the indirect approach of psychological operations.

Figure 1. Countries with Ties to Russia

Operational Consistencies

Russia's military operational ways of achieving its strategic ends incorporate classic deep operations. Soviet intellectuals invented deep operations theory as a reaction to the battlefield dynamics of the early twentieth century. Soviet deep operations theorists like Svechin, Triandafillov, and Isserson found the answer to the problem of layered defenses used during the First World War with an offensive that defeats the enemy throughout its entire depth: the deep operation.[20]

Deep operations expanded from a material focus to targeting the morale of the opposing force. In his 1927 book *Strategy*, deep operations theorist Aleksandr Svechin wrote, "War is waged not only on an armed front; it is also waged on the class and economic fronts." He goes on to say that the use of political agitators and propaganda within the opposition's country are crucial efforts to a military operation and must be coordinated.[21] Morale is a crucial factor for any combat force. Clausewitz recognized the importance of morale in the phenomenon of war, making it one of the sides of the paradoxical trinity (reason, passion, and chance).[22]

The adversary's morale became the decisive target for successful Soviet military operations. The Soviet Union was legendary for attacking the moral cohesion of its enemies, sowing division and doubt within its adversaries in hopes of sapping fighting spirit. B.H. Liddell Hart observed this in *Strategy* when discussing

Lenin's ultimate deep fight, the indirect approach targeting Western morale. He stated that "the soundest strategy in any campaign is to postpone battle and the soundest tactics to postpone attack, until the moral dislocation of the enemy renders the delivery of the decisive blow practical."[23]

Operational Adaptations

Russia continues to use deep operations to achieve expansion of its borders, but it has also made great improvements targeting the psyche of adversaries and neutrals. Russian deep operations enabled its territorial ambitions by tearing off pieces of Georgia and the Ukraine with an excuse that it was protecting its native Russian populations abroad and promoting national self-determination. When Russia seized the Crimea, the Ukrainian army capitulated after a well-planned and -executed information campaign.[24]

Russia perfected its use of information warfare through the use of *reflexive control*. In *Recasting the Red Star,* Timothy Thomas defines reflexive control as "a means of conveying to a partner or an opponent specially prepared information to incline him to voluntarily make the predetermined decision desired by the initiator of the action."[25] Russian reflexive control appeared successful targeting Ukraine's NATO partners as well. NATO members were reluctant to get involved in the conflict, effectively isolating the Ukraine from the international community.[26]

Russia uses reflexive control to put its neighbors on the horns of a dilemma. Either the countries allow Russian citizens within their borders and deal with eventual separatist movements, or those countries isolate their Russian populations and give Russia pretense for invasion. In his book *A Little War that Shook the World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West,* Ronald Asmus outlines how this occurred in Georgia in 2008.[27] Asmus accuses Russia of enabling separatist South Ossetians to attack Georgian towns from within Russian-controlled areas. After steady escalation, Georgia responded with a military attack of its own, killing fifty Russian peacekeepers in the process. The Russian response was severe, crushing the Georgian army and acquiring two new vassal states (South Ossetia and Abkhazia) at the expense of Georgian sovereignty. According to Asmus, however, the Russian counterattack force crossed into South Ossetia from Russia days before the Georgian attack even started. Russian information warfare spun a narrative of an aggressive Georgian military that attacked Russian troops, leaving Russia no choice but to counterattack. This classic example of reflexive control allowed Russia to gain territorially at the expense of Georgia. Russia won the information war as well. European news outlets and international bodies assigned Georgia the blame for the war.[28]

Tactical Means

Berzins outlines two developments in Russia's tactical means. First is the use of a hybrid force; the "use of armed civilians (four civilian to one military)."[29] The U.S. Army's Training Circular 7-100, *The Hybrid Threat,* defines the



(Graphic by G. Cabrera, NATO/Reuters)

Figure 2. NATO Expansion

hybrid threat as "the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, and/or criminal elements all unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects."[30] A fighting force comprised predominantly of native militia provides not only an economy of force to the regular Russian military, but also gives legitimacy to the Russian side because the militia lives in the contested regions.

Second are tactics seeking to avoid conflict when possible through "noncontact clashes by highly interspecific forces."[31] These interspecific forces include protesters, rioters, militia groups, biker gangs, nationalists, mercenaries, and *spetsnaz* (special forces) to exacerbate the situation to force a reaction by the host government, which then gives Moscow the justification to intervene with conventional forces. When battle is unavoidable, however, Russian tactics are similar to the encirclement and annihilation tactics of the last century.

Tactical Consistencies

Russia's hybrid force and encirclement and annihilation tactics are consistent with the military history of the nation. In 945 AD, Russian rulers employed a Tatar tribe, the Pechenegs, in a successful campaign against the Byzantine Empire.[32] Another employment of a hybrid force was the use of Cossacks against Napoleon's *Grande Armée* during the retreat from Moscow.[33] And, the Soviet Union's hybrid force during World War II was instrumental in defeating the German invasion. For the Soviets, the partisans provided reconnaissance, assisted in deception campaigns, and provided guides for Soviet forces attacking the Germans.[34]

The idea of encircling and destroying an enemy force has fascinated military planners since its perfection at Cannae. Modern technology made encirclement and annihilation tactics possible in the mid-twentieth century. The Soviets experienced success using this tactic in 1939 against the Japanese in the Battle of Khalkhin Gol (Nomonhan); against the German 6th Army in Stalingrad in 1942; and against the German Army Group Center during Operation Bagration in 1944.[35]

Tactical Adaptations

Russian tactics evolved to fit the modern operational environment. The Russian hybrid force includes regular forces, local militias, private contractors, extreme nationalists, criminals, and Muslim fundamentalists. This mixture of forces is particularly difficult to oppose because of their diverse backgrounds and motivations. The regional militias—trained and equipped by Russia—provide that homegrown, forward-deployed force that offers legitimacy to the cause. Private contractors are an evolution of the pan-Slav motivated force seen in Balkan conflicts of the twentieth century.[36] Employing criminals, extreme nationalists, and Islamic fundamentalists outside of Russia's borders are a win-win for Russia. It prevents problems within Russia's borders while allowing these actors to serve as cannon fodder and act out their aggression on a

common enemy.[37] Conveniently, these disparate militant groups are more deniable than regular Russian forces.

Encirclement and annihilation tactics were decisive in Russia's war with Ukraine. In the battle for Ilovaisk, Ukrainian forces seized a critical road-and-rail junction between the separatists-held cities of Donetsk and Luhansk. Russian forces quickly surrounded and besieged the city. Casualties and demoralization weakened the Ukrainian forces, leading to an agreed withdrawal for safe passage. According to *Newsweek*, Putin himself sanctioned the agreement, but Russian forces ambushed and destroyed the retreating Ukrainian column. Officially, Kiev admits to 108 killed, but eyewitnesses report five-to-six times that number.[38] Russia used the same tactics in Debaltseve in January 2015. In this battle, Ukrainian armed forces once again occupied a critical road-and-rail junction between both separatist regions. Russian and separatist forces advanced against the flanks of the city, creating a salient. Fearing complete encirclement, Ukrainian forces retreated. Once again, Russian forces waited in ambush. One survivor recounted, "Yes, the Russians let us retreat and we were met with tanks and grads [mobile rocket launchers]."[39] The Ukrainian government announced that 179 Ukrainian soldiers were killed, 110 were captured, and 81 were missing.[40] Both battles left the Ukrainian forces demoralized. Internal division settled in with forces who blamed Kiev for abandoning them.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Berzins's paper on Russian NGW provides an excellent framework to gain an understanding of what Russia was doing in April 2014. The benefit of hindsight is that it allows one to see that Russian actions in the Ukraine have a historical context strategically, operationally, and tactically with minor adaptations. There are a number of things the United States and NATO can do to counter Russian aggression; why not use what worked in the past against Russia with minor adaptations?

Strategically, Operation Atlantic Resolve, the U.S.-led operation in Europe to provide assurance to NATO allies, is very similar to the policy of containment outlined in NSC-68 (a National Security Council report) by the Truman administration.[41] The major advantage for NATO is the former Warsaw Pact enemies it now calls allies. Figure 2 depicts the spread of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization after the demise of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1989. Partnership with these nations serves to assure NATO allies that they will not be abandoned in the face of Russian territorial expansion.

Operationally, NATO must counter the Russian deep operations that seek to delegitimize the sovereignty of vulnerable NATO members, and it must take measures to bolster its collective willpower. Additionally, failure to counter Russian information warfare could fracture the trans-Atlantic security framework that serves to protect the freedom, prosperity, and peace for millions.

Tactically, NATO should embrace the hybrid model. NATO operated as a hybrid force in Afghanistan and, given the small armies of NATO allies, the likelihood is high of partnering with militias in the event of future conflict.

Russia appears to have chosen recidivism over peaceful coexistence. Russia is setting the terms and defining the operational environment because of its relatively unchallenged aggressive audacity, but the Russian way of warfare and its historic propensity for expanding in the face of weak resistance has been generally consistent throughout its entire history. Consequently, the real problem facing NATO is not a new brand of Russian warfare or new policy of expansion, but its own reluctance to return to its original purpose of preventing Russian conquest. ■

Biography

Maj. Nicholas Sinclair, U.S. Army, is the battalion executive officer for 1-68AR, 3ABCT, 4th Infantry Division. He holds a BA from The Citadel, Charleston, South Carolina, and is a graduate of the School of Advanced Military Studies on Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Notes

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(Reprinted with permission from James Dietz, American Art & Antiques, www.jamesdietz.com)

Print of the 75th Ranger Regiment making a parachute assault 20 December 1989 on Rio Hato Drop Zone, Panama, during Operation Just Cause. The painting, by noted combat artist James Dietz, is titled *Energetically, Will I Meet the Enemies of My Country*.

Unconventional Art and Modern War

Maj. Randall A. Linnemann, U.S. Army

Much visual art is produced about and because of war. But, when an artist paints a war scene, does he or she paint just the warriors and their weapons? Far from it. Artists strive for visual effects that capture the ambiance and the meanings of their subjects, regardless of their style of painting.

So, how might an artist capture the energy, friction, and chaos of war? Would Clausewitzian friction in a painting look like James Dietz's *Energetically, Will I Meet The Enemies of My Country,* a classical composition that shows a scene of war in a realistic style?

Would Clausewitzian friction in a painting look like a frenetic explosion of energy and color? Or, might it be more akin to Umberto Boccioni's *Dynamism of a Soccer Player* (see page 18), an abstract, symbolic composition that shows objects in contact creating friction as potential energy becomes kinetic energy?

If the energy, the friction, and the chaos of war were illustrated in the latter style, if kinetic energy were a frenetic explosion of colors and angles, then how would potential energy be painted? Would it be illustrated through the absence of colors and objects, or would it look like something else? How would an artist's cultural perspective influence ways of representing potential energy in a scene of war, or potential energy in any kind of scene? How might understanding cultural perspectives in art reveal their influence in ways of conducting warfare?



(Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

Dynamism of a Soccer Player (1913), oil on canvas, by Umberto Boccioni.

The West Paints Like It Fights

The precepts of design in visual art and the art of war overlap. For example, the military concept of a *center of gravity* relates to the artistic concept of *emphasis*.[1] If a center of gravity is "the hub of all power and movement," then a visual artwork's center of gravity, or focal point, is the subject matter receiving emphasis.[2] For instance, in Leonardo da Vinci's *Mona Lisa* (see page 19), the subject's smile is the most important aspect of the composition—the smile is the work's center of gravity.

In Rembrandt's *The Return of the Prodigal Son* (see page 20), the son's head in his father's chest is the center of gravity. All faces and gazes point to a single hub in the composition, a hub that gives the composition power. Without the smile or the paternal embrace, neither the *Mona Lisa* nor the *Prodigal Son* would emphasize any subject. The very concept of emphasis, that one aspect of a picture is more important than all others, reinforces the idea that a picture can have a center of gravity.

As gravity is a force exerted on objects to pull them in certain direction, the weights of objects have certain relationships to the center of gravity, and the center of gravity helps determine their relationships to each other. Objects in visual art have a visual weight, and the weight of the objects should balance each other, symmetrically or asymmetrically.[3] While some may think of asymmetry as the absence of balance, in fact it encompasses all methods of balance that are not symmetrical. The *Mona Lisa* is symmetrically balanced. Her face and her stance balance in the composition so that nothing is disproportional. In contrast, Vincent van Gogh's *The Starry Night* (see page 21), demonstrates asymmetrical balance. On the left, it shows several stars and a prominent cypress tree. These are offset by the disproportionately large moon and the town on the right. Similarly, defense strategists refer to symmetry and asymmetry to describe how enemies counter each other.

The West Fights Like It Paints

U.S. Army Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster quipped about the Iraqi army in the First Gulf War, "there are two ways to fight the United States military:

asymmetrically and stupid."[4] While the implication of this statement is that no military should ever engage the U.S. military in a balanced, conventional fight, the U.S. military always has organized its staffing, equipping, and doctrine around a symmetric threat. U.S. military forces conduct what historian Russell F. Weigley dubbed in 1973 "the American way of war," based on "a strategy of attrition."[5] Although it evolved into what Max Boot would describe in 2003 as "a new American way of war," U.S. forces, nonetheless, still organize around a symmetric threat.[6] The American way of war now emphasizes technological overmatch, overwhelming precision firepower, and the offense. This understanding treats war as a narrow and specific activity of violence in isolation from other elements of national power.[7]

Returning to McMaster's belief that no rational actor, of a nation-state or any other group, would go toe-to-toe with the U.S. military, asymmetric warfare suggests that weaker adversaries will counter the United States' power by excelling in areas where the United States performs weakly. In many instances, adversaries seek to exploit U.S. reluctance to deviate from relying on technological overmatch, overwhelming firepower, and the offense—which the United States considers its strengths in conventional war.

Adversaries Probably Will Fight Like They Paint

Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, colonels in the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), argue in *Unrestricted Warfare: China's Master Plan to Destroy America* (an English summary translation based on a 1999 Chinese publication) that "hacking into websites, targeting financial institutions, terrorism, using the media, and conducting urban warfare" are all potential ways unconventional warfare could asymmetrically match conventional militaries.[8]

Though disavowed by the PLA after an international uproar, unconventional ways of war such as those described in *Unrestricted Warfare* have been on parade around the world—Russia's seizure of Crimea in 2014, the disintegration of Syria since 2011, the various Paris attacks in 2015, PLA Unit 61398's theft of intellectual property throughout the past decade, hacktivism against Sony in December 2014, and irregular warfare by Muslim African radicals such as Boko Haram since 2009.[9] The United States has struggled to establish a lasting grand strategy to



(Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

Mona Lisa (1503–06), oil on poplar wood, by Leonardo da Vinci.

address these kinds of wicked complex threats.

Traditionally, the United States (as well as other Western nation-states) has chosen to treat war as a specific action governed by a specific system of laws, mores, and norms. Strategists do not explicitly disconnect war from the political ends it is intended to achieve. Implicitly, however, war is often disassociated from the whole-of-government approach needed to achieve political goals; consider the differences in the apparatuses of the Departments of State and Defense, and the often-used diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) model of national power. This treatment of war as a specific, governable activity disguises the essence of war—the organized violence of human beings killing each other. In different words, the United States believes that all war is organized violence, but not all organized violence is war.

(Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

The Return of the Prodigal Son (1668), oil on canvas, by Rembrandt.

On the other hand, if it is accepted that all war is politically motivated, then all organized violence or aggression could also be considered politically motivated. However, this would mean that organized violence, without formally "going to war," advances a political agenda just as a conventional war might. Limiting the concept of what constitutes a war limits the ability of the United States to understand its enemies. For example, it is very likely that some U.S. enemies believe they are already in a state of war—being that U.S. enemies have selected to use a level of organized violence to achieve an essentially political goal.

When leaders stop considering war as only a violent action of the state, and they start considering it as any organized aggression with the intent to harm—physically violent actions or otherwise—on behalf of political agendas, the aperture for understanding what war is opens wider. Denying that all violence or aggression in service of an agenda is war limits strategic approaches to engaging enemies.

A U.S. Army Special Operations Command 2015 white paper, *Redefining the Win*, depicts a spectrum of conflict (see figure on page 22).[10] Using that spectrum, the paper describes unconventional warfare in a nebulous gray area of not quite being "political warfare" but also not quite being war. The implication is that in an intermediate, undefined area of "unconventional

(Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

The Starry Night (1889), oil on canvas, by Vincent van Gogh.

warfare," the United States very likely would refuse to sanction organized violence or regard the situation as war (though organized, politically motivated violence happens regularly) based on defined thresholds for "going to war."

This is the distinct difference between how the United States narrowly understands war versus what the broader nature of war could be. To the United States, war is conventional and defined, and it looks like Omaha Beach or the race to Baghdad. Therefore, organized aggression that occurs outside a declared theater of armed activity or conflict is unconventional, irregular.

However, to certain cultures the treatment of war as a narrow and specific activity of violence may be considered unconventional. Other cultural perspectives on war can be likened to how certain classic works of Chinese art regard *negative space*.

Nebulous Conflicts are like Negative Space

Twentieth-century Chinese leader Mao Zedong described war as "politics with bloodshed."[11] Similarly, *Dau Tranh,* the Vietnamese military strategy of the late twentieth century, sought to unify war and politics as different forms of the same struggle that worked in concert with each other.[12] These approaches to war, which achieved their political goals, operated inside the nebulous area between political struggle and armed conflict. A possible reason these East Asian cultures do not define war as narrowly as Western cultures is that in East



Figure. Spectrum of Conflict from a U.S. Special Operations Command White Paper (Modified)

Asian cultures, people tend to be more comfortable with negative space.

Negative space, in artistic terms, means the space not consumed by the primary subject matter in a work of visual art.[13] In the West, negative space represents a dilemma for the artist. Does the artist fill the space with substance, or does the artist leave the space empty? Cultural biases in traditional Western visual art usually induce the artist to fill the negative space with something of substance. For example, Rembrandt filled the negative space of the background in *Prodigal Son* with darker shades of objects in shadow. The shading is so dark that the objects are nearly indiscernible.

In contrast, according to Seong-heui Kim, traditional East Asian visual art celebrates the emptiness of negative space not as lacking substance, but rather as emptiness being "the latent form before the realization and … the potentiality of all existence."[14] For example, Kim describes how the "potentiality" in negative space can be seen in Guo Xi's landscape scroll painting *Early Spring*, completed in 1072 (see page 24), where in the fore, middle, and background, the mountain's traits are implicitly, rather than explicitly, represented. The background is left absent of objects or shades.

Kim also explains how in Cui Bai's *Magpies and Hare* (see page 25), negative space, or emptiness, and positive space, or substance, wrestle while coexisting in oneness with the universe as *chi* (vital energy, spirit, or natural force). East Asian artists also express "the interchange and vibrancy of [chi]."[15] From a philosophical perspective, chi is "a biological phenomenon revealed in the field of exchanging experience between our body and the world."[16] To depict the movement of chi, East Asian art emphasizes the mechanics of "line."[17] A line's mechanics integrate and intuitively depict the natural world "as an endlessly circulating and changing flow which humans had to become one with."[18]

A 2002 Department of Defense annual report on China's military power describes China's broad strategy for building national strength by balancing "comprehensive national power" (elements of national power such as DIME) and a "strategic configuration of power."[19] The report interprets the strategic configuration of power, which encompasses "unity, stability, and sovereignty," as *shi*—which it calls an "alignment of forces, … propensity of things, … or potential born of disposition … that only a skilled strategist can exploit to ensure victory over a superior force."[20]

The similarity is that both chi and shi celebrate the "notion of a situation or configuration (xing), as it develops and takes shape before our eyes (as a relation of forces) … and counterbalancing this, the

notion of potential (shi), which is implied by that situation."[21] To the East Asian artist and military strategist alike, negative space—along with its inherent potential—is necessary to balance positive space and its defined objects.

Unconventional War is Like Modern Art

The negative space between war and peace is where actors are fighting modern wars in unconventional ways, such as activities in the cyber domain by the Anonymous hackers' collective.[22] Instinctively, the West focuses on the parts of the whole and desires substance to fill the negative space.[23] East Asian artwork, in contrast, demonstrates a cultural preference to focus on the whole, recognizing "that action always occurs in a field of forces."[24]

François Julien contrasts Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz in *A Treatise on Efficacy: Between Western and Chinese Thinking*. Julien explains how Sun Tzu describes war: as water flowing down a mountain, so military officers are encouraged to learn how to use the existing conditions of the world, the river's flow, to their benefit.[25] Julien explains that Clausewitz describes war as an idea, and Clausewitz encourages officers to reckon historical analysis against conceptual models to define and set conditions for wars to be successful.[26]

The unconventional nature of conflict in the modern era does not conform to traditional Western conceptions of war. Sun Tzu's advocacy of accepting conditions and working within them, as opposed to the West's tradition of defining and setting conditions, challenges the strategic assumptions of U.S. policy. Accepting the friction of war as it is, rather than war as conforming to Western conceptions of war, could offer considerable insight for U.S. policymakers.

Considering how chaotic the world is, a military planner is a kind of strategic artist painting a response to volatile, uncertain, chaotic, and ambiguous conflicts. The strategic artist must choose if the violence, for example, is the center of gravity and the focal point of the painted response, or if violence is just an object surrounded by negative space. Principles used in Western artwork imply that the Western strategic artist will identify centers of gravity and develop counters to balance systems, rather than operate inside negative space to "make the most of the ongoing process."[27]

Complexity is Nonlinear

In "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War," Alan D. Beyerchen applies principles from modern nonlinear science to show that war, even as described by Clausewitz, is a nonlinear system. Following Beyerchen's premise, negative space in art, or conflicts that fall outside Western definitions of war, with their unpredictable potentiality, would be like the "nonlinear phenomena that have always abounded in the real world."[28] Nonlinear systems upset the Western predilection to look for "stable, regular, and consistent" rules to govern the world since nonlinear, or complex adaptive systems, "may involve 'synergistic' interactions in which the whole is not equal to the sum of the parts."[29]

In many ways, East Asian cultures depict nonlinearity in visual art by using the emptiness of negative space to imply potential. In contrast, Western artists instinctively fill negative space with objects or substance that are consistent with the rest of the picture.

The West's cultural bias to analyze inherently complex adaptive systems as if they were stable, regular, and consistent systems is why traditional Western art emphasizes objects. Western painters try to balance all objects with other objects within a specific boundary. In contrast, East Asian painters try to accept complexity by focusing on the system as a whole.

Beyerchen identifies the West's cultural biases, arguing that even though Clausewitz perceives war as "a profoundly nonlinear phenomenon," there is a desire by the West to define the world through analysis, and "to partition off pieces of the universe to make them amenable to study."[30] This cultural bias artificially validates focusing on parts of systems in isolation of the important links that have a bearing on the systems as a whole.[31] Julien believes that the West's cultural biases, such as those summarized by Beyerchen, are what made it impossible for Clausewitz to connect his empirical observations of war with any lasting theory of war.[32] Clausewitz understood the West's cultural bias favoring analysis. He described the conflict between analysis of parts and the complexity of the whole as friction.[33]

(Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

Early Spring (1072), ink and light colors on silk, by Guo Xi.

The ill-defined area on the U.S. Army Special Operations Command's spectrum of conflict—where conflict is not politics but is not war—represents a complex adaptive system that is a kind of negative space. In this negative space, the East Asian military strategist would see the vibrant interchange of the potential born of disposition. The Western strategist trying to analyze objects isolated from their synergy would see friction in that negative space. Seeing negative space as friction can impede painting an appropriate strategic response to threats because no amount of analysis can accurately predict what the "painted line" of action—the input of a lever of national power—will do to synergize outcomes in a complex world. Yet, confronted with negative space, U.S. military and state leadership feel compelled to *do something*, because to the United States a goal unattained is as unnerving as a painting that seems half-painted.

Modernity Defies Conventional Perspectives

The strategic challenge to the United States is to innovate, adapt, and adopt unconventional warfare through a broad strategic approach rather than sustaining its current view of a tactical capability for a niche mission. This approach would address the needed fusion of diplomatic and military actions.

Modern art began as a reaction to the limitations traditional Western artworks imposed on the artist's desire to represent the world.[34] Modern art has since demonstrated a fusion of the principles of Western art with modern implements and unconventional

approaches. Modern war should similarly integrate the principles of traditional strategists with modern means and unconventional warfare's evolving ways.

To win in a complex world, the United States must become more comfortable with operating in the negative space of unconventional war. Clausewitz advises the strategist to know the nature of war. For the United States to know the nature of its wars in a world of many cultures, its leaders must better understand the limitations of its approach to strategic thought. They must recognize that war is not a narrow and specific activity of violence isolated from other elements of national power. War is not just a way for political ends. Rather, it is the vibrancy and interchange of diplomacy and organized force—organized force that affects both the actors and the many nonlinear systems composing the world with unpredictable results. War, being as chaotic as Boccioni's *Dynamism of Soccer Player*, needs to be understood as a violent struggle that is anything but conventional. ■

Biography

Maj. Randall A. Linnemann, U.S. Army, is the regimental signal officer for the 75th Ranger Regiment, Fort Benning, Georgia. He holds a BA from the University of Dayton and an MA from the Naval War College. He has served in a variety of signal command and staff assignments.

(Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

Magpies and Hare (1061), ink and watercolor on silk, by Cui Bai.

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19. Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, *Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China*, Secretary of Defense, July 2002, 6, accessed 19 January 2016, http://archive.defense.gov/news/Jul2002/d20020712china.pdf. Subsequent annual reports focus on comprehensive national power rather than strategic configuration of power.

20. Ibid.

21. François Julien, *A Treatise on Efficacy: Between Western and Chinese Thinking,* trans. Janet Lloyd. (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 2004), 17.

22. Vivian Lesnik Weisman, *The Hacker Wars*: *The Battlefield is the Internet,* documentary film (New York: Vitagraph Films, 2014), http://thehackerwars.com/; D.J. Pangburn, "The 'Hacker Wars' Documentary Does Hacktivism No Favors," *Vice News* (22 October 2014), accessed 21 February 2016, http://www.vice.com/read/the-hacker-wars-documentary-does-hacktivism-no-favors-1023.

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27. Ibid., 26.

28. Alan D. Beyerchen, "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War," *International Security* 17(3) (Winter 1992–1993): 63.

29. Ibid., 61–62.

30. Ibid., 81 and 85.

31. Ibid.

32. Julien, *A Treatise on Efficacy*, 14.

33. Beyerchen, "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity," 80.

34. "Modern Art Synopsis," The Art Story website, accessed 19 January 2016, http://www.theartstory.org/definition-modern-art.htm.

(Photo by Dmitry Kostyukov, Agence France-Presse)

Russian convoys poured into Georgia during the 2008 conflict, part of the force that dealt a devastating blow to Georgia's ambition to reestablish control over breakaway territory.

Defining a New Security Architecture for Europe that Brings Russia in from the Cold

John Mearsheimer, PhD

Editor's note: This article is adapted from a speech made during a roundtable discussion on 2 March 2015 at the Press Club in Brussels, Belgium.[1]

The subject I have been asked to talk about is how to create a new security architecture in Europe that brings the Russians out of the cold and promotes peace in the region.

I think that the best we can hope for at this point in time is to return to the status quo ante, and by that I mean the situation that existed here in Europe before 2008. I think there's no hope of creating a radically new security architecture. And, I even think it's going to be extremely difficult to go back to the pre-2008 situation in Europe. I think the best way to understand the options that we face is to start with a discussion of the history of the past twenty-five years, which can be divided roughly into two periods. The first period is from 1990 to 2008, and the second period is from 2008 up to the present. I think the period from 1990 to 2008 was really the golden period. Europe was remarkably peaceful—save for what happened in the Balkans, of course. But there was virtually no serious possibility of a conflict between Russia and the West during those years. All seemed to be going very well here in Europe on the security front, which raises the obvious question: Why was that the case? There are two reasons.

(Photo by Maxim Shemetov, Reuters)

Russian servicemen march during celebrations to mark Victory Day in the Crimean port of Sevastopol 9 May 2014. Russian troops invaded Crimea in February 2014, and the territory of Crimea was officially annexed by Russia 18 March 2014.

One, NATO remained intact, which meant the Americans remained militarily committed to Europe, allowing them to serve as the pacifier in the region. The United States was, in effect, the ultimate arbiter and a higher authority that maintained order. Its military presence in Europe made it almost impossible for any of the states that fell underneath its security umbrella to fight with each other. This is the principal reason why no European leader since the end of the Cold War has asked the Americans to leave. And, it's the principal reason the Russians were perfectly happy to allow the United States to remain in Western Europe after they retreated when the Cold War ended.

So, the American pacifier was an important part of the story. The second part of the story is that the West—and here we are talking mainly about NATO—did not threaten the Russians in any meaningful way. There is no question that the Russians were opposed to NATO expansion. The Russians opposed both the first tranche of expansion in 1999, as well as the second tranche in 2004, but the Russians did not view those initial moves eastward as a mortal threat. So, between 1990 and 2008, all was well in Europe. Again, that was because of the American pacifier and because the West was not a serious threat to Russia.

But, that situation began to change in 2008, which was a fateful year. First of all, there was the NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008. At the end of that summit, NATO said in no uncertain terms that both

Georgia and Ukraine would become part of NATO. The Russians, in response, made it perfectly clear at the time that this was unacceptable. And they made it clear they would go to great lengths to prevent that from happening. Nevertheless, NATO did not back off. Furthermore, in May of that same year, the European Union (EU) announced that there was going to be an Eastern Partnership, which in effect meant that the EU too would be moving eastward toward Ukraine. Not surprisingly, in August 2008, you had a war between Georgia and Russia, which was in good part a result of the April 2008 decision to eventually include Ukraine and Georgia in NATO. The Georgians thought that NATO would back them if they got into a crisis or a conflict with the Russians. They of course were wrong; nevertheless, that was the first big piece of evidence that trouble was in store in Eastern Europe.

(Photo by Cornelia Smet, EC - Audiovisual Service, European Union, 2011)

European Commission chief Jose Manuel Barroso and European Union (EU) Council President Herman Van Rompuy meet with Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych 19 December 2011 in Kiev, Ukraine. The EU and Ukraine agreed to the terms of a free trade and political association treaty, creating tension between the West and Russia.

Barack Obama, as you know, was elected in November 2008. He came into office with the goal in mind of resetting relations between Russia and the United States. He failed. And, the reason he failed is that the West, with the Americans in the driver's seat, continued to push a policy that called for peeling Ukraine away from Russia's orbit and making it part of the West. EU expansion was one of the key strategies underpinning that policy. NATO expansion and democracy promotion were the other two underlying strategies. Democracy promotion in principal is an attractive idea to virtually all of us in the West. But, the fact is that democracy promotion in the hands of the United States is mainly about toppling leaders who are seen as anti-American or anti-West, and putting in their place leaders who are pro-American or pro-West. Of course the Orange Revolution was all about doing just that. Toppling [Viktor] Yanukovych was all about putting a leader in power in Kiev who would be pro-West.

So, this triple-prong strategy—NATO expansion, EU expansion, and democracy promotion—bothered the Russians greatly. And, it all came to a head with the coup in Kiev on 22 February 2014. We then had a major crisis that we still face and which shows no signs of going away. What is the solution to this problem? I think the only possible solution is to go back to the situation that existed before 2008. Otherwise, there is no hope of settling this matter. What in particular has to be done? Ukraine has to be turned into a neutral buffer state. The West has to recognize that there is no way it can continue to pursue a set of policies that are designed to make Ukraine a Western bulwark on Russia's border. The Russians will not tolerate this and will instead go to great lengths to

(Photo by Evan Vucci, Associated Press)

President Barack Obama meets with Russian President Vladimir Putin 17 June 2013 in Enniskillen, Northern Ireland. Relations between the United States and Russia have been strained, in part from Western policies that call for bringing countries such as Ukraine into the NATO fold and the European Union.

wreck Ukraine to prevent it from becoming part of the West. This is what is going on now. Putin is basically telling the West they have two choices. Either they back off, or he will work to damage Ukraine so badly that it cannot join the West.

If you want to end this crisis, and you care greatly about the Ukrainian people, and you don't want to see their country destroyed, then it's imperative that we back off and give up on the idea of making Ukraine part of the West. Instead, we must work to make Ukraine a neutral buffer state, which it was effectively between 1991 and 2014. I am talking here about returning to the status quo ante. This means, of course, that NATO expansion must be explicitly taken off the table, and it means that EU expansion must also be explicitly taken off the table. And, it means that the United States and its European allies have to stop democracy promotion in Kiev that aims to put in power individuals who are pro-Western and anti-Russian.

Now, the question is, how likely is it that the West can do a 180-degree turn and abandon its present policy and adopt one that's designed to make Ukraine a neutral buffer state? I think it's very unlikely this will happen. I think there are a number of reasons for that. First of all, Western leaders are so deeply invested in the present policy that it is going to be very difficult for them to move away from it and instead work to make Ukraine neutral. Remember that NATO expansion into Ukraine has been at the heart of the West's strategy since 2008. I think it would be hard to turn that ship around. Second, I think that Putin, and the Russians more generally, do not trust the West anymore. And, any promises that we make will be hard to sell in Moscow. I think the waters have been so thoroughly poisoned in recent years that convincing the Russians that the West has good will and wants to work with them will be difficult. Third, I think NATO itself is in trouble independent of this crisis. For starters, the United States is pivoting to Asia. And, if

Uncle Sam pivots to some place he has to pivot away from another place, and where the United States is going to pivot away from is Europe. China is a potential peer competitor, and all that is needed is a major crisis in Asia and the United States will focus its attention on that region in laser-like fashion. When that happens, America's interest in Europe will diminish significantly. I like to tell students that historically the United States has cared greatly about three areas of the world outside of the Western Hemisphere: Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf. And, over our entire history, Europe has been the most important area of the world for us outside of the Western Hemisphere. We are undergoing for the first time in our history a fundamental transformation in our strategic priorities. Asia is going to become the most important area of the world for the United States, the Persian Gulf is going to be the second most important area, and Europe is going to become a distant third.

So, if China continues to rise, we are eventually going to pivot, and that means that we're going to greatly reduce our presence in Europe, and we are going to be much less interested in Europe than we have been over the course of our history. At the same time, if you look at what's happening among America's allies in Europe, it seems clear they're not spending much money on defense, and it doesn't look like they are going to come together to take up the slack if the United States pivots to Asia. I think the principal bellwether of the trouble ahead is what's happening in Britain. Defense spending is shrinking, and, by the year 2019, all British troops will be removed from the European continent. This is an event of great significance. So, what I am saying to you is that even if we are able to turn around Western policy and convince Putin that the West has good intentions, the future of NATO is uncertain, which means a lot of trouble ahead. For all these reasons I'm quite sure you cannot go back to the status quo ante in Eastern Europe.

My bottom line is that we had an excellent situation with regard to European security before 2008. And we, meaning the West, blew it big time. ■

Biography

Dr. John Mearsheimer is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science and the co-director of the Program on International Security Policy at the University of Chicago. A graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, he spent five years in the U.S. Air Force. He received an MA in international relations from the University of Southern California, and an MA and a PhD in political science from Cornell University. Mearsheimer has published five books and numerous articles about security issues and international politics, has received a number of teaching awards, and is an elected member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.





Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault

The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin

John J. Mearsheimer

According to the prevailing wisdom in the West, the Ukraine crisis can be blamed almost entirely on Russian aggression. Russian President Vladimir Putin, the argument goes, annexed Crimea out of a long-standing desire to resuscitate the Soviet empire, and he may eventually go after the rest of Ukraine, as well as other countries in eastern Europe. In this view, the ouster of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014 merely provided a pretext for Putin's decision to order Russian forces to seize part of Ukraine.

But this account is wrong: the United States and its European allies share most of the responsibility for the crisis. The taproot of the trouble is NATO enlargement, the central element of a larger strategy to move Ukraine out of Russia's orbit and integrate it into the West. At the same time, the EU's expansion eastward and the West's backing of the pro-democracy movement in Ukraine—beginning with the Orange Revolution in 2004—were critical elements, too. Since the mid-1990s, Russian leaders have adamantly opposed NATO enlargement and in recent years, they have made it clear that they would not stand by while their strategically important neighbor turned into a Western bastion. For Putin, the illegal overthrow of Ukraine's democratically elected and pro-Russian president—which he rightly labeled a "coup"—was the final straw. He responded by taking Crimea, a peninsula he feared would host a NATO naval base, and working to destabilize Ukraine until it abandoned its efforts to join the West.

Putin's pushback should have come as no surprise. After all, the West had been moving into Russia's backyard and threatening its core

JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER is R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago.

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MR We Recommend

If you found Dr. Mearsheimer's comments provocative or intriguing, your attention is invited to an earlier manuscript he penned, published in the September-October 2014 edition of *Foreign Affairs,* in which he treats the thesis of Western culpability for events transpiring in Ukraine in much greater detail. The article can also be found at: http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/Ukraine%20Article%20in%20Foreign%20Affairs.pdf.

(Photo by Hosam Katan, Reuters)

Members of al-Qaida's al-Nusra Front pause in a trench 25 November 2014 near the village of al-Zahra, north of Aleppo, Syria. Members of al-Nusra and other Sunni Islamist insurgents clashed with pro-government fighters in an attempt to capture the Shi'ite Muslim village.

Understanding Today's Enemy

The Grand Strategists of Modern Jihad

Dr. Sebastian Gorka

Editor's note: The following article is a chapter extract from Defeating Jihad: The Winnable War, *by Dr. Sebastian Gorka, published here by his permission coincident with publication of the full book by Regnery Publishing, April 2016. Gorka is the Major General Matthew C. Horner Distinguished Chair of Military Theory at Marine Corps University. We appreciate his gracious permission to republish this highly relevant material.*

Just as one must study Carl von Clausewitz, Machiavelli, or Napoleon to understand the modern Western way of war, there are key writers and thinkers that those who wish to defeat our current Jihadist enemy must acquaint themselves with intimately. In order to understand the strategy of today's global jihadist movement, one must understand the work of a handful of Islamists who wrote the most important strategic texts on war against the "infidel." These men are Seyyid Qutb, Ayman al-Zawahiri (the current head of al-Qaida), Brig. Gen. S.K. Malik, and lastly, the late American al-Qaeda leader, Anwar al-Awlaki. The works of these "big picture" Islamist thinkers together shape the actions and plans of all of today's jihadist terror groups, from Boko Haram to al-Qaida, from the al-Nusra Front to the Islamic State (IS).



(Photos courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

Seyyid Qutb is author of the 1964 book *Milestones*, which became a field manual for jihadists. It remains a doctrinal text for the Muslim Brotherhood.

Milestones: All Must Fight for the Caliphate

Qutb, a minor Egyptian government official, is responsible for writing the most influential modern text on jihad. His 1964 book, *Milestones* (sometimes translated as *Signposts Along the Way*), has become the field manual for jihadists everywhere and remains a core doctrinal text for the Muslim Brotherhood, of which Qutb was a key member. Written after Qutb visited the United States on an exchange program soon after World War II, the book describes the reasons why the Muslim community has lost its preeminent position in the world and how the godless, infidel nation of the United States must be destroyed in order to rid the world of *jahilliyyah*, the pagan ignorance of Allah that once again has infected the minds and souls of Muslims across the globe.

In this violent purification of the world and the reinstatement of Islamic greatness through the re-establishment of the theocratic empire that was the Caliphate, the most powerful weapon is a "holy war," or jihad. Most significantly of all, Qutb is explicit in his belief that Islam is not to be understood as just a religion, but instead as a "revolutionary party," with a politically supremacist mission to mobilize the masses and capture global power for the glory of Allah. Islam for Qutb is not limited to a matter of personal belief. Again and again, in this short book, Qutb repeats that Islam has a mandate to recreate the Caliphate, but this time a theocratic empire that will span the world.

It is no accident that given this understanding, *Milestones* lifts heavily and frequently from other ideologies which promoted revolution, especially fascism and communism, which is why Qutb (and later Osama bin Laden) frequently used Marxist terminology such as the "vanguard" to explain the special role the small minority of "enlightened" religious revolutionaries has.

Qutb was eventually arrested by the regime of Gamal Abdel Nasser for his central role in the Brotherhood and involvement in a plot to kill the president, and he was finally executed in August 1966. However, his ideas on jihad and religious war live on and his book is available not only all over the Middle East but also in many Islamic "cultural centers" across the United States. This is a problem because the other places it is most often found are in the possession of high-value jihadist targets on the battlefield and on terrorists apprehended here in the United States.

Qutb's ideas very specifically link insurgent leaders like Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi of IS with individual terrorists, such as the Tsarnaev brothers responsible for the Boston Marathon bombing, because each of them concurs with the fundamental analysis in *Milestones* that:

- Muslims are once again like the pagan Arab tribes of Mecca in the time of Mohammed.
- They have failed to submit themselves to the will of Allah, in part because they are following leaders who are themselves false Muslims and puppets of the West, but also because they have been corrupted by the heretical values of the infidel.

- As a result, there is no true Islamic state today, only pretense and falsehood.
- The answer is a return to Allah and the reestablishment of his sovereignty on Earth through the recreation of his theocratic Caliphate in a jihad.

For Qutb, being a Muslim was not a personal, theoretical, or individualistic exercise. One could only be a true Muslim if you took part in eradicating the infidel and all his influences, and taking an integral part in the war that would bring the Islamic empire back.

Zawahiri: One Superpower Down, One to Go

Zawahiri, who now heads al-Qaida after the successful special operations mission in Abbottabad, Pakistan, that killed bin Laden, has also contributed significantly to the canon of jihadi strategy. More so, in fact, than his former boss.

An Egyptian surgeon born into a very prominent Cairo family, Zawahiri was also a member of the Muslim Brotherhood like Qutb, but would later become one of the leaders of the terror group Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Arrested and imprisoned by the Egyptian authorities for his extreme beliefs and personal goal to bring down the Cairo government, Zawahiri would eventually be released and end up in Pakistan during the anti-Soviet jihad of the 1980s, where he would use his medical skills to heal the *mujahideen* who had been wounded fighting the Russians.

(Image courtesy of The Counter Jihad Report)

Knights Under the Prophet's Banner, published by the London-based *Asharq al-Awsat*, is Ayman al-Zawahiri's book describing his political and religious world views. He explains what role a global jihadi movement should play in the future, and that Muslims are responsible to conduct jihad.

In Pakistan, Zawahiri would eventually meet bin Laden and be drawn deeper into the world of the "Arab mujahideen"; Zawahiri would become a member of the Arab Services Bureau (the MAK in Arabic). After the head of the MAK, Abdullah Azzam, was killed in 1989 and bin Laden took over the organization, the Saudi's puritanical Wahabbi-ideology would begin to meld with Zawahiri's Muslim Brotherhood-influenced ideas, and subsequently the MAK would transform into al-Qaida with Zawahiri as bin Laden's new deputy.

(Photo courtesy of WIkipedia)

Osama bin Laden (left) sits with his adviser and translator Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri (right) during an interview with Pakistani journalist Hamid Mir on 8 November 2011 in Kabul. After bin Laden's death, Zawahiri assumed the principal leadership role over al-Qaida.

The renamed jihadi group was now redefined as bin Laden and Zawahiri gave it a global mission. Instead of focusing exclusively on one type of target, foreign invaders on Muslim soil—or un-Islamic apostate Arab leaders and their governments in the Middle East—*The Base* would do both, and most importantly for America, al-Qaida would now take the jihad into the "belly of the beast," into the heart of infidel lands. This move into "enemy territory" would eventually result in al-Qaida

managing to do that which no other jihadist group had ever achieved.

Since the Muslim Brotherhood had declared that the Caliphate must be re-established back in the 1920s, and by force if need be, scores of jihadist groups had been founded around the globe, from the Middle East to Southeast Asia and from Africa to Central Asia. Some had been more successful than others, with the Brotherhood itself being able to jeopardize the stability of several Arab nations with assassinations and sundry subversions and conspiracies. But each one was stymied in their shortsighted focus on the proximate infidel or apostate enemy. Whether it was Egyptian Islamic Jihad trying to take down the secular government in Cairo, or jihadist groups fighting the "heathen" Indians in Kashmir, they were all limited by their operational parochialism. Under bin Laden and Zawahiri, this would all change with al-Qaida becoming a self-appointed "vanguard" of a global movement that would eventually stun the world with the death and destruction it was able to realize in Tuesday, 11 September 2001.

Al-Qaida now retooled itself along three fronts:

- Exporting jihadists to new guerrilla theaters across the globe.
- Becoming the global "face" of Jihad in terms of propaganda.
- Establishing cells across the world to execute terrorist attacks against the infidel.

In the 1990s, al-Qaida would recruit new jihadi fighters and deploy them to Bosnia in the Balkans, Chechnya in Russia, Kashmir in India, and to all significant war zones where Muslims were fighting non-Muslims. At the same time, bin Laden would come out of the shadows of the war in Afghanistan and record video and audio messages for a global audience of willing holy warriors, eventually becoming such an international media "personality" that outlets such as CNN and ABC would interview him.

All of this was happening as bin Laden and Zawahiri were recruiting Muslims fundamentalists, not only to become just guerrilla fighters but also to become clandestine operatives in terrorist cells embedded within Western infidel nations, or nations where there was enough of an infidel presence to afford a target-rich environment. As a result of this network being successfully established in more than fifty nations around the world, al-Qaida was able to take the Holy War to the *kuffar* (infidel) again and again and again in the 1990s, with bin Laden and Zawahiri being responsible, or otherwise connected, to:

- The first World Trade Center attack
- The 1998 American Embassy bombings in East Africa
- The bombing of the USS *Cole* in Yemen in 2000

Despite all of these successful attacks against America during that decade, as a nation we were not prepared for, nor were we able to detect and prevent the deadliest terrorist attack in history, and so on 11 September 2001, al-Qaida was catapulted to a position of worldwide significance that other jihadist groups had only dreamt of.

Throughout this period, and especially after the 9/11 attacks, when al-Qaida was discussed, it was bin Laden who garnered all the attention, and for obvious reasons, since he was the leader of the group, and because he presented an image that fit the stereotype of the ascetic jihadi warrior. This focus on bin Laden failed to recognize that it was Zawahiri who was the ideological master of al-Qaida. It was the older Egyptian jihadist who had studied and honed his theological and rhetorical skills in the dock of the Egyptian court system and the prisons of Cairo who would engage online most often with other Muslims to explain and justify the new global campaign of terror that al-Qaida had unleashed. This role was crucial to building the al-Qaida brand amongst potentially sympathetic Muslims around the world.

In preparation for the reaction to the 9/11 attacks and the worldwide attention they would bring, Zawahiri went to the lengths of penning a semi-autobiographical book on his experience of jihad, and why the time had come for all to choose sides in the religious war to end all wars. Sent to an Arabic outlet in London, *Asharq al-Awsat*, which published and serialized the work online just two months after the attacks, *Knights Under the Prophet's Banner*—or *Warriors Under the Flag of Mohammad*, more colloquially—built upon the themes of both Qutb and Azzam, but reformats them for the new age of holy war in which al-Qaida is the global jihadi "brand" for the twenty-first century.

In brief, Zawahiri's argument is that Islam must rejuvenate itself with an assault on all that is un-Islamic and that this revival to greatness will come through each believer taking up the sword of jihad. The time has



(Image courtesy of The Gorka Briefing)

S.K. Malik, a general officer in the Pakistan army, wrote *The Quranic Concept of War* in 1979. The book has become one of the most influential treatises on why jihad is necessary and how it must be fought. The preface was written by Gen. Zia ul-Haq, a former military dictator over Pakistan, who deemed holy war and spread of Islam by force an obligation for all Muslim believers.

come for all humans to choose which side of history they will live or die on. The Arab mujahideen of Afghanistan, the founders of al-Qaida, have shown the way. In the 1980s, there were two global superpowers. One, the Soviet Union, was foolish enough to invade Muslim land when it deployed its troops into Afghanistan. This led to the "best Muslims" deciding to fight in a holy war against the kuffar invaders. Despite being outnumbered and outgunned, the jihadists won, a feat only possible because they were fighting for Allah and Allah made their victory possible.

Not only did the mujahideen defeat the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, two years later their enemy imploded when the USSR disbanded itself on Christmas Day 1991. Now at the dawn of a new century there is only one infidel superpower left standing, the United States, and it too will fall to the sword of Allah's Army.

The final message of *Knights under the Prophet's Banner* was very simple: God is on the side of the jihadists. Their eventual victory over all disbelief, including the destruction of America, is inevitable.[1] The members of the human race have one simple choice to make: join the "Caravan of Jihad" or be destroyed.

General Malik: War Against the Soul of the Infidel

However, the ideological and strategic thinker of greatest importance to the global jihadi movement today is the one most people, and even members of the American intelligence community, have never heard of.

In 1979, just as the seminal events mentioned above were unfolding in Tehran, Mecca, and Kabul, an astonishing book was published in Pakistan by Malik under the title of *The Quranic Concept of War*. The book is remarkable not only in its direct connection to later events like 9/11, and its rationalization of such heinous acts, but also in the category-negating nature of its content. For *The Quranic Concept of War* is unlike any strategic tome in the canon of western military thought.

In it, the former general officer destroys the central tenets of Western military thought, most especially the seminal theories of Clausewitz. Since the earth-shattering campaigns of Napoleon, which were analyzed and explained by Clausewitz, western military academies and war colleges have taught as holy writ the Prussian's dictum that war is an instrument of the nation-state, a violent tool to be used in the furtherance of the national interest when all other tools fail. We teach that war is just an extension of policy, that war is politics with a gun, or as the great Prussian originally put it: "the continuation of politics with an admixture of different means."

Yet Malik reverses centuries of understanding of warfare with his book by stating that war has nothing to do with the nation-state—which is in any case an heretical construct of the infidel West—or with serving the nation, or earthbound politics aims. Instead war is understood by Malik to only ever serve one purpose: the realization of Allah's sovereignty here on Earth. According to the Pakistani general, all war must only serve the objective of recreating the Caliphate, the theocratic empire of Islam, so that Allah's writ may once again reign supreme.

Secondly, again in a denial of Western strategic thought, Malik rejects the way the infidel goes to war. When American or Allied forces ready themselves for war they perform what is called *intelligence preparation of the battlefield*.[2] This analysis serves in part to identify what are termed "key vulnerabilities," or "centers of gravity" within the enemy's forces and infrastructure, to locate those most valuable targets, which if destroyed will incapacitate the enemy or force his surrender. Malik states that the infidel's concept of multiple centers-of-gravity or key vulnerabilities in war is just as fallacious as the idea that war serves political purposes. According to the Pakistani general, there is only one target of import in war and that target is not even physical. In war,

according to Malik, there is only ever one center of gravity: the soul of the enemy. The infidel foe must be converted to Islam or crushed.

Lastly—and here we see the relevance of this book to groups like al-Qaida and IS—since the only target that matters in war is the soul of the infidel, Malik concludes that the most effective weapon in war is terror. The enemy's belief system must be utterly destroyed and terror is the most effective way to do that. That is why 9/11 was so important. It is the highly symbolic suicide attacks, the crucifixions, the beheadings, the pressure-cooker bombs at marathon events, and the videos of immolations that will destroy the will of the infidel to go on.

Lest anyone think *The Quranic Concept of War* was the work of some radical and disenchanted fringe Pakistani officer, it must be noted that the book has a foreword by Gen. M. Zia-ul-Haq, chief of the army staff and president of Pakistan. In the foreword, Zia is clear, jihad in the cause of Allah "is not the exclusive domain of the professional soldier," echoing Azzam's fatwa in which a holy war was deemed an obligation of all Muslim believers.



(Photo courtesy of Muhammad ud-Deen, Wikimedia Commons)

American-born Anwar al-Awlaki served as an imam and Islamic lecturer in both the United States and Yemen. His influence continues even after his death in 2011 by a U.S. drone strike. His sermons continue to stoke jihadi-violence, including having inspired such persons as Maj. Nidal Hassan and the Tsarnaev brothers.

These above works by Qutb, Zawahiri, and Malik have been found on high value targets, on jihadi leaders, in every theater of conflict where a holy war is being fought. The ideas of these strategic thinkers have shaped the worldview and objectives of al-Qaida, IS, and every jihadist terror group working today to recreate the Caliphate so Islam can reign supreme.

But when it comes to the threat of jihadi violence here in America and the danger of American service personnel and citizens becoming terrorists, there is one more individual we must discuss.

Awlaki: Leave Infidel Land or Kill the Infidel

Born in New Mexico in 1971 to Yemeni parents, Anwar al-Awlaki would become the spiritual jihadi leader for a whole new generation of terrorists. Labeled "the bin Laden of the Internet," Awlaki would train in Islamic theology and become the imam of a Falls Church mosque in Virginia before ending his days as one of the most senior leaders of al-Qaida. He was killed on the orders of the White House in a drone strike in 2011.

Awlaki's significance, even after his death thanks to the scores of videos and audio recordings he made, was to bring his understanding of American culture and society to the challenge of recruiting young Americans to the cause of jihad, so making a holy war attractive to a post-Afghan war generation.

This became especially important after the 9/11 attacks brought a robust American national security response, which meant that another similar attack, executed by Arabs from the Middle East traveling on U.S. visas, would be much, much harder.

In fact, Awlaki's hand, or his influence, can be found behind:

- The Fort Hood massacre, where he was in contact with the killer Maj. Nidal Hasan
- The attempted Times Square bombing by Faisal Shahzad
- The Christmas Day bomb plot by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, and even
- The Boston Marathon bombing

Awlaki's importance was best illustrated by his ideological and theological roles in the Boston Bombing. I had the honor to serve as an expert for the U.S. Attorney's Office in the preparations for that trial, which was the most significant post-9/11 attack until San Bernardino, California, in December 2015.

In preparing the case, I was given access to the jihadi materials found on the surviving Tsarnaev brother's hard drive, documents that have been disclosed during the court proceedings and that should be mandatory reading for all those who wish to understand how jihadi terrorism is a living, breathing threat walking the streets of America.

Tsarnaev had multiple issues of the al-Qaida magazine *Inspire* downloaded from the Internet, as well as a series of audio lectures by Awlaki titled, *Hereafter*, which focus on the rewards devout Muslims will receive in heaven when they become *shaheed*, martyrs in the cause of the Caliphate.

In one of the issues of *Inspire* [online magazine] from 2010, Awlaki pens his own article titled, "Shaykh Anwar's Message to the America People and the Muslims of the West," and includes the key statement:

> I for one, was born in the U.S., and lived in the U.S. for 21 years. America was my home. I was a preacher of Islam involved in non-violent Islamic activism. However, with the American invasion of Iraq and continued U.S. aggression against Muslims, I could not reconcile between living in the U.S. and being a Muslim, and I eventually came to the conclusion that *jihad against America is binding upon myself, just as it is binding on every other able Muslim.*

Most significantly, Awlaki gives a very operational choice to Muslims living in un-Islamic countries such as America, a choice based upon the principle of *al wala al barra*. Originally simply a call to do that which pleases Allah and reject that which Allah would not like, Awlaki now tells Muslims of America and the West that today *al wala al barra* must be understood thusly:

> To the Muslims in America I have this to say: How can your conscience allow you to live in peaceful coexistence with a nation that is responsible for the tyranny and crimes committed against your own brothers and sisters? How can you have your loyalty to a government that is leading the war against Islam and Muslims? Hence, my advice to you is this: *you have two choices: either hijra [migration] or jihad. You either leave or you fight.* You leave and live among Muslims or you stay behind and fight with your hand, your wealth and your word. I specifically invite the youth to either fight in the West or join their brothers in the fronts of jihad: Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia.

Awalaki was the catalyst for several of the most serious attacks and jihadi conspiracies occurring on U.S. soil after 9/11. His message, transmitted in professional and attractive media, appealed to American citizens and immigrants in ways that the old and stolid preachings of the senior al-Qaida never could.

Today his influence continues after his death, just as it informed the Tsarnaev brothers in their attack in Boston almost two full years after Hellfire missiles killed Awlaki the man.

Assessment of Impact of Key Jihadi Theorists

The message of a holy war is alive. It is stronger than ever thanks to the former al-Qaida off-shoot in Iraq deciding the time for Caliphate is here. The new Islamic State will not stop until it is destroyed or it destroys us. There are no negotiations with totalitarians, especially religious totalitarians who see the rest of the world as infidels to be converted, enslaved, or killed.

For the last fifteen years, we have been losing this war. Egregiously in fact, with tens of thousands killed around the world in the name of Allah, and now in the name of the new Caliphate of IS and its new emperor, al-Baghdadi.

Jihad has become a threat to all that is decent in the world and foremostly to America, the nation that embodies the values of individual liberty and freedom that is so antithetical to the global jihadi movement. So what is to be done? How do we win? We learn from the lessons of the last war we fought against totalitarians, the Cold War we won against communism. We apply the approach of George Kennan to understand the threat against us and then we craft a strategic response as good as Paul Nitze's TOP SECRET NSC-68 to crush our enemy. ■

Biography
Dr. Sebastian Gorka is the Major General Matthew C. Horner Distinguished Chair of Military Theory at Marine Corps University and chair of the Threat Knowledge Group. Specializing in irregular warfare and jihadi strategy, he is a regular instructor for the U.S. Army Special Operations Command's John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, the FBI's Counterterrorism Division, and U.S. Special Operations Command. He served as an expert for the Department of Justice during the Boston Marathon bombing trial.

Notes

1. It is fascinating to parallel this "inevitability of victory" theme with Marxist totalitarianism, which also took as an article of faith the fact that communism will win and destroy capitalism and democracy. All that humans must do is choose whether they will join and build the "Workers' Paradise," or end up on the "ash heap of History."

2. In recent years, the phrase "intelligence preparation of the battlefield" has fallen victim to political correctness within the Pentagon. Today it is most often replaced with the new official phrase: "intelligence preparation of the environment," lest someone have the impression that we actually are at war.

Much the same thing happened when our information warfare professionals at Fort Bragg were told that they no longer performed psychological operations against our enemies, but instead were to execute military information support operations.

Welcome to the *Alice in Wonderland* world of euphemisms in a time of war.



MR We Recommend

For those who found the above article insightful, Dr. Sebastian Gorka of Marine Corps University discusses in much greater detail the ideological and philosophical foundations of modern Islamic terrorism in *DEFEATING JIHAD*. His book provides an in-depth study of the doctrine of the global jihadist movement and outlines a strategic plan to defeat groups like al-Qaida and the Islamic State.

For more information, see www.TheGorkaBriefing.com.

(Photo by Andrea Comas, Reuters)

More than three thousand former Iraqi soldiers from the disbanded Iraqi army protest in front U.S. soldiers next to the headquarters of the U.S.-led administration in Baghdad, 2 June 2003. The angry soldiers shouted slogans and vowed to launch suicide attacks on U.S. troops unless they were given wages and compensation.

The Particular Circumstances of Time and Place

Why the Occupation of Japan Succeeded and the Occupation of Iraq Failed

Col. David Hunter-Chester, PhD, U.S. Army, Retired

Before the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, the U.S. occupation of Japan from 1945 to 1952 was often invoked as evidence that Americans knew how to do occupations right. Consequently, at the outset of Operation Iraqi Freedom, it was assumed that, just as we Americans had done previously with non-Western Japan, we would be able to defeat non-Western Iraq and then turn it into a beacon of democratic hope in the benighted Middle East just as we had established Japan as an enlightened democratic state in the Far East. Confident in the already developed template of Japanese occupation, we would walk away with a new and successful ally left in place.

Of course, that is not what our occupation of Iraq resulted in. In retrospect, the main question has now become: Why did the Japan occupation succeed and the Iraq occupation fail? But, additionally, we should ask ourselves if the assumptions and supposed lessons drawn from the occupation in Japan were faulty to begin with?

Professionally, as a historian, I have studied extensively the U.S. occupation of Japan. Additionally, I was assigned to serve in the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Baghdad to help establish the ground work for the occupation of Iraq while I was on active duty in the U.S. Army. This background has perhaps given me the ability to offer a unique perspective due to my familiarity with the details of the occupation of Japan complemented by personal observations collected from my practical experience participating in establishing the ground floor phase of coalition efforts to successfully occupy and transform Iraq.

Consequently, in my view, the most concise answer to why the two occupations differed is captured by John Dower in his book *Cultures of War: Pearl Harbor / Hiroshima / 9-11 / Iraq,* which can be summarized as follows: the roles of the U.S. occupying apparatus and the central and local Japanese government entities through which it worked had been "tailored to the particular circumstances of time and place in Japan."[1] In Iraq, they were not.

Though "location, location, location" was the real key difference, other factors were important. But before addressing those factors, the next question should be, why do Americans consider the occupation of Japan to be a success?

Success in Japan

To some extent, the idea that Japan became a democracy, an economic powerhouse, and a loyal U.S. ally mainly as a result of prescient and consciously developed American postwar occupation policies is a holdover from the influence of an outdated historiography of Japan that also claimed Japan was the first non-Western state to successfully industrialize—during its Meiji Restoration—primarily because it copied Western techniques. The implication in such histories of course is that the Japanese, as a people, had no special originality in either political philosophy or industrial organization—that such had to be borrowed from the outside. From such an erroneous perspective, almost all of Japan's previous history is thus ignored. In this distorted view, modern Japanese history starts when Commodore Matthew Perry opens up a secluded Japan, which begins to copy from the superior West, dispensing almost entirely with the cultural and sociopolitical influence of Japan's past. Such a notion is absurd on its face, but has often been accepted without questioning it.

Similarly, in many of the initial histories written about the American occupation, the extensive influence of Japan's own complicated, multi-faceted cultural and social history simply disappear. According to such facile histories, a new Japan emerges as a result of the occupation, molded by America in its own image, as if World War II had wiped the Japanese historical slate clean, and this new Japan only succeeded to the degree it learned from its occupier.

Fortunately, later histories of Japan have restored more honest depth to the record and have acknowledged Japanese agency in the direction of postwar recovery, giving better context when explaining Japan's foundational steps toward modern industrialization during the Meiji Restoration as a precursor to Japan's later success during the occupation and its aftermath. For example, while it is true that Japan imported technologies and entire factories from the West as it industrialized around the turn of the last century, it is more accurate to recognize that Japan had already arrived at a proto-industrial stage independently prior to Perry's arrival, just as it was already experimenting and struggling with democratic concepts and institutions. Just as Great Britain had moved from cottage-industry production into factory production before the advent of the steam engine, Japan, too, had independently developed a proto-factory



(Images courtesy of Sonoma Valley Museum of Art)

The organizational mindset that would serve as the foundation for the introduction of heavy manufacturing and industrialization is reflected in artwork depicting the step-by-step process of nineteenth century Japanese paper making.

system, which it then later more effectively mechanized with imported machinery.[2] More careful historians have come to realize Japan's rapid transformation into a developed European-style nation-state at the end of the nineteenth through the beginning of the twentieth centuries was—while impacted by the West—not a radical change from the path toward modernization Japan was already on. Both nascent industrialism and capitalism were developing and flourishing from native roots independent of Western influence, as was an independent strain of democracy.

The consensus of current American-written history of Japan is that the Meiji Restoration, with all its ramifications, was a fundamentally conservative movement, led by capable bureaucrats, revolutionary in some respects but merely the result of reforms in other respects.[3] Thus, Japan's industrialization was not sui generis. Though the Japanese did import ideas and material from the West, these ideas and material were interpreted and reworked by the Japanese, and textured by their own history and culture. Consequently, in the end, on closer examination, the West fundamentally has had only a relatively moderate impact on the managerial and cultural direction of Japanese industrialization and capitalism.

Similarly, while America's seven-year occupation of Japan did greatly influence the country, most of the successes Americans have a tendency to attribute to the occupation are fundamentally Japanese, not American, in origin. For example, did Japan emerge as a Western-style democracy? Yes, and no. Before World War II, Japan already had a democratic tradition of its own that had flowered, particularly in the 1920s, during what is known as the Taisho Democracy. Japan's democratization after the war is better interpreted as a return to, and strengthening of, this tradition after postwar demilitarization had removed the dominant influence of Japanese militarists, rather than the exclusive product of imported institutions and practices from the West.

Did Japan become an economic powerhouse primarily because the West taught it how to do so? No.

It is true by 1955, three years after the end of the relatively generous policies the United States applied during occupation to rebuild the country, Japan's economy was again producing at wartime levels, and by 1968 Japan had the second largest economy in the free world. While there are many reasons for this success—a subject that has its own extensive historiography—certainly the primary reason for this success was not the material assistance from the West, but the hard work of a well-educated, highly disciplined populace with a high degree of cultural habituation to community cooperation and

(Photo courtesy of National Diet Library, Japan)

A crowd assembles before the House of Representatives Gate, 5 February 1913. The Taisho Democracy existed 1912–1926 during the reign of Emperor Taisho in Japan.

responsiveness to hierarchical authority—prerequisites for successful modern industrialization. Some key policies, like land redistribution to former tenant farmers, which produced a larger, more stable middle-class agricultural sector, were effected by occupation fiat. However, in the end, the economic miracle can be traced mainly on a consistent arc back through Japanese history to deeply embedded cultural factors already inclined to foster the kind of cooperative social organization conducive to organizing heavy industrialization, of which the occupation was a part but not the main factor.

Were the policies of the occupation consciously formulated to mold Japan into the staunch U.S. ally it is today? Japan did become an ally, and it remains one. However, this particular development was arguably inevitable despite the occupation, owing to the expedient circumstances that developed in the East Asia/Pacific region during the time period in general, to include such factors as the breakout of the Korean war and Western stand-off with Communist China.

Japan remains a key ally as evidenced, for instance, by it continuing to host a large contingent of the U.S. military on its soil. But, this did not come about because of any farsighted, consciously developed occupation policy. Rather, it resulted from a Japanese policy put in place to accelerate the end of the occupation. Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida agreed to allow American troops to remain stationed in Japan as a carrot to the U.S. government to receive a peace treaty that restored Japan's sovereignty. Further, another key reason Japan is one of America's most important allies in the region is Japan's development of its modern, professional, and capable Self-Defense Force. Not only was the development of such a force not foreseen by occupation planners, but was actually opposed by many since it was contrary to initial occupation policy that sought to demilitarize Japan permanently. Indeed, many who created the policy for occupied Japan considered the demilitarization of the erstwhile empire the most important goal of occupation. Thus, this development, often cited as a key success of the occupation—Japan as a strong ally—was the result of spontaneous reactions to events and not the result of long-term planning by the occupation force. Indeed, it represents a 180-degree turn from initial, strongly held positions among those who formulated and executed the original occupation plans.

(Photo by Arthur Curlis, U.S. Army)

Industrial training experts watch as a light bulb machine drop bulbs down to other workers who sort them according to defects 25 January 1951 at Tokyo Shibaura Electric Co. in Tokyo, Japan.

Reasons for Success

Again, after the close-to-the-bone histories written by those who had worked in the American occupation, more recent histories have stressed the continuities between wartime, occupation, and post-occupation Japan.[4] Such studies tend to conclude that the successes of Japan during and after the American occupation have more to do with Japan and the Japanese people than with the policies or actions of the American occupation. But, even so, the American occupation of Japan

was more successful than the U.S. occupation of Iraq. Although many points of comparison can be made, I will outline three I regard as key reasons explaining why that can be reasonably demonstrated by events.

Psychological Acceptance of Defeat. The Japanese, as a people, recognized they had been defeated long before the fact was acknowledged by their leaders. Most were starving, and their cities were being incinerated at will by their enemies. Near the end of the war, they were ready to lay down their arms—to do anything to end their misery, but continued nonetheless out of national fealty rooted in reverence for their emperor.[5]

In Iraq, the situation was more problematic. The United States defeated Saddam Hussein's armed forces, but many people did not regard those armed forces as representative of their interests or of national identity. As a result, many Iraqis were happy enough to find themselves out of their dictator's hellish embrace as enforced by an oppressive military, but had no personal sense of defeat. However, any initial relief they felt at the end of Hussein's rule exercised by the state security apparatus soon evaporated when it became clear the occupying forces could not provide security or civil stability. Consequently, the conflict had not been a war of the people as Japan's had been. The Iraqis were ready to start anew, just as the Japanese had been, but the fear they had previously had of Hussein and his thugs was soon replaced by a Hobbesian sense of insecurity due to lack of security, domestic chaos, and inept civil administration by the occupying force led by the CPA.

While working in the Office of Policy, Planning, and Analysis (OPPA) of the CPA, I was a member of a small staff responsible for the CPA's strategic plan. During the course of this work, I had the opportunity to collect insights regarding some Iraqi perspectives toward our occupation. For example, one Iraqi I spoke to in the OPPA said—while he did not wish for the return of Hussein or a brutal and merciless individual like him—Iraq was nevertheless insecure because it did not need democracy so much as a strong hand, a strong leader to hold dissent in check and enforce social order and stability.[6] Whether one agrees with that assessment or not, at that time Iraq was clearly deficient in leadership, especially leadership recognized, respected, and feared enough by all Iraqi people to forgo rebellion against the government.

Leadership. Moreover, below the highest levels, the character of leadership differed at every level when comparing Iraq to postwar Japan. The Japanese had been indoctrinated to revere their emperor as a god. Although starving, demoralized, and largely resigned that Japan's defeat was inevitable, the Japanese would have continued to fight if the emperor had not instead asked them to "endure the unendurable" and accept occupation.

By comparison, there was no leader of similar stature or influence among the Iraqis. The lack of such a unifying figure over the state was not Iraq's only leadership problem. After World War I, Japan embraced the idea of total war, requiring the mobilization of everyone in a combatant nation, perhaps more completely than any other nation.[7] The resulting human machinery of bureaucrat and technocrat able to efficiently administer the state remained intact after World War II—with the exceptions of the armed forces and War and Naval ministries—and was therefore available to immediately oversee and manage reconstruction during the American occupation if given the chance. As a result, going into the occupation, the U.S. government decided to minimize the troops required by governing through the existing and competent leadership structure already in place with minimal vetting to remove die hard militarists.

In comparison, the national and local leadership of Iraq's managerial class had atrophied during Hussein's reign and consequently, unlike what was available during the occupation of Japan, represented only the bare bones of an effective managerial class of Iraqi bureaucrats that might otherwise have been able to help manage the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Iraq under U.S. occupation. Further, in contrast to policies used in Japan, rather than vetting and preserving what remained of the former Iraqi bureaucracy under Hussein, the United States introduced a draconian program to remove all Ba'athist party members from government, which in practice meant almost all leaders in government at all levels. The subsequent de-Ba'athification program thoroughly expunged what remained of managerial expertise from the former Iraqi government, effective and otherwise, which resulted in removing from positions of authority the only real institutional expertise available on long established modes of Iraqi governance. This decision resulted in social

and political chaos followed by the painful necessity of trying to select and develop fresh, politically acceptable leadership at practically every level. In contrast to the relatively efficient transition to national administration and governance in the Japanese occupation, the process used in Iraq effectively stymied efforts to normalize and efficiently manage reconstruction and governance throughout Iraq for the better part of the following decade during and after the occupation.

Military- versus Civilian-led Occupational Government. Additionally, the method of leadership the United States employed was radically different from the situation that prevailed in the Japanese occupation as compared to that in Iraq. The occupation of Japan was overseen and administered through a U.S. military government. As a result, the American leadership was overwhelmingly military, which provided well-defined levels of responsibility and a clear chain of command up to Gen. Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP—an acronym that came to denote both MacArthur and the overall bureaucracy of the occupation). Under military occupational government, similar to wartime, soldiers were assigned in organized units, remained for relatively long periods of time under military discipline and direction, and were given specifically assigned tasks and missions as directed by the chain of authority, the progress of which they were required to report. One result was accountability and follow through at all levels.

By comparison, although under the Department of Defense, and supported by Combined Joint Task Force 7, Iraq's CPA was little more than an ad hoc exercise for the year of its existence.

My office, OPPA, worked directly for the CPA director, Amb. L. Paul Bremer. He was a decisive man, but he could only get to so much in his inbox each day as he tried to function in an organization that was constantly in flux with no clear chain of command and little accountability to him directly within each organization. While there were several capable leaders immediately below him, below them was a chaotic and dysfunctional organizational structure that provided little continuity, and little real leverage in terms of actual power to get things done. Moreover, staffers—most of whom were political appointees of some kind—filtered in and out of the CPA with dizzying speed. Some were there for weeks, some for months, some for just a few days. But very few stayed for the length of the CPA's short existence, and even fewer remained from the time of the CPA's predecessor, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Activities (ORHA). Consequently, there was little in the way of institutional memory or established networks of personal relationships with the Iraqis.

(Image courtesy of Flickr)

Demobilizing World War II Japanese Army veterans awaiting a train in Sasebo, Japan, circa 1945.

As noted, even for their short stints in the organization, few staffers actually worked directly for the CPA. Instead, many reported back to their home offices without any direct accountability to Bremer. Consequently, there was no clear chain of command and weak mechanisms for assigning and enforcing authority. For example, one individual, who had somehow attached himself to the OPPA, had volunteered to come up with an antiterrorism policy for the Interim Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), which he committed to have ready to deliver to the IGC by a date fixed in December 2003. That individual also kept desks in two other CPA sections, and we did not see much of him in the weeks prior to the due date of the policy. But, twenty-four hours before the policy was due to the IGC, he



(Image courtesy of Library of Congress, Plate No. 66)

Unlike the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq, the occupation of Japan was overseen by a highly organized U.S. occupational force military government subject to military discipline and internal oversight. Moreover, unlike the CPA, the U.S. occupational authorities made the decision to administer the reconstruction effort through the already established existing Japanese civil service and local government structures that had survived the war after vetting such bodies to eliminate residual militarist sympathizers.

showed up and said he would not be able to get it done, and then he left.

We had no authority over the individual to require him to stay and deliver what was committed. As a result, we were then compelled to hastily write a draft policy, which we delivered on the promised date. Nonetheless, the lack of accountability and follow-through was not only an inconvenience, but was an embarrassment at the time. It was a disservice in terms of wasted time, but also was a failure to comply with a promised commitment to deliver on time a well-developed policy to members of an institution that desperately needed it to proceed with establishing order in their country. Such failures only helped undermine IGC confidence in the CPA's competence and trust in the United States.

Failure to have the ability to hold this individual accountable to finish the project also compelled us to contract out for development of a more fully thought out and developed policy, which was an unanticipated expense and administrative issue that produced greater needless delay. Fortunately, we were able to obtain the services from a world-class terrorism expert whom we contracted through the RAND Corporation, and the end result was a fuller and well written policy though it was done well after when it had been promised for delivery.

Unfortunately, this kind of incident was not uncommon in the CPA, and was due mainly to lack of authority vested in the CPA to hold people accountable resulting in lack of follow-through, which was in stark contrast to the U.S. administration of the Japanese occupation. In SCAP, a directive to a subordinate was, in almost all cases, a legal order from a superior officer. Consequently, there were few problems with follow-through.

Preparation. Additionally, in a closely related issue, unlike the Japanese occupation experience, CPA staffers, for the most part, were not particularly prepared by background, education, experience, or personality to work in the occupation environment of Iraq. This highlights another key difference between the two occupations by comparing the strategic foresight involved in what would be required for a successful occupation. The United States began planning for the occupation of Japan as early as 1942.[8] For example, both the Department of the Navy

and the Department of War set up civil affairs courses for potential occupiers—at Columbia University and the University of Virginia, respectively. As time went on, other schools were added.[9] Similarly, the United States also began to plan and prepare for the occupations of Axis countries after the war.

(Photo by Staff Sgt. Russell Bassett, 115th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment)

Oregon National Guard and Japan Ground Self Defense Force troops salute the U.S. and Japanese flags during the Orient Shield 2007 opening ceremony 9 October 2006 at the Sekiyama Maneuver Area in Honshu, Japan. Japan has emerged as one of the United States most important allies. However, this occurred as a matter of defense policy expediency and not by U.S. design.

Initially, the plans for occupation were crafted by individual organizations: the Army, the Navy, and the State Department. These first plans were not coordinated and thus often were at cross purposes. But, in the final months before the defeats of Germany and Japan, an interagency body—the State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC)—was created, which worked surprisingly well. It was also in the last months before defeating Germany and Japan that President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who had wanted civilian occupation authorities, was persuaded that only the U.S. military had the large-scale capacity to take on the myriad tasks of occupation. Consequently, he directed the Department of War to take charge, which it did by establishing military commanders and command structure over the interim governments.

In contrast, though the United States had been planning for the combat operations for a potential invasion of Iraq for an even longer period than had been done for war with Japan—during the ten-year period after the first Gulf War—the pleas by various military leaders during that time to also stress planning for the post-invasion did not gain traction. Within U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), for instance, promising beginnings on such planning were not followed through.[10] As a result, few initiatives, such as developing a pool of regional experts through formal schooling to serve as leaders in a potential occupation, as was done in preparation for dealing with the end of World War II, were put in place. In sum, there was no similar serious effort to consider and prepare for the occupation of Iraq before the invasion of Iraq.

This was true despite the fact that, unlike during World War II, an organization to coordinate interagency policy, the National Security Council, did exist prior to the invasion of Iraq. But, in the end, it was not used as effectively as SWNCC had been to coordinate occupation policies across the government.

Finally, just as Roosevelt and others wanted civilians in charge of occupied territories, the Bush administration felt the same way about occupying Iraq. The difference was that Roosevelt was finally persuaded that only the military had the physical capacity together with the necessary command and control structure to take on the myriad tasks involved in occupations.[11] In contrast, this realization did not sink in for the Bush administration. Though the Department of Defense was placed in charge, it responded by organizing the CPA (and ORHA before it), without a clear chain of command in place and with no specifically delineated responsibilities nor authority to enforce accountability. As a result, the occupation remained a hodgepodge of loosely affiliated organizations with no command and little control throughout its short existence.

(Photo by Ahmed Saad, Reuters)

People shout slogans during a demonstration against the poor quality of basic services and power outages, and call for the trial of corrupt politicians 2 October 2015 in Baghdad, Iraq.

Conclusion

Though the American occupation of Japan was generous and constructive toward the Japanese people, the successes of the American occupation of Japan nevertheless mostly stem from the formative socio-cultural characteristics of the Japanese people, as extensively chronicled in Japanese history, and the resulting efforts of the Japanese themselves. Prior to World War II, Japan was a developed country moving toward modernization that for nearly two decades starting in the early twentieth century tragically fell captive to radical, militarist leaders who took Japan into what the Japanese have since called the "Dark Valley."

With those militarists defeated and discredited, Japan was able to take advantage of a battered but knowledgeable and capable Japanese bureaucracy at all levels, well-educated and motivated workers, and a favorable international environment to forge the Japanese "economic miracle," both during and after the occupation.

Those factors did not exist in Iraq. It was not a fully developed industrialized country before Hussein's dictatorship, and what infrastructure it had, for instance, was ravaged by Hussein's wars, his neglect and, finally, the sanctions of the post-Gulf War decade. As just one example, while I served in the CPA, we rarely met our electrical output goals. The national hodgepodge of electrical grids the occupation inherited from the Hussein regime was in much poorer condition than almost anyone had realized before the war. But even as we were consistently laying new wire in an effort to build the infrastructure for restoration and modernization of Iraq as a whole, the lack of a sense of civic responsibility in many sectors of the Iraqi populace and economic desperation combined with poor overall security to protect rebuilding efforts continually blocked progress; as new electrical lines were strung, they were quickly brought down by thieves who stole from them the copper wiring later sold in Turkey.

Also, prior to the war, Iraq did not have a reliable corps of public servants or state organizations dedicated to serving the entire Iraqi people, and did not have a population with a strong sense of national identity reflected in loyalty to the common nation-state. It rather was a state riven by long standing ethnic and religious divides. Nevertheless, either due to inexcusable ignorance or tacit dereliction in rejecting the counsel of experts who knew better, we went into the occupation with much less planning and coordination than we did for Japan. Moreover, as a final point, we spent much less time there than in Japan in

a committed effort to rebuild the national infrastructure and establish democratic governance.

Common sense might have indicated that since Iraq was a less-developed country with a less homogeneous population, and much less of a tradition of either industrialization or democratic rule, to achieve our goal of producing a democratic, capitalistic Iraq should have been recognized as a commitment that would require a long time—perhaps generations.

In summary, occupations require enlightened leadership, extensive training and education, and whole-of-government efforts, even in countries that may share a heritage of industrial development and democratic traditions where our desire is to return the country to a peaceful and stable democracy. However, the planning requirements should be seen as even more important for less-developed countries without an indigenous democratic tradition or experience in modern industrial organization and economic management. Going into the occupation of Iraq, we ignored or misinterpreted our prior, extensive experience in the occupation of Japan (and postwar Germany), tacitly assuming the Iraqi people, freed from Hussein's criminal abuse, would spontaneously produce a stable, friendly democracy led by a corps of altruistic and patriotic Iraqi managers that we quickly discovered did not exist. For any future occupation duties, we have to learn from the past, pay attention to what area experts tell us, closely tailor the occupation to the present situation, avoid dogmatically using assumed templates from past experience, coordinate across the government, and keep our eyes and policies focused on the art of the possible. ■

Biography

Col. David Hunter-Chester, U.S. Army, retired, has a PhD in East Asian studies. His military career included assignments in Germany, Iraq, and the Pentagon, and he spent fifteen years in Japan.

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The AFRICOM Queen

Brian J. Dunn

United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) advances American interests in Africa by deploying elements of U.S. national power in a persistent manner. It seeks to prevent problems from growing to direct-threat proportions by enhancing the ability of states and regional or international organizations to promote security, stability, and prosperity. USAFRICOM (also known as AFRICOM) needs cost-effective and nontraditional naval platforms—*auxiliary cruisers*—to project U.S. Army and civilian interagency assets (supplemented by nongovernmental organizations, when appropriate) around the African continent for peacetime engagement and crisis response.

In a June 2015 article for *Signal Magazine*, former U.S. Navy Adm. James Stavridis makes a case for increased use of the Navy's afloat forward staging bases (AFSBs), which he says could fulfill the need for offshore bases to support missions in USAFRICOM. He suggests commercial options for creating more of this type of asset: "Given the uses for the concept, it is worth considering any commercial version that could be purchased for even less than the military's AFSBs. While they would have somewhat less capability, their numbers would provide far more flexibility in distributing them among the regional combatant commanders."[1]

Similarly, modularized auxiliary cruisers using civilian container ships taken into government service under contract, using primarily military crews and equipped with an array of weapon and support systems housed in commercial shipping containers, could function as mobile platforms for projecting and supporting Army military missions and civilian developmental and humanitarian initiatives around Africa. In a tight budget environment, when the Navy prioritizes battle fleet assets for U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), which has more sophisticated naval challenges, and to U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), which is carrying out ongoing military campaigns, modularized auxiliary cruisers are the asset USAFRICOM needs.

The Challenges of AFRICOM

To cope with a full range of missions across a large, diverse continent, USAFRICOM sets forth a

(Image courtesy of U.S. Navy)

Angola's Fuzileiros da Marinha de Guerra (marines) prepare to clear buildings after disembarking a boat during room-clearing training, 7 October 2015, in Lobito, Angola. U.S. Marines and U.K. Royal Marine Commandos trained the Fuzileiros da Marinha de Guerra as part of the Africa Partnership Station, which is a U.S Naval Forces Africa initiative to increase the maritime safety and security capacity of African partners through collaboration and regional cooperation.

succinct mission: "United States Africa Command, in concert with interagency and international partners, builds defense capabilities, responds to crisis, and deters and defeats transnational threats in order to advance U.S. national interests and promote regional security, stability, and prosperity."[2] The establishment of USAFRICOM reflects America's need to engage Africa in a sustained shaping fashion rather than in a reactive crisis mode.

In a report for the Institute of Land Warfare's *National Security Watch,* analyst Milady Ortiz describes the security situation that led to the creation of USAFRICOM: "The post-9/11 environment and prioritization of counterterrorism for U.S. national security,

in addition to the traditional security issues on the continent—humanitarian crises, ethnic conflict, and health epidemics—have raised Africa's geopolitical profile."[3] Weak African states with poor internal cohesion have limited capacity to effectively resist foreign aggression, and they are vulnerable to terrorist groups that further destabilize the state, potentially creating sanctuaries for planning terrorism abroad.[4]

Terrorism is just one aspect of the African continent's new importance to security. According to Kofi Nsia-Pepra, writing in a 2014 *Military Review* article, "Contrary to Africa's strategic insignificance to the United States in the post-immediate Cold War era, [Africa] gained primacy in post-9/11 due to terrorism, energy sources, and China's creeping influence into Africa."[5] We need to bolster the continent's governments and security forces so they can resist violent extremist organizations trying to establish themselves in sanctuaries. We need to reduce the conditions that can make Africa more vulnerable to these influences, and we need to use our resources to leverage individual government and regional initiatives to defeat threats to stability and progress.

Africa will, in the near term, be an economy-of-force effort, partly because the United States is dedicating increased military resources to the Asia-Pacific region. The rise of Chinese military and economic power—coupled with uncertainties about how China's leaders will use that power—make USPACOM a priority theater.

Worse, USCENTCOM, which U.S. policymakers once believed had quieted down sufficiently to allow the pivot to USPACOM, has many crises compelling our attention at the expense of USAFRICOM. Numerous challenges make USCENTCOM a continuing drain on American military assets. These challenges include instability in Egypt, the rise of the Islamic State, Iranian efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, Iranian threats to American allies in the Middle East, insecurity of Arabian Gulf oil traffic, civil war in Yemen, and instability in Afghanistan.

Finally, U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), once a "peace dividend" command following the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, is fully engaged in rebuilding military capabilities in NATO, to refocus on a newly assertive Russia. Therefore, with American defense spending restricted under the impact of sequestration despite increased instability and uncertainty around the globe, these demands mean that USAFRICOM will struggle for resources to cope with its diverse challenges.

Complicating USAFRICOM's missions, this command must project ground power into the continent. Only in Djibouti, in the Horn of Africa region, do we have an enduring military presence focused on counterterrorism operations.[6] The lack of a major U.S. presence on the ground in Africa is driven by local aversion to a major "permanent" American military presence on the continent.[7] In time, that sentiment may shift as the people and governments see that our activities aid them without infringing

(Image courtesy of NATO)

Two Standing NATO Maritime Group Two (SNMG2) ships, the flagship, Federal German Ship (FGS) *Hamburg*, and Her Danish Majesty's Ship (HDMS) *Absalon*, arrive for a port visit to Haifa, Israel, 7 December 2015.

on their autonomy. Until then, our footprint on the ground must necessarily be small and temporary, capable of shifting, surging, and receding with the specific missions.

The result is that USAFRICOM lacks sufficient ground maneuver units deployed within its area of responsibility to achieve its missions. In early 2015, when the Army reported it had an infantry battalion stationed in Djibouti, that unit remained far from most of the African continent.[8] Even the newly established Marine Corps African rapid reaction force in Morón, Spain, with MV-22 air assets assigned at the request of USAFRICOM, has a restricted radius of action limited to northwest Africa.[9]

To deploy the marines from Spain beyond the range of their aircraft or to move ground units in Djibouti any significant distance, USAFRICOM needs additional shipping capacity. According to a report by Sam LaGrone, "The marines are also looking to buttress the land-deployed SPMAGTF [special purpose marine air-ground task force] units in Morón and Sigonella, Italy, with a maritime component that would include nontraditional ships from which to launch marines into regions further south, including the Gulf of Guinea."[10] LaGrone quotes Lt. Gen. Kenneth Glueck, commander of Marine Corps Combat Development Command: "We must continue to mitigate the amphibious shipping shortage by looking for other ways to do business."[11]

If marines cannot count on Navy hulls to operate in Africa, how low a priority will Army units have? The helicopter-mobile 101st Airborne Division, with ample helicopter assets organic to the unit, will face similar restrictions if deployed to Africa. The United States needs low-cost hulls for a broad range of missions in war and peace around the African continent. Modularized auxiliary cruisers can mitigate the amphibious shipping shortage for deploying land power throughout USAFRICOM's area of responsibility.

The Design of an Auxiliary Cruiser

Auxiliary cruisers were once a common type of improvised warship for navies that needed to expand their numbers quickly. Civilian ships with light cannons bolted to their decks, along with other equipment, supplemented navies during times of war.

Such simple conversions are not feasible today because of more complex ship systems. The U.S. Navy has forged a path toward effective conversions, however, with the littoral combat ship (LCS), which opens up possibilities for modern auxiliary cruisers. The basic LCS hull, with only limited organic combat capabilities, is designed to incorporate what the Navy calls removable "mission packages" built from "mission modules" that allow a LCS to be specialized for mine clearing on one deployment and antiship missions for the next after changing the mission package.

For the purposes of the proposed modularized auxiliary cruiser, I modify the Navy term for the building blocks (mission modules) to "containerized mission modules," to emphasize their portability. I adopt unchanged the Navy term "mission package" to mean a collection of containerized mission modules focused on one type of mission.



(Figure by Arin Burgess, *Military Review*)

Figure 1. Examples of Containerized Mission Modules

While LCS costs have exceeded expectations, leading the Navy to dramatically restructure the ship class, the modularity concept still has potential for building Army modularized auxiliary cruisers. Denmark had more success with perhaps more restricted ambitions when it built a low-cost flexible support ship designed to use interchangeable "self-contained, 10-foot cubes which contain entire warfighting systems."[12] The ship, HDMS *Absalon*, which attracted the interest of the U.S. Navy, was "designed to use modularity and scalability to perform a wide variety of missions" such as naval combat, transport, command and control, and humanitarian.[13] The concepts of modularity and scalability are key.

The modular part of a modularized auxiliary cruiser would be provided by building system components in shipping containers. These proposed containerized mission modules would be easy to move by sea, road, rail, or air, and they would be housed in industry-standard sizes already in use and armored to provide protection for personnel and equipment.[14]

Commercial container ships stack shipping containers on their decks for maximum usage. For a modularized auxiliary cruiser layout, however, I do not envision stacking containerized mission modules, in order to allow the modules to mount gun turrets or other weapons, antennas, sensors, and gear on the roof of the module.

For missions that require more robust self-defense capabilities, the modularized auxiliary cruiser would be equipped with containerized mission modules that included offensive and defensive missiles or gun turrets with small cannons or automatic weapons. Other modules designed for Army, Marine, or U.S. Special Operations Command ground elements would support company-sized teams tailored to the specific mission, whether combat, training, or humanitarian. Modules to support civil affairs and Special Forces, plus helicopters or unmanned aerial vehicles, would supplement combat elements. Some modules would contain power supplies for other containerized mission modules, while others would house the communications systems to plug a ship into USAFRICOM's command-and-control network. Figure 1 provides hypothetical examples of containerized mission modules.

The scalability part of a modularized auxiliary cruiser comes from the platform. Larger or smaller container ships could be selected for conversion, depending on the size, complexity, and duration of the envisioned mission. Any container ship selected would have the deck space to accommodate containerized mission modules and room to launch, land, and stow rotary- or fixed-wing manned or unmanned aircraft.

Using an appropriately sized container ship, the modularized auxiliary cruiser would be converted



(Image courtesy of Austal USA/U.S. Navy)

The USNS (U.S. Naval Ship) *Millinocket* is rolled out of its building shed 4 June 2013 in Mobile, Alabama. The ship was transferred to a floating drydock, which was towed out to deeper water in Mobile Bay. There, the dock was flooded down, the joint high-speed vessel floated off, and tugs towed the incomplete vessel back to the shipyard for final fitting out.

using various containerized mission modules to build mission packages installed on the deck of the ship. Because missions for the modularized auxiliary cruiser would change and evolve, mission packages would be different from one mission to the next. Figure 2 (page 56) provides hypothetical examples of modularized auxiliary cruiser mission packages. Army regionally aligned forces would train with these mission packages on the modularized auxiliary cruiser or on land-based training facilities (or perhaps afloat on larger barges) laid out to simulate deck positioning on the modularized auxiliary cruiser. The military would have the flexibility of training reservists at land-based training facilities before overseas deployment.

The source of ships that could be converted to modularized auxiliary cruisers is the world's container ship fleet. There are about five thousand in the total world fleet.[15] The top twenty container ship operators controlled over 3,200 of these types of ships, as of 2014.[16] America's share was small, however, with only sixty-nine in private hands in 2014.[17] Therefore, USAFRICOM could not restrict the potential pool to American-flagged container ships.

The Department of Defense Civil Reserve Air Fleet program presents a model for building a pool of available container ships to create modularized auxiliary cruisers. This aviation program compensates American civilian airlines or other entities for enrolling aircraft that meet performance requirements as a reserve source of airlift capacity. As of June 2014, the Air Force had 553 aircraft from twenty-four carriers contracted through the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF).[18] The Army could create a Civilian Reserve Cruiser Fleet by paying shipping companies to modify certain container ships to accommodate mission packages and keep USAFRICOM informed of their location and availability status at all times. With a large enough pool of container ships to draw from, some would be clear of most cargo at any given time. For emergencies, there could be additional payments from the U.S. government to compensate the shipping company and cargo owners for inconvenience.

China already is seeking to make civilian ships suitable for military use. In June 2015, the state-run *China Daily* newspaper reported that to facilitate the mobilization of civilian ships, China ordered its shipbuilders to make them more readily usable by its military:

> The regulations require five categories of vessels including container ships to be modified to "serve national defense needs." … The regulations "will enable China to convert the



(Figure by Arin Burgess, *Military Review*)

Figure 2: Examples of Modularized Auxiliary Cruiser Mission Packages

considerable potential of its civilian fleet into military strength."[19]

China can simply order private shipping companies to provide a reserve naval force, of course. But the Air Force's CRAF experience demonstrates that a democracy can accomplish the same objective with cooperative means. By contracting with major shipping companies to modify portions of their fleets, the Army would have a sizable pool of ships that sail within or near USAFRICOM's area of responsibility. Those ships could be alerted as needed to move to friendly ports where mission packages—and crews composed of Army mariners, Navy and Coast Guard sailors, and contractors if necessary—that were shipped or flown into those ports could be installed on their hulls

Modularized Auxiliary Cruisers in AFRICOM

Modularized auxiliary cruisers would typically operate alone, but they could operate within a Navy or allied task force for missions that take place in a high-threat environment.

Because African security forces comprise mostly armies and police forces, American ground forces must take the lead in missions that support African security forces. By supporting missions ashore carried out by ground forces and civilian assets to perform the key tasks of USAFRICOM, the modularized auxiliary cruiser would be a power-projection asset rather than a pure navy asset for naval missions.

Some ground-oriented missions could be carried out by American forces that remained on a modularized auxiliary cruiser that would enter the port or stay offshore if the mission was a single, brief operation or if local sentiment or threat levels ruled out even a temporary land presence. Longer missions could be conducted by personnel and mission packages deployed ashore for months, on the coast, or inland via contractor-provided land or air transport. Deploying elements ashore would allow the modularized auxiliary cruiser to move on to other locations and other missions. Ground-force mission packages used by small detachments of Army, Marine Corps, or Special Operations Command troops could provide a ground-force option on the scene to support local security in a nonmilitary mission, or as a rapid-reaction force for Army regionally aligned forces.

Sometimes the United States needs help to manage a crisis abroad without using U.S. military forces. When appropriate, the United States could support allies by providing containerized mission modules for their use.

Key tasks across the African continent recognized by USAFRICOM that could benefit from using modularized auxiliary cruisers are—

- Counter violent extremist organizations (VEOs) and their networks
- Support defense institution building
- Strengthen maritime security
- Support peace support operations

- Support humanitarian and disaster response
- Counter illicit flows [of terrorists, people, narcotics, and arms] [20]

Counter violent extremist organizations. Many readers are acquainted with examples of insurgent groups threatening U.S. and partner interests in Africa. For example, insurgencies in Libya, Somalia, Mali, and Nigeria have demonstrated that weak or failing governments with inadequate military capacity can enable the rise of jihadi organizations. One less-known African insurgent group is the Lord's Resistance Army. This group "abducted at least 66,000 [Ugandan] children and youth between 1986 and 2005" and displaced almost two million people in Northern Uganda; the Department of State calls it "one of Africa's oldest, most violent, and persistent armed groups."[21] The Lord's Resistance Army originated in Uganda in 1986 and operated there until it was pushed west into the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic (and eventually the Republic of South Sudan), where, as of 2011, more than 465,000 people were displaced or living as refugees.[22] The horrors of genocidal killing in Rwanda two decades ago as well as Sudan's ongoing Darfur killings are reminders that ethnic hatreds are a potent threat to stability.

Modularized auxiliary cruisers with combat and support mission packages could carry out an array of direct counterterrorism missions against groups like the Lord's Resistance Army, such as air strikes (manned and unmanned), Special Forces direct action, and advising for local forces. In

(Photo courtesy of Military Sealift Command, U.S. Navy)

USNS *Spearhead* during sea trials, 19 April 2012.

USNS *Spearhead*

In December 2012, the Navy placed its first joint high-speed vessel (JHSV) in service: USNS *Spearhead*. In 2014, the *Spearhead*, which was named by the Army, "conducted its maiden operational deployment to Europe and Africa and … [supported] U.S. Southern Command," according to U.S. Navy Military Sealift Command. Designed for rapid intratheater transport of troops and military equipment, "the JHSV is showing a broader range of applications such as logistical support, counter-trafficking, and medical operations in support of larger platforms such as amphibious assault ships," according to a report by Kris Osborn in June 2015.

Now renamed *expeditionary fast transports* (EPFs), the 338-foot-long aluminum catamarans are designed to be fast, flexible, and maneuverable even in shallow waters or austere ports. Per Osborn, "while the JHSV is not expected to perform combat missions, it could be used to rapidly resupply special operations forces in some instances." In March 2015, the *Spearhead* supported "a large-scale multinational exercise off the coast of Africa … called Obangame Express 2015." Based on the platform's performance in Obangame Express and other exercises around the world, "the Navy is looking at using the JHSV more frequently with an emerging platform called the mobile landing platform, or MLP. Using a commercial tanker as a base platform, the MLP can launch and recover landing craft air cushions [hovercraft] and is engineered for a wide range of ship-to-shore operations." The vessels operate with civilian crews.

As of March 2016, the Navy's ship inventory includes six EPFs, with five more planned. Originally, five ships were to be assigned to the Army, but the services agreed to transfer all to the Navy.

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addition, they could provide key combat and support functions to enable allies to carry out such missions. If intelligence indicated threats to American interests or facilities, USAFRICOM could deploy Army or Marine Corps ground forces from Djibouti and Spain (or State Department security teams) along with air elements aboard a modularized auxiliary cruiser to be in a position to preempt or react to a terrorist attack.

Support defense institution building. Helping local, national, and regional actors train defense forces that bolster stability rather than undermine it is key to preventing problems in Africa from exploding into major crises. Security force assistance missions could use ground-force mission packages, with other supporting containerized mission modules, as needed. Classroom modules would be useful for training friendly military and police forces, especially when a host nation has minimal resources. In Somalia, for example, international training efforts sometimes started with even less than a poorly trained local military structure to build on. Some countries lack capabilities not only in military tactics and planning, but also in maintaining civilian control of the armed forces and combating corruption and sectarian or tribal influences that weaken defense institutions.

Developing core African military reaction forces, such as the multinational and regionally based African Standby Force established under the African Union to provide an African force to respond to African disasters or crises, is also a mission that modularized auxiliary cruisers could support.

U.S. and African militaries, and other friendly forces with interests in Africa, could bolster interoperability using training-related mission packages deployed ashore or on a modularized auxiliary cruiser for a broad range of military and nonmilitary educational missions. This would increase U.S. knowledge of the physical and human terrain of the continent and facilitate smoother interventions if local forces requested assistance during a crisis.

Strengthen maritime security. Forces could use naval warfare mission packages paired with Army, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard-related mission packages to find, track, and attack or seize pirate vessels or rescue their victims.[23] Deployments in the Gulf of Guinea or in support of USCENTCOM off the coast of Somalia could support those missions. Should missions ashore to destroy pirate bases be required, Army or Marine Corps maneuver or special operations units could be deployed to friendly ports to initiate operations from land or operate directly from the modularized auxiliary cruiser using aviation assets.

In addition to their usefulness to the Army for projecting land power, the Navy could cope with its inability to devote scarce hulls to USAFRICOM by deploying modularized auxiliary cruisers for certain missions. Modularized auxiliary cruisers would be a force multiplier in core Navy capabilities.[24]

Support peace support operations. Modularized auxiliary cruisers could fill the combat and logistics capabilities gaps of allied or coalition forces to enable international assistance for peace operations and promote interoperability. U.S. forces could train allied or coalition partners to use these mission packages. Planners could exploit the ease of transporting containerized mission modules to move mission packages overseas for training in other countries or bring partner forces to temporary locations in Africa or the United States for training.

Examples of African countries where USAFRICOM's support could be vital include the Democratic Republic of Congo, where United Nations peacekeepers have long struggled to contain instability and violence.[25] Another is Zimbabwe, which would strain the resources of neighbors if it descended into chaos from economic and political instability.[26] In Burundi, protesting students fleeing police operations in June 2015 entered the U.S. embassy compound, a situation that would have created a threat if terrorists had entered with them.[27] The Central African Republic, Sudan, and South Sudan also face ongoing challenges to achieving stability.

Support humanitarian and disaster response. Medical support with a visiting modularized auxiliary cruiser fitted with appropriate mission packages would increase the good will of people in a region. The modularized auxiliary cruiser could drop off mission packages and personnel to establish temporary clinics or civilian development projects at many locations on land. The packages could support interagency efforts to build local facilities and train host-nation personnel, which could reduce the need for the support in the future.

Disaster response for earthquakes, floods, hurricanes and cyclones, or refugee migration, could be enhanced by medical and ground-force mission packages for relief efforts and local security. These could even be flown

(Photo by Spc. David M. Shefchuk, U.S. Army)

Senegalese special operations forces conduct a beach-landing exercise during Flintlock 2016 in Saint Louis, Senegal, 12 February 2016. Riverine operations like this are important in Military Zone 2 in Saint Louis because the region has seven hundred kilometers of coastline. The exercise culminated a week of training with Netherlands and U.S. special operation forces. Flintlock 2016 is designed to enhance interoperatibility among all participating nations.

directly to airports near the disaster area for land-based operations, to be sustained by a modularized auxiliary cruiser when it arrives in the operational area.

The 2014 Ebola crisis in West Africa demonstrated how U.S. troops could be pulled into a nonmilitary crisis.[28] With any type of disease crisis, a modularized auxiliary cruiser could provide direct medical care, construction assistance, training, and even forward screening of travelers leaving an infected region, in order to contain the spread of disease.

Counter illicit flows of terrorists, people, narcotics, and arms. The trafficking of people (whether refugees, victims, criminals, or terrorists), drugs, and weapons destabilizes the African states involved and destabilizes or threatens others nearby or even outside the continent. Manned aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles could be projected and deployed ashore using modularized auxiliary cruisers, to find and track such potentially destabilizing flows through African countries. The cruisers could deliver ground forces to support local security or limited military missions.

Using modularized auxiliary cruisers with helicopter and boarding modules, USAFRICOM could work with other commands to help monitor and interdict flows of narcotics to Africa from South America and South Asia.[29] It could work with USEUCOM in the Mediterranean Sea or with USCENTCOM in the Red Sea and in the waters off of the Horn of Africa, where Iranian weapons shipments have been dispatched to support rebel factions in Yemen and Hamas in Gaza.[30]

A Successful Economy-of-Force Mission

With an extensive coastline, and many parts of the continent close to international waters but far from established American or allied bases to project land power, sea-based platforms are vital for USAFRICOM to succeed in its missions. Unfortunately, the Navy cannot routinely provide the naval assets necessary. In a June 2013 article, Megan Eckstein describes recent Marine Corps efforts to enlarge the amphibious ship fleet by using "nontraditional platforms" and foreign navies' ships.[31] The U.S. Marines recognize that even with MV-22s, their Spain-based units have a relatively short radius of action in Africa without the ability to deploy by sea.

Like Humphrey Bogart's fictional tramp steamer in the 1951 film *African Queen*, which was modified to carry out a military mission in East Africa during World War I, sea-based platforms to deploy combat power do not need to be expensive vessels. The commander of U.S. Southern Command, Marine Corps Gen. John F. Kelly, stated that naval needs for drug

interdiction in his area of responsibility could be supplied by simple assets: "So as I said, I don't need a warship. I need a ship, something that floats, with a helicopter."[32] A modularized auxiliary cruiser could provide that, and much more. The twenty-first century *AFRICOM Queen* does not need to be sleek or shiny to carry out the many missions USAFRICOM must conduct. Modularized auxiliary cruisers can provide the platforms to cope with the tyrannies of distance and budgets that challenge our ability to shape the security environment in Africa. ■

Biography

Brian J. Dunn holds an AB in political science and history from the University of Michigan and an MA in history from Eastern Michigan University. He retired in 2010 from his job as a nonpartisan research analyst for the Michigan State Legislature, and he served in the Michigan Army National Guard for six years. He has published in Army *magazine,* Joint Force Quarterly, Military Review, *and other publications, and writes about defense and national security issues for his online journal,* The Dignified Rant.

(Photo by Staff Sgt. Brian Kimball, U.S. Air Force)

Cpl. Shawn Jouthe, a military policeman with the 93rd Military Police Battalion, explains a tactical movement procedure to members of the Zambian Defense Force 10 August 2015 during exercise Southern Accord 2015 in Lusaka, Zambia. The annual exercise provides U.S. military, United Nations allies, and the Zambian Defense Force an opportunity to train together as a combined joint peacekeeping force.

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To Respond or Not to Respond

Addressing Adversarial Propaganda

Lt. Col. Jesse McIntyre III, U.S. Army, Retired

German political and military leaders attribute Germany's defeat in World War I in part to Allied propaganda efforts and the failure of Germany to effectively counter them.[1] By the spring of 1917, Germany was reeling from propaganda activities. Indeed, in May 1917, senior German officials met to outline a plan to combat the demoralizing effects of the Allied propaganda effort.[2] The plan included the establishment of a central agency within the Foreign Office to collect Allied propaganda and press releases, to develop programs to raise the morale of German soldiers, and to develop policy to guide propaganda activities directed at the Allies.[3] The Germans' decision to direct an effort at such a high level indicates the importance they placed on countering propaganda. Unfortunately for them, the effort came too late and was ineffective in changing the course of the war.[4]

History is replete with examples of the consequences of using or failing to use counterpropaganda measures. One of the earliest recorded was during the Peloponnesian Wars. Propagandists on both sides of the Athenian and Spartan Archidamian War (431–404 BC) responded to each other's propaganda with counterassertions without directly denying the claims or acknowledging the propaganda itself.[5]

Thucydides observed that the counterassertions were always more severe than the original, concluding it was a requirement for effective counterpropaganda. [6]During World War I, the Italians conducted counterpropaganda operations against Austro-Hungarian troops by altering Austro-Hungarian trench newsletters with propaganda messages.[7]

However, history also shows that counterpropaganda efforts must be executed skillfully in order to keep them from backfiring. For example, German propaganda practitioners created an interesting counterpropaganda leaflet during the Battle of Anzio in World War II.[8] When the Allies disseminated a leaflet that described Allied successes against German positions on the Cassino Front, German propagandists attempted to counter the claims with remarks that reflected a reverse in battlefield fortunes for the Allies. The German leaflets ultimately proved futile as an attempt to discredit the Allied leaflet with American soldiers, but they did have the unintended result of being so ridiculously unbelievable that they increased the morale of the GIs.[9]

Executed by experts, counterpropaganda can have a powerful and decisive influence over an ideological adversary. For example, President Ronald Reagan delivered perhaps one of the best examples of successful counterpropaganda that had worldwide repercussions in 1987. During the 1980s, Soviet propaganda had been successful in creating the perception in Europe that then-Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev was a leader of peace efforts.[10] While

(Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

President Ronald Reagan gives a speech 12 June 1987 at the Berlin Wall in front of Brandenburg Gate in Berlin, Germany. From this speech came his famous quote, "Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall."

giving a speech near the Berlin Wall, Reagan exploited this perception, undercutting it with an explicit and palpable challenge:

> There is one sign the Soviets can make that would be unmistakable, that would advance dramatically the cause of freedom and peace.... Secretary General Gorbachev, if you seek peace—if you seek prosperity for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe—if you seek prosperity: come here, to this gate. Mister Gorbachev, open this gate. Mister Gorbachev, tear down this wall.[11]

This challenge, which so simply but clearly highlighted the hypocrisy of the Soviet Union's public pronouncements, resulted in enormous international public and political pressure on the Soviet Union. Twenty months later, in response to increasing public unrest stemming in large measure from the open challenge, East Germany opened the Berlin Wall.

Challenging Negative Adversarial Information

The issue of addressing adversarial information attacks is a question faced daily by governments and the private sector. Like Germany's experience in World War I, failure to quickly and to properly respond can result in serious consequences for a nation or other actor in the public eye. Nevertheless, the emphasis on counterpropaganda measures in U.S. military doctrine has decreased since the end of the Cold War. The subject is merely mentioned in passing in current information operations (IO) doctrine, and no further formal guidance or direction as to its importance, methodology, or benefits exists.

This article presents a way to look at the need and ways to incorporate a doctrinal counterpropaganda methodology into joint doctrine to generate thought and discussion about counterpropaganda methods that personnel on joint IO staffs should follow in

(Photo courtesy of Bundesarchiv)

Adolf Hitler writing a speech, circa 1933.

Adolf Hitler

Mein Kampf

Volume 1, Chapter VI: War Propaganda

But the most brilliant propagandist technique will yield no success unless one fundamental principle is borne in mind constantly and with unflagging attention. It must confine itself to a few points and repeat them over and over. Here, as so often in this world, persistence is the first and most important requirement for success. … The purpose of propaganda is … to convince, and what I mean is to convince the masses. But the masses are slowmoving, and they always require a certain time before they are ready even to notice a thing, and only after the simplest ideas are repeated thousands of times will the masses finally remember them. … All advertising, whether in the field of business or politics, achieves success through the continuity and sustained uniformity of its application. Here, too, the example of enemy war propaganda was typical; limited to a few points, devised exclusively for the masses, carried on with indefatigable persistence. Once the basic ideas and methods of execution were recognized as correct, they were applied throughout the whole War [World War I] without the slightest change. At first the claims of the propaganda were so impudent that people thought it insane; later, it got on people's nerves; and in the end, it was believed. After four and a half years, a revolution broke out in Germany; and its slogans originated in the enemy's war propaganda. And in England they understood one more thing: that this spiritual weapon can succeed only if it is applied on a tremendous scale, but that success amply covers all costs. There, propaganda was regarded as a weapon of the first order, while in our country [Germany] it was the last resort of unemployed politicians and a comfortable haven for slackers. And, as was to be expected, its results all in all were zero.

Source

Adolf Hitler, "War Propaganda," *Mein Kampf*, vol. 1, chap. 6, Hitler Historical Museum website, accessed 30 March 2016, http://www.hitler.org/writings/Mein_Kampf/mkv1ch06.html.

responding to adversarial propaganda or negative information attacks. Inclusion of former Army doctrinal counterpropaganda techniques into joint publications would at a minimum provide those staffs with the basic tools.

Counterpropaganda in Joint Doctrine

In recent years, joint and service IO doctrine place little emphasis on countering propaganda. Indeed, Joint Publication (JP) 3-13.2, *Psychological Operations,* replaced the term "counter propaganda" with the terms "countering adversary misinformation" and "countering adversary information activities."[12] JP 3-13, *Information Operations,* is equally deficient, mentioning the term "counterpropaganda" only once.[13] Inexplicably, neither doctrinal publication provides guidance to employ counterpropaganda measures. Conversely, Army Field Manual (FM) 3-05.301, *Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures,* does provide guidance on propaganda analysis and counterpropaganda techniques.[14] Unfortunately, this manual was declared obsolete by the Army in 2014.

The current lack of emphasis placed on counterpropaganda in joint doctrine (resulting in lack of emphasis at a strategic level) is due to our consistent success on the battlefield in recent conflicts and a perceived lack of credible propaganda efforts by our adversaries. While these conditions would most likely change in a conflict with a near peer whose propaganda activities resonated with American and coalition military personnel, the United States must also consider the use of counterpropaganda against less than near-peer adversaries. For example, the United States and its allies are losing the information war against Islamic State (IS) propaganda. The Brookings Institute reports conservative estimates

of twenty thousand foreigners from over eighty countries responding to IS propaganda recruiting efforts.[15] Clearly, counterpropaganda concepts should be addressed more thoroughly, and the Joint Staff should incorporate the guidance found in FM 3-05.301 into joint doctrinal publications (see figure on page 66).

Analyzing Propaganda

Though obsolete, FM 3-05.301 provides a proven approach in analyzing propaganda. Propaganda analysis is a complex process that requires historical research, examination of propaganda messages and media, and critical scrutiny of the entire propaganda procedure. While propaganda analysis is primarily done to gather information to develop future IO programs, it can uncover intelligence for other uses: errors of fact that suggest a weakness in the adversary's intelligence-gathering assets, indications the adversary is attempting to prepare public opinion for a particular eventuality, issues on which the adversary displays exceptional sensitivity, and successful military operations that require propaganda reaction from the adversary.[16]

(Image courtesy of Worldwar1postcards.com)

A World War I propaganda postcard depicts the execution of Edith Cavell, a British nurse working in Belgium during the German occupation who helped more than two hundred Allied soldiers to escape. Arrested and executed for treason by German occupation forces in 1915, her death was exploited extensively by British propagandists to portray German forces as murderers of innocent women.

(Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

Australian World War I-era propaganda cartoon by Norman Lindsay, circa 1918. Allied propaganda sought to adversely shape international perceptions regarding German soldiers as well as undermine German domestic morale. German soldiers and their leaders were relentlessly depicted as brutish and uncivilized savages bent on conquering the world.

Previously, FM 3-05.301 was the Army's doctrinal reference for analyzing adversarial propaganda. Its approach is still sound. IO cells have used its *source-content-audience-media-effects* model to effectively analyze adversarial propaganda activities.

Source. A source is the origin or sponsor of the propaganda.[17] It may be an individual, government, organization, or combination thereof. Identifying the source of the propaganda provides information concerning the purpose of the propaganda. According to Garth Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell, "Propaganda that conceals its source has a larger purpose than what is readily discernible."[18] For example, the Soviet Union often used left-wing front groups resident in many nations during the Cold War to disseminate its propaganda messages

globally. In one case, the Soviets provided fake scientific information to peace groups and others, aimed at stoking fear of a "nuclear winter" in an attempt to prevent the United States from putting Pershing II missiles in Europe.[19]

Content. Content analysis reveals the message and determines the source's motives and goals for the propaganda.[20] For example, during the Cold War, the West learned much about Russian leadership and military capabilities by observing the Soviets' annual Red Army Day parade in Moscow. Placement of an individual on the official party's reviewing stand reflected importance within the party. Appearance of new equipment reflected a change in the Red Army's military capabilities. Such content analysis of events may also provide information on morale, intentions, and propaganda inconsistencies.

Audience. Audience analysis reveals the group whom the propagandist is attempting to target, as well as the propagandist's understanding of and expectations for the audience.



Figure. Proposed Joint Counterpropaganda Methodology

Media. Media analysis determines why a particular medium was selected, what are an opponent's media capabilities, and how consistently it communicates a message.

Effects. Effect analysis reveals the impact that propaganda has had on the target audience. The IO staff is given the responsibility of determining behavioral or attitudinal changes within the intended audience and assessing the need and means to respond, as required.

The propaganda analysis methodology found in FM 3-05.301 serves as an excellent starting point in determining the need for a propaganda response. It allows the IO staff to analyze adversary propaganda and its effect on the intended audience. Additionally, effective propaganda analysis can provide valuable information regarding the adversary's intent, capabilities, sensitivities, economy, and leadership. It can also identify potential vulnerabilities of the adversary for targeting during future IO campaigns.

Pros and Cons of Counterpropaganda

When assessing options for dealing with adversary propaganda, the IO staff should consider all potential positive and negative consequences. Responding quickly is essential; a rapid response provides a better chance of controlling the discussion and the outcome by increasing the audience's perception that the respondent is credible.

Additionally, audience interest in a topic will decrease over time.

One of the most compelling reasons for utilizing counterpropaganda measures is that they provide a responding organization the opportunity to regain information dominance or change the topic to something more favorable for its purposes. Conversely, however, their use could give legitimacy or credibility to the source or the allegations in the propaganda. Counterpropaganda measures may also allow the adversary to control the discussion. Finally, failure to respond fosters the perception of hiding something, or it may be perceived as a tacit admission of guilt.

It is important to keep in mind that trained, experienced personnel are needed to execute successful counterpropaganda measures, and that patience is required since the results of counterpropaganda efforts may not be known for some time.

(Image courtesy of Radio Free Europe)

During the Cold War (1947–1991), the United States used a wide variety of informational tools and techniques to counter Soviet communist propaganda. However, the strongest instrument for countering propaganda proved to be simply telling the truth. To that end, the United States established several radio broadcast agencies, such as Radio Free Europe, that beamed truthful programming into areas of the Soviet Union.

Counterpropaganda Techniques

After weighing the pros and cons, the IO staff should determine the proper counterpropaganda response. FM 3-05.301 provides nine options with examples in responding to adversarial propaganda: direct refutation, indirect refutation, diversion, silence, restrictive measures, imitative deception, conditioning, forestalling, and minimization. (These are only some of the variety of techniques used by military practitioners, political campaigners, and advertisers. However, these nine are the most prominent.)

Direct and indirect refutation. Direct refutation is a point-for-point rebuttal of adversarial claims.[21] Indirect refutation seeks to change the topic by questioning the creditability of the speaker or some other aspect of the allegation. During the Civil War, for example, the South countered Northern antislavery propaganda with themes depicting the deplorable working conditions in Northern factories.[22] These themes argued that slaves were provided decent working conditions and cradle-to-grave shelter and subsistence, while wage laborers in northern factories were treated far worse.

Diversion. Diversion seeks to avoid addressing a topic through the introduction of a new topic. An example of this occurred in late 1943 when the German propaganda ministry introduced rumors of a German plan to establish a redoubt in the Alps as part of a campaign to divert attention away from increasing German battlefield defeats.[23] The plan, titled "Alpine Fortress," consisted of Germany's government and military forces retreating to prepared positions in the German Alps. Rumors of an Alpine Fortress became a major concern for Allied military planners in early 1945.

Silence. Silence refers to not responding to the propaganda claims, other than to offer "unworthy of comment."[24] An interesting note is that World War II German propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels would sometimes refuse to deny or refute Allied claims concerning damage from air strikes in order to deceive the Allies into believing they were achieving great successes in the air war.[25]

Restrictive measures. Restrictive measures deny access to the propaganda. Russia utilized jamming and other measures during the Cold War to prevent the

broadcast of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty from reaching its citizens.[26]

Imitative deception. Imitative deception involves subtly altering an adversary's propaganda in order to discredit it or to use it as propaganda against the adversary.[27] During World War II, the Allies had developed a successful leaflet depicting life in an Allied prisoner of war camp. Interrogations of German prisoners indicated a fear of being shipped to America, where it would presumably take longer to get home after the war, so the Allies modified the leaflet to say that prisoners were no longer going to be shipped to America. The Germans turned this around on the Allies. They disseminated the leaflet to German troops to prove that since "prisoners are no longer sent to America," they were instead being shipped to Siberia. This was further developed into a successful propaganda slogan *Sieg oder Sibirien!* (Victory over Siberia!) for German troops.[28]

Conditioning. Conditioning eliminates potential vulnerabilities in the target audience before exposure to adversarial propaganda. The U.S. Army educated soldiers during the Cold War on potential Warsaw Pact propaganda themes and lines of persuasion in order to condition them against Warsaw Pact propaganda.

Forestalling. Forestalling anticipates adversary propaganda and counters it by reaching the intended audience first with the message. German Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels used the technique of forestalling during his preparation of the German populace for the defeat and surrender of German and Italian forces in North Africa in 1942. German media reported the historic struggle of German forces in an attempt to beat Allied reporting of the surrender.[29]

Minimization. The minimization technique acknowledges certain aspects of propaganda but minimizes its importance to the audience. An example is when the Soviet Union shot down Korean Air Lines Flight 007. The Soviets initially denied the shooting, claiming the aircraft was not a passenger liner but was on an intelligence collection mission. The Soviets further attempted to minimize the incident, claiming the aircraft strayed into Soviet airspace and had ignored Soviet interceptor aircraft requests for identification.[30]

These are just nine of the variety of techniques for countering propaganda. The IO staff may use one or a combination of these techniques based upon the situation. The decision of which technique to use is difficult and requires extensive coordination, as well as resources and assets. The IO staff considers the consequences, especially unintended consequences, and the reaction of the adversary. The IO staff must also make their organization aware that results require time, but the benefits will be worth the investment.

Information operations will continue to play a critical role in the success of an organization to conduct operations. Our adversaries will use propaganda in conjunction with their operations in order to influence the populace, to discredit the United States and its coalition partners, and eventually to prevent us from accomplishing our goals. Timely use of effective counterpropaganda measures provides the IO staff or organization the best chance of controlling the discussion and the outcome.

Conclusion

This article serves as a starting point for the discussion on inclusion of Army doctrinal counterpropaganda methodology in joint doctrine publications. Germany's failure to conduct counterpropaganda activities in a timely manner was a significant reason for its defeat in World War I. Germany learned from its mistake and was conducting an aggressive propaganda campaign against the United States in the late 1930s through early 1940; its activities may have contributed to America's late entry into the war.

America's success on the battlefield has marginalized the role of counterpropaganda in joint doctrine. However, the counterpropaganda techniques outlined in FM 3-05.301 need to be incorporated into joint publications. Counterpropaganda measures will become increasingly important in hybrid wars where the war of ideas takes on greater importance.

Herbert Romerstein, former director of the U.S. Information Agency's Office to Counter Soviet Disinformation and Active Measures, underscored the importance of counterpropaganda when he remarked, "Anti-American propaganda and disinformation are powerful weapons in the hands of our rivals and enemies. Counterpropaganda is our defense."[31]

Biography

Lt. Col. Jesse McIntyre III, U.S. Army, retired, is an assistant professor at the U.S Army Command and General Staff College. He holds a BA from the University of Missouri and an MA from Touro University. He served as the director for psychological operations policy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict; as a psychological operations officer on the Department of the Army staff; and in a variety of special operations and infantry assignments. He also instructed at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School and Center.

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(Image courtesy of Petty Officer 1st Class Chad J. McNeeley, U.S. Navy)

Adm. Mike Mullen, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, addresses faculty and students at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 4 March 2010.

A Rigorous Education for an Uncertain Future

Col. Francis J.H. Park, U.S. Army

In a July-August 2015 article in *Military Review* discussing the Army University, Lt. Gen. Robert B. Brown, commanding general of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, states, "Our current [Army educational] system is inadequate for addressing the growing complexity, volatility, and uncertainty of the twenty-first century security environment."[1] The Army's system for professional military education, if not upgraded, will be unequal to the challenges that the Army and its leaders will face in the future. Building an educational architecture to better develop critical and creative thinkers in the Army is not a tax on the force. Instead, it is a long-term investment in the health of the force. It is a critical component for

enabling education, which, in Brown's words, "is the most reliable strategic hedge in investment that the Army can make in the face of an uncertain future."[2]

The Army's brigade commanders of 2025 are entering the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) this year. Increasing the rigor in professional military education (PME), one of the goals of the newly created Army University, offers a method for building the Army's strategic hedge.[3] One element of the hedge is a rigorous intermediate-level education (ILE) that selects, educates, and places officers in a way that maximizes the intellectual capability in the force, beyond tactical training and experience. Doing so requires challenging two tacit assumptions in the traditional system: that all officers can complete ILE, and that board selection is more important than education for assessing promotion potential. As units at lower levels are thrust into circumstances that tactical training and experience cannot answer, a more rigorous ILE would provide those units an insurance policy against the unknowns they will face.

The State of Intermediate-Level Education

The Army has tried various approaches over time to provide high-quality ILE that meets the needs of the force. From 1946 to 2004, attendance at resident ILE was determined by a command and staff college (CSC) board, which selected approximately the top 50 percent of a year group for resident attendance at CGSC, another service college, or a foreign staff college.[4] The officers who did not get the benefits of that education perceived their nonselection as a negative discriminator, and in turn did not perceive that they had a reasonable expectation of future service.[5]

To address that training disparity and its cultural perceptions, consistent with the recommendations in the 2003 *Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Study Report to the Army*, the Army instituted universal resident ILE common core attendance from 2004 to 2012 at Fort Leavenworth and at several satellite campuses.[6] Officers in their basic branches then completed ILE through the Advanced Operations Warfighting Course, later the Advanced Operations Course (AOC) at Fort Leavenworth or via distance learning, while officers in functional areas completed ILE through their qualification courses. This approach, combined with the Army's operational requirements, created several challenges to effectiveness.

As the Army started growing in 2004 to meet wartime requirements, increasing demand from the force for field-grade officers resulted in shorter promotion timelines and less-selective promotion boards. Officers had fewer opportunities to pursue broadening assignments. Over time, the constant rotation of forces in and out of combat, while building a solid basis in small-unit tactics and leadership, left little time for most officers to gain doctrinal and theoretical foundations in combined arms warfare beyond the small-unit level.[7]

The separation of the common core and the AOC pushed most of the functional area and special branch officers out to the satellite campuses, and it closed off their access to the additional skill identifier elective programs such as the strategic studies, joint firepower, historian, homeland security, and space operations tracks.[8] The cross-pollination that formerly came from having varied student populations, with a range of experiences among basic branch, functional area, and special branch officers, was diminished.

Another challenge facing ILE is that it must serve as "a course for the next ten years." Given punishing selection rates for senior service colleges, only a handful of ILE students will attend a war college, making ILE the only strategic education provided to most officers. The Army's true requirements for strategic education, especially in joint task forces and combatant commands, far outstrip the Army's investment to deliver that instruction.[9] If officers have limited experience above the tactical level before ILE, and then study a curriculum with little or no strategic-level instruction, they will be hard pressed to gain substantive proficiency in military operations beyond tactics. Unfortunately, ILE graduates incapable of grasping the conduct of war above the tactical level are a liability to their future commands.

As of 2015, academic performance in ILE had little bearing on officer placement after graduation. Before 2011, about the time the Army reached its peak wartime end strength, CGSC did not use the "exceeded course standards" rating on academic evaluation reports. Those circumstances contributed to a Gresham's law-like trend of skyrocketing demand for relatively scarce and more valuable graduates of advanced military studies programs (AMSPs) such as the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS). Unlike their

ILE-only peers, AMSP graduates were admitted to their programs through a formal selection process.[10] The demand for those graduates was not an endorsement of AMSPs; it was a tacit indictment of ILE.

The Army can improve ILE to meet the needs of the force, consistent with the goals of the Army University. Creating a more rigorous ILE that will prepare officers for the challenges they will face suggests four changes:

1. An entrance examination for ILE and a Graduate Record Examination (GRE) revised General Test minimum score for those attending ILE at Leavenworth
2. A more selective CSC board
3. An attritional model for ILE
4. ILE as a placement tool

Change 1: An Entrance Examination for ILE and a GRE General Test for Those Attending at Leavenworth

The first proposed change would be instituting an entrance examination for those desiring to attend Leavenworth or a satellite campus (Fort Belvoir, Fort Gordon, or Fort Lee). Such a proposal is not new; the Officer Professional Management System XXI Task Force proposed an examination in 1997, as did former Army Lt. Gen. Leonard D. Holder after retiring as commandant of CGSC, in a 1998 article in *Joint Force Quarterly* coauthored with Williamson Murray. The rationale for entrance examinations was to tie attendance to academic standards as a prerequisite for professional military education, rather than selecting solely based on assignment patterns, reputation, and evaluations.[11]

Holder and Murray specifically cited entrenched beliefs that learning at professional military education courses was secondary to attending as a reward for past performance and an opportunity to relax. Such attitudes reflected a culture of anti-intellectualism in many officers attending CGSC at Leavenworth, a trend that recent scholarship continues to observe.[12]

An entrance examination would assess and screen for general military and branch-specific knowledge, skills, and attributes, in addition to basic academic skills. Attendance at Leavenworth or a satellite campus would require a passing score on the examination, which would be administered annually. Those seeking attendance at Leavenworth would have to opt in by additionally submitting GRE scores equal to the advanced civil schooling standard.[13]

Screening students for basic combined arms warfare, academic, and writing skills would reduce the need for CGSC to maintain a remedial writing skills program. It would enable instruction to start from a higher baseline of student knowledge, raising the overall bar for students. This would reduce the supplemental workload on instructors at Leavenworth and its

(Image courtesy of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College)

Col. Douglas C. Cardinale, director of the Command and General Staff School, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, speaks to the Class of 2016 for the first time on 6 August 2015 in Eisenhower Auditorium, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

satellite campuses, who are teaching baseline skills to students ill qualified for graduate-level work. As part of this change, completion of a master of military art and science (MMAS) degree would be mandatory for all at Leavenworth. By passing the entrance examination and meeting the GRE screening criteria, each student would demonstrate the aptitude for a graduate thesis program, a step toward addressing Brown's observation of a prestige gap between Army and civilian academic institutions. Such a requirement would also provide a greater source of original scholarship to address research in topics of special interest to the Army because more officers would be conducting research.[14]

Requiring all students attending Leavenworth to pass an entrance examination and meet a minimum GRE score for admission, and to complete an MMAS degree for graduation, would likely cause some officers to apply to ILE satellite campuses. This would benefit all groups because the resulting distribution of students would encourage cross-pollination among officers from all branches across all campuses, rather than reserving Leavenworth attendance almost exclusively for command-track officers. In addition, the satellites would better accommodate individual scheduling needs if a prospective student could not attend during a given year or start that summer.

Change 2: A More Selective CSC Board

The second change would be to make the CSC board, which was reinstated in 2012, more selective. Rather than current practice, in which a board selects the top 60 percent of a single year group, the Army should select for an elite of capability.[15] The percentage of the eligible population who would attend Leavenworth might be as low as 30 percent, factoring in the two opt-in screenings of an entrance examination and a GRE.

Officers desiring attendance at Leavenworth would be eligible for consideration only after achieving the required scores on the entrance examination and the GRE, with no waivers allowed. The CSC board would then select those officers best qualified for attendance. Such a process would account for academic aptitude as well as performance and potential, as expressed through officer evaluation reports and academic evaluation reports. Such selection is particularly important for career fields such as functional area 48 (foreign area officer), functional area 49 (operations research and systems analysis), functional area 50 (force management), functional area 52 (nuclear research and operations), and functional area 59 (strategist), where even stellar company command is no guarantor of future success.

Officers who do not wish to pursue an MMAS, contingent on board selection, would complete the ILE common core curriculum at a satellite location. Officers attending satellites would be subject to the same entrance examination standard as their Leavenworth counterparts but would not be required to submit GRE scores. Some of those students would have gained advanced degrees prior to ILE, while others would not pursue an advanced degree for other reasons. After completing the ILE common core at a satellite, basic branch officers would then complete the AOC through distance learning, while officers in functional areas would be able to start their qualification courses immediately after completing the common core, without having to wait until the end of the AOC.

A leaner CSC board would offer other opportunities. First, it would not preclude an officer's attendance at SAMS or other service AMSPs, which are volunteer courses independent of any centralized Army selection board (and therefore independent of the CSC board).[16] Second, students attending satellites would have greater flexibility in starting the ILE common core, rather than once a year as is the case at Leavenworth. The availability of multiple starts during the year, followed by completion of AOC or a functional area qualification course, would enable a flow of ILE graduates to the force throughout the year. The third, and perhaps most intangible, opportunity offered by a highly selective CSC board would be protecting the satellites from being considered dumping grounds for less-qualified officers. Selecting officers who had attended satellite ILE courses through centralized selection boards for command and future schooling would also help preempt potential stigmas associated with such attendance.

(Image courtesy of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College)

Students at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College participate in a class 23 September 2014 in the Lewis and Clark Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Change 3: An Attritional Model for ILE

One method to increase rigor in PME, consistent with one of Army University's goals, would be to substantially reduce the obstacles to disenrolling a student for failure to meet academic standards. Based on experience with multiple staff groups in a two-year period of teaching at Fort Leavenworth and Fort Lee,

I had observed an informal consensus among faculty that some students, in the absence of any screening mechanism, had academic skills well below the standards needed for graduate-level work. The presence of those weaker students sometimes caused instructors to teach to the lowest common denominator of knowledge. This was most apparent during group instruction in subjects such as deliberate planning. The expression of "no-major-left-behind" came into common usage among students, reflecting a widely held perception of absent rigor and markedly less-capable graduates than ILE before 2004.[17]

The current CGSC standard places students on academic probation for receiving a final end-of-class grade of C+ ("below average," ranging from 78 to 79.99) or U ("unsatisfactory," below 70). An academic review board is required for a third end-of-class grade of C+, or C ("marginal," ranging from 70 to 77.99) or below, or a second U grade.[18] Any grade of U requires remediation before graduation, but it also places that student at a disadvantage since he or she is attempting to remediate previously failed course material and keep pace with classmates.

Instead of the current system, students receiving any two end-of-class grades of C+ or C, or any end-of-class grade of U at the end of a course, should be immediately disenrolled from that phase of ILE without prejudice. Instead of expending time and energy in academic retention boards to retain borderline performers who may never catch up to their peers intellectually, educationally, or professionally, such boards should occur only in truly extenuating circumstances. Those who desire to complete ILE need to begin their studies with sufficient academic, professional, and communication skills to meet standards, without exception.

The aggregate effects of an attritional PME model, building on rigorous screening criteria for attendance, would challenge students through creating an intellectually rigorous environment to promote greater self-discipline. An attritional model would also contribute to addressing the PME prestige gap that Brown mentions.

Change 4: ILE as a Placement Tool

Another Army cultural norm related to ILE is that the time taken for study is a break from duties, rather than preparation for future responsibilities. One indicator of that norm is the expression "it's only a lot of reading if you do it," a common utterance among ILE students.[19] The prevalence of that expression also reflects the relative lack of importance placed on grading in ILE courses, and it validates Brown's observation of an "Industrial Age legacy" approach geared to mass production of forces.[20]

Instead, academic performance should be a key factor in assignments subsequent to ILE. The 2015 *Army Vision* states that the Army must "commit to personnel policies that better develop and manage soldiers and Army civilians in order to optimize individual performance, best meet our manning requirements, and assure the health and welfare of our force."[21]

Tying academic performance in ILE to future assignments would be a substantive step toward promoting all of those goals, while addressing current cultural norms that devalue grades in ILE. It would also require adjusting personnel policies to account for grading, including redirecting officers should they have significant downturns in academic performance during the year. The friction incurred by implementing such a system would be offset by the gains from matching ILE graduates' skills and academic performance to the units that need their skills the most. Matching student performance to subsequent assignments would also provide a tangible incentive for ILE students to maximize their efforts during the course.

The Payoff

The challenges of complexity and uncertainty in the security environment now and in the future, combined with the cascading effects of leader development on the rest of the force, require the Army to have the fortitude to prepare officers intellectually to meet those challenges. Revitalizing the place CGSC occupies in PME is a critical step in setting the force for the future, both through its students and its instructors.

Changing the system would offer several immediate benefits. First, an entrance examination and GRE score in conjunction with a selection board would identify, and then best serve, those most capable of benefitting from the unique resources available at Leavenworth. Those attending satellites after passing the entrance examination and board selection would necessarily outnumber those attending at Leavenworth. However, distributing best-qualified officers of all branches throughout all the ILE locations would benefit the force at large. Doing so

would make ILE a true combined arms school for all, not just for those at Leavenworth.

Additionally, spreading talent across the different types of ILE would introduce diversity in the students attending AMSPs. Graduates of those second-year programs have included officers from Leavenworth, graduates of other service and allied CSCs, and officers who completed ILE entirely by distance education. The distribution of AMSP graduates, at first only to divisions and corps, expanded commensurate with expansion of SAMS in the early 2000s. Present-day distribution of AMSP graduates includes almost forty additional requisitions, most of which are individual augmentee positions for joint task forces and theater-level commands. The sustained demand for AMSP graduates, combined with the fact that not all Leavenworth ILE students apply to AMSPs, suggests that AMSPs would continue to draw applicants from all types of ILE.[22]

Instituting a baseline quality cut through an entrance examination and then identifying the greatest talent in the candidate pool through a selection board would pay long-term dividends. Increasing rigor in this manner would distinguish superior officers from the merely competent, while serving notice on officers unprepared to serve above the tactical level. Disenrolling underperforming students from ILE quickly without prejudice would provide a catalyst for students who required remediation to seek it, while debriding from the ranks those who could not meet standards. The long-term return on investment to the Army, in the form of greater intellectual capacity being returned to the force from a more rigorous CGSC, would far outweigh whatever opportunity costs might be incurred in the short term. Implementation would instill a standard of intellectual capability that would benefit the entire force and educate officers to build upon but not be prisoners of their immediate experiences. The true benefit would come over time as graduates of this revamped ILE applied the rigors of their education to lead their units through the challenges of an uncertain future. ■

Biography

Col. Francis Park, U.S. Army, is a strategist assigned to the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, Operation Enduring Freedom Study Group, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. He is a graduate of the nonresident Command and General Staff Officer Course, the U.S. Army War College Basic Strategic Art Program, and the School of Advanced Military Studies. He holds a PhD in history from the University of Kansas. His previous assignments include strategic plans and policy assignments at the division and joint task force levels in Iraq and Afghanistan and at the U.S. Army Special Operations Command; intermediate-level education instructor at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; strategy branch chief, Strategic Plans, Concepts, and Doctrine Division, Headquarters, Department of the Army G-3/5; and deputy director, Commander's Action Group, International Security Assistance Force.

Notes

1. Lt. Gen. Robert B. Brown, "The Army University: Educating Leaders to Win in a Complex World" *Military Review* 95(4) (July–August 2015): 19.

2. Ibid., 22.

3. Ibid., 19–22.

4. Hanson W. Baldwin, "Army College Expands: Leavenworth Broadens Scope, Has 496 U.S. Officers and 52 From Abroad," *New York Times,* 17 January 1949, 8, as cited in Michael D. Stewart, "Raising A Pragmatic Army: Officer Education at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College [CGSC], 1946–1986," (doctoral dissertation, University of Kansas, 2010), 30; Army Regulation (AR) 350-1, *Army Training and Leader Development* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 18 December 2009), 71.

5. Officer Personnel Management System [OPMS] XXI Task Force, *Officer Personnel Management System XXI Study* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army [HQDA], 1997), 4-12; OPMS XXI Task Force, "OPMS XXI Precursor Study Issue Paper: Nonselection for Resident CGSC and Its Career Implications," (issue paper, HQDA, Washington, DC, 9 April 1996).

6. U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, *The Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Study Report to the Army* (Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2003), OS-12–OS-13, ADA415810, Defense Technical Information Center.

7. The need to refocus on previously neglected tasks was one of the Army's training challenges, as described in John M. McHugh and Raymond T. Odierno, *A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2015*, presented to the 114th Congress, 1st sess. (Washington,

DC: Department of the Army, March 2015), 7-8. A more immediate example appears in the refocusing of the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, in Justin Naylor, "New 'Black Jack' Command Team Focused on Basics," U.S. Army Homepage, 14 April 2010, accessed 15 March 2016, http://www.army.mil/article/37347/.

8. The Army War College Defense Strategy Course and the Army G-3/5 (Operations and Plans) Strategic Education and Development Program (formerly the Harvard Strategist Program) confer the additional skill identifier, or ASI, 6Z, the same as the strategic studies track. Graduates of the Joint and Combined Warfighting School administered through the Joint Forces Staff College receive ASI 3H, the same ASI as the Joint Planner track at Leavenworth.

9. Requirements for strategic education are laid out in AR 350-1, "Army Training and Leader Development," 19 August 2014, 77.

10. U.S. Army Lt. Col. Jon Griese, former HQDA G-3/5 (Operations and Plans) functional area (FA) 59 proponent, email to author, 25 August 2015; HQDA G-3/5, periodic memoranda regarding distribution of advanced military studies program (AMSP) students (Washington, DC: HQDA G-3/5, 2005–2013). The FA 59 proponent officer at the Army G-3/5 Strategic Leadership Division is also responsible for distribution of AMSP students after graduation and handles requests for AMSP graduates from the force. The application process for AMSP has been in effect with minor changes since the inception of the course. Harold R. Winton, interview by Richard Mustion, 5 April 2001, U.S. Army War College Senior Officer Oral History Program, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL; School of Advanced Military Studies, *Program Guide AY 2016* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 2015), 18.

11. OPMS XXI Task Force, Tab 17, "Officer Education System Revisions," dated in Annex D, "OPMS XXI Task Force Recommendations," *Officer Personnel Management System XXI Final Report,* vol. III, prepared for the Chief of Staff of the Army (Washington, DC: Headquarters, OPMS XXI Task Force, 1997); Leonard D. Holder and Williamson Murray, "Prospects for Military Education," *Joint Forces Quarterly* 18 (Spring 1998): 86–88.

12. Holder and Murray, "Prospects for Military Education": 90; Charles D. Allen and George J. Woods, "Developing Army Enterprise Leaders," *Military Review* 95, no. 4 (July–August 2015): 42–49; Jason Warren, "The Centurion Mindset and the Army's Strategic Leader Paradigm," *Parameters* 45(3) (Autumn 2015): 28–38.

13. The legacy GRE General Test standard for advanced civil schooling was 500 verbal, 500 quantitative, and 4.0 for writing. Based on the ETS conversion table for scores prior to 1 August 2011, the current GRE General Test scores are 143 verbal, 147 quantitative, and 4.0 for writing.

14. The U.S. Army War College publishes a list of strategic topics of special interest to the U.S. Army annually as the *Key Strategic Issues List.* CGSC is accredited by the North Central Association of Colleges and Schools to grant master's degrees. The component for accreditation that would be affected by an increase in the number of MMAS degrees being conferred is Core Component 2b, "The organization's resource base supports its educational programs and its plans for maintaining and strengthening their quality in the future," U.S. Army CGSC, CGSC Bulletin 933, *CGSC Accreditation Program*, 14 July 2011, 16.

15. Merit-based CSC selection boards were reinstated per Secretary of the Army John McHugh, memorandum to Principal Officials of Headquarters, Department of the Army, et al., Army Directive 2012-21, *Optimization of Intermediate-Level Education*, 14 September 2012.

16. The process for application to SAMS involves a written entrance examination lengthier than the GRE verbal or written sections.

17. The "no-major-left-behind" label, a common expression among CGSC students (to include the author's own) and graduates when universal resident attendance was the norm, owes to the perceived relaxing of standards to accommodate the greater population of officers attending resident ILE in the absence of a selection board. Tanya Biank, *Undaunted: The Real Story of America's Servicewomen in Today's Military* (New York: NAL Caliber, 2013), 170**.**

18. U.S. Army CGSC, CGSC Bulletin 903, *Command and General Staff College Academic Performance, Graduation and Awards Policies and Procedures* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army CGSC, 30 January 2012), 9.

19. Thomas E. Ricks, "A Field Grade Army Officer on What the Problem is with U.S. Military Education," Foreign Policy online, 11 December 2014, accessed 15 March 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/12/11/a-field-grade-army-officer-on-what-the-problem-is-with-u-s-military-education/.

20. Brown, "The Army University: Educating Leaders to Win in a Complex World": 19–20.

21. John M. McHugh and Raymond T. Odierno, *The Army Vision* (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2015), 7.

22. Jon Griese, email to author; HQDA G-3/5, memoranda regarding distribution of AMSP students.

(Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

U.S. Marines watch as Marine Corps F4U Corsairs provide effective close air support 6 December 1950 in the vicinity of the Chosin Reservoir, Korea. One aircraft can be seen flying through the smoke billowing from a successful napalm bomb strike on a Communist Chinese position.

Precedent and Rationale for an Army Fixed-Wing Ground Attack Aircraft

Maj. John Q. Bolton, U.S. Army

Effective close air support (CAS) depends on close cooperation between ground and air units, predicated on mutual understanding and proximity as well as aviator training and aircraft characteristics. Despite recurring predictions of air power's unilateral dominance by many theorists beginning after World War I, air-ground teams remain the most effective employment of military power. Technology, specifically precision weapons and stealth, may have altered the conduct of air campaigns, but it has "not brought about the revolution often proclaimed by many air power advocates."[1]

Army doctrine reflects this in ADRP 3-0 *Unified Land Operations*.[2] Importantly, FM 3-90.6 *Brigade Combat Team* (BCT), which describes employment of the Army's primary warfighting units, describes CAS as an Army requirement: "[BCTs] accomplish their missions by integrating the actions of maneuver battalions, field artillery, aviation, engineer, air and missile defense, close air support, and naval gunfire."[3]

(Image courtesy of Wikipedia Commons)

A U.S. Marine Corps F4U-4B Corsair fighter-bomber receives a final check of its armament of bombs and 5-inch rockets prior to being catapulted from the USS *Sicily* (CVE-118) for a strike on enemy forces in Korea in the autumn of 1950.

The Case for Organic Army Close Air Support

While its organic helicopters are critical to operations, the Army needs CAS, meaning fixed-wing (FW) aircraft, to perform its primary role. Therefore, in the face of concerted efforts by the Air Force to scale back CAS to accommodate other budget priorities—because CAS is vital to combined arms maneuver—the Army should hedge its requirements in this area by developing its own organic CAS assets to augment the Air Force (USAF) CAS.

While the Army views CAS as vital to its own combined arms operations, the USAF views it as a high-risk, low-payoff mission. This risk "often makes a dubious trade-off for the damage inflicted, all of which makes interdiction, in Air Force eyes, appear more profitable than close support.."[4] USAF CAS ambivalence turns on concerns regarding "the efficacy of using precious aircraft sorties on dispersed targets close to, or intermingled with, friendly troops where the risk of fratricide is great."[5] This view has permeated the USAF since the 1930s, when the Air Corps Tactical School developed and fostered an institutional focus on bombing and interdiction—both of which necessitated an independent air force.

This institutional focus was reinforced after World War II when the Air Force became a separate branch and solidified by the 1966 Johnson-McConnell Agreement, which gave the Army control over tactical helicopters while the Air Force retained all FW attack aircraft.[6] As a result, the Army currently relies almost exclusively on the USAF for FW CAS.

However, utilizing nonorganic means for critical functions violates the unity of command, and results in CAS performed by aircraft primarily designed for other missions. This is by no means a recent phenomenon. Since the advent of the jet, the Air Force has been committed to the concept of multirole aircraft (MRA). Focused on technology as an end, rather than a means, USAF programs have consistently prophesied that new technologies will ameliorate any capability gaps. However, MRAs exemplify the pejorative characteristics of American military equipment design by demonstrating a high cost-to-capability ratio and overall low performance of key missions. They tend to be larger than necessary, overly complex, and costly. In short, when you try to do everything well, you end up doing many things poorly. The result is wasted time, effort, and money attempting to achieve "do it all" miracles.

(Photo by Senior Airman Brett Clashman, U.S. Air Force)

An A-10 Thunderbolt II from the U.S. Air Force Weapons School fires an AGM-65 Maverick missile during a close air support training mission 23 September 2011 over the Nevada Test and Training Range, Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada. Budget cuts have threatened cancellation of the A-10 program.

Additionally, multirole, high-tech aircraft invariably cost more than the aircraft they replace. Despite projections of low-cost and savings due to technological advances, MRA/Joint aircraft nearly always cost more, do less, and result in fewer aircraft procured than originally forecasted.[7] The result is often "expensive and delicate high-tech white elephants" that perform better only in test-like circumstances, both unlike and unrepresentative of combat environments.[8]

The F-35 represents the contemporary iteration of this process. Critics charge the F-35 is overly expensive and cannot supplant A-10 CAS. Supporters contend that the F-35 is not a replacement for the A-10, but can perform many missions including interdiction against high-end integrated air defense systems and air-to-air combat, all equally well. What these supporters fail to understand is that the combination of these related missions degrades performance in all, regardless of how much impressive technology designers cram into the aircraft. MRA may brief well, but designing for multiple, nearly exclusive roles from the start inevitably results in poorly performing aircraft. Furthermore, crews trained for multiple missions will inevitably do some better than others. Given USAF historical and institutional preferences, along with its broader missions, CAS provided to the Army will suffer both qualitatively and quantitatively.

This situation will continue to worsen as the combined pressures of budget cuts, escalating aircraft costs, and the need to replace older aircraft coincide. Aircraft like the F-16 and F-15 are rapidly approaching their service life, forcing the service to bring the F-35 online, regardless of its issues.[9] These facts place the Army in a poor position: requiring CAS but lacking the organic capability while depending on another service to perform the mission with aircraft designed for other purposes.

Aircraft cost must be measured against its capability and quantity produced. Particularly significant is the marginal cost of each aircraft over its predecessor. With only two exceptions, since the 1950s (A-10 and F-16) marginal costs exceeded 200 percent. This is an unpleasant fact for MRA. Ironically, these cost increases resulted in a smaller quantity of aircraft delivered and relatively poor performance when compared to single-mission aircraft. Conversely, examples abound of aircraft designed for a specific mission that ended-up performing many missions well. Consider the P-51 Mustang, which dominated the skies of Europe during World War II as a fighter, fighter-bomber, and reconnaissance aircraft, only to emerge from storage during the Korean War—when USAF jets performed CAS poorly—as the F-51.[10]

Obstacles to Army CAS

Current Army doctrine and organizational thinking preclude Army aviation from utilizing FW attack aircraft. Additionally, the Army is, at least on paper, restricted from owning FW attack aircraft. However, this has not precluded Army-operated FW armed unmanned aerial systems (UAS) of nearly every type. These platforms are launched and operated by Army units into USAF controlled airspace without issue. Additionally, Army helicopters routinely work with USAF ground and air controllers without issue, often

An aircraft such as the Beechcraft AT-6 light attack aircraft could provide the U.S. Army with a cost effective, highly capable platform to augment its close air support needs. The aircraft can carry a wide array of U.S. and NATO munitions.

(Photo by John Voo, Flickr)

above the coordinating altitude. So would an Army FW attack aircraft doing the same tasks be any different?

At the tactical level, the Army requires an aircraft able to bridge the capability gap between its helicopters and USAF jets. FW aircraft offer great advantages over helicopters in terms of speed, loiter time, and cost. So, given the historic USAF aversion to CAS and contemporary budget constraints, exacerbated by an impending loss of USAF capabilities with the retirement of the A-10, the Army requires a new approach if it is to enjoy uninterrupted CAS to ground forces in the future. Simply, if CAS is an essential element of combined arms maneuver—which it is according to Army Doctrine—the Army should have organic FW attack aircraft in order to provide the full spectrum of aviation support.

Additionally, fielding such aircraft would free the USAF to focus on its broader and institutionally preferred missions such as Air Superiority/Interdiction/Global Strike. An Army FW attack aircraft would enhance Army capabilities against low-end threats, leaving the Air Force to focus on high-threat environments. This is the high-risk, low-probability scenario that dictates the design of USAF aircraft. Consequently, only the A-10 (retiring) and AC-130 (limited) are designed explicitly for CAS. Other USAF aircraft are neither designed for nor cost-effect in the CAS role.

An Army FW CAS aircraft would have no such limitations. Ironically, the USAF high-tech scenario, while a threat, does not represent the overwhelming majority of American conflicts; in other words, an Army aircraft would be an 80 percent solution 95 percent of the time. Air Force MRA are a 100 percent solution 5 percent of the time.

Third Army and XIX Tactical Air Command

While the reduction of CAS capability in the USAF—due to the aforementioned decrease in the number of aircraft and the high cost of new aircraft not specifically developed for CAS—is undesirable, it is not without precedent. After acknowledging the effectiveness of tactical air forces during World War II, the USAF proceeded to disregard support to ground forces in favor of strategic (nuclear) attack missions. One consequence was that both Army and Marine ground commanders were dissatisfied with USAF CAS; in Korea, the X Corps commander, Lt. Gen. Ned Almond vociferously criticized USAF CAS in Korea, compared to what he considered excellent support from Marine CAS.[11] Coordination and performance issues were eventually rectified when the USAF pushed controllers forward and deployed non-jet aircraft for CAS.[12] However,

the situation replicated itself early in Vietnam, which eventually saw the emergence of platforms such as the AC-47 gunship, OV-10 Bronco, and, most significantly, the epochal arrival of the helicopter. In Korea, Vietnam, and, to a lesser extent, Iraq and Afghanistan, the Air Force was forced to adopt procedures and aircraft it did not particularly care for such as the A-10, AC-130, and OV-10. By 1991, the emergence of Army Aviation mitigated much of the Army-Air Force conflict, although Army Aviation remained limited to helicopters; this created a significant capability gap.

History offers an example of effective Army-Air Force cooperation from Northern Europe during World War II. Based on mutual understanding and close proximity, Gen. George Patton's Third Army and Brig. Gen. Otto Weyland's XIX Tactical Air Command (TAC), espoused close cooperation and forged a capable team. Though some Air Force (then Army Air Corps) officers used doctrine to demand coequal status with ground forces, to Weyland it was merely a starting point for developing solutions appropriate to each situation.[13] Weyland embraced his role as "a tactical airpower expert."[14] Weyland had spent most of his career in tactical operations and consequently understood "ground forces forwards and backwards."[15]

(Image courtesy of the U.S. Air Force)

Gen. George S. Patton and Brig. Gen. Otto P. Weyland, 1944, in Nancy, France, where the Third Army headquarters and XIX Tactical Air Command advance headquarters were stationed.

To support Patton, "Weyland threw away the air power book, decentralizing operations, delegating command, [and] dispersing assets as the situation dictated."[16] As the Third Army advanced, Weyland moved his headquarters frequently to keep up. At one point in late August 1944, XIX TAC had four separate elements spread across northern France in order to coordinate its subordinate units operating from a dozen different airfields.[17] That month, XIX TAC moved seven times, totaling nearly 250 miles.[18] The frequent movements demonstrated that Weyland understood his headquarters needed proximity to the ground commander in order to facilitate close cooperation and mutual understanding between ground and air units.

Because of the close cooperation between the Third Army and XIX TAC, procedures for requesting and controlling air support were streamlined and integrated into operations.[19] Weyland detached pilots to accompany each armored column commander to "advise him concerning the capabilities of air and how to bring aircraft on to their targets."[20] Because of this emphasis on personal communication and close proximity to maneuver staffs, air and ground units effectively coordinated their actions. As the American air-ground cooperation rapidly improved, one Wehrmacht division commander bitterly characterized the employment of U.S. tactical aircraft and artillery as "excellent."[21] Because of the relentless pursuit of the fighter-bombers, many Germans soldiers developed what they called, "the German look," head turned skyward looking for the next fighter-bomber coming in to attack.[22]

The close proximity of XIX TAC and Third Army headquarters also allowed for bottom-up refinement of operational plans as well as habitual relationships between air and ground units below command levels, often down to the regimental (brigade) level. Furthermore, like the current Army Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB), and unlike modern USAF doctrine, TAC operations were "planned, discussed, and arranged together."[23]



(Source: see note 28)

Figure 1. Hourly Operating Cost of Various Attack Aircraft

A Comparison to Army Aviation

The effectiveness demonstrated by the Third Army and XIX TAC set the precedent for the modern Army CAB, which provides a similar level of support and integration with ground units. Because of the organic chain of command, close proximity, and mutual understanding enabled by the current Army division-CAB task organization, Army aviators are able to tailor and employ air power to best suit the ground force's needs.

Comparing the doctrinal missions and organization of the TACs and CABs illustrates the similarities. Though the CAB and TAC organizations are different in scale and scope, their relationship to ground forces, and cooperation are very similar.[24] In fact, the CAB performs missions other than attack and reconnaissance, such as air movement, air assault, as well as MEDEVAC.

Regarding air support, the CAB uses similar procedures as those used by the TAC. Its close proximity and regular working relationship with ground units promote unity of command and a common understanding of the operating environment as the CAB is simply closer to the point of need. Since Army helicopters do not require improved sites or long runways, they can locate forward with ground units. However, the USAF, with very limited exceptions, has not placed aircraft forward at austere sites since Korea. While USAF aircraft can mitigate distance somewhat through speed, nothing is as effective at creating situational awareness as proximity to events. Since Army aircraft operate forward, they inherently have this trait, along with traditional air power characteristics such as flexibility, responsiveness, and firepower. As a result, the Army Aviation's organization and operational frameworks could easily accommodate a FW attack aircraft.

Assuming Air Superiority While Limiting Costs

In addition to the USAF's institutional aversion to CAS and the escalating cost of aircraft, another factor will undoubtedly limit USAF CAS: lack of interservice cooperation. Since the USAF has consistently demonstrated that it believes CAS is "a lower-priority mission or less effective use of air power than interdiction or strategic bombardment," the Army makes little effort to conduct CAS training with USAF squadrons while the USAF focuses its pilots on other missions first, assuming it can perform CAS when the need arises.[25] The retirement of the A-10, the rollout of the F-35, and impending budget cuts will exacerbate this situation.



(Source: see note 28)

Figure 2. Total Ownership Costs per Aircraft (2014 Dollars)

Though joint operations over the last ten years have alleviated some of this gap—USAF liaison squadrons are not co-located with Army divisions—it will always exist between different services.

Army reliance on USAF CAS contradicts numerous principles of war, most specifically unity of command; the commander performing a mission should control all the tools directly required for success. At the tactical level, this implies control. If the Army is to be "decisive" in land operations, it should not artificially restrict its means. Since Army doctrine recognizes the need for FW CAS, in addition to Army aviation, it follows that the Army should own and control the assets for the mission. The Army needs an aircraft designed for the CAS mission its doctrine describes as critical.

An Army CAS Solution

Modern turboprop aircraft offer a solution to fill capability gap described above by providing the ideal mix of cost and capabilities. Turboprops like the Beechcraft AT-6 are fast enough to move quickly across a theater, but operate at slower speeds conducive to target acquisition for long periods once at the objective. They also have the avionics and modern sensors found on advanced aircraft and employ common precision weapons like the AGM-114 Hellfire Missile and GBU-series GPS guided bombs.[26] Moreover, turboprops can loiter for upwards of five hours, land on short runways or dirt strips, and provide precision fires. Compared to USAF jets and Army helicopters, turboprops are inexpensive; an entire twenty-four aircraft squadron of AT-6s, for example, would cost less than a single F-35A or slightly more than two F-15Es.

In a single, three-hour mission typical of those seen in Iraq and Afghanistan, an Army turboprop saves nearly $18,000 over an Army AH-64E, and nearly $88,000 over the F-35A. Light attack turbo props can perform the "bomb truck" mission the U.S. Army needs.[27] Figures 1 (page 83) and 2 demonstrate the cost savings provided by these type of aircrafts.[28]

Conditions under which CAS Operate

Even in situations with a significant enemy air defense or aircraft threat, which is the USAF's primary tactical responsibility, Air Force CAS doctrine assumes air superiority as a prerequisite condition for conducting operations.[29] Likewise, the obvious vulnerability of Army CAS aircraft from enemy aircraft not neutralized must also assume air superiority as a precondition for successful support of troops on the ground. Such an assumption allows for an aircraft

designed specifically for CAS, rationally sacrificing other characteristics such as air-to-air survivability. One factor that grows out of such conditions is that, while technology is important, effective CAS is less about the "box," meaning the aircraft and its technology, than it is about the "man in the box."[30]

Additionally, the characteristics of the aircraft are important. These characteristics, from a ground commander perspective, are consistent throughout history, from World War II and Vietnam to Iraq and Afghanistan. The desired characteristics for an aircraft supporting ground troops with CAS are endurance, responsiveness, precision, situational awareness, survivability, and effective air-to-ground communications.

(Image courtesy of U.S. Marine Corps)

A Marine air-observer team guides a Marine Corps Corsair aircraft in for a strike on an enemy-held hill during the Korean War (circa 1950). The "black Corsairs" were highly praised by soldiers and marines alike for their precision strikes on targets and their extremely close support of forward units.

Army CAS Provides Sustained Continuity During Contact

Since air superiority is an undisputed prerequisite for operations and the USAF prefers interdiction to CAS, it follows that the number of available USAF CAS sorties will decrease as the USAF fleet gets smaller. This may well lead to a situation where MRAs are overtaxed, switching back and forth between very different types of missions, preventing them from focusing on specific missions as well as the close relationship CAS requires. This may lead to an increased fratricide risk to ground forces during CAS missions, as exemplified by a recent incident in Afghanistan.

On 9 June 2014, a USAF B-1B bomber dropped two 500 lb. GPS-guided bombs on an Army Special Forces team working with Afghan security forces, killing five.[31] Numerous errors by the aircrew and ground element contributed to deaths on the ground, all of which are historically endemic to CAS: The controller was unfamiliar with the operating environment; the aircrew could not visually acquire either the friendly or the enemy positions from 12,000 feet above; and the air-ground team did not understand the capabilities and limitations of the targeting and signaling equipment. Because the aircrew believed they could identify friendly strobe lights, the air-ground team "collectively failed to effectively execute the fundamentals, which resulted in poor situation awareness and improper target identification."[32] Sadly, when it comes to CAS, this type of tragic incident is too common.

Recommendations

The Army requires an aircraft under its direct control designed for CAS. As an X Corps report

noted in 1950, "It is axiomatic that any weapon of war is best suited for the purpose for which it has been produced."[33] Technology cannot solve these dilemmas; it can only provide enhancing tools. However, there is a point of diminishing returns: "Comparing fighter-bombers of both periods, it turns out that a Stuka was quite as capable of knocking out a World War II tank as an A-10 Warthog is of doing the same to a present-day one. Similarly, P-47s in 1944–1945 did not take many more sorties to bring down a bridge or hit a locomotive than an F-16 did six-and-a-half decades later."[34] However, the cost of an F-16 today is orders of magnitude higher than was for those aircrafts that effectively performed the missions previously.[35]

Consequently, CAS is a need the Army must develop organically, as the services cannot overcome "the barriers that prevent troops from receiving the realistic, standardized training" required.[36] Present, MRAs provide only some capabilities needed by ground forces. It is true that jets can be responsive, can carry significant ordnance, and are survivable against both high- and low-order threats. On the other hand, the displacement of air units from ground units and the speed of jets necessitate relatively restrictive employment procedures as opposed to the flexible, less formal methods used by Army Aviation.[37]

The Army should fill the gap between its helicopters and USAF CAS with its own FW attack aircraft. A turboprop aircraft within the CAB seems the best location for such an aircraft. Fielding this type of aircraft would augment USAF CAS, providing a responsive, capable attack platform to the Army for a relatively low cost. This transition could allow the Army CAB to support joint efforts, should the Army pass excess sorties to the joint force commander in the same way as Marine Corps aviation.[38]

In the absence of significant USAF allocations during active operations, Army commanders will turn to what organic aviation assets they have at their disposal, which at present are primarily Army aviation helicopters. However, Army commanders need the capability and flexibility that FW aircraft provide such as speed, loiter time, and altitude-based survivability. Additionally, the institutional Army will appreciate the low procurement and operational cost of such an aircraft. Combining the advantages of a FW turboprop with the proven capability of Army helicopters is the ideal solution. ■

Biography

Maj. John Q. Bolton is a student at the Defense Language Institute-Monterey (Chinese) as an Olmsted Scholar. His previous assignment was as a student at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, where he received the George C. Marshall Award. He holds a BS in mechanical engineering from the United States Military Academy, an MBA from American Military University, and a MMAS from the CGSC. An Army aviator (AH-64D/E), his assignments include multiple deployments during Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom.

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Social Factors and the Human Domain

Maj. Brian Hildebrand, U.S. Army National Guard

The Army conducts operations through mission command.[1] Both as a warfighting function and a philosophy, leaders use mission command to project military might in order to achieve political and military objectives. Exercised in the context of strategic landpower, mission command helps to create conditions favorable for defeating an enemy or stabilizing a region.[2] Wrought in conjunction with leader development, mission command exploits the potential, knowledge, and experience of each soldier to attain operational and tactical success.[3] Yet, no matter how it is used, mission command is tied to the human domain.

The concept that war is a human endeavor has endured through many epochs.[4] While Clausewitz famously casts, "War is merely the continuation of policy by other means," there is no denying the fact that at its core, war is human.[5] However, a complete comprehension of the human domain may never be achieved due to complexity stemming from the enigmatic nature of humanity itself. The works of twentieth-century American pragmatist John Dewey provide some insight. Dewey reflects on experience, daily life, the correlation between knowledge and action, and values in order to increase awareness of the human domain. Furthermore, he suggests, "all deliberate, all planned human conduct, personal and collective, seems to be influenced, if not controlled, by estimates of value or worth of ends to be attained."[6]

Applying this insight to practical employment of mission command, success depends at every echelon on leaders using mission command to affect the human domain. How exactly the Army uses decisive action through mission command to win relies heavily on the ability of its leaders to integrate techniques for analyzing different aspects of the human domain into the military decision making process (MDMP) to achieve understanding. This article describes one such technique.

Another Mission Analysis Tool

Translating Dewey's insights into a framework for understanding the human domain is a challenge because values differ from one society to the next, are influenced by culture, and change over time. Yet, leaders and soldiers need something to lend context and coherence to the observations, knowledge, experience, and intuition they have pertaining to the diverse societies in which they perform missions. A common framework, once devised, can be used as part of mission analysis to increase the shared understanding by the organization as a whole.

Why another mission analysis tool? As depicted in figure 1 (page 90), the current mission analysis tools are used for different applications at each level of planning: strategic, operational, and tactical. At the strategic level, planners use DIMEFIL (diplomacy, information, military, economics, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement) to provide an analysis framework. At the operational level, planners use PMESII-PT (political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time). PMESII was first designed by joint planners and introduced in the *Commander's Handbook for an Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations* in 2006.[7] The Army later added PT in 2008 when it published FM 3-0, *Operations*.[8] METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain and

LEFT: Egyptian soldiers on top of an armored vehicle join pro-democracy supporters in prayer during an anti-government rally 25 February 2011 in Tahrir Square, Cairo, Egypt. Hundreds of Egyptians attended the rally, calling for an end to a long-running state of emergency and demanding that the Egyptian cabinet step down.

(Photo by Peter Andrews, Reuters)



(Figure by Maj. Brian Hildebrand)

Figure 1. Mission Analysis Tools

weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations) is the tried-and-true tool for the tactical level planner.

Army scholars have further elaborated on different aspects of these mission-analysis planning tools. For example, Army engineers have created an additional mnemonic tool for analyzing infrastructure derived from PMESII-PT. The now ubiquitous SWEAT-MSO (sewer, water, electric, academics, trash, medical, safety, and other considerations) has been a combat-tested mission analysis tool for operational-level planners. Elsewhere, at the tactical level, leaders often use other mnemonics such as OAKOC (observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment) to improve understanding of terrain and ASCOPE (area, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events) to further dissect the civil considerations of METT-TC. The creation of these mnemonic devices and their usefulness as mission analysis tools testify to the complexity of the operational environment.

The human domain, equally as complex as the operational environment, requires the same thoughtfulness, introspection, and analysis in order to understand it. Creating a mission analysis tool for the human domain does not have to be an elaborate or laborious process. There is truth in the old adage that to know others you must know yourself first. An introspective awareness of beliefs, values, and actions creates a baseline of knowledge, which leaders and soldiers can compare to other societies and derive commonalities. These commonalities can become a framework similar to SWEAT-MSO at the operational level and OAKOC and ASCOPE at the tactical level, and are a subset of factors under the social aspect of the operational factors PMESII-PT. Used as an

(Photo by Suhaib Salem, Reuters)

A protester holds a cross and Koran during a protest demanding that Islamist Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi resign 1 July 2013 at Tahrir Square, Cairo, Egypt. Morsi had taken steps to rewrite the Egyptian constitution to impose sharia law on the secular government and limit non-Muslim rights in the country. Backed by massive numbers of protestors in the street, Egypt's powerful armed forces later forced Morsi from power and organized a new election that greatly reduced the power of Morsi supporters.

analytical tool during planning to focus on specific elements of the human domain within the operational environment, these specific factors, in a manner of expression, are a subset of the social element of PMESII-PT.

Social Factors

Akin to other mission analysis tools, social factors are used to build situational understanding. Commanders and staff can analyze and describe an operational environment in terms of a mnemonic that employs six interrelated social factors: moral, religious-spiritual, social, political, economic, and aesthetical (MRsSPEA). Figure 2 (page 93) provides a brief description of each factor.

While developers at the proponent level have yet to codify the social factors as a doctrinal framework, the Army has been working with these social factors under different auspices and through a variety of means. Country briefs, cultural studies, and comprehensive language classes all contribute to a leader's understanding of social factors. Not actually having the MRsSPEA framework available, much of the understanding gained from these briefs, studies, and classes has heretofore not been applied in systematic and structured way in the MDMP.

These factors employed systematically to organize key considerations with regard to dealing with a society, culture, group, or tribe within the human domain provide information that can be used to develop situational understanding and frame a problem during the initial planning phases, MDMP steps one and two.[9] What does this look like in action? Consider its application to a modern-day deployment to the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula.

A Framework Application Example

The MRsSPEA framework serves as analytical tool for commanders and staff to get ahead of a threat's decision making cycle by focusing on those elements of the human domain that contribute to its ability to act. As we increase our understanding of the social factors for a particular society, we also increase our understanding of

their behavior and how they will use judgement, intelligence, and character to shape their decisions.

Overall, the MRsSPEA framework emphasizes the importance of the complex set of relationships that link distinctly human characteristics to military potential and outcomes at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

Whereas PMESII-PT and METT-TC can satisfy a staff's need for an operational and mission analysis of the Sinai Peninsula region of Egypt, MRsSPEA can create vitally needed understanding of the human domain of that region.[10] An example of the systematic analysis that might result by using MRsSPEA is suggested below.[11]

(Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

Sharm el-Sheikh (Bay of the Sheikh), sometimes called the City of Peace due to the large number of international peace conferences that have been held there, is situated on the southeastern tip of the Sinai Peninsula on a coastal strip along the Red Sea. Featuring scuba diving and archeological tours, it has become a significant center for tourism in Egypt and has attracted many Western chain businesses. Western influence has had the effect of liberalizing the traditionally conservative Egyptian society in the area.

Moral. Egypt, with its Muslim and Coptic population, is primarily a conservative, religious society. Egyptians place great emphasis on honor, respect, and family. Honor is very important to interpersonal relationships, and many Egyptians stress hospitality as an outward extension of their family honor. Egyptians are duty bound to treat others with respect and high esteem. Families, which are the core unit in Egyptian society, are the basis for this obligation to treat others fairly. Almost as an aberration of this custom, it is important to note that the Southern Sinai, and Sharm el-Sheikh in particular, has a far more liberal local social culture than most other areas in Egypt due to the liberalizing influence from a large influx of foreign visitors since the signing of the 1978 Camp David accords that led to large scale investment by the Egyptian government to attract tourists.

Religion-Spiritual. Despite any liberalizing influence due to foreign presence, religion continues to play an important role in the lives of the inhabitants of the Southern Sinai. The overwhelming majority are Sunni Muslims. However, 10 percent of the total population is Coptic Christian. Leaders in the community express their religiosity in many ways. Local police have prayer areas in civic buildings, and Ramadan is a national event with a high level of participation. Public displays of religious devotion are respected in Egyptian culture. For example, many Egyptians show off a dark callus on the forehead, an imprint from endless hours of prayer, as an outward badge of religious zeal.

Social. Wealth and a highly esteemed social status are not synonymous in Egyptian culture. More than any other quality, family background determines an Egyptian's social class and, consequently, his or her access to power and position. One result is that, while there are three social classes (upper, middle, and lower), mobility up the social ladder is very difficult to achieve.

Political. The Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) play an important role in the Egyptian government. The EAF role extends well beyond typical military functions related to security. In addition to traditional security roles, EAF officers also serve in all agencies of the government in many different capacities. For



(Figure by Arin Burgess, *Military Review*)

Figure 2. Social Factors

example, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi is a former commanding general in the EAF.

In terms of governance, the Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE) has a democratic-republican system of government with executive, legislative, and judiciary branches. After the 25 January 2013 revolution that deposed Mohamed Morsi, Egypt focused on redefining its foreign policy priorities and rebuilding its economy. Egypt's aim to become a regional power has impelled it to host three different economic summits and the Arab League Conference in 2015.

Economic. The Egyptian economy is the second largest in the Arab world after Saudi Arabia, but struggles nevertheless to support the growing population. While economic opportunities are far more limited in the Northern Sinai, tourism in the Southern Sinai is driving the need for infrastructure development, such as new roads, water pump stations, and electricity plants. Nearly all of the business for these developments goes to local companies. Outsiders may view this as nepotism, but culturally Egyptians prefer to do business with those they know intimately and respect. As a result, new business relationships do not just happen overnight. Quite the contrary, Egyptians feel impelled to take the time they deem necessary to cultivate personal relationships and fully assess the reliability of prospective business partners before doing business.

Aesthetical. While there are few museums located in the Southern Sinai, Sharm el-Sheikh has many important landmarks, statues, and buildings that express important Egyptian ideals, especially peace. Of note, there are three major mosques and a Coptic church. All are tourist destinations due to their architectural beauty and displays of religious artwork. Additionally, the influence of ancient Egyptian culture is pervasive through modern society in the form of art and architecture. Lastly, Ras Mohammed National Park, the first national park in Egypt, is a protected marine and terrestrial nature area located in Sharm el-Sheikh.

Applying Mission Command

Having created understanding in terms of the operational, mission, and social factors, the next step is to apply mission command. Commanders drive the operations process in order to create shared understanding. As Andrew Whitford argues, "It is the job of commanders and leaders to consider a variety of viewpoints about the world to build the understanding and empathy necessary to accomplish their mission."[12] Social factors will affect not only how the

(Image courtesy of Hossam el-Hamalawy, Flickr)

Guests dance with newlyweds at a Nubian wedding celebration in the affluent Zamalek District of Cairo, Egypt, on 20 October 2011. Egyptian society in general is family centered.

(Image courtesy of Zoltan Matrahazi, http://www.discoversinai.net)

Bedouins from the Jabaleya tribe gather in a garden under a traditional Bedouin tent 11 March 2009 during a Bedouin event to bless the garden near the town of St. Catherine, south Sinai, Egypt. Though the Bedouin tribes today are settled in small villages, they are still largely animal herders by trade and periodically migrate with their animals out of their settlements, following traditional routes to grazing areas as rainfall permits. The most effective military and government officials administering the Sinai are those who have studied Bedouin law and tradition, and have taken the time to develop relationships with the Bedouin tribal leaders.

commander visualizes an appropriate end state, but also how he plans to achieve it.

The effect of social factors on the commander's visualization is especially apparent during stability operations. Revisiting the previous example of a unit deployed to the Sinai, the commander would use mission command and social factors to execute a peacekeeping mission. The problem set requires that the commander use the subtler tools of power projection such as security cooperation, promoting economic infrastructure development, and cooperating with local governance, in addition to achieving the assigned mission to observe, verify, and report. Understanding the social factors of Egypt, the commander and staff can successfully navigate high-level meetings with Egyptian officials. Take, for example, a collaborative security meeting between the Multinational Force and Observers and Egyptian leaders.

(Image courtesy of the office of the Egyptian president)

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi shakes hands with a member of the Egyptian Armed Forces during a 4 July 2015 visit to North Sinai, Egypt.

A Mission Command Vignette

In advance of this meeting, the commander has dialogue with the staff, specifically the force protection officer and the liaison officer. In this dialogue, he establishes his objectives for the meeting, clearly states his intent, and details his expectations for the end state. In this case, the commander describes a concept to the force protection officer and the liaison officer that will establish security protocols that benefit the force and prepare it for potential crisis response scenarios.

Having the commander's intent and end state, the force protection officer and the liaison officer build the agenda for the meeting. While the agenda includes a variety of security concerns, both long-standing and newly formed, the staff uses the MRsSPEA framework along with other inputs to build a strategy for the security meeting. Before deciding when the meeting would take place, planners consider the religiosity of Egyptian society. Meetings will have to be scheduled around prayer times. An understanding of moral aspects of Egyptian society cues the staff into the importance of honor and hospitality. The ranks for both parties of the meeting must be equivalent in some sense. Commanders would meet with commanders, and deputies with deputies. Additionally, the host of the meeting would provide for the needs of their guests. In Egyptian circles, the most basic provisions are tea and tobacco. The economic dimension to the meeting is not just about business. Egyptians feel the need to create personal relationships with those they intend to do business with. Hence, before the business finally concludes, the participants will leave with a personal connection and broadened network. Using these inputs with mission command, the commander and staff are prepared to conduct the meeting.

In this case, the commander works to achieve his security objectives in a fashion akin to the basics of maneuver warfare: focus on objectives, bypass resistance, and reinforce successes. This means building consensus by leveraging past agreements as precedents of successful transactions. Additionally, the commander is careful to avoid potential

disagreements, treating them like pockets of resistance to be tackled at the end, and circling back only to engage after sufficient momentum is achieved. All of this takes place against the backdrop of the MRsSPEA framework. During the execution of the meeting, the commander is mindful of the social factors because without them he jeopardizes the successful attainment of the objectives.

Conclusion

While the MRsSPEA framework is an analytical tool for drawing attention to the social factors of the human domain, like the other mnemonic devices (SWEAT-MSO, OAKOC, and ASCOPE), it is only as good as its inputs. Society and the roles that individuals play in it change constantly. Hence, every attempt to harness MRsSPEA as a tool for increasing shared understanding and facilitating mission command depends on having the most up-to-date information about the particular aspects of the human domain. Ultimately, as a subset of PMESII-PT, MRsSPEA offers commanders and staff a better way to apply mission command in order to realize decisive action in any operational environment and win. ■

Biography

Maj. Brian Hildebrand, a full-time member of the Texas Army National Guard, is the executive officer of 1st Battalion, 133rd Field Artillery Regiment, in Houston, Texas. He holds a BA from the University of Saint Thomas and an MS from Norwich University. He has deployed twice in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and he recently returned from deployment to Egypt as part of 1-112 Cavalry Squadron USBATT 60, Multinational Forces and Observer Mission.

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7. Joint Warfighting Center, *Commander's Handbook for an Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations* (Suffolk, VA: U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center, February 2006).

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9. Army Doctrine Publication 5-0, *The Operations Process* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, May 2012), 8. Step 1 of the military decision making process is "Receipt of mission," and step 2 is "Mission analysis."

10. ADRP 5-0, *The Operations Process* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, May 2012), 1-7. The acronym PMESII-PT stands for political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information, physical environment, and time. METT-TC stands for mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations. Respectively, the terms in each acronym describe operational and mission factors used during analysis by commanders and staffs to gain situational understanding.

11. Information used in the example regarding Egypt is taken from "Egypt—Language, Culture, Customs and Etiquette," Kwintessential website, accessed 20 January 2016, http://www.kwintessential.co.uk/resources/global-etiquette/egypt-country-profile.html.

12. Whitford, "The Path to Mission Command," 42.



(Graphic courtesy of U.S. Army)

The U.S. Army launched *America's Army: Proving Grounds* August 2013 on Steam, an Internet-based digital distribution platform. More than 920,000 player accounts were created for the game during the beta period, and over 7.7 million hours of play have been logged since. *America's Army* is developed by the Army Game Studio, which falls under the Aviation and Missile Research, Development, and Engineering Center's Software Engineering Directorate. The studio operates in support of the Army Marketing and Research Group.

Force Agility through Crowdsourced Development of Tactics

Lt. Col. Chad Storlie, U.S. Army, Retired

The year is 2020. On a Navy aircraft carrier off the western coast of Africa, U.S. Army Col. Lisa Eversen, commander of Task Force Justice, reads the mission statement quickly:[1]

Who: Task Force Justice
What: Attack to destroy three terrorist training camps—conduct attacks simultaneously
When: Execute the missions in seven hours
Where: Per attached coordinates
Why: Help remove terrorist forces to enable the restoration of law and order in the democratically elected government

Eversen and her staff quickly begin a condensed Army *military decisionmaking process* (MDMP) to create an executable plan, per Field Manual 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*.[2]

(Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

Soldiers from the British Royal Artillery inside a simulation tent 5 March 2015 during Exercise Steel Sabre at the Otterburn Training Area, Northumberland, United Kingdom. The simulation system uses 360-degree technology to enhance training realism.

The commander and staff have only seven hours until their mission commences. For planning, they need to assemble threat and friendly force information, intelligence products, environmental data, logistic requirements, and other planning material.

In the past, the development and evaluation of viable courses of action (COAs) would have largely been driven by experience, doctrine, and best practices contributed by a small staff group.[3] In 2020, however, Task Force Justice also uses the *force agility—crowdsourced development of tactics* (FA-CDT) technology, a new way to develop and analyze COAs. Using a structured process with the FA-CDT technology, the staff systematically produces five viable COAs, based on

- crowdsourced, tactical game play gathered from over one million global players using mobile platforms that incorporate the latest threat tactics,
- war-gaming of COAs against one hundred thousand threat simulations to produce success probabilities,
- big data to analyze and improve the five draft COAs for Task Force Justice, and
- a systematic twelve-step process.

After developing and analyzing COAs (in steps 3 and 4 of the MDMP), Task Force Justice begins comparing their COAs (in step 5) with tactical planning options created, tested, improved, and delivered for approval and final planning. Their technology integrates crowdsourcing, big data, and mobile-gaming technology from a global military user base to create the best chance of tactical success.

Effective Responses to Future Challenges

The Army needs an FA-CDT technology platform that will allow design, validation, war-gaming, and dynamic analysis for creating plans with the greatest probability of success in the shortest time possible. Three pieces of technology in use today that can drive the future of Army planning are crowdsourcing, big data, and mobile gaming. The way to revolutionize Army tactical mission planning is through a mobile-gaming platform that could be offered to thousands, or even millions, of users and then have the results analyzed using big data analytics.

The key question concerning military challenges in 2020 and beyond is what path do leaders take to prepare for a successful future? Two possible ways to prepare for future military operations are to (1) attempt to predict where future wars will be and why,

or (2) create agile systems to speed decision making for successful operations. The historical record of predicting the military future has shown that the chances for failure are high, and the chances for success are slim. On the other hand, agile systems like FA-CDT could help the Army accomplish missions that it might not be able to predict.

Prediction. The failure of the French Maginot Line, built during the pre-World War II years along the French and German border, offers a warning on the shortcomings of military prediction. The French built an extensive static defense, based mainly on experience and old technology. This approach did not predict or anticipate the rapid advance of technology (such as faster tanks and glider infantry) and new tactics (such as blitzkrieg) that rapidly neutralized static defense.[4] During the German invasion of France and the Low Countries at the start of World War II, the Nazis outflanked the Maginot Line and rendered years of effort useless.[5]

Agility. The path of trying to learn quickly how to defeat threat tactics also is challenging. For example, the Army discovered in Iraq that defeating the threat's weapon of choice, the improvised explosive device (IED), was a multiyear and multibillion dollar undertaking. The Army struggled with technology, tactics, intelligence, and procedures for nearly the entirety of Operation Iraqi Freedom to reduce the percentage of deaths from IED attacks to about less than half.[6] It was only the rapid fall in IED events after 2007 that helped reduce the number of U.S. military deaths from IEDs to about 10 percent.[7]

Technology. The dangers of ineffective prediction, as with the Maginot Line, and the difficulty of creating agile systems to defeat threat tactics, such as those developed to support counter-IED efforts in Iraq, illustrate the challenges in preparing for future conflict. Nonetheless, with technologies already available and with forward thinking, the Army can improve its agility for responding to threats it cannot predict.

Even if the Army could know where conflicts would occur and why, the knowledge would be insufficient to design, plan, and lead an effective military operation. Generalized prediction of the conditions where forces would be likely to fight and the causes of conflict in certain geographical areas are also insufficient for force-generation activities intended to ensure deployed forces are equipped, resourced, and trained to achieve military success.

To fulfill its mission, "to fight and win our Nation's wars," the Army must determine how it can rapidly understand, learn, adapt, and execute military operations to defeat future threats.[8] The objective of technological approaches like FA-CDT is to meet the Army's goal for agility, "the ability of friendly forces to react faster than the enemy."[9]

(Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

Vainglory, a mobile multiplayer online battle arena game by Super Evil Megacorp being played on an iPad, 5 September 2014.

The Combination of Crowdsourcing, Big Data, and Mobile Gaming

For success in future conflicts, the Army needs to rapidly understand, create, test, revise, and implement new tactics and plans that will have the best probability of success. The FA-CDT technology offers the combination of crowdsourcing, big data, and mobile gaming to help achieve these goals. Additionally, the FA-CDT model can rapidly "learn" or adjust as it sees the threat implement new or modified tactics.

Crowdsourcing. *Crowdsourcing* is "the practice of obtaining needed services, ideas, content, or information by soliciting contributions from a large group of people and especially from the online community rather than from traditional employees or suppliers."[10] An example of crowdsourcing is the Netflix Prize, an open, global challenge announced in 2006 to improve Netflix's movie selection algorithm.[11] Netflix, an online content subscription company, offers entertainment content to its customers. Critical to Netflix's success is how well customers like and view Netflix's recommendations for entertainment. The Netflix Prize offered a $1 million award to improve Netflix's movie recommendation system.[12] By 2009, the contest had received 44,014 valid submissions from 5,169 teams based in

186 countries.[13] The winning team submitted an algorithm that could improve the existing Netflix movie selection algorithm by just over 10 percent.

Big data. The phrase *big data* refers to data sets too large for traditional programs, and the advanced analytics and speedy processing that can analyze them to help solve complex and multivariable organizational challenges. In "Big Data: What It Is and Why it Matters," the analytics company SAS Institute, Inc., shows big data's importance in relation to reducing costs and time, developing products, and making smart decisions.[14] One example of a company using big data to improve operations is UPS, a global delivery and logistics network. Critical to the company's success is how well its drivers pick up and deliver on time (customer satisfaction) and how efficiently they conduct operations (safety and cost savings). UPS introduced the Orion driver routing system in 2013, which designs, validates, and improves driver delivery routes. UPS estimates that Orion will save the company up to $400 million by 2017.[15]

Mobile gaming. By 2017, mobile gaming—gaming on handheld devices—is expected to account for approximately one-third of all gaming revenue, according to market research firm Newzoo.[16] Mobile gaming is growing at a rate of two times traditional electronic gaming platforms (such as consoles and personal computers).[17] Newzoo reports that, as of 2013, about 1.6 billion people around the world played games on mobile devices, with Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe comprising the largest segments.[18]

Private companies are finding a variety of ways to use mobile-gaming technology for improving operations. For example, the insurance company Allstate is using gaming technology to teach and reinforce ethics and legal compliance in its business practices for over eighty thousand employees.[19] For the Army, mobile gaming offers maximum ability to rapidly design, test, and learn how different tactics, techniques, and procedures would succeed or fail when played against an engaged user base.

A Twelve-Step Process

The complete MDMP consists of step 1, receipt of mission; step 2, mission analysis; step 3, COA development; step 4, COA analysis; step 5, COA comparison; step 6, COA approval; and step 7, orders production, dissemination, and transition.[20] The complete FA-CDT process comprises twelve steps, nested primarily within steps 3, 4, and 5 of the MDMP. FA-CDT supports the most difficult aspects of planning—viable COA development and analysis. Planners can organize the process as a whole using the major mission command activities outlined in the Army's operations process: plan, prepare, execute, and assess.[21]

Plan. The first two FA-CDT process steps fall within the planning activity:

Step 1. Test and validate the game software and platform.

Step 2. Determine game and simulation objectives, friendly force capabilities, threat capabilities, and evaluation criteria.

The planning steps focus on creating the mobile gaming piece of the platform that enables full game play and simulation. The results of game play and simulation over millions of iterations drive the data for COA development (for step 3 of the MDMP).

Prepare. The third FA-CDT step falls within the prepare activity:

Step 3. Design mobile and individual technology interface with data collection, data storage, and data analytics capabilities.

The third step focuses on ensuring that the data collected via gaming can be stored, analyzed, and recalled. The purpose is to ensure it can be used for steps 3 and 4 of the MDMP, developing and analyzing complete and effective COAs.

Execute. The next four steps in the FA-CDT process fall within the execute activity:

Step 4. Run the game and identify pilot and control groups for game results validation.

Step 5. Analyze the initial results to meet development objective and evaluation criteria.

Step 6. Incorporate tactical learning and adaptation into the initial game results.

Step 7. Deliver proposed COAs in electronic format to the commander.

The execution steps involve running the game, employing crowdsourcing to select the game user base, and using big data to analyze and compare the results, supporting steps 4 and 5 of the MDMP. Finally, staffs recommend validated COAs with the greatest success probability to the field commander for COA approval.

Assess. The last five steps of the FA-CDT process fall within the assessment activity:

(Photo by Staff Sgt. Stacy L. Pearsall, U.S. Air Force)

Spc. Joshua Philbeck, 1st Cavalry Division, plays a video game after finishing guard duty 15 February 2007 at the Iraqi police station in Buhriz, Iraq.

Step 8. Test draft COAs with full live rehearsal testing or red team rehearsal.

Step 9. Conduct an after action review to analyze how the COAs performed in the rehearsal.

Step 10. Revise the COAs to account for rehearsal results and emergent threat tactics.

Step 11. Continue with recommended COA in steps 6 and 7 of the MDMP.

Step 12. Obtain final commander approval of a COA and final planning guidance, and produce an operation order.

The commander reviews the recommended FA-CDT COAs. Based on updated assumptions, the commander selects one or more for rehearsals and additional evaluation and modification. Once the commander approves a modified COA, the staff completes the MDMP. It is vital to remember that the FA-CDT process reinforces and supports the commander's authority and ultimate selection of a COA for implementation.

Benefits and Challenges of FA-CDT

The technology for FA-CDT is already available, and this article provides a comprehensive process to ensure its effective use, consistent with existing Army planning doctrine. Force 2020 could realize the benefits in terms of enhanced agility, but certain challenges would need to be overcome.

Benefits. The primary benefit of using FA-CDT technology is the rapid, dynamic creation of multiple COAs that are modeled, tested, and war-gamed against the most up-to-date threat tactics during the MDMP. Additional benefits include—

- an independent COA development platform outside traditional Army mission planning
- the ability to discover, test, and evaluate unexpected solutions quickly
- testing by gamers in the specific geographic area where Army units will operate to discover any threat strengths and vulnerabilities
- a cost-effective, dynamic, and adaptable solution for mission planning across a variety of mission sets and geographies

Challenges. The challenges of using FA-CDT revolve around creating a crowdsource user base large

enough to drive creation of innovative tactical solutions as well as the design, implementation, maintenance, and improvement of the FA-CDT technology.

First, there could be potentially misleading results if the crowdsourced gaming population is too small. The global gaming market is more than 1.6 billion users; the Army's gaming should include millions of users. Second, initial FA-CDT technology could be designed, tested, implemented, revalidated, and improved by 2020. The Netflix Prize, the UPS Orion project, and others have shown multiyear efforts can produce good initial results that are further improved over time to be ultimately successful. Third, the games would have to be constantly updated and revised to include new Army equipment; capabilities; threats; doctrine; tactics, techniques, and procedures; and environmental mission factors. Fourth, the games would have to effectively simulate and accurately evaluate the success probabilities of the Army missions being considered. Fifth, game software would have to maintain effective language, readability, cultural aspects, and underlying similarity of game results to allow big data analysis.

Finally, while operational security is of some concern, overall security would be for the totality of the evaluated gaming results—not for the individual games. Some strategy games may not even need to be military-style games.

(Photo by Pamela Redford, Fort Riley PAO)

Soldiers use the Virtual Battle Space 2 program 10 April 2012 in the Mission Training Complex Gaming Lab at Fort Riley, Kansas. Using the program, soldiers create personal avatars and enter into a realistic virtual mission scenario that is tailored to meet their unit's training needs.

The Approach to Developing the Technology for Army Use

The Army can use a systematic, sequential approach to developing and implementing FA-CDT technology. This type of development process would allow the FA-CDT to begin to win or fail at the lowest tactical level and then progress up the levels of operational complexity once it was producing winning solutions.

Initial testing. The Army should start with a low-level test to demonstrate that the concept of combining crowdsourcing, big data analytics, and mobile gaming works. There are three parts to this initial test. The first part is for the Army to create a squad-level tactical game playable on Android and iOS mobile operating platforms. The game must incorporate Army tactics and capabilities versus a threat competitor. The second part is to crowdsource an audience of soldiers who are given access to play the game through their Army Knowledge Online accounts. The third part is a big data analysis of the game results from an individual to an aggregated level to determine the patterns of the crowdsource gaming audience that allow them to successfully "win" the game. The end goal is for the crowdsourcing, big data analysis, and mobile-game platform to be able to produce game-winning squad-level tactics.

Expanded testing. The winning squad-level tactics would then be tested at the various Army Combat Training Centers (CTCs) using historical results as a control group and FA-CDT results as the test group. Once the squad-level analysis was successful, the FA-CDT process could be applied to platoon-, company-, battalion-, and brigade-level CTC operations following the same testing process. The final step would be to open the game to global crowdsource testing at squad through brigade levels to identify best practices and effective tactics. The game should also be played on both the Army side and the threat side to allow development, testing, and analysis of both Army tactics and threat tactics.

Success in Future Operations

The Army cannot predict exactly where or how conflicts will unfold beyond the short term, but it

can improve its agility when conflicts arise. Future conflicts will demand rapid and effective creation of plans and tactics that allow fast, effective operations using all available data for even faster execution. The technology that could help the Army achieve rapid tactical agility is already available through crowdsourcing, big data, and mobile gaming. The Army needs to embrace it to fight successfully in a complex world.[22] Agility, not prediction, is the prescription for success in future conflict. ■

Biography

Lt. Col. Chad Storlie, U.S. Army, retired, is a midlevel marketing executive at Union Pacific Railroad and an adjunct lecturer at Creighton University, Omaha, Nebraska. He holds a BA from Northwestern University and an MBA from Georgetown University. He served over twenty years in active and Army Reserve units in Iraq, Bosnia, Korea, and throughout the United States. He is the author of two books and has published articles in over eighty print and online publications.

Notes

1. The mission, the task force, and the commander represented in this vignette are fictitious; they are used for illustration purposes only.

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8. "Army Mission Statement," Organization page of the U.S. Army homepage, accessed 22 March 2016, http://www.army.mil/info/organization/.

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10. Merriam-Webster Unabridged Dictionary online, s.v. "crowdsourcing."

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12. "The Netflix Prize Rules," Netflix, Inc., 2006, accessed 22 March 2016, http://www.netflixprize.com/rules.

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(Photo by Levon Biss, U.S. Army)

U.S. Army Cadet Command promotional photo shoot at the University of North Georgia, 26 September 2013.

Army ROTC at One Hundred

Paul N. Kotakis

The program that produces the majority of commissioned officers for America's Army marks an important milestone this year: Its one hundredth birthday. The Army Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) program was formally established by the National Defense Act of 1916.[1] Since then, it has produced two chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, an astronaut, and seven Army chiefs of staff.[2] Among its graduates are also two former secretaries of state and a sitting Supreme Court justice.[3] And, with over six hundred thousand graduates to its credit, Army ROTC arguably can be said to have had a lasting impact on virtually all elements of American society.[4]

The manner in which the program has kept pace with the ever-changing needs of the Army presents an interesting study of organizational behavior. The

adaptability of the Army ROTC program belies the notion that large organizations are prone to becoming staid and hidebound.

A comprehensive understanding of ROTC's impact on the American profession of arms begins with an examination of its origins. The antecedents of the Army ROTC program may be found in events nearly a century before then President Woodrow Wilson signed the National Defense Act of 1916.

The notion of providing quality precommissioning military education on American college campuses is as old as the Nation itself. In 1783, George Clinton, a senior political leader and then governor of New York, advocated making military education available at one civilian college in each state of the Union. Under Clinton's proposal, upon completion of their studies, graduates would be commissioned and serve for a brief period on active duty. Upon their return to civilian life, these officers would become the nucleus of an expanded Army during times of national emergency. Given the multiple competing priorities then facing the new nation, however, no substantive action was taken on Clinton's proposal.[5]

(Photo courtesy of Norwich University)

ROTC cadets from Norwich University conduct marksmanship training in 1938.

The Role of Alden Partridge

No proper accounting of the origins of American collegiate military training is complete without recognizing the pivotal role of Capt. Alden Partridge. In 1819, Partridge, who served as U.S. Military Academy superintendent, established the American Literary, Scientific, and Military Academy in Norwich, Vermont.[6] That institution, known today as Norwich University, is widely recognized as the birthplace of the ROTC program and the *citizen-soldier*.

Under the concept of the citizen-soldier, men were to be trained on campus for future service as military leaders. Under the Partridge model, such officers would be "identified in views, in feelings, and in interests, with the great body of the community."[7] The academic institution envisioned by Partridge would "reconcile the efficiency and discipline demanded by a regular army with the republican values and popular sentiment inherent in the militia system."[8] Most graduates would serve in the militia, and some in the regular army, thus improving the overall quality of the officer corps.

Partridge garnered national fame for his efforts to transform the traditional college curriculum by making it more practical, scientific, and relevant to modern life. As ROTC's subsequent history illustrates, the ongoing effort to improve the curriculum for new officers has remained at the forefront.

The Partridge educational model was fully in place at a number of academic institutions before the outbreak of the American Civil War. University of Virginia founder Thomas Jefferson required all students there to participate in military-oriented instruction. Both the Virginia Military Institute and The Citadel embraced his concept. Indiana University and the University of Tennessee had established compulsory military training by 1840.[9]

The Land Grant College Act of 1862

Partridge's pioneering approach contributed to the concepts embodied in the Land Grant College Act of 1862, also known as the Morrill Act.[10] Introduced by

(Photo courtesy of Cushing Memorial Library)

Texas A&M University cadets conduct field artillery training, circa 1941.

Vermont Rep. Justin S. Morrill and signed by President Abraham Lincoln, the act granted each state thousands of acres of public land for establishing institutions that would teach subjects in support of agriculture and industry. To receive this valuable offer of land, colleges were required to include military tactics courses in their curricula.[11]

Citizen-soldiers from these land-grant institutions joined those already educated in the Partridge model serving in the Confederate and Union forces. Lee's surrender at Appomattox in 1865 did not mark the end of the continuing effort to provide military instruction on college campuses. By 1893, the legislature had authorized one hundred officers for detached duty as college instructors, and by the turn of the century, forty-two institutions were teaching military subjects.[12] As of 1900, most land-grant colleges required men to complete one year of military training.[13]

With the conclusion of the Civil War, activities of the Army were primarily focused on the American frontier. After defeating Spain in the Spanish–American War in 1898, the United States emerged with new territories to administer in the Philippines and the Caribbean. However, the Army was still quite small compared to the forces of the other Great Powers.

The "Plattsburg Idea" is another important antecedent of today's Army ROTC program. In 1913, then Army chief of staff Gen. Leonard Wood introduced experimental summer camps to train potential Army officers, starting at Pacific Grove, California, and Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. Wood and other American leaders formed what would become known as the Preparedness Movement to advocate a strong national defense. The movement recognized the standing U.S. Army was too small to be immediately effective if America entered World War I. In 1915, Wood added a larger camp at Plattsburg, New York, which became a model for training. Over seventeen thousand men had received training at these camps by the end of 1915.[14]

The National Defense Act of 1916

The signing of the National Defense Act of 1916 brought into existence Army ROTC units that closely resemble the college-based Cadet Command formations of today. World War I ended in 1918, and the program became permanently established by 1919. Students and administrators at private and land-grant colleges clamored for officer training. Prestigious academic institutions such as Harvard, Yale, Princeton, and Dartmouth successfully petitioned for military units. From 1919 to 1920, Army ROTC training enrolled 57,282 students and produced 133 officers. A year later, more than fifty-four thousand men had enrolled in the program, which produced 934 officers.[15] The numbers increased annually for the next fifteen years.

A foreign policy of isolationism and the resulting decision to maintain only a small standing army did not portend well for advocates of combining a military education with a traditional college experience. Most active-duty commissions were reserved for service

academy graduates. For ROTC graduates, the competition for a place in the active component was intense.

(Photo courtesy of Pittsburg State University [Kansas] ROTC)

Pittsburg State University cadets hone their cold weather and team building skills in spring 2015, at Camp Crowder, Missouri.

Army ROTC and World War II

During the years before the Pearl Harbor attack, Army ROTC produced the majority of reserve officers. These ROTC-trained leaders made a crucial difference in the early days of World War II, when the nation struggled to achieve rapid mobilization. In a 1943 report, Gen. George Marshall, then chief of staff of the Army and a graduate of the Virginia Military Institute ROTC program, pays tribute to these officers:

> The procurement of suitable officer personnel was fortunately solved by the fact that during the lean, post-war years, over 100,000 Reserve officers had been continuously trained, largely the product of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps. These Reserve officers constituted the principal asset available which we possessed at this time.[16]

Without these officers, the successful rapid expansion of our Army would have been impossible.

Post-World War II Developments

At the war's end in 1945, the United States began a period of rapid demobilization. However, the emerging Soviet threat quickly sparked renewed emphasis on populating the officer corps with Army ROTC graduates. The hostilities on the Korea Peninsula that began in the summer of 1950 further increased the need for a strong ROTC program. By the mid-1950s, the Army ROTC program was producing more than twelve thousand lieutenants annually.[17]

The ROTC Vitalization Act of 1964 solidified ROTC's status as the primary source of active duty Army officers.[18] The ROTC program of instruction was revised, and a scholarship program was instituted. Cadet stipends were increased, and the potential pool of cadets was broadened. Around the same time, however, some military and university leaders began to question the requirement that all able-bodied males at land-grant institutions participate in ROTC. Simultaneously, antiwar sentiments resulting from U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War were adversely affecting ROTC operations.

After World War II, all males in the United States were subject to compulsory military service. Those enrolled in ROTC were granted deferments while in school, which enhanced interest in the program. In 1969, however, when the Selective Service conducted a lottery that determined the order in which men were subject to involuntary military service, ROTC's popularity began to wane. The new lottery method did not offer deferments for ROTC cadets.[19]

Army ROTC enrollment declined precipitously when the draft ended in 1973. But, on a positive note, during school year 1972–1973, female college students became eligible to enroll in Army ROTC as part of a pilot program. In school year 1975–1976, the first group of women earned their commissions through Army ROTC.[20]

The Establishment of Cadet Command

Perhaps the most significant development in Army ROTC's proud history was the decision to establish Cadet Command. Formed at Fort Monroe, Virginia,

Service is never about self. It extends to others—to those we are helping, to those we are protecting, to those we are defending.
-Gen. Mark Milley

in 1986, Cadet Command assumed responsibility for the nearly two hundred thousand students then participating in the college- and high school-level Army ROTC programs.[21] Maj. Gen. Robert E. Wagner, its initial commander, immediately set the new organization on a path of transformation. Within a few years of Cadet Command's formation, Army ROTC improved in many ways. Wagner stressed the importance of a common standard for on-campus instruction and added rigor to the summer camps that had long been a feature of ROTC. Among Wagner's many innovations was the establishment of a resident training course for newly assigned ROTC cadre that became known as the School of Cadet Command.[22] Wagner further refined the methodology that measured each cadet's leadership potential.

Recent Innovations

The superb quality of ROTC-trained officers has won high praise from many quarters since the onset of the Global War on Terrorism. In 2002, President George W. Bush addressed the George C. Marshall ROTC Award winners at Virginia Military Institute, whom he said represented "the best of our country and the best future for the United States Army." Bush said the award-winning cadets stood out

> among the nearly thirty thousand young Americans who are today enrolled in the Army ROTC; the officers who will serve in the military of the future, and one day will lead it. For nearly ninety years, this great program has developed leaders and shaped character. Those looking for idealism on the college campuses of America will find it in the men and women of the ROTC. ROTC's traditions and values are a contribution and a credit to every college and every university where they're found.[23]

(Photo courtesy of Princeton University)

Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Milley addresses convocation 20 February 2016 after receiving Woodrow Wilson Award, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.

Bush also noted former U.S. Army Gen. Colin L. Powell, a graduate of the City College of New York Army ROTC program, was serving in the Bush administration as secretary of state. Bush shared with the audience views Powell reportedly expressed about his time as a cadet: "The order, the self-discipline, the pride that had been instilled in me by our ROTC prepared me well for my Army career or, for that matter, any career I might have chosen," said Powell.[24]

(Photo courtesy of U.S. Army Cadet Command)

Army ROTC cadets conduct small boat training 18 July 2008.

In the years since Bush's address, Cadet Command has continued refining its training methodologies and its approach to leader development. For example, all the collective summer training conducted by Cadet Command was consolidated at Fort Knox in 2014. New hands-on training opportunities became available to all cadet underclassmen for the first time. More plentiful opportunities for cadets to gain familiarity with other nations now exist than ever before.

Cultural awareness training has become a vital component of the Army ROTC curriculum. Overseas immersion helps educate future leaders in ways the classroom cannot. Cadets selected for these opportunities gain first-hand experience with different cultures and sharpen their foreign language skills. They work side-by-side with host-nation military forces, and they have unmatched opportunities to learn more about the culture and history of the nations to which they are sent. In 2014, 1,320 ROTC cadets participated in this experience.[25] In the future, at least half of all cadets are expected complete an overseas immersion internship.

Cadet Command has brought significant improvements to the high school program, including extensive revision of the curriculum. The number of JROTC units increased significantly while Powell was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. With its focus on building better citizens, JROTC now touches the lives of hundreds of thousands of young people each year.

A New Century of Service

The challenges currently facing America's Army are far different from those it had to address when the ROTC program first came into existence. However, as ROTC prepares to enter its second century, it is well positioned to continue providing the talented leaders the Army needs.

For the seventh time in U.S. history, an ROTC-trained officer serves as chief of staff of the Army. Gen. Mark Milley is a 1980 graduate of the Princeton University Army ROTC program. On 20 February 2016, Milley was presented the 2016 Woodrow Wilson Award by his alma mater. Princeton bestows the award annually to a former undergraduate whose career reflects the concepts in Wilson's 1896 speech, "Princeton in the Nation's Service." Upon receiving the award, Milley explained why he chose to serve in the Army after completing his studies at Princeton. He offered his views on the importance of service: "Service is never about self. It extends to others—to those we are helping, to those we are protecting, to those we are defending. This bond created through service extends to the brothers and sisters who are wearing the uniform."[26]

Referring to the rights of free citizens, Milley noted America's Army is powerful because it protects "the most powerful idea that has ever existed in world history."[27] As the Army's thirty-ninth chief of staff, and a product of the Army ROTC program, his words echo the sentiments of countless others within the profession of arms. And it is quite reasonable to believe they would resonate well with Alden Partridge and President Woodrow Wilson too. ■

Biography

Paul N. Kotakis is the special assistant to the U.S. Army Cadet Command chief of public affairs. He has served with the U.S. Army Cadet Command since 1986, including as the command's public affairs officer and the deputy director of marketing and outreach. He received an undergraduate degree in history and an ROTC commission from Washington University in Saint Louis, and an MA from Webster University. Kotakis served in a variety of command and staff assignments in Europe and the United States.

Notes

1. National Defense Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-85, 39 Stat. 166 (1916).

2. Generals Colin Powell and Hugh Shelton served as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Col. Nancy Jane Currie-Gregg was a NASA astronaut. Former and current Army chiefs of staff include Gen. of the Army George C. Marshall Jr. and Generals George H. Decker, Fred Weyand, Gordon Sullivan, Peter Schoomaker, George Casey, and Mark Milley.

3. Former secretaries of state are Dean Rusk and Colin Powell. Justice Samuel Anthony Alito, Jr. serves on the U.S. Supreme Court.

4. Stand-To!, "Army Reserve Officers' Training Corps," U.S. Army website, 2 December 2015, accessed 24 March 2016, http://www.army.mil/standto/archive_2015-12-02/.

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8. Coumbe, Harford, and Kotakis, *U.S. Army Cadet Command: The 10 Year History*, 8.

9. Ibid, 7–8.

10. Morrill Act, Pub. L. No. 37-108, 12 Stat. 503 (1862); Coumbe, Harford, and Kotakis, *U.S. Army Cadet Command*, 9.

11. Coumbe, Harford, and Kotakis, *U.S. Army Cadet Command*, 9.

12. Ibid., 9–10.

13. Ibid., 10.

14. Ibid., 13.

15. Ibid., 300.

16. George C. Marshall, *Biennial Reports of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Secretary of War: 1 July 1939-30 June 1945* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1996), 9, accessed 24 March 2016, http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/070/70-57/CMH_Pub_70-57.pdf.

17. Coumbe, Harford, and Kotakis, *U.S. Army Cadet Command*, 301.

18. Reserve Officers' Training Corps Vitalization Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-647, 70A Stat. 119 (1964).

19. "The Vietnam Lotteries," Selective Service System website, accessed 1 April 2016, https://www.sss.gov/About/History-And-Records/lotter1.

20. Coumbe, Harford, and Kotakis, *U.S. Army Cadet Command*, 301.

21. Ibid., 299–305.

22. Ibid., 114.

23. George W. Bush, "President Outlines War Effort" (remarks by the president to the George C. Marshall ROTC Award Seminar on National Security, Virginia Military Institute, 17 April 2002), accessed 24 March 2016, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/04/text/20020417-1.html.

24. Colin L. Powell, quoted in George W. Bush, "President Outlines War Effort."

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26. Gen. Mark Milley, quoted in Kristin Qian, "General Mark Milley '80 Talks Service at Alumni Day," *The Daily Princetonian*, 21 February 2016, accessed 24 March 2016, http://dailyprincetonian.com/news/2016/02/general-mark-milley-80-talks-service-at-alumni-day/.

27. Ibid.



(Photo by Senior Airman Franklin R. Ramos, U.S. Air Force)

U.S. Air Force Staff Sgt. Jerome Duhan, a network administrator with the 97th Communications Squadron, inserts a hard drive into the network control center retina server 24 January 2014 at Altus Air Force Base, Oklahoma, in preparation for a command cyber readiness inspection.

U.S. Cyber Force
One War Away

Maj. Matt Graham, U.S. Army

In *Wealth of Nations*, published in 1776, Adam Smith explains how division of labor allows the greatest efficiency: farmers focus on producing food, blacksmiths focus on crafting goods from metal, and so on.[1] The principle still holds true today; individuals and organizations develop expertise by focusing on a single activity. In the U.S. military, the division of labor between armed services accomplishes this expertise: the Air Force concentrates on air superiority, allowing the Army to focus on land warfare and the Navy to concern itself with maritime combat. The Marine Corps develops its expertise in bridging the gap between land and sea.

Although it possesses some very different characteristics from the physical domains, cyberspace has recently emerged as an independent domain that requires its own particular military expertise. With nations seeking advantages in this new domain, competition within cyberspace has assumed many of the traits of warfare, and

it now requires the same level of expertise as is needed to win wars in the physical world. The military needs an independent U.S. Cyber Force, coequal with the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, to focus on the cyberspace domain.

Current Approach to Cyberspace

The military has not been idle during the advent and development of cyberspace and cyber warfare. The Department of Defense (DOD) established the U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) in 2009 as a joint headquarters to orchestrate the cyberspace efforts of the department. Members from each armed service come together within USCYBERCOM to address cyberspace threats. A portion of the DOD budget is directly allocated to USCYBERCOM, and some of its resources come through the armed services. Under USCYBERCOM, each service established a component headquarters (e.g., Army Cyber Command or Fleet Cyber Command) to support the DOD's efforts in cyberspace. The emerging importance of cyberspace certainly warrants each of these actions. However, each armed service devoting a fraction of its attention to cyberspace guarantees two outcomes: the services are distracted from their traditional combat roles in the physical domains, and cyberspace efforts are inefficient (at best), disjointed (likely), or fratricidal (at worst). Currently, this inefficiency is not a major concern and results primarily in bureaucratic frustration. However, when the stakes are higher and U.S. cyberwarriors must prove better than adversaries' cyberwarriors, these inefficiencies will not be tolerable.

The current approach (with each armed service anteing up to the joint cyberspace effort) is not only inefficient, but it is also unnecessary. A cyberspace operation is largely independent of the platform or physical domain from which a cyberwarrior accesses cyberspace. The logic employed or network vulnerability exploited by a cyberwarrior is the same whether executed from the bridge of an aircraft carrier, the belly of a command-and-control aircraft, or a desk in an air-conditioned office park.

Decisive in a cyberspace operation is the exploitation of vulnerabilities in an adversary's system before the adversary can identify and mitigate them (and vice versa). When considered in this light, cyberwarriors from the Navy and Air Force share more similarities with their fellow cyberwarriors than with other sailors and airmen from their respective armed services.

The U.S. Cyber Force Would Provide Focus

In contrast to the approach the DOD is currently taking, an independent cyber service could provide the necessary level of concentration on cyberspace operations. Greater focus is required to build cyberspace competence throughout the military, and particular gains could be expected in three areas: developing leadership, building cyberwarriors, and operating within cyberspace.

Leadership. The U.S. Cyber Force would ensure the senior-most cyberspace leaders possessed a depth of

experience in cyberspace operations. Currently, senior officers within each of the armed services are promoted for performance in their service's domain (e.g., the Air Force's chief is a fighter pilot, and the chief of naval operations is a submarine officer). It is appropriate that these officers are experienced in their domain's warfare. They must communicate the challenges associated with their domains to political decision makers. These leaders then interpret political guidance and disseminate funding for their services. Who accomplishes this function for the cyberspace domain? The commander of USCYBERCOM currently advocates for cyberspace. However, USCYBERCOM is under U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), several levels removed from political decision makers. Furthermore, the USCYBERCOM commander ascends to command from within one of the armed services, largely governed by officers who are focused on their specific physical domains. Since the services determine which officers are to be promoted, even the USCYBERCOM commander must split attention between cyberspace and the domain of his or her service or risk failure to advance. Establishing the Cyber Force, complete with its own member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would allow military leaders with experiential depth in cyberspace to effectively communicate the challenges of cyberwarfare to political decision makers. In turn, the Cyber Force leaders could efficiently employ the guidance and resources ascribed to military operations in cyberspace.



(Photo courtesy of U.S. Army)

Soldiers with the 780th Military Intelligence Brigade conduct cyberspace operations 24 January 2016 during a training rotation for the 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California. The unit, based in Fort Meade, Maryland, was one of several cyber organizations that took part in the rotation as part of a pilot program designed to help the Army build and employ cyber capabilities in its tactical formations.

Cyberwarriors. Beyond developing experienced leaders for cyberwarfare, the Cyber Force would attract and develop better qualified cyberwarriors. Currently, civilians who want to defend the nation in cyberspace must choose one of the existing armed services and undergo its basic training curriculum. While those programs are exquisitely tailored toward producing soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, they may be unnecessary and daunting to civilians who merely want to engage in the predominantly mental competition of cyberwarfare. Certainly, DOD employs many civilians who are involved in cyberspace activities; however, this is a suboptimal solution. There are legal complications to civilians conducting warfare, and recruiting cyberwarriors as service members more accurately recognizes their contribution and allows for greater upward mobility and command. By establishing the Cyber Force, the military would appropriately recruit and categorize its cyberwarriors without dissuading interested civilians and influencing them to enter the lucrative computer or communications industries instead.

Training cyberwarriors would also become more efficient in the Cyber Force. Currently, each armed service is forming a training program for its respective cyberwarriors. For example, the Army established the Cyber Center of Excellence at Fort Gordon, Georgia. This distributed method for developing cyberwarriors nearly guarantees inefficiency for the larger DOD

cyberspace effort. Though USCYBERCOM is working to establish common standards for all armed services' cyberspace training, the armed services' interpretations will diverge, if only slightly. Professors at each of these centers will deliver unequal results. For example, the Army may hire the best computer code trainer, while the Marine Corps may hire the best network trainer. Despite common training standards, divergent interpretations and varying skills of instructors will produce cyberwarriors of suboptimal quality. Conversely, the Cyber Force could consolidate the best professors into a single cyberspace training center and better oversee the implementation of standards. Additionally, because students would be consolidated, the brightest would interact with each other, and the faculty would facilitate improved cyberspace research.

(Image courtesy of CERDEC)

The boundaries between traditional cyber threats and traditional electronic warfare threats have blurred. The U.S. Army Materiel Command's Communications-Electronics Research, Development, and Engineering Center (CERDEC) Integrated Cyber and Electronic Warfare program employs both cyber and electronic warfare capabilities as an integrated system to increase the commander's situational awareness.

Development continues beyond training. Assignments and practice pick up where training leaves off. As an independent service, the Cyber Force could skillfully tailor the career development of its cyberwarriors. Appropriate fields might be established (e.g., coding, networking, virus protection, or intrusion management), and career pathways might also be designed, including assignments in cyberspace units, in capability development agencies, and on joint staffs, where they can integrate cyberspace effects with operations in the physical domains. Currently, cyberwarriors are beholden to their services' human resources needs, and they often are seen as interchangeable with communications personnel. While there is certainly overlap between the fields of communications and cyberwarfare, a cyber force would enable better discernment of expertise and better management of human capital.

Operating within cyberspace. The primary advantage of establishing an independent Cyber Force is the ability to develop the most capable force. However, operating within cyberspace will also become less risky and more efficient. In the physical domains, it is relatively easy to divide the battlefield by physical location: the Army operates inland, the Navy operates at sea, the Marines operate in the littorals, and the Air Force in the sky. However, no such obvious boundaries exist in cyberspace, and all four armed services operate throughout it. The opportunity for one service to infringe on, or inadvertently sabotage, another's cyberspace operation is much greater than in the separate physical domains. The command-and-control burden and the risk of cyberspace fratricide increase with the number of cyberwarriors from four different services operating independently in the domain. Another consequence of four discrete cyberspace efforts is the potential for unintended redundancy (i.e., two services may commit resources to solving the same problem or developing the same capability). A joint oversight effort might reduce some redundancy, but more bureaucracy adds time and money to an already time-consuming capability development process. Removing the four armed services from the battle for cyberspace reduces the risk of their stepping on each other and wasting resources.

Advantages for the armed services. In *Good to Great*, Jim Collins modernizes some of Adam Smith's thoughts and notes successful businesses stick to their core concepts, foreswearing distractions. Collins offers

(Photo by Staff Sgt. Chuck Burden, U.S. Army)

U.S. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Milley watches officers from the Army Cyber Institute 12 October 2015 at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York, demonstrate taking down a drone with a cyber capability rifle.

three questions to help determine an enterprise's core concept: What are you deeply passionate about? What can you be the best in the world at? What drives your economic engine?[2] While the last question is difficult to translate for the public sector, the first two help illuminate why cyberspace should not be a core competency for the existing armed services. It is hard to imagine the Navy as the best in the world at cyberwarfare at the same time it is best in the world at maritime warfare. Similarly, few marines would describe themselves as deeply passionate about cyberwarfare. The delicate, distant nature of cyberwarfare conflicts with the Marine Corps' culture of up-close and personal fighting. By shedding the distraction of cyberwarfare and transferring it to the new Cyber Force, the current armed services maintain their focus on specific domains.

As a military service, the Cyber Force could provide forces to each of the combatant commands (CCMDs) in the form of a Cyber Service Component Command (CSCC). Just as the existing armed service components often serve dual-hatted as functional components (e.g., an Air Force service component command may also serve as a joint force air component command), the CSCC would shoulder the functional responsibilities of cyberwarfare. The Cyber Force could equip each of the geographical CCMDs with a CSCC focused on the systems of that CCMD's area of responsibility. USSTRATCOM's CSCC could serve as global synchronizer of threats that cross areas of responsibility, and U.S. Special Operations Command's (USSOCOM) CSCC might provide cyberwarriors capable of physical infiltration to achieve direct access to adversary closed-circuit systems. Though perhaps beyond the DOD's charter, U.S. Transportation Command's CSCC might aim to harden the cyberspace systems of key transportation partners (e.g., key commercial freightliners, air traffic controllers, or railroad partners), helping the joint force overcome anti-access challenges. Operating a cyber force is far simpler and more efficient than the existing services contributing forces to USCYBERCOM, which then must cobble together

cyber units and deliver them to the CCMDs.

Another approach to increase efficiency. A third approach, separate from the current DOD approach or a wholly independent cyber service, would involve promoting the current USCYBERCOM to a functional CCMD, on par with USSTRATCOM or USSOCOM. Elevating USCYBERCOM to a CCMD would be an appropriate, and likely, intermediate step to establishing the independent Cyber Force. This could remove one of the hierarchical layers between USCYBERCOM and political decision makers. Also, USSOCOM enjoys quite a bit of influence over the services' development of special operators. However, this arrangement solves only part of the problem. As a CCMD, USCYBERCOM would still be reliant on the existing services to conduct its operations. Cyberwarriors would still face the decision of which of the services' cyberspace pipelines to navigate on their way to working in USCYBERCOM. This arrangement works for USSOCOM because the training for an Air Force AC-130 pilot is different from that of a Navy SEAL, which is still different from developing an Army Special Forces soldier, but not so in cyberspace. A cyberspace operation is the same regardless of the physical domain from which it is launched. The solution that provides the DOD with the best-staffed, -trained, and -equipped cyberspace units is an independent cyberspace force.

(Photo courtesy of National Security Agency)

U.S. Cyber Command is located in Fort Meade, Maryland, along with the headquarters of the National Security Agency and the Central Security Service.

U.S. Cyber Force Establishment: After the Next War

With so many reasons supporting the establishment of the U.S. Cyber Force, what is stopping it? There are two major hurdles. First, cyberspace is still unproven as a combat zone in the thinking of many senior security leaders. Second, in the absence of an obvious significant security threat, the national security resources required for such a major overhaul will remain unavailable. The United States' next major conflict will likely eliminate both hurdles.

Proving cyberspace is a battle space. The air domain played a role in World War I. Observation balloons and dogfighting (aerial warfare à la the Red Baron) serve as the predominant aerial features of that conflict. However, the combatants of World War II truly grasped the significance of air superiority. The Battle of Britain, the allies' strategic bombing campaign, the advent of parachute units, and, ultimately, the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki all demonstrated the importance of combat in the skies.

Currently, cyberspace resides in the type of limbo status air power occupied during the interwar years. Nonetheless, there have been a few isolated instances of state-on-state cyberwarfare. In April 2007, Russia conducted an effective denial-of-service attack on Estonia's

major networks, paralyzing many of that nation's economic and government functions.[3] Russia also attacked Georgia through cyberspace in conjunction with its 2008 invasion of South Ossetia.[4] Additionally, governments are using cyberspace to penetrate networks routinely, stealing missile plans, chemical formulas, and financial data.[5] However, similar to air power in 1920, cyberspace operations played a relatively small role in the United States' latest wars, and some skeptics still consider cyberspace a hobbyist's arena or *the domain you can turn off*.

Cyberspace activities increasingly impact the day-to-day operations of the U.S. military and the U.S. economy, along with the operations of its allies and adversaries (both state and nonstate). In the next war, cyberspace will likely feature more prominently than it has in previous conflicts. Whether the United States wins or loses the cyberspace battles of the next war, the importance of the battles will justify the creation of the Cyber Force. If the U.S. cyberwarriors emerge victorious, as the airmen did in the skies over 1944 Europe, cyberspace will have been proven as a legitimate warfighting domain, and the case for the independent U.S. Cyber Force will be validated. If the United States fails to achieve cyberspace superiority and suffers the stifling consequences, the inefficiencies in the DOD's current approach to cyberspace will be punctuated, and a cyber force will serve as the remedy.

Carl von Clausewitz noted that war requires the maximum use of force a nation can muster: "If one side uses force without compunction … while the other side refrains, the first will gain the upper hand."[6] Bringing the maximum force to the enemy, including effects through cyberspace, is the surest guarantee of success, and inefficient organization will hamper that effort.

New wars, new budgets. It is an odd dynamic of organizations that when budgets are large, leaders prioritize growth over efficiency. Then, when budgets are smaller and efficiency is truly necessary, the capital required to optimize practices cannot be spared. With a peace dividend as the goal, the expense required to establish a new, more efficient military service is unavailable. As the wars of the last decade end, the defense budgets will likewise shrink. Admittedly, the defense budget shrank following World War II, and the Nation still managed to establish the Air Force. In that situation, national security policy leaders rightly identified the rising communist threat as justification for the expense. Today, following the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, no single identifiable threat has emerged to convince the Nation to delay the expected peace dividend. Therefore,

(Photo by David Vergun, U.S. Army)

The 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division's brigade headquarters and tactical operations center at Fort Bliss, Texas, participate in Network Integration Evaluation (NIE) 16.1. The exercise, which ran 25 September through 8 October 2015, evaluated a coalition network that linked together the disparate networks of fourteen other armies that participated live or virtually in a simulated combat environment. New technologies assessed during NIE 16.1 included coalition network capabilities, expeditionary command posts, operational energy capabilities, and manned/unmanned teaming (air and ground robotics).

achieving efficiency by creating an independent cyber service must wait until funds are available. Those defense resources will likely become available when cyberspace proves its viability as a warfighting domain during the next major U.S. conflict.

Conclusion

The United States needs an independent military service focused on cyberspace but will likely wait until the next major conflict to establish it. The current DOD approach to cyberspace, where existing armed services donate personnel of varying experience for USCYBERCOM to knit together, is fraught with inefficiencies. Establishment of the Cyber Force would allow the cyberwarrior community to thrive, and it would unburden the existing armed services from the distraction of cyberspace. The United States' next major conflict will allow cyberwarriors to demonstrate the importance of their domain and will provide the military with the resources to support a major bureaucratic overhaul.

The prediction that it will take another conflict to establish a cyber force is merely an assumption based on the likely course of events. Inspired leadership may hasten the formation of the new military service.

Clausewitz compares war to a wrestling match, noting that a wrestler's "*immediate* aim is to *throw* his opponent in order to make him incapable of further resistance [original emphasis]."[7] He observes that if one wrestler uses all his might to pin his opponent, the pinned belligerent may not ever have the opportunity to muster his total strength. Due to its isolation by two oceans, the United States has historically been afforded the opportunity to muster its military strength before committing to war. However, oceans mean little in cyberspace, and, unprepared, the United States may suffer tremendous damage in the initial cyberspace attacks of the next major war. Wise defense leaders will begin moving the military toward establishment of the U.S. Cyber Force to achieve superior focus and efficiencies before the next conflict rather than after it. ■

Biography

Maj. Matt Graham is an U.S. Army strategist assigned to the Joint Staff Directorate for Joint Force Development. He holds a master's degree in public administration from the George Washington University and a BS from the U.S. Air Force Academy in computer science. His previous assignments include tours in Alaska, Germany, Washington, D.C., Iraq, and Afghanistan.

Notes

1. Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations: A Selected Edition*, ed. Kathryn Sutherland (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008), 12–14.

2. Jim Collins, *Good to Great: Why Some Companies Make the Leap … and Others Don't* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2001), 94–96.

3. Scheherazade Rehman, "Estonian's Lessons in Cyberwarfare," U.S. News and World Report website, 14 January 2013, accessed 22 August 2014, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/01/14/estonia-shows-how-to-build-a-defense-against-cyberwarfare.

4. E. Lincoln Bonner III, "Cyber Power in 21st-Century Joint Warfare," *Joint Force Quarterly* 74 (2014): 102.

5. Michael Riley, "How Russian Hackers Stole the Nasdaq," Bloomberg Business website, 17 July 2014, accessed 4 March 2016, http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-07-17/how-russian-hackers-stole-the-nasdaq.

6. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael E. Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 75–76.

7. Ibid., 75.



(Graphic courtesy of Wikipedia)

Figure. Unified Combatant Command Areas of Responsibility

Advantages of Assigning Forces

Lt. Col. Heather Reed, U.S. Army

The Department of Defense (DOD) has traditionally looked to save money through reform and efficiencies in procurement. With the pressure it now faces from shrinking budgets, the time has come to look beyond a narrowly focused, materiel-centric approach to effective management of forces. One solution is to reform the DOD process for distributing forces to combatant commands: *global force management* (GFM). This article demonstrates that by using GFM to assign forces to combatant commands (CCMDs, depicted in the figure), the DOD could manage forces more effectively within reduced budgets while balancing the interests of the services and the combatant commands. In addition, the DOD would meet the intent of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 to "place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands and ensure the authority of those commanders is fully commensurate with that responsibility."[1]

The first section of this article gives a brief explanation of the key elements of GFM—*allocation*, *apportionment*, and *assignment*. It includes a discussion of *administrative control* (ADCON) in relation to assignment. The next section provides recommendations on how to assign the force. The third section applies those recommendations to show why assigning forces to CCMDs would be beneficial to accomplishing the DOD's mission.

The final section discusses specific factors needed to support implementation.

How Global Force Management Works

GFM addresses allocation, apportionment, and assignment. It is also important to understand how ADCON relates to GFM, especially to assignment.

Allocation: distributing forces and resources for specified missions. Allocation is a familiar construct to many service members who have supported Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. According to the *Global Force Management Implementation Guidance*, allocation is the temporary transfer of control of a force (normally, operational control [OPCON]) for a specific mission.[2] Since about 2003, the DOD has distributed forces to support worldwide operations by filling requests for forces through allocation as published in the *Global Force Management Allocation Plan*.[3]

Apportionment: estimated availability of forces for planning. Apportionment does not represent a command relationship. Apportionment estimates the availability of forces and capabilities for planning purposes to help combatant commanders know their resource constraints when writing or evaluating contingency plans. Apportionment tables provide details about force capabilities and timelines showing when units will be available for deployment. Apportionment tables have evolved recently to provide more details on capabilities and better estimates of when forces will be available for deployment.

Assignment: distributing forces through enduring command relationships. The focus of this article is assignment of forces to CCMDs. Service secretaries are directed to assign all operating forces to specified and unified commands.[4] Combatant commanders direct operations through *combatant command (command authority)*, a term often shorted to "COCOM" or "COCOM authority." According to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122.01A, COCOM authority is the "nontransferable command authority established by title 10 (Armed Forces), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense."[5] COCOM authority includes all aspects of OPCON (controlling military operations). In addition, it includes certain daily support

associated with an assigned force, including authority to assign or reassign subordinate commanders or officers, reassign forces, conduct internal discipline and training, and direct logistics.[6] Assignment decisions are made in support of *Unified Command Plan* (UCP) missions, which are approved by the president of the United States. Assignment of a unit represents an enduring relationship, documented in the *Forces for Unified Commands*.[7] As of 2016, many U.S. forces are not assigned to CCMDs.

Before Operation Iraqi Freedom, all operating forces were assigned to CCMDs. Most forces based in the continental United States were assigned to U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). When USJFCOM was disestablished in 2011, forces and service components assigned to USJFCOM reverted to their respective military departments.[8] They became known as "service-retained forces." This decision allowed the DOD to continue operations as usual while providing rotational forces to U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) for operations abroad.

(Photo by Master Sgt. Chad McMeen, U.S. Marine Corps)

U.S., Norwegian, Dutch, and British troops train 2 March 2016 during Exercise Cold Response 16 near Namsos, Norway. Norway's cold environment challenges the air, land, and sea capabilities of the thirteen participating NATO allies and partners while improving their collective capacity to respond and operate as a team.

Administrative control: generating the force. ADCON is the joint term for the collective responsibilities of the service secretaries to manage the affairs of military units—such as support, training, and readiness, based on title 10, U.S. Code.[9] Each service manages administrative functions within that service. Each service determines who performs all of its administrative functions, and each service maintains flexibility in managing its title 10 mission regardless of how forces are assigned.

Opposition to assigning forces to CCMDs is sometimes based on the erroneous idea that ADCON will accompany COCOM authority or that ADCON and COCOM authority will be two competing chains of command. By definition, ADCON only flows through service lines, and ADCON functions differ from COCOM functions. Although joint force commanders may perform some functions considered administrative (such as preparing evaluations and approving leave requests), those functions are regulated through service regulations and managed by service components. Additionally, the operational and administrative authorities merge at the service component command level. The service component command synchronizes the functions of ADCON and COCOM, limiting the chance of competing interests occurring at the unit level.

Moreover, the only person who holds ADCON in its entirety is the service secretary, who exercises it through the service chief. ADCON functions are performed by multiple service organizations in support of each service member and unit within and outside this defined "administrative chain of command."

How Assignment to Combatant Commands Could Benefit the Joint Force

Assignment establishes formal relationships and gives authorities to combatant commanders commensurate with their UCP responsibilities. According to joint doctrine, the UCP establishes CCMD missions and responsibilities, delineates the general geographical area of responsibility for geographic CCMDs, and provides the framework used to assign forces.[10] More specific guidance and prioritization is provided by the secretary of defense in the *Guidance for the Employment of the Force*.[11]

Regional knowledge. The Army's regionally aligned forces and the Marine Corps' *regional orientation* capstone concept (with both constructs usually keeping units service-retained) acknowledge the need for familiarity with a given region's cultures, terrain, and languages, among other considerations.[12] If the services took regional alignment and regional orientation one step further and established a command relationship between the CCMDs and the units, subordinate commanders could receive direction from and provide input to the combatant commander and staff. Assignment of such forces to CCMDs could facilitate both steady-state and contingency operations by improving forces' knowledge, experience, and relationships within certain regions and shortening the response times during crises.

(Photo by Pfc. Lloyd Villanueva, U.S. Army)

Soldiers assigned to the 3rd Infantry Division and soldiers from Albania and Bulgaria discuss mission objectives while conducting a combined-arms rehearsal 24 May 2015 during Exercise Combined Resolve IV at the U.S. Army's Joint Multinational Readiness Center, Hohenfels, Germany.

Joint planning. Although assigned forces may not always be the first to deploy to a theater (due to readiness levels and availability), formalizing an enduring relationship between a unit and a CCMD by assigning the unit would improve the readiness of the overall force to meet specific contingencies. Although valuable for any unit, an enduring relationship is particularly important for those service units that may assume the role of a joint task force headquarters in an operation led by a CCMD. Assigning units would also help the CCMD develop effective plans by allowing the units that will potentially execute the plans to actively participate in the planning process. Units without this focus are not more trained in the range of military operations, just less knowledgeable of any theater of operations. In addition, division and corps headquarters have planning capabilities that are largely dormant when units are not operationally employed. Their participation in developing plans and concepts of operation would not only help them build proficiency but also could lighten the load on a CCMD's planning staff for contingency response planning.

Unit leaders' participation in contingency planning and exercises helps them gain knowledge about their assigned regions and the capabilities needed to support a commander's operations or contingencies. This knowledge makes unit leaders better informed to advise service capabilities and budget prioritization in future jobs. For example, many field grade officers will leave a division or corps headquarters (or other service equivalent) job to work within the generating force (for example, in the Joint Staff, a service headquarters, or an institutional command), and they will bring their understanding of a CCMD's issues to the new job. By assigning forces to each CCMD, the units' leaders would gain direct knowledge and understanding of the needs of that command and be better able to advise the Joint Staff and the services in future jobs.

Assigning forces would give combatant commanders a greater role in the Planning, Programming, Budget, and Execution (PPBE) cycle. It would make CCMD planning horizons mirror those of the services in planning steady-state use of forces. Campaign planning must include resource and force planning through the Future Years Defense Program, and the Joint Strategic Planning System. Now, however, CCMDs, particularly those without assigned forces, tend to have limited knowledge of long-term resources. This prevents them from fully engaging in planning processes and restricts much of their input to the budget year and year of execution (current year and next year) rather than the longer term for their theater campaign plans.[13] CCMDs do not have large budgets and must rely on the services and governmental organizations to pay for steady-state activities. Through assigned forces and dedicated employment funding, CCMDs could fully participate in these processes, which would allow them to better negotiate funding with the services. The current GFM process looks no more than two years out on the use of the force, as it relies largely on allocation.

Joint training. Another advantage of assigning units to CCMDs is that joint force commanders would control joint training. In 2011, when USJFCOM was disestablished, a number of its roles were given to the Joint Staff. Many tasks and responsibilities transferred easily. However, those previously associated with command authorities cannot be fulfilled without COCOM authority. As the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is not in the military chain of command, and the Joint Staff is prohibited from exercising executive authority by law, the chairman and the staff may not exercise command and control over any forces. This limits their role in joint training.[14]

Service-retained forces have no joint commander responsible for ensuring joint training is resourced and prioritized. This results in joint training by happenstance or buddy networks rather than command direction and oversight. The benefits of giving joint commanders control over joint training include improved proficiency of the joint force and better relationships between units that may deploy together.

Why Services Should Not Be Wary of Assignment

Assigning forces to CCMDs does not modify or limit a service secretary's management of service forces. COCOM and ADCON are separate authorities, through the secretary of defense to the CCMD (for COCOM authority) and through the service secretary (for ADCON).[15] Assignment does not infringe on service authorities as outlined below:

- Assignment of a force to a CCMD does not entail a restationing action.
- Services always determine ADCON.
- Assignment is not tied to readiness.
- Assignment is not an unrestrained authority to employ the force.
- Assigning the force does not mean the secretary of defense will not reallocate to higher priorities.

Restationing not required. Assignment reflects a change in command authority. Assignment does not require a stationing change.

Administrative control determined by the services. Only the service determines which organizations manage administrative functions for any service unit, so daily support remains at the service's discretion. Most or all units on an installation should be assigned to one CCMD so ADCON would go through the senior mission commander.

Additionally, the services may determine that some ADCON functions are best controlled by one organization for the entire force or all forces based in the continental United States. For example, U.S. Forces Command performs much of the day-to-day support for forces based in the United States and assigned to U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM); it shares ADCON responsibilities with the Army service component command for USPACOM and United States Army, Pacific Command.

Assignment not tied to readiness. Assignment is not directly tied to readiness—when the secretary of defense allocates a force, he or she does so for a specific period for a specific mission. The force must be trained and resourced to perform that mission in that specified period. If a force were assigned to a CCMD, its readiness levels would rise and fall through the service's rotational model like any service unit. The combatant commander would account for these fluctuations in planning employment of forces.

Authority for employing forces. Assignment is not an unrestrained authority to employ forces. A joint commander cannot employ a service unit for operations without coordinating with the service and ensuring funding is available. The services develop most of the DOD budget, including funding for the employment of forces. This, as well as the secretary of defense's guidelines on dwell time (time at home between deployments), allows the services to constrain employment to supportable levels. Additionally, the authority for the use of force against a potential enemy rests with the president of the United States and the secretary of defense.[16] This limits a combatant commander's use of the force to steady-state operations. Further restrictions may be defined as part of the assignment process, such as the recommendations later in this article.

Reallocation possible. Assignment places no limitations on allocation. The secretary of defense has the authority to transfer forces from one command to another in accordance with the U.S. Code. In terms of allocation or assignment, this is not an "either/or" discussion; assigning forces does not mean the secretary of defense will no longer allocate forces. The joint force will still plan and budget to allocate forces. There will be unplanned, unbudgeted allocations due to crises.

Some argue that assigning forces to CCMDs would make it harder to allocate forces for crises. This is not a valid argument against assignment for two reasons: first, if forces were assigned appropriately, the volume of allocations would be reduced. The combatant commanders who used forces the most would already have a command relationship with those forces, as USPACOM and U.S. European Command do now. Employment would not require a temporary transfer. Allocations would receive greater scrutiny as they would always require weighing one commander's priorities against another's before transferring a requested unit. Second, the secretary of defense can allocate any force at any time for a military mission. The secretary is not limited to units not assigned to CCMDs. Combatant commanders may nonconcur with allocating their forces, but the secretary of defense can overrule the combatant commanders. Currently those with assigned forces can nonconcur when the Joint Staff or the services recommend allocating away from one CCMD to another.

As of 2016, CCMDs with a large number of assigned forces rarely request allocation because they have enough forces to perform their steady-state missions. Commands without assigned forces submit many allocation requests, particularly USCENTCOM. Service-retained forces have no operational mission; they are simply a pool of forces. Thus, any time USCENTCOM has requested allocation of a force, the services have had no counterargument if a force was ready and available because that force had no other competing mission. A combatant commander with an assigned mission, however, could produce a counterargument. Since 2011, Army units based in the continental United States (mostly service-retained) have rotated more often than optimal; the health of the force has suffered. When assigned forces have been recommended for allocation to a CCMD, the other CCMDs have opposed transferring OPCON of their units, resulting in the greater scrutiny needed.

If all forces were assigned, the Global Force Management Board would scrutinize every unprogrammed use of forces against the owning CCMD's needs before recommending the secretary of defense approve allocation. Allocating less and scrutinizing allocations more would be a good thing for the health of the force and for prioritizing globally—a powerful argument for assigning all operating forces.

How to Implement Assignment Effectively

The DOD needs to determine how to assign forces before it completes the planned structure reductions. The joint force needs to develop a strategy for prioritizing assignment of units to CCMDs. Consideration must be given to steady-state and contingency operation requirements. Additionally, units that provide a service such as lift or intelligence collection may be best assigned to functional CCMDs for centralized management.

Service considerations for administrative control of assigned units. The services should consider stationing in determining which units to assign to each CCMD—a single operational chain of command at an installation is most beneficial, and the operational chain should parallel service administrative chains. The services need to review who executes their title 10 authorities and the manner in which they do it. In addition, the services need to determine which administrative tasks should be performed by service component commands and which should be performed by a centralized service organization. Once these decisions are made, the services need to adjust force structure by installation to reflect changes.

DOD considerations for assigned forces. An allocation-centric mindset has meant that combatant commanders had to explicitly define the use of forces every time they desired a new capability—this situation would change with assignment. With assignment, the secretary of defense would define which missions could be executed through COCOM authority and which would require secretary of defense approval before execution. The services would budget an appropriate level of funding for steady-state operations, and for deployments—at a sustainable level. Any additional unprogrammed employment would be approved by the secretary of defense for overseas contingency operations funding or reprogramming. The DOD would develop employment, readiness, and budget guidelines for the use of the force.

Finally, the secretary of defense would direct readiness and response requirements both regionally and globally—this may include regional and global response forces. Directing these requirements prevents CCMDs from mortgaging contingency response abilities with steady-state operations. These requirements should help shape apportionment tables by defining availability of forces, as directed by the secretary of defense, for contingency planning.

A Balance of Interests

Goldwater-Nichols was largely about balance: balancing service and CCMD interests and influence and balancing combatant commanders' authorities with their responsibilities.[17] Assigning the force was one aspect of this balance that has not yet been realized. Assignment does not take away any service title 10 authorities. Even with all forces assigned, services have all the authority they need to perform their ADCON responsibilities. Assigning the force to CCMDs would benefit the services and CCMDs and ultimately better synchronize DOD planning and resourcing to support national security objectives. ■

Biography

Lt. Col. Heather Reed, U.S. Army, is the force structure branch chief in the U.S. Forces Korea J-8 (Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment Directorate). She holds a BS from the United States Military Academy and an MS from Long Island University. She has served in the 4th Infantry Division and the 101st Airborne Division as well as separate brigades in Korea; Headquarters, Department of the Army; and the Joint Staff. Her operational assignments included deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan where she worked global force management.

Notes

1. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-433, 100 Stat. 992 (1986).

2. Department of Defense (DOD), *Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG)* (Washington, DC: DOD, 25 February 2014), III-10 (document is classified; all information used in this article is unclassified and cleared for public release).

3. Ibid., III-5. A combatant command (CCMD) sends a "request for forces" to the secretary of defense to obtain units for a mission.

4. Ibid., A-2-21. This article focuses on operating forces and therefore does not discuss generating forces.

5. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122.01A, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume 1, Planning Policies and Procedures* (Washington, DC: DOD, 29 September 2006), GL-13 (limited distribution; login required); 10 U.S.C. § 164, 1986.

6. Field Manual (FM) 3-94, *Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 21 April 2014), paragraphs 1-38–1-56.

7. The *Unified Command Plan* (UCP), prepared by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff every two years, assigns missions; planning, training, and operational responsibilities; and geographic areas of responsibilities to CCMDs. The *Forces for Unified Commands* prescribes which forces are assigned to each CCMD in line with their UCP assigned missions. They align with 10 U.S.C. § 161.

8. Secretary of Defense, memorandum to secretaries of the Military Departments, et. al., United States Joint Forces Command Disestablishment, 9 February 2011.

9. JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 25 March 2013), V-12.

10. Ibid., page II-2.

11. Ibid., page II-4. Per JP 1, *Guidance for Employment of the Force* (GEF) merges comprehensive, near-term contingency planning and security cooperation guidance. The president approves the contingency planning guidance and approves the secretary of defense's issuance of the GEF. Guided by the UCP and *National Defense Strategy*, the GEF forms the basis for strategic policy guidance, campaign plans, and the *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*.

12. FM 3-22, *Army Support to Security Cooperation* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 22 January 2013), Glossary-3, defines *regionally aligned forces*: "Those forces that provide a combatant commander with up to joint task force capable headquarters with scalable, tailorable capabilities to enable the combatant commander to shape the environment. They are those Army units assigned to CCMDs, those Army units allocated to a combatant command, and those Army capabilities distributed and prepared by the Army for combatant command regional missions." Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, *Expeditionary Force 21 Capstone Concept* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 4 March 2014), 11–18, discusses *regionally oriented* Marine forces.

13. CJCSM 3130.01A, *Campaign Planning Procedures and Responsibilities* (Washington, DC: DOD, 25 November 2014), C-6. Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) is the cyclic process for determining requirements and allocating DOD resources. The Joint Strategic Planning System is the primary means by which the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides strategic direction to the Armed Forces; prepares strategic plans; prepares and reviews contingency plans; and advises the president and secretary of defense. The Future Years Defense Program is the official document and database summarizing forces and resources associated with DOD programs.

14. Under 10 U.S.C. § 155, the Joint Staff is prohibited from acting in the capacity of a general staff.

15. Single-service organizations that could exercise OPCON of their assigned forces were *specified* commands; the last were U.S. Army Forces Command and the U.S. Air Force Strategic Air Command.

16. CJCSM 3122.01A, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume 1*, E-7.

17. James R. Locher III, "Has it Worked, The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act," *Naval War College Review* 54 (4) (Autumn 2001): 9–10.

REVIEW ESSAY



Disciples

The World War II Missions of the CIA Directors Who Fought for Wild Bill Donovan

Douglas Waller, Simon & Schuster, New York, 2015, 592 pages

John G. Breen, PhD

The CIA is said to have three primary missions: the clandestine recruitment and handling of human assets, the analysis and production of finished intelligence, and the conduct of presidentially directed covert action. The last mission set appears to be the most problematic; it has resulted in embarrassing disclosures and ever-increasing congressional oversight. Reportedly, presidents used to be able to wield the authority to order covert action by simply picking up a phone and calling the CIA director; today it takes a signed presidential finding with congressional notification.

While truly successful covert action will perhaps never be acknowledged or revealed, the litany of failed or ethically questionable covert actions is well known: the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961, the effort to influence the Chilean presidential elections in 1970, the CIA involvement in the Vietnam-era Phoenix Program, the clandestine and illegal sale of arms to fund Nicaraguan fighters in the Iran-Contra affair, and most recently, the use of "enhanced interrogation techniques" such as waterboarding against prisoners in CIA custody. Though morally dubious as they may sometimes be, presidents rely on covert action. It is an important tool to support identifiable foreign policy objectives vital to national security, certainly, when overt action tied to the United States would run the risk of conflagration.

In *Disciples*, author Douglas Waller provides a detailed accounting of the early careers of CIA luminaries Allen Dulles, Richard Helms, William Colby, and William Casey. Each began his career immersed in World War II espionage, and each ended his career after covert action programs following the war went wrong, with details spilling into the press or into congressional hearings. These four began their service under "Wild Bill" Donovan, the legendary director of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), in a largely paramilitary covert-action-based "good fight" against the Nazis. Each eventually rose within the ranks of the newly created CIA, successor to the OSS after the war, to become

director of central intelligence (DCI). Each pursued far-ranging covert action and clandestine human intelligence operations throughout the Cold War.

What lessons can today's CIA leadership learn from their examples? What lessons did the author draw from their World War II OSS careers to help explain their challenging director tenures–Dulles and the Bay of Pigs, Helms convicted of lying to the Congress, Casey and Iran-Contra? While Waller leaves many of these questions for readers to figure out on their own, in a separate article based on the book, he suggests an answer of sorts, highlighting how the OSS's failings "permeated the new agency," and attributing those failings to "the delusions that covert operations, like magic bullets, could produce spectacular results" and the feeling that "legal or ethical corners could be cut for a higher cause."[1]

Disciples is at its best when the author takes some time to consider these ethical and moral ambiguities. Why, for example, diverging so sharply from the views of his contemporaries, did Colby choose to release to Congress the "Family Jewels," an internal report on questionable CIA covert action? In 1975, following media reports of domestic intelligence collection and foreign assassination plots, the Senate established a Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, better known as the Church Committee. DCI Colby made the arguably bold and precedent-setting decision to cooperate with this congressional oversight. But, while Colby soberly called the final report of the committee "a comprehensive and serious review of the history and present status of American intelligence," Helms felt betrayed and had a "special loathing" for Colby; Casey "watched in horror" and, responding to a friend who suggested Colby was forced to answer congressional questions, replied that "[h]e didn't have to understand the question."[2]

Waller offers several theories for Colby's decision to cooperate with Congress. He notes, for example, that some OSS veterans believed Colby's service as a commando might have made him less attuned to keeping secrets, than, say, Helms, and more "oriented to noisy action." However, this suggestion seems simplistic. Colby was involved in significant covert action and managed large espionage programs throughout the Cold War, and his ability to keep a secret was never in doubt.

Closer to the mark perhaps, Waller offers that the "real reason" for Colby's openness was his legal reasoning that being less than forthcoming would result in Congress seizing the information anyway, without the ability for Colby to provide "proper context." Given the hostility at the time of a Congress reeling from the presidential malfeasance wrought by Nixon, this explanation resonates.

Colby's actions as DCI may have been tied more explicitly to his background and activities in war. Unlike Dulles, Helms, and Casey, Colby began his career as a true street operator. The others spent their OSS careers running the operations of others and planning larger scale espionage campaigns. Vital work of course, but one's perspective from the perch of management is different from one's perspective at the pointy tip of the spear. Dulles, for example, displayed perhaps a less than well-honed knack for espionage early in his own diplomatic career when he declined a request to meet with Lenin in 1918; how this meeting might have changed history is unknowable.

As Waller relates in some of the more entertaining segments of his book, Colby was a member of the original "Jedburgh" OSS paramilitary officer cadre. He parachuted into France after the D-Day invasion, and later in the war he lost a toe and part of a finger to frostbite while conducting direct action behind enemy lines in Norway. Unlike the others, Colby came face-to-face, in perhaps a more personal way, with the sometimes-ugly realities of covert action, first in Norway dealing with the investigation of the possible assassination of German prisoners of war under his control, and later in Vietnam, when he was involved with the controversial Phoenix Program. Perhaps it was more his close contact with these activities that later affected his decision to "open the books" to Congress.

In the end, Dulles, Helms, Colby, and Casey felt a call to duty they answered with devotion, though perhaps at times misplaced. They were complex individuals and certainly not infallible. As the U.S. military and the CIA engage in overt and covert action in hot spots around the world

today (some newly lit, others smoldering, while others have notably rekindled), Waller's *Disciples* offers the reader a thoroughly researched and highly detailed history of these influential spies who ignited the covert action industry of the late twentieth century, led as they were by the progenitor spy—Wild Bill Donovan. Perhaps future directors can draw some lessons from the examples of these early pioneers. ■

Biography
John G. Breen, PhD, is the Commandant's Distinguished Chair for National Intelligence Studies at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Notes

1. Douglas Waller, "How the OSS Shaped the CIA and American Special Ops," War on the Rocks website, 30 September 2015, accessed 8 March 2016, http://warontherocks.com/2015/09/how-the-oss-shaped-the-cia-and-american-special-ops.

2. Central Intelligence Agency, "The CIA and Congress: Creation of the SSCI," CIA website, 30 April 2013, accessed 8 March 2016, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2011-featured-story-archive/the-cia-and-congress-creation-of-the-ssci.html; Douglas Waller, Disciples: The World War II Missions of the CIA Directors Who Fought for Wild Bill Donovan (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2015), 442-43.

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

Correction to essay

My essay "Remembering Vietnam" (*Military Review,* September–October 2013) incorrectly indicated that Lt. Gen H.R. McMaster's book *Dereliction of Duty* criticized the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1964–65 for not resigning or protesting against policy decisions made by the Johnson administration as it approached intervening in the Vietnam War. That criticism was made by many commentators who cited McMaster's research, but his book did not express that view, and I was wrong to write that it did. I regret the error and apologize to Lt. Gen McMaster and *MR*'s readers for the misstatement.

Arnold R. Isaacs


MR Review Essay

REMEMBERING VIETNAM

Arnold R. Isaacs, Journalist and Vietnam War Correspondent

BOOK REVIEWS

THE LAST WARRIOR: Andrew Marshall and the Shaping of Modern American Defense Strategy

Andrew F. Krepinevich and Barry D. Watts, Basic Books, New York, 2015, 336 pages

In the arena of national security policy, Andrew Marshall may be the "most influential man you have never heard of." Through most of the Cold War and up to his retirement in 2015, Marshall operated behind the scenes, first at the RAND Corporation and then in the little-known Office of Net Assessment (ONA), an organization buried deep in the recesses of the Pentagon. There, he advised a series of key leaders on how to manage the strategic competition with the Soviet Union and, more recently, China. Sometimes jokingly referred to as "Yoda," he mentored platoons of bright young officers and defense intellectuals in an office that eventually became known as "Saint Andrew's Prep."

In *The Last Warrior*, authors Andrew Krepinevich and Barry Watts trace Marshall's career in what they call an "intellectual history" rather than a standard biography. Their book describes Marshall's education as a young economist recruited to the newly created RAND Corporation in 1949. There, Marshall analyzed the problems of nuclear strategy with such well-known "wizards of Armageddon" as Bernard Brodie, Albert Wohlstetter, and Herman Kahn. With the maturation of his analytical skills, Henry Kissinger lured Marshall from California to Washington; by 1973, he became the head of the new ONA under Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger. In this role, Marshall's mission was to look over the horizon to anticipate emerging threats while seeking areas of opportunity where the United States might gain an advantage over its rivals. There, he identified the early signs of the Soviet Union's collapse; he heralded the "Revolution in Military Affairs," and he offered the first warnings of China's rise as a strategic competitor to the United States.

Given this track record, the authors argue that Marshall is one of the great unsung heroes of recent American history. Yet, they face at least four formidable obstacles in making their case. First, Marshall is reticent about putting himself in the spotlight. He is, by nature, a self-effacing man, and he let his protégés write the ONA's most influential studies and assessments. Second, much of the important work Marshall was involved with remains classified. Third, Marshall insisted that ONA's products be "diagnostic" rather than prescriptive. He directed his subordinates to identify issues and opportunities without recommending a certain course of action. Thus, one is hard-pressed to assess his role in the constructing of key policies. Fourth, there is the issue of bias. Both Watts and Krepinevich are former members of "Saint Andrew's Prep," and Krepinevich leads the Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments—a think tank that receives a sizeable chunk of its budget from ONA.

For these reasons, readers may have to make their own assessments of Marshall's significance. Granting that, the book is well-written, well-researched, and recommended for those looking for "deep background" on U.S. strategic decision making in the Cold War and after.

Scott Stephenson,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

HOSTILE INTENT AND COUNTER-TERRORISM: Human Factors Theory and Application

Edited by Alex Stedmon and Glyn Lawson, Ashgate, Burlington, Vermont, 2015, 356 pages

Terrorism is becoming more diverse and innovative as it continues to evolve. Defense, intelligence, and police services are tasked

with anticipating and countering terrorist activities before they occur. Human factors in counterterrorism are still an area largely under-researched, and yet human factors have immense potential in developing effective policies and strategies for combating terrorism. Alex Stedmon and Glyn Lawson, recognized researchers in the field of human factors and ergonomics, edit a timely study that presents world-leading ideas and research that explore the emerging domain of human factors in counterterrorism.



Hostile Intent and Counter-Terrorism is broken into six key themes: conceptualizing terrorism, deception and decision-making, social and cultural factors in terrorism, modeling hostile intent, strategies for counterterrorism, and future directions. Stedmon and Lawson use empirical studies to challenge widely held beliefs that terrorists are irrational and that militant social networks form for carrying out violent acts.

Among Stedmon and Lawson's many significant observations and reflections, four stand out. First, responsibility modeling for evaluating emergency preparedness is extremely beneficial for identifying and managing vulnerabilities. Counterterrorism experts can develop those models for prospective and retrospective analysis. Second, counterterrorism policies must focus upon educating and reassuring the public about the real risks of terrorism. Any approach that chooses, instead, to emphasize the dangers associated with terrorism is likely to have the counterproductive effect of increasing fears. Third, a mixed-methods approach that combines quantitative and qualitative analysis of primary and secondary data to analyze changes in network relations and activities within terrorist groups is indispensable. This approach allow researchers to identify changes in leadership relations over time corresponding to major events in a group's development. Fourth, research of female suicide bombers indicates that this growing and dangerous phenomenon is not ideological or cultural but is associated with the disintegration of traditional patriarchal societies. Disintegration results in the weakening of traditional norms that would prevent women from taking nontraditional roles including suicide terrorism.

Stedmon and Lawson go beyond traditional works of reporting research efforts to include a section that looks to the potential future directions of hostile intent and counterterrorism research. Potential future research questions include: How can counterterrorism policies be best adapted to engage the public? How can intelligence analysis be improved? How best can we integrate design into security dialogue and practice? *Hostile Intent and Counter-Terrorism* illustrates the unique insights that human factors research can provide in developing our understanding of counterterrorism measures.

This book is a must read for researchers investigating counterterrorism. In addition, it will provide a valuable resource to security stakeholders at policy and practitioner levels.

Jesse McIntyre III,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE CONQUERING TIDE: War in the Pacific Islands, 1942-1944

Ian W. Toll, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 2015, 656 pages

For readers interested in the broad historical aspects of the war in the Pacific during World War II, *The Conquering Tide: War in the Pacific Islands, 1942-1944* is the perfect companion. Ian Toll has hit a home run, and *The Conquering Tide* distinguishes him as this generation's Samuel Eliot Morison. For World War II or naval history fans, this book is a must read and would be a great addition to their library.

The Conquering Tide highlights a well-synchronized mix of battles fought in the air, land, and sea throughout the Pacific from 1942 to 1944. Toll repeatedly allows the reader to get a sense of what it was like sitting in the cockpit of an airplane during an air-to-air engagement, bounding along a sandy beach during an amphibious landing, or feeling the fear as a torpedo approaches a ship you are serving on. Toll's detail regarding the interservice rivalries of the Navy and Army, not just within the American armed forces but also within the Imperial Japanese forces, leaves the reader feeling irritated at the inability for these services to work together as a team for a common cause.



As he writes of the war's progression and America gaining footholds, Toll expands upon how American service leaders improved their integration, particularly in their usage of air assets, while the Japanese leaders continued to lose momentum and were unable to integrate their air force, navy, or army forces to achieve needed victories. Last, his use of primary and secondary sources is extensive, and his bibliography and notes are organized to enable readers to find other sources to research if they are interested in specific subjects.

Although *The Conquering Tide* is a fantastic book, the author faced the challenge of fitting two full years of the war in the Pacific into one very broad book. He could have easily picked one year and still had plenty of material and references. As I read the book, I constantly wanted more detail about the human dimension and military actions during this pivotal time in the war. Toll eloquently hits the highlights within this period in the Pacific War but does not expand upon any subject in great detail. I believe Toll's intended audience for this book is readers not already familiar with the subject. Regardless, *The Conquering Tide* is a page-turner and keeps the reader interested from start to finish.

I highly recommend this book for any U.S. service member who is interested in the Pacific War during World War II. The leadership and operational lessons learned will allow readers to increase their knowledge on the complexity of conducting joint operations and maintaining unity of effort.

Maj. Matthew Prescott, U.S. Army,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE MAKING OF A NAVY SEAL: My Story of Surviving the Toughest Challenge and Training the Best

Brandon Webb and John David Mann, foreword by Marcus Luttrell, St. Martin's Griffin, New York, 2015, 256 pages

The Making of a Navy SEAL is Brandon Webb's autobiographical account of his life from early teens to the completion of his Navy career. One should not judge this book by its title; it is less a story about becoming a SEAL than one about overcoming adversity and achieving extraordinary goals. Webb takes the reader through his trying times of self-discovery, and the conflicts with his father that led him to discover the Navy SEALs, which ultimately became his passion. He discusses setback after setback as he pushed through obstacles put in his way by family, friends, leaders, and even the Navy, to pursue his dream of becoming a SEAL and excelling at his work. Rather than a Hollywood-style shoot-'em-up SEAL story, this is a factual account of one man's journey from troubled teen to a man that boys would strive to emulate.

The book is in six parts, each with multiple chapters. Each part covers a significant period in Webb's life: teen years, first tour in the Navy, SEAL training, sniper training, operational time, and time as an instructor. The chapters are short. They break down detailed military terms in a manner nonmilitary readers can easily understand. Webb's perspective is based on his unique experiences and a deep understanding of the SEALs. He provides a great look into the phases of SEAL training and the mind of a determined individual set on accomplishing a goal.

This is a great book focused toward the younger male reader. By the author's own admission on page xvii, in the first paragraph, he speaks to that audience: "What I would not give to be twelve years old again … I can't go back in time, but I can give you some tips that I wish I'd had when I was about your age."

The professional military reader will not get much out of this book. There are some points that are interesting and might be new information, but overall the book is written in a very basic way. Some of the detailed explanations, and occasionally misused basic terms, may put off the military professional. This book seems targeted at men in their early teens to early twenties. At around 213 pages, the very short chapters likely will help busy young readers progress rapidly through the book and remain interested. To that end, Webb hits the nail on the head. This is an outstanding book, easy to read and easy to understand. For that young man looking at the challenges in front of him and wondering how he will ever overcome them, this story can provide some perspective.

Lt. Col. Steven Zynda, U.S. Army,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

AIRPOWER REBORN: The Strategic Concepts of John Warden and John Boyd

Edited by John Andreas Olsen, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 2015, 256 pages

For over 2,500 years, since warrior–scholars such as Thucydides have been writing about warfare, strategic landpower theory has been developed, debated, and refined. Airpower theory, on the other hand, has a relatively short history, having evolved only during the last one hundred years. In *Airpower Reborn*, John Andreas Olsen and five other leading strategic theorists present an authoritative, comprehensive, and well-structured book on the development of airpower theory by its original proponents, such as Giulio Douhet and Sir Hugh Trenchard, through to the contemporary work of John Warden III.

Olsen organizes the book into five chapters, each authored by a different strategic theorist, and an introductory essay written by himself. Chapter 1, by Peter Faber, presents a historical perspective on airpower theory, tracing its development from Douhet to Warden. Faber offers an analytical framework to categorize the different airpower theories and correlates the debates between the theories of Warden and Boyd with those of Antoine-Henri Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz.

Frans Osinga provides a detailed examination of the theories of John Boyd in chapter 2. Osinga provides his interpretation and critique of Boyd's theory, suggesting that it offers significantly more to strategic planners then the often-misunderstood OODA (observe, orient, decide, and act) loop. Osinga captures Boyd's vision of war as a dynamic contest between complex adaptive systems.

Warden builds on his earlier airpower theories in chapter 3, offering an alternative approach to warfare where the use of force is directly linked to end-state strategic objectives rather than the act of fighting battles. This chapter shares a similar perspective to Osinga's by considering warfare within a systems approach. Building on his five-ring model for identifying centers of gravity, Warden draws on examples from Operation Desert Storm to illustrate the application of this model.

Chapter 4, by Alan Stephens, presents the thesis that modern western strategic thinking is simply an extension of the land-power dominated strategic theory from the nineteenth century. Stephens argues that airpower theorists must change this paradigm by moving toward a strategy based on knowledge dominance, tempo, precision, and a fleeting footprint. In a play on words taken from the terminology of fighter aircraft development, Stephens labels this the "fifth-generation strategy."

Colin S. Gray presents a summary of airpower theory in the form of twenty-seven dicta in the final chapter. Gray emphasizes that theory provides an explanation that serves as a guide, but theory is not a definitive checklist for success. Gray's essay presents a reasoned assessment of airpower's potential and limitations into the future.

Airpower Reborn is well written and logically structured. It brings together a century of airpower theory in one concise reference, providing airpower's historical roots as well as its contemporary theory. Not all

readers will agree with certain theoretical aspects, but most will find the discussion intellectually stimulating. Airpower practitioners and anybody involved in strategic planning, from policymakers to warfighters, are likely to consider it a must-read.

Maj. Ian Sherman, Australian Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

OUTSOURCING SECURITY: Private Military Contractors and U.S. Foreign Policy

Bruce E. Stanley, Potomac Books as an imprint of the University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, Nebraska, 2015, 198 pages

How do privateers affect foreign policy? To whom do they swear an oath? Who pays them? Those questions come to mind about private military contractors (PMCs) and private security contractors (PSCs) in twenty-first century conflicts. *Outsourcing Security: Private Military Contractors and U.S. Foreign Policy* examines the growth of contracting organizations over the last two-and-a-half decades. Those who wish to understand a framework for why the U.S. government employs PMCs and PSCs should read Bruce Stanley's book. However, I caution those wanting a political analysis of PMCs not to be misled by the book's title. Stanley deliberately does not provide a significant amount of historical analysis.

Stanley argues the United States created a situation in which PMCs are used regularly because of reduced troop levels. While his argument is valid, I believe it would be stronger if he combined his hypothesis with an in-depth historical and political analysis. Operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm, Joint Endeavor, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom prove as the supply of available U.S. troops decreased, there was a corresponding increase in PMCs to fill the gap. Stanley provides a framework of the PMC community and analyzes each of the operations to show the increased contractor use. I inferred the relevance of statistics and tied their importance to larger foreign policy questions, which is not a negative aspect, but my conclusions could be much different from Stanley's. His book provides a comprehensive analysis of the situation in which PMCs are employed, but not of the significance of that employment to foreign policy.

Stanley's use of statistics creates an authoritative tone, but his argument would be stronger if he incorporated an in-depth political or historical analysis. While he gives strong evidence to prove his hypothesis, Stanley appears reluctant to address the effect of contracting on foreign relations. While he does briefly discuss the significance of the rise of PMCs, the discussion could have illustrated why the contractor industry grew in the first place. Stanley's case studies begin with Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, but contractor usage by the United States did not begin with those operations. His argument would be reinforced had he touched upon the political reasoning behind policy decisions that brought about an increase in PMCs over the last twenty-five years. Policymakers could then use his framework to understand the development of the industry and how to regulate its future.

As a future combat leader, I want to know how contractors will affect my soldiers and our mission. Having read Stanley's book, I have a level of certainty about when to expect a PMC to be used, but my question for Stanley is, so what? What will an increase in PMC use have on American foreign policy? For the security community, to what extent do we allow private contractors to shape American security policy? Those questions are complicated, but they add to the complexity of the twenty-first-century warfare my generation will be fighting.

Cadet Casey McNicholas, U.S. Army Cadet Command, Washington State University, Pullman, Washington

81 DAYS BELOW ZERO: The Incredible Story of a World War II Pilot in Alaska's Frozen Wilderness

Brian Murphy with Toula Vlahou, Da Capo Press, Boston, 2015, 238 pages

Americans are enamored with survival stories. Simply turn on your television and you are inundated with reality shows tied to survival (most very loosely). Consequently, when a book focuses on a true story of survival, it is likely to appeal to a

significant audience. This is the case with *81 Days Below Zero*.

Within this excellent volume, author Brian Murphy (with assistance from his wife Toula Vlahou) details the incredible story of Leon Crane. Crane was part of a five-man, B-24 Liberator crew that crashed in Alaska while conducting a test flight days before Christmas in 1943. He was the sole survivor, going on to survive an amazing eighty-one days in brutal conditions before his rescue.

The telling of Crane's story is a challenge for any would-be writer. Throughout his life, Crane was very reluctant to discuss his experience. Consequently, there is a not a great deal of archived material available. The challenge is even more difficult because Crane died in 2002; thus, the possibility of interviewing Crane was not available.



So how did Murphy meet the challenge and fill in the blanks? He made significant use of accessible resources. Those include an unedited transcript of an interview with Crane, a 1944 story written by Crane, and a videotaped oral history from the late 1990s. Murphy combined those with interviews of family members and friends to provide himself with an understanding of Crane's ordeal and of the man himself. He then utilized this information to extrapolate on parts of the story that may have been missing or needed expansion.

Throughout the pages of *81 Days Below Zero*, two things are emphasized for the readers. First, the ability of Crane to overcome what Murphy labels as the "enemies" of survival, which include pain, cold, thirst (which was not an issue), hunger, fatigue, boredom, and loneliness. Second, the unbelievable strokes of luck that aided Crane tremendously in defeating the aforementioned enemies. Some of those opportune breaks will literally have readers shaking their heads in astonishment.

An interesting aspect of *81 Days Below Zero* is Murphy's decision to interweave many other stories within the story in his book. In particular, the author inserts several chapters within the volume detailing the efforts decades later to search the wreckage site. This discussion and his shift into other areas may not be appealing to some readers who sought a book solely focused on Crane's "81 days." For others, this may be appreciated background information that aids in telling the entire story.

81 Days Below Zero is a book that should grip the preponderance of readers. Murphy crafted a volume that is superbly written, thoroughly researched, and is unique within this popular genre. Crane's incredible story of survival deserves to be known by a far greater audience. That is why *81 Days Below Zero* is such a valuable contribution.

Lt. Col. Rick Baillergeon, U.S. Army, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE UNSUBSTANTIAL AIR: American Fliers in the First World War

Samuel Hynes, Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, New York, 2014, 322 pages

Samuel Hynes's latest work covers a subset of World War I history previously neglected, a discussion of who America's first combat aviators were and how they undertook their combat roles. Hynes is a World War II Marine pilot who has previously written about his own combat experiences as well as another book detailing soldiers' accounts of twentieth-century wars. He is a masterful storyteller who engages the reader from page one.

Using various first-hand aviator accounts to family and friends, Hynes artfully and seamlessly transformed disparate accounts into an awe-inspiring narrative that brings the reader from pilot training through the World War I front lines. The use of the author's personal knowledge regarding military

aviation coupled with first-hand accounts from American aviators in World War I has never been as detailed in other works regarding the subject. What makes this work an easily understood and fascinating read was the simple premise Hynes expertly proved, which was based on Billy Mitchell's quotation in the prologue, page 1, "The only interest and romance in this war was in the air." Hynes writes about this romance in the air throughout the book and uses the personal letters and testimony of several aviators to demonstrate his point.

Hynes uses nineteen chapters (or waypoints) to plot his course on this journey. These nineteen waypoints then are grouped into three sections. The first seven waypoints allow the reader to understand how the young men of 1914 America underwent pilot training; how colleges and universities were the first to develop flight training courses that the military then supported to boost its ranks; and how some Americans went to foreign militaries to fly at the onset of the war and at the forefront of military aviation. Hynes also described in detail the romance of the flight for these young men using their letters home as the basis.

Section two describes in detail how the American aviators were flying and undertaking missions in World War I. Hynes used this section to describe low-level flying; close air support (which had different terminology during the war); how pilots spent their free time around the French countryside; and, how pilots dealt with death of close friends. Additionally, this section also evaluated the start of differences between combat pilots and support/reconnaissance pilots. At the beginning of chapter 12, Hynes tells the story of the lack of observation pilot collections, but has plenty of pilot material; an interesting take still seen in various aviation units in today's military. The only negative against the book occurs in this section due to the lack of a map with city names and locations. Having a map in the book would have made it easier for the reader to follow the location of the forces in relation to the front lines.

The third and final section describes in detail the final few months of the war and the postwar aviation period. In this section, various pilots not giving up flying because the war was over illustrates the romance of aviation. Hynes also describes the various postwar memorials and writings and how they directly affected how pilots trained for future combat aviation roles.

Ultimately, Hynes's book is a must read for anyone interested in aviation history or in firsthand accounts of World War I events. This book gives an interesting look at the lead up and first use of American airpower in war and should be mandatory reading for all members of the U.S. Air Force, as well as all other military aviators, to inform them where military aviation truly started as depicted straight from those flying the first combat missions.

Maj. Joseph Ladymon, U.S. Air Force, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

A HIGHER FORM OF KILLING

Diana Preston, Bloomsbury Press, New York, 2015, 352 pages

A follower of today's headlines cannot escape the constant mention of concerns over the threat of weapons of mass destruction. In *A Higher Form of Killing*, author Diane Preston impressively details a mere six-week period in 1915 when the entire concept of killing on a mass scale took a quantum leap on battlefields, at sea, and in city streets. The tools of this paradigm shift were poison gas, submarine warfare, and aerial bombardment.

Preston provides a concise historical run up to World War I, expertly weaving the political, technological, and legal currents influencing the evolution of warfare. Beginning with the Old Testament, she considers centuries of study and debate as to the nature of "just war," ending with the Hague Conference of 1899. That the conference placed bans on the use of airdropped bombs and poison gas is evidence of the world's awareness at the time of the potential horrors to come. However, also fascinating is her recounting of the many rationale presented in opposition to bans; most notably that gas was a more "humane" way of dying than, say, being blown to bits.

Preston proceeds in chronological order, with chapters rotating between U-boats, chemical weapons, and aerial bombardment (practiced mostly by zeppelins). Each weapon's development, tactical employment, and strategic impact is explained in precise detail, but in a narrative format that seizes and holds the reader's attention. One particularly insightful

thread she identifies is the nexus of the military, scientific, and psychological thought that encouraged industry to develop weapons designed to inflict terror on civilian populations.

The author provides an interesting parallax view of the impact of these weapons through three lenses. First, a discussion of the political decisions and reactions to use of these weapons; second, the way military leaders wielded and defended against these new capabilities; and finally, the impact of these implements on soldier and civilian alike. To do this, she examines archival material from the United Kingdom, United States, and Germany, as well as extensive files of war letters and remembrances of survivors. Using these resources, she delves into the efficacy of such weapons, asking the question whether the military advantage derived from the use of these weapons was worth the cost of public approbation.



In the case of all three, the answer seems to be "no"; they were sometimes tactically effective but produced extremely negative public reaction (in the case of gas and aerial bombing) or strategically disastrous (unrestricted U-boat warfare being a precipitate for American intervention). Preston then provides an illuminating look at how these weapons remained largely unaddressed from a treaty perspective during the interwar period, leading to the predictable use of their much technically advanced successors, the submarines and bombers of World War II.

This book is detailed enough to edify the serious student of history, but also eminently readable for those approaching the subject for the first time. I would highly recommend it for both audiences. Preston concludes with a highly compelling explanation of why readers should care about these century-old developments. In short, these weapons are still with us, in much more powerful modern incarnations. The question that should concern all with regard to such weapons is their employment in the future. Her answer relies less on history and more on the calculations resident in the hearts and minds of those who would use them. That is a sobering prospect indeed.

Robert M. Brown,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

ARDENNES 1944: The Battle of the Bulge

Anthony Beevor, Viking, New York, 2015, 480 pages

The Ardennes offensive launched by the Germans in late 1944, more commonly known as the Battle of the Bulge, needs little introduction and one wonders if another telling is necessary. The wondering does not last long as Anthony Beevor, the distinguished author of *D-Day,* does not disappoint with this excellent new addition to the literature.

At 0520 hours on 16 December 1944, artillery from the 6th Panzer Army opened fire on the surprised American troops. A battle of desperation on both sides—a last gasp for the Germans and for the understrength Americans—began in the snowy and bitter cold Ardennes forest. It brought the incredibly hard eastern front fighting to the west, Beevor argues. By the end, casualties on both sides were similar, he notes with 80,000 killed, wounded, or missing on the German side and 75,482 with 8,407 dead for the Americans. Additionally, the British suffered two hundred killed, but civilian casualties were difficult to measure. The overall results were far from even as the German attack was checked and ultimately reversed.

The author does an excellent job laying out Hitler's strategy and reasons behind the attack and argues persuasively that the absence of the two Panzer Armies from the eastern front opened the door for the Russian winter attack. The only absence in the book is any thinking on how, or if, the Allied demand for unconditional surrender factored into German thinking; the author is silent on this point.

This is a complex story to tell, especially from the multiple perspectives used. But, Beevor does a masterful

job. He seamlessly connects the soldiers in their foxholes to the generals in their headquarters, encompassing all levels from small unit tactics to theater strategy, including the ambivalence to downright negativity over the plan by many in the German leadership ranks. He provides an excellent account of Obersturmbannführer Otto Skorzeny's infiltration of English speaking German soldiers behind American lines, and the "overreaction bordering on paranoia" it created. The anecdotal accounts of the senior leadership, particularly on the Allied side, demonstrate the strengths, weaknesses, character, and overall personalities of this disparate group.

An important component of the book is how the author weaves the impact of the battle on the civilian population with the military aspects, adding another human dimension. The kindness shown by American troops toward the Belgians and the reciprocation of these suffering people is juxtaposed against the abuse and cruelty by the Waffen-SS. This enriches the overall picture Beevor paints of the conflict.

The well-known command structure controversies are thoroughly handled, most importantly the transfer of the U.S. First Army to Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, angering his American counterparts. Montgomery's public pronouncements, aided by a complicit British press corps, resulted in a public relations nightmare for not only Dwight Eisenhower, but also Winston Churchill and Field Marshal Alan Brooke, who understood the deeper implications. Beevor argues that this ensured that the British would minimally influence the conduct of the remainder of the war.

An in-depth and captivating account of this important battle, *Ardennes 1944* is an outstanding addition to the bookshelf and is highly recommended.

Gary R. Ryman,
Scott Township, Pennsylvania

KILL CHAIN: The Rise of the High-Tech Assassins

Andrew Cockburn, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 2015, 320 pages

In President Dwight D. Eisenhower's 1961 farewell address, he famously warned of the growing military-industrial complex: "In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist." Andrew Cockburn's book, *Kill Chain: The Rise of the High-Tech Assassins*, at its surface, attempts to trace the history of the U.S. drone program, but in reality is a commentary on how drone warfare is a direct product of Ike's prescient warning. Cockburn articulates the danger of the military and industry's affection for automated warfare despite surprisingly poor results that targeted killings have engendered on the battlefield. While Cockburn brings many biases to his conclusions, *Kill Chain* represents an important work in the U.S.' public discourse over the merits of expanded drone use.

Cockburn has written extensively on national security affairs, war, and military strategy. Known for his *New York Times* Editors' Choice, *Rumsfeld*, and his analysis of the Soviet military in *The Threat*, *Kill Chain* represents deeply researched first-hand military and intelligence sources regarding the history of the U.S. drone program. The scope of *Kill Chain* is vast: Cockburn connects today's modern drones to their roots in World War II's strategic bombing campaigns and the rise of automated battlefield sensors in Vietnam. He analyzes the effectiveness of air power in Kosovo and the Gulf War as well as the use of "high value targeting" across both conventional and irregular conflicts like counternarcotics in Colombia.

Cockburn's conclusions are clear: the military industrial complex is selling a profitable story that targeted killing with drones (and reliance on technology in general) is an efficient improvement to warfare. This story, more colloquially referred to as RMA (revolution in military affairs), is misleading because the technology is creating the opposite of its intended effects. Cockburn highlights, for example, that eliminating cocaine kingpins in Colombia actually increases cocaine supply in the United States. Additionally, the targeting of terrorists in Iraq and Afghanistan increases violence and further radicalizes insurgencies.

A reader who is looking to study drones specifically should beware that *Kill Chain* is more a critique of military high-value targeting and RMA in general—this is where the author's biases are most apparent. War is tough, complicated, and the enemy always has a vote. Cockburn rather oversimplifies and misinterprets these

aspects of warfare by blaming past failures on the military's targeting approach and the tools used to prosecute it. Cockburn's antitechnology and antiwar views in general cloud his analysis of drones as a useful platform. Technology, whether it be computerized analytical tools, battlefield sensors, or unmanned aviation, is a reality and it would be irresponsible not to harness it to win wars. Cockburn should not shun its use, blaming it for all failures, but rather should analyze where we are getting drone use wrong and recommend how we can use it better. Cockburn should have separated the strategy—high-value targeting—from the tools used to prosecute it (drones); they are certainly linked but not the same. By viewing drones, RMA, and high-value targeting as inseparably linked, Cockburn undermines his conclusions.

Ultimately, *Kill Chain* highlights many missteps of the U.S. drone program, but as a result brings up several valid questions as Americans continue to grapple with the implications of emerging drone technology in the future of warfare. Despite its biases, *Kill Chain* can significantly contribute to American understanding of the implications of these platforms.

Capt. William J. Denn, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

OUT OF THE MOUNTAINS: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla

David Kilcullen, Oxford University Express, New York, 2015, 342 pages

Many books are written analyzing past conflicts; however, few of them manage to link past events with the current tendencies in order to predict the nature of future conflicts and come up with recommendations to counter them. David Kilcullen accomplishes this with *Out of the Mountains*. His diverse background as a former lieutenant colonel in the Australian Army and as a senior advisor to Gen. David H. Petraeus and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan provides him with a comprehensive knowledge about counterinsurgencies and conflicts. The author shows a unique knack for combining his tactical understanding from operations on the ground with the knowledge of the policy and strategy decision processes taking place the highest level of government.

Kilcullen claims that the existing theories on conflict, including his own on counterinsurgency, are too narrow to address the uncertainty of today's ever-changing and sporadic conflicts. Based on four global megatrends, Kilcullen uses case studies of different events and conflicts to highlight how these megatrends affect these incidents. This analysis leads to his new "theory of competitive control" that explains how nonstate armed groups draw their strength from local populations in competition with the state.



The four global megatrends identified by Kilcullen are population growth, urbanization, littoralization, and connectedness. These megatrends will affect not just conflict, but all aspects of life. Although the trends themselves might seem obvious, analyzing the effects is a complicated process. One way would be to isolate each factor and study it individually, but according to Kilcullen, this methodology does not provide viable answers. Since the factors are all mutually connected, these trends must be looked upon as "systems of systems." While population growth, urbanization, and littoralization has gone on for decades, although at an accelerating rate, the real game-changer is the connectedness. The access to information anywhere in the world via the Internet and social media has provided nonstate actors and individuals with a powerful tool that only few years back was reserved for states. This has changed the battlefield of conflicts and dissolved many of the physical boundaries. An example of this presented by Kilcullen is the 2008 Mumbai terror attack in which the terrorists carrying out the attack used Skype, cellphones, and satellite phones to stay in contact with their leaders in Pakistan, who monitored the social

media and the news in real-time. This allowed the leaders to direct the terrorist operation and react to the Indian response to the attack. The distinction between types of present and future conflicts is no longer that of regular or irregular warfare. Conflicts will be more of a hybrid kind in, which the military aspect is just one part of the puzzle. Therefore, a comprehensive effort combining the effects of all government institutions with local knowledge is required to resolve potential conflicts and prevent them from escalating.

Although Kilcullen's target audience includes people involved in defining policies and strategies at the national level, anyone interested in or dealing with conflict resolution at any level can benefit from his views and theories presented in the book. Unlike his previous books, *Out of the Mountains* provides few implementable recommendations, especially at the tactical level. However, just like the counterinsurgency strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan did not materialize overnight, solutions must evolve over time. Admitting that there are challenges to meet is the first step toward a solution, and Kilcullen does a good job defining these. Whether Kilcullen is right in his predictions, it is not known until the future has become the past. One can only hope that the message of using a comprehensive approach in which the military is only one part of the solution will reach the right people in time.

Maj. Kenneth Boesgaard, Danish Special Operations Command, Monterey, California

13 SOLDIERS: A Personal History of Americans at War

John McCain and Mark Salter, Simon & Schuster, New York, 2014, 384 pages

When an author decides to write a biography or collection of biographies, he or she will always face a number of obstacles to overcome. One of the biggest obstacles is trying to convey to an audience the importance of the deeds committed that are being discussed by the person. It is easy to write of the deeds of well-known soldiers. All one has to do is look at the military history section of a library to see the truth in this. Where the true difficulty begins is finding worthiness in the telling of the tale of a lesser-known individual.

Arizona Sen. John McCain and Mark Salter, the authors of the historical biography collection, *13 Soldiers: A Personal History of Americans at War*, do an incredible job of bringing to life not only the experiences and stories of the individuals being examined, but also of those who served around them. The book begins with the experiences of little-known Revolutionary War soldier Pvt. Joseph Plumb Martin. The authors hammer on the consistent privations of Martin throughout the course of the war. This hammering produces a silver thread that stretches throughout the entire text, and was summed up very early in the work when the two authors asked the question, "What is it soldiers expect from those whose lives and liberty they defend?" McCain and Salter answer this question by saying these soldiers only ever expected "not fame and no more in compensation than the modest benefits they are promised". In short, they were willing to give it all for next to nothing in return.



McCain and Salter cover soldiers from a wide variety of social classes and ethnicities, which helps produce a diversely unique work. Along with that coverage, they also work to expel some of the widely accepted truths laid out in some other historical texts. An example of this comes in the biography of Capt. Edward L. Baker, a buffalo soldier and Medal of Honor recipient who fought in the Spanish-American War. While being a well-written biography of Baker, McCain and Salter go on to contest the widely accepted role future President Theodore Roosevelt played in the taking of San Juan Hill. Allegedly, a certain sergeant by the name of Berry from the 10th Cavalry, also a buffalo soldier, made it to the hill before Roosevelt. Roosevelt, however, being the more

robust personality, took credit. This challenging of information taught to high school students creates a very interesting read. Herein lies the one major weakness of McCain and Salter's work. If the authors are going to contest a widely accepted instance in history with new information, it would be behoove them to disclose their source in the text. While the two authors do have a bibliography, they never cite any of their information with footnotes or any kind of in-text citations.

This fact does not affect a reader from the general audience as it remains a quality text. It introduces an audience interested in history, but not researchers, to little-known or unknown soldiers. For the world of academia though, this text should not be used as a scholarly source due to the lack of quality citations. I would definitely recommend *13 Soldiers: A Personal History of Americans at War* to a general audience of individuals interested in history, but for the world of academia, this text is still wanting.

1st Lt. Eugene M. Harding, U.S. Army National Guard, Auburn, Indiana

BLOOD AND STEEL 2: The Wehrmacht Archive: Retreat to the Reich, September to December 1944

Donald E. Graves, Frontline Books, London, 2015, 202 pages

Blood and Steel 2, the second book in a series (the first covers the Normandy campaign), is a collection of annotated documents from the German archives and Allied intelligence files. Canadian military historian Donald Graves naturally focuses on the German forces opposing the First Canadian Army—making the title somewhat of a misnomer as the Germans fighting the Canadians actually retreated into the Netherlands. However, the documents selected are broad enough to provide a good overview of the general German situation in the west and at home in the fall of 1944, making this a valuable addition to any library on the Wehrmacht in World War II.

The documents are thematically organized, including looks at German morale, the individual soldier and POW experience, and organization and German assessments of Allied troops. The latter discussion focuses on the German impression of the American soldier. Documents chosen include orders, intelligence estimates, diary entries, and Allied POW interrogations. The documents are all from the 1944 period and thus rely on information gleaned from contemporary sources and do not depend on post-war research or analysis. Graves' somewhat limited annotations are useful, although they supply minimal analysis of the presented documents.

The most interesting documents for *Military Review* readers are those related to the German impression of the U.S. Army. To some extent these are contradictory, a point generally ignored by Graves. On one hand, various POWs and units report that American forces are timid and depend too heavily on aerial and artillery fire support (which the Germans did as well when they had such support available). On the other hand, a junior officer in the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division, a unit virtually destroyed in Normandy, considered fighting the Americans to be a completely different and much harder than fighting the Russians. And the German 3rd Parachute Division, considered the best unit in the Wehrmacht as recounted in American intelligence estimates, was also destroyed in Normandy.

Another interesting feature of the book is the discussion of the organization of the German Army and its recovery from the battle of France. Documents give a sampling of how units received replacements and conducted training, how officers were selected, and how units as diverse as a stomach battalion, a V1 regiment, and a Tiger tank battalion were employed.

For the American reader, the use of British and Commonwealth terminology and acronyms may slightly hinder to those unfamiliar with them. For example, company is written "coy" and enlisted personnel are referred to as OR (for other ranks). However, the work provides a good sampling of both the state of affairs of the German armed forces in late 1944 and Germany as a whole at the same time. The $39.95 price tag for the book is a little steep for the material presented, but the Kindle version is more reasonably priced under ten dollars.

John J. McGrath, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

In Memoriam
John J. McGrath

September 29, 1956-
March 30, 2016

Our staff at *Military Review* was deeply saddened in March by the sudden passing of our friend and colleague, John J. McGrath. John worked as a historian for our sister organization under the Army Press, the Combat Studies Institute. A prolific author, he wrote numerous books, articles, and studies, and was a recent contributor to our journal.

Before his tenure at the Combat Studies Institute, John spent several years as an archivist and historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History in Washington, D.C. He also served for more than twenty years as a commissioned officer in the active Army and Army Reserve.

John's gruff exterior hid a brilliant, incisive mind. As a historian and writer, his research was meticulous and his attention to detail was exacting. He was a perfectionist when it came to getting the story just right; this was exemplified by his painstakingly thorough recounting of tactical-level operations.

John was highly regarded among military historians and Army leadership. His book *The Brigade: A History* and his subsequent research paper on that topic were influential in Army-level plans for the future brigade structure. He was also one of the few historians who wrote about small-unit actions in Afghanistan.

A private man, John was a voracious reader and a rabid fan of all Boston sports teams. He was fiercely opinionated and defended his opinions passionately, and he could be brutally honest. But, he was also highly principled, hardworking, focused, and totally dedicated to the Army.

John McGrath will be sorely missed and fondly remembered.









RED, WHITE, AND TRUE: Stories from Veterans and Families, World War II to Present

Edited by Tracy Crow, Potomac Books, Dulles, Virginia, 2014, 288 pages

As military members return from war, the images and emotions from their experiences follow them home, influencing their lives and the lives of those around them forever. The book *Red, White, and True* is an anthology of thirty-two selected writings from various authors about the lasting impacts of military service; it offers diverse perspectives from veterans, military spouses, and grown children of veterans about the struggles and triumphs of war and how it affected their lives. Tracy Crow is well qualified as the editor. She personally served ten years as an officer in the Marine Corps and received both her bachelor's and master's degrees in creative writing. Several of the individual authors, who are not military veterans themselves, are college writing faculty and students in creative writing programs. While each author's experience is different, the theme throughout this book is the human heart in conflict with itself.

The book starts with an introduction explaining the editor's inspiration for developing this anthology. When she realized everyone has a heart that at some point has wrestled with conflict, she set out to collect true stories that accurately portray American military war experiences. Each story recounts a unique experience within the timeframe from World War II through present day Iraq and Afghanistan. The individual stories of pain and struggle illustrate the damage that war rends and describes its impact throughout society. It is not a warmongering, flag-waving, mission-accomplished collection. These stories illuminate the emotional experience of war. The reader notices that the emotional experience is irrelevant to the war in which the experience occurred. Whether it is World War II, Vietnam, the Cold War, Korea, or present-day Iraq and Afghanistan, the unexpected, sudden death that occurs in war creates images and emotions that leave the mind of the veteran scarred for life.

Crow organized the book such that one could read any story independently or start at the beginning and read story after story to the end. The strength in the book is that every story is true, drawing an emotional connection between the reader and writer. The editor encouraged each author to go deeper into his or her story to get to the point where it showed the human heart and its conflict. Crow could have organized the book into sections of similar short stories so a reader could hone in on cross-generational experiences, for example, or the lighthearted silliness that sustains a combat unit through the ugly side of war. Overall, though, each story gains and maintains the reader's attention through its gripping details. The anthology as a whole reveals the lasting impacts of death and destruction that our veterans have endured throughout history.

I recommend this book to anyone who has not seen combat and wants to understand the true nature of war and get a better understanding of what military members experience. It helps put into perspective what is going on in the mind of veterans. It reveals true experiences and perhaps explains some of the post-traumatic stress disorder, moral injury, depression, or withdrawal suffered by veterans today.

Maj. Allyson D. Benko, U.S. Air Force, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

GLOBAL ALERT: The Rationality of Modern Islamist Terrorism and the Challenge to the Liberal Democratic World

Boaz Ganor, Columbia University Press, New York, 2015, 240 pages

The founder and executive director of Israel's International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Boaz Ganor, offers a contemporary study of modern Islamist terrorism in *Global Alert*. Given the November 2015 attacks in France, his topic is timely. While his case studies draw heavily from Israeli experience, his analysis and insights are applicable to our own with 9/11 and the current international fight against the Islamic State.

Ganor defines terrorism as political violence in which a nonstate actor makes deliberate use of violence against civilians to achieve political ends. By galvanizing international support for his definition,

Ganor seeks to elevate the standards by which nonstate actors are judged and change the cost-benefit calculus of attacking civilian targets. Despite the attacks on 9/11 and the rise of transregional terrorist groups, international agreement on defining terrorism is lacking. Without international consensus, there is little to suggest that these organizations will choose to take greater risk in attacking military targets.

His proposed legal framework to redefine combatants and civilians into four categories of involved actors is novel but cumbersome. He expands the definition of combatant to include nonstate actors. He distinguishes civilians into those uninvolved with hostilities from those used as human shields. Two additional categories, militias/reservists and civilian support personnel, complete his framework.

These tiers support his proportionality equation that assigns three levels of precautionary obligation for targeting involved actors. Uninvolved civilians retain the highest level of protection against attacks while combatants keep their low level of protection. However, he develops an intermediate level that includes militias and reservists not on active duty, civilian support personnel, and those civilians forced as shields. This departure seeks to close a gap exploited by terrorist organizations.

His loosening of the protections civilians enjoy should be skeptically viewed in the context of terrorism that he writes about. It raises a difficult question that has far-reaching implications for all forms of warfare. Legal analysts and scholars would have a fruitful debate based on his proposal.

In the second half of the book, he analyzes the tension between combating terrorism and liberal democratic values. Methods used to combat terrorism may be at odds with democratic values and may undermine the legitimacy of the state. The degree to which states choose to do this may or may not give the terrorist an advantage.

Our post-9/11 experience demonstrates his point and it remains to be seen if France and Belgium will follow suit. As part of his eight principles for formulating a doctrine against the modern terrorist organization, he articulates the need to win on legal, operational, and public opinion fronts. We see this conflict today with the Islamic State and the search for solutions that counter their ideological narrative.

Global Alert is a quick read for those seeking a broad overview of the modern Islamist terrorist organization. While gaining a familiarity with the legal arguments Ganor raises, the reader should place those into the context of the Israeli experience from which the author writes. Ganor starts a great conversation about the need to modify international agreements in light of terrorism—a conversation that we will all participate in for the foreseeable future.

Col. Chuck Rush, U.S. Army,
Arlington, Virginia

THE FIRES OF BABYLON: Eagle Troop and the Battle of 73 Easting

Mike Guardia, Casemate Publishers, Havertown, Pennsylvania, 2015, 248 pages

The Fires of Babylon: Eagle Troop and the Battle of 73 Easting is an engaging historical account of Eagle Troop, 2nd Squadron, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment's push into Kuwait as part of Operation Desert Storm in February 1991. The author links together detailed accounts of Eagle Troop's Battle of 73 Easting derived from personal interviews and memoirs of soldiers from Eagle Troop to give a minute-by-minute account of the battle. This book is not an argumentative piece, nor does it try to persuade the reader to view events under a particular lens; it is simply a description of events as told by the soldiers who lived through the United States' first major tank battle since World War II. The author, Mike Guardia, is a veteran of the U.S. Army and served as an armor officer from 2008 to 2014.



The book begins by recounting the Army's transition from the Vietnam War to the all-volunteer force. The struggles encountered during this time detail an army attempting to define itself and its role in the

decades-long Cold War. With the addition of new combat systems and doctrine, the Army needed to recruit soldiers who were motivated to serve and ready to face the Soviet threat. Several members of Eagle Troop recount their individual paths that led them to join the Army and their assignments in Eagle Troop.

The account of Eagle Troop's rapid mobilization and deployment to Saudi Arabia and the struggle to survive the environment is a testament to how quickly the Army must be able to transition and adapt to threats around the globe. Many of the tenets and core competencies of the *U.S. Army Operating Concept* are on full display in this book. Details accounting the arrival in theater to crossing the berm north into Iraq provide a look into the friction at the tactical and operational levels of war that plague all armies in terms of planning and actuality once boots hit the ground.

The detailed account of the determination of the soldiers to perform their duties in the austere environment and the speed and veracity with which the battle unfolded serves as the major attraction of this book. Eagle Troop, lead element of VII Corps, led the charge east from Saudi Arabia through the 73 Easting at a pace that caught the Iraqi Republican Guard by surprise. Although the battle is a small portion of the book, it highlights the tenets of initiative, endurance, and lethality in the *U.S. Army Operating Concept*.

I do not perceive any major detractors from the book. The only minor issue is the long lead up to the battle itself. The author uses the first third of the book for character background and development. If you are expecting to be submersed into the battle immediately, this may catch you off guard. One may derive lessons from the personal accounts of the soldiers and the actions of the units that were a part of this battle.

The book is well written and informative given the first-hand accounts and level of detail derived only from extensive research and a willingness to provide accuracy in detail. I recommend this book to casual readers interested in personal accounts of the battle and to Army leaders interested in how this battle relates to the *U.S. Army Operating Concept* tenets and core competencies.

Maj. John Halsell, U.S. Army,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

DRONE WARFARE: The Development of Unmanned Aerial Conflict

Dave Sloggett, Skyhorse Publishing, New York, 2014, 256 pages

Dave Sloggett has penned an ambitious survey of the development and uses of unmanned aircraft (UMAs). An experienced analyst and scientific advisor to UK military forces, Sloggett sets out to document the long history of UMAs, their technical evolution, their operational uses, and their impact on counterinsurgency campaigns in the Middle East and South Asia.

He succeeds impressively in defining parameters: What is a UMA, or "drone" in popular parlance? What does it do? How can it be used? His answers to these questions provide a fascinating analysis of the interplay between technology and operational uses. *Drone Warfare* draws the reader into the cycles of technological development in airworthiness, reliable remote control, and real-time sensing that broadened UMAs' military utility from an experimental aircraft of questionable reliability to contemporary UMAs that regularly conduct surveillance and carry out precision strikes. Sloggett has collected an impressive set of facts for this work.



Drone Warfare falls short at times when the author fails to lay out these facts in a coherent narrative. Faced with competing demands for detail and succinctness as he navigates through the abundance of UMAs developed over the past century, Sloggett opts for succinctness. This can leave the reader bewildered by the sudden appearance of a new UMA or concept

in the narrative (particularly in the chapter on intelligence collection and defense suppression), without much context or background information. The reader may be well served by reading *Drone Warfare* with Wikipedia or having *Jane's All the World's Aircraft* at the ready.

Another confusing approach is *Drone Warfare*'s twin focus on UMA technological development and operational impact. A significant portion of the book is devoted to analyzing and refuting claims that UMA strikes in tribal Pakistan incite further insurgent activity. Sloggett's analysis is compelling, but the lack of detail about the development of the UMAs involved (such as the Predator and Reaper UMAs used for these strikes) makes for head-scratching reading. In other areas, he makes overly broad assertions about the impact of UMA operations on military campaigns. His claim that a Vietnam-era UMA that detected firing signals between enemy radar and a surface-to-air missile was a "pivotal moment" in the Vietnam War is particularly odd. It is not exactly on the same tier as the commitment of U.S. combat troops to South Vietnam in 1965 or the Tet Offensive.

Despite its shortcomings, *Drone Warfare* is a fine resource reference for the military scholar on UMAs, which is an increasingly prominent topic among the defense community and the public. Other similar works, such as Richard Whittle's *Predator,* may be better written, but the breadth and scope of Sloggett's work is impressive—and much needed.

Jonathan Wong, Santa Monica, California

OPERATION THUNDERCLAP AND THE BLACK MARCH: Two World War II Stories from the Unstoppable 91st Bomber Group

Richard Allison, Casemate, Philadelphia, 2014, 256 pages

This book examines the impact on a personal level of Operation Thunderclap and the Black March. The two main characters are Addison Bartush, a copilot for thirty-one missions with the 91st Bomb Group for Operation Thunderclap, and Paul Lynch, who was captured by the Germans on his first mission and survived the "Black March." Richard Allison, based on extensive research, interviews, and the letters that Addison Bartush was able to provide, created a look through the eyes of both men into the final operations of the 91st Bomber Group and ordeal of captivity suffered by Allied service members from Germans.

This book tells the story of the two stories in vibrant detail from their training in the United States, to include the formation of the Bishop crew, named after pilot Dave Bishop. The author avoids made up dialogue to liven up the book. Arriving in November 1944 at Bassingbourne Airfield in southwest England, the Bishop crew began flying combat missions by the end of the month. The policy was that new crew members would fly with experienced crews before getting assigned together as a complete crew. Bartush filled in on 25 November with another crew as a copilot and was not available for the 26 November mission when German fighters downed the *Wild Hare,* the aircraft that had a majority of the Bishop crew assigned as replacements.

Allison alternates chapters between Bartush and Lynch, describing their experiences. From Bartush's point of view, he examines the Combined Bomber Offensive through the last year of the war against the Germans and their European allies. He stresses the Allies' decision to use American aircraft to engage in daytime area bombing as opposed to "precision" attacks. He used destruction of Dresden as an example.

With Russians advanced into Poland, the Nazis chose to attempt to evacuate Allied prisoners from their prisoner of war camps and herd them on foot into Germany. Paul Lynch was among more than eight thousand prisoners held in Stalag Luft IV in Poland who endured the Black March, a five hundred-mile march in sometimes whiteout conditions with inadequate food and water, and no real plan in place for the housing of the prisoners on the move. Hundreds of the prisoners perished from starvation and exposure to the elements; on average, the prisoners lost about one-third of their body weight.

The Russians would eventually liberate Paul Lynch as the Third Reich collapsed. Allison discusses some the implications of the Yalta Conference and the policy of forced repatriation of all prisoners of war as part of the arrangement that resulted in

Russia declaring war on Japan three months after the formal surrender of Germany.

Allison attempts to tell two corresponding stories and, for a large part, he succeeds in his endeavor. However, his discussions of the "big picture" themes, such the area bombardment by the U.S. Army Air Force in the final year of the war and the forced repatriation of prisoners, are a little bit distracting from the true story. Maps illustrating the route of the Black March would have been informative and helpful.

I would recommend this book for anyone interested in the closing of the air war in Europe and first-person perspectives on the treatment of prisoners during the Black March. This book is well researched and written.

Lt. Col. David Campbell Jr., U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

WASHINGTON'S CIRCLE: The Creation of the President

David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler, Random House, New York, 2015, 560 pages

In the superbly written book *Washington's Circle: The Creation of the President,* David and Jeanne Heidler place the reader squarely inside George Washington's inner circle of confidants to witness the stormy, confrontational, and emotionally draining creation of national policy and executive precedent during the formative years of the American republic. This is not another book about Washington; rather, it is the story of those indispensable people—the family, friends, and advisers—who helped sustain the president, shape his presidency, and define America.

Punctuated by bits of wit, *Washington's Circle* is a compelling leadership drama. It allows the reader to experience the array of human emotions exuding from the intense debate over national issues, while simultaneously relaxing in the confidence, experience, and trust of Washington as he thoughtfully influences the creation of the federal government. From those who continuously sustained and reinvigorated Washington, to the brilliant men comprising the first cabinet who tested his patience, each person played an essential role in assisting Washington in his "final, most demanding job."

The Heidlers, incorporating acclaimed research of the early American republic, scrutinize Washington's vast network of friends and family, business and political associates, and wartime lieutenants developed over years of public service to determine the eligibility criteria for *Washington's Circle.* The authors reveal a network of "those people who had close involvement in the country's major events and who were intimately involved with Washington as a private and public figure during the opening years of the constitutional republic." These include the heads of executive departments, cabinet secretaries, personal advisers, close family members, and personal staff. Each contributed to the unifying character that helped shape a strong constitutional government.

The Heidlers introduce the reader to the United States in spring 1789—a country emerging from a raging storm of revolution—and several years of inept governance under the Articles of the Confederation. After the contentious debate and ratification of the Constitution, the United States was a vast country, richly complex in nature and regional cultures and potentially rich in resources, yet it faced the daunting challenge of developing its system of governance while maintaining a wary eye on threats at every border. Many observers maintained it was only a matter of time before the republican model failed and a monarchy would again reign in America.

The Heidlers masterfully begin the eight-year journey on 14 April 1789 when Charles Thompson arrives at Mount Vernon and delivers the message to Washington that he was unanimously elected the first president of the United States. As the writers describe Washington reflecting on the election results, the reader is struck by a reluctant, even fearful, leader who already has sacrificed so much for liberty. He has asked for nothing in return for his leadership—he finds immeasurable enjoyment in his private life as a farmer, businessman, and family man. The passionate pleas from his close friends and advisors force him to grasp the reality that the revolution is not complete and that only he is entrusted to complete the tasks. Indeed, he fully understands the notion that his place in history would be judged not only on his battlefield exploits but also

on his leadership in building the enduring institutions supporting liberty and freedom. The Heidlers' detailed account positions the reader alongside the time-weathered Washington as, with trembling hands, he delivers the inaugural speech that launches his eight-year presidential journey.



As the authors narrate this historical account, they acquaint the reader with Washington's devoted wife Martha; his loyal secretary Tobias Lear; and his friend Gouverneur Morris, each of whom played a noteworthy role in shaping the Washington presidency. Their personal interactions with and sustainment of Washington provided him with a private audience to share his thoughts and emotions concerning the day's issues and challenges.

The power of Washington's *Circle: The Creation of the President* is the skillful, meticulous development of the "circle" comprised of some of American's greatest political practitioners, including the author of the Constitution and Bill of Rights, Federalist James Madison. Considered Washington's "prime minister" in Congress during his first term, Madison grew disillusioned by the growth of federal power; eventually, Madison drifted away from the president and led the opposition "Republicans" during Washington's second term.

Henry Knox, once a rabid revolutionary, trusted lieutenant, and close friend of Washington, achieved modest success as secretary of war with his creation of the Native American pacification program, also known as the "Civilization Plan," but never fully overcame his insecurity among the intellectual giants operating within the circle. Knox loses favor with Washington for his absence from duty during the first critical challenge to national authority, the Whiskey Rebellion. Just as Madison was transformed from a Federalist to a Republican, Attorney General Edmond Randolph's ascent from a quasi-states-rights anti-Federalist in the first term to Washington's most trusted, politically neutral advisor during the second term testifies to the fluctuating composition of the president's inner circle—and the crushing personal toll these changes took on Washington.

By far, the book's most enthralling storyline is the bitter personal feud between Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson and Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton. The book comes alive with vivid debate between the brilliant, politically savvy, ultra-Federalist Hamilton and the formable yet reserved Republican Jefferson as they clashed over profoundly important constitutional questions and precedent-setting policy, such as the "Necessary and Proper" clause of the Constitution, the creation of a National Bank, western expansion, and relations with France and Great Britain. The passion of these "gifted counselors" often was guided by conflicting political and philosophical visions of America, and it was driven by sectionalism and personal ambition. As the authors state, "They would make the easy seem impossible." However, the combined brilliance of Hamilton and Jefferson guided Washington in establishing a coherent, effective United States executive branch.

David and Jeanne Heidler's *Washington's Circle: The Creation of the Presidency* is splendidly written and well researched. They skillfully illustrate the leadership embodied in the first eight years of the constitutional government in a manner that comes alive with emotion. Their vivid descriptions of Washington's inner circle and detailed discussions of their motives help create intense mental images that place the reader alongside Washington as he grapples with creating a new executive branch. This book should be considered required reading for the student of organizational leadership or United States government.

Lt. Col. Harry C. Garner, U.S. Army, Retired, Fort Belvoir, Virginia

Farewell Colonel Friederich-Maggard

Retiring after 31 Years of Military Service

The *Military Review* staff reluctantly bids farewell to the director of the Army Press and the editor in chief of *Military Review*, Col. Anna Friederich-Maggard. After nearly three years in this assignment and more than thirty-one years of military service, Col. Friederich-Maggard is retiring from the Army.

As our editor in chief, she was passionate, creative, and innovative. She continuously sought ways to improve the journal's content and readability. And, as our director, she provided professional, caring, and compassionate leadership.

During her tenure, Col. Friederich-Maggard oversaw significant improvements to *Military Review*, including the use of color and Joomag software to enhance the journal's visual appeal, themed editions to better organize content, and the successful solicitation of many prominent contributors to increase the journal's relevance. Most notably, she managed the unification of *Military Review* with the Combat Studies Institute and the *NCO Journal* under the banner of the Army Press, assuming the title of director of the new organization in autumn of 2015.

Col. Friederich-Maggard will be sorely missed by everyone in the organization. We wish her the best of luck and continued success in her new life as a civilian and Army veteran.

And whether we shall meet again I know not.
Therefore our everlasting farewell take:
For ever, and for ever, farewell .... If we do meet again, why, we shall smile; If not, why then, this parting was well made.

Act 5, Scene 1, *Julius Caesar* by William Shakespeare