Commanding the Right
Islamic Morality and Why It Matters
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Sebastian Gorka rightfully states that the Islamic State (IS) can only be defeated if we understand and undermine Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s claim to moral legitimacy.1 Baghdadi’s claim to moral legitimacy is similar to other jihadist groups, enabling them to recruit, sometimes at astounding rates.2 Why is this, and is there anything we can do about it? In order to help understand what the United States’s role may be in defeating IS and other jihadist organizations, this article will introduce two ideas that may be new to most readers: (1) an Islamic moral and legal duty called “commanding the right and forbidding the wrong,” and (2) how jihadists have crafted a populist narrative using this duty to establish their own moral and legal legitimacy.

Highlighting the influence of commanding right and forbidding wrong, also translated “to enjoin that which is good and to forbid that which is evil,” is an effort to understand the underlying principle by which Islamic communities seek to organize civic
and personal life. Groups such as IS claim to be exemplars of the duty and by doing so not only offer financial benefits to those who join, but also the most effective recruiting tool available, an “authentic” Islamic identity.

The concept of commanding the right or enjoining good can easily go unnoticed because it is an assumed basis of morality just as Westerners, religious or not, assume the Golden Rule. But in times of turmoil and injustice, the duty may be invoked just as the civil rights leader Dr. Martin Luther King stood upon the moral authority of the Golden Rule to challenge the public morality of the status quo. Likewise, Muslim visionaries have been able to challenge the public morality of their status quo with reforms they claim are rooted in the moral duty to enjoin the good and forbid evil.

The Formation of Islamic Law and Its Promise for Success

Since the Quran does not comprehensively describe how to enjoin the good, Muhammad and his companions (approximately 610–680 AD), known as the salafi or the pious ones, are frequently referred to as the “best of generations” and serve as exemplars of the duty. Therefore, early Islamic scholars meticulously cataloged their practices and traditions in order to determine how they lived and made decisions. These traditions, or hadith, became a practical guide for life. Consequently, from the earliest stages of the Islamic ummah (community), the duty is woven through every aspect of life from banking to family law and is so fundamental it is nearly considered the “Sixth Pillar” of Islam.

In time, the Quran and the hadith became the first and second sources of Islamic law by expert scholars and jurists known as the ulema. Leading scholars such as Imams Hanafi, Maliki, Shafei, and Hanbal, whose legal methods formed the four main Sunni schools of jurisprudence, recognized that certain matters of faith and practice found consensus, or ijma, across the entire Islamic community. Ijma became the third source of Islamic law. Complex matters required interpretive reasoning and analogical adjudication, making qiyas (the use of reason and analogy) the fourth source of Islamic law.

During the golden age of the Islamic Empire (approximately the ninth to twelfth centuries), jurists developed a comprehensive understanding and interpretive method of these four sources of Islamic law called ijtihad, which was applied to issues such as trade agreements, war, treaties, civil disputes, and practices of personal and public piety. This tradition, often referred to as “traditional Islam,” survived the Mongol invasion and extended through the Ottoman Empire.

Today, Islamic extremists and jihadists interpret their sacred texts by connecting the success of the salafi and the golden age with the application of passages from the Quran such as Surah 3:104, which says, “Let there arise out of you a band of people inviting to all that is good, enjoining what is right, and forbidding what is wrong.”

An early hadith from the first caliph, Abu Bakr, states, “If you follow the (right) guidance and forbid what is wrong, no hurt can come to you from those who are in error.” These passages and others like them have prompted many Muslims to wonder, “If the duty was a means of success for the Salafi, why not us?”

The Fall of Legal Procedure and the Rise of Moral Duty from 1880 to 1980

Although the ulema had been the interpreters of Islamic law for centuries, they lost influence due to political changes starting with the centralization of power in the Ottoman Empire and its demise, culminating with the abolishment of the caliphate in 1924. Additional challenges to their influence were the rise of socialism, the success of Israel, the disparate distribution of oil wealth that mainly benefited certain wealthy families, and the perceived domination of Western powers. These grievances are often discussed as explanations for terrorism. But under the surface, a religious reformation was taking place in which the authority of the ulema was being challenged by “prophets” of the moral duty who promised success even as they planted the seeds of jihadism.

As early as 1880, members of the ulema such as Muhammad ‘Ilish (1802–1882) and others predicted that if the populist teachings of Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (1838–1897) and Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849–1905) were accepted over the traditional jurist’s authority to interpret Islamic law, there would be “religious anarchy,” “civil war,” and “chaos in religion for common Muslims.” ‘Ilish pointed to the rise of Muhammad al-Wahhab, who had rejected the consensus of jurists and waged jihad within Arabia, as a case in point. ‘Abduh effectively argued that any educated person had the right to interpret Islamic law, and particularly the Quran, rather
than relying upon specially trained jurists. In Egypt, this spawned advocates of everything from progressive education and gender reform to political Islamists and Salafist movements. Ironically, these movements were as pro-European in their early days as they were assaults on the traditional influence of the ulema. However, by the mid-twentieth century they were producing revolutionary groups with political potency.

The Muslim Brotherhood and Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966) argued that the administration of Gamal Abdel Nasser lacked true commitment to Islam and failed to live and govern according to the Quran and hadith. Qutb also charged that the ulema was bought and paid for by the government, was unable to hold government officials accountable, and was allowing society to slip into un-Islamic practices leading to an ignorance of Islam. Qutb argued that the state of affairs required an eternal jihad by faithful Muslims against these “near enemies” of Islam based on what the salafi had done in order to enjoin the good.

Although Qutb’s populist tone stopped short of calling for violent jihad, Salam Faraj went further, arguing that jihad in its fullest sense had become a neglected duty. He reasoned that the dangers posed by Egyptian leadership in the 1970s were analogous to the dangers of the thirteenth-century Mongol rule. Faraj justified the assassination of Anwar Sadat as an act of jihad by positing that fighting the near enemy must be a priority.

Because Qutb and Faraj were not legally trained, they were dismissed by the ulema and charged with “cherry picking” certain jurists and hadith to advance their ideas. However, the combination of Qutb’s populism and Faraj’s individualism shaped the conditions for jihadist moral legitimacy in three ways. First, their writings were laced with quotations from the Quran and hadith and were crafted with a passionate rhetoric to engage fellow Muslims regarding their future.

Second, because the narrative initiated by ‘Abduh and others had cast so much doubt on the ulema, their legal scholarship was no longer perceived as authoritative but a man-made tradition propped up by outdated and rigid methods of ijma and qiyas. This second point was partially due to a narrative that the traditional ulema had created in the nineteenth century in order to prevent ‘Abduh and his students from interpreting Islamic law. But the strategy failed, and rather than preserving the role of specially trained jurists, they were marginalized.

Finally, with the ulema and their approach to Islamic law undermined, these lay reformers framed their arguments upon the moral essence of the law, the sacred duty to command the right and forbid the wrong. By conscientiously pursuing this duty, the promises of Islam would be realized and the ummah’s lost honor restored.

This appeal to morality combined with the political undercurrents of change boiled over in Iran with the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and Ruhollah Khomeini (1902–1989), who fueled the Shia revolution by arguing he would be a “just jurist”:

Command over you is worth still less in my eyes, except for this: by means of ruling and commanding you I may be able to establish the “right”—i.e., the laws and institutions of Islam—and destroy the wrong”—i.e., all impermissible and oppressive laws and institutions.

The rise of Hamas over the more secular Palestine Liberation Organization also reflects the trend toward Islamic morality. The opening statement of Hamas’s Charter is lifted straight out of the Quran 3:110:

In the Name of Allah, the Merciful, the Compassionate ... You are the best community that has been raised up for mankind. Ye enjoin right conduct and forbid indecency; and ye believe in Allah. And if the People of
hadith such as this: “Whoever sees a wrong, and is able to put it right with his hand, let him do so; if he cannot then with his tongue; if he cannot then with his heart. That is the bare minimum of faith.” While this hadith is a no-nonsense approach to personal and public morality, it also gives latitude for a benevolent application of enjoining the good by most jurists. Yet jihadists have rejected latitude in favor of their own interpretation which turns use of the hand into a strict ideology of hisbah applied to all spheres of life, especially public piety. This is the ideological basis for al-Baghdadi’s moral legitimacy. Those who attempt to confine enjoining the good to personal piety, or jihad to an inner spiritual struggle, but fail to support their perspectives with evidence from all four sources of Islamic law, cannot sustain their arguments in the face of someone like al-Baghdadi, who is well versed in this legal and moral narrative.

The declaration of a caliphate is another expression of commanding the right and is a call to the spirit of piety that has attracted thousands of recruits to participate as lawyers, civil servants, soldiers, and most notably, hisbah—morality police who forbid the wrong. One only has to watch the “Jihadist Next Door” to see its appeal in Britain, or the ISIS VICE News documentary to see that according to their public image, IS is engaged in a comprehensive social program of enjoining the good in which modesty and respect for women are encouraged and activities such as price gouging and mixing water with gasoline are monitored and forbidden. Additionally, leaders of IS submit to the decisions of the Islamic courts and have punished those whom the Syrian government would not. This has a broad appeal because it appears as though everyone is accountable to the law. The journalist Jurgen Todenhöfer has noted IS is attracting recruits who are “winners” from their respective communities, not “losers.” Furthermore, those willing to fight and die as martyrs are memorialized as hisbah, i.e., those who have died commanding the right and forbidding the wrong.

The Ulema’s Response

After Salam Faraj assassinated Anwar Sadat and described jihad as a neglected duty, the Al-Azhar Islamic scholars at an Abbasid library. Maqamat of al-Hariri illustration by Yahyá al-Wasiti, Baghdad, 1237. (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

Living by the New Moral Narrative

Jihadists today who command the right are powerful recruiters merely by living in compliance with
University Mufti Jad al-Haq articulated the traditional role of jurists in an accurate but unpopular tone: “Piety is for Muslims as a whole, but the religion and decreeing its precepts and what is lawful and what is forbidden are for the people who are specialized in it.”

The “Amman Message” written by the traditional scholars of Jordan responded to jihadists with this as part of its opening statement:

“This magnanimous message that the Originator—great is His power—revealed to the unlettered Prophet Muhammad—God’s blessings and peace upon, and that was carried by his successors and the members of his household after him, is an address of brotherhood, humanity and a religion that encompasses all human activity. It states the truth directly, commands what is right, forbids what is wrong, honors the human being and accepts others.”

The “Open Letter to al-Baghdadi” written by a wide assortment of scholars from across the Middle East disputes the actions of IS and claims their use of hisbah is coercion and assault.

The scholars present their case point by point in saturating the Open Letter with words stating “this is forbidden,” “this is prohibited.” Under the heading “Coercion and Compulsion,” the authors write,

In Al-Raqqa, Deir el-Zor and other areas under your control, armed groups who call themselves “al-hisbah” make their rounds, taking people to task as though they were assigned by God to execute His commandments. Yet, not a single one of the Companions did this. This is not enjoining the right and honourable and forbidding the wrong; rather it is coercion, assault, and constant, random intimidation.

These statements are not only refutations of jihadist morality but also an appeal to the same Islamic morality for legitimacy. They are also undergirded by the theological belief that it is Allah who has called Muslims to command the right as a means to transcend political rivalries, and not as an interpretive method to which one group may lay an exclusive claim. This is of critical importance to recognize. Since the rules are rooted in religion, the duty to govern is sacred. Both the jihadists and the scholars share this conviction with a key distinction being that most scholars today believe Islamic law does not require a caliphate but accommodates a variety of governing arrangements such as monarchies, autocratic leaders, or even liberal democracies (not be confused with secular democracies) such as the 2014 constitution of Tunisia. Furthermore, even though the duty to govern is sacred, government is not perceived as an instrument to enforce piety, as
with IS, but as an institution accountable to Islamic law and in submission to Allah.27

**Understanding Islamic Law Is Culturally Complicated**

Because of these perspectives on government, the United States must understand how proposals for governance appear through the lens of Islamic law and morality, especially since we think and speak in terms of a secular democracy and tend to project the separation of church and state upon the rest of the world.28 Khomeini warned his readers that westerners would attempt to strip Islam of its power by turning their mosques into churches.29 In fact, our foreign policy has required U.S. military personnel to work out the details of secular governance on the ground, and as we have all learned from multiple deployments, the devil is in the details.

Consider a 2007 incident in Al Qaim, Iraq, in which a U.S. patrol found a young Iraqi male hanging from a swing set. A report was sent up that eventually reached Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I). A MNC-I staff officer called the planner for Governance and Tribal Engagements of Al Anbar Province, wanting to know what was being done about this “murder” and whether steps were being taken to investigate the matter through appropriate Iraqi officials. The planner explained that it was essentially a matter of tribal justice involving the rape of a younger girl and strongly advised against any U.S. involvement. Agitated, the officer said, “We call this the rule of law?”30

Suppose an investigation had been pursued in accordance with the rule of law, where and how would one separate the tribal justice from the *tasir* (discretionary) and *hudud* (fixed) punishments of Islamic law?31 Whose moral legitimacy would be threatened or vindicated? It serves as an example of why we need to be aware of the moral principles behind Islamic law and allow our partners to adjudicate crime. In this case, despite the distasteful method of punishment, good was enjoined and wrong was forbidden.

**What Can Be Done to Undermine the Moral Legitimacy of Jihadists?**

1. The legitimacy of extremists such as the Taliban can be significant when they prohibit immoral practices such as the recruitment and use of dancing boys in Afghanistan. Failing to appreciate the morality behind certain aspects of Islamic law will result in a failure to understand who the people believe are legitimate authorities. Furthermore, if we hesitate to support our partners because of their commitment to Islamic law (i.e., sharia law), extremists and jihadists will dominate the conversation and the cycles of violence will continue. During the 1980s and 1990s, Egypt’s al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya forcefully pursued hisbah by the “use of the hand.” After much bloodshed, pressure from the Egyptian government, and being exposed to the larger tradition of Islamic law, most came to understand Islam as a practical religion and recognized more peaceful means of hisbah.32

2. Secularism has stoked the jihadist recruiting fires and cycles of violence against “collaborators” for years. We must be aware of how our description of secular democracies may undermine the efforts of traditional scholars and partner-government officials who simultaneously need our support while they engage in political conversations that discuss sharia law and its contemporary reforms.

3. Lt. Col. Brian Steed has noted that in Arab cultures we must focus on being providers. Being a provider who offers various services is a cultural method of building mutual trust and understanding.33 A recent example of this at the tactical level is the training, air-lift capability, and operators we provided to assist the Pesh Merga in their mission to free Iraqi prisoners in October 2015.34 A long-standing diplomatic example is our mission in the Sinai Peninsula that came from the Camp David agreements. Likewise, in 2007, while in Ramadi, the United States embarked on a policy during the Anbar Awakening which would forgive tribal fighters who had attacked our soldiers if Sunni leaders would reconcile with Shia leaders. This provided a service of negotiations couched in moral language that enjoined the good. The combined action and narrative produced results that undermined the legitimacy of IS operating in Iraq. Approaches such as these will keep our partners in a position of leadership projecting a vision of governance based upon a moral legitimacy that is recognized by population.

**Conclusion**

We must make the effort to understand and appreciate the conversations our Islamic partners...
are having in relationship to enjoining good and forbidding wrong. We must resist the temptation to establish a secular rule of law apart from a specific understanding of how Islamic law is perceived within the region of operation. Finally, we should also help facilitate negotiations and provide services to help defeat jihadists in ways that allow our partners to enhance their moral legitimacy.

Biography
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Notes
4. Anonymous, "The Mystery of ISIS," New Yorker, 13 August 2015, accessed 15 July 2016, http://www.newyorker.com/articles/2015/aug/13/mystery-isis. The point is well made that the rise of the Islamic State (IS) cannot be reduced to economics, morality, nationalism, territory, or any particular combination thereof. Instead, we are left with a baffling reality. The author’s thesis offers a thoughtful word of caution to that of Gorka’s thesis (mentioned below). IS is not the sum total of the problem, and, therefore, we need to look beyond IS and reflect upon how much we understand the moral framework and culture of our allies.
5. Muhammad Musa Al Shareef, Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah, Youtube video, 26 January 2011, accessed 15 July 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mPOQ1PR5IIE. In this fascinating video, a sheik of Islam, Ibn Taymiyyah, is being held as model of enjoining the good during the turmoil under Mongol domination. Within the first twenty-five minutes, the phrase is repeatedly used to show the Taymiyyah’s sterling character and conviction; Martin Luther King Jr., "Early Years," in The Autobiography of Martin Luther King, Jr., ed. Clayborne Carson (New York: Warner Books, January 2001), chap. 1. King said, "We cannot be truly Christian people so long as we flout the central teachings of Jesus: brotherly love and the golden rule.”
8. Abdullah Yusuf Ali, The Meaning of the Holy Qur’an (Beltsville, MD: Amana Publications, 2002), 3:104, "Let there arise out of you a band of people inviting to all that is good, enjoining what is right, and forbidding what is wrong. They are the ones to attain felicity"; Al Tawbah 9:111, 112 of the Quran states, ”Those that turn in repentance; that serve Him, and praise Him; that walk in devotion to the Cause of Allah; that bow down and prostrate themselves in prayer; that enjoin good and forbid evil; and observe the limits set by Allah. So proclaim the glad tidings to the Believers”; see also Quran 3:110, 7:157, and 22:41.
12. Faraj Muhammad Abd al-Salam, The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat’s Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East, trans. Johannes J. G. Jansen (New York: Macmillian, 1986), 55 and following, 200. "Know that when jihad is an individual duty, there is no (need to) ask permission of your parents to leave to wage jihad, as the jurists have said; it is thus similar to prayer and fasting; “Fighting the near enemy is more important than fighting the far enemy,” 193.
17. Gesink, “Chaos on the Earth.” This quote was in response to the Saudi government jailing scholars who spoke out against them.


19. Ibid., 517, 522. Historically, forbidding wrong was debated as mix of individual and community duties at the local level that required various modes of one’s hand, tongue, heart, or faith to either positively enjoin good or negatively to forbid evil. The contemporary and competitive nature of organizational politics in the Middle East has led to the view that Islamic states must manage this duty with a particular interest in “proceeding with the hand.” This is justified by looking back into scattered references throughout history by scholars such as Al-Ghazzali (518, 554), Ibn Taymiyya (524), and Nawawi (526).


29. Khomeini, Governance of the Jurist, 8.


31. Raj Bhala, Understanding Islamic Law (San Francisco: Matthew Bender, 2011), 1177. Haqq adami (claims of man), “No transgression in this category is explicitly forbidden by Allah in the Qur’an … Commission of these offenses certainly is unacceptable, and the Qur’an suggests punishments for certain of them, notably, murder.” To paraphrase Bhala, punishment of haqq adami crimes is discretionary. Depending on the specific offense, enforcement discretion lies with one of two parties: (1) an Islamic qadi (judge) who may order a ta’zir (discretionary) punishment or a hadd (mandatory) punishment (a fine, imprisonment, or a combination thereof), or (2) the victim or family of the victim who may use qisas (legal retaliation), or diyu (blood money); Patricio Asfura-Heim, “No Security Without Us: Tribes and Tribalism in Al Anbar Province” (Arlington, VA: CNA Analysis & Solutions, June 2014), accessed 2 August 2016, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA604289. “Only cases of murder or serious inter-tribal disputes are typically dealt with at the ‘ashira (tribal) level. Following the sectarian violence that occurred in Baghdad during the civil war, the high demand for tribal dispute resolution resulted in more serious cases being resolved at the fakhdha (clan) level.”

