How the Army's Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback Program Could Become a Catalyst for Leader Development

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Developing strategic thinkers, planners, and leaders is one of the most important things we do, and is grounded in the best possible training, education, and experiences.

—Gen. Mark A. Milley, Chief of Staff of the Army

The U.S. Army considers it important to develop leaders who can operate in the dynamic strategic environment of the twenty-first century. A component of the Army's training and leader development, and a tool in the self-development domain, is the Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback (MSAF) program.[1] The MSAF is a 360-degree leader development tool. It provides feedback to leaders who then can use it to inform and focus their self-development.[2]

Implemented in 2008, the MSAF ostensibly allows users "to navigate complex leadership challenges, to enhance leader adaptability and self-awareness, and to identify Army leaders' strengths and weaknesses," and it "guides their preparation for future leader responsibilities."[3] Many civilian organizations use 360-degree feedback for employee development.[4] In the Army, officers are required to initiate assessments, provide assessments of others, and annotate the date of their MSAF event on their officer evaluation report (OER).[5]

However, requiring participation does not equate to developmental effectiveness. Civilian studies on post-assessment feedback from 360-degree programs indicate

widespread employee performance improvement is unlikely.[6] Additionally, when the feedback is solely in the hands of the individual, accountability in interpreting it is lacking, and an inability to implement behavior changes is likely.[7] Development fails to occur when rated officers are unaccountable, when they see the feedback as supplemental information, or when they view the assessment as an administrative event instead of part of their developmental process.[8] In other words, the tool can become just a bureaucratic hoop to jump through.

In their groundbreaking work *Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession*, Leonard Wong and Steven J. Gerras discuss the Army's MSAF:

> Requiring all officers to attest on their OERs that they have initiated a multi-source assessment and feedback (MSAF) in the last three years probably has the well-intended purpose of socializing the force to 360-degree feedback. But, the unanticipated outcome has been the diminution of the gravitas of an officer's signature as rated officers, raters, and senior raters dismiss the requirement as an administrative nuisance rather than an ethical choice.[9]

The Army is failing to make effective use of the MSAF. This failure is not because 360-degree assessments are inherently flawed. Instead, it is because the Army's implementation is flawed. With certain changes, the MSAF could be a powerful means for building the

Newly commissioned 2nd Lt. Alix Schoelcher Idrache became the Maryland Army National Guard's first U.S. Military Academy graduate 21 May 2016. Idrache, originally from Haiti, graduated at the top of his class in physics and will attend Army aviation school at Fort Rucker, Alabama. If properly implemented, multi-source assessment and feedback has the potential to greatly improve the development process for young officers like Idrache. (Photo by Sgt. Ryan Noyes, U.S. Army)

kind of relationships that would enhance leader development. The purpose of this article, therefore, is to influence the Army to improve how it uses the program.

The discussion first shows how and why the MSAF is failing to meet its goals. Then it describes a critical weakness in Army leader development efforts that a 360-degree assessment tool could address, if implemented effectively. Next, it analyzes ways the Army could respond to the evidence that Army leaders are scarcely benefitting from the MSAF. Finally, it recommends the Army adopt four initiatives that could make the MSAF an effective catalyst for leader development.

How the Army's Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback Program Measures Up

Each year, the Center for Army Leadership conducts surveys to assess leadership in the Army. It produces annual reports known as the *Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership* (CASAL).[10] The reports cover a wide range of topics and capture "assessments from the field about leadership and leader development."[11] The center has been assessing the MSAF since 2010. The 2014 report, published June 2015, describes the goal for the MSAF program: "The optimal impact of the process (i.e., improving leadership capabilities) is realized through the assessed leader's actions that follow feedback receipt, such as requesting additional feedback from others, interacting with a coach, developing an individual leader development plan (ILDP), and self-initiated learning."[12]

Unmet program goals. The 2014 CASAL highlights the disappointing state of the MSAF program. The report shows that most officers using MSAF do not value the program, do not devote effort to self-development and improvement, and do not internalize their feedback. The goals of the MSAF program are not being achieved. Indications also suggest "a culture of resistance" from

officers toward the MSAF and the mandated OER block entry.[13] Indicators from the 2014 CASAL include that—

- About 80 percent of officers had participated as an assessed leader over the thirty-six months before the survey date.
- In the Active Component, 32 percent of field grade, 33 percent of company grade, and 38 percent of warrant officers rated the MSAF as effective.
- About two-thirds of officers and three-fourths of warrant officers only initiated MSAF to meet OER requirements.
- Seventy percent of leaders did not complete an ILDP.
- Two thirds reported devoting minimal effort to the MSAF feedback.
- Only 10 percent used virtual improvement coaching.[14]

The 2012 and 2013 CASALs report similar findings that indicate a downward trend in the effectiveness of the MSAF as a catalyst for leader development. Table 1, which compares CASAL results over three years, indicates virtually no positive trends in the Army's MSAF program between 2012 and 2014. The 2010 and 2011 CASAL reports used different indicators to assess the MSAF so those results are not included in table 1. Of note, in 2010 only 27 percent and in 2011 only 29 percent of leaders rated the MSAF as having a great or moderate impact on their development, and in 2010 only 56 percent of respondents reported taking full advantage of the program.[15]

The 2014 CASAL survey asked respondents to rate thirteen leader development practices according to whether they had a large, moderate, or small positive impact on their development as a leader. Among all respondents combined, the MSAF came in last: 54 percent rated it as having the least impact of all development activities.[16] Despite weaknesses in how the program typically is used, however, 22 percent found it had a large impact on their growth as leaders. If the program were better managed, this number could become much higher.

Table 1. Comparison of Leadership Survey Results for the MSAF, 2012–2014

Indicators	2012	2013	2014	Trend
Percent of assessed leaders who feel the MSAF experience was effective at increasing their awareness of their strengths and developmental needs	58	59	53	⬇
Percent of assessed leaders who feel the MSAF was effective for improving their organization	36	37	30	⬇
Percent of senior noncommissioned officers who view the MSAF favorably	79	77	71	⬇
Percent of senior noncommissioned officers who view the MSAF favorably	71	75	63	⬇
Percent of noncommissioned officers who initiated an MSAF for their own self-development	48	48	42	⬇
Percent of field grade officers who rate the MSAF program as effective in improving their leadership capabilities	38	41	32	⬇
Percent of company grade officers who rate the MSAF program as effective in improving their leadership capabilities	41	44	33	⬇
Percent of warrant officers who rate the MSAF program as effective in improving their leadership capabilities	45	44	38	⬇
Percent of all active-component respondents who rate the MSAF as effective for extending improvement to their organization	36	36	32	⬇
Percent of officers who only initiated the MSAF to fulfill an OER block check requirement	59	59	66	⬆
Percent of warrant officers who only initiated the MSAF to fulfill an OER requirement	51	51	74	⬆
Percent use VIC	9	10	10	↔
Percent who use VIC who rate it as effective	65	63	Not assessed	↔
Percent who reported knowing about the VIC	31	33	Not assessed	↔

Legend

MSAF—Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback   **OER**—officer evaluation report
VIC—virtual improvement coaching

(Graphic by Kevin McAninch)

Reasons 360-degree feedback fails. Considering the data in table 1, it might seem too early to draw a definitive conclusion on trends in the effectiveness of the MSAF program. However, this article proposes a second analytical rubric that suggests similar conclusions. Table 2 aligns general summary statements of the CASAL's MSAF results to leadership trainer Craig Chappelow's "Eight Reasons 360 Feedback Fails."[17] Chappelow bases the eight reasons on his fifteen years' experience in managing a 360-degree

assessment program for the Center for Creative Leadership (CCL). He calls the eight reasons mistakes because they lead to failure. Therefore, the arrows in column three represent this article's interpretation of the MSAF results in relation to Chappelow's eight reasons for failure: A green upward-pointing arrow indicates a favorable comparison (the MSAF is not failing because of that specific reason); a red downward-pointing arrow indicates that the MSAF is trending toward failure in that category; and an amber horizontal arrow indicates a neutral trend.[18]

How Army Leaders Fail to Develop Others

One other negative trend regarding Army leader development, as observed in the 2010–2014 CASAL reports, stands out: Army leaders consistently rate low in *developing others*:

- In 2014, developing others was rated as the Army's lowest leader competency and the only category below the Army's established benchmark, with "more than half [of Army leaders] receiv[ing] informal performance feedback occasionally or less often."[19]
- In 2013, "Develops others continues to be the competency most needing improvement."[20]
- In 2012, "Develops others continues to be the competency most needing improvement."[21]
- In 2011, "One consistent exception in strong indicators is the *Develops Others* competency. Many leaders are perceived as not providing useful counseling, nor encouraging individual development, and not showing genuine concern for subordinate development."[22]
- In 2010, "*Develop Others* is also identified in Army MSAF data as the greatest developmental need of leaders."[23]

Table 2. Comaparison of MSAF Survey Results to Reasons 360-degree Feedback Fails

Chappelow's eight reasons 360-degree feedback fails	Representative CASAL findings for the MSAF	Interpreting the MSAF results based on Chappelow's eight reasons
1. Unclear Purpose	Guidance and purpose clear in Army regulations and the MSAF website	⬆
2. Dumbing it Down	The MSAF generally is not seen as an opportunity for leader development: two-thirds of officers participated to fulfill OER requirement	⬇
3. Project Bloat	Soldiers report a declining view of its usefulness: effectiveness rates are dropping, and the MSAF generally is rated as the lowest-valued leader development tool	⬇
4. No Support from Senior Executives	Senior Army leaders have indicated support for the program and have led the effort by using the General Officer 360 assessment	⬆
5. Misreading Organization's Readiness	Misreading the organization's readiness involves a culture of feedback avoidance: declining participation and effectiveness coupled with poor VIC utilization indicate a culture of resistance	⬇
6. Growing Your Own	The Army created the MSAF; however, the questions appear to be modeled after CCL products, indicating the Army did not entirely grow its own	⬅➡
7. Poor Communication	Expectations about the requirement and impact are not met: declining participation and low VIC utilization	⬇
8. Confusing Assessment with Development	No feedback mechanism for development exists. There are indicators of minimal effort applied: 70 percent of leaders surveyed did not create an ILDPP	⬇

Legend
CASAL—Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership   CCL—Center for Creative Leadership
ILDP—individual leader development plan   MSAF—Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback
OER—officer evaluation report

(Graphic by Kevin McAninch)

While the MSAF is directly related to the leader competency called *prepares self*, the inability for Army leaders to *develop others* shows the alarming rate at which leaders are not taking responsibility to those they lead.[24] This is an individual and a leader responsibility that clearly is not occurring to the extent needed. A well-implemented MSAF could help the Army remedy this problem.

More structure is needed to link a rated officer's MSAF assessment with other leaders who can fulfill the responsibility to develop others.[25] The consistent negative perception of assessed leaders toward those they view as responsible to develop them, combined

with a negative trend in the MSAF program, represents a failure for the Army.

However, the situation also presents an opportunity for the Army to assess potential positive impacts of the MSAF on leader development resources. The 2014 CASAL suggests that a linkage between developing others and self-development is important to the Army:

> The practice of subordinate development (i.e., leaders' abilities to develop others) has been consistently found to be an area for improvement in past CASAL surveys, and should continue to receive the Army's attention and focus. Subordinate leader development requires a concerted effort in both enabling superiors to do it well and holding them accountable for this leadership responsibility. Further, given the frequent percentage of superiors who are rated ineffective or neutral, the role of every Army leader in their own development is elevated in importance.[26]

How the Army Could Address the MSAF Trends

The MSAF is not the catalyst for leader development that it could be. With Army leaders indicating they consider the MSAF program of limited effectiveness, declining in value since 2012, and increasingly only initiated to meet an OER requirement, the Army needs to address the way ahead for the MSAF. Four options are worthy of discussion: keeping the program as it is, scrapping the program, making the program voluntary, or improving the program.

Keeping the program as it is. The first option is to do nothing and leave the current program just as it is: a low-cost, easy-to-use, web-based application that puts the professional responsibility on the individual to seek and implement self-development. Small but positive improvements from the program benefit some users. However, with the trends over the past few years as mostly negative, doing nothing would be, at best, complacency. Moreover, it would increase mistrust in an Army program of record.

Scrapping the program. A second option is to scrap the program altogether (due to its generally ranking lowest in value for leader development) and eliminate the requirement for the OER block check (due to the inadvertent creation of the culture of resistance). This would satisfy Wong and Gerras's recommendation to put a "restraint in the propagation of requirements and compliance checks."[27] However, because of its low cost and the positive impact to some professionals who use the MSAF as intended, this option is not recommended. Eliminating the program would also run counter to a 2014 RAND report that concluded, "making 360 feedback available for developmental use in the military services is a good idea."[28] Eliminating the program would also run counter to current research that supports the need: "Leadership development is one of the most pressing issues facing organizations globally today—and represents a great chance for them to seize competitive advantage in their industries … 'the future success of organizations lies in the bench strength of its leaders and in the developmental opportunities that are afforded to them.'"[29]

Making the program voluntary. A third option would be for the Army to continue to make the tool available but change it to voluntary. This would likely change the negative perception and the culture of resistance if the OER requirement were also dropped, while still providing a resource to those with interest to take advantage of the program. As a voluntary program, it could mirror the execution of the Army War College's Strategic Leadership Feedback Program. This program offers 360-degree multirater assessments, comparisons with other students' assessments, and outreach and feedback.[30] A voluntary system, it reports an annual class participation rate of 93 percent, with 91 percent of participants rating it "a critical component of their professional military education experience."[31]

Improving the system. The last and most advisable option is to improve the system of implementation and gradually add more guided or structured self-development to the MSAF program. Initiatives to support this option would require increased organizational support and effort. The Commander 360 program illustrates examples of specific improvements. As of February 2016, it directs centrally selected commanders at the rank of lieutenant colonel and colonel to conduct two 360-degree assessments during their command tenure, and it directs increased rater involvement; therefore, could the MSAF do the same?[32] This increased organizational support and effort in the Commander 360 program focuses on enhancing leader growth, increasing rater involvement

in the development process, and encouraging greater leader-to-leader development.

As the CCL indicates, "The goal of an effective 360-feedback implementation should be positive, measurable, long-term leadership growth and development … in conjunction with organizational support."[33] Organizational support must come from the leader; the person charged to develop others. The superior, rater, or senior rater must invest the time in developing others and focus on the MSAF beyond just the initiation and OER data entry. Leaders have a responsibility to do this, not only to develop others but also to ensure the Army's bench strength of leaders remains strong and the Army does not develop a leadership gap in which new leaders lack critical skills.[34]

How to Make the Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback Program Effective

This article recommends improving the MSAF program through four initiatives consistent with research on 360-degree feedback programs:

1. Enforce follow-up.
2. Require development of an ILDP.
3. Train leaders to coach and mentor in professional military education (PME).
4. Restructure tools to support vertical development.

These initiatives would return the MSAF to its intent of "a better-led force, with leaders who are capable of leading in a range of military operations."[35]

Initiative 1: Enforce follow-up. Research indicates follow-up from an initial 360-degree event is important. Currently, there is no formalized feedback process for follow-up within the MSAF program. With no follow-up or accountability to encourage leaders to pursue self-development, they check the block and move on to the next task, missing a key step in internalizing feedback and improving leadership behavior.

A follow-up requirement now exists for the Commander 360, establishing a precedent for possible inclusion in the MSAF.[36] The CCL further elaborates on post-assessment follow-up with this recommendation: "Every few months participants should be held accountable for their progress toward accomplishing their goals. This may include follow-up meetings with the working group that provided feedback, follow-up with the supervisor who helped

establish the developmental goals, or follow-up with coaches."[37] Reinforcing a follow-up feedback session could also help reverse the downward trend in developing others.

Initiative 2: Require an individual leader development plan. Creating an ILDP that includes setting developmental goals is one way to institutionalize feedback mechanisms. This is important because "development is what happens afterwards; and development is what matters most to organizations. For the organization and the individual to get the most out of a 360, there needs to be a process for creating a development plan, support, and follow-through."[38] The Commander 360 has added a requirement for a developmental discussion two weeks after commanders receive their assessment, reinforcing "the Army's expectations that raters will help their subordinate commanders grow as leaders."[39]

In addition, setting goals enables individual leaders to focus on what is important to them and on areas where they need feedback. "Feedback should be focused on your goals—you should have a good idea what your goals are … [and] also have fresh ideas on new skills and perspectives you want and need to develop."[40] The link from self-awareness to goal to behavior change is how the intended development occurs. As the CCL reiterates, "A significant goal will require a change in your behavior, and changing your behavior is hard work."[41]

Initiative 3: Train leaders to coach and mentor in professional military education. How does the Army train leaders in PME on how to ask for and provide feedback, or how to mentor and provide coaching so others can integrate their feedback into a developmental plan? To address the need to improve developing others, the Army could institute a leaders-as-teachers program. Using an organization's leaders as a key component of a successful learning strategy seems obvious: "Why not use the potential of these leaders to inspire, mentor, coach, and train other talented leaders … to enable them to reach their full potential?"[42]

A leaders-as-teachers program could take on a few different forms. First, the Army could require rater and senior rater involvement before an MSAF event. This would put a focus on goal development and identification of desired feedback. Subordinate development is a leader's responsibility, and active

involvement before an MSAF could result in more focus and, subsequently, greater developmental impact. Second, the Army could require post-MSAF mentoring outside the chain of command. Rated officers could seek outside coaches and mentors to help them interpret the MSAF and build relationships across the Army. These leader-coaches could help clarify inputs needed for development.[43] Because they would be outside the chain of command, the likelihood of negative effects on careers or evaluations would be lessened.

Finding outside coaches and mentors could also have a positive networking effect, whereby "healthy relationships of mutual respect, honest communication, and genuine support" would be more dependable.[44] Army doctrine states, "Trust-based mentorship can help focus self-development efforts to achieve professional objectives."[45] Additionally, according to coaching and mentoring expert Douglas Riddle, "every leader must be engaged in developing the leadership capabilities of those around them, or future organizational growth cannot be assured."[46] This is critical to avoid the development of a leadership gap in the Army.

Initiative 4: Restructure tools to support vertical development. The current MSAF is a horizontal development tool focused on competencies, but it does not assist in vertical development. Per coaching and mentoring expert Nick Petrie, "Horizontal development is about knowledge, skills, and information."[47] Alternately, vertical development is based on different levels or stages of thinking. It "involves gaining new perspectives and leadership mindsets needed to make the business strategy work."[48] The MSAF format and content have undergone modest improvements, but the Army is still using one form of the MSAF for second lieutenants through colonels. This seems illogical given that the Army's description of leadership identifies three different levels: direct, organizational, and strategic, which all have different foci and required skills.[49] The current MSAF lacks vertical development assessments to help leaders achieve new levels of thinking and self-development.

The introduction of new OERs in 2014 acknowledged that different competencies were required at the three different levels of leadership. If performance evaluations should assess different competencies, then the Army should provide different leader development tools as well. Research by Ellen Van Velsor, Jean Brittain Leslie, and John W. Fleenor supports this, stating, "An instrument targeted towards all levels of management might not be right for middle managers in your organization because the capacities assessed are not in line with company-wide management development goals."[50] Additionally, "Employees come into their roles with different experiences, skills, perspectives, and stages of development."[51]

How an Improved Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback Program Could Enhance Leader Development

Indicators from the CASAL reports suggest it will be a challenge to add structure to the MSAF program due to possible cynicism and a culture of resistance. Research outside the Army suggests otherwise. According to talent development expert Edward Betof, "Career experts agree that the first level of responsibility for ongoing learning and career personal development begins with the individual. Yet, a committed leader-teacher and coach with a real interest in the growth and development of others is an important part of an individual's journey towards success."[52] Diane Reinhold, Tracy Patterson, and Peter Hegel propose "at-work learning partners," because "people apply what they learn more effectively when they have a developmental relationship with someone who understands the organizational context and is committed to helping them be successful."[53] This sounds like *developing others*.

According to the CCL, "coaching is one of an organization's best tools for developing and retaining internal leaders with the capability to secure current and future success."[54] Betof, citing behavioral scientist Bernard Haldane, describes reasons people (such as leaders and superiors) want to coach (develop) others by sharing expertise:

- Most people have good will and thus will help others with their career challenges in the workplace.
- Many people are proud of what they know or have accomplished, especially if they are regarded as experienced, competent, or experts by others.
- Many individuals' sense of self is enhanced when asked to share their experience, competence, or expertise with others.[55]

Staff Sgt. Shannon Knorr and 1st Sgt. Bryan Smethurst, both of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 211th Aviation Regiment, Utah National Guard, conduct an end-of-tour counseling session 18 November 2012 in Kunduz Province, Afghanistan. (Photo by Sgt. Duncan Brennan, U.S. Army)

The creation of a coaching culture could help with "building leadership development into the organizational fabric" of the Army.[56] According to Douglas Riddle, a coaching culture can improve an organization's "competitive advantage" when leaders are committed to developing others in formal or casual mentoring relationships.[57]

All of these initiatives for the MSAF program are about making the learning stick, and, by extension, making the leader—both the *developer* and the *developed*—better. The focus needs to be on the "learning transfer" to "ensure people apply what they learn."[58] Learning transfer is a social process. Learning—and the desired performance that comes from learning—does not take place in isolation. The work context, including the level of support from role models, mentors, peers, coaches, and bosses, has a powerful impact on turning lessons learned into leadership in action.[59] One of the greatest leadership challenges the Army needs to overcome is when the operational and learning cultures in organizations clash, and "learning transfer barriers such as lack of team support, leadership, and organizational culture" impede development.[60]

Conclusion

The Army's leader development system and the MSAF program warrant improvements. Keeping the MSAF program as it is or eliminating the program are not viable choices. The importance of leader development to ensure the Army's ability to succeed in an increasingly complex world and to avoid a leadership gap is too important to neglect. If the Army would enforce follow-up, require an intermediate leader development plan, train leaders to coach and mentor in professional military education, and restructure tools to support vertical development, the MSAF could help Army leaders' improve their performance in developing others. ■

Biography

Col. Kevin A. McAninch, U.S. Army, is the commander of the Army Support Activity, Soto Cano, Honduras. He holds a BS from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York; an MA from Central Michigan University, Mount Pleasant, Michigan; an MMAS from the School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; and an MS in National Security Studies from the U.S. Army War College. He commanded the 519th Military Intelligence battalion during Operation Enduring Freedom XIII.

Notes

Epigraph. Mark A. Milley, in *Advance Policy Questions for General Mark A. Milley, USA [United States Army] Nominee for Chief of Staff of the Army*, 21 July 2015, prepared for the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services Confirmation Hearing to Consider the Nomination of General Mark A. Milley, USA, to Be Chief of Staff of the Army, 24.

1. Army Regulation (AR) 350-1, *Army Training and Leader Development* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 19 August 2014). The Army's training and leader development occur in three training domains: institutional, operational, and self-development. On page 4, the regulation states that self-development "encompass[es] the planned, goal-oriented learning that reinforces and expands the depth and breadth of an individual's knowledge base, self-awareness, and situational awareness."

2. For this article, multi-source assessment and feedback (MSAF) refers only to the Leader MSAF and does not address others tools such as Commander 360, General Officer MSAF, or Unit MSAF.

3. AR 350-1, *Army Training and Leader Development*, 200.

4. 3D Group et al., *Current Practices in 360-Degree Feedback: A Benchmark Study of North America Companies* (Emeryville, CA: 3D Group, 2013), as cited in Chaitra M. Hardison et al., *360-Degree Assessments: Are They the Right Tool for the U.S. Military?* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015), 9. Sixty-nine percent of organizations surveyed by 3D Group indicated their feedback results were used for developmental purposes, whether planning programs or self-directed efforts.

5. ALARACT 124-2008, "Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback Program," 12 May 2008; Army Directive 2011-16, "Army Directive 2011-16 (Changes to the Army Evaluation Reporting System)," memorandum from John M. McHugh to principal officials of Headquarters, Department of the Army et al., 15 September 2011; and U.S. Army Human Resources Command (AHRC-PDV-E), Milper Message 11-282, "Enhancement to the Officer Evaluation Reporting System," 16 September 2011, para. 3(B).

6. James W. Smither, Manuel London, and Richard R. Reilly, "Does Performance Improve Following Multisource Feedback? A Theoretical Model, Meta-Analysis, and Review of Empirical Findings," *Personnel Psychology* 58, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 33.

7. David W. Bracken, "Multisource (360-Degree) Feedback: Surveys for Individual and Organizational Development," cited in Allen I. Knaut, ed., *Organizational Surveys: Tools for Assessment and Change* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1996), 123.

8. Ibid.

9. Leonard Wong and Stephen J. Gerras, *Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2015), 31, accessed 6 July 2016, http://www.strategic-studiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1250.

10. Center for Army Leadership (CAL), "Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL) Leader Development Resources," Leader Development Resources page of the Center for Army Leadership website, accessed 11 July 2016, http://usacac.army.mil/organizations/mccoe/cal/ldrdevelopment. The center, a subordinate element of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, provides numerous leadership products and services for the Army.

11. Ryan P. Riley et al., *2014 Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL): Military Leader Findings*, Technical Report 2015-01 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CAL, June 2015), v, accessed 11 July 2016, http://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/documents/cal/2014%20CASAL%20Military%20Leader%20Findings%20Report.pdf.

12. Ibid, 90. As of the date this article was written, the 2015 CASAL had not yet been published.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid., 89–90.

15. Ryan P. Riley et al., *2011 Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL): Main Findings*, Technical Report 2012-01 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CAL, May 2012), 59–60, and 70; Ryan P. Riley et al., *2010 Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL): Volume 2, Main Findings* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CAL, May 2011), 64–65.

16. Ryan P. Riley et al., *2014 Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL): Military Leader Findings*, Technical Report 2015-01 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CAL, June 2015), 88.

17. Craig Chappelow, "Eight Reasons 360 Feedback Fails," Center for Creative Leadership (CCL) website, accessed 1 July 2016, http://www.ccl.org. Note: All subsequent CCL articles cited can be found at this website.

18. Clemson Turregano, CCL's director of global digital products, provided information and analysis pertaining to Table 2, row six, column two, in a telephone interview with the author 6 January 2016. He further indicated that the Army's MSAF questions are very similar to the CCL's *Benchmarks* assessment, which is a standard, industry-recognized leader development product.

19. Riley et al., *2014 Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL)*, x.

20. Riley et al., *2013 Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL): Main Findings*, Technical Report 2014-01 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CAL, April 2014), Abstract.

21. Riley et al., *2012 Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL): Main Findings*, Technical Report 2013-1 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CAL, April 2013), Abstract.

22. Riley et al., *2011 Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL): Main Findings*, Technical Report 2012-01 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CAL, May 2012), Abstract.

23. Riley et al., *2010 Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL): Volume 2, Main Findings*, Technical Report 2011-1 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CAL, May 2011), 16.

24. Riley et al., *2014 Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL)*, Abstract. In 2014, CASAL results revealed assessments of all leader attributes except one, surpassed their benchmark the Army established by an additional 6 to 21 percent. The one exception was the attribute of developing others, with only "62% of the uniformed leaders … rated effective or very effective."

25. AR 350-1, *Army Training and Leader Development*, 95. Despite the 2014 CASAL feedback that showed ratees' preference for individual self-development, adding more structure and moving the output stage of the MSAF from self-development into guided or structured self-development, where the leader would assume a greater role to develop others, could reinforce the importance of leader development and the MSAF as a tool in the process.

26. Riley et al., *2014 Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL)*, 73.

27. Wong and Gerras, *Lying to Ourselves*, ix.

28. Chaitra M. Hardison et al., *360-Degree Assessments: Are They the Right Tool for the U.S. Military?* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015), xi.

29. CCL, "Driving Performance: How Leadership Development Powers Sustained Success," white paper (Greensboro, NC: CCL, 2015), 5. The paper quotes Bersin & Associates, "High-Impact Leadership Development for the 21st Century," Oakland, CA, July 2011.

30. The United States Army War College Strategic Leadership Feedback Program website, accessed 14 July 2016, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/orgs/SLDR/feedback.htm.

31. Ibid.

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