

The AFRICOM Queen



Brian J. Dunn

United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) advances American interests in Africa by deploying elements of U.S. national power in a persistent manner. It seeks to prevent problems from growing to direct-threat proportions by enhancing the ability of states and regional or international organizations to promote security, stability, and prosperity. USAFRICOM (also known as AFRICOM) needs cost-effective and nontraditional naval platforms—*auxiliary cruisers*—to project U.S. Army and civilian interagency assets (supplemented by nongovernmental organizations, when appropriate) around the African continent for peacetime engagement and crisis response.

In a June 2015 article for *Signal Magazine*, former U.S. Navy Adm. James Stavridis makes a case for increased use of the Navy's afloat forward staging bases (AFSBs), which he says could fulfill the need for off-shore bases to support missions in USAFRICOM. He suggests commercial options for creating more of this type of asset: "Given the uses for the concept, it is worth considering any commercial version that could be purchased for even less than the military's AFSBs. While they would have somewhat less capability, their numbers would provide far more flexibility in distributing them among the regional combatant commanders."¹

Similarly, modularized auxiliary cruisers using civilian container ships taken into government service under contract, using primarily military crews and equipped with an array of weapon and support systems housed in commercial shipping containers, could function as mobile platforms for projecting and supporting Army military missions and civilian developmental and humanitarian initiatives around Africa. In a tight budget



environment, when the Navy prioritizes battle fleet assets for U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), which has more sophisticated naval challenges, and to U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), which is carrying out ongoing military campaigns, modularized auxiliary cruisers are the asset USAFRICOM needs.

The Challenges of AFRICOM

To cope with a full range of missions across a large, diverse continent, USAFRICOM sets forth a



(Photo courtesy of U.S. Navy)

Angola's Fuzileiros da Marinha de Guerra (marines) prepare to clear buildings after disembarking a boat during room-clearing training, 7 October 2015, in Lobito, Angola. U.S. Marines and U.K. Royal Marine Commandos trained the Fuzileiros da Marinha de Guerra as part of the Africa Partnership Station, which is a U.S. Naval Forces Africa initiative to increase the maritime safety and security capacity of African partners through collaboration and regional cooperation.

succinct mission: "United States Africa Command, in concert with interagency and international partners, builds defense capabilities, responds to crisis, and deters and defeats transnational threats in order to advance U.S. national interests and promote regional security, stability, and prosperity."² The establishment of USAFRICOM reflects America's need to engage

Africa in a sustained shaping fashion rather than in a reactive crisis mode.

In a report for the Institute of Land Warfare's *National Security Watch*, analyst Milady Ortiz describes the security situation that led to the creation of USAFRICOM: "The post-9/11 environment and prioritization of counterterrorism for U.S. national security,

in addition to the traditional security issues on the continent—humanitarian crises, ethnic conflict, and health epidemics—have raised Africa’s geopolitical profile.”³ Weak African states with poor internal cohesion have limited capacity to effectively resist foreign aggression, and they are vulnerable to terrorist groups that further destabilize the state, potentially creating sanctuaries for planning terrorism abroad.⁴

Terrorism is just one aspect of the African continent’s new importance to security. According to Kofi Nsia-Pepa, writing in a 2014 *Military Review* article, “Contrary to Africa’s strategic insignificance to the United States in the post-immediate Cold War era, [Africa] gained primacy in post-9/11 due to terrorism, energy sources, and China’s creeping influence into Africa.”⁵ We need to bolster the continent’s governments and security forces so they can resist violent extremist organizations trying to establish themselves in sanctuaries. We need to reduce the conditions that can make Africa more vulnerable to these influences, and we need to use our resources to leverage individual government and regional initiatives to defeat threats to stability and progress.

Africa will, in the near term, be an economy-of-force effort, partly because the United States is dedicating increased military resources to the Asia-Pacific region. The rise of Chinese military and economic power—coupled with uncertainties about how China’s leaders will use that power—make USPACOM a priority theater.

Worse, USCENTCOM, which U.S. policymakers once believed had quieted down sufficiently to allow the pivot to USPACOM, has many crises compelling our attention at the expense of USAFRICOM. Numerous challenges make USCENTCOM a continuing drain on American military assets. These challenges include instability in Egypt, the rise of the Islamic State, Iranian efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, Iranian threats to American allies in the Middle East, insecurity of Arabian Gulf oil traffic, civil war in Yemen, and instability in Afghanistan.



Finally, U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), once a “peace dividend” command following the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, is fully engaged in rebuilding military capabilities in NATO, to refocus on a newly assertive Russia. Therefore, with American defense spending restricted under the impact of sequestration despite increased instability and uncertainty around the globe, these demands mean that USAFRICOM will struggle for resources to cope with its diverse challenges.

Complicating USAFRICOM’s missions, this command must project ground power into the continent. Only in Djibouti, in the Horn of Africa region, do we have an enduring military presence focused on counterterrorism operations.⁶ The lack of a major U.S. presence on the ground in Africa is driven by local aversion to a major “permanent” American military presence on the continent.⁷ In time, that sentiment may shift as the people and governments see that our activities aid them without infringing



(Photo courtesy of NATO)

Two Standing NATO Maritime Group Two (SNMG2) ships, the flagship, Federal German Ship (FGS) *Hamburg*, and Her Danish Majesty's Ship (HDMS) *Absalon*, arrive for a port visit to Haifa, Israel, 7 December 2015.

on their autonomy. Until then, our footprint on the ground must necessarily be small and temporary, capable of shifting, surging, and receding with the specific missions.

The result is that USAFRICOM lacks sufficient ground maneuver units deployed within its area of responsibility to achieve its missions. In early 2015, when the Army reported it had an infantry battalion stationed in Djibouti, that unit remained far from most of the African continent.⁸ Even the newly established Marine Corps African rapid reaction force in Morón, Spain, with MV-22 air assets assigned at the request of USAFRICOM, has a restricted radius of action limited to northwest Africa.⁹

To deploy the marines from Spain beyond the range of their aircraft or to move ground units in Djibouti

any significant distance, USAFRICOM needs additional shipping capacity. According to a report by Sam LaGrone, "The marines are also looking to buttress the land-deployed SPMAGTF [special purpose marine air-ground task force] units in Morón and Sigonella, Italy, with a maritime component that would include nontraditional ships from which to launch marines into regions further south, including the Gulf of Guinea."¹⁰ LaGrone quotes Lt. Gen. Kenneth Glueck, commander of Marine Corps Combat Development Command: "We must continue to mitigate the amphibious shipping shortage by looking for other ways to do business."¹¹


If marines cannot count on Navy hulls to operate in Africa, how low a priority will Army units have? The helicopter-mobile 101st Airborne Division, with ample helicopter assets organic to the unit, will face similar restrictions if deployed to Africa. The United States needs low-cost hulls for a broad range of missions in war and peace around the African continent. Modularized auxiliary cruisers can mitigate the amphibious shipping shortage for deploying land power throughout USAFRICOM's area of responsibility.

The Design of an Auxiliary Cruiser

Auxiliary cruisers were once a common type of improvised warship for navies that needed to expand their numbers quickly. Civilian ships with light cannons bolted to their decks, along with other equipment, supplemented navies during times of war.

Such simple conversions are not feasible today because of more complex ship systems. The U.S. Navy has forged a path toward effective conversions, however, with the littoral combat ship (LCS), which opens up possibilities for modern auxiliary cruisers. The basic LCS hull, with only limited organic combat capabilities, is designed to incorporate what the Navy calls removable "mission packages" built from "mission modules" that allow a LCS to be specialized for mine clearing on one deployment and antiship missions for the next after changing the mission package.

For the purposes of the proposed modularized auxiliary cruiser, I modify the Navy term for the building blocks (mission modules) to "containerized mission modules," to emphasize their portability. I adopt unchanged the Navy term "mission package" to mean a collection of containerized mission modules focused on one type of mission.



(Figure by Arin Burgess, *Military Review*)

Figure 1. Examples of Containerized Mission Modules

While LCS costs have exceeded expectations, leading the Navy to dramatically restructure the ship class, the modularity concept still has potential for building Army modularized auxiliary cruisers. Denmark had more success with perhaps more restricted ambitions when it built a low-cost flexible support ship designed to use interchangeable “self-contained, 10-foot cubes which contain entire warfighting systems.”¹² The ship, HDMS *Absalon*, which attracted the interest of the U.S. Navy, was “designed to use modularity and scalability to perform a wide variety of missions” such as naval combat, transport, command and control, and humanitarian.¹³ The concepts of modularity and scalability are key.


The modular part of a modularized auxiliary cruiser would be provided by building system components in shipping containers. These proposed containerized mission modules would be easy to move by sea, road, rail, or air, and they would be housed in industry-standard sizes already in use and armored to provide protection for personnel and equipment.¹⁴

Commercial container ships stack shipping containers on their decks for maximum usage. For a modularized auxiliary cruiser layout, however, I do not envision stacking containerized mission modules, in order to allow the modules to mount gun turrets or other weapons, antennas, sensors, and gear on the roof of the module.

For missions that require more robust self-defense capabilities, the modularized auxiliary cruiser would be equipped with containerized mission modules that included offensive and defensive missiles or gun turrets with small cannons or automatic weapons. Other modules designed for Army, Marine, or U.S. Special Operations Command ground elements would support company-sized teams tailored to the specific mission, whether combat, training, or humanitarian. Modules to support civil affairs and Special Forces, plus helicopters or unmanned aerial vehicles, would supplement combat elements. Some modules would contain power supplies for other containerized mission modules, while others would house the communications systems to plug a ship into USAFRICOM’s command-and-control network. Figure 1 provides hypothetical examples of containerized mission modules.

The scalability part of a modularized auxiliary cruiser comes from the platform. Larger or smaller container ships could be selected for conversion, depending on the size, complexity, and duration of the envisioned mission. Any container ship selected would have the deck space to accommodate containerized mission modules and room to launch, land, and stow rotary- or fixed-wing manned or unmanned aircraft.

Using an appropriately sized container ship, the modularized auxiliary cruiser would be converted



(Image courtesy of Austal USA/U.S. Navy)

The USNS (U.S. Naval Ship) *Millinocket* is rolled out of its building shed 4 June 2013 in Mobile, Alabama. The ship was transferred to a floating drydock, which was towed out to deeper water in Mobile Bay. There, the dock was flooded down, the joint high-speed vessel floated off, and tugs towed the incomplete vessel back to the shipyard for final fitting out.

using various containerized mission modules to build mission packages installed on the deck of the ship. Because missions for the modularized auxiliary cruiser would change and evolve, mission packages would be different from one mission to the next. Figure 2 (page 56) provides hypothetical examples of modularized auxiliary cruiser mission packages. Army regionally aligned forces would train with these mission packages on the modularized auxiliary cruiser or on land-based training facilities (or perhaps afloat on larger barges) laid out to simulate deck positioning on the modularized auxiliary cruiser. The military would have the flexibility of training reservists at land-based training facilities before overseas deployment.

The source of ships that could be converted to modularized auxiliary cruisers is the world's container ship fleet. There are about five thousand in the total world fleet.¹⁵ The top twenty container ship operators controlled over 3,200 of these types of ships, as of 2014.¹⁶ America's share was small, however, with only sixty-nine in private hands in 2014.¹⁷ Therefore, USAFRICOM could not restrict the potential pool to American-flagged container ships.

The Department of Defense Civil Reserve Air Fleet program presents a model for building a pool of available

container ships to create modularized auxiliary cruisers. This aviation program compensates American civilian airlines or other entities for enrolling aircraft that meet performance requirements as a reserve source of airlift capacity. As of June 2014, the Air Force had 553 aircraft from twenty-four carriers contracted through the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF).¹⁸ The Army could create a Civilian Reserve Cruiser Fleet by paying shipping companies to modify certain container ships to accommodate mission packages and keep USAFRICOM informed of their location and availability status at all times. With a large enough pool of container ships to draw from, some would be clear of most cargo at any given time. For emergencies, there could be additional payments from the U.S. government to compensate the shipping company and cargo owners for inconvenience.

China already is seeking to make civilian ships suitable for military use. In June 2015, the state-run *China Daily* newspaper reported that to facilitate the mobilization of civilian ships, China ordered its shipbuilders to make them more readily usable by its military:

The regulations require five categories of vessels including container ships to be modified to "serve national defense needs." ... The regulations "will enable China to convert the



(Figure by Arin Burgess, *Military Review*)

Figure 2. Examples of Modularized Auxiliary Cruiser Mission Packages

considerable potential of its civilian fleet into military strength.”¹⁹

China can simply order private shipping companies to provide a reserve naval force, of course. But the Air Force’s CRAF experience demonstrates that a democracy can accomplish the same objective with cooperative means. By contracting with major shipping companies to modify portions of their fleets, the Army would have a sizable pool of ships that sail within or near USAFRICOM’s area of responsibility. Those ships could be alerted as needed to move to friendly ports where mission packages—and crews composed of Army mariners, Navy and Coast Guard sailors, and contractors if necessary—that were shipped or flown into those ports could be installed on their hulls

Modularized Auxiliary Cruisers in AFRICOM

Modularized auxiliary cruisers would typically operate alone, but they could operate within a Navy or allied task force for missions that take place in a high-threat environment.

Because African security forces comprise mostly armies and police forces, American ground forces must take the lead in missions that support African security forces. By supporting missions ashore carried out by ground forces and civilian assets to perform the key tasks of USAFRICOM, the modularized auxiliary cruiser would be a power-projection asset rather than a pure navy asset for naval missions.

Some ground-oriented missions could be carried out by American forces that remained on a modularized auxiliary cruiser that would enter the port or stay offshore if the mission was a single, brief operation or if local sentiment or threat levels ruled out even a temporary land presence. Longer missions could be conducted by personnel and mission packages deployed ashore for months, on the coast, or inland via contractor-provided land or air transport. Deploying elements ashore would allow the modularized auxiliary cruiser to move on to other locations and other missions. Ground-force mission packages used by small detachments of Army, Marine Corps, or Special Operations Command troops could provide a ground-force option on the scene to support local security in a nonmilitary mission, or as a rapid-reaction force for Army regionally aligned forces.

Sometimes the United States needs help to manage a crisis abroad without using U.S. military forces. When appropriate, the United States could support allies by providing containerized mission modules for their use.

Key tasks across the African continent recognized by USAFRICOM that could benefit from using modularized auxiliary cruisers are—

- ◆ Counter violent extremist organizations (VEOs) and their networks
- ◆ Support defense institution building
- ◆ Strengthen maritime security
- ◆ Support peace support operations

- ◆ Support humanitarian and disaster response
- ◆ Counter illicit flows [of terrorists, people, narcotics, and arms]²⁰

Counter violent extremist organizations. Many readers are acquainted with examples of insurgent groups threatening U.S. and partner interests in Africa. For example, insurgencies in Libya, Somalia, Mali, and Nigeria have demonstrated that weak or failing governments with inadequate military capacity can enable the rise of jihadi organizations. One less-known African insurgent group is the Lord's Resistance Army. This group "abducted at least 66,000 [Ugandan] children and youth between 1986 and 2005" and displaced almost two million people in Northern Uganda; the Department of State calls it "one of Africa's oldest, most violent, and persistent armed groups."²¹ The Lord's Resistance Army originated in Uganda in 1986 and operated there until it was pushed west into the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic (and eventually the Republic of South Sudan), where, as of 2011, more than 465,000 people were displaced or living as refugees.²² The horrors of genocidal killing in Rwanda two decades ago as well as Sudan's ongoing Darfur killings are reminders that ethnic hatreds are a potent threat to stability.

Modularized auxiliary cruisers with combat and support mission packages could carry out an array of direct counterterrorism missions against groups like the Lord's Resistance Army, such as air strikes (manned and unmanned), Special Forces direct action, and advising for local forces. In



(Photo courtesy of Military Sealift Command, U.S. Navy)

USNS *Spearhead* during sea trials, 19 April 2012.

USNS *Spearhead*

In December 2012, the Navy placed its first joint high-speed vessel (JHSV) in service: USNS *Spearhead*. In 2014, the *Spearhead*, which was named by the Army, "conducted its maiden operational deployment to Europe and Africa and ... [supported] U.S. Southern Command," according to U.S. Navy Military Sealift Command. Designed for rapid intratheater transport of troops and military equipment, "the JHSV is showing a broader range of applications such as logistical support, counter-trafficking, and medical operations in support of larger platforms such as amphibious assault ships," according to a report by Kris Osborn in June 2015.

Now renamed *expeditionary fast transports* (EPFs), the 338-foot-long aluminum catamarans are designed to be fast, flexible, and maneuverable even in shallow waters or austere ports. Per Osborn, "while the JHSV is not expected to perform combat missions, it could be used to rapidly resupply special operations forces in some instances." In March 2015, the *Spearhead* supported "a large-scale multinational exercise off the coast of Africa ... called Obangame Express 2015." Based on the platform's performance in Obangame Express and other exercises around the world, "the Navy is looking at using the JHSV more frequently with an emerging platform called the mobile landing platform, or MLP. Using a commercial tanker as a base platform, the MLP can launch and recover landing craft air cushions [hovercraft] and is engineered for a wide range of ship-to-shore operations." The vessels operate with civilian crews.

As of March 2016, the Navy's ship inventory includes six EPFs, with five more planned. Originally, five ships were to be assigned to the Army, but the services agreed to transfer all to the Navy.

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addition, they could provide key combat and support functions to enable allies to carry out such missions. If intelligence indicated threats to American interests or facilities, USAFRICOM could deploy Army or Marine Corps ground forces from Djibouti and Spain (or State Department security teams) along with air elements aboard a modularized auxiliary cruiser to be in a position to preempt or react to a terrorist attack.

Support defense institution building. Helping local, national, and regional actors train defense forces that bolster stability rather than undermine it is key to preventing problems in Africa from exploding into major crises. Security force assistance missions could use ground-force mission packages, with other supporting containerized mission modules, as needed. Classroom modules would be useful for training friendly military and police forces, especially when a host nation has minimal resources. In Somalia, for example, international training efforts sometimes started with even less than a poorly trained local military structure to build on. Some countries lack capabilities not only in military tactics and planning, but also in maintaining civilian control of the armed forces and combating corruption and sectarian or tribal influences that weaken defense institutions.

Developing core African military reaction forces, such as the multinational and regionally based African Standby Force established under the African Union to provide an African force to respond to African disasters or crises, is also a mission that modularized auxiliary cruisers could support.

U.S. and African militaries, and other friendly forces with interests in Africa, could bolster interoperability using training-related mission packages deployed ashore or on a modularized auxiliary cruiser for a broad range of military and nonmilitary educational missions. This would increase U.S. knowledge of the physical and human terrain of the continent and facilitate smoother interventions if local forces requested assistance during a crisis.

Strengthen maritime security. Forces could use naval warfare mission packages paired with Army, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard-related mission packages to find, track, and attack or seize pirate vessels or rescue their victims.²³ Deployments in the Gulf of Guinea or in support of USCENTCOM off the coast of Somalia could support those missions. Should

missions ashore to destroy pirate bases be required, Army or Marine Corps maneuver or special operations units could be deployed to friendly ports to initiate operations from land or operate directly from the modularized auxiliary cruiser using aviation assets.

In addition to their usefulness to the Army for projecting land power, the Navy could cope with its inability to devote scarce hulls to USAFRICOM by deploying modularized auxiliary cruisers for certain missions. Modularized auxiliary cruisers would be a force multiplier in core Navy capabilities.²⁴

Support peace support operations. Modularized auxiliary cruisers could fill the combat and logistics capabilities gaps of allied or coalition forces to enable international assistance for peace operations and promote interoperability. U.S. forces could train allied or coalition partners to use these mission packages. Planners could exploit the ease of transporting containerized mission modules to move mission packages overseas for training in other countries or bring partner forces to temporary locations in Africa or the United States for training.

Examples of African countries where USAFRICOM's support could be vital include the Democratic Republic of Congo, where United Nations peacekeepers have long struggled to contain instability and violence.²⁵ Another is Zimbabwe, which would strain the resources of neighbors if it descended into chaos from economic and political instability.²⁶ In Burundi, protesting students fleeing police operations in June 2015 entered the U.S. embassy compound, a situation that would have created a threat if terrorists had entered with them.²⁷ The Central African Republic, Sudan, and South Sudan also face ongoing challenges to achieving stability.

Support humanitarian and disaster response. Medical support with a visiting modularized auxiliary cruiser fitted with appropriate mission packages would increase the good will of people in a region. The modularized auxiliary cruiser could drop off mission packages and personnel to establish temporary clinics or civilian development projects at many locations on land. The packages could support interagency efforts to build local facilities and train host-nation personnel, which could reduce the need for the support in the future.

Disaster response for earthquakes, floods, hurricanes and cyclones, or refugee migration, could be enhanced by medical and ground-force mission packages for relief efforts and local security. These could even be flown



(Photo by Spc. David M. Shefchuk, U.S. Army)

Senegalese special operations forces conduct a beach-landing exercise during Flintlock 2016 in Saint Louis, Senegal, 12 February 2016. Riverine operations like this are important in Military Zone 2 in Saint Louis because the region has seven hundred kilometers of coastline. The exercise culminated a week of training with Netherlands and U.S. special operation forces. Flintlock 2016 is designed to enhance interoperability among all participating nations.

directly to airports near the disaster area for land-based operations, to be sustained by a modularized auxiliary cruiser when it arrives in the operational area.

The 2014 Ebola crisis in West Africa demonstrated how U.S. troops could be pulled into a nonmilitary crisis.²⁸ With any type of disease crisis, a modularized auxiliary cruiser could provide direct medical care, construction assistance, training, and even forward screening of travelers leaving an infected region, in order to contain the spread of disease.

Counter illicit flows of terrorists, people, narcotics, and arms. The trafficking of people (whether refugees, victims, criminals, or terrorists), drugs, and weapons destabilizes the African states involved and destabilizes or threatens others nearby or even outside the continent. Manned aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles could be projected and deployed ashore using modularized auxiliary cruisers, to find and track such potentially destabilizing flows through African countries. The cruisers could deliver ground forces to support local security or limited military missions.

Using modularized auxiliary cruisers with helicopter and boarding modules, USAFRICOM could work with other commands to help monitor and interdict flows of narcotics to Africa from South America and South Asia.²⁹ It could work with USEUCOM in the Mediterranean Sea or with USCENTCOM in the Red Sea and in the waters off of the Horn of Africa, where Iranian weapons shipments have been dispatched to support rebel factions in Yemen and Hamas in Gaza.³⁰

A Successful Economy-of-Force Mission

With an extensive coastline, and many parts of the continent close to international waters but far from established American or allied bases to project land power, sea-based platforms are vital for USAFRICOM to succeed in its missions. Unfortunately, the Navy cannot routinely provide the naval assets necessary. In a June 2013 article, Megan Eckstein describes recent Marine Corps efforts to enlarge the amphibious ship fleet by using “nontraditional platforms” and foreign navies’ ships.³¹ The U.S. Marines recognize that even with MV-22s, their Spain-based units have a relatively short radius of action in Africa without the ability to deploy by sea.

Like Humphrey Bogart’s fictional tramp steamer in the 1951 film *African Queen*, which was modified to carry out a military mission in East Africa during World War I, sea-based platforms to deploy combat power do not need to be expensive vessels. The commander of U.S. Southern Command, Marine Corps Gen. John F. Kelly, stated that naval needs for drug

interdiction in his area of responsibility could be supplied by simple assets: “So as I said, I don’t need a warship. I need a ship, something that floats, with a helicopter.”³² A modularized auxiliary cruiser could provide that, and much more. The twenty-first century AFRICOM *Queen* does not need to be sleek or shiny to carry out the many missions USAFRICOM must conduct. Modularized auxiliary cruisers can provide the platforms to cope with the tyrannies of distance and budgets that challenge our ability to shape the security environment in Africa. ■

Biography

Brian J. Dunn holds an AB in political science and history from the University of Michigan and an MA in history from Eastern Michigan University. He retired in 2010 from his job as a non-partisan research analyst for the Michigan State Legislature, and he served in the Michigan Army National Guard for six years. He has published in Army magazine, Joint Force Quarterly, Military Review, and other publications, and writes about defense and national security issues for his online journal, The Dignified Rant.



(Photo by Staff Sgt. Brian Kimball, U.S. Air Force)

Cpl. Shawn Jouthe, a military policeman with the 93rd Military Police Battalion, explains a tactical movement procedure to members of the Zambian Defense Force 10 August 2015 during exercise Southern Accord 2015 in Lusaka, Zambia. The annual exercise provides U.S. military, United Nations allies, and the Zambian Defense Force an opportunity to train together as a combined joint peacekeeping force.

Notes

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