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Military Review

THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF THE U.S. ARMY

NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2016

Greetings!

As the new director of the Army Press, I look forward to continuing to build an organization dedicated to advancing the ideas and insights military professionals need to lead and succeed. And, as the new editor in chief of *Military Review*, I am proud to be associated with a publication that has served as a vehicle for discussion and debate on a wide range of topics pertinent to the Army and our national defense for over ninety-four years.

Keeping up with the times, Army Press is working hard to better serve our readership by modernizing our digital presence. In the near future *Military Review* articles, book reviews, and related content will be more easily discoverable and searchable on our improved web interface and our social media platforms. Going forward, some products will only appear online in an effort to improve timeliness and facilitate real-time discussion on current events and issues. I encourage you to contribute your suggestions and provide feedback on how we can best support your needs as military and national security professionals.

This month's journal highlights the military implications and challenges associated with human mass migrations—situations like the plight of refugees depicted on our cover. We begin this issue with an excerpt from *Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity* by Samuel Huntington, in which he discusses the threat to our national identity posed by trends in immigration to the United States. We follow this with "Migration as a Weapon in Theory and in Practice" by Dr. Kelly Greenhill. Greenhill explores how some states can engineer human migrations to gain concessions from more powerful countries.

This issue also features the winner of the 2016 General William E. DePuy Special Topics Writing Competition, "Transforming Unit Training with the Science of Learning," by Capt. Andrew Jenkins. We will publish other notable DePuy articles in subsequent issues of the journal. Congratulations, Capt. Jenkins!

Thank you to all the *Military Review* contributors and our distinguished readers. Please continue to check us out online at http://armypress.dodlive.mil/, like us on Facebook at https://www.facebook.com/ArmyPress/, and follow us on Twitter @ArmyPress. ■

Soldiers stretch during sunrise before an early morning run 13 June 2016 at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. (Photo by Sgt. Brandon Hubbard, U.S. Army)

WINNERS!

2016 General William E. DePuy Special Topics Writing Competition

This year's theme was "Educating the force: what is the right balance between training and education?"

1st Place
Capt. Andrew Jenkins
"Transforming Unit Training with the Science of Learning"

2nd Place
Maj. Hassan Kamara
"Writing: Maximizing on the Army's Investments in Education"

3rd Place
Lt. James Tollefson
"Treading the Way of Ignorance: Officer Education and Critical Thought"

Honorable Mention
Maj. Christopher Gin
"Soldiers, Scholars, Diplomats: Educating Strategic Leaders at Foreign Staff Colleges"

Honorable Mention
Dean Nowowiejski, PhD
"The Importance of a Long-Term Self-Development Concept to Army Officers"



For updates and information on the DePuy writing competition, please visit http://militaryreview.army.mil.

Themes and Suggested Topics for Future Editions

War by Other Means

- Are there nations that consider themselves to be at war with the United States? If so, how are they conducting war and what are the probabilities of their success?
- Insurgent warfare: case studies of winning by outgoverning
- Clash of cultures: Is winning the struggle for cultural hegemony a prerequisite for final victory?
- Case studies: immigration as a strategic weapon of war
- What must the United States do to defend itself against economic, political, or informational warfare?
- Economic war with the West: China's presence in Latin America and Africa
- The relationship of Russia and Turkey as related to the Syrian conflict
- Syria and beyond: Dealing with a reestablished Russian presence in the Middle East
- Kleptocracies: Why they matter to the United States. The military's role in dealing with them

Dealing with a Changing World

- Adjusting to changing societal norms: how they impact the Army
- Military role in dealing with revival of global slavery
- Security implications of the new Syrian, Iranian, and Russian triad in the Middle East
- Security implications of growing Chinese hegemony over the South China Sea
- Security implications of the new Islamic Europe
- Preparing for the collapse of Venezuela: coping with the adverse effects of a failed state in the Western hemisphere
- Filling the ranks: how to deal with the long-term challenge of finding people who want to serve in the military and who are qualified
- Clash of civilizations as the new paradigm for global conflict: Was Samuel Huntington right?
- Analysis of the nation-state: Is it the cause of war? Are open borders the solution to ending global conflict?

Operational Level of War

- How are campaigns planned in the age of global insurgency, international terrorism, highly mobile populations, and social media?
- Is the center of gravity concept still relevant in today's operational environment?
- Converging cavalry columns: Does this frontier American Indian war concept have any relevance today?

A French army soldier stands watch during a field training exercise 17 March 2016 in Arta, Djibouti. On-watch soldiers rotated several times throughout the night as French and U.S. soldiers defended their post. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Kate Thornton, U.S. Air Force)

"Sacred Cows": What Should Go Away but Won't

- Barnacles: Army institutions, processes, customs, or doctrine that are anachronistic and impede needed change and progress
- Relevance of the Uniform Code of Military Justice: What needs to be updated? Is military justice applied fairly and equitably across all ranks?
- Military policing: Is racism or excessive force an issue of concern for military police? How well trained are military police as compared to civilian counterparts?
- Straining tradition: What legal guidelines should be imposed on the participation of senior retired officers in partisan elections?

Mission Command Revisited

- Has the philosophy of mission command taken hold inside the Army? After many years of trying to change, critics say mission command still looks a lot like command and control
- Case studies on the use of the Army design methodology during specific operations
- Modularity ten years after: an evaluation
- Noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and mission command: Are we blurring too much the lines between officer/NCO duties and responsibilities? Are we training soldiers or quasi-commissioned officers? What is the impact of new NCO evaluation reports, schooling, and the Army University on the enlisted force?

★ 2016 ★

U.S. ARMY OLYMPIANS & PARALYMPIANS

SFC JOE **GUZMAN**
CARGO SPECIALIST
BOXING COACH

SPC SHADRACK **KIPCHIRCHIR**
FINANCIAL MGMT TECH
TRACK AND FIELD

SGT ELIZABETH **MARKS**
COMBAT MEDIC
PARA-SWIMMING

SSG JOHN **NUNN**
DENTAL HYGIENIST
RACE WALKING

SPC LEONARD **KORIR**
MOTOR TRANSPORT OP
TRACK AND FIELD

SGT HILLARY **BOR**
FINANCIAL MGMT TECH
TRACK AND FIELD

Graphic courtesy of U.S. Army MWR

CPT ANDREW **LOCKE**
INFANTRY OFFICER
RUGBY COACH

SSG MICHAEL **LUKOW**
INFANTRYMAN
PARA-ARCHERY

SGT NATHAN **SCHRIMSHER**
MOTOR TRANSPORT OP
MODERN PENTATHLON

SFC KEITH **SANDERSON**
INFANTRYMAN
PISTOL SHOOTING

SPC PAUL **CHELIMO**
WATER TREATMENT SPC
TRACK AND FIELD

SSG DENNIS **BOWSHER**
MOTOR TRANSPORT OP
MODERN PENTATHLON COACH



SGT WHITNEY **CONDER**
MILITARY POLICE NCO
WRESTLING ALTERNATE

SGT CAYLOR **WILLIAMS**
HUMAN RESOURCES SPC
WRESTLING ALTERNATE

SPC ILDAR **HAFIZOV**
MOTOR TRANSPORT OP
WRESTLING ALTERNATE

XXXI SUMMER OLYMPIC AND XV PARALYMPIC GAMES

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 2016

Photo by Tim Hipps

2ND LT. SAM **KENDRICKS**
ARMY RESERVIST
POLE VAULT

RESULTS

Gold
SGT Elizabeth Marks,
100 meter breaststroke

Silver
SPC Paul Chelimo,
Men's 5K

Bronze
SGT Elizabeth Marks,
Women's 4x100m medley relay

2nd Lt. Sam Kendricks,
Men's pole vault



SFC MICHAEL **MCPHAIL**
INFANTRY
50-METER PRONE RIFLE

SFC JOSH **RICHMOND**
INFANTRY
DOUBLE TRAP

SFC GLENN **ELLER**
INFANTRY
DOUBLE TRAP

SPC DANIEL **LOWE**
WATERCRAFT ENGINEER
AIR RIFLE, THREE-POSITION PRONE RIFLE

U.S.ARMY

2017 General William E. DePuy

Special Topics Writing Competition

This year's theme: "What needs to be fixed in the Army?"

Articles will be comparatively judged by a panel of senior Army leaders on how well they have clearly identified issues requiring solutions relevant to the Army in general, or to a significant portion of the Army; how effectively detailed and feasible the solutions to the identified problem are; and the level of writing excellence achieved. Writing must be logically developed and well organized, demonstrate professional-level grammar and usage, provide original insights, and be thoroughly researched as manifest in pertinent sources.

Contest opens 1 January 2017

Closes 14 July 2017

1st Place	$1,000 and publication in *Military Review*
2nd Place	$750 and consideration for publication in *Military Review*
3rd Place	$500 and consideration for publication in *Military Review*

For information on how to submit an entry, please visit http://militaryreview.army.mil.

U.S. service members role-play as accident victims awaiting rescue 25 September 2012 during Mass Casualty Exercise 12-1 in the Grand Bara Desert, Djibouti, Africa. The event was a joint medical exercise involving U.S. and French service members in support of Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa. (Photo by Senior Airman Veronica Mcmahon, U.S. Air Force)

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About the Cover: A Syrian family covered with thermal blankets walks along the coast of the Aegean Sea 27 October 2015 on the Greek island of Lesbos. The refugees had just arrived from Turkey. (Photo by Santi Palacios, Associated Press)

November-December 2016

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Mark A. Milley—General, United States Army Chief of Staff

Official:

Gerald B. O'Keefe—Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army

BOOK REVIEWS

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Spc. Mariah Ridge, a military working dog handler assigned to Joint Task Force-Bravo's Joint Security Forces, laughs at her military working dog, Jaska, during K9 hoist evacuation training 15 August 2016 at Soto Cano Air Base, Comayagua, Honduras. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Siuta B. Ika, U.S. Army)

The Crisis of National Identity

Samuel P. Huntington

Editor's note: The following article is a chapter extract from Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity *(2005) by Samuel P. Huntington. © 2004 by Samuel P. Huntington. It is used by permission of the publisher, Simon & Schuster.*

Salience: Are the Flags Still There?

Charles Street, the principal thoroughfare on Boston's Beacon Hill, is a comfortable street bordered by four-story brick buildings with apartments above antique stores and other shops on the ground level. At one time on one block American flags regularly hung over the entrances to the United States Post Office and the liquor store. Then the Post Office stopped displaying the flag, and on September 11, 2001, the liquor store flag flew alone. Two weeks later seventeen flags flew on this block, in addition to a huge Stars and Stripes suspended across the street a short distance away. With their country under attack, Charles Street denizens rediscovered their nation and identified themselves with it.

Samuel P. Huntington (1927–2008) was the Albert J. Weatherhead III University Professor at Harvard University, where he was also the director of the John M. Olin Institute for Stategic Studies and the chairman of the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies. He was the director of security planning for the National Security Council in the Carter administration, the founder and coeditor of *Foreign Policy*, and the president of the American Political Science Association.

In their surge of patriotism, Charles Streeters were at one with people throughout America. Since the Civil War, Americans have been a flag-oriented people. The Stars and Stripes has the status of a religious icon and is a more central symbol of national identity for Americans than their flags are for peoples of other nations. Probably never in the past, however, was the flag as omnipresent as it was after September 11. It was everywhere: homes, businesses, automobiles, clothes, furniture, windows, storefronts, lampposts, telephone poles. In early October, 80 percent of Americans said they were displaying the flag, 63 percent at home, 29 percent on clothes, 28 percent on cars.[1] Wal-Mart reportedly sold 116,000 flags on September 11 and 250,000 the next day, "compared with 6,400 and 10,000 on the same days a year earlier." The demand for flags was ten times what it had been during the Gulf War; flag manufacturers went overtime and doubled, tripled, or quintupled production.[2]

The flags were physical evidence of the sudden and dramatic rise in the salience of national identity for Americans compared to their other identities, a transformation exemplified by the comment on October 1 of one young woman:

> When I was 19, I moved to New York City. . . . If you asked me to describe myself then, I would have told you I was a musician, a poet, an artist and, on a somewhat political level, a woman, a lesbian and a Jew. Being an American wouldn't have made my list.
>
> [In my college class Gender and Economics my] girlfriend and I were so frustrated by inequality in America that we discussed moving to another country. On Sept. 11, all that changed. I realized that I had been taking the freedoms I have here for granted. Now I have an American flag on my backpack, I cheer at the fighter jets as they pass overhead and I am calling myself a patriot.[3]

Rachel Newman's words reflect the low salience of national identity for some Americans before September 11. Among some educated and elite Americans, national identity seemed at times to have

May Day demonstrators seek amnesty and other rights for immigrants 1 May 2006 in downtown Los Angeles, California. May Day—the International Workers Day observed in Asia, most of Europe, and Mexico, but not officially recognized in the United States due to its communist associations—coincided with The Great American Boycott, a one-day boycott of U.S. schools and businesses by immigrants in the United States, conducted mainly by people of Latin American origin. (Photo courtesy of Jonathan McIntosh)

faded from sight. Globalization, multiculturalism, cosmopolitanism, immigration, subnationalism, and anti-nationalism had battered American consciousness. Ethnic, racial, and gender identities came to the fore. In contrast to their predecessors, many immigrants were ampersands, maintaining dual loyalties and dual citizenships. A massive Hispanic influx raised questions concerning America's linguistic and cultural unity. Corporate executives, professionals, and Information Age technocrats espoused cosmopolitan over national identities. The teaching of national history gave way to the teaching of ethnic and racial histories. The celebration of diversity replaced emphasis on what Americans had in common. The national unity and sense of national identity created by work and war in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and consolidated in the world wars of the twentieth century seemed to be eroding. By 2000, America was, in many respects, less a nation than it had been for a century. The Stars and Stripes were at half-mast and other flags flew higher on the flagpole of American identities.

The challenges to the salience of American national identity from other-national, subnational, and transnational identities were epitomized in several events of the 1990s.

Other-National Identities. At a Gold Cup soccer game between Mexico and the United States in February 1998, the 91,255 fans were immersed in a "sea of red, white, and green flags"; they booed when "The Star-Spangled Banner" was played; they "pelted" the U.S. players "with debris and cups of what might have been water, beer or worse"; and they attacked with "fruit and cups of beer" a few fans who tried to raise an American flag. This game took place not in Mexico City but in Los Angeles. "Something's wrong when I can't even raise an American flag in my own country," a U.S. fan commented, as he ducked a lemon going by his head. "Playing in

Los Angeles is not a home game for the United States," a *Los Angeles Times* reporter agreed.[4]

Past immigrants wept with joy when, after overcoming hardship and risk, they saw the Statue of Liberty; enthusiastically identified themselves with their new country that offered them liberty, work, and hope; and often became the most intensely patriotic of citizens. In 2000 the proportion of foreign-born was somewhat less than in 1910, but the proportion of people in America who were also loyal to and identified with other countries was quite possibly higher than at any time since the American Revolution.

Subnational Identities. In his book *Race Pride and the American Identity*, Joseph Rhea quotes the poetry

Cpl. Balreet Kaur and Spc. Jasleen Kaur, Indian-born sisters, compare common courtesies of the United States and India with an Indian soldier 31 October 2010 before the opening ceremony for the combined training exercise Yudh Abhyas 2010 on Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska. The sisters are California National Guardsmen assigned to the 79th Infantry Brigade Combat Team. Both are medics and were cultural liaisons for the fourteen-day exercise. (Photo by Spc. Ashley M. Armstrong, U.S. Army)

recited at two presidential inaugurations. At President John F. Kennedy's in 1961, Robert Frost hailed the "heroic deeds" of America's founding that with God's "approval" ushered in "a new order of the ages":

Our venture in revolution and outlawry
Has justified itself in freedom's story
Right down to now in glory upon glory.

America, he said, was entering a new "golden age of poetry and power."

Thirty-two years later, Maya Angelou recited a poem at President Bill Clinton's inauguration that conveyed a different image of America. Without ever mentioning the words "America" or "American," she identified twenty-seven racial, religious, tribal, and ethnic groups—Asian, Jewish, Muslim, Pawnee, Hispanic, Eskimo, Arab, Ashanti, among others—and denounced the immoral repression they suffered, as a result of America's "armed struggles for profit" and its "bloody sear" of "cynicism." America, she said, may be "wedded forever to fear, yoked eternally to brutishness."[5] Frost saw America's history and identity as glories to be celebrated and perpetuated. Angelou saw the manifestations of American identity as evil threats to the well-being and real identities of people with their subnational groups.

A similar contrast in attitudes occurred in a 1997 telephone interview by a *New York Times* reporter with Ward Connerly, then the leading proponent of an initiative measure in California prohibiting affirmative action by the state government. The following exchange occurred:

REPORTER: "What are you?"
CONNERLY: "I am an American."
REPORTER: "No, no, no! What *are* you?"
CONNERLY: "Yes, yes, yes! I am an American."
REPORTER: "That is not what I mean. I was told that you are African American. Are you ashamed to be African American?"
CONNERLY: "No, I am just proud to be an American."

Connerly then explained that his ancestry included Africans, French, Irish, and American Indians, and the dialogue concluded:

REPORTER: "What does that make you?"
CONNERLY: "That makes me all-American!"[6]

In the 1990s, however, Americans like Rachel Newman did not respond to the question "What are

you?" with Ward Connerly's passionate affirmation of his national identity. They instead articulated subnational racial, ethnic, or gender identities, as the *Times* reporter clearly expected.

Transnational Identities. In 1996 Ralph Nader wrote to the chief executive officers of one hundred of the largest American corporations pointing to the substantial tax benefits and other subsidies (estimated at $65 billion a year by the Cato Institute) they received from the federal government and urging them to show their support for "the country that bred them, built them, subsidized them, and defended them" by having their directors open their annual stockholders meeting by reciting the Pledge of Allegiance to the flag and the republic for which it stands. One corporation (Federated Department Stores) responded favorably; half of the corporations never responded; others rejected it brusquely. The respondent for Ford explicitly claimed transnational identity: "As a multinational . . . Ford in its largest sense is an Australian country [company] in Australia, a British company in the United Kingdom, a German company in Germany." Aetna's CEO called Nader's idea "contrary to the principles on which our democracy was founded." Motorola's respondent condemned its "political and nationalistic overtones." Price Costco's CEO asked, "What do you propose next—personal loyalty oaths?" And Kimberly-Clark's executive asserted that it was "a grim reminder of the loyalty oaths of the 1950s."[7]

Undoubtedly the vociferous reaction of American corporate leaders was in part because Nader had been hounding them for years and they could not resist the opportunity to castigate him as a latter-day Joe McCarthy. Yet they were not alone among American elites in downgrading or disavowing identification with their country. Prominent intellectuals and scholars attacked nationalism, warned of the dangers of inculcating national pride and commitment to America in students, and argued that a national identity was undesirable. Statements like these reflected the extent to which some people in American elite groups, business, financial, intellectual, professional, and even governmental, were becoming denationalized and developing transnational and cosmopolitan identities superseding their national ones. This was not true of the American public, and a gap consequently emerged between the primacy of national identity for most Americans and the growth of transnational identities among the controllers of power, wealth, and knowledge in American society.

September 11 drastically reduced the salience of these other identities and sent Old Glory back to the top of the national flag pole. Will it stay there? The seventeen flags on Charles Street declined to twelve in November, nine in December, seven in January, and five in March, and were down to four by the first anniversary of the attacks, four times the number pre-September 11 but also one-fourth of those displayed immediately afterward. As an index of the salience of national identity, did this represent a modified post-September 11 normalcy, a slightly revised pre-September 11 normalcy, or a new, post-post-September 11 normalcy? Does it take an Osama bin laden, as it did for Rachel Newman, to make us realize that we are Americans? If we do not experience recurring destructive attacks, will we return to the fragmentation and eroded Americanism before September 11? Or will we find a revitalized national identity that is not dependent on calamitous threats from abroad and that provides the unity lacking in the last decades of the twentieth century?

Substance: Who Are We?

The post-September 11 flags symbolized America, but they did not convey any meaning of America. Some national flags, such as the tricolor, the Union Jack, or Pakistan's green flag with its star and crescent, say something significant about the identity of the country they represent. The explicit visual message of the Stars and Strips is simply that America is a country that originally had thirteen and currently has fifty states. Beyond that, Americans, and others, can read into the flag any meaning they want. The post-September 11 proliferation of flags may well evidence not only the intensified salience of national identity to Americans but also their uncertainty as to the substance of that identity. While the salience of national identity may vary sharply with the intensity of external threats, the substance of national identity is shaped slowly and more fundamentally by a wide variety of long-term, often conflicting social, economic, and political trends. The crucial issues concerning the substance of American identity on September 10 did not disappear the following day.

"We Americans" face a substantive problem of national identity epitomized by the subject of this sentence. Are we a "we," one people or several? If we are a "we,"

what distinguishes us from the "thems" who are not us? Race, religion, ethnicity, values, culture, wealth, politics, or what? Is the United States, as some have argued, a "universal nation," based on values common to all humanity and in principle embracing all peoples? Or are we a Western nation with our identity defined by our European heritage and institutions? Or are we unique with a distinctive civilization of our own, as the proponents of "American exceptionalism" have argued throughout our history? Are we basically a political community whose identity exists only in a social contract embodied in the Declaration of Independence and other founding documents? Are we multicultural, bicultural, or unicultural, a mosaic or a melting pot? Do we have any meaningful identity as a nation that transcends our subnational ethnic, religious, racial identities? These questions remain for Americans in their post-September 11 era. They are in part rhetorical questions, but they are also questions that have profound implications for American society and American policy at home and abroad. In the 1990s Americans engaged in intense debates over immigration and assimilation, multiculturalism and diversity, race relations and affirmative action, religion in the public sphere, bilingual education, school and college curricula, school prayer and abortion, the meaning of citizenship and nationality, foreign involvement in American elections, the extraterritorial application of American law, and the increasing political role of diasporas here and abroad. Underlying all these issues is the question of national identity. Virtually any position on any one of these issues implies certain assumptions about that identity.

National interests derive from national identity. We have to know who we are before we can know what our interests are.

So also with foreign policy. The 1990s saw intense, wide-ranging, and rather confused debates over American national interests after the Cold War. Much of this confusion stemmed from the complexity and novelty of that world. Yet that was not the only source of uncertainty about America's role. National interests derive from national identity. We have to know who we are before we can know what our interests are.

If American identity is defined by a set of universal principles of liberty and democracy, then presumably the promotion of those principles in other countries should be the primary goal of American foreign policy. If, however, the United States is "exceptional," the rationale for promoting human rights and democracy elsewhere disappears. If the United States is primarily a collection of cultural and ethnic entities, its national interest is in the promotion of the goals of those entities and we should have a "multicultural foreign policy." If the United States is primarily defined by its European cultural heritage as a Western country, then it should direct its attention to strengthening its ties with Western Europe. If immigration is making the United States a more Hispanic nation, we should orient ourselves primarily toward Latin America. If neither European nor Hispanic culture is central to American identity, then presumably America should pursue a foreign policy divorced from cultural ties to other countries. Other definitions of national identity generate different national interests and policy priorities. Conflicts over what we should do abroad are rooted in conflicts over who we are at home.

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland was created in 1707, the United States of America in 1776, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1918. As their names indicate, they were all unions "of" entities brought together through processes of federation and conquest. In the early 1980s, all three seemed like reasonably cohesive and successful societies, whose governments were relatively effective and in varying degrees accepted as legitimate, and whose peoples had strong senses of their British, American, and Soviet identities. By the early 1990s the Soviet Union was no more. By the late 1990s, the United Kingdom was becoming less united, with a new regime struggling to be born in Northern Ireland, devolution well under way in Scotland and Wales, many Scots looking forward to eventual independence, and the English increasingly defining themselves as English rather than British. The Union Jack was being disassembled into its separate crosses, and it seemed possible that sometime in the first part of the twenty-first century the United Kingdom could follow the Soviet Union into history.

Few people anticipated the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the movement toward possible

decomposition of the United Kingdom a decade before they got under way. Few Americans now anticipate the dissolution of or even fundamental changes in the United States. Yet the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 1990s East Asian economic crisis, and September 11 remind us that history is replete with surprises. The greatest surprise might be if the United States in 2025 were still much the same country it was in 2000 rather than a very different country (or countries) with very different conceptions of itself and its identity than it had a quarter century earlier.

The American people who achieved independence in the late eighteenth century were few and homogeneous: overwhelmingly white (thanks to the exclusion of blacks and Indians from citizenship), British, and Protestant, broadly sharing a common culture, and overwhelmingly committed to the political principles embodied in the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and other founding documents. By the end of the twentieth century, the number of Americans had multiplied almost one hundred times. America had become multiracial (roughly 69 percent white, 12 percent Hispanic, 12 percent black, 4 percent Asian and Pacific Islander, 3 percent other), multiethnic (with no majority ethnic group), and 63 percent Protestant, 23 percent Catholic, 8 percent other religions, and 6 percent no religion. America's common culture and principles of equality and individualism central to the American Creed were under attack by many individuals and groups in American society. The end of the Cold War deprived America of the evil empire against which it could define itself. We Americans were not what we were, and uncertain who we were becoming.

No society is immortal. As Rousseau said, "If Sparta and Rome perished, what state can hope to endure forever?" Even the most successful societies are at some point threatened by internal disintegration and decay and by more vigorous and ruthless external "barbarian" forces. In the end, the United States of America will suffer the fate of Sparta, Rome, and other human communities. Historically the substance of American identity has involved four key components: race, ethnicity, culture (most notably language and religion), and ideology. The racial and ethnic Americas are no more. Cultural America is under siege. And as the Soviet experience illustrates, ideology is a weak glue to hold together people otherwise lacking racial, ethnic, and cultural sources of community. Reasons could exist, as Robert Kaplan observed, why "America, more than any other nation, may have been born to die,"[8] Yet some societies, confronted with serious challenges to their existence, are also able to postpone their demise and halt disintegration, by renewing their sense of national identity, their national purpose, and the cultural values they have in common. Americans did this after September 11. The challenge they face in the first years of the third millennium is whether they can continue to do this if they are not under attack.

The Global Identity Crisis

America's identity problem is unique, but America is not unique in having an identity problem. Debates over national identity are a pervasive characteristic of our time. Almost everywhere people have questioned, reconsidered, and redefined what they have in common and what distinguishes them from other people: Who are we? Where do we belong? The Japanese agonize over whether their location, history, and culture make them Asian or whether their wealth, democracy, and modernity make them Western. Iran has been described as a "nation in search of an identity," South Africa as engaged in "the search for identity" and China in a "quest for national identity," while Taiwan was involved in the "dissolution and reconstruction of national identity." Syria and Brazil are each said to face an "identity crisis," Canada "a continuing identity crisis," Denmark an "acute identity crisis," Algeria a "destructive identity crisis," Turkey a "unique identity crisis" leading to heated "debate on national identity," and Russia "a profound identity crisis" reopening the classic nineteenth-century debate between Slavophiles and Westernizers as to whether Russia is a "normal" European country or a distinctly different Eurasian one. In Mexico questions are coming to the fore "about Mexico's identity." The people who had identified with different Germanies, democratic and Western European vs. communist and Eastern European, struggle to recreate a common German identity. The inhabitants of the British Isles have become less sure of their British identity and uncertain as to whether they were primarily a European or a North Atlantic people.[9] Crises of national identity have become a global phenomenon.

The identity crises of these and other countries vary in form, substance, and intensity. Undoubtedly each crisis in large part has unique causes. Yet their

During part of a day-long celebration of the 125th anniversary of the Statue of Liberty's dedication, two babies sleep while holding American flags at a naturalization ceremony 28 October 2011 for 125 new citizens on Liberty Island, New York. (Photo by Sgt. Randall. A. Clinton, U.S. Marine Corps)

simultaneous appearance in the United States and so many other countries suggests that common factors are also likely to be at work. The more general causes of these quests and questionings include the emergence of a global economy, tremendous improvements in communications and transportation, rising levels of migration, the global expansion of democracy, and the end both of the Cold War and of Soviet communism as a viable economic and political system.

Modernization, economic development, urbanization, and globalization have led people to rethink their identities and to redefine them in narrower, more intimate, communal terms. Subnational cultural and regional identities are taking precedence over broader national identities. People identify with those who are most like themselves and with whom they share a perceived common ethnicity, religion, traditions, and myth of common descent and common history. In the United States this fragmentation of identity manifested itself in the rise of multiculturalism and racial, ethnic, and gender consciousness. In other countries it takes the more extreme form of communal movements demanding political recognition, autonomy, or independence. These have included movements on behalf of Quebecois, Scots, Flemings, Catalonians, Basques, Lombards, Corsicans, Kurds, Kosovars, Berbers, Chiapans, Chechens, Palestinians, Tibetans, Muslim Mindanaoans, Christian Sudanese, Abkhazians, Tamils, Acehans, East Timorese, and others.

This narrowing of identities, however, has been paralleled by a broadening of identity as people increasingly interact with other people of very different cultures and civilizations and at the same time are able through modern means of communication to identify with people geographically distant but with similar language, religion, or culture. The emergence of a broader supranational identity has been most obvious in Europe, and its emergence there reinforces the simultaneous narrowing of identities. Scots increasingly think of themselves as Scottish rather than British because they can also think of themselves as European. Their Scottish identity is rooted in their European identity. This is equally true for Lombards, Catalonians, and others.

A related dialectic has been occurring between mixing and huddling, the interaction and separation, of communal groups. Massive migrations, both temporary and permanent, have increasingly intermingled peoples of various races and cultures: Asians and Latin Americans

coming to the United States, Arabs, Turks, Yugoslavs, Albanians entering Western Europe. As a result of modern communications and transportation, these migrants have been able to remain part of their original culture and community. Their identity is thus less that of migrants than of diasporans, that is, members of a transnational, trans-state cultural community. They both mix with other peoples and huddle with their own. For the United States, these developments mean the high levels of immigration from Mexico and elsewhere in Latin America could have quite different consequences for assimilation than previous waves of immigration.

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, nationalism was intensely promoted by intellectual, political, and, on occasion, economic elites. These elites developed sophisticated and emotionally charged appeals to generate among those whom they saw as their compatriots a sense of national identity and to rally them for nationalist causes. The last decades of the twentieth century, on the other hand, witnessed a growing denationalization of elites in many countries, as well as the United States. The emergence of a global economy and global corporations plus the ability to form transnational coalitions to promote reforms on a global basis (women's rights, the environment, land mines, human rights, small arms) led many elites to develop supranational identities and to downgrade their national identities. Previously, mobile individuals pursued their careers and fortunes within a country by moving from farms to cities and from one city to another. Now they increasingly move from one country to another, and just as intracountry mobility decreased their identity with any particular locale within that country, so their intercountry mobility decreases their identity with any particular country. They become binational, multinational, or cosmopolitan.

In the early stage of European nationalism, national identity was often defined primarily in religious terms. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, nationalist ideologies became largely secular. Germans, British, French, and others defined themselves increasingly in terms of ancestry, language, or culture, rather than religion, which often would have divided their societies. In the twentieth century, people in Western countries (with the notable exception of the United States) generally became secularized, and churches and religion played decreasing roles in public, social, and private life.

The twenty-first century, however, is dawning as a century of religion. Virtually everywhere, apart from Western Europe, people are turning to religion for comfort, guidance, solace, and identity. "La revanche

de Dieu," as Gilles Kepel termed it, is in full swing.[10] Violence between religious groups is proliferating around the world. People are increasingly concerned with the fate of geographically remote co-religionists. In many countries powerful movements have appeared attempting to redefine the identity of their country in religious terms. In a very different way, movements in the United States are recalling America's religious origins and the extraordinary commitment to religion of the American people. Evangelical Christianity has become an important force, and Americans generally may be returning to the self-image prevalent for three centuries that they are a Christian people.

The last quarter of the twentieth century saw transitions from authoritarian to democratic regimes in more than fifty countries scattered throughout the world. It also witnessed efforts to broaden and deepen democracy in the United States and other developed countries. Individual authoritarian governments may rule and often have ruled over people of diverse nationalities and cultures. Democracy, on the other hand, means that at a minimum people choose their rulers and that more broadly they participate in government in other ways. The question of identity thus becomes central: Who are the people? As Ivor Jennings observed, "the people cannot decide until someone decides who are the people."[11] The decision as to who are the people may be the result of long-standing tradition, war and conquest, plebiscite or referendum, constitutional provision, or other causes, but it cannot be avoided. Debates over how to define that identity, who is a citizen and who is not, come to the fore when autocracies democratize and when democracies confront many new claimants on citizenship.

Historically, the emergence of nation-states in Europe was the result of several centuries of recurring wars. "War made the state, and the state made war," as Charles Tilly said.[12] These wars also made it possible and necessary for states to generate national consciousness among their peoples. The primary function of the state was to create and defend the nation, and the need to perform that function justified the expansion of state authority and the establishment of military forces, bureaucracies, and effective tax systems. Two world wars and a cold war reinforced these trends in the twentieth century. By the end of that century, however, the Cold War was over, and interstate wars had become rare; in one estimate only seven of one hundred and ten wars between 1989 and

Muslims socialize after Eid al-Adha prayers 21 October 2013 at Valley Stream Park, Long Island, New York. (Time-lapse photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

1999 were not civil wars.[13] War is now more often the breaker of states than the maker of states. More generally, the erosion of the national security function reduced the authority of states and the reason for people to identify with their state, and instead promoted identification with subnational and transnational groups.

The relative significance of national identity has varied among cultures. In the Muslim world, the distribution of identities has tended to be U-shaped: the strongest identities and commitments have been to family, clan, and tribe, at one extreme, and to Islam and the *ummah* or Islamic community, at the other. With a few exceptions, loyalties to nations and nation-states have been weak. In the Western world for over two centuries, in contrast, the identity curve has been more an upside-down U, with the nation at the apex commanding deeper loyalty and commitment than narrower or broader sources of identity. Now, however, that may be changing, with transnational and subnational identities gaining salience and the European and American patterns flattening and coming more to resemble the Muslim one. The notions of nation, national identity, and national interest may be losing relevance and usefulness. If this is the case, the question becomes: What, if anything, will replace them and what does that mean for the United States? If this is not the case and national identity is still relevant, the question then becomes: What are the implications for America of changes in the content of its national identity?

Prospects for American Identity

The relative importance of the components of national identity and the salience of national identity compared to the other identities have varied over the years. In the last half of the eighteenth century the peoples of the colonies and states developed a common American identity that coexisted with other, primarily state and local, identities. The struggles first with Britain, then France, and then again Britain strengthened this sense of Americans as a single people. After 1815 the threats to the nation's security disappeared, and the salience of national identity declined. Sectional and economic identities emerged and increasingly divided the country, leading to the Civil War. That war solidified America as a nation by the end of the nineteenth century. American nationalism became preeminent as the United States emerged on the world scene and in the following century fought two world wars and a cold war.

The ethnic component of American identity gradually weakened as a result of the assimilation of the Irish and Germans who came in the mid-nineteenth century and the southern and eastern Europeans who came between 1880 and 1914. The racial component was first marginally weakened by the outcome of the Civil War and then drastically eroded by the civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s. In the following decades, America's core Anglo-Protestant culture and its political Creed of liberty and democracy faced four challenges.

First, the dissolution of the Soviet Union eliminated one major and obvious threat to American security and hence reduced the salience of national identity compared to subnational, transnational, binational, and other-national identities. Historical experience and sociological analysis show that the absence of an external "other" is likely to undermine unity and breed divisions within a society. It is problematic whether intermittent terrorist attacks and conflicts with Iraq or other "rogue states" will generate the national coherence that twentieth-century wars did.

Second, the ideologies of multiculturalism and diversity eroded the legitimacy of the remaining central elements of American identity, the cultural core and the American Creed. President Clinton explicitly set forth this challenge when he said that America needed a third "great revolution" (in addition to *the* American Revolution and the civil rights revolution) to "prove that we literally can live without having a dominant European culture."[14] Attacks on that culture undermined the Creed that it produced, and were reflected in the various movements promoting group rights against individual rights.

Third, America's third major wave of immigration that began in the 1960s brought to America people primarily from Latin America and Asia rather than Europe as the previous waves did. The culture and values of their countries of origin often differ substantially from those prevalent in America. It is much easier for these immigrants to retain contact with and to remain culturally part of their country of origin. Earlier waves of immigrants were subjected to intense programs of Americanization to assimilate them into American society. Nothing comparable occurred after 1965. In the past, assimilation was greatly facilitated because both waves substantially tapered off due to the Civil War, World War I, and laws limiting immigration. The current wave continues unabated. The erosion of other national loyalties and the assimilation of recent

immigrants could be much slower and more problematic than assimilation has been in the past.

Fourth, never before in American history has close to a majority of immigrants spoken a single non-English language. The impact of the predominance of Spanish-speaking immigrants is reinforced by many other factors: the proximity of their countries of origin; their absolute numbers; the improbability of this flow ending or being significantly reduced; their geographical concentration; their home government policies promoting their migration and influence in American society and politics; the support of many elite Americans for multiculturalism, diversity, bilingual education, and affirmative action; the economic incentives for American businesses to cater to Hispanic tastes, use Spanish in their business and advertising, and hire Spanish-speaking employees; the pressures to use Spanish as well as English in government signs, forms, reports, and offices.

The elimination of the racial and ethnic components of national identity and the challenges to its cultural and creedal components raise questions concerning the prospects for American identity. At least four possible future identities exist: ideological, bifurcated, exclusivist, and cultural. The America of the future is in reality likely to be a mixture of these and other possible identities.

First, America could lose its core culture, as President Clinton anticipated, and become multicultural. Yet Americans could also retain their commitment to the principles of the Creed, which would provide an ideological or political base for national unity and identity. Many people, particularly liberals, favor this alternative. It assumes, however, that a nation can be based on only a political contract among individuals lacking any other commonality. This is the classic Enlightenment-based, civic concept of a nation. History and psychology, however, suggest that it is unlikely to be enough to sustain a nation for long. America with only the Creed as a basis for unity could soon evolve into a loose confederation of ethnic, racial, cultural, and political groups, with little or nothing in common apart from their location in the territory of what had been the United States of America. This could resemble the collections of diverse groups that once constituted the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and Russian empires. These conglomerations were held together by the emperor and his bureaucracy. What central institutions, however, would hold together a loose American assemblage of groups? As the experiences of America in the 1780s and Germany in the 1860s suggest, past confederations normally have not lasted long.

Second, the massive Hispanic immigration after 1965 could make America increasingly bifurcated in terms of language (English and Spanish) and culture (Anglo and Hispanic), which could supplement or supplant the black-white racial bifurcation as the most important division in American society. Substantial parts of America, primarily in southern Florida and the Southwest, would be primarily Hispanic in culture and language, while

both cultures and languages would coexist in the rest of America. America, in short, would lose its cultural and linguistic unity and become a bilingual, bicultural society like Canada, Switzerland, or Belgium.

Third, the various forces challenging the core American culture and Creed could generate a move by native white Americans to revive the discarded and discredited racial and ethnic concepts of American identity and to create an America that would exclude, expel, or suppress people of other racial, ethnic, and cultural groups. Historical and contemporary experience suggest that this is a highly probable reaction from a once dominant ethnic-racial group that feels threatened by the rise of other groups. It could produce a racially intolerant country with high levels of intergroup conflict.

Fourth, Americans of all races and ethnicities could attempt to reinvigorate their core culture. This would mean a recommitment to America as a deeply religious and primarily Christian country, encompassing several religious minorities, adhering to Anglo-Protestant values, speaking English, maintaining its European cultural heritage, and committed to the principles of the Creed. Religion has been and still is a central, perhaps the central, element of American identity. America was founded in large part for religious reasons, and religious movements have shaped its evolution for almost four centuries. By every indicator, Americans are far more religious than the people of other industrialized countries. Overwhelming majorities of white Americans, of black Americans, and of Hispanic Americans are Christian. In a world in which culture and particularly religion shape the allegiances, the alliances, and the antagonisms of people on every continent, Americans could again find their national identity and their national purposes in their culture and religion. ■

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Refugees walk from Syria into Akçakale, Sanliurfa Province, southeastern Turkey, 14 June 2015 after breaking through a border fence. The mass displacement of Syrians came as Kurdish fighters announced they were making headway toward the city of Tal Abyad, a stronghold of the Islamic State near the Turkish border. (Photo by Lefteris Pitarakis, Associated Press)

Migration as a Weapon in Theory and in Practice

Dr. Kelly M. Greenhill

Editor's note: This article is adapted in part from Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion and Foreign Policy *by Kelly M. Greenhill. © 2010 by Cornell University. It is used by permission of the publisher, Cornell University Press.*

In late March 2016, ambassadors from the twenty-eight European Union (EU) member states concluded what was supposed to be a secret deal to curtail further in-migration with leaders of eight countries in the Horn of Africa. They were responding to mounting fears and anxiety within the EU about the migration crisis that brought more than one million people to Europe in 2015 alone. In exchange for a promise to help stanch unregulated flows of people to Europe, the EU agreed to provide the African countries with about $50 million in monetary and in-kind aid and equipment over the following three years.[1]

This deal followed closely on the heels of far more broadly publicized migration deal between the EU

and Turkey, which was concluded, as one observer put it, "with EU policymakers' backs seemingly against the wall, and in an atmosphere of palpable panic."[2] In exchange for permitting Greece to return to Turkey all irregular migrants arriving after 20 March 2016, the EU agreed to assist the regime of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in meeting the mounting burden of hosting approximately three million refugees via provision of more than €6 billion in aid and increased resettlement of Syrian refugees residing in Turkey.[3] The EU also agreed to accelerate visa liberalization for Turkish nationals and to "reenergize" previously moribund talks on Turkish EU membership, both of which Turkey had been seeking for years without success.[4] Conclusion of the EU–Turkey deal followed a series of threats by Turkish officials that effectively amounted to, "We're tired of waiting. Either concede to our array of demands or face the migration-related consequences of failing to do so."[5]

The exploitation of refugees and migrants, which we might politely refer to as foreign-policy bargaining chips—and less politely, as coercive weapons—is neither new nor novel. Moreover, neither is target state vulnerability to this unconventional brand of nonmilitary coercion.

Although widely popular with some segments of society within EU member states, both migration deals have been widely criticized as inhumane, immoral, and possibly illegal, particularly in light of creeping authoritarianism within Turkey and the fact that parties to the Horn of Africa deal include despots such as Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, a leader who has been indicted by the International Criminal Court on charges that he directed a campaign of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and other crimes against humanity during the country's Darfur conflict.[6]

Arguably more important, however, is that in addition to lambasting these deals on their own terms, critics have expressed concerns about what precedents might be set by these seemingly Faustian bargains and what these deals may portend for the future of refugee protection more generally. Concerns about the future security and stability of the regimes that host refugees are indisputably valid, especially given recent developments in this regard in Australia, in certain EU member states, and beyond.[7] However, future-focused claims about the precedents that might be set by these "new" migration deals are curiously and potentially dangerously ahistorical. This is because in point of fact the exploitation of refugees and migrants, which we might politely refer to as foreign-policy bargaining chips—and less politely, as coercive weapons—is neither new nor novel. Moreover, neither is target state vulnerability to this unconventional brand of nonmilitary coercion, a fact that carries significant operational and policy implications.

Mass Migration as a Weapon

Indeed, as illustrated in detail in my 2010 book, *Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion and Foreign Policy*, using displaced people as nonmilitary instruments of state-level coercion has long been a common feature of international politics.[8] In fact, this frequently asymmetric brand of coercion—i.e., *coercive engineered migration* (CEM)—has been attempted at least seventy-five times since the advent of the *1951 Refugee Convention* alone; that is at least one per year on average.[9] In that time, CEM has been undertaken by dozens of discrete state and nonstate challengers against at least as many disparate targets and, by extension, against an equally large number of victimized groups of displaced people.

Sometimes the coercive weaponization of population movements has simply comprised threats to generate outflows, such as former Libyan leader Mu'ammar Gaddhafi's recurrent, colorful, and rather dramatic promises to "turn Europe black" if the EU failed to meet his demands. Gaddhafi used this tool with varying degrees of success in 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010, before fatally overplaying his hand in 2011. Although the EU/NATO intervention in Libya that year was not primarily driven by this unique brand of coercion, Gaddhafi aggressively employed it against the interveners. He used

it first as an instrument of deterrence in the form of threats against EU officials in the earliest days of the uprising, and later as an instrument of compellence against nearby NATO member states, after the bombing campaign had commenced and the civil war had erupted.[10]

In other instances, coercion has entailed forcing large numbers of victims across borders, as then Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic did in the spring of 1999 in an attempt first to deter and then to compel NATO to stop its bombing campaign during the Kosovo War. Former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer later admitted his regret in not taking Milosevic seriously when he said he "could empty Kosovo in a week." Thus, while NATO was seeking to compel Milosevic to cease his offensive against the Kosovars through the use of air strikes, Milosevic was engaged in his own intensive game of countercoercion against NATO and its allies. However, displaced people, rather than bombs, were his political and military weapons of choice.[11] Although details remain somewhat sketchy at this point, evidence suggests the Syrian regime employed this tool as an instrument of deterrence against one or more of its neighbors at the start of the ongoing civil war.[12]

On still other occasions, coercers have merely opened (and later closed) borders that are normally sealed. One such example is former Cuban President Fidel Castro, who used this tool against the United States on at least three occasions: in 1965, 1994, and, most famously, during the Mariel boat lift of 1980.[13] In still other cases, coercion has been effected by exploiting and manipulating outflows created by others, whether intentionally or inadvertently. This was the case in the late 1970s when a group of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states threatened to push Indochinese boat people out to sea, where they would likely drown, if the group's demands were not met. The aforementioned case of Turkey is another clear example.

Success or Failure of Coercive Engineered Migration

Operationally speaking, CEM is a "coercion by punishment" strategy. Challengers aim to create domestic conflict, public dissatisfaction, or both, within the target state in an attempt to convince its leadership to concede to the challenger's demands rather than incur the anticipated (domestic or international) political costs of resistance.[14] As is the case with terrorism and strategic bombing—also coercion by punishment strategies—the principal targets (namely, states) tend not to be synonymous with the principal victims (the displaced themselves).

There are two distinct but not mutually exclusive pathways by which CEM can be effected using punishment strategies; loosely speaking, they might be thought of as "capacity swamping" and "political agitating." Simply put, swamping focuses on manipulating the *ability* of targets to accept, accommodate, and assimilate a given group of migrants or refugees, while agitating focuses on manipulating the *willingness* of targets to do so. In both swamping and agitating, coercion is effectively a dynamic, two-level game in which target responses on the international level to threats issued or actions taken by challengers tend to be driven by simultaneous (or subsequent) actions taken by actors within the target state.[15] Somewhat paradoxically, evidence suggests the *objective dangers* posed to targets tend to be greater in the case of swamping, but the *probability of coercive success* tends to be greater in the case of agitating.

In the developing world, coercive attempts most often focus on swamping and comprise threats to severely tax or overwhelm a target's physical or economic capacity to cope with an influx—thereby effectively debilitating it—if it fails to concede to the coercer's demands.[16] Challengers anticipate that, in locations where ethnic tensions may already be elevated and where the

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extension of central government control may be compromised even at the best of times, where essential resources are limited and consensus on the legitimacy of the political regime is shaky at best, a large influx can present a real and persuasive threat. For instance, in early 2014, Russia threatened to expel many of its Central Asian guest workers if those states supported the United Nations resolution condemning the annexation of Crimea.[17] (Support of said resolution was not forthcoming.)

Capacity swamping can also be an effective strategy in the developed world, or "the West," broadly defined. This is particularly true if the incipient crisis is large and sudden, since even highly industrialized states need time to gear up to effectively deal with disasters, be they natural or manmade, as the ongoing European migration crisis dramatically illustrates.[18] That said, advanced industrial societies tend to have greater resources they can bring to bear in a crisis, making it much more difficult—if not impossible—to overwhelm their physical ability to cope with such an exigency.

In the developed world, therefore, political agitating often supplants capacity swamping as the linchpin of coercion. Challengers on the international level seek to influence target behavior on the domestic level by engaging in a kind of norms-enhanced political blackmail that relies on *exploiting* and *exacerbating* what Robert Putnam has called the "heterogeneity" of political and social interests within polities.[19] Exploitation of heterogeneity within Western states is possible because population influxes, such as those created in migration and refugee crises, tend to engender diverse and highly divisive responses within the societies expected to bear the brunt of their consequences, as electoral campaign rhetoric both at home and abroad makes clear. As Marc Rosenblum puts it, "efforts to bend immigration policy to the national interest compete with pluralistic policy demands originating at the party, subnational (local and state), and sector- or class-specific levels."[20] Like immigration and refugee policy more generally, real and threatened migration crises tend to split societies into (at least) two mutually exclusive and often highly mobilized groups: the pro-refugee/migrant camp and the anti-refugee/migrant camp.

What it means to be pro- or anti-refugee/migrant will perforce vary across targets and across crises. Depending on circumstances, pro-refugee/migrant camps may call for relatively limited, short-term responses, such as accepting financial responsibility for settling the migrant or refugee group in a third country, or far more significant—even permanent—commitments, like offering asylum or citizenship. Conversely, anti-refugee/migrant groups may demand that requests for financial assistance be rejected or, more radically, that migrants be interdicted, refugees refused asylum, or even, in extreme cases, forcibly repatriated.

The bottom line is that because targets cannot simultaneously satisfy demands both to accept and reject a given group of migrants or refugees, leaders facing highly mobilized and highly polarized interests on both sides of the divide can find themselves on the horns of a real dilemma in which it is impossible to satisfy the demands of one camp without alienating the other. Thus, it is not heterogeneity per se that makes targets vulnerable. Instead, strategies of political agitation can succeed because these two competing groups tend to have mutually incompatible interests that they may be highly committed to defending, and target leaderships may have compelling political, legal, or moral reasons to avoid conflicting with either group.

Under such conditions, leaders may face strong domestic incentives to concede to coercers' international-level demands—particularly if doing so can make real or potential migration crises cease or disappear, thereby freeing target leaderships from the proverbial trap between a rock and a hard place. As Marco Scalvini aptly put it in the middle of the 2011 Libyan crisis, after Gaddhafi had once more threatened to "turn Europe black," "the anxiety over a refugee invasion from Africa reveals the contradictions present in Europe today, where, on the one hand, the moral imperative of universal emancipation is proclaimed, but on the other, policies and practice continue the trend of refusing a safe haven to the very refugees they have helped to create."[21]

In short, challengers aim to influence targets by what is, in traditional coercion, known as *force majeure*—a choice dictated by overwhelming circumstances. Targets of course always have a choice, but one that is skewed if they believe the consequences of noncompliance will be a denial of future choices.[22] Thus, coercers seek to narrow a target's range of domestic policy responses to an outflow such that concession begins to appear more attractive, at least relative to the possibility that the future will hold fewer, still less-auspicious choices. This is not to suggest that concession is cost-free, only that, in the face of a



Figure 1. Relative Power of Challengers and Target States



Figure 2. Target States by Regime Type

threatened or mounting crisis, the anticipation of future pain and mounting costs has to be weighed against the costs and opportunities associated with ending the crisis immediately by conceding to the challenger's demands.

As the aforementioned examples might suggest, this kind of coercion is most often employed by the relatively weak (in terms of power and capabilities) against the relatively strong, as figure 1 indicates.

Of the seventy-five cases analyzed, the vast majority of targets of CEM have been liberal democracies, while the vast majority of coercers have not only been weak but also disproportionately illiberal, as figure 2 illustrates. Why we have likely witnessed this distribution of coercers and targets is explored in detail in the section that follows.

In sum, in traditional military coercion, the aim is to achieve political goals "on the cheap." In CEM, by contrast, the general aim for weak actors is to achieve political goals that would be utterly unattainable through military means or, in a more limited number of cases, for powerful actors to achieve aims wherein the use of military force would be too costly or potentially escalatory, and hence, dangerous.[23] For instance, the idea that states such as Cuba, Haiti, and Mexico could successfully coerce their neighbor, the United States, with the threat of military force is absurd. But doing so via the tacit or explicit threat of demographic bombs is a different story. Indeed, Castro successfully coerced the United States to the negotiating table three times using this tool, most famously during the 1980 Mariel boatlift, but also in 1965 and, most significantly, in 1994–1995. Some have argued that the current Castro regime is even now gearing up again as the country moves towards normalization with the United States.[24]

Coercive Engineered Migration as an Attractive (Asymmetric) Means of Influence

Research on negotiating strategies of the (relatively) weak has revealed that weak state and nonstate actors often view crisis generation as a necessary precursor to negotiations with their more powerful counterparts,

who tend to be reluctant to yield concessions and even to negotiate with weaker challengers absent crisis-generating incentives.[25] As Thomas Schelling put it, "'If I say, 'Row, or I'll tip the boat over and drown us both,' you'll say you don't believe me. But if I rock the boat so that it may tip over, you'll be more impressed … To make it work, I must really put the boat in jeopardy; just saying that I may turn us both over is unconvincing."[26]

Mu'ammar Gaddhafi attends the 12th African Union Summit 2 February 2009 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Gaddhafi frequently threatened to use Libya as a conduit for massive illegal immigration into Europe as leverage for attaining policy goals. (Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Jesse B. Awalt, U.S. Navy)

Crisis generation offers relatively weak actors a tried-and-true strategy for both overcoming powerful actors' reluctance to negotiate and leveling the playing field. It is one of the few areas in which weak, and even internationally illegitimate, actors may possess relative strength vis-à-vis more powerful target states, and certainly—in the case of migration crises—also vis-à-vis their even weaker domestic victims.[27] After intentionally generating crises, weak actors can offer to make them disappear in exchange for military, financial, or political payoffs. Indeed, international negotiators routinely report recognizable patterns of "drama and catastrophe" when dealing with particular international actors.[28]

In the face of such catastrophes, overlapping bargaining space may develop rapidly where before there was none. Indeed, strong actors who were previously unwilling to even talk to, much less negotiate with, their weaker counterparts will often abruptly temper or reverse positions in the face of clear and present crises. As one migration scholar bluntly put it, "Sending nations can sometimes structure emigration so that receiving states are very likely to respond with inconsistent administrative action," which can then be used as a lever against those who had "in effect brushed [them] off" previously.[29]

Consequently, migration crisis generation can help enhance weak actors' credibility, increase the potency of their threats, and improve their coercive capabilities in several different ways.[30] For one thing, under certain conditions, migration crises may permit weak challengers to inflict punishment upon targets disproportionate to the costs of compliance. Although targets may be understandably reluctant to concede before an event occurs, quite often demands that were unacceptable at the outset may begin to appear nominal compared with the costs of managing sustained, large-scale outflows into the indefinite future, as the EU, like many targets before it, is in the process of discovering as of this writing. Consider that, unlike a bombing sortie, which may be profoundly damaging but is perforce finite, a migration crisis can be, as noted above, "a gift that keeps on giving."

Therefore, not only are the reputational barriers to resorting to such norms-violating tactics lower, but the bargaining advantages of doing so are also far greater.

In addition, because in-kind retaliation is rarely an option for targets—and alternate responses may also be problematic—coercers using CEM may achieve a kind of escalation dominance over potential targets.[31] For instance, launching a war to counter outflows may be an option in certain circumstances, but often the expected costs associated with escalation to that level

far exceed the expected costs of conceding in whole or in part. For instance, as disconcerting as West German leaders found the periodic inflows of large numbers of Eastern bloc refugees, neither they nor their NATO allies were ever going to be willing to risk starting World War III by taking retaliatory military action against East Germany.[32] Likewise, if a coercer is already internationally isolated, the methods short of war that powerful states may employ in response may be slow-acting—e.g., sanctions—and thus inappropriate as a method of counter-coercion during a crisis. And, war itself can be a risky option. Conflicts are costly, and their outcomes are uncertain.[33]

Simply put, in traditional military coercion, potential adversaries tend to be deterred from even attempting coercion unless they possess superior military capabilities that can protect them from retaliation. However, in the case of CEM, coercers are frequently undeterred by their targets' military superiority, because retaliation is only rarely a politically feasible option. This is because targets generally value the issues at hand less than do the coercers, who tend to be highly dissatisfied with the status quo and more resolved than their targets. This makes sense in that coercers are often fighting for their very political survival, whereas for targets the issues at hand tend to be of more limited importance.[34]

Moreover, compared with more conventional military operations, catalyzing out-migrations is usually relatively cheap, particularly as the number of troops required is frequently small, and the manpower necessary to effect population displacement need not be highly trained or well equipped.[35] Inducing mass migration does not rely on direct combat, but rather on the expectations associated with the demonstrative capacity of the violence that can be brought to bear. Sometimes no force need be used at all; the fear of future violence may be sufficient to cause people to flee.[36]

Furthermore, because of the widespread belief that liberal democracies possess particular characteristics that make them and their leaders behave differently than those in other regime types, "fellow liberals benefit from a presumption of amity; nonliberals suffer from a presumption of enmity."[37] Hence, illiberal actors—already viewed with suspicion and contempt by the most powerful members of the international community—have little left to lose should they choose to abrogate the norms associated with the generation of migration crises. In short, nondemocratic, "illegitimate" states and nonstate actors face a double whammy: few are strong enough to impel their strong counterparts to take them seriously under normal conditions, and still fewer are likely to be trusted to negotiate in an above the board manner. Therefore, not only are the reputational barriers to resorting to such norms-violating tactics lower, but the bargaining advantages of doing so are far greater. Hence, this kind of coercion can be an attractive method of influence for those with limited resources and few other options at their disposal. Consequently, it is unsurprising that the vast majority of would-be coercers have been weaker in capabilities terms than their targets.

In terms of the obvious exceptions—namely, those cases where strong or democratic actors have employed this tool—coercers' goals have usually been the achievement of political goals at lower cost than they could possibly have been achieved through military means. While John F. Kennedy's administration was understandably reluctant to use force to influence Soviet behavior vis-à-vis Berlin in the early 1960s, U.S. officials—at the very least—entertained the idea of using CEM to "encourage" greater cooperation from Moscow.[38] And, more recently, Iran's episodic threats to expel Afghan refugees to influence Afghan government behavior have surely appeared less problematical and potentially less costly than engaging in overt military operations in furtherance of the same political goals.[39]

Coercers' Objectives and Rates of Success

As is the case with traditional military coercion, challengers' demands have been highly varied in scope, content, and magnitude. As the discussion above suggests, demands have been both concrete and symbolic and have comprised entreaties to undertake actions or to cease undertaking them (compellence) as well as to eschew taking them at all (deterrence). Demands have run the gamut from the simple provision of financial aid, to the termination of insurgent funding, to full-scale military intervention, and even to regime change. Broadly speaking, we can usefully divide these myriad objectives into three key (and nonmutually

exclusive) categories: political goals, military goals, and economic goals. As figure 3 indicates, more than 60 percent of seventy-five coercive attempts have been driven by political objectives, about 30 percent by military objectives, and approximately 50 percent by economic objectives. That the sum of these three sets of objectives is greater than 100 percent makes clear that numerous coercers have sought multiple, often disparate objectives.

Moreover, in their coercive attempts, challengers have also been relatively successful on their own terms and in comparison to their more powerful counterparts.[40] Success in this context is defined as persuading a target to change a previously articulated policy, stopping or reversing an action already undertaken, or disbursing side payments, in line with a challenger's demands; in other words, most of a challenger's demands were met. A case is coded as a "success" if most or all of the challenger's known objectives were achieved and as a "partial success" if the challenger achieved a significant fraction, but not all, of its aims. If few or none of the challenger's objectives were achieved—or were achieved for what appear to be exogenous reasons—the case is coded as a "failure." Finally, a case is coded as "indeterminate" if the challenger achieved at least some of its objectives, but causality is unclear; if there is insufficient evidence to conclude that coercion was in the end attempted; or if threats were issued, but a crisis never materialized, and it remains unclear whether or not the challenger's demands were met. (Indeterminate cases are excluded from aggregate assessments of coercive success and failure.)



Figure 3. Distribution of Coercers' Objectives

Overall, challengers have achieved at least some of their objectives about 74 percent of the time. If one imposes a stricter measure of success and excludes partial

successes, coercers have gotten more or less everything they reportedly sought 57 percent of the time.[41] While rather more modest, this more restrictive rate is comparable to some of the best-case estimates of deterrence success (ca. 57 percent), and substantially greater than best estimates of the success of economic sanctions (ca. 33 percent) or U.S. coercive diplomacy efforts (between 19 and 37.5 percent).[42]

Disaggregating CEM into exercises of compellence and deterrence reveals that the vast majority of the seventy-five to eighty-six heretofore-documented cases of CEM have been exercises in compellence; the remaining cases have comprised exercises combining crisis deterrence and compellence and crisis deterrence alone.[43] While deterrence attempts are in the aggregate successful at rates akin to U.S. coercive diplomacy (40 percent partial plus complete success; 20 percent complete success), compellence-only attempts have on average yielded rates significantly higher than CEM as a whole (78 percent partial plus complete success; 63 percent complete success).

Target Defenses and Evasive Actions

The previous discussion notwithstanding, however, migration-driven coercion is no superweapon. The political and military risks associated with its employment can be enormously high, even fatal, as, for instance, Gaddhafi discovered when he fatally overplayed his hand in 2011 after a series of successful uses of CEM throughout the 2000s.[44] The reputational costs of weaponizing innocent people to effect state-level coercion can also be great, as can be the international opprobrium incurred following such uses. Thus, it is hardly surprising that the vast majority of documented coercers have been highly committed but relatively weak (relative to their targets) illiberal actors. Even so, it is rarely a weapon of first resort for several distinct reasons.

First, challengers may ultimately catalyze larger crises than they anticipate or desire, and massive outflows can destabilize both states of origin and destination.[45] Fears of just such a collapse, for instance, led to the construction of the Berlin Wall in the early 1960s.[46]

Second, once a crisis has been initiated, challengers often lose (some degree of) control over it, in no small part because engineered migration-related "cleansing" operations may be carried out by irregulars, or even bands of thugs, who lack discipline and whose objectives may not be synonymous with those who instigated an outflow. Likewise, migrants and refugees of course have agency, and once they find themselves outside the sending state, they are frequently capable of autonomous actions. For example, they might move in different directions and do so in smaller or larger numbers than the challenger desires. When this happens, an outflow can become more like an unguided missile than a smart bomb, thus making coercing a particular target more difficult.

Third, as Schelling has argued, "the ideal compellent action would be one that, once initiated, causes minimal harm if compliance is forthcoming and great harm if compliance is not forthcoming."[47] However, while migration and refugee movements, once initiated, can be stopped, under certain conditions, they can be difficult to undo. As such, threats of further escalation can be quite persuasive, but promises of minimal harm in the face of compliance can be difficult to keep, potentially reducing the value of concession for targets.

Fourth, the potential for blowback can be great, and the intended consequences thereof quite costly. For instance, not only did the U.S.-instigated mass migration of North Vietnamese southward following the First Indochina War fail to achieve its stated objective of deterring Ho Chi Minh from pushing for reunification elections, but it also inadvertently further weakened the sitting regime in South Vietnam while simultaneously increasing U.S. commitment to propping it up.[48]

Moreover, coercion is not a one-sided game, and targets are not without recourse. Although, due to their generally liberal democratic nature, the majority of targets are constrained from responding in kind by launching flows of their own. However, many do find ways to fight back and to resist, sometimes successfully. Three responses in particular warrant mention. First, under certain conditions, targets can "externalize," outsource, or simply pass on the visible (and politically costly) consequences of migration crises to others, thereby skirting successful coercion by persuading third parties to warehouse, host, or even assimilate the unwanted group.[49] Transferring responsibility is not always an option, however, particularly if the displaced are already inside the target state or if other potential host or asylum states themselves fear the destabilizing consequences of an influx. Second, some target governments manage



Figure 4. Change over Time in Target Distribution and Frequency

to navigate the political shoals represented by their constituents' mutually incompatible interests, either by assuaging one or another camp through the use of side payments or by changing mobilized actors' minds about the undesirability of a given migrant or refugee group through issue redefinition. In other words, leaders may succeed in shifting domestic perceptions of the expected costs or benefits associated with a particular influx.[50] Third, targets may successfully threaten to launch—or actually do launch—military action to forestall or stop outflows at the source. Indeed, sometimes they even use the threat of hypothetical outflows to justify military actions they wish to take for other reasons. Sometimes targets simply convincingly threaten other actions that convince challengers to back down or end an outflow. When evasion succeeds, coercion will fail, or at least be less successful than challengers may have hoped.

Coercion can also fail because of missteps by challengers, some of which may also be successfully manipulated by targets. For instance, although such cases appear to be relatively unusual, attempted migration-driven coercion may unify the target's population, rather than polarize it. Similarly, if a group of migrants or refugees—previously viewed with skepticism or hostility—is effectively recast as the victim of gross human rights abuses and worthy of protection, mobilized opposition may evaporate, and with it, the possibility of successful coercion.[51] This is a key point, which reinforces the fact of the dynamic nature of this coercive, two-level game. More broadly, whenever there are significant downward shifts in the level of mobilization of (and degree of polarization between) pro- or anti-refugee camps over time, coercion is likely to fail.

Nevertheless, as we have now seen, migration-driven coercive attempts occur on average at least once a year, and, on average, they are relatively successful when undertaken, particularly against liberal democratic targets. This is particularly true in the domain of compellence, which comprises the vast majority of cases of CEM. At the same time, as figure 4 suggests, even if the United States' relative popularity as a target is currently ebbing, overall the average number of cases per year may be creeping upward (although these apparent trends may not endure). In sum, while not a tool of first resort, under the right circumstances, CEM can grant the last word to those who employ it.

Conclusions

Coercion is generally understood to refer to the practice of inducing or preventing changes in political behavior using threats, intimidation, or some other form of pressure—most commonly, military force. Coercion-driven migrations, or coercive engineered migrations, by extension, are those real or threatened cross-border population movements that are deliberately created or manipulated as instruments of deterrence or compellence in order to prevent or induce changes in political behavior, or to extract political, military, and economic concessions from a target state or states. As the above discussion should make clear, CEMs are generally used as a means to achieve objectives in other policy arenas *and* to counter threats by adversaries to inflict costs and punishment using means other than migration.

Conventional wisdom suggests this kind of coercion is rare at best; indeed, some observers erroneously appear to believe Turkey in 2016 was the first time we have seen it in action. Yet, not only is this kind of coercion attempted far more frequently than the accepted wisdom would suggest, but it also tends to succeed far more often than capabilities-based theories would predict, especially in the realm of compellence, its most common manifestation. Thus, a greater appreciation for the frequency of its employment, the actors who resort to it and why, and what potential targets can do to protect themselves and the true victims of this kind of coercion—the displaced themselves—is imperative, from both policy and field operational standpoints. Such an imperative is particularly acute at a time when more people than ever have been forcibly displaced—65.3 million around the world as of this writing, a figure that enterprising, capable, and opportunistic coercers are likely to push higher.[52]

If there is a silver lining in this account, it is that while many observers have underappreciated the significance of this kind of coercion, thankfully the same cannot necessarily be said for target states, particularly those that have been targeted multiple times. For example, U.S. national intelligence estimates have long included warnings of U.S. vulnerability to this kind of coercion and have recommended taking steps to guard against future predation. Similarly, Australia shut down its so-called "Pacific Solution," at least for a time, in no small part to guard itself against future coercive attempts by the tiny island of Nauru.[53] Likewise, in 2003 alone, the EU committed to spending €400 million to increase border security, at least in part to deter future migration-driven coercion, and some have argued that Gaddhafi was deposed in no small part to prevent further recidivism by the North African nation. (However, it has since become clear that getting rid of Gaddhafi did not destroy Libyan incentives to target the EU, and indeed the Europeans have been targeted by *both* competing government entities in Libya subsequent to Gaddhafi's ouster.)[54]

As far as China and its sometimes volatile next-door neighbor go, in 2006, the Chinese constructed a fence along part of its border with North Korea to impede cross-border movements. In 2014, the Chinese produced a (now-leaked) military plan for dealing with potential migration-related fallout in the event of a threatened or actual collapse.[55] Additionally, some states, including China, the United States, and Italy, regularly conduct military exercises designed to leave them better prepared to respond to potential massive influxes across their borders.[56]

In the case of the United States and Cuba, the normalization of relations may materially reduce the probability of future coercive attempts, but the situation at present remains very much in flux. How things will develop in the months and years to come is an open question, and some argue low-intensity nods towards coercion are underway even as this piece goes to press.[57]

Further, the political and national security implications of strategically engineered migrations extend far beyond the politically charged realms of immigration, asylum, and border security policy—and not simply because coercers' objectives extend to domains far beyond migration. Indeed, it has been suggested that the unspontaneous "flood of refugees from East to West Germany in 1989 … helped to bring down the Berlin Wall, expedited the unification of the two German states, and generated the most significant transformation in international relations since World War II."[58] In the here and now, some have suggested, the ongoing European migration crisis may presage or even catalyze the collapse of the EU.[59]

Migration and refugee flows have likewise been identified as one of the most significant causes of armed conflict in the post-Cold War period. In the

last decade alone, we have witnessed the consequences of CEM in arenas as significant and diverse as economic sanctions and arms embargoes, ethnic conflict, military intervention, both intra- and inter-state war, nuclear proliferation, and regime change. While for many this is a phenomenon that has been hiding in plain sight, its consequences and implications have been anything but invisible. ■

Notes

1. Ben Rawlence, "Refugees Shouldn't Be Bargaining Chips," *New York Times*, 17 May 2016, accessed 6 October 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/17/opinion/refugees-shouldnt-be-bargaining-chips.html.

2. Elizabeth Collett, "The Paradox of the EU-Turkey Deal," Migration Policy Institute.org website, March 2016, accessed 3 October 2016, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/paradox-eu-turkey-refugee-deal.

3. "EU-Turkey Statement," The European Council website, 18 March 2016, accessed 3 October 2016, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18-eu-turkey-statement/.

4. Duncan Robinson and Alex Barker, "EU and Turkey Agree Deal to Return Migrants," *Financial Times*, 18 March 2016, accessed 3 October 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/94314ec0-eca7-11e5-9fca-fb0f946fd1f0.

5. Agence France-Presse, "Turkish President Threatens to Send Millions of Syrian Refugees to EU," *The Guardian* online, 11 February 2016, accessed 3 October 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/12/turkish-president-threatens-to-send-millions-of-syrian-refugees-to-eu; Agence France-Presse, "Turkey Threatens to Back Out of EU Migrant Deal over Visas," France24.com, 19 April 2016, accessed 3 October 2016, http://www.france24.com/en/20160419-turkey-migrant-deal-eu-visa-free-travel; Kelly M. Greenhill, "Open Arms Behind Barred Doors: Fear, Hypocrisy and Policy Schizophrenia in the European Migration Crisis," *European Law Journal* 22, no. 3 (May 2016): 279–94.

6. Selena Sykes, "EU Does Secret Deal with Suspected War Criminal in Desperate Bid to Stop Migrants," *Express* online, 15 May 2016, accessed 3 October 2016, http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/670550EU-secret-deal-war-criminal-Sudan-migrant-crisis-Africa.

7. "Australia Asylum: Why is it Controversial?" BBC News website, 3 August 2016, accessed 3 October 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-28189608; Greenhill, "Open Arms Behind Barred Doors," 279–81.

8. Kelly M. Greenhill, *Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion and Foreign Policy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010).

9. This makes coercive engineered migration (CEM) significantly less common than interstate territorial disputes (ca. five cases/year), but markedly more prevalent than both civil wars (ca. 0.7 cases/year) and extended intermediate deterrence crises (ca. 0.6 cases/year). Seventy-five of eighty-six migration cases since 1951 were determined to be CEM.

10. See Greenhill, "Migration as a Coercive Weapon: New Evidence from the Middle East" (forthcoming).

11. Greenhill, *Weapons of Mass Migration*, chap. 3.

12. Michael Weiss, "Breaking: Syrian State Documents 'Show Assad Orchestrated Nakba Day Raids on Golan Heights,'" *Telegraph*, 13 June 2011; Rick Gladstone and Damien Cave, "Torrent of Syrian Refugees Strains Aid Effort and Region," *New York Times*, 24 August 2012, accessed 6 October 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/25/world/middleeast/refugee-numbers-swell-as-fighting-in-syria-intensifies.html; David D. Kirkpatrick, "Syrian Army Attacks Village Near Jordanian Border," *New York Times*, 6 September 2012, accessed 6 October 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/07/world/middleeast/Syria.html.

13. Greenhill, *Weapons of Mass Migration*, chap. 2.

14. Robert Pape, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War* (Cornell University Press, 1996), 21. "The hope is that the government will concede or the population will revolt."

15. Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games," *International Organization* 42, no. 3 (1988): 427–60.

16. Karen Jacobsen, "Factors Influencing the Policy Responses of Host Governments to Mass Refugee Influxes," *International Migration Review* 30, no. 3 (1996): 655–68.

17. "Russian Pundit Examines Central Asian Response to Crimea Annexation," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 17 April 2014.

18. Consider, for instance, the United States' tragically underwhelming initial response to Hurricane Katrina.

19. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics."

20. Marc R. Rosenblum, "Immigration and U.S. National Interests," in *Immigration Policy and Security: U.S., European and Commonwealth Perspectives,* eds. Terry E. Givens, Gary P. Freeman, and David L. Leal (Abingdon-on-Thames, UK: Routledge, 2008), 15.

21. Marco Scalvini, "Humanitarian Wars and Rejected Refugees," OpenDemocracy website, 17 April 2011, accessed 3 October 2016, http://www.opendemocracy.net/marco-scalvini/humanitarian-wars-and-rejected-refugees.

22. Lawrence Freedman, "Strategic Coercion," in *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases*, ed. Lawrence Freedman (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1998), 29.

23. For example, while John F. Kennedy's administration was understandably reluctant to use force to influence Soviet behavior vis-à-vis Berlin in the early 1960s, U.S. officials—at the very least—entertained the idea of using CEM to "encourage" greater cooperation from Moscow. See the partially declassified "(Secret) U.S. Department of State (DOS) Telegram, From U.S. Embassy Berlin (Deputy Commandant Allen Lightner) to U.S. Secretary of State, 'Refugee Problem May Deter Soviets from Going Ahead with Treaty,'" 24 July 1961, No. 87, Control No. 15686; and "(Secret) Memo 'Discontent in East Germany,'" 18 July 1961, 3. Both are available through the Digital National Security Archive (subscription service).

24. Ian Smith, "Raul Castro is Launching a 'Weapon of Mass Migration' Against the U.S.," *National Review* online, 28 January 2016, accessed 3 October 2016, [continued next page]

http://www.nationalreview.com/article/430385/cuban-refugee-crisis-fabricated-win-sanctions-repeal.

25. For an examination of an analogous phenomenon in the nuclear arena, see Scott Snyder, *Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior* (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1999), especially chap. 3.

26. Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), 196.

27. Mark Habeeb, *Power and Tactics in International Negotiation: How Weak Nations Bargain with Strong Nations* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988).

28. Ibid.; Snyder, *Negotiating on the Edge*, 43, 71.

29. Christopher Mitchell, "Implications," in *Western Hemisphere Immigration and United States Foreign Policy*, ed. Christopher Mitchell (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992).

30. This can be particularly important because powerful actors tend to dismiss weaker actors' threats for two distinct reasons. First, they frequently have trouble believing their weaker counterparts would initiate crises or conflicts they seem destined to lose, based on relative capabilities. This tendency may be further exacerbated by the fact that targets may also underestimate the magnitude of the threats facing weak challengers when the issues at stake seem trivial to them, thus leading them to further discount the probability of crisis initiation. Second, because the majority of targets would not themselves initiate migration crises, they tend to dismiss threats to do so as "irrational" or "crazy" and, consequently, also incredible.

31. Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2002).

32. Valur Ingimundarson, "Cold War Misperceptions: The Communist and Western Responses to the East German Refugee Crisis in 1953," *Journal of Contemporary History* 29 (1994): 463–81; D. G. Pruitt, *Negotiating Behavior* (New York, Academic Press, 1981).

33. Indeed, targets who engage in foreign-imposed regime change often inadvertently create conditions even more conducive to the employment of CEM after they have intervened to change the incumbent regime, as U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya in recent years makes clear.

34. Ibid., 6–7.

35. John Mueller, "The Banality of Ethnic War," *International Security* 25, no. 1 (Summer 2000): 42–70. The use of regular troops is often not even necessary to effect population displacement; it can also be done with paramilitary "shock troops" and even bands of thugs, as the 1990s wars of imperial dissolution in the Balkans demonstrate.

36. James Gow, "Coercive Cadences: The Yugoslav War of Dissolution," in Freedman, *Strategic Coercion*, chap. 11.

37. Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review* 80, no. 4 (1986): 1151–69; Bruce Russett, "Why Democratic Peace?" in *Debating the Democratic Peace*, ed. Michael Brown (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), 93.

38. DOS Telegram No. 87, Control No. 15686, and "(Secret) Memo 'Discontent in East Germany.'"

39. "Iran Threatens to Expel Afghan Refugees if Kabul Ratifies U.S. Strategic Partnership," *Telegraph*, 12 May 2012, accessed 4 October 2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/9256602/Iran-threatens-to-expel-Afghan-refugees-if-Kabul-ratifies-US-strategic-partnership.html. Fazel Hadi Muslimyar, speaker of the Afghan Senate, reported that the Iranian ambassador to Afghanistan threatened to expel Afghans if Kabul signed the partnership treaty with the United States.

40. Greenhill, *Weapons of Mass Migration;* for post-publication cases and data, see Greenhill, "When Virtues Become Vulnerabilities: The Achilles' Heel of Migration Social Policy," in *Handbook of Migration and Social Policy,* eds. Gary Freeman and Nikola Mirilovic (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2016); Kelly M. Greenhill, "Demographic Bombing: People as Weapons in Syria and Beyond," *Foreign Affairs* online, 17 December 2015, accessed 6 October 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015-12-17/demographic-bombing.

41. Greenhill, "When Virtues Become Vices."

42. Paul K. Huth, "Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates," *Annual Review of Political Science* 2 (1999): 25–48; Gary Clyde Hufbauer et al., *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*, 3rd ed. (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute, 2008).

43. It is of course also possible that if general deterrence succeeds and nothing happens, there still may be a large number of as yet unidentified cases of CEM-driven deterrence. It is well known, for instance, that Chinese fears of both the direct and indirect anticipated costs and potentially destabilizing effects of a mass migration of North Koreans into China has long deterred the Chinese from exerting greater pressure on the Hermit Kingdom on a variety of military and nonmilitary fronts, including its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs and its occasional regional acts of aggression. How many other such cases might invisibly exist (or have existed previously) is an open question.

44. Greenhill, "Migration as a Coercive Weapon."

45. While just such an outcome will be a good thing if the challenger is, for instance, a nongovernmental organization trying to bring down a dictatorship, it is a highly undesirable outcome in most cases.

46. "The Construction of the Berlin Wall," Berlin website, accessed 4 October 2016, www.berlin.de/mauer/en/history/construction-of-the-berlin-wall.

47. Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 89.

48. Ronald B. Frankum Jr., *Operation Passage to Freedom: The United States Navy in Vietnam, 1954-1955* (Lubbock, TX: Texas Tech University Press, 2007), 207.

49. Ibid. However, attempting to "pass the buck" can also backfire by inadvertently permitting further—and more successful—coercion by enterprising opportunists.

50. H. Richard Friman, "Side-Payments Versus Security Cards: Domestic Bargaining Tactics in International Economic Negotiations," *International Organization* 47, no. 3 (1993): 387–409.

51. Of course, the converse is also true, should coercers aim to galvanize action within the pro-camp. That said, most research suggests that changing the prevailing frame in policy debates is a difficult task.

52. Adrian Edwards, "Global Forced Displacement Hits Record High," United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees website, 20 June 2016, accessed 4 October 2016, http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/6/5763b65a4/global-forced-displacement-hits-record-high.html.

53. Greenhill, *Weapons of Mass Migration*, appendix.

54. Colin Freeman, "Libya Warns it Could Flood Europe with Migrants if EU Does Not Recognize New Self-declared Government," *Telegraph*, 2 November 2015, accessed 4 October 2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/11970313/Libya-warns-it-could-flood-Europe-with-migrants-if-EU-does-not-recognise-new-Islamist-government.html.

55. For information on the Pacific Solution's demise, see Connie Levett, "Pacific Solution Cost $1 Billion," *Sydney Morning Herald*, 25 August 2007; for information on the European Union and Belarus, see Volker ter Haseborg, "Radioactive Refuge: Offering Asylum in Chernobyl's No Man's Land," *Der Spiegel*, 14 October 2005; for information on the Chinese border fence and North Korea, see Norimitsu Onishi, "Tension, Desperation: The China-North Korean Border," *New York Times*, 22 October 2006; for information on the military contingency plan, see Martin Sieff, "China's North Korea Collapse Plan is Credible, Analysts Say," *Asia-Pacific Defense Forum*, 15 May 2014.

56. James Brooke, "North Korea Lashes Out at Neighbors and U.S.," *New York Times*, 19 August 2003; Sam Dillon, "US Tests Border Plan in Event of Mexico Crisis," *New York Times*, 8 December 1995, accessed 6 October 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/1995/12/08/us/us-tests-border-plan-in-event-of-mexico-crisis.html; personal conversations with U.S. military officials, U.S. Southern Command, Miami, Florida, in April 2000, (with follow-up discussions in 2016); and conversations with personnel from Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts, in October and November 2001.

57. Smith, "Raul Castro is Launching."

58. Gil Loescher, "Refugee Movements and International Security," Adelphi Paper 268, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992), 3.

59. "Tusk Gives EU Two Months to 'Save Schengen'," EuroNews website, 19 January 2016, accessed 4 October 2016, http://www.euronews.com/2016/01/19/tusk-gives-the-eu-two-months-to-save-schengen; "Schengen to Fail in Months if Migration Crisis not 'Under Control,' says Tusk," Deutsche Welle website, 19 January 2016, accessed 4 October 2016, http://www.dw.com/en/schengen-to-fail-in-months-if-migration-crisis-not-under-control-says-tusk/a-18989697.

Police escort men arrested in connection with the killing of prominent Sikh politician Soran Singh after they were presented to the media at a news conference 25 April 2016 in Peshawar, Pakistan. (Photo by Khuram Parvez, Reuters)

Bridging the Gap between Policing and Counterinsurgency in Pakistan

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Counterinsurgency (COIN) best practices integrate an important role for the police. As Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency,* sums up: "The primary frontline COIN force is often the police—not the military" because "the primary COIN objective is to enable local institutions."[1] The national military

forces may suppress insurgents in some countries, but "the task of restoring public order invariably involves careful and sustained police work."[2] Yet, the police have played a limited COIN role in Pakistan's recent campaigns in the semiautonomous Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Baluchistan. An experienced Pakistani military official described the police as "a weak link in Pakistan's counterinsurgency efforts."[3] Over half of Pakistan's territory is not policed, which facilitates not only the proliferation of terrorism but also the graduation from terrorist organizations—characterized by clandestine groups using violence against civilians—to more powerful insurgent organizations that control territory and threaten the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state.[4]

Drawing on evidence from four case studies, we argue that the police can and should play a larger COIN function. The police are particularly useful for consolidating a state's legitimate authority through the reestablishment of law and order in areas previously contested or dominated by insurgents. Policing is also a key to preventing terrorist acts in areas of limited state authority from erupting in the first place, as well as from turning into a full-fledged insurgency. Even in areas where the state exercises considerable power, terrorism may be a looming threat.[5]

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Police in Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency

Counterterrorism (CT) is "activities and operations to neutralize terrorists and their organizations and networks in order to render them incapable of using violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies to achieve their goals."[6]

Successful CT keeps terrorist organizations from graduating to insurgent groups. While terrorism is widely seen as a weapon of small, clandestine organizations, insurgent organizations tend to be better trained and equipped to maintain control over territory. Successful insurgents create an alternative government structure, especially in semiungoverned areas where the writ of state is weak.[7]

COIN's scope is broader than that of CT. Per Joint Publication 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, COIN is "the blend of comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes."[8] Insurgents usually start their campaign as terrorists and subsequently gain territory, size, and influence. They may continue to use terrorism as a tactic, especially in government-controlled areas. In the areas under their influence, insurgent groups often use symmetrical warfare. A successful COIN strategy recaptures territory from insurgents, thereby downgrading them to terrorists, which may result in increased use of terrorism as a tactic.

Most experts argue that the police should be used after the more heavily armed military establishes some level of territorial control.[9] The police are less capable than the military when it comes to defeating insurgents in direct combat, but they have some moral, practical, and tactical advantages over militaries. These can be leveraged to bring areas where the state exercises some territorial control back to normalcy. However, the military

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may still be necessary for maintaining control and keeping the insurgents from recapturing an area.

Police forces recruited from local populations offer the cultural and political advantages of governance by people coethnic with the general population. This may provide legitimacy for the government and help counter the insurgents' rhetoric that frames the conflict in "us versus them" terms. Practically, when the police recruit locally, this employment opportunity also provides an alternative to joining the insurgents for those who might otherwise do so out of economic necessity or security concerns.

(Graphic by Trevor Cloen, Skidmore College)

Pakistan

At a tactical level, coethnic and local recruitment provides intelligence advantages and enables the police to target rebels individually. Local police can be better than the military at gathering intelligence in areas where the military is seen as an outside force. Coethnic police are better able to infiltrate insurgencies. Last, if the police forces are competent at providing basic security and are capable of responding to civilian tips, they can gather more intelligence from civilians about individual insurgents, which leads to more discriminate targeting. The police are, therefore, not only essential for providing law and order after the insurgency ends but they can also contribute to defeating insurgents during the COIN campaign.

India's experience in the state of Punjab during the late 1980s and early 1990s bears this out. The Khalistan insurgency was a secessionist movement that sought an independent homeland for Sikhs in India. The Indian Army's attempt to rid the militants of a safe haven in the Golden Temple (a holy site) destroyed the Temple, which delegitimized the Indian Army in the region.[10] This required the Punjab police to take the lead in COIN operations that sought to eliminate individual insurgents, though the Indian Army and paramilitaries would play the important support roles of denying safe havens for Khalistanis in the countryside and along the Pakistani border. After considerable investment in a more capable force, the Punjab police were able not only to provide law and order in the cities but also to conduct offensive operations against armed insurgents. They did so by leveraging their moral, practical, and tactical advantages stemming from local Sikh and Punjabi recruitment. Notably, the police recruited new officers who could provide local intelligence, and they infiltrated Khalistani and criminal organizations. Then, they used these advantages to find and target the insurgents.[11]

Notwithstanding the clear advantages, using the police for COIN also risks drawbacks that should be taken into account. There is a wide variation in the level of professionalism within and across the police forces. In Pakistan, many police forces are corrupt or inadequately trained.[12] Corruption hampers the rule of law,

and ill-trained forces cannot be effective in intelligence gathering or even supplying basic order. The lack of professionalism and accountability allows the police to harass and abuse the civilian population. This behavior hurts not only the credibility of the government but also the COIN efforts.

The characteristics outlined above were present in Punjab during COIN against the Khalistanis. The police were incapable of countering the militants in the early stages of the insurgency. Instead of targeting individual insurgents, the police arrested petty criminals and others from vulnerable populations and passed them off as terrorists. The Punjab police's lack of accountability resulted in abuses of the civilian population. This need not be the case in Pakistan. The more the police operate within the bounds of the rule of law, the easier it should be to gain the favor of the civilian population.

The following case studies explore the Pakistani police's experience in COIN. The first two cases demonstrate that Pakistani police have played, in the past, an important role in COIN. The last two studies represent cases in which the police have not, but certainly could have, played an important role. In the conclusion, we consider why Pakistani police have been kept from contributing to COIN and offer policy recommendations for moving forward.

Hashtnagar (1969–1974)

Due to the status of Pakistan's military forces, Pakistani police played an important COIN role in a little-known peasant rebellion in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) (then called the North-West Frontier Province) from 1969–1974. The military forces were, at the time, largely preoccupied with the rebellious eastern wing of the country (now Bangladesh) and the ensuing war with India. On 16 December 1971, following a two-week war with India, the Pakistani military forces surrendered to the Indian Army and Bangladeshi Mukti Bahini (Freedom Fighters). After their surrender to a joint Bangladesh–India command, the political and social influence of the military forces declined severely. This created an opening for the police to play an unusually active role in confronting the peasant rebellion in KPK Province, which took off from a small KPK town called Hashtnagar in 1969.

According to Kamran Asdar Ali, the Hashtnagar movement began as a struggle "for the eradication of feudal taxes and the introduction of a more just tenancy system."[13] The peasants challenged Pakistan's powerful landlords. Tenant peasants and laborers adhering to the Marxist ideology of the Mazdoor Kissan Party (Workers and Peasants Party, or MKP) drove many large landowners away from their property. The lands were then confiscated and distributed among the landless peasantry.

The police operations began after the rebels took over the lands. The provincial police were ill trained and poorly equipped to confront the insurgency. Nevertheless, they were sent as reinforcements to the district police. Young officers, such as assistant superintendents of police Afzal Shigri and Tauqir Haider, led their forces in violent conflict against the peasants. Their strategy was incremental, primarily because of their limited resources.[14] However, they managed to contain the insurgency to Hashtnagar and the surrounding areas, thereby preventing it from spreading to other parts of the province where landlords were holding large tracts of land.

Notwithstanding, a final conclusion was hindered by the landlords' refusal to return to their areas even after the police drove the insurgents away. One result was that the insurgency lingered on for five years, until MKP leaders were arrested, killed, or fled to neighboring Afghanistan.

Malakand (2009)

In 2009, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and its affiliate, Tehreek-e-Nizam-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TSNM), managed to wrest control over the Swat Valley and adjacent districts of the Malakand Division of KPK Province.[15] They had already taken over the semiautonomous FATA, and they were advancing toward KPK's settled area. The Pakistani Army was called in. Following Operation Rah-e-Haq, the Islamist insurgents were ousted from Malakand. Following a "clear, hold, build, and transfer" strategy, the police moved in to reestablish law and order, and helped to return the troubled area back to normalcy.[16]

Pakistani police played a supporting role in curbing and rooting out the remnants of insurgents and their sympathizers. The return of the police to the contested areas was designed to regain the confidence of the local populace. Legal proceedings were initiated against the insurgents arrested by the military during the COIN

Training officers of the Special Security Unit attend a field briefing 30 November 2015 at the Shaheed Benazir Bhutto Police Training School, Razzakabad, Karachi, Pakistan. (Photo by Farhan Zahid)

operations, and TSNM founder and ideologue Sufi Mohammad was booked under sedition charges after the police registered thirteen cases against him.[17]

The military did not leave the area, but administration was handed over to the civilian authorities. The police thus played an important role in the "transfer" and "shape" stages of the COIN campaign. In addition, during the Malakand military operations, the police were responsible for securing and maintaining the internally displaced people camps, which were established in the adjacent districts, as many of the TTP rank-and-file had taken refuge there.

Federally Administered Tribal Areas (2004–2009)

Between 2004 and 2009, during the height of the Islamist insurgency in FATA's Khyber District, the police thwarted numerous direct attacks on civilian and military installations in Peshawar City. The KPK government was even considering shifting the provincial capital from Peshawar to Abbottabad because of the proximity of Peshawar to the tribal areas from where the Islamist militants were launching their attacks.[18] Police had taken the primary responsibility of securing the access points to Peshawar in order to check the movement of TTP militants. In response to this security arrangement, the TTP beheaded a number of police officers patrolling the area in the outskirts of Peshawar.[19] Two superintendents of police were killed while on duty. Superintendent of Police Khurshid Khan was leading a patrol when he was surrounded and beheaded by the TTP militants on the spot in October 2012, whereas Abdul Kalam Khan was killed in a suicide bombing in March 2012.[20] Since the police had no jurisdiction in the tribal areas, the insurgents took full advantage of this by using these areas for strategic depth, moving back and forth into Peshawar from the tribal areas.

Baluchistan (2004–Present)

The police have played a minimal COIN role in Baluchistan. The military operation ongoing since 2004 is managed by the Frontier Corps, a paramilitary force commanded by Pakistan army officers. Baluchistan has been divided into "A" and "B" areas for administrative and law enforcement purposes since the British colonial period. Paramilitary forces called the Baluchistan Levies are responsible for maintaining law and order in the B area, which represents 95 percent of the province, whereas the police are limited to the remaining A area.[21] Most of the insurgent-hit areas are in the B area of the province and, hence, are out of police jurisdiction.

The role of the police is not well defined in the COIN operations led by the paramilitary forces in cooperation with the Pakistani military. However, the police have to deal with terrorist attacks committed by the Baluch separatists in the urban centers of Baluchistan, which are under police jurisdiction. For example, when the insurgent group Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) burned down a historic government building, the Quaid-e-Azam Residency in the Ziarat district in June 2013, the local police investigated the case and traced the individuals involved.[22] The BLA insurgents were later killed by the Frontier Corps in an operation outside of police jurisdiction.

Training officers of the Special Security Unit exhibit their repelling skills at the Shaheed Benazir Bhutto Elite Police Training School 30 November 2015 in Razzakabad, Karachi, Pakistan. (Photo by Farhan Zahid)

Conclusion

The role of police in COIN in Pakistan is limited. However, even though the police forces are better trained and armed than before, the military authorities seem uninterested in trusting the police with COIN functions. There is no policing in over half of Pakistan's territory, and those areas have become breeding grounds for insurgents. The lack of initiative in reforming the police and increasing its role in COIN presents a missed opportunity.

We believe that the COIN efforts in Baluchistan and FATA would benefit from a greater role for police in consolidating government control and maintaining law

and order. The laws restricting their contribution are outdated and should be updated to allow for a more expansive police role. In doing so, the police should recruit and train officers from affected areas to maximize their moral, practical, and tactical advantages. They should also continue improving their performance through internal reform. The police's role should be clearly defined from the very onset of the COIN operations. Moreover, the officers should be adequately trained and armed to carry out their duties effectively and responsibly. ■

Notes

1. Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 15 December 2006), 6-19. (This manual was superseded in May 2014 by FM 3-24, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*.)

2. C. Christine Fair and Sumit Ganguly, "The Police in Counterinsurgency Operations," in *Policing Insurgencies: Cops as Counterinsurgents*, eds. C. Christine Fair and Sumit Ganguly (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2014), 1.

3. Shaukat Qadir, "The State's Response to the Pakistani Taliban Onslaught," in *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in South Asia: Through a Peacebuilding Lens*, ed. Moeed Yusuf (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2014), 149.

4. Christopher K. Butler and Scott Gates, "Asymmetry, Parity, and (Civil) War: Can International Theories of Power Help Us Understand Civil War?" *International Interactions* 35, no. 3 (2009): 330–40.

5. Huma Yusuf, "University Radicalization: Pakistan's Next Counterterrorism Challenge," *CTC Sentinel* (February 2016): 4–8.

6. Joint Publication (JP) 3-26, *Counterterrorism* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 24 October 2014), GL-3.

7. Timothy Wickham-Crowley, *Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes Since 1956* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), chaps. 8 and 11; Stahtis Kalyvis, *The Logic of Violence in Civil Wars* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), chap. 5.

8. JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 22 November 2013), III-1. The defeat of an insurgency means a return to normalcy—that is, recapture territory from insurgents, end their use of violence, and govern that territory in accordance with the rule of law.

9. Sir Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency: Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (New York: Praeger, 1966); FM 3-24.

10. C. Christine Fair, "The Golden Temple: A Tale of Two Sieges," in *Treading on Hallowed Ground: Counterinsurgency Operations in Sacred Spaces*, eds. C. Christine Fair and Sumit Ganguly (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

11. C. Christine Fair, *Urban Battlefields in South Asia: Lessons Learned from Sri Lanka, India, and Pakistan* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005); Prem Mahadevan, *The Politics of Counterterrorism in India: Strategic Intelligence and National Security in South Asia* (London: I. B. Tauris & Company Ltd., 2012); Jugdep Chima, "The Punjab Police and Counterinsurgency against Sikh Militants in India: The Successful Convergence of Interests, Identities, and Institutions," in *Policing Insurgencies: Cops as Counterinsurgents*, eds. C. Christine Fair and Sumit Ganguly (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2014), 258–90.

12. Adnan Naseemullah, "Police Capacity and Insurgency in Pakistan," in *Policing Insurgencies: Cops as Counterinsurgents*, eds. Fair and Ganguly, 189. Police corruption can be linked to poor pay. According to Naseemullah, underinvestment in police salaries carries "predictable [negative] effects on morale, police-society relationships, and recruitment."

13. Kamran Asdar Ali, "Pakistan's Troubled 'Paradise on Earth,'" *Middle East Research and Information Project*, 29 April 2009, accessed 13 September 2016, http://www.merip.org/mero/mero042909.

14. Afzal Shigri (inspector general of police [retired]), interview by Farhan Zahid, 10 February 2016, in Islamabad, Pakistan. Shigri served as assistant superintendent of police in Charsada and played a pivotal role in the counterinsurgency, which includes Swat, Buner, Shangla, Swabi, and Dir districts of the Malakand Division in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) Province.

15. These included Swat, Buner, Shangla, Swabi, and Dir districts of the Malakand Division in KPK Province.

16. C. Christine Fair, "Obama's New 'Af-Pak' Strategy: Can 'Clear, Hold, Build, Transfer' Work?" *The Afghanistan Papers* 6 (July 2010), 5, accessed 26 September 2016, https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/afghanistan_paper_6.pdf.

17. Noorwali Shah, "Charge-sheeted: ATC indicts Sufi Muhammad in sedition case," *Express Tribune* website, 8 February 2015, http://tribune.com.pk/story/834852/charge-sheeted-atc-indicts-sufi-muhammad-in-sedition-case/.

18. Names withheld, Senior police officers of KPK Province, interviews by Farhan Zahid, February 2016, in Peshawar, Pakistan.

19. "Policeman's Beheaded Body Found in Peshawar," *Daily Times* website, 3 April 2009, http://archives.dailytimes.com.pk/national/03-Apr-2009/policeman-s-beheaded-body-found-in-peshawar.

20. Ali Hazrat Bacha, "Officer's Beheading Raises the Questions about Police Preparedness," *Dawn* website, 17 October 2012, http://www.dawn.com/news/757312/officers-beheading-raises-questions-about-police-preparedness.

21. Name withheld, Baluchistan police officer, interview by Farhan Zahid, 20 February 2016, in Islamabad, Pakistan. The reintroduction of Levies is linked to tribal patronage networks in Baluchistan. While police forces are controlled by the Inspector General of Police of Baluchistan Province, the Levies are beholden to tribal networks and local politicians.

22. "BLA destroys Jinnah's Residency in Ziarat," *Express Tribune* website, 16 June 2013, http://tribune.com.pk/story/563877/bla-destroys-jinnahs-residency-in-ziarat/; name withheld, senior Baluchistan police officer, interview by Farhan Zahid, 20 February 2016, in Islamabad, Pakistan.

Transformative Staff Training in Ukraine

Col. Nick Ducich, U.S. Army
Lt. Col. Nathan Minami, U.S. Army
Maj. Ryan Riggin, U.S. Army
Capt. Jacob Austin, U.S. Army

The events of March 2014 shocked the world: Russian forces invaded Crimea, and Russia annexed the Donbass region of eastern Ukraine. Subsequently, the Russians employed hybrid tactics that included using conventional forces and Russia-sponsored separatists to destabilize eastern Ukraine (which is on the Russian border). In response, the Ukrainian government authorized antiterrorism operations in Donbass. To support Ukraine, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) formed the NATO–Ukraine Commission (NUC). The NUC includes the NATO–Ukraine Joint Working Group on Defence Reform, which conducts security force assistance. In addition, the United States, Canada, Lithuania, United Kingdom, Estonia, and Ukraine created the Joint Multinational Training Group–Ukraine (JMTG–U) to conduct complementary efforts for robust defense reform.

Col. Nick Ducich, U.S. Army, is the commander of Joint Multinational Training Group–Ukraine. He holds an MS in nuclear engineering from the University of Maryland and an MSS from the U.S. Army War College. He is pursuing an MS in space studies from the University of North Dakota.

Lt. Col. Nathan Minami, U.S. Army, served as the battalion commander for 3rd Battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment. He holds an MS from the systems design and management program at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a PhD in business administration from Northcentral University.

The JMTG–U, comprised of a brigade-level headquarters that included U.S., Canadian, and Lithuanian instructors, was tasked with training five Ukrainian battalions, developing a combat training center capability, supporting a doctrine-and-education advisory group, and providing mission command for a task force from the U.S. Army 3rd Battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment. This article is written from the perspective of officers from that task force, which was the partner-and-advise training team (PATT) battalion headquarters at the International Peacekeeping and Security Center (IPSC) in Yavoriv, Ukraine, from 15 February 2016 until 17 July 2016.

The 3rd Battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment's task force trained two Ukrainian battalions; this article focuses on the first. The PATT headquarters developed training that transformed a Ukrainian airborne battalion staff from an antiquated and centralized Soviet command style to a contemporary mission-command focus. In contrast to the Soviet command style, using mission command would help optimize warfighting function integration and staff functional capability. The PATT's leaders understood that a traditional training approach would not accomplish the desired transformation. Therefore, the PATT used Army design methodology to develop problem-solving and instructional approaches that would incorporate action learning and andragogy.

Framing the Operational Environment

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 resulted in Ukraine possessing the fourth largest army in the world and a nuclear capability. Within twenty years,

A BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicle provides supporting fire to Ukrainian infantrymen during a live-fire exercise for Joint Multinational Training Group–Ukraine 23 June 2016 at the International Peacekeeping and Security Center near Yavoriv, Ukraine. (Photo by Capt. Scott Kuhn, U.S. Army)

political and economic strife mixed with in-depth corruption and forfeiture of its nuclear arsenal (due to a diplomatic agreement) degraded the Ukrainian military to a shadow of its previous strength. Following unrest in western Ukraine in late 2013 and early 2014, pro-Russian separatists seized key government buildings in the east in April 2014. Ukrainian forces, still operating under antiquated Soviet military principles, began antiterrorism operations in the Donbass region in June 2014. However, since increasingly large numbers of Russian regular forces were covertly aiding the separatists, the probability of successful antiterrorism operations was limited. Moreover, a Ukrainian field-grade officer explained to the PATT trainers that the Ukrainians learned during antiterrorism operations in eastern Ukraine that the old system did not work. He said they would need to learn a new way of fighting.[1] Although most Ukrainian forces withdrew from the Donbass region in early 2015, some battalions are still being deployed for antiterrorism operations as of 2016.

The ability to recognize and execute transformational change tests any large organization. The PATT headquarters quickly observed that although Ukrainian unit leaders were patriotic, hardworking, and dedicated to mission accomplishment, they adhered to a centralized-control organizational structure, thereby limiting their ability to integrate warfighting functions. During the first week of training, a shocked senior Ukrainian officer asked the PATT instructors if they always allowed company commanders to plan training and train wherever they wanted.[2]

Initial discussions with Ukrainian leaders revealed that most warfighting enablers, such as mortars and engineers, were regularly employed independently from the maneuver companies. Use of the battalion's mortar battery consisted of direct-lay mortar fires with the battery commander as the observer. The battalion had almost no experience shooting the mortars in indirect-fire mode while using forward observers to adjust rounds. Their complete reliance on old Soviet order-of-battle techniques included static- and linear-defensive arrays with predictable offensive maneuvers. Marching in column, deploying formations on line, and infantrymen fighting

from behind or directly beside their combat vehicles depicted little institutional change since the Soviet era.

Framing the Problem

The problem was further complicated by an overly bureaucratic tradition reminiscent of Soviet forces, with little support for change at higher echelons and narrowly defined roles across seventeen staff officers. The Ukrainian officers were accustomed to being taught what to think and not how to think. Communication flow originated almost exclusively from the top, with little bottom-up refinement or input. Under the Soviet model, maneuver battalions were units of execution instead of headquarters capable of detailed planning and complex decision making. This arrangement limited battalion commanders to only two or three decisions during a typical combat operation, in which most battalion actions consisted of battle drills. The restrictive command system greatly hindered the Ukrainian army's response to the hybrid-warfare conditions of antiterrorism operations in 2014.

Also exacerbating the situation were cultural norms and behaviors exemplified by leaders afraid to admit shortcomings or mistakes. This fear spiraled down to subordinates, as false reports of readiness were the norm, instead of truth and honest dialogue. Early in the training, one Ukrainian company commander stated outright that he would not tell his battalion commander of existing problems. Instead, he would opt to tell the U.S. PATT company commander, who would inform the U.S. PATT battalion commander, who in turn would advise his Ukrainian counterpart of the problem.

Under such conditions, the creation of a battalion common operational picture becomes extremely difficult, and an incomplete or inaccurate picture invites decisions based on faulty facts or assumptions. Consequently, Ukrainian staff officers typically asked the trainers for definitive solutions to tactical problems and struggled with the concept that well-analyzed mission variables and accurate staff estimates could influence mission success. To the Ukrainians, following the plan to the letter was more important than achieving mission success. This situation was analogous to how a Western army would view regulations. The Ukrainians regarded straying from a Ukrainian doctrinal template similarly to how U.S. Army soldiers would regard violating a regulation—a mindset that allows little creativity and flexibility in a complex operational environment. This same rigidness extends to the Ukrainian staff structure. Numerous majors and lieutenant colonels exist at the battalion level, but each is confined by a narrow scope of responsibility, thus limiting any staff officer's influence on the commander's decisions.

Developing an Operational Approach for Training

To effect organizational change, the PATT applied Army design methodology to frame the problem and the desired end state.[3] The primary difficulty in transforming Ukrainian leaders from a centralized, control-oriented command style resided in proving the benefits of using staff analyses, empowering junior leaders, relying on results-oriented mission orders, and building mutual trust across the organization. The PATT's Army design process led to the adoption of two learning methods to guide developing an operational approach to this problem: action learning and andragogy learning. The goal was to shape the Ukrainian battalion staff using adult-learner fundamentals in a group setting, in a manner that would make each individual willing to adopt new behaviors. Figure 1 illustrates how the PATT framed the problem during its design process.

Developed by management expert Reg Revans in the late 1940s, action learning is a dynamic, team-oriented process useful for solving complex, real-world problems while teams simultaneously share experiences and lessons learned.[4] Public- and private-sector organizations continue to use it as a way to improve operations. For example, human resource development professor Michael Marquardt describes General Electric's success with action learning over about ten years, including

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faster decision making, more collaboration across lines of responsibility, and better trust among team members. Marquardt also describes how the Boeing Company capitalized on action learning to develop employees' leadership skills and attributes while focusing on core competencies. This resulted in strong relationships, trust, and increased shared understanding of the company's vision and mission.[5]

Action learning concentrates on developing solutions to real problems using collaboration. The process includes a period of reflection on the results to improve an organization's problem-solving methodology. For Ukraine's urgent and uniquely diverse problems in antiterrorism operations, action learning garnered quick support. The Ukrainian staff, while learning the new approach, embraced the intellectual curiosity that, according to Marquardt, facilitates both personal and team introspection and reflection.[6]

The Ukrainian battalion expected to return to conducting antiterrorism operations immediately following its nine-week training exercise at the IPSC. The swiftness of the return to the front, coupled with the urgency of the Ukrainian army's institutional problems, reinforced action learning as a viable methodology to achieve change. After several discussions and coaching sessions, the Ukrainian battalion staff began to grasp the issues and renewed their commitment to learn and grow. The task force's executive officer and its headquarters commander became the primary action-learning coaches because of their individual expertise.



(Graphic by authors)

Figure 1. Design Input and Output Model

While creating the action-learning plan, the PATT identified the need to address the challenge of training adults who were accustomed to a rigid thought process. The team chose the andragogy model to address this challenge. In the 1970s, Malcolm Knowles popularized andragogy as a means of effectively teaching adult learners, bringing to light fundamental differences between the way children and adults learn.[7] Andragogy research, such as papers regularly published in the scholarly journal *New Directions for Adult and Continuing Education*, shows that adults learn best through hands-on application in which they self-direct and actively lead their learning process.[8] Practical exercises assist in formulating new experiences that translate into learning. Ukrainian officers easily achieved readiness, orientation, and motivation to learn because they knew they were likely to return to combat operations immediately.

Developing a Plan for Training

The PATT initially thought a progressive, linear approach was best suited to reach the desired end state. Upon further analysis, the team adapted a spiral

development approach, similar to a model sometimes used by software designers.[9] Spiral development sequences functional goals so that each goal represents an iteration, or a loop, in the spiral. The iterations used included developing an initial concept, determining and refining goals, identifying problems, certifying instructors, assessing progress, conducting retraining, and making appropriate adjustments to the training plan. The final iteration would integrate the functions already established in the other iterations.



(Graphic by authors)

Figure 2. Learning Modules

Figure 2 depicts the three modules developed to complement this approach: foundational education, practical application, and collective integration. The focus during the first module included basic knowledge of U.S. and NATO doctrine. Classroom instruction covered the U.S. Army's operations process, establishing a tactical operations center, tactics in a decisive-action environment, warfighting functions, and the military decision-making process (MDMP). Multiple delivery methods such as lectures, practical exercises, terrain walks, and use of multimedia reinforced key learning objectives.

The second module, practical application, included three scenarios to facilitate three complete iterations of the MDMP. The three scenarios included a defense task, a counterattack, and a cordon-and-search operation that incorporated stability tasks. The Ukrainian battalion staff conducted the seven steps of the MDMP during each iteration of the tactical scenario. They eventually produced a final operation order, constructed a terrain model for a combined-arms rehearsal, and established mission-pertinent battle-tracking tools in the battalion tactical operations center for each prescribed scenario.

The third module focused on collective integration. Following the MDMP practical exercises, the Ukrainian battalion staff planned and executed a more complex command-post exercise against a hybrid threat. The command-post exercise required the battalion to execute defensive operations including combined-arms maneuver and stability tasks in a simulated Donbass environment. Following the exercise, the staff planned and executed a new orders process and provided mission command for a full-battalion situational training exercise at the Yavoriv Training Area. The situational training exercise used a multiple integrated laser engagement

system, or MILES, in an environment similar to a U.S. Army combat training center. This event served as the culminating exercise for the battalion's fifty-five days of training.

Conducting Training

On the first day of training, one senior member of the Ukrainian battalion staff stated that he usually was given forty minutes to plan and issue an operation order and that the concept of deliberate planning was foreign to him.[10] The Ukrainian staff had received little formal training in the staff functionality that the U.S. Army considers standard. Therefore, the PATT's initial task was to build a foundation that would enable them to progress to practical application. The Ukrainian staff were initially skeptical of new doctrine that differed from their usual linear tactics and time-based triggers. The introduction of new techniques for integrating fires and maneuver with event-based decision points caused one senior staff member to state that this was not how things would really work.[11] The staff members did not initially grasp the purpose of building a nonprescriptive doctrinal foundation that would provide a commander with multiple options, and they expected the classes to be prescriptive.

During a class on stability operations, the Ukrainians began to accept and learn from the new approach. The task for the learning group was to identify the root cause of instability in Donbass. The learning group collaborated to develop a cluster map to describe the current state in Donbass, illustrated in figure 3 (page 50, translated to English). They identified historically formed cultural differences between eastern and western Ukrainians as the root cause of conflict.

The practical exercise demonstrated that the learning group could successfully apply doctrine to the operational environment. The exercise was the first validation of action learning and andragogy as viable models. The Ukrainian staff applied previous experiences to identify and solve a problem, demonstrated the readiness to learn, and displayed motivation during the exercise.

A battalion staff from the Ukraininan Ground Forces' 25th Airborne Brigade pauses for a photo during an operation order briefing 29 April 2016 as part of staff training at the International Peacekeeping and Security Center, Yavoriv, Ukraine. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Adrianna Diaz, U.S. Army)

The action-learning coaches observed growth within the Ukrainian staff during the practical-application phase of each MDMP iteration. The learning group initially struggled with conducting the MDMP, primarily with the application of mission-command principles. The staff conducted a thorough mission-analysis brief, but it developed courses of action that were too complex, detailed, and prescriptive. They left little flexibility for subordinate units to exercise initiative or provide refinement.

Through coaching and interactive discussions, the staff began to develop concepts and mission orders

allowing subordinates to exercise disciplined initiative. The PATT's battalion commander complemented the staff's efforts by coaching his counterpart on the role of the commander in the operations process. Coaching stressed the commander's role, including "understand, visualize, describe, and direct," and the principles of mission command.[12]



(Graphic by authors)

Figure 3. Ukrainian Learning Group Cluster Map Identifying Causes of Conflict

A critical component was helping the Ukrainian commander and staff understand the conceptual difference between tasks and purposes. This was accomplished through interactive discussions and tactical decision games using examples relevant to the antiterrorism operations. The commander and staff gradually began to understand that junior leaders must be empowered to make decisions in order to accomplish the assigned purpose and meet the commander's intent. They began to understand the importance of disciplined initiative in an environment where conditions change rapidly. By the second iteration of the MDMP, the Ukrainian battalion commander verbalized clear planning guidance and intent while the staff began to see how the MDMP process develops effective mission orders.

The learning coaches also focused on the integration of warfighting functions during the practical application module. The Ukrainian staff addressed all the warfighting functions from the start, but they failed to integrate them sufficiently. This was apparent during the counterattack practical exercise. The staff developed a plan that employed obscuration fires to conceal the battalion's movement to the objective, and then they established attack-by-fire positions encircling the enemy defense. However, the plan lacked fire-control measures and risked fratricide. The plan also failed to mass combat power at the decisive place and time, and it lacked control measures for integrating indirect fires, engineer assets, and maneuver forces on the objective. By using action-learning techniques such as inquiry and reflection, the Ukrainian staff identified the problems in their course of action and revised the plan prior to the decision brief. Action learning was the vehicle for the coaches to stimulate the change in planning.

By the time the Ukrainian staff reached the collective integration module, they displayed a full understanding of how to integrate warfighting functions during the operations process. The staff integrated fires with maneuver in both classroom practical exercises and live-fire exercises. They began to employ forward observers to synchronize fires using technical and

tactical triggers. During a platoon live-fire exercise, the battalion integrated each warfighting function to conduct a combined-arms breach on terrain that replicated the Donbass region.

The staff continued to successfully plan and issue mission orders during the command-post exercise and company situational training exercises, applying the knowledge gained during the foundational portions of the training. By the end of the rotation, the Ukrainian staff was capable of following the Army operations process in a manner that would give them some degree of NATO interoperability. They demonstrated remarkable progress in using the MDMP to produce mission orders, conduct effective combined-arms rehearsals, and apply mission command during a tactical exercise in field conditions.

An important factor to this successful training was using a variety of teaching techniques to keep the training audience engaged. The learning coaches attempted to limit lectures by supplementing classroom instruction with practical exercises, real-world vignettes, live-fire exercises, situational training exercises, terrain walks, and a command-post exercise. Andragogy was integrated into the action-learning model to create a learning environment optimized for the adult training audience.

Mission Success

Although the action-learning coaches were unable to change the Ukrainian Army's centralized post-Soviet mentality at the operational or strategic level, action learning as a catalyst for change was successful at the tactical level. Action learning could be applied by national-level military advisers at the brigade level and above. This approach could accelerate change by delivering the training opportunity on a wider scale while garnering senior-level support.

Coupling the bottom-up training of Ukrainian rotational battalions at JMTG–U with embedded action-learning coaches at the operational level would maximize the effectiveness of the methodology. Action learning could support building warfighting function integration and staff capabilities while promoting mission-command principles.

In Ukraine, the scope of training should be expanded to higher echelons to persuade senior leaders to achieve enduring, transformative change. This case study suggests that action learning and the andragogy model can assist in changing cultural norms in the Ukrainian army, and possibly with other forces in Eastern Europe, while rapidly producing modernized and NATO-interoperable formations. ■

Notes

1. Name withheld, Ukrainian airborne battalion deputy commander in discussion with the authors, through an interpreter, in Yavoriv, Ukraine, March 2016. Discussions with Ukrainian officers were conducted in confidentiality, and all names are withheld.

2. Name withheld, Ukrainian airborne battalion commander in discussion with the authors, Yavoriv, Ukraine, March 2016.

3. Army Techniques Publication 5-0.1, *Army Design Methodology* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 2015).

4. Reg Revans, *ABC of Action Learning* (Surrey, England: Gower Publishing Limited, 2011); Michael J. Marquardt, *Optimizing the Power of Action Learning: Real-Time Strategies for Developing Leaders, Building Teams, and Transforming Organizations* (Boston, MA: Nicholas Brealey Publishing, 2011).

5. Michael J. Marquardt, "Harnessing the Power of Action Learning," National Science Foundation, *T&D* [Training and Development] 8, no. 6 (June 2004): 26–32, accessed 15 August 2016, https://www.nsf.gov/attachments/134059/public/PowerofActionLearning.pdf; Mary Stacey, "Action Learning: Addressing Today's Business Challenges While Developing Leaders for Tomorrow," Fresh Perspectives on Leadership Development (Toronto: Context Management Consulting, Inc., 2007).

6. Michael J. Marquardt, *Optimizing the Power of Action Learning*.

7. Malcolm Knowles, *The Modern Practice of Adult Education: From Pedagogy to Andragogy* (New York: Association Press, 1970).

8. See *New Directions for Adult and Continuing Education*, Wiley Periodicals, Inc., accessed 7 September 2016, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1002/%28ISSN%291536-0717.

9. Barry Boehm, *Spiral Development: Experience, Principles, and Refinements*, ed. Wilfred J. Hansen, Spiral Development Workshop Special Report, CMU/SEI-2000-SR-008, (Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie-Mellon Software Engineering Institute, July 2000).

10. Name withheld, Ukrainian airborne battalion chief of staff, in discussion with the authors, Yavoriv, Ukraine, March 2016.

11. Name withheld, Ukrainian airborne battalion deputy commander in discussion with the authors, Yavoriv, Ukraine, March 2016.

12. For the commander's role in the operations process, see Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0, *The Operations Process* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 2012). For the principles of mission command, see ADRP 6-0, *Mission Command* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 2012).

A Nepalese soldier carries a young earthquake victim to a medical triage area from a U.S Marine Corps UH-1Y Venom helicopter assigned to Joint Task Force 505 at Tribhuvan International Airport, Kathmandu, Nepal, after a 7.8-magnitude earthquake struck the country in April 2015. At the invitation of the Nepalese government, the U.S. government deployed an interagency task force and leveraged its network of commercial sources within the region to provide rapid and effective humanitarian assistance to the people of Nepal. (Photo by Gunnery Sgt. Ricardo Morales, U.S. Marine Corps)

Operational Contract Support

The Missing Ingredient in the Army Operating Concept

Maj. Gen. Edward F. Dorman, III, U.S. Army

Lt. Col. William C. Latham Jr., U.S. Army, Retired

The *U.S. Army Operating Concept* (AOC) describes how our future Army will prevent conflict and shape security environments while operating within a complex environment as part of the joint force. The concept highlights many of the capabilities required to shape security environments and conduct advanced expeditionary maneuver.[1]

The new concept, however, overlooks at least one essential factor that will shape future conflict for better or worse. Receiving no attention within the AOC, *operational contract support* (OCS)—the process of planning for and obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources in support of joint operations—has and will continue to play a critical role in our ability to deploy, fight, and win our nation's wars (see figure, page 55).[2]

This article demonstrates the importance of the OCS process within the AOC. Moreover, it highlights several key points about OCS that are important for Army commanders.

Importance of Operational Contract Support

OCS continues to be overlooked because commanders and planners tend to pigeonhole it as a sustainment function requiring attention only after major combat operations commence.[3] This tendency ignores three important facts.

First, Phase 0 (shaping) operations play a vital role in national security efforts. For example, during fiscal year (FY) 2014 in Africa, U.S. forces conducted sixty-eight missions, including counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief, and they supported eleven major exercises and 595 security cooperation activities designed to promote stability and prosperity. While some of these missions were Phase III (dominate) operations designed to find and defeat terrorist networks, the overwhelming majority were Phase 0 operations designed to help our allies and deter adversaries in a region of rapidly increasing strategic importance.[4]

Second, these types of operations depend heavily—and often totally—on commercial support. Geopolitical considerations, host-nation restrictions, and extended lines of communication often limit the size and shape of military deployments. However, soldiers who deploy must rely on commercial support for such basic needs as communications, base life support, and logistics.[5] To illustrate, the Army's 413th Contracting Support Brigade conducted twenty-nine expeditionary missions in the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) area of responsibility during FY 2016. These contracting activities supported deployed military forces while strengthening relations with our allies and building a reliable vendor base for future operations.[6]

Third, OCS provides more than just logistics. While access to commercial support significantly enhances sustainment capabilities, the OCS process also provides responsiveness, effectiveness, and efficiency across the full spectrum of warfighting capabilities and functions. These include security, construction, training, translators, and intelligence analysis. Military communications networks are especially dependent on commercial support. The Defense Information Systems Agency employs a series of contracts to provide the information-technology backbone that allow commanders to exercise mission command over far-flung operations around the globe.[7] As the Army confronts an era of shrinking force structure and increasing social, political, and economic complexity, the commander's ability

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Lt. Col. William C. Latham Jr., U.S. Army, retired, serves as the operational contract support integrator for the U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command at Fort Lee, Virginia. He holds a BA from Georgetown University and an MA from the University of Alaska Fairbanks. He has taught at the United States Military Academy, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and Army Logistics University. He is the author of *Cold Days in Hell: American POWs in Korea.*

From left to right, Frhadi Foroq, advisor for Afghanistan's Directorate of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock; Col. Alber Rivera, U.S. Army Reserve; and Capt. Jennifer Leathers and Maj. Anthony Evanego, both assigned to Provincial Reconstruction Team Farah, observe a solar-powered water pump 28 September 2013 during a meeting in Farah City, Afghanistan. The project was part of over $30 million in U.S. Agency for International Development, foreign aid, and commander emergency funds spent between 2005 and 2013 to rebuild roads and highways, fifteen schools, seven health care centers, several government buildings, agricultural structures, and orphanages, and for repairs to mosques and small business micro-grant support. (Photo by Lt. Chad A. Dulac, U.S. Navy)

to integrate OCS within his or her operational-design concept plays an increasingly important role.[8]

This is an important point. OCS enables commanders to respond effectively to a number of warfighting challenges identified within the AOC, including the Army's responsibility to shape security environments; provide security force assistance; conduct entry operations; conduct wide area security; and set the theater, sustain operations, and maintain freedom of movement.[9]

What Commanders Really Need to Know

Commanders need to know six key points about OCS:

- OCS is here to stay.
- OCS is a key enabler.
- OCS gets us there faster and smarter.
- OCS helps us set the theater.
- Planning usually works better than reacting.
- Ignorance is not bliss.

OCS is here to stay. U.S. military forces are more dependent than ever on contract support to execute contingency operations and other smaller-scale, combatant-commander-directed operations. That dependency is likely to increase based on two important trends within the U.S. military. The first trend is the series of decisions to accept risk within our force structure by shifting organic sustainment capability to the reserve component.[10] Reserve units now provide 71 percent of the Army's sustainment, including 92 percent of the Army's bulk-petroleum storage capability.[11] These forces will continue to play a critical role in future military operations, but policy and resource issues limit both their responsiveness and the frequency of their deployments.[12]

The second trend is a dramatic reduction in the deployment of large military formations, including

sustainment headquarters, during recent operations. This change reflects the Department of Defense's (DOD) strategy of developing "innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities."[13] Geopolitical considerations, geographic restrictions, and resource limitations all contribute to this pattern.[14] In the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, for example, contractors easily outnumber U.S. military personnel, with approximately forty-five thousand contractors currently supporting U.S. military operations, including more than two thousand contractors in Iraq.[15] With limited numbers of uniformed military personnel in theater, commanders will increasingly rely on commercial support to fill the gaps.



(Original figure from Joint Publication 4-10, *Operational Contract Support*; modified for *Military Review* by Arin Burgess)

Figure. Notional Operational Contract Support Actions by Phase of Operation

OCS is a key enabler. Dependence on commercial support need not be a limitation. Used properly, OCS provides a critical force multiplier, enabling commanders to deliver desired military and economic effects on a global scale without spending the time, money, and political capital to deploy additional soldiers and equipment.

During the U.S. military's 2010 humanitarian assistance mission in Haiti, for example, planners immediately leveraged existing commercial-shipping contracts and hired vehicles and drivers from the neighboring Dominican Republic. They reopened port facilities and began movement of critical relief supplies to earthquake victims within forty-eight hours after the earthquake. Within fifteen days, U.S. military and commercial assets had combined to deliver 9,529 tons of goods and 6,387 relief personnel, including the 82nd Airborne Division's 2nd Brigade Combat Team. Reliance solely on military transportation assets would have been significantly slower and less effective, but the ability to leverage commercial partners provided strategic flexibility and depth in the midst of major combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.[16]

To achieve these effects, commanders must integrate OCS early within the conceptual-planning phase of the operations process. This integration begins at the geographic combatant commander's level, where planners must link strategic and operational OCS effects to campaign objectives. This process begins with two critical tasks: analysis of political, military,

economic, social, infrastructure, and information factors; and joint intelligence preparation of the operating environment. Completion of these tasks ensures a clear linkage between specific OCS tasks and the theater campaign plan, operation plans, and related support plans. These planning actions set the context and drive key OCS-related staff functions, such as the joint requirements review board, that enable the commander to maintain situational awareness and exercise effective mission command.

Failure to integrate OCS increases the cost and reduces the precision, efficiency, and effectiveness of military efforts. It can also generate significant friction between the U.S. military and its partners inside and outside the U.S. government. Recent accounts of the infamous $43 million gas station in Afghanistan, for example, suggest both poor analysis and a lack of synchronization between the DOD, the State Department, and the Afghan government.[17] The United States can do better.

OCS gets us there faster and smarter. OCS enables U.S. forces to conduct expeditionary operations more rapidly and effectively. American forces currently operate in places where a large uniformed military presence is not feasible or desirable. Fortunately, our unified-action team includes supporting commands and agencies, such as United States Transportation Command and the Defense Logistics Agency, whose suppliers provide extant networks possessing regional expertise. These partners can assist in overcoming issues such as customs and diplomatic-clearance delays. They can also build relationships with host-nation vendors, assess infrastructure, and provide the equipment, materiel, facilities, and expertise to facilitate early entry.

OCS helps us set the theater. We cannot conduct expeditionary movement and maneuver without the ability to rapidly deploy forces on a global scale. OCS allows U.S. forces to set the theater, sustain operations, and maintain freedom of movement. This warfighting challenge represents an essential U.S. Army responsibility whenever our nation sends military forces to conduct land-based operations. Meeting this challenge begins in Phase 0, when commanders engage in joint and multinational operations and various interagency activities "to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships with friends and allies."[18] The Army relies on OCS to support Phase 0 requirements such as military engagement and security force assistance missions and the pre-positioning of equipment.

It is difficult for pundits and policymakers to measure the impact of these missions, and even more difficult to appreciate the enormous impact of OCS on their success. When we deploy soldiers to train and assist regional military forces in sub-Saharan Africa, for example, we do not deploy large military sustainment headquarters to support them. Instead, those training teams depend on local contractors for everything from food, fuel, and field services to translators and communications. Our pre-positioned equipment and stocks, meanwhile, provide us with forward-deployed combat power around the world, but we cannot afford to station soldiers with that equipment in order to maintain it. Instead, the Army relies on contractors to secure, maintain, and repair these pre-positioned equipment sets, whether on land or afloat.[19]

Setting the theater during Phase 0 also involves identifying and validating reliable vendors for the provision of services and commodities. This critical process enables U.S. forces to rapidly expand local sources of commercial support when necessary, while reducing the risk of inadvertently funding criminal or enemy networks.[20] Planned carefully, these efforts also contribute directly to a commander's economic and social objectives, while improving security and stability within the operational area.

Planning usually works better than reacting. Unfortunately, commanders and staff officers commonly ignore OCS until a crisis erupts, when it is too late to plan and execute an effective OCS process, much less incorporate that process within the commander's operational design. Recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan suggests that our reliance on OCS will escalate as we transition from Phase 0 into a contingency operational mode. In turn, that escalation will challenge commanders' ability to maintain situational awareness of contracts, contractors, and contract facilities and equipment supporting the operation.

Control measures such as Theater Business Clearance guidance and the contract integration and validation process provide the commander with some visibility over the status of OCS within the joint operational area.[21] Developed in a vacuum, however, these tools can provide more hindrance than help, delaying the arrival of critical capabilities in theater.

Personnel distribute U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) hygiene kits at a cholera treatment center 28 October 2010 in Verrettes in the Artibonite department of Haiti. Existing commercial-shipping contracts allowed for rapid distribution of critical supplies during the crisis. (Photo by Kendra Helmer, USAID)

To avoid delays and better integrate OCS at the operational level, joint doctrine recommends establishment of an OCS integration cell within geographic combatant commands, joint task forces, and service–component-command staffs. Doctrinally, the OCS integration cell leads OCS planning and execution oversight across the joint force and serves as the primary hub for OCS-related information, including data from the contract integration and validation process.[22] This OCS common operating picture provides visibility, enabling the commander to anticipate and integrate OCS solutions within his or her larger operational design.

Ignorance is not bliss. To put it bluntly, OCS is the wrong area to accept risk. OCS has its own rules, regulations, processes, and procedures. These can be cumbersome and complex, but they are designed to ensure good stewardship of taxpayers' money, a critical task in the current fiscal environment.

Moreover, each commander has an obligation to establish an ethical climate. This obligation often comes into direct conflict with the constant temptation to cut corners in order to expedite OCS activities. Commanders who learn and enforce the rules will prevent fraud, waste, and abuse, while avoiding embarrassment, distractions, and adverse administrative and legal actions.[23]

Conversely, commanders should not blindly accept lengthy and bureaucratic staffing procedures that interfere with effective decisions regarding OCS. Parallel planning, running estimates, staff assistance visits, and web-based information sharing will improve knowledge management across the force while enabling subordinate commanders to acquire the necessary decisions, funding, and contract support to accomplish their missions.[24]

What Right Looks Like

On 25 April 2015, a 7.8-magnitude earthquake devastated the nation of Nepal, destroying homes, damaging

infrastructure, triggering avalanches, and killing thousands. The United States responded within hours. Special operations teams already in Nepal provided immediate relief and medical support, and the Office of the U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) within the U.S. Agency for International Development deployed a disaster-assistance relief team on DOD aircraft. Meanwhile, the OFDA representative at USPACOM headquarters in Hawaii initiated coordination with military counterparts to assess potential DOD support capabilities. Concurrently, a coalition of United Nations partners began preparing relief packages for shipment to Nepal.[25]

The severely damaged international airport at Kathmandu quickly became a bottleneck that delayed the international relief effort. Fortunately, USPACOM planners were able to work with commercial partners on the ground in Nepal, such as Deutsche Post DHL Group, to provide real-time intelligence, identify capability gaps, and provide local expertise and ground-support equipment to help reopen the airport as the main reception point for international aid.

The existing U.S. relationship with the contractors in place accelerated the USPACOM staff's ability to conduct joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment and establish a distribution network. The relationships and resulting quick action contributed directly to the success of the U.S. mission.[26]

Conclusion

British historian Sir Michael Howard argued, "The roots of victory and defeat often have to be sought far from the battlefield in political, economic, and social factors."[27] OCS can influence the social, cultural, economic, human, moral, and psychological dimensions simultaneously, and thus it has the potential to shape future military campaigns. By integrating OCS within operational design, commanders will leverage the power of commercial support to effectively frame the operational environment, initiate and develop relationships, and, when necessary, enable a rapid response to crises.

Winning in a complex environment requires the integration of simultaneous actions across multiple domains along multiple lines of operation. In creating multiple dilemmas for our enemy, we must learn to optimize our ability to fully leverage all available resources and extant networks. OCS provides the ability to quickly and flexibly establish nonstandard mechanisms—such as commercial providers and facilities—that can dramatically expand both operational flexibility and freedom of movement.

The current atmosphere of fiscal austerity has forced senior leaders to accept risk within certain warfighting functions.[28] OCS can and does mitigate these risks. Managed carefully, the OCS process balances organic capabilities with those external capabilities already extant within a given theater. The wise commander will operationalize OCS by involving the entire planning staff, not simply the logisticians, to identify, synchronize, and leverage commercial support capabilities across the joint enterprise partners as part of the larger joint operational planning process.[29]

This article suggests the importance of the OCS process within the Army operating concept. That process enables a "set theater" from which to operate, increases available options, enhances rapid transition to crisis, and complements kinetic effects to shape desired outcomes. OCS also reduces large-scale support requirements and enhances the operational flexibility of expeditionary forces by leveraging extant local networks and infrastructure.

Finally, OCS provides fiscal stewardship through its inclusion within the operational planning and design of any operation. This thought process must begin at the strategic level during Phase 0 with an understanding of transition points during subsequent phases of operations. Commanders and planners who understand these considerations and factor them into campaign objectives will provide the appropriate capability and capacity required to produce desired mission outcomes and effects. ■

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A paratrooper with the 82nd Airborne Division's 1st Brigade Combat Team passes before the rising sun during a patrol into a village 4 May 2012 in Ghazni Province, Afghanistan. The equipment on his back is used to block remotely detonated improvised explosive devices. (Photo by Sgt. Michael J. MacLeod, U.S. Army)

New Business Practices for Army Acquisition

Lt. Col. Rafael Rodriguez, U.S. Army
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Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) Gen. Mark A. Milley has stated that U.S. military superiority is disappearing and that improved strategic planning is needed to maintain qualitative dominance beyond 2025.[1] Milley describes a future force structure based mainly on smaller units acting in disaggregated teams that can combine into larger formations so the Army can meet the demands of asymmetrical, peer,

and near-peer conflicts.[2] The outdated and inflexible acquisition system is not adequate to meet the needs of future force structure and engagement. Strategic planning needs to integrate how the Army acquisition system will equip soldiers with technologies and innovative solutions. This article discusses new business practices that would enable the acquisition system to field more near-term innovative capabilities faster and support preparation for future operations.

Milley can improve the acquisition process using existing authorities and targeted recommendations to Congress on how to enhance the CSA's role in acquisition. For instance, by exerting influence through provisions in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (the FY 16 NDAA), enacted 25 November 2015, the CSA can reshape the acquisition enterprise to more effectively meet his stated objectives of improving operational readiness, aligning Army modernization to future operations, and preparing soldiers to operate in a variable global environment.[3]

Fortunately, Milley's term as CSA coincides with increasing congressional support for tweaking the Army acquisition process to create a service provider/customer business model. In his testimony at his 2015 nomination hearing, and in his recommendations to Congress regarding the NDAA acquisition authorities in March 2016, Milley acknowledged the opportunity to increase his role in acquisition to meet the needs of current and future land forces.[4]

The Opportunity to Improve Army Acquisition

While an increase in the CSA's influence on acquisition represents a positive change, more change is needed. The media have reported widely on concerns over the U.S. military's seeming inability to meet increasing global threats to U.S. security. Amid these concerns, Congress has been calling for the military service chiefs to have an increased role in Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition to ensure their operational needs are aligned with the acquisition community's priorities and investments.[5]

Policies such as Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5000.02, *Operation of the Defense Acquisition System*; Army Regulation (AR) 70-1, *Army Acquisition Policy*; and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01I, *Joint Capabilities Integration Development System* (JCIDS), all allow for rapid, flexible, and agile acquisition.[6] Their policy guidance, however, is essentially undone by the Army's organizational culture. That culture lacks a synchronized purpose and shared objectives; sustains a multilayer bureaucracy that impedes acquisition policy by overimplementing, overmanaging, and overregulating; and tolerates entrenched organizational agendas.[7]

These organizational and cultural impediments have an inhibiting effect on positive change and reform. Instead of removing these impediments, and moving toward eliminating centrist organizational agendas and a burgeoning multilayer bureaucracy, leaders are often incentivized to defend their turf, so they request additional resources to cover the cost of bureaucratic processes. In the absence of shared Army goals, and in response to increasing oversight, organizations default to this common mantra: "more money, more people." This situation illuminates why culture change is needed—to focus on maximizing the flexibility of the acquisition system to meet shared priorities and operational objectives.

The Army can improve how it conducts business. It needs to identify and resolve the core problems and obstacles within the acquisition system. Now that the FY 16 NDAA has begun to address acquisition

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problems, the CSA and the secretary of the Army can advocate for and influence strategic planning that synchronizes Army operational needs and objectives with acquisition planning. This will free up senior leaders to sharply focus resources on achieving mission objectives with fewer individuals, organizations, and resources.

The Need to Improve Army Acquisition

Acquisition has three major pillars: *identification* of the capabilities needed through the JCIDS; *resourcing* the capabilities via the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process; and *execution* of programs by science and technology (S&T) and research and development (R&D) organizations, program executive officers (PEOs), and their program managers (PMs).[8]

There have been many attempts to reform DOD and Army acquisition over the last fifty years, most intending to overcome inherent bureaucratic and incentive-driven practices (some say counter-incentive-driven practices). However, reform has been stymied because of inertia due to entrenched organizational stakeholder equities and a bureaucracy that believes in overlapping oversight.[9] A 2009 report published by the Business Executives for National Security describes the DOD's acquisition process evolution as not reflecting "any rational overall design. It is, rather, a collection of Band-Aids laid over other Band-Aids, each an incremental measure intended to fix a narrowly defined problem."[10]

Within Army acquisition practices, senior leaders rarely are authorized to make wholesale change, and they do not stay in their positions long enough to see change through. Consequently, enacting total acquisition system reform has been nearly impossible, leaving minor incremental improvements as the most pragmatic approach.[11] Unfortunately, many improvements made in this manner have exacerbated the underlying problems. In a 2015 review of acquisition reforms enacted between 1980s and 2015, the Center for Strategic and International Studies found that "despite many implemented reforms being apparent 'successes,' the problems of cost and schedule growth have remained significant and persistent."[12] They have increased the amount of oversight and documentation rather than identifying meaningful business practices that would reduce cost and time and eliminate needless layers of oversight.

The authors of this article, members of a team from the Chief of Staff of the Army Strategic Studies Group (CSA SSG), offered recommendations for facilitating rapid capability development in an article in the September-October 2016 issue of *Military Review*.[13] The previous article, "Strategic Acquisition for Effective Innovation," explained why the Army needs a rapid acquisition and innovation organization modeled after those within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the other services. Such an organization could deliver objective, analytics-based capability recommendations to the CSA and the secretary of the Army. This article extends the discussion by proposing new business practices that would focus Army priorities, maximize investments, and rapidly assess solutions through prototyping and experimentation.

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Maj. Gen. Cedric T. Wins (left), commanding general of the U.S. Army Research, Development and Engineering Command (RDECOM), learns about a prototype version of the Joint Tactical Aerial Resupply Vehicle from Sgt. 1st Class Daniel Guenther (right), an enlisted advisor at the U.S. Army Research Laboratory Weapons and Materials Research Directorate 8 September 2016 at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. (Photo by Conrad Johnson, RDECOM)

To identify good business practices for acquisition, the authors reviewed the Air Force's Rapid Capabilities Office, the OSD's Strategic Capabilities Office, and the Office of Naval Research TechSolutions and SwampWorks programs. In addition, they explored successful research, development, and acquisition business practices used by U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). The effectiveness of USSOCOM's practices illustrates that the Army could overcome its reduced unity of command, which results from bifurcated authority chains.[14] This bifurcation impairs the requirements, resourcing, and execution phases of the acquisition process.[15] A key aspect of the USSOCOM business model is its single chain of command that authorizes the commanding general of USSOCOM to have oversight over the USSOCOM Acquisition Executive. This organizational structure creates a single pathway for articulating and acting on operational needs and priorities that are understood across its enterprise. The Army could mitigate the negative impacts of its bifurcated system by streamlining the enterprise to create enduring organizational processes that better align acquisition activities across the under secretary of the Army and the Army staff.

Furthermore, the PPBE funding process conditions Army organizations to seek sustained funding through materiel programs without consideration of nonmateriel or less sexy technology solutions. This promotes not only a harmful stovepipe culture but also an insatiable appetite for resources. This situation may have been manageable in the past, but the expanding operational requirements of the Army, coupled with the increasing nondiscretionary cost of

Army personnel, are more than can be funded. Not all acquisition programs can continue in perpetuity if the Army plans to have resources for emerging threats and needs.

The Way to Improve Army Acquisition

The FY 16 NDAA included language in its Acquisition Policy and Management sections affecting two aspects of defense acquisition.[16] First, it provided language reforming the CSA's current acquisition responsibilities—changes that created some controversy between civilian acquisition leadership and the uniformed services' leadership over the separation of duties established by the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act.[17]

Second, it called for the service chiefs to review their authorities under Title 10, U.S. Code, and all subordinate acquisition statutes and regulations. They were to report to Congress in March 2016 on how their roles should be revised to improve overall acquisition responsiveness.

Under the NDAA, defense acquisition's goal is "to meet the needs of its customer in the most cost-effective manner practicable."[18] The law defines the "customer" as the military service having the primary responsibility for fielding newly acquired systems. Further, the customer is now represented by the respective service secretary and the military service chief.

It is clear that these reforms will enhance the chiefs' role in acquisition. However, the NDAA's amendments are also littered with qualifiers such as "strongly consider," "advise," and "assist."[19] Nor did the FY 16 NDAA repeal Section 2546 of Title 10, which provides specifically for civilian management of the acquisition system. Rather, these reforms are really about influence—who gets more of it and who gets less. Additionally, these reforms shift the balance of influence within the system closer to the services—and their chiefs. However, they do not eliminate the OSD or service acquisition executives or their authorities.[20]

The importance of influence should not be underestimated—especially when backed up by a congressional mandate and, perhaps more important, continued congressional interest. That influence could give the chiefs a louder, if not quite deafening, voice at a very crowded table. Accordingly, since the chiefs were required to submit additional recommendations to Congress in March 2016, it was clear that Congress had not yet completed this round of acquisition reform—a fact that may further enhance the chiefs' influence over time.

Milley's recommendations in March 2016 included establishing an Army Rapid Capabilities Office (ARCO), which would be similar to the Air Force's rapid capability business model. The ARCO would increase his influence on critical R&D investments. A key objective would be to increase operational prototyping of promising technologies within a streamlined acquisition organization.

Acquisition and Near-Term Capabilities

Section 804 of the FY 16 NDAA, "Middle Tier of Acquisition for Rapid Prototyping and Rapid Fielding," provides the undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics the opportunity to shrink the bloated bureaucracy. According to Section 804, in coordination with the service chiefs and DOD comptroller, the undersecretary may establish middle-tier programs using an expedited process waiving the JCIDS and DODI 5000.02 requirements. These middle-tier programs must address near-term capability needs, i.e., they must be able to begin production within six months of program initiation and be completely fielded within five years. This streamlining for developing and fielding near-term capabilities is similar to the USSOCOM acquisition model, in which senior leadership's priorities are executed within an environment that appropriately tailors an acquisition approach and then fully resources its needs.

Precedent exists for the CSA to influence near-term capability development and prioritization of needs through programs such as the Rapid Equipping Force, Asymmetric Warfare Group, and others. These rapid acquisition activities were mobilized to accelerate fielding equipment during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan for urgent warfighter needs. While these ad hoc programs succeeded at meeting immediate operational needs, they were urgent workarounds to a cumbersome acquisition process that failed to respond to operational needs quickly. Acquisition's underlying problems are exacerbated during conflict, when warfighters are in harm's way.

Therefore, the natural tendency is to work around the system rather than fix it.

A postconflict regression from wartime, operations-based, innovative solutions to the lethargic traditional acquisition methods would rob the Army of innovative thinking and technological discovery. Reverting to the prewar methodologies for acquisition also would bury good business practices such as early prototyping and experimentation prior to product development. The establishment of the ARCO would be a positive step for institutionalizing innovation and rapid solutions.

The National Defense University's Center for Technology and National Security Policy report titled *A Strategic Vision and a New Management Approach for the Department of the Navy's Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) Portfolio* provides recommendations for the Navy that are similar to the ARCO concept.[21] The report advocates for consistent resourcing of "early experimentation and operational demonstrations of new technology-driven capabilities to get warfighter buy-in on requirements, specifications, and capabilities before initiation of a major product development."[22] Fortunately, the Army's ability to rapidly build prototypes and operationally assess innovative technologies and their impact on tactics, techniques, and procedures can be applied using the new NDAA middle-tier prototyping and fielding authorities in conjunction with the ARCO. Strategies and program plans for critical capability prototyping can be generated using analysis-based and operationally vetted inputs from organizations such as the Army's Research, Development and Engineering Command (RDECOM) in collaboration with Army internal and external organizations. With the removal of the organizational barriers that have overwhelmed the flexibility of the JCIDS and DODI 5000.02, the CSA can influence a streamlined prototyping and fielding process. That process could effectively address the CSA's highest priorities and align the Army acquisition community with shared Army objectives and end states that are informed by operational and technical analyses.

Acquisition and the Future Force—2030 and Beyond

In addition to Milley's views on improving processes to acquire near-term materiel capabilities, he recognizes that the Army community must collectively understand and visualize future operating environments before the Army can build an S&T investment framework for 2030, and beyond. At a minimum, the Army's understanding of the future must be "more right" than our enemies' future framework. To build the future force, the CSA can leverage the current momentum for change to drive thinking on what future operating environments may look like. In this way, he can start influencing Army organizations to focus on shared end states.

The Army's understanding of the future must be "more right" than our enemies' future framework.

The Army needs to adopt certain entrepreneurial business practices and success metrics to redefine what success means in future product and materiel development. For example, leaders in industry view and reward success based on what is produced with specified resources that meet performance objectives in a timely manner. On the other hand, Army leaders typically represent their success based on organizational charts and funding levels, as though the level of resources they manage and spend equates to success. Government leaders sometimes criticize industry for being too profit focused, but perhaps the Army's "profit" or outcomes should be defined as solutions to soldiers' problems that are produced in the fastest, simplest, and most efficient manner.

Another business practice that could help the Army maintain an advantage is to seek divergent thinking from multidisciplinary groups that span government, industry, futurists, and academia. The critical outputs from diverse groups on future operating environments and concepts can help create the foundation for acquisition and R&D strategies that unify the Army enterprise. By generating operational concepts based on a shared vision of the future and vetted across many types of thinkers, senior leaders are provided with information and data to make tough decisions today, such as divestment of weapon systems to make resources available for future capability.

Another useful practice for vetting technologies and operational concepts is capturing technical and operational data from early concept prototyping, systems integration, war-gaming, and other efforts. Currently, prototyping, systems integration, and war-gaming are discrete activities and are not guided by a consistent future vision. The outputs, therefore, do not provide guidance to the Army as a whole. Moreover, the results of these activities are often disconnected from the JCIDS process, and they tend to be biased by organizational interests. A more unified approach is needed.

Soldiers remove ammunition and supplies from the autonomous, unmanned Squad Mission Support System during a robotics demonstration 7 August 2014 at Fort Benning, Georgia. (Photo courtesy of U.S. Army)

For that approach to work, the CSA needs a network of trusted agents to provide objective and unbiased information and data. These trusted agents must be disinterested with regard to branch, lab, and PMs. Making the best investment decisions to meet the Army's needs will require a clear, robust, and objective process for analyzing and vetting potential solutions. Organizations such as RDECOM and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ASA[ALT]) can develop analysis-driven S&T and R&D strategic plans that fall within budgetary constraints. Those plans can apply realistic return-on-investment metrics, and they can drive a streamlined acquisition process that is responsive to the CSA's priorities.

Conclusion

The improvements guided by the FY 16 NDAA provide senior leadership an opportunity to drive effective changes in Army acquisition. The CSA can influence S&T and R&D investments to meet near- and far-term priorities by leveraging successful practices now in use at RDECOM, ASA(ALT), and in the other military services. The CSA can identify and eliminate wasteful practices that have outlived their usefulness and that no longer support operations effectively.

With this approach, the CSA can influence today's capabilities and systems and prepare for the Army's

future challenges. Most important, the CSA can join forces with the other service chiefs and the secretary of the Army to facilitate improvements already under way for enabling needed technology-based capabilities to be identified, demonstrated, vetted, and acquired efficiently.[23]

In addition, the Army should expand successful practices such as war-gaming and future-gazing exercises, prototyping, and experimentation before product development. It should explore using existing venues such as combat training center exercises for assessing non-program-of-record capabilities, and it should assess innovative materiel and nonmateriel solutions generated by soldiers during operations to solve challenging problems. In this way, a more competitive R&D environment would meet needs with the resources available. The greatest challenge is to change the existing culture, but through a shared vision of the future and modified incentives for the organizations that support capability development, the culture may begin to evolve. ■

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Conceptions of Leadership

U.S. and African Models

Maj. John D. McRae II, U.S. Army National Guard

Cultural understanding is a prerequisite for effective interoperability, the gold standard to which the U.S. military aspires as it operates alongside partner militaries. Unfortunately, our history reveals numerous instances where this standard was neglected, usually leading to frustration, lack of progress, and incomplete objectives. In Africa, a continent with over two thousand languages and three thousand ethnic groups, the cultural differences between the U.S. military and our African military partners can be particularly pronounced, resulting in insufficient plans to address U.S. and partner needs.[1] For bilateral and multilateral events developed by the U.S. military, we must take into consideration our partners' specific conceptions of leadership and their force capabilities if the events are to be truly feasible, acceptable, and suitable for the participants.

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An academic research program known as the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness (GLOBE) program created a model that is employed by ethnographic researchers to study how leadership and cultural domains intersect across numerous distinct dimensions. Researchers using this model consider nine factors in their analysis: uncertainty avoidance, power distance, societal collectivism, in-group collectivism, gender egalitarianism, assertiveness, future orientation, performance orientation, and humane orientation.[2]

This research model provides significant insight into why certain cultures conceive of leadership differently. For example, some cultures place a high value on "learning from mistakes," whereas others have a much more punitive mind-set with respect to errors.[3] Other cultures place a high value on the immediate, whereas others consider a leader's near-term emphasis to be rash and impetuous. It is important to note these differences are more than just stylistic. Accounting for a partner nation's cultural outlook is fundamental to constructing effective theater security cooperation activities. To that end, some broad cultural leadership attributes should be accounted for based on existing research.

Leader Styles

One important dimension of GLOBE research is centered on the prevailing leader styles in different cultures. Culled from a list of twenty-one leader attributes, the six leader styles include

- charismatic/value-based style,
- team-oriented style,
- participative style,
- humane style,
- self-protective style, and
- autonomous style.[4]

When initiating fresh partnerships, it is helpful to conduct an initial comparison between the prevailing U.S. style and that of our African partners. It becomes apparent almost immediately that our approaches can differ widely. GLOBE research shows the charismatic style is most valued in the United States, with self-protective

U.S. Marine Corps Maj. Keith Vital speaks to Armed Forces of Liberia soldiers about their mission and progress during a field training exercise 25 February 2009 at Camp Sandee S. Ware in Careysburg District, Liberia. (Photo by Sgt. Elsa Portillo, U.S. Marine Corps)

coming in last.[5] Charismatic style, defined by outward passion, a guiding vision, and an inspirational demeanor, resonates in the U.S. military culture accustomed to a certain amount of command swagger.[6] In contrast, a team-oriented approach, one predicated on loyalty and cooperation, is favored by black respondents in South Africa.[7] Meanwhile, in Morocco, a participative style that pushes leaders down into the trenches with their team members is the favored approach.[8]

In the aforementioned countries, these values represent the inherent understanding of how a leader behaves. As such, U.S. doctrinal and cultural models are often incorrect for developing African leaders of all echelons. African models must serve as the primary basis for African curriculum development, professionalization initiatives, and capability development efforts. By transplanting Western models onto African militaries, U.S. envoys risk a fundamental failure of recognizing the environment generating these leader models as well as the environment in which they will soon be required to operate. For U.S. military leaders and planners, these dynamics must also be examined on a personal level when considering how best to engage African leaders. Being cognizant of one's personal bearing and comportment is an important part of dealing with African counterparts, for even the most culturally nested plan cannot overcome a tone-deaf presentation.

The modern French experience in Africa provides an example of a carefully developed and culturally attuned approach to partnering. A 2006 *Military Review* article by retired French Col. Henri Boré details the significant amount of thought and preparation that he and his compatriots invested to ensure the effectiveness of their unconventional warfare efforts alongside African partners. This groundwork was exhaustive and time intensive, but it frequently resulted in a number of mission-essential insights. Boré writes of the sometimes-jarring learning process:

> There are beliefs and practices below the cultural surface that many Westerners miss or find difficult to fathom: a company commander in Chad shooting one of his lieutenants in the head for lack of respect in front of the unit; a captain, native of the south of Mauritania, paying obedience to his second lieutenant, who was a member of a dominant northern

U.S. military members from the Defense Medical Readiness Training Institute and infantrymen from 3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, join with soldiers from the Gabonese Armed Forces for a huddle during a tactical combat casualty care course 17 June 2016 while participating in Central Accord 2016 in Libreville, Gabon. U.S. Army Africa conducts the exercise annually with joint and multinational partners to practice and demonstrate proficiency in conducting peacekeeping operations. (Photo by Tech Sgt. Brian Kimball, U.S. Army Africa)

tribe; regular soldiers killing women and children execution-style in Rwanda.[9]

These vignettes suggest a fundamentally different set of leader dynamics facing African militaries, dynamics that are not easily addressed with the French or U.S. military leadership models. As Boré concludes from his time in Africa, a fresh way of thinking was essential when endeavoring to enter any new country, noting, "Altogether, we were deeply aware that cultural adjustments were vital to mission accomplishment."[10]

Meeting the Mark: Plan Ahead

Many other considerations exist at the operational and strategic levels. If the first step in constructing leader engagements is recognizing the cultural divide, the next step must be integrating this knowledge into the broader aspects of our interactions with our African partners. Aid organizations often speak of the risk of oversaturation in developing areas of Africa, or the introduction of assistance beyond what a community can reasonably manage. A similar risk exists for the U.S. military with dropping a heavily resourced, exhaustively researched, technology-facilitated system of leading troops like mission command on a partner military with neither the resources nor the cultural orientation necessary to make it work.

In addition to the differing cultural leadership styles previously mentioned, the spectrum of cultural comfort with decentralized decision-making demands close attention. One cause of the disinclination to empower subordinates is the very different focus of U.S. and African organizations, given their entirely different threat orientations. Whereas the United States looks outward with an expeditionary mindset, threats facing African militaries skew internally.[11] For domestically focused African militaries often closely tied to political leadership, ceding control to lower echelons might seem excessively risky. Thus, mission command, while a suitable approach for a large and complex expeditionary organization like the U.S. military, might not be the ideal fit for African militaries.

If U.S. leaders determine an alternate command-and-control model is indeed appropriate, a study of African national leadership competencies can be a helpful guide. A Center for Creative Leadership study illustrates some fascinating points concerning the comparative strengths and weaknesses of African

states. In West African states, perception of leadership competencies demonstrated particularly high marks for resourcefulness; however, their metrics for the nuts-and-bolts skill of "leading employees" was quite low.[12] In southern African states, the favorable attribute of decisiveness placed in the top half of leader attributes, whereas self-awareness placed near the bottom.[13] For U.S. leaders, knowledge of these dynamics and others is critical to crafting effective strategies to meet partner needs. In addition to these culturally ingrained leadership attributes, there are existing military doctrines that cannot be easily overridden. For the U.S. military, well-intentioned initiatives that nonetheless run counter to doctrinal processes inculcated in our African partners can create cognitive dissonance and challenge their ability to learn. Worse yet, partner resentment or the frustrated abandonment of U.S. techniques could undermine the strength of the partnership itself.

A great number of resources exist for U.S. leaders to consult prior to engaging with African partners. One such resource is the Africa Center for Strategic Studies at Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. The center provides a wealth of in-depth, country- and region-specific research to inform involved parties on the numerous institutional and environmental issues facing leaders in the partner country.[14] The Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is a resource that combines its archival journal material with tutorials on how to utilize a variety of freely available military databases.[15] Finally, the African Leadership Centre at King's College London has extensive monographs, working papers, studies, and podcasts devoted to the study of leadership on the African continent.[16] These resources, in concert with a mindset oriented toward optimizing the many existing positive African leader attributes, form the foundation of a constructive and mutually rewarding connection.

African militaries fill a spectrum of roles and operate in a range of dynamic environments. This demands an adaptive spirit familiar to those in the U.S. military growing accustomed to an expanding range of missions around the globe. Approached correctly, African and U.S. militaries can adapt to face our respective challenges side by side. Success in these partnerships lies not in modeling African militaries in the United States' likeness, but in understanding, leveraging, and complementing our distinct strengths. ■

Notes

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4. Center for Creative Leadership (CCL), "Leader Effectiveness and Culture: The GLOBE Study," CCL website, 2014, accessed 19 August 2016, http://www.ccl.org/leadership/pdf/assessments/globe-study.pdf. GLOBE researchers utilize geographic areas rather than specific countries as the primary means of organizing their research. The two geographic areas relevant to the African continent are "The Middle East," which includes North Africa, and "Sub-Saharan Africa."

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7. Ibid., 6. The study's authors distinguish between white and black respondents in South Africa as a means of controlling for the pronounced Western-European and African attitudinal split there.

8. Ibid.

9. Henri Boré, "Cultural Awareness and Irregular Warfare: French Army Experience in Africa," *Military Review* 86, no. 4 (July-August 2006): 111, accessed 22 August 2016, http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20060831_art016.pdf.

10. Ibid.

11. Joseph Soeters and Audrey Van Ouytsel, "The Challenge of Diffusing Military Professionalism in Africa," *Armed Forces & Society* 40, no. 2 (2014): 252–68. This is a pronounced difference, as expeditionary and territorial armies are manned, trained, and equipped according to very different sets of needs. There is also the dual role that African militaries often fill of military-police force, yet another factor for Western militaries to account for when squaring their own orientation with that of their African partners.

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Members of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and the French army's Operation Sangaris force conduct security February 2016 in Bangui, Central African Republic (CAR). French soldiers initially were deployed to the CAR in December 2013 to prevent a humanitarian crisis; two thousand deployed by February 2014. As of July 2016, Sangaris had downsized to 350 French troops, and MINUSCA was the primary international security force in the CAR. (Photo by Staff of the Armed Forces of France)

Operation Sangaris

A Case Study in Limited Military Intervention

Maj. Rémy Hémez, French Army

On 5 December 2013, France launched Operation Sangaris in the Central African Republic (CAR). In the days that followed, there were harsh debates about the operation's likely effectiveness. Critics pointed to the low numbers of French and multinational troops, given the complexity of the mission and the scale of the operational area. They also pointed out that, in terms of military effectiveness, Operation Sangaris appeared likely to be less effective than Operation Serval (2013–2014), despite their fundamentally different natures. Serval was launched in Mali eleven months prior, and "many French and foreign observers were surprised by both the swiftness of the deployment and the promptness of results."[1]

However, in Sangaris, French soldiers did have successes: they were able to adapt to the context and become militarily effective.[2] Indeed, Sangaris did not resolve the CAR's crisis, but it helped avoid genocide, it jump-started the disarmament process while fostering a nascent administrative structure, and it restored the supply of essential goods—all of this with relatively few casualties.[3] Above all, Sangaris managed to be a "bridging operation" to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, known as MINUSCA, and bridging to MINUSCA was the desired end state.[4]

Therefore, Sangaris shows how adapting at tactical and operational levels and accepting risk can ensure a limited military intervention achieves the desired end state. Nonetheless, questions about the sustainability of the end state conditions are warranted, and we address them here.

A Look at the Numbers

The number of international and French forces combined in the CAR increased from 4,500 in December 2013 to 11,700 in August 2015. France deployed 1,600 troops in December 2013, their number grew to 2,000 in February 2014, and French forces were reduced to 900 in June 2015. The Africa-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic, known as MISCA, provided 4,500 soldiers as of December 2013, later replaced by MINUSCA.[5] By August 2015, MINUSCA had 10,800 troops in the CAR. The European Union force, known as EUFOR-RCA, deployed 700 soldiers in June 2014. These numbers, depending on the period under examination, represent a 1.1 to 2.2 ratio of soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants—far lower than standard force recommendations for a stabilization operation.[6] Experts recommend 10–20 soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants.[7] Moreover, these contingents had to execute a complex mission in the midst of an ethnic-religious civil war, and in a country as vast as France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg combined—622,000 square kilometers with approximately 5.3 million inhabitants. This is a great example of the basic disconnect between Western doctrine that calls for large deployments in stabilization operations and current Western political views that seek to avoid large deployments.

This relatively low level of French troop deployment was the result of cyclical, structural, and cultural causes. In reality, in December 2013, the French army was already overstretched: 7,400 French soldiers were deployed in operations abroad and 11,640 were employed as presence and sovereignty forces.[8] One can add to this the reluctance of staff members and policy makers to embark on a new stabilization mission that promised to be long and difficult.

Structurally, the French army has drastically reduced its size since the end of the Cold War: from 669,904 in 1990 to 270,849 in 2014. According to the 2013 *French White Paper on Defence and National Security*, the French army must be able to deploy 15,000 soldiers for 6 months to a main theater and 7,000–8,000 soldiers to a secondary theater.[9] French armies are not designed for long-term stabilization missions involving high numbers of troops but rather are built for "strategic raid/expeditionary model" operations. Culturally, France is accustomed to "operational frugality." Since 1964, it has conducted more than 50 operations in 20 African countries. The operations, aside from Operation Licorne (2002–2015) in the Ivory Coast and Operation Serval in Mali, were almost always carried out with relatively few troops, usually between 1,000 and 3,000. This may have created the image of a French model of intervention in Africa able to produce results at a relatively low cost.

Military Effectiveness through Adaption

Does low-level troop deployment in a stabilization operation impair military effectiveness? Since the Vietnam War, we have known that numbers do not win a war, and that adaptations at the tactical and operational levels can allow a force to be effective despite low numbers. Let us have a look at the way the French army has adapted in the CAR.

At the operational level, the deployment of two thousand soldiers in so vast an area of operations necessarily means rethinking and limiting courses of action. This is true regarding French actions in CAR's capital city, Bangui, which proved difficult

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

(Graphic by Simon Fauret, French Institute of International Relations [Ifri])

Figure 1. Operation Sangaris, First Phase

to control after the departure of Battlegroup Panther (about eight hundred to one thousand soldiers make up a battlegroup) in February 2014 to more remote areas. Battlegroup Amarante had to control Bangui, population over one million, with only two reinforced companies (about three hundred soldiers). Accordingly, some neighborhoods had to be left unsecured, and French troops had to focus on the center and south of the city. The four hundred additional troops that arrived in February 2014 were used to gain more freedom of action.

In the rest of the country, faced with the vastness of the territory, timing was important. To accomplish their missions, French forces had to be in the right place at the right time with the right amount of force. This means that they could only have a favorable strength ratio for an action that had been anticipated and planned, while retaining sufficient mobility. However, the lack of road infrastructure in the CAR made intratheater mobility challenging, to say the least, so freedom of movement at the operational level depended largely on the ability of the force to recognize, open, and maintain secondary airstrips in good condition.[10]

The fact that French units were equipped mainly with light vehicles facilitated mobility at the expense of protection—only 50 percent of French battlegroups were armored at the beginning of the operation. The use of the air proved crucial, even if the scarcity of the resources deployed (ten helicopters in June 2014) and the absence of heavy helicopters were limiting factors. Centralizing these assets at the operational level was essential for optimizing their use.

The maneuvers chosen at the operational level reflect the fact that Sangaris forces had a full range of capabilities, but their low numbers imposed successive actions. It was therefore decided that maneuvers would unfold in three phases. First, from December 2013 to January 2014, the focus was on Bangui—where the majority of the population and expatriates lived—in order to gain

(Graphic by Simon Fauret, French Institute of International Relations [Ifri])

Figure 2. Operation Sangaris, Second Phase

an advantage over the enemy and implement confidence-building measures (see figure 1).

Operations in the second phase, January to March 2014, focused on the west. A major objective was to secure the CAR's main supply road, from Bouar to Bangui (see figure 2).

In the third phase, beginning March 2014, operations turned to the east. Forces sought to reestablish government authority and to maintain a unified CAR territory (see figure 3, next page).

This step-by-step approach, rendered necessary by low troop levels, echoes the course of action implemented by French army Gen. Joseph Gallieni in Tonkin, Vietnam, in the nineteenth century, known as the "oil spot" concept.[11] Faced with the refusal of his superiors to grant him more men despite being ordered to secure a vast area stretching from Lao Kay to Dien Bien Phu, Gallieni decided to proceed methodically and not to change sectors until the one he held was secured. Gallieni had opted for this course of action being fully aware that it would take a significant amount of time. Indeed, for a sector to be considered secure, economic improvements would need to be visible and occupation seen as definitive by the population.

However, in contrast to that distant inspiration, the operational tempo in the CAR was much faster. Sangaris had to maintain a high operational tempo to match political objectives and to stop massacres. As a result, areas were never really secured, even after MINUSCA was deployed in the wake of Sangaris.

The goal was to control only what was strictly necessary and to operate where the population was most at risk while seeking to hand over control of each location to international forces as soon as possible. In effect, tactical success was achieved by incessantly shifting efforts at the operational level. This highlights the question of the sustainability of military achievements. The triptych "Clear, Hold, Build" was not applied in its entirety

(Graphic by Simon Fauret, French Institute of International Relations [Ifri])

Figure 3. Operation Sangaris, Third Phase

by Sangaris. In this bridging operation, French forces had to focus on the "clear" while letting the "hold" and the "build" be taken up by multinational forces, international organizations, and local government.

The French army was well prepared for adapting to the tactical challenges of Sangaris. French forces possess valuable skills and insight gained from operations in Afghanistan and from Operation Serval in Mali. At the tactical level, the high commitment level of the French Armed Forces for more than twenty years makes them a good fit for a complex operation, as officers and noncommissioned officers nearly all have combat experience.

To maximize effectiveness, small combined-arms tactical teams known as *sous-groupement tactique interarmes* (SGTIAs, about one hundred men) were spread all over the CAR. Since French forces had been employing SGTIAs in recent years, the soldiers who make up these units were fully trained and accustomed to combined-arms combat. At the beginning of the operation, individual SGTIAs were often divided into two parts that operated autonomously. This raised the question of how small an independent unit could be while remaining tactically maneuverable and survivable. This question was especially pertinent since the enemy was polymorphic.

One enemy group called the Sélékas usually fights in thirty-person groups around a 14.5 mm machine gun, maneuvering almost like a regular army. Another called the anti-balakas behaves more irrationally; this group often acts under the influence of drugs and alcohol, equipped with Kalashnikovs at best. Anti-balakas prefer guerilla-style hit-and-run action.[12] Battlegroups were forced to continuously review their task organization and to deploy into vast expanses, in a manner well outside doctrinal norms. For instance, Battlegroup Panther, operating in western CAR from February to March 2014, had units deployed over more than three hundred kilometers, with platoon-level units operating

more than one hundred kilometers from their company commander (more than five hours by tracked vehicle). From March to July 2014, Battlegroup Scorpion had an area of operations that ran from Sibut to Bria, a distance of approximately 350 kilometers, for an area of sixty thousand square kilometers.[13]

It is difficult in these cases to consider reaction maneuvers and rapid reinforcement. This is why rotary-wing support was crucial, especially given its psychological effects for enemy forces. Some areas had to be left uncontrolled or monitored by mobile surveillance at intervals. Then there was the issue of radio links: VHF (very high frequency) radio waves do not effectively cover these distances, and SGTIAs are not normally equipped with high frequency or satellite radios. The immense distances made command more complex, since it is difficult for a battlegroup command post to deploy more than one tactical command post. To be able to control its area of operations, Battlegroup Scorpion, from a ten-officer command post, deployed one main command post and three tactical command posts (composed of one signal team and one or two officers) permanently for four months. Of course,

Specially Designated Global Terrorist: Joseph Kony

In March 2016, the U.S. Department of the Treasury announced new sanctions against the "specially designated global terrorist" Joseph Kony and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). According to the Department of the Treasury, since its beginnings in northern Uganda in the 1980s,

The Lord's Resistance Army leader, Joseph Kony, in 2012. (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

"the LRA engaged in the abduction and mutilation of thousands of civilians across central Africa. [Instead of recruiting, the LRA, which considers itself Christian, abducts children and turns them into fighters.] Under increasing military pressure [from the United States and other nations], Kony ordered the LRA to withdraw from Uganda in 2005 and 2006 [after it had displaced nearly two million people, according to the U.S. Department of State]. Since then, the LRA has been concentrated in eastern Central African Republic (CAR) and … on the border of Sudan and South Sudan …, while also operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and South Sudan.

"Since December 2013, the LRA has kidnapped, displaced, committed sexual violence against, and killed hundreds of individuals across the CAR, as well as looted and destroyed civilian property … .

"LRA cells are frequently accompanied by captives who are forced to work as porters, cooks, and sex slaves. The LRA engages in a high prevalence of gender-based violence including rapes of women and young girls … . In southeastern CAR, … approximately 21,000 Central Africans and 3,200 refugees from the DRC have been displaced as a result of LRA violence.

"In addition to its attacks on civilians, the LRA has engaged in illicit diamonds trade, elephant poaching, and ivory trafficking for revenue generation since at least 2014."[1]

In "How Killing Elephants Finances Terror in Africa," National Geographic online, Bryan Christy narrates how an expert taxidermist created an artificial tusk that could contain a tracking system and then be placed with poached tusks to trace their illegal trade route, which passes through the Central African Republic. African tusks eventually sell in China for thousands of dollars.[2]

Notes

1. Department of the Treasury, "Treasury Sanctions the Lord's Resistance Army and Founder Joseph Kony," Department of the Treasury Press Center website, 8 March 2016, accessed 17 March 2016, https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jjl0376.aspx.; see also Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, "The Lord's Resistance Army: Fact Sheet," Department of State website, 23 March 2012, accessed 29 February 2016, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/03/186734.htm.

2. Bryan Christy, "How Killing Elephants Finances Terror in Africa," National Geographic website, 12 August 2015, accessed 17 March 2016, http://www.nationalgeographic.com/tracking-ivory/article.html.

staff constraints were significant, but units were still able to maintain communications and a suitable level of contact with local authorities.

This necessary spreading out of units on the ground was also a challenge in terms of logistics. A combined-arms company team required seven tons of supplies per week (other than ammunition). This meant delivery by C-130 aircraft was not enough. However, a road convoy required four days for a Bangui–Bouar round trip. During the rainy season (June to September), forty-eight hours were needed to reach the border with Chad from Bangui (350 kilometers).[14] Moreover, these convoys took soldiers away from other operational tasks. All this led to considering airdrop delivery operations in case of emergencies for isolated units. The issue was similar regarding helicopters. Within one hour, one Gazelle light-attack helicopter or two Puma medium-transport helicopters consume two cubic meters of fuel, so long-distance flights required refueling on the move. Logistics was a real constraint for operations, and this situation necessitated the application of a "strict-sufficiency" logic. This was especially true since the Sangaris "tooth-to-tail" ratio was between 20 and 25 percent, which is considered a low level.[15]

Beyond these tactical adjustments, the Sangaris operation was militarily effective because down to the lowest levels, military leaders were able to implement a "comprehensive approach." Indeed, company commanders in remote areas, and sometimes even platoon leaders, found themselves coordinating or involved in administrative tasks, and they had to manage without a court system.[16] They improvised and innovated. Battlegroup Scorpion established local restoration and integration projects (*chantiers de rehabilitation et d'intégration locale*), with the aim to unite voluntary ex-combatants around a common project while providing vocational training to help with their reintegration into society.[17] This was done knowing there was no way to fully control such a vast operational area, and so persuasion rather than force was necessary.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Make sustainable actions to avoid having to come back. Act swiftly to leave quickly.[18]

—Gen. Bellot des Minières

The French army's current expeditionary model implies that France will deploy only modest contingents if the vital interests of France are not at stake. However, if some risks are accepted, using modest contingents does not necessarily make the model inefficient. The problem is that in the context of a modest commitment, it is difficult to transform military achievements into lasting results. The French are far from being able to claim victory, the roots of the Central African crisis are deep, and normality in the CAR can only be considered from a very long-term perspective. Sangaris's desired end state was to be able to hand over operations (in suitable condition) to an international force but not to create lasting peace. Events in Mali and a new resolutely multilateral and indirect French African policy have led to coordination between French operations abroad and UN peacekeeping operations.[19] This division of tasks is not unique to France and has become commonplace in the past ten years. As a result, in the CAR, France intervened in support of MISCA, and this cooperation is but one example of French determination to implement confidence-building measures. The replacement of MISCA by MINUSCA in September 2014 and the gradual increase of MINUSCA's troop level enabled Sangaris to change its mission gradually. It became a reaction and reinsurance force in support of MINUSCA, downsized to nine hundred troops in June 2015.

Surely, this outcome creates ambiguities when addressing the issue of how to evaluate the results. Nevertheless, for France the main issue in such operations becomes the transfer of responsibility to partner forces, and, in particular, to a UN peacekeeping mission that may offer the "critical mass" and operate with a long-term perspective "where no one is willing to keep troops."[20] This creates a real coordination challenge to ensure unity of effort among all these forces, and it requires a significant investment in liaison officers. Another issue is the questionable quality of the troops that relieve the French forces.

We should not draw broad conclusions from the Sangaris experience. As Marshal Lyautey wrote, "There is no method …. There are ten, there are twenty, or rather if there is a method, it is called flexibility, elasticity, compliance to places, times, circumstances."[21] However, adaptation measures taken by units during this operation allow us to identify—beyond the question of troop level—some effectiveness

criteria in stabilization operations under the constraint of available forces:

- Be able to quickly deploy battle-hardened and well-trained troops.[22]
- Do not refrain from deploying both heavy and mobile means.
- Be capable of reversing course.
- Show restraint and discrimination in the use of force while being able to use force brutally if needed to establish credibility.
- Be able to operate with frequent effort shifts over long distances.
- Be able to rapidly concentrate efforts following intelligence to create a sense of ubiquity.
- Dedicate specialized resources to monitor holes on the map.
- Adapt the structure of the units and their command continuously to better match the requirements of the mission.
- Have units capable of operating independently down to the reinforced platoon level.
- Implement a comprehensive approach down to lower levels.
- Reform, train, and equip local forces from the beginning of the operation, and do not rely on them in the planning phase. ■

This article is adapted and translated from Rémy Hémez and Aline Leboeuf, "Retours sur Sangaris: Entre Stabilisation et Protection des Civils," Focus Stratégique *67 (April 2016), accessed 23 August 2016,* http://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/fs67hemez_leboeuf.pdf. Focus Stratégique *is a publication of the Institut Français des Relations Internationales (French Institute of International Relations, or Ifri). Maps are from Ifri and the Centre de Doctrine d'Emploi des Forces (CDEF), used by permission.*

The views expressed here are the author's own and do not reflect those of the French army.

Military Review

A DIFFERENT VIEWPOINT

Ghanaian troops practice individual squad movements 17 June 2014 with soldiers from Company A, 1st Battalion, 29th Infantry Regiment, 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, during Exercise Western Accord '14. The exercise, a partnership between the United States and the Economic Community of West African States, is sponsored by U.S. Africa Command and hosted by U.S. Army Africa. The purpose is to increase interoperability of military forces and ensure the common ability to conduct peace operations throughout West Africa.

The First Regionally Aligned Force

Lessons Learned and the Way Ahead

Capt. Cory R. Scharbo, U.S. Army

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In April 2013, U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) designated the 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team (2nd ABCT), 1st Infantry Division, based at Fort Riley, Kansas, as the first regionally aligned force to support United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM), the unified command responsible for engaging with nations on the continent of Africa. The 2nd ABCT performed the mission for one year, supporting myriad taskings under policies established by the U.S. Congress, the Departments of State and Defense, and USAFRICOM. It operated directly under U.S. Army Africa/Southern European Task Force (USARAF/SETAF), the Army Service component command of USAFRICOM, to support U.S. national commitments aimed at developing theater security cooperation bilateral and multilateral relationships. Tasks included numerous military training engagements with diverse African states.

The 2nd ABCT supported USAFRICOM objectives by strengthening relationships with its key allies and training its partnered nations. Small-unit leadership adapted to changing conditions across a broad range of military operations, enabling the first regionally aligned force to achieve success.

The unit, together with the U.S. Army Center for Army Lessons Learned at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the Asymmetric Warfare Group at Fort Meade, Maryland, captured many of the ABCT's achievements, helping to lay a knowledge base for future regionally aligned force operations. This article offers some of the most salient lessons learned to assist other commands preparing for similar missions and to recommend improvements to the overall process for supporting regionally aligned force deployments to Africa. These lessons are intended to contribute to the future success of both the operating force and the generating force when preparing for similar regionally aligned missions.

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Rémy Hémez recommends a comprehensive approach and adaptability as the keys to successful limited interventions while acknowledging that success is difficult to assess. Lessons learned by French forces in the Central African Republic included the need "to operate with frequent effort shifts over long distances" and to have "units capable of operating independently down to the reinforced platoon level." Operating over long distances poses challenges for providing support to units.

In "The First Regionally Aligned Force: Lessons Learned and the Way Ahead," *Military Review*, July-August 2015, pages 84–93, Capt. Cory R. Scharbo, U.S. Army, describes infrastructure challenges the 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, faced while operating in Africa from 2013–2014.

Scharbo's unit conducted security cooperation and partnership efforts rather than combat operations, but like Hémez, he attributes success to adaptability. Scharbo also finds that the U.S. Army lacks objective, valid measures for assessing the success of regionally aligned force missions.

For online access to Scharbo's article, visit: http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20150831_art016.pdf.

Notes

1. Antoine d'Evry, *L'opération Serval à l'épreuve du doute*, *Focus Stratégique* 59 (July 2015): 1. Editor's note: for more on Operation Serval, see Olivier Tramond and Philippe Seigneur, "Operation Serval: Another Beau Geste in Sub-Saharan Africa?" *Military Review* 94, no. 6 (November-December 2014): 76–86.

2. *Military effectiveness* is classically defined as "the process by which armed forces convert resources into fighting power. A fully effective military is one that derives maximum combat power from the resources physically and politically available." Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, eds., *Military Effectiveness*, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 2.

3. In Operation Sangaris, three French soldiers have been killed in action, one accidentally, and 120 were wounded in action.

4. MINUSCA stands for *Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations unies pour la stabilisation en Centrafrique*, or United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic.

5. MISCA stands for *Mission internationale de soutien à la Centrafrique sous conduite africaine*, or Africa-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic. See the MISCA website for more information, accessed 21 September 2016, http://misca.peaceau.org/en/page/110-about-misca.

6. Sangaris is not considered officially as a stabilization operation but as a bridging operation. However, the missions accomplished by the units were clearly stabilization focused.

7. James T. Quinlivan, "Force Requirements in Stability Operations," *Parameters* 23 (Winter 1995-1996): 59–69; Quinlivan, "Burden of Victory: The Painful Arithmetic of Stability Operations," *Rand Review* 27 (Summer 2003): 28–29; John J. McGrath, *Boots on the Ground, Troop Density in Contingency Operations* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006).

8. Sangaris updates are posted at the French joint headquarters (Etat-major des armées [EMA]) website, accessed 21 September 2016, http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/centrafrique/actualites.

9. French Ministry of Defense, *French White Paper on Defence and National Security: 2013* (France: Ministry of Defense, 2013), accessed 23 August 2016, http://www.defense.gouv.fr/portail-defense/mediatheque/publications/livre-blanc-2013.

10. "RETEX Sangaris," *Sapeur la Revue du Génie,* no. 16, June 2015, 19. Editor's note: *RETEX* is short for *retour d'expérience*, which refers to analyzing experiences to develop feedback that will lead to improvement or after-action analysis.

11. Joseph Gallieni, "Rapport sur la conquête de Madagascar," in *Anthologie Mondiale de la Stratégie* (Paris: Robert Laffont Collection Bouquins, 1990) 1016–25.

12. For more about the insurgent groups in the Central African Republic, see Yannick Weyns et al., "Mapping Conflict Motives: The Central African Republic," International Peace Information Service report, November 2014, accessed 21 September 2016, http://ipisresearch.be/publication/mapping-conflict-motives-central-african-republic-2/.

13. Lt. Col. Philippe, "RETEX du GTIA 5e RIAOM/Scorpion sur l'opération Sangaris," Lettre du RETEX-Témoignages no. 26, CDEF [*Centre du Doctrine et d'Enseignement du Commandement*], December 2015.

14. "RETEX opérations Sangaris," *Fantassins* 32 (Summer 2014): 93–105.

15. John J. McGrath, *The Other End of the Spear: the Tooth-to-Tail Ratio (T3R) in Modern Military Operations*, Long War Series Occasional Papers 23 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2007).

16. "RETEX opérations Sangaris," 93–105.

17. Philippe, "RETEX du GTIA 5e RIAOM/Scorpion sur l'opération Sangaris."

18. Gen. Bellot des Minières, *Journées de la Cavalerie* (annual armor conference), Paris, 12 October 2015, translated from French by the author.

19. Aline Leboeuf et Héléne-Quenot Suarez, "La politique Africaine de la France sous François Hollande," Etudes de l'Ifri, 2014, accessed 26 August 2016, https://www.ifri.org/fr/publications/etudes-de-lifri/politique-africaine-de-france-francois-hollande-renouvellement-impense.

20. Michel Liégeois, "Quel Avenir pour les Casques Bleus et le Maintien de la Paix?" *Politique Etrangère*, Fall 2013, 65–78.

21. Hubert Lyautey, *Lettres du Tonkin et de Madagascar (1894-1899)*, vol. II (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin,1920), 129.

22. Stephen Watts and Stephanie Pezard, "Rethinking Small-Footprint Interventions," *Parameters* 44 (Spring 2014): 23–36. Author's note: A quick deployment can prevent the situation from escalating, and French forces were able to deploy quickly to the CAR thanks to predeployed forces in Africa.

The invasion planning staff created in 1943 under the Chief of Staff Supreme Allied Command meets (clockwise from top left): Lt. Gen. Omar Bradley, commander, 1st U.S. Army; Adm. Sir Bertram Ramsay, naval commander-in-chief; Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, air commander-in-chief; Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, chief of staff; Gen. Sir Bernard Montgomery, commander, 21st Army Group (all Allied land forces); Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, supreme commander; and Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, deputy supreme commander. (Photo courtesy of Imperial War Museum, London)

The Area under the Curve

Developing Strategic Leaders to Win in a Complex World

Col. Valery C. Keaveny Jr., U.S. Army

Col. Michael R. Fenzel, U.S. Army

I tell my audiences that it is like calculus—we are "the area under the curve." I am the product of all my bosses, bad and good, all the training and education and all the assignments and experiences.

—Gen. Colin Powell

There is no greater strength for a military than having leaders capable of constructing strategies to avoid conflict or, once committed, to win decisively. Although the military-industrial complex spends billions each year to field capabilities to maintain U.S. military dominance relative to potential foes, the human element of conflict is where victory resides. Determining what measures the Army can take to grow our best tactical commanders into strong strategic leaders demands a historical look at our country's most gifted examples. We argue that there are two underdeveloped components in the strategic development of officers the Army should consider revising if we are to cultivate exceptional strategic talent in the future. First, there is a range of career paths that will provide opportunities to optimize the transition to strategic leadership. Second, there are important adjustments to officer professional education from captain through colonel worthy of enacting. These refinements will enhance the Army's efforts to build a wellspring of strategic acumen, especially when coupled with exceptional potential. This potential is best identified through differentiating leadership behaviors in outstanding young officers, which will enable leaders to narrow career path choices and broaden the number of strategic opportunities available to our most promising officers (see figure).

Good strategy explains what we are doing and why we are doing it in clear terms. It binds the nation's political and military objectives with resources made available from Congress, and it gives purpose to our tactical formations. Bad strategy muddles these things to the point where they are of little use.[1] At the heart of good strategy are leaders who possess insight, experience, and a keen understanding of the issues before them.

Most Americans would associate good strategy with our campaign across Europe in World War II and the success we enjoyed in Operation Desert Storm. In each of these conflicts, great strategic leaders were at the helm. Gen. George Marshall and Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower in World War II, and Gen. Colin Powell and Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf Jr. in Desert Storm were leaders of uncommonly strong character, physical and emotional resilience, and tremendous breadth of operational and strategic experience. These leaders were well prepared for the complexity they faced. When we think of the type of strategic leaders who are prepared to lead our military through crises in the future, few would disagree that Marshall, Eisenhower, Schwarzkopf, and Powell are models worthy of emulation.

World War II and Operation Desert Storm had clear political and military objectives, and both included a magnificent articulation of strategic detail. The future operational environment is unlikely to afford that same

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

(Graphic from authors)

Figure. Strategic Traits Map

clarity, and the continued expansion of social media is likely to foreclose some options for national decision makers. This coming period of inevitable turbulence demands strategic leaders whose intellectual sabers are sharp, but sharpening those sabers requires a course refinement. Powell expressed the difficulty associated with developing our future strategic leaders:

> The contemporary problem is complex. We have been at a tactical level for fourteen years with repeated non-broadening tours. Less schooling, less time to think and debate. Less time to read.[2]

As Powell suggests, the development of strategic leaders begins with an officer's own personal and enduring commitment to self-development. Understanding complexity only comes with such a commitment to ongoing personal study.

The operational environment is becoming increasingly complicated, while our defense budget is becoming increasingly tight. As the global outlook portends a proliferation of military challenges, the future success of our Army and our nation rests in the hands of our (yet-to-be developed) next generation of strategic leaders.

Importance of Intellectual Agility

In order to respond to the threats we are facing today and remain prepared for those of tomorrow, we must identify and develop extraordinary talent. The best military advice now requires a deep understanding of all instruments of power and an ability to communicate persuasively with civilian leaders. It requires intellectual agility.

The foundational strategic trait of intellectual agility is worth defining for these purposes. An officer who is not confined to what he or she was previously taught but possesses sufficient breadth of experience and a natural ability to adjust quickly and comfortably to circumstances and conditions is intellectually agile. We suggest that such agility begins with tactical and operational mastery. Indeed, it is a prerequisite for higher-level military leadership. Our future strategic leaders must have the ability to transition quickly and seamlessly between tactical concerns and strategic issues.

Ready or not, senior officers are thrust into these roles at a stage in their careers where the cost of failure is unacceptably high. In-depth discussions and due consideration of methods to manage these situations are essential, before intellectual agility becomes a zero-sum game and the cost of getting it wrong includes either American blood and treasure or damage to our national reputation.

The accumulated experiences of colonels and general officers assigned complex missions are the connective tissue in the body of expeditionary contingency operations. Those collective experiences have taught senior leaders for over a quarter century how to plan and carry out nearly any operation, with an understanding that mission-specific expertise can be surged but organizational acumen cannot. This is poignantly expressed by three West Point professors who directly address the importance of intellectual capital:

> As technology and industry dominated the wars of the twentieth century, intellectual human capital will likely decide many of the world's future security issues. Army officers

> are America's "boots on the ground" senior leaders in the middle of rapidly changing environments. Army officers must have the intellectual agility not only to survive, but to thrive in such environments.[3]

How then should we think about the challenge of identifying and cultivating that sort of intellectual agility in our officers? A close examination of the careers of four legendary strategic leaders provides some insight into the type of developmental experiences and career paths that have the potential to enhance the development of strategic fluency.

Paradigms Worthy of Emulation

An analysis of the early careers of Marshall, Eisenhower, Schwarzkopf, and Powell reveals a set of paradigms for strategic preparation that are worthy of emulation. Each of these leaders garnered remarkable experience from the point of commissioning through their service as colonels. These experiences do not reveal a single silver bullet to address strategic leader development. However, their distinguished careers clearly illustrate that the combination of diverse experiences and rich educational opportunities develops intellectual agility over time and optimizes otherwise uneven transitions to strategic leadership. We suggest there are no less than four career paths worth considering for refining this transition: teacher, organizer, commander, and communicator.

Gen. George C. Marshall—the teacher. This great strategic leader was afforded the time to read, reflect, and teach throughout the course of his eclectic early career. Marshall's experience as an apprentice to senior leaders gave him a richer perspective as a junior and midgrade officer. As a lieutenant colonel, he served as an instructor at the Army War College, and then as assistant commandant at Fort Benning's Infantry School, where he demanded students engage in a disciplined and rigorous program of reading history and discussing tactics. These measures, along with structured reflection, we would argue, are foundational to strategic development. Marshall studied history, tactics, and strategy, but he was not burdened by an unbroken line of tactical assignments. Indeed, he was stationed in the Philippines twice before attaining the rank of brigadier general. He served as aide-de-camp to the former Army chief of staff at the Presidio in San Francisco, Gen. J. Franklin Bell, when Bell commanded the Department of the West. Then, he transitioned with Bell to Governor's Island in New York City to guide the mobilization effort for World War I (while Bell commanded the Department of the East). Marshall was a planner for and then aide to Gen. John Pershing while Pershing was the commander of American Expeditionary Forces, and then he transitioned to the Army staff when

Chief of Staff of the United States Army George C. Marshall (left) confers with Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson 21 December 1941 in Washington, D.C. (Photo courtesy of U.S. Army)

Pershing became Army chief of staff. Leavening his overseas experience, Marshall served as commander of the 15th Infantry Regiment in China for three years prior to moving back to Fort Benning as assistant commandant. The combination of his time abroad, his apprenticeships to senior leaders in times of war, and his responsibilities as an instructor provided him the perspective and experience he needed to lead the Army up to and through World War II.[4]

Strategic career path #1 (teacher). An officer who has a rich educational experience (at graduate school, in a fellowship, or as an instructor) and possesses the ability to adapt quickly and effectively to individual and group dynamics will excel on this career path. A leader who exhibits a passion for teaching and confidently applies different engagement techniques or information-sharing methods is a good fit here. The opportunity to teach students at the U.S. Military Academy, in one of the captain's career courses, at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, at the U.S. Army War College, or through a civilian fellowship would develop critical skills and broaden an officer's perspective. The time devoted to considering the lessons of history puts an officer in a position to evaluate strategic options based upon similar circumstances from the past. This type of officer must possess extraordinary technical competence and the appropriate temperament to impart lessons in a manner that is compelling. A great teacher very often has great command potential.

Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower—the organizer. As a senior officer, Eisenhower was known for his public patience, organizational acumen, and skill in managing big personalities. He possessed legendary talents for building coalitions and applying calm and thoughtful judgment under the most exigent circumstances. His early career provides interesting insight into the origin of this reputation. A year after graduating from West Point and receiving his commission, Eisenhower was stationed at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, where he chose to serve as the head football coach at St. Louis College. This unique experience unquestionably cultivated his organizational skill. While Pershing was directing the battlefield monuments commission in Europe, he asked Eisenhower to develop a guide to the World War I battlefields, which honed Eisenhower's organizational skills further. As an aide to Gen. Fox Connor in the Philippines, and later to then Army Chief of Staff Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Eisenhower refined an ability to work with big personalities. His time with MacArthur included the Bonus March fiasco, which pressed the development of his political acumen, utilizing traits that he would call upon repeatedly while serving as the supreme allied commander.[5]

Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, with Gen. George C. Marshall, waves to spectators 18 June 1945 at the airport in Washington, D.C. (Photo by Abbie Rowe, U.S. National Parks Service)

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Colin Powell communicates with the Pentagon during Operation Desert Shield. (Photo by Sgt. Jeff Wright, U.S. Army)

Then, as the executive officer to Assistant Secretary of War George Mosely, and through another challenging year with MacArthur as his assistant military adviser to the Philippine government, Eisenhower solidified his strategic voice.[6]

Strategic career path #2 (organizer). This path includes rich early-career experience as a tactical evaluator and then a follow-on teaching assignment to share those lessons (along the lines of Project Warrior).[7] It then places those with demonstrated aptitude for service at the general-officer level (demonstrated through exclusively enumerated senior rater reports) to work as a field grade officer (before and after battalion-level command) at either the enterprise level in force management or on the Joint Staff in the same capacity. The Chief of Staff of the Army Strategic Studies Group's senior fellows are another set of appropriate assignments for an officer on this career path. There, he or she would address big problems for the Army chief of staff directly and, in so doing, see the larger Army as a member of a handpicked team. These officers not only are witnesses to the future development of the Army but, just as important, they have to write about it. Developing this ability to articulate through the written and spoken word is a critical element to the career path of an organizer.

Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf—the commander. Schwarzkopf's global perspective was developed early in life while growing up abroad (Iran, Switzerland, and Germany) from the age of twelve and learning three languages. Schwarzkopf's lifelong interest in the Middle East and his experiences in combat, graduate school, and teaching provided him with a strategic maturity that he would draw upon in the first Gulf War. In 1962, he attended graduate school at the University of Southern California and earned a master of science degree in both mechanical and aerospace engineering. He then taught at West Point for the first year of his three-year obligation, before he cut short the assignment by volunteering to become a military advisor in Vietnam. Schwarzkopf's perspective developed significantly through intense combat

Maj. Gen. Shaikh Khalifa bin Ahmed Al-Khalifa, minister of defense of Bahrain, presents Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, then commander of U.S. Central Command, with a sword during a ceremony at defense forces headquarters 26 March 1991 in recognition of Schwarzkopf's role in the allied success during Operation Desert Storm. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Dean W. Wagner, U.S. Army)

experience as an advisor to a group of one thousand Vietnamese paratroopers, and then again as a battalion commander, where he was wounded four times and awarded the Silver Star. Between combat assignments, he returned to complete his teaching tour at West Point. The time to reflect, write, teach, and hone his views gave him the perspective a commander needs to grow as a strategic leader. As the 24th Infantry Division commander, Schwarzkopf led his soldiers through the limited intervention in Grenada as part of Operation Urgent Fury. His experiences from formative years abroad through division command in a smaller-scale intervention enabled him to gradually develop the strategic agility required to lead a coalition through a major theater war.[8]

Strategic career path #3 (commander). This career path requires tremendous flexibility on the part of the institutional Army and particularly the academic institutions within it. Ideally, an officer on this career path demonstrates tremendous intellectual capacity and critical-thinking ability early on (e.g., selection as a Rhodes Scholar, Olmstead Scholar, White House fellow, or as part of similarly competitive programs), sufficient to warrant offering the officer the flexibility to move between teaching and operational assignments at either the lowest or highest levels on joint or combatant command staffs. Such an officer must exhibit exceptional tactical and operational proficiency and demonstrate a clear passion for command and for leading soldiers. The intensity of a staff experience on either the Joint Staff or the National Security Council would provide the type of broad perspective required of a higher-level commander.

For those officers who demonstrate rare gifts in command and coalition-building potential (indicated by exclusive enumeration on evaluation reports from company- to battalion-level commands), latitude should be granted for them to pursue an even more diverse approach or, put differently, to construct a unique set of experiences in between commands—much as

Schwarzkopf was given the latitude to do in the midst of his teaching tour at West Point. Commanders demonstrate the ability to think in space (positioning of talent) and time (sequencing of resources), and they exhibit substantial system-engineering gifts. This career path is appropriate for officers who demonstrate impeccable judgment and show deep interest in becoming students of history and warfare.

Gen. Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (left), Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of U.S. Central Command, and Schwarzkopf's wife, Brenda, ride in the New York City welcome home parade 10 June 1991. The parade honored the men and women who served in Desert Storm. (Photo by Master Sgt. Wetterman, U.S. Army)

Gen. Colin Powell—the communicator. Powell's searing experience in Vietnam shaped his worldview, and one might conclude that his time as a graduate student at George Washington University provided him with much-needed time to reflect and write. He served as a White House fellow at the Office of Management and Budget under future Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci. This experience challenged him in very different and strategic ways as a young lieutenant colonel. The opportunity to expand and cultivate a strong professional network must have also given him even greater confidence to proceed as a strategic leader. His merging of military and civilian thinking is a skill that cannot be overstated in strategic terms. A persistent challenge for senior military leaders is translating military language into a form that can be understood and appreciated by civilian counterparts. The culmination of honing these skills was on full display with Powell throughout Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, as he provided nearly perfect clarity to both political leaders and to the Nation[9]

Strategic career path #4 (communicator). This path demands direct and regular involvement with the civilian sector. It may be accomplished through a fellowship experience (as a White House or congressional fellow) or during a year with industry, in a position where there is high-level government or corporate interaction such as within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, or on the Joint Staff in a position of policy formulation (e.g., as a Joint Staff intern, military aide, or policy analyst in a very challenging joint-staff billet). This career path is appropriate for officers who are comfortable operating outside military circles and who demonstrate an aptitude to thrive in the interagency environment. This may include experience on the National Security Council or in other venues within the national security community, such as the National Counterterrorism Center, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Department of State, or the Department of Defense. In these positions, officers cultivate the ability to translate detailed military concepts and distill complex ideas into simple terms for civilian counterparts. This type of high-level engagement

builds powerful communication skills and strong bridges to civilian leaders. This career path facilitates the development of leaders who are gifted at communicating a shared vision and possess a natural ability to operate effectively within the interagency environment.

Finally, these four career paths provide a more diverse set of options for our commanders and our human resource community to work with as they engage officers on their next and subsequent assignments. This approach adds a level of depth and creativity to the conversations and widens the aperture of how a young officer might consider diversifying career experience. Although there is no silver bullet, there is perhaps a "magazine" of silver bullets that offer the type of broadening paths that may lead more purposefully—and less haphazardly—toward real strategic development.

Finding a Strategic Voice

As an institution, we can develop a stronger stable of strategic leaders by expanding the diversity of select leaders' experiences. This is not to suggest that every leader would become the recipient of this strategic broadening approach. In fact, we argue that only the top 10 percent of our talent should be carefully managed from the rank of captain and groomed for strategic leadership. Some of our best and brightest may be missed in the early stages. Those late bloomers will self-select into senior ranks through their own personal determination and exceptional performance, just as some who display early potential will not reach the highest levels for personal or professional reasons. However, it is difficult to develop a steady flow of strategic leaders without a more deliberate effort to manage a highly selective population from a much earlier point in their careers.

The measure of an officer's success in the Army is his or her performance in tactical roles. Yet, beginning to develop a strategic voice as a colonel is too late. It is immeasurably difficult to quickly become confident and conversant in the foreign-policy arena where implications of certain actions are understood, strong arguments are made, and alternatives are deeply considered. Starting the maturation process toward foreign policy comprehension and the development of strategic fluency must begin much earlier in an officer's career. The major issues surrounding tenets of U.S. foreign policy do not change dramatically from year to year, but understanding nuance and expressing precisely what is changing require time and regular study. In effect, the effort to guide an officer to develop a worldview and a foreign-policy voice should begin as a senior company-grade officer and continue beyond brigade command, at which point there is an implicit expectation for a colonel to begin contributing to the formulation of military strategy and foreign policy. However, developing strategic fluency can take up to a decade of dedicated study.

Our Army does not have the organizational framework to prepare officers to think more deeply about foreign policy until enrollment at the U.S. Army War College. However, it is not merely an understanding of these disciplines that will best prepare Army leaders for the transition to the strategic level. Instead, it is the broad exposure to different concepts, the chance to apply strategic understanding to unfolding crises over time, the opportunity to debate strategic options, and the interaction with private-sector professionals that give our best officers the opportunity to grow intellectually and think more broadly about the world. Education is certainly a decisive component of this effort, but it is by no means a panacea. What is closest to a panacea is the time that our young military leaders are allotted and carve out to read, reflect, think, write, and clarify their professional thinking on larger and more complex geopolitical issues.

Institutionalizing a New Approach to Strategic Education

The current trajectory for an Army officer without any change to the well-worn career path includes the branch-specific basic course (four months in duration), the advanced course (up to six years later, six months in duration), U.S. Army Command and General Staff College for the top 50 percent of officers in uniform (one academic year in duration), and senior service college for those officers who have excelled in battalion-level command (one academic year in duration). A close examination of this path suggests there are opportunities where strategic thought might be instilled. This is not to suggest that attention should be diverted from the primary tasks in the basic and advanced courses—to develop mastery of tactical operations, hone proficiency, and cultivate a grasp of how to apply those concepts in combat. But, senior-level captains should begin to gain strategic understanding and, upon reaching the field-grade level, they should begin the transition to greater strategic comprehension. Following battalion command, the primary educational

focus is ideally on honing strategic understanding. Put differently, this is where to apply a "crawl, walk, and run" methodology to training and preparing strategic leaders. Captains should be "crawling" at the strategic level, working to understand the fundamentals of strategy and foreign policy. Majors should be "walking" through the type of strategic material that is now most commonly found in our war colleges. Finally, all lieutenant colonels who attend the war college should be "running" through the same curriculum now covered in the Advanced Strategic Art Program, which is currently designed for a smaller and more carefully selected subset of students. By definition, those selected for senior service college are in the top 10 percent of the Army at their rank and therefore should be required to demonstrate strategic fluency before transitioning back into the field. The Advanced Strategic Art Program possesses all the components necessary to cap off strategic fluency. It should no longer serve as an introduction to strategy but instead as a sort of finishing school for all war college students. Adopting these refinements to our professional education would obviate the too often lamented concern that we are selecting tactical masters for brigade command who lack a strong enough understanding of strategic concepts. Instead, what we see is a disproportionate amount of time spent on polishing the stone of tactical and operational excellence.

We suggest that officers who are more broadly educated and experienced are much more capable of informing strategic discourse. How we manage the educational experience from captain to colonel is worth considering more deeply. The timing of these experiences is just right; now it is a matter of refining precisely what is taught and how that critical time is used. Powell reiterated the importance of these well-placed periods of research and reflection:

> Command and General Staff College and the National War College are probably at the top of my list (of strategically developmental assignments). Both took me out of the Army I was in and accelerated me to get ready for the Army that was coming and I might help lead.[10]

When the four distinct career paths presented here are coupled with an institutional commitment to generate educational focus on strategy earlier in the career and maintain that focus through the professional life of an officer, then the conditions are set for a strong bench of strategic leaders to emerge. Our great Army can enact all of these reforms, bring officers to the water's edge of strategic thinking, and perhaps whet substantially more appetites for the study of foreign policy and national security. Still, there must be a zest and passion to continue those pursuits, or the end game of having a strong bench of strategic leaders will remain elusive. As an Army, we must aim to make the area under each promising officer's "career curve" full of breadth and depth. ■

Notes

Epigraph. Colin Powell, e-mail message to author (Fenzel), 28 December 2015.

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2. Powell, e-mail message to author (Fenzel).

3. Everett S.P. Spain, J.D. Mohundro, and Bernard B. Banks, "Toward a Smarter Military—Intellectual Capital: A Case for Cultural Change," *Parameters* 45, no. 2 (Summer 2015): 78.

4. Ed Cray, *General of the Army: George C. Marshall, Soldier and Statesman* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1990).

5. The Bonus March involved seventeen thousand U.S. World War I veterans and their families who gathered in Washington, D.C., in the summer of 1932 to demand early redemption of their service certificates from the U.S. Department of the Treasury in the midst of the Great Depression. (The certificates were not scheduled to reach maturity until 1945). Then Army Chief of Staff Gen. Douglas MacArthur put down the three-month-long protest aggressively, burning their camps and driving them out of the city.

6. Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower: Soldier and President* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990).

7. Project Warrior is a formal Army program designed to further develop up-and-coming post-company-command captains by funneling them directly into combat training centers to serve as observer-controller-trainers and from there into a captain's career course to serve as small group instructors. This combination of observing and advising other units with the experience of teaching and sharing those lessons with future company commanders is commonly understood as an effective path toward battalion-level command and tactical mastery.

8. Norman Schwarzkopf, *It Doesn't Take a Hero: The Autobiography of General H. Norman Schwarzkopf* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990).

9. Colin Powell and Joseph E. Persico, *My American Journey* (New York: Random House, 1995).

10. Powell, e-mail message to author (Fenzel).

Cpl. Kyle Click, a dog handler with 3rd Platoon, Kilo Company, 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment, and a native of Grand Rapids, Michigan, shares a moment with Windy, an improvised-explosive-device detection dog, while waiting to resume a security patrol 27 February 2012 in Garmsir District, Helmand Province, Afghanistan. (Photo by Cpl. Reece Lodder, U.S. Marine Corps)

A Call for Research on the Impact of Dogs Deployed in Units to Reduce Posttraumatic Stress

Rebecca Segal

There is evidence that dogs should be deployed in forward-operating units to reduce the incidence and severity of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). PTSD is a major medical concern for the U.S. military, yet current therapies are of limited effectiveness, and they do not begin until weeks after a stressful event.[1] The body's response to stress actually begins on day zero and, if severe, is referred to as an *acute stress*

reaction (ASR). However, the diagnostic criteria for PTSD require thirty days to have passed after a traumatic event, and intervention is often delayed until that point.[2] This raises the question of whether PTSD treatment would be more effective if begun on day zero, rather than on day thirty or later. Doing this would require a treatment that is both benign and effective.

There is growing evidence that contact with dogs is useful in treating PTSD. In addition, there is anecdotal evidence that dogs are helpful during diagnosis and later in patient compliance to recommended treatment. Thus, the use of dogs could meet the criteria needed for a day-zero intervention.



A therapy dog with the 219th Medical Detachment (Combat Operational Stress Control) named Maj. Butch concludes her tour interacting with service members 1 February 2013 in Afghanistan at Bagram Air Field. (Photo by Maj. Charles Patterson, U.S. Army)

The hypothesis that dogs are therapeutically useful is being tested in a large U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) study.[3] If this shows a positive effect, the research should be extended into the efficacy of treating those diagnosed with the possibility of PTSD from day zero. The study of dogs in deployed units should assess their impact on the rates and intensity of ASR, the rates of ASR conversion to PTSD, and the intensity of the resulting PTSD, as well as any effect dogs have on relapse rates.

The stakes are high. PTSD results in high medical costs while on active duty, premature reassignment stateside or retirement, and difficulty transitioning to civilian life. Moreover, for the U.S. taxpayer, the costs of medical care in support of veterans extend well beyond their separation from service.

As indicated in a RAND Corporation study, PTSD is now mainly treated with a combination of pharmacological and behavioral interventions. However, those interventions fail to work for many patients, their benefits are often temporary, and they can entail bad side effects or stigma.[4] Therefore, an alternative option that would effectively mitigate PTSD in earlier stages of its development would be a better solution for those with PTSD and would greatly reduce the overall cost of treatments currently borne by the taxpayer.

The Problem

The American Psychiatric Association's *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (DSM-5) defines PTSD as a disturbance triggered by "exposure to actual or threatened death, serious injury, or sexual violation … The disturbance, regardless of its trigger, causes clinically significant distress or impairment in the individual's social interactions, capacity to work, or other important areas of functioning."[5] The DSM-5 lists common symptoms of PTSD as intrusive recollection, guilt, and inability to cope or function, often resulting in behaviors such as recklessness, aggression, depression, and substance abuse.[6]

PTSD was reported in 10–30 percent of wartime service members (varying by conflict and measurement technique).[7] The RAND Corporation study of the costs of PTSD care for veterans showed that of the 1.6 million service members returning in 2005, approximately 7.5 percent had PTSD, and approximately another 7.5 percent had PTSD as well as major depression.[8]

The RAND study modeled the cost per person during the first two years after being diagnosed with PTSD. The model included treatment costs and costs related to lost productivity from reduced employment and lower earnings, but not monetary costs relating to

Pfc. Alex Fanning, 98th Medical Detachment Combat Stress Control (CSC) behavioral health specialist, and Maj. Eden, a 98th Medical Detachment CSC combat stress dog, visit service members 21 January 2014 at Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan. (Photo by Senior Airman Kayla Newman, U.S. Air Force)

lives lost to suicide.[9] The study found an average cost of $5,900 for a PTSD-only case, and $12,400 for cases with co-morbidities.[10] When the cost of cases were combined, the estimated total annual cost to the military alone was $2.2 billion. The study further estimated that if 100 percent of affected individuals were offered treatment and they follow through with it, 19 percent of these costs could be saved.

The above cost figures apply only to active-duty service members, but the study estimated that the incidence of PTSD was one-and-a-half times higher among veterans than among active duty personnel, suggesting that the total cost to the taxpayers of treating veterans with PTSD may be about $3 billion.[11] The RAND study did not consider costs associated with transitions to civilian life common to service members with PTSD, including monetary costs associated with violence.[12] Furthermore, the current treatments do not offer reliable cures. As a result, relapses are a constant risk. Depending on the type of treatment, relapses occur in 61–70 percent of the cases, implying that the total societal costs are likely to continue to grow as the base of veterans with PTSD increases.[13]

Current Treatment Approaches

The main treatment options for PTSD are psychological and pharmacological. For psychological therapies, the single most effective is behavior therapy. It is more effective than the most effective pharmacological approach, although these treatments are often used in combination.[14]

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A soldier stands with two warrior-trained therapy dogs 7 November 2011 at the Warrior Canine Connection Healing Quarters in Brookeville, Maryland. (Photo courtesy of Warrior Canine Connection)

Behavioral therapy programs for soldiers with PTSD range from individualized therapy to group fly-fishing trips.[15] Among veterans, 20–50 percent discontinue behavior therapy before the treatment is complete.[16] Accordingly, doctors develop and use treatments that include activities one would naturally do, such as video games and outdoor activities, which are more likely to be continued after the official treatment.[17]

The most effective pharmacological approach is use of selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs). These SSRIs elevate brain levels of serotonin, a neurotransmitter that regulates pain suppression and mood.[18] However, various side effects—including agitation, nausea, diarrhea, and low sex drive—often lead to poor compliance.[19] Moreover, for those with PTSD who are compliant, these medications have only a 60 percent response, with "only 20–30 percent of patients [achieving] complete remission."[20] There are other pharmacological options, but they have even lower effectiveness or worse side effects, so SSRIs are seen as the best overall pharmacological treatment for PTSD.[21]

One reason for soldiers not following through on both psychological and pharmacological approaches is the perceived stigma of the diagnosis and the associated treatment.[22] This stigma results from fear of being perceived as weak, belief that superiors look down upon treatment, and fear of potential repercussions for seeking help.[23] Such attitudes toward mental health treatment vary by gender and marital status, but are widely held.[24] Certain types of treatment have also been shown to have a higher stigma than others. For instance, service members would rather have behavioral "exposure" therapy than medication therapy.[25]

Using Dogs to Treat PTSD

There is evidence that using therapy dogs in treatment of PTSD can result in much-improved outcomes, such as a servicemember previously assessed as likely to

be sent home early being able to complete a deployment. Dr. Heidi Squier Kraft, a Navy psychologist who deployed with the U.S. Marines, chronicled such an effect. She encountered a marine who was struggling with depression and PTSD during deployment. "She told me her future was hopeless," wrote Kraft. "She spoke of falling asleep and never awakening."[26] Kraft worked with the marine, using both antidepressant medication and behavioral therapy, with only limited progress. She worried she would need to send the marine stateside, mid-deployment. However, a few weeks later, the marine came back to see Kraft, and the psychologist's concerns disappeared. According to Kraft, the marine appeared happy:

> "Our unit has adopted this puppy," she started as she sat down. I had heard about several groups of marines finding the orphaned puppies of wild dogs on base and making them unofficial mascots, feeding them with shipments of puppy chow sent from home …[27]

Kraft had tried all of the standard medical treatments for PTSD for this marine, but reached a point at which there were no other known medical options apart from removal from the location of the inciting event. Then, the marine got a dog, she got better, and she was able to finish her deployment.

Kraft relates that since then, she has heard of other examples of marines adopting dogs, with similar therapeutic outcomes. These dogs apparently played an important role by helping comfort and facilitating psychological healing among other marines in the same way. In effect, the troops were self-medicating by bringing these dogs into the units.[28]

Additional data comes from the Army, where dogs have been useful in facilitating the mission of Combat and Operational Stress Control (COSC) teams. These teams "provide education and therapy in the theater of war."[29] The Army began attaching dogs to COSC teams in 2007 in an initiative that originally sent two dogs to Iraq.[30] The dogs accompanied their handlers and were able to serve as icebreakers between the medical practitioner and the soldiers. In a *U.S. Army Medical Department Journal* article, William Kroll wrote, "Whether in a one-on-one or group setting, members of the COSC teams have reported that service members would talk to them for longer periods of time than if they were alone."[31] In another report, Lorie Fike, Cecilia Najera, and David Dougherty wrote of a Labrador retriever, Albert, which was a part of one of the COSC units. His handler was grateful to have the dog assist in therapy:

> [Albert] was able to ease tension of many of our clients in order to assist in their willingness to seek out the COSC unit for care and to openly discuss the issues that had troubled them … The ability to travel with Albert to each unit within our contingency operations base provided opportunities to engage our clients from a preventative standpoint … As we would visit a unit, news would travel to adjacently oriented units that would also request our services. This only further assisted our detachment in trying to reach all of the potentially at-risk [combat and operational stress reaction] casualties.[32]

The report observes that members of the COSC teams noted how the dogs provided multiple benefits across the entire mental health process, from setting up meetings to getting soldiers coming back for appointments: "The primary handlers noticed an increase in requests for unit visits and commands scheduled more commander briefs."[33] The dogs also helped to de-stigmatize the mental health intervention because the interaction now seemed to be about the dog and no longer as much about the psychologist or other care provider. As the report noted elsewhere, "The therapy dogs allowed the COSC units to market their services in a unique way, because they were able to post flyers and write stories about the therapy dogs."[34] An additional collateral impact was that unit commanders seemed more likely to allow the COSC prevention teams to meet with units when there was a dog involved:

> The dog's presence helped the therapist seem more approachable and assisted with the flow of conversation. Senior officers and enlisted personnel took more time to listen to the mental health staff and find out what services were available for soldiers. The mental health team also walked through motor pools and aircraft hangars, and throughout the [forward operating base's] work and living spaces to make contact with service members and to try to gauge the stress and morale levels. If the therapy dog was present, service members appeared more

likely to share their concerns, fears, and goals, and to let down their guard for a short time … The prevention mission was much easier and more effective with therapy dogs as members of the team.[35]

Employing Dogs to Stimulate Conversation and Identify Issues

Currently, for deployed soldiers, dogs are used mainly to engage soldiers in diagnostic conversations to help identify those in need of therapy and to increase compliance with other therapies, not as a direct therapeutic modality. However, because COSC teams are not integrated into the soldiers' units, and are often spread thin due to demand, they are unable to attend to everybody in need.[36] Furthermore, because a soldier must actively take the initiative to go to meet with a member of these teams, the limited availability of COSC teams further reduces the prospect of diagnosis because one of the downsides of PTSD is a reduction in an individual's likelihood to actively seek help.[37]

One measure aimed at helping to mitigate the effects of a shortage of COSC units—at least as an interim measure—is early exposure to therapy dogs. There have been many retrospective studies on the use of dogs for PTSD treatment that suggest soldiers greatly benefit from working with dogs.[38] The VA has undertaken the first prospective controlled study, over a two-year period, to evaluate the efficacy of dogs for treating those with PTSD.[39]

Treatment using dogs has few side effects as compared to drugs. Additionally, patients are then more willing to engage and comply with other prescribed therapies. Neuroscience research suggests multiple physiological mechanisms that may be involved. When petting a dog, a person experiences the body releasing higher levels of several chemicals, including oxytocin, β-endorphin, and dopamine.[40] Oxytocin, known as a bonding hormone, helps with relationships by promoting attachment and trust.[41] Endorphins, as opiates, "are involved in pain reduction [and] pleasure … Endorphins are also thought to play a role in appetite, sexual activity, blood pressure, mood, learning, and memory … a link [also] exists between endorphins and human attachment."[42] Dopamine is involved in emotion, pleasure, and reward.[43] Dogs apparently help people calm down, be happy, trust others, and, in general, improve morale due to the natural release of such substances within the human body.

Much of the innovation in the use of dogs in treatment has been for veterans. Once home, veterans get involved with service dogs in various ways. Some get service dogs for themselves. Others train service dogs for other veterans, getting the side benefits of being with dogs during the training period. Over time, training a service dog has been shown to improve patience, impulse control, emotional regulation, and sleep. It also appears to increase in many cases a trainer's sense of purpose and enables a decrease in pain medications and depression.[44] As a result, the benefits of one dog can extend to many veterans, as shown by the Warrior Canine Connection, a specific service dog training organization.[45]

Discussion

PTSD is a major cost to the military in lost productivity (including premature retirements) and higher health care costs. Taxpayers continue to bear PTSD-related costs for soldiers after their retirement. In addition, the nonmonetary, human costs are significant. When soldiers leave the military because of PTSD, their lives may be impaired, particularly if they fail to comply with care guidelines. These soldiers often becoming dependent on drugs, have trouble being in civilian gatherings, and feel abandoned by the military.

Better interventions may improve the situation. On a small scale, COSC teams have successfully used dogs in programs to help soldiers recognize combat stress and trauma, to aid in diagnosis, and to get the soldiers to accept treatment. Given the scale of the problem, however, there are not enough dogs deployed to meet the need. Assuming that the VA study supports the hypothesis, the Army should consider dramatically increasing the number of dogs deployed.

The reports of dogs attached to COSC teams and informally adopted into units raises the question of whether widespread deployment of dogs within units, rather than with the COSC teams, might help to avoid development of PTSD from ASR.[46] If this proves successful, those who do develop PTSD would have a socially acceptable therapeutic approach from day zero, one that will easily transition into civilian life.

Given the promise of this new approach, the military should test the efficacy of using dogs in the prevention and treatment of PTSD. The military should evaluate

the benefits of integrating dogs directly into units to reduce the rate at which the ASR converts to PTSD and the degree to which the presence of dogs reduces the severity of PTSD among deployed soldiers, either directly or through better detection and treatment compliance.

The study should be designed to answer a number of questions. First, what are the optimal and minimum required ratios of dogs to soldiers to have the desired outcome? Second, what level of training is needed for the dogs? Is it necessary or cost effective to integrate fully trained service dogs into every platoon, or will lower levels of training meet the requirements? While a service dog can perform more specialized duties that may be important in the treatment of PTSD, an emotional support dog, or even a well-trained, ordinary dog, may have enough of a benefit to help prevent PTSD without costing $50,000 in training.[47] Third, the study should measure several outcomes: the frequency of development of ASR; the frequency of conversion from ASR to PTSD; the severity and duration of the PTSD; and any impact on unit cohesion and combat readiness. Finally, the study design needs to avoid a key risk: with the de-stigmatization shown to come from involving dogs in PTSD treatment, the rate of reporting PTSD symptoms could go up with no change in the true incidence. The study design should be structured to control for this risk and the confounding data as much as possible.

Future Implications

Before the military could act on the results of such a study, the economics will need to be understood. There is reasonable data from which to estimate cost. Training soldiers is expensive; the basic cost to train a new soldier is about $50,000.[48] However, if additional training or education and use of expensive equipment are included, that number rises significantly. Furthermore, as soldiers gain experience, they learn information that cannot always be taught, making them worth even more.[49] The military invests the money to train a soldier under the assumption that they will then serve for a certain number of years or a certain number of deployments. However, when a soldier must leave the deployment or the military prematurely because of PTSD, the military loses the benefit of the productivity.

Service dogs require about two years of training, costing $25,000–$50,000. In addition, the military would assume the costs to transport, house, feed, groom, and provide the required veterinary care for the dogs. Such costs are likely to be higher in a forward operation base than in garrison. Ideally, the study will allow estimates of the complete cost of the proposed dog deployments.

Although preliminary numbers look promising, it is too early to make a formal economic case for the benefit of integrating dogs into units. In designing the study, it would be essential to collect the data necessary to enable an effective cost-benefit economic analysis.

Conclusion

By deploying support or service dogs, service members with PTSD might be diagnosed and treated more quickly, ultimately improving their chances for recovery as well as enhancing unit cohesion. Dogs might also help de-stigmatize mental health care and reduce behavioral incidences due to PTSD. By deploying the dogs in units, not just with the COSC teams, the military may be able to reduce the development and severity of PTSD after an ASR. In this way, the military could more effectively take care of a problem that is affecting as much as 20 percent of their soldiers; they could better take care of their own. ■

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A simulated improvised explosive device detonates during a realistic training scenario 1 May 2008 at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California. The soldiers are from 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, based at Fort Carson, Colorado. Training events like this can be further enhanced by applying the science of learning and instructional design. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Brian Ferguson, U.S. Air Force)

Transforming Unit Training with the Science of Learning

Capt. Andrew P. Jenkins, U.S. Army

The Army is currently in the midst of a multiyear effort to optimize training and education across the force to ensure it is ready for any future conflicts. The U.S. Army Operating Concept forecasts future conflicts as complex endeavors, requiring agile and adaptive leaders and organizations to address hybrid threats and complex environments.[1] To prepare for these challenges, the Army sees education as its primary tool. In a July-August 2015 article in *Military Review*, Lt. Gen. Robert Brown, then commanding general of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (CAC), states that enabling education "is the most reliable strategic hedge in investment that the Army can make in the face of an uncertain future."[2] Brown further describes the status of the Army's educational system as "inadequate for addressing the growing complexity, volatility, and uncertainty of the twenty-first century security environment."[3] To address this shortfall, there are several ongoing efforts to improve

the Army's formal professional military education (PME) system, primarily through the establishment of the Army University, which is expected to increase rigor and effectiveness in all Army courses.[4] Regardless of these efforts, PME's scope and duration are insufficient to effectively transfer all knowledge necessary for professional soldiers and leaders.

25th Infantry Division soldiers view video feed from a Phantom 4 Quadcopter unmanned aerial system during the Pacific Manned-Unmanned Initiative 22 July 2016 at Marine Corps Training Area Bellows, Hawaii. The exercise provided an opportunity for soldiers, partnered with organizations and agencies such as the Maneuver Center of Excellence and the U.S. Army Tank Automotive Research Development and Engineering Center to test and learn from new technology in the field. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Christopher Hubenthal, U.S. Air Force)

Operating in our complex modern world requires our leaders and formations to be agile and adaptive, but we currently do not have a system in place to give them all the skill sets and capabilities necessary to win. The overarching problem is that training is not treated as learning, especially in the operating force. Unit commanders often expect soldiers and leaders to arrive at their units following PME with all the necessary knowledge to perform as a part of the team.[5] Without significant expansion of PME, however, this expectation is unrealistic. Compounding this problem, Army operational training doctrine such as Army Doctrine Publication 7-0, *Training Units and Developing Leaders*, does not provide sufficient guidance or direction to plan effective learning experiences. Many in the operating force view the training they conduct more as rehearsals of skills rather than deliberate experiences to learn new skills or knowledge.[6] Where PME is embracing evidence-based learning practices from academia, doctrine for training does not take advantage of the advances in the learning sciences. To prepare its leaders and formations to win in a complex world, the Army must get more educational value from training conducted in the operating force. The Army can accomplish this by applying the science of learning and instructional design to create training events that not only are realistic but also transfer necessary knowledge and provide sufficient motivation. The Army must develop doctrine and guidance based on a constructivist philosophy of cognitive learning theory and provide commanders with tools to design training as deliberate learning experiences.

Defining the Problem

To manage the development of its leaders, the Army uses a structure of domains in which training and education occur: institutional, operational, and self-development.[7] According to doctrine, training and education occur in each of these three domains, but to varying degrees. The operational domain is characterized by an emphasis on training, particularly as a member of an operational unit but also through broadening experiences.

The institutional domain, though, is where education takes primacy. The Army University, a part of the institutional domain, has recently begun sweeping changes to ensure courses across the Army are using evidence-based practices for instruction and activities. However, these changes can only be expected to have a small effect on a leader's development over the course of a career. For example, an armor officer taking command of a battalion has spent as few as twenty months in resident PME over the course of the officer's career up until that point (4.5 months in the Armor Basic Officer Leadership Course [BOLC], 5.5 months in the Maneuver Captain's Career Course [MCCC], and ten months in the Command and General Staff Officers' Course).[8] With less than two out of seventeen years spent in PME, this institutional education can hardly be expected to provide all necessary knowledge for a battalion commander to win in the complex world described in the *Army Operating Concept*.

The majority of an officer's career is spent in the operational domain, so to have significant, meaningful change in a person, a greater amount of education must occur within this domain. The Army has devoted significant time and energy into creating doctrine on training and education; however, none of the doctrinal or related training or administrative publications addresses how training in the operating force is to be designed.[9] Several tools are available for commanders to use as they create training events, but almost all of them, to include the Eight-Step Training Model, are focused primarily on the resourcing of training, and they provide little guidance or direction on the content.[10] The U.S. Army CAC has recognized this problem, and published a white paper titled "Enhancing Realistic Training." The purpose of the paper is to present an operational design for the development and integration of efforts to enhance realistic training.[11] The white paper is a very useful document in describing what future training should consist of, especially as it relates to the inclusion of all the complexities expected on a future battlefield. What the paper is missing is a description of how the training is to be designed. Taken at face value, commanders could assume that when creating a training event, they are expected to include all possible complexities into the scenario because they will be expected to operate eventually in a complex world. Though the Army also professes the "crawl, walk, run" model of incrementally increasing the difficulty and complexity of training, there is no doctrine to help a commander create the conditions for a unit to progress in the complex tasks described in the CAC white paper.[12] Additionally, the white paper references other joint and Army publications (such as doctrine, guidance, regulations, and white papers) but does not include any academic work or research in training and education. If the Army wants to continue to develop soldiers and leaders in the operational domain while also preparing organizations to operate in a complex world, it must use evidence-based practices of the learning sciences to design training.

The Science of Learning

The science of learning is based on an understanding of how individuals and groups learn.[13] The field is now over one hundred years old, and it has gone through several major shifts in that time. For the purposes of this paper, the definition of learning used is from Richard E. Mayer, a psychologist from the University of Santa Barbara:

> Learning is the relatively permanent change in a person's knowledge or behavior due to experience. This definition has three components: (1) the duration of the change is long-term rather than short-term; (2) the locus of the change is the content and structure of knowledge in memory or the behavior of the learner; (3) the cause of the change is the learner's experience in the environment rather than fatigue, motivation, drugs, physical condition, or psychological intervention.[14]

This definition allows us to apply it to both individual and organizational outcomes. Whenever we train, we expect that trainees will come out of the event changed (hopefully for the better), that the change

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will be long-lasting, that trainees will behave differently given a certain set of circumstances, that the change will be repeatable, and that it will occur regardless of varying conditions. This is where differences between Army and academic understanding of training and education become apparent. The Army distinguishes the primary difference between training and education as the focus on the known versus the unknown. The Army definition of training is "a structured process designed to increase the capability of individuals or units to perform specified tasks or skills in known situations,"[15] but the definition of education is focused on "an individual's ability to perform in unknown situations."[16] In the learning sciences, training is a subset of education, with learning occurring in both. The term "training" in academia refers to those instructional experiences that are focused on individuals acquiring specific skills that they will apply almost immediately, but it is recognized that similar actions occur in both training and education.[17] To improve training, the Army must embrace the idea of training as learning, as opposed to training as experience.

To use the science of learning in training design and development, it is important to understand the philosophies and theories that guide the science of learning. Learning philosophies and theories describe *why* learning occurs in individuals and organizations.[18] The learning sciences have developed these ideas that are not just based upon experiences of what works, but have been substantiated and modified based on empirical research. By codifying a philosophy and theory in doctrine, it would support commanders by giving them evidence-based tools and guidance to design better training.

"Constructivism" is the most recently popular philosophy within many educational communities, and is nested within the larger category of general philosophies that are described as "rationalism."[19] This philosophy is characterized by the belief that reason is the primary source of knowledge, and that individuals construct knowledge, rather than discover it.[20] To understand what this looks like in practice, it is built on three subgroupings: individual constructivism, social constructivism, and contextualism. Individual constructivism is the idea that knowledge is constructed from an individual's experiences. Learning results from a personal interpretation of knowledge and is an active process in which an individual constructs meaning based on experience. Social constructivism adds the assumption that learning can be collaborative with meaning or knowledge being negotiated from multiple perspectives (such as a dialog between an instructor and a student or between multiple students within a classroom). Finally, contextualism implies that learning should occur in realistic settings and assessments should be integrated into the learning task, not be a separate activity.[21] While this last point is already a goal of Army training, the constructivism aspect is missing from the vast majority of Army training. While the Army University and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (with its Army learning model) have committed to a constructivist philosophy for PME, the doctrine for training operating forces has not been altered accordingly.[22]

The vast majority of Army training is based on the philosophy of behaviorism, which was the predominant school of thought for the first half of the twentieth century. While doctrine does not explicitly state the underlying philosophy, the ideas of behaviorism can be found in training doctrine and training guidance throughout the force. According to behaviorism, learning has occurred when learners display the appropriate response to a particular stimulus.[23] This philosophy emphasizes the influence of the environment on learning and prioritizes the necessity of learners receiving appropriate reinforcement (both positive and negative) for their responses to particular stimulus. This philosophy reached its peak in the 1940s and 1950s with B. F. Skinner's work on "operant conditioning," but soon it fell out of favor in the educational world as science was beginning to unlock mysteries behind how the brain functioned, which led educators to focus more on cognitive processes than displayed behaviors.[24]

Applying the Science

The differences between constructivism and behaviorism as philosophies may seem trivial, but understanding them and using them appropriately could greatly improve how the Army trains. For example, compare the behaviorist and constructivist responses to a typical small-unit training problem: failure to bound across an objective. In March 2016, this problem was so prevalent that the XVIII Airborne Corps commander wrote an e-mail about it to his entire command.[25] Soldiers were simply not bounding, by individual or by teams, across an objective as they cleared. For those not familiar, during a squad live-fire exercise, as the unit reaches the objective, they are expected to maneuver

Sgt. Victor Garciaramos, an observer/controller/trainer from 1st Battalion, 361st Engineer Regiment, Task Force Redhawk, 5th Armored Brigade, gives feedback to soldiers of the 485th Military Police Company, Nevada Army National Guard, 15 September 2011 during fundamentals of patrolling training at McGregor Range, New Mexico. (Photo by Sgt. 1st Class Alejandro Sias, 5th Armored Brigade, First Army, Division West, Public Affairs)

across the objective with personnel alternating between stationary and moving. Those moving do so rapidly while exposing themselves as little as possible, and those stationary are presenting as little of themselves as possible while providing direct covering fire as necessary. The problem is that this rarely happens. Often, units will clear the objective all at once with no stationary element providing supporting fires. And, in the worst cases, those moving personnel will walk across the objective with no consideration of cover or concealment, presenting themselves as the largest targets possible to the enemy. A behaviorist would look at this problem and prescribe more repetitions.

The behaviorist would identify the lack of bounding as a behavior that needs correction and would create conditions for the soldiers to bound more often to build a habit of bounding. A constructivist would identify why the soldiers were not bounding and use education to modify the decision making the soldiers used so that they would choose to bound under similar situations in the future. The constructivist would be more focused on the cognitive processes used by the soldiers because research shows students' actions are rational given the way that they perceive the conditions.[26] Soldiers do not fail to bound because of lack of knowledge of how to bound; they fail to bound because, in their "reality," they do not perceive a need. Perhaps this is because the soldiers never had to bound in the video games they played, neither in commercial games nor in Army virtual battlespace simulations. Or, possibly, their previous experiences may tell them that there is no threat, because they have never received fire while clearing an objective. Or, if their reflexive-fire training was always conducted from the standing position, they may be more comfortable firing from that position. All of these could be valid assumptions, and all could result in different prescriptions for how to address the problem. Though both the behaviorist and the constructivist may have arrived at similar conclusions regarding the problem, the constructivist analysis allows

for a greater number of solutions. If the Army embraces a constructivist philosophy for training, commanders will transition from managing training to designing training, which will achieve greater results.

With constructivism as the philosophy on which Army training is built, we can use a more cognitive learning theory to design training events and scenarios. Cognitive learning theory is the dominant theoretical influence on instructional design in the educational world.[27] This theory places emphasis on factors within the learner, as opposed to factors within the environment (which would fall more within the behaviorist model).[28] Cognitive psychology is the basis for cognitive learning, and has influenced instructional design primarily through the understanding that (1) learning is an active process where high-level cognitive processes occur, (2) learning is cumulative in that prior knowledge is always a factor, (3) the brain represents and organizes knowledge in a certain way as memory, and (4) learning is itself a specific and deliberate cognitive process.[29] In this theory, the learner constructs meaning from instruction rather than being a recipient of meaning.[30] Commanders that incorporate cognitive learning theory into their training design will be more concerned with why their units performed a certain way than with how they performed. While the desired training outcomes may be very similar to those used in past training, the purpose will be to observe an action as evidence of the individual or group performing the desired cognitive process.[31] Many good commanders intuitively do this, but codifying this approach in doctrine will support training that is more effective across the operating force.

Through a cognitive learning theory, training and education can be developed to specifically target desired outcomes. While there is significant research on different ways of developing and assessing learning, Ellen Gagné's system of categorization is widely used.[32] Constructivists agree that there are different types of learning outcomes, and each type of outcome requires a different type of instruction (or condition) for it to be transferred to a learner.[33] Gagné establishes five large categories or "domains": declarative knowledge, intellectual skills, cognitive strategies, attitudes, and psychomotor skills.[34] Additionally, intellectual skills can be further refined into concepts, procedures, and problem solving—all of which have different requirements for learning. Though these differences may seem either obvious or trivial, they could significantly affect the way the Army trains. Obviously, no one will train troop-leading procedures (TLP) exactly the same way he or she trains land navigation, but there can also be a difference in training TLP as processes, as opposed to problem solving. In PME, the two maneuver BOLCs train TLP as processes, as it is often the officers' first experience with thorough TLP, but the MCCC trains them as problem solving. This allows the MCCC to present different and challenging opportunities to its students. This idea of categories of learning is used in PME, but not in the operating force.

Instructional Design as a Solution

Currently there is no guide for operating-force commanders to determine how to best train a task other than the objective of accomplishing the task. Incorporating the academic process of instructional design into training development is how the Army could apply the science of learning and constructivism in the operating force. The term "instructional design" refers to an academic process of systematically translating the theories and principles of learning into plans for instructional materials, activities, resources, and evaluation.[35] Though some may not think of unit training as instruction, it actually shares many characteristics: it is the intentional arrangement of experiences leading to soldiers (or other learners) acquiring particular capabilities or skills. Quality instructional design based on the constructivist philosophy and cognitive learning theory promotes cognitive processes that lead to learning.[36] Using an established doctrinal system is important to design instruction so that the goals (learning or training outcomes), instructional strategy (the "how"), and evaluation (or assessment of the instruction and the learners) all match. The academic world has been using instructional-design processes for years, and the Army has been using instructional design for PME courses; however, to prepare our formations to operate in a complex world, we must begin to use it for training design in the operating force as well.

The Army could dramatically improve training across the force by creating a doctrinal construct for training design that incorporates learning science philosophy and theory with evidence-based instructional-design principles and processes. PME can only provide so much education in the brief time a student participates, and current Army unit training based on behaviorism is insufficient at bridging the gap to prepare soldiers and

leaders to operate in a complex world. Commanders must become more than training managers; they must become training designers. They must understand and apply evidence-based practices to develop their formations. Through this approach, the Army will no longer rely just on the institutional Army (also known as the generating force) for education, as the training conducted in the operating force will allow for greater development of knowledge and understanding in all its soldiers and leaders. Thinking of unit training as more than just rehearsals will improve soldier and leader education throughout their careers. ■

Notes

1. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet (TP) 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army Operating Concept, Win in a Complex World, 2020-2040* (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 2014).

2. Robert B. Brown, "The Army University: Educating Leaders to Win in a Complex World," *Military Review* 95, no. 4 (July-August 2015), 22.

3. Ibid., 19.

4. Ibid., 19–22.

5. This is certainly not a doctrinal statement, but commanders' expectations that soldiers will arrive from professional military education (PME) knowing all they need to know have been evident over the past few years. An example is recent interactions between the Infantry School and operating force leadership from Stryker brigade combat teams. In several formal meetings and briefings, the operating force leadership has asked the school to provide more and better opportunities for individuals to learn the Stryker system before arriving to their unit. While this may be possible, it would require additional PME expansion, which may not be feasible.

6. Again, this perspective regarding soldiers viewing training merely as rehearsing is not doctrinal, but is based on personal experience during interactions between the institutional force (the Maneuver Center of Excellence) and leaders from the operational force. There was an expectation amongst operational leaders that the Maneuver Center of Excellence would create graduates that had all the skills necessary to perform in follow-on operational-force assignments with little to no additional development necessary. Those leaders saw unit training as "exercising" or "practicing" skills that individuals gained through PME.

7. While the training domains are a doctrinal construct, the U.S. Army Human Resources Command also has several publications covering this topic, specifically in how it relates to career progression.

8. These time figures for PME are based on a chart developed by Armor Branch at Human Resources Command to depict career timelines. The information was presented to Maneuver Captain's Career Course students in fall of 2015.

9. There are several training-related publications, but I would specifically like to point the reader to Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 7-0, *Training Units and Developing Leaders* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 2012) and its related series of manuals.

10. "8 Step Training Model," Fort Benning graphic, accessed 6 September 2016, http://www.benning.army.mil/armor/ocoa/content/References%20and%20Guides/8%20Step%20Training%20Model.pdf.

11. U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (CAC), "Enhancing Realistic Training White Paper: Delivering Training Capabilities for Operations in a Complex World" (white paper, U.S. Army CAC, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 26 January 2016), accessed 21 September 2016, http://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/documents/cact/ERT%20White%20Paper%20-%20Signed%20(26%20JAN%202016).pdf.

12. It is difficult to cite a lack of something. Though "crawl, walk, run" is discussed throughout training doctrine, there is little else to shape training design in many of the doctrinal publications available for operating force commanders.

13. Richard E. Mayer, *Applying the Science of Learning* (Boston: Pearson Education, Inc., 2011), 18.

14. Richard E. Mayer, "Learning," in *Encyclopedia of Educational Research* (New York: The Free Press, 1982), 1040–58.

15. Army Regulation 350-1, *Army Training and Leader Development* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 2014), 239.

16. Ibid., 229.

17. Patricia L. Smith and Tillman J. Ragan, *Instructional Design* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2005), 5.

18. Ibid., 26.

19. Ibid., 19.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. TP 525-8-2, *The U.S. Army Learning Concept for 2015* (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 20 January 2011).

23. Smith and Ragan, *Instructional Design*, 25.

24. Wallace Hannum, "B. F. Skinner's Theory," Learning Theory Fundamentals website, accessed 6 September 2016, http://www.theoryfundamentals.com/skinner.htm.

25. E-mail from Lt. Gen. Stephen Townsend to the XVIII Airborne Corps leadership and the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, 1 March 2016.

26. Paul Cobb, "Constructivism and Learning," in *International Encyclopedia of Educational Technology*, 2nd ed., eds. Tjeerd Plomp and Donald P. Ely (Tarrytown, NY: Elsevier Science, 1996), 56–59.

27. Smith and Ragan, *Instructional Design*, 26.

28. Ibid., 25.

29. T. J. Schuell, "Cognitive Conceptions of Learning," *Review of Educational Research* 56 (1986): 415.

30. Smith and Ragan, *Instructional Design*, 11.

31. Ibid., 26.

32. Ibid., 79.

33. Ibid., 80–81.

34. Ellen D. Gagné, Carol Walker Yekovich, and Frank R. Yekovich, *The Cognitive Psychology of School Learning* (Boston: Little & Brown, 1985).

35. Smith and Ragan, *Instructional Design*, 5.

36. Ibid., 9.


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Pathways
A Division Commander's Observations in the Pacific

Maj. Gen. Charles A. Flynn, U.S. Army

As dawn broke across the Manila skyline, it seemed like a normal April morning in the Philippines. But, for the thousands of U.S. soldiers, marines, and airmen working shoulder to shoulder with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the day was anything but routine. Exercise Balikatan 2016 continued at full speed despite the death of eighteen Filipino soldiers who were killed fighting Abu Sayyaf militants in Mindanao the night before.[1] Also, the omnipresent tension over the militarization of the South China Sea added layers of complexity and purpose to the ongoing efforts in this region.

The AFP were using this year's exercise with the 25th Infantry Division (ID) to work through their "Philippine Army 2028," a comprehensive redesign of their army. I was scheduled to meet with Lt. Gen. Ano, Philippine army chief of staff, to discuss the exercise, but our engagement was cancelled so he could attend a speech by U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, who had just arrived in Manila. Carter was to discuss the recently signed Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, which would allow the U.S. to build and operate facilities on Philippine bases and rotate troops into the country for extended periods. These are interesting times in the Indo-Asia-Pacific Theater, with many lessons to be learned.

Filipino soldiers demonstrate methods for preparing food for soldiers from 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, during jungle survival training 5 April 2016 as part of Exercise Balikatan 2016 at Fort Magsaysay, Philippines. Training with host-nation forces helps bridge language barriers, correct misconceptions, and overcome bias, ultimately forging strong relationships and enhancing readiness. (Photo by Sgt. 1st Class Meillettis Patton, U.S Army)

A New Paradigm

Years before, as a young major in the 25th ID, I played a role in many of the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) theater-security-cooperation exercises that seemed to be scattered extensively across that half of the globe. My experience then, almost two decades ago, was extremely different from what one might experience today. In the late 1990s, we moved companies and battalion task forces (TFs) to partner nations, spending thousands of dollars on travel costs, conducting mostly unilateral training, and ultimately missing the partnering (or advise and assist) aspect of the exercise. The outcomes were singular and predictable.

Today is very different—so much so that we have had to embrace a new paradigm. In fact, if you served in the 25th ID before the advent of Pacific Pathways in 2014, you would not even recognize the scale, scope, and complexity of the missions now associated with our theater security cooperation exercises. You would also be amazed at the professional and resilient "Tropic Lightning" soldiers. On any given day, the 25th ID is deployed across fourteen time zones in ten to twenty different countries, continually conducting shaping and deterrence operations in support of USPACOM.[2] The sun never sets on the Tropic Lightning Division.

Balikatan 2016 was the third of three

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A soldier assigned to the 25th Infantry Division crosses a river during the waterborne operations portion of the Jungle Operations School 21 January 2015 at the 25th Infantry Division East Range Training Complex, Hawaii. The training, associated with the Pacific Pathways 16.01 exercise, included soldiers from the Singapore Army's 6th Division. (Photo by Spc. James K. McCann, U.S. Army)

exercises that Pacific Pathways 16.01 tied together during the year.[3] Prior to deploying to the Philippines, elements of 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 2nd Infantry Division, began the operation in Thailand in support of Exercise Cobra Gold, an annual bilateral exercise we have conducted with the Royal Thai Army for over thirty years. They followed this mission with a deployment to the Republic of Korea in support of Exercise Foal Eagle, where they executed reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) operations and then conducted four weeks of partnered collective training before finally deploying to the Philippines.

Observations

By weaving a series of tactical actions and deployments across an operational construct, U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) and I Corps achieved the strategic effects of shape, prevent, and deter in the Indo-Asia Pacific. After planning, synchronizing, and executing mission command during six Pacific Pathways exercises in over two years of division command, I offer the following observations in an effort to describe the Army's success in the USPACOM area of responsibility so that others may visualize and more completely understand the scope of our efforts.

Observation #1: Continuous operations—the totality of the deployment. Pacific Pathways places the 25th ID and its associated enabling assets at the BCT and echelon-above-brigade levels into a continuous state of planning, coordinating, synchronizing, and executing deployments and operations across the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Even as we concluded Pacific Pathways 16.01, iterations 16.02 and 16.03 were just one terrain feature away from execution. In Pathways, no country, training event, or series of experiences matters more than another does. Rather, it is the totality of continual forward-deployed operations that builds readiness—a readiness that simply cannot be

quantified in a unit status report or a Government Accountability Office audit. The same can be said of the deterrence effort Pathways simultaneously supports; Pathways is a whole greater than the sum of its parts. From an operating tempo perspective, Pacific Pathways is sustainable, since the associated deployments are roughly ninety days. Our soldiers and leaders regard a Pathways deployment as a mission with a clearly defined and tangible purpose, and not just another tasking. As I interact more and more with our younger deployed soldiers, NCOs, and officers, this observation becomes unquestionable. It is exactly what they thought they would be doing in the Army: forward deployed, operating continually, mission-focused, and ready. This type of readiness contributes directly to Chief of Staff of the Army Gen. Mark A. Milley's number one priority.[4]

Observation #2: Flexible response options for the USPACOM and the theater land force commanders. The capabilities forward deployed and resident in the BCT, aviation TF, and logistics TF, coupled with their associated mission-command nodes and enabling expeditionary communication access, provide several credible options for the USARPAC and USPACOM commanders. This unique mix and forward positioning of capabilities, experience, technical skills, and environmental understanding has created the initial framework necessary to seize and maintain the initiative. Examples range from battalion TFs training and partnering with host-nation forces during combined-arms live-fire exercises (CALFEXs), to aviation TFs supporting operations and fighting wild fires that threatened U.S. and partner-nation people and property, to our BCT and division command posts forming the nucleus of a mission-command node for any emerging situation. The division early-entry command post is structured to rapidly grow into a joint-task-force-capable node with few modifications and additional assets. This flexibility offers a myriad of options for our joint and Army commanders, and the partner nations we support.

Observation #3: Readiness is job one—building readiness at echelon. Participation in Pacific Pathways builds soldier, leader, and unit readiness. This statement can be summarily addressed by relating a conversation I had with a BCT commander and two of his battalion commanders. I asked them, "Are you more ready today then before you deployed and why?" The BCT commander responded emphatically, "Absolutely." He explained further by saying that at the combat training centers, commanders have an opportunity to stress their units, and the units truly begin to see themselves. But, during a Pathways exercise, they not only get to see themselves, they also get to see and understand their force, their soldiers and leaders, in the actual environment where they would have to operate and potentially fight.

Not only are our soldiers conducting live-fire exercises more frequently during a Pathway than they would typically conduct at home station, but they are executing this training in a foreign country, on nonstandard ranges, and under a plethora of adverse conditions. I have observed several battalion operation officers and company commanders build remarkable squad and platoon live-fire lanes in host-nation training areas. I have seen young platoon leaders explain to their partner platoons, sometimes through an interpreter and sometimes through a drawing in the dirt, the fundamentals and importance of surface danger zones. Our young soldiers are focused, motivated, and diligently working to master their craft, regardless of the environmental factors.

At the corps, division, and BCT levels, we are in a continual state of mission command, executing countless repetitions, jumping command posts from country to country, and learning valuable lessons. After seven Pathways, our forces have entered and exited foreign ports in excess of forty times—an example of how we learn to overcome enemy anti-access/area denial capabilities with speed. These repetitions are critical to building readiness in real time.

An unintended outcome of Pathways was the spiral development of materiel solutions. Problems such as communications in triple-canopy jungle, ground mobility across host-nation road networks, and the requirement for region-specific soldier equipment would not have surfaced were it not for our presence in the theater. By discovering these shortcomings now and rapidly sourcing and providing solutions, we are saving time and money while also contributing to Gen. Milley's priority number two, the "Future Army."[5]

Observation #4: The three Rs—relationship building, rehearsals, and reconnaissance. Because of Pacific Pathways deployments, the leaders of our BCTs

Soldiers from Company B, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Infantry Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, and Indonesian soldiers from 1st Infantry Division of Kostrad conduct tomahawk training 23 August 2015 during Garuda Shield, Pacific Pathways 2015, at Cibenda, West Java, Indonesia. Garuda Shield is a regularly scheduled bilateral exercise sponsored by U.S. Army-Pacific and hosted annually by the *Tentara Nasional Indonesia* (Indonesian National Armed Forces) to promote regional security and cooperation. (Photo by Spc. Michael Sharp, U.S. Army)

and other organizations have spent countless hours with their foreign counterparts, from every branch and across the Total Army; the bonds they created through their shared tactical experiences in training will have positive strategic impacts. This is time well spent, as gestures of respect and friendship are all in an effort to create interoperability at the most junior levels.

For example, our pilots and crew chiefs invited the Filipino pilots and leaders to fly with them at night while wearing night vision goggles. This is not a capability typically found in their aviation units, and the Filipino aviators were thrilled with the opportunity. Days later, as a nearby brush fire grew into a raging wildfire and began to threaten Fort Magsaysay, a Filipino operations officer who felt comfortable with our battalion commander and his team asked our pilots if they would provide support to help contain the fire. Our battalion commander and his superb soldiers immediately began preparing and flying buckets of water to drop on the blaze. Over the next three days, day and night, they provided over three hundred "Bambi Bucket" drops totaling 63,000 gallons of water. They successfully extinguished the fire despite the threat it posed by coming within five hundred meters of the fort.

Relationships are everything. Our ability to bridge language, perceptions, and biases is accelerated when Army leader and soldier relationships manifest to solve problems.

The combined capabilities of a division early-entry command post and BCT, logistics, and aviation TFs provide a flexible and formidable force package with command-and-control options for USARPAC and USPACOM. These capabilities are becoming far better understood by other U.S. leaders and our partners the more they see them. The mixture of experience and capability resident in the division and BCT TFs allows us

to plan, coordinate, synchronize, and execute missions both quickly and effectively. This continuous process is an ongoing, iterative rehearsal; the more we do it, the better we get. The lessons learned through our continuous rehearsals form the basis of a greater regional reconnaissance effort. Small details such as customs procedures in each country, host-nation electromagnetic spectrum management, airspace coordination, port procedures, terrain management, and equipment and weapons effects are all part of theater setting. Pacific Pathways affords us the opportunity to tackle these warfighting challenges.

Mere presence alone provides remarkable insights into our partnered countries' governments. Given the growing importance of the South China Sea, its surrounding nations, and the extensive span of tactical operations in Balikatan this year, the units participating in Pathways TF were well versed in what was required to operate in the Philippines. Our planners at every echelon, our understanding of the operational environment, and our knowledge of the threats and the political nuances in that environment were excellent. The BCT commander emphatically stated that he could not have accomplished his mission were it not for the endless behind-the-scenes work of the logistics TF, and the communications and network operations that enabled his tactical actions. From port operations, to customs, command-and-control nodes, airspace, and cyber, the reconnaissance that our soldiers and leaders accomplished on Pathways was extraordinary. It set conditions for the United States to be in a position of relative advantage upon arrival if called upon to respond to a crisis.

Observation #5: Empowering leaders and soldiers—building soldiers to thrive in chaos and complexity. Soldiers, leaders, and, most important, commanders at every echelon, learn and grow while deployed on Pathways. They develop confidence in their skills and abilities through the repetitive performance of tasks and the continual decision making associated with accomplishing missions in foreign countries. These stressful performance situations build true capabilities beyond what our equipment alone can do and create a unique level of soldier and leadership mastery; one that is gained by being on the ground and working through problem after problem, day after day, risk after risk. It is the learned ability of commanders and leaders to look in the eyes of their soldiers and get a "fingertip feel" of a situation. Pathways affords the opportunity for real soldiers, in real time, to solve real problems, and it is paving the way for a new generation of intellectually curious, very agile, and adaptive Army soldiers and leaders that thrive in complexity and chaos.

Observation #6: Army force projection and presence—an expression of U.S. national commitment and resolve. Placement of U.S. soldiers on foreign soil goes a level beyond interest; it is a physical manifestation of national commitment. We are committing people, time, and money because we care, and because we know real relationships must be built on trust. And, from this trust, we can build teams. Absent trust, you can build nothing. Pathways reassures our partners and allies while simultaneously deterring adversaries and aggressors. Our ability to project forces via Pathways builds a deep reservoir of experiences in our officer and NCO corps.

For example, our BCT TFs' agility and force-projection capabilities were peerless in the Philippines. Over the span of ninety-six hours, the Pathways TF executed and provided mission command over a joint and combined TF CALFEX, recovered that element from the Crow Valley Gunnery Range to Fort Magsaysay, conducting a 125-kilometer road march from their objective areas to Subic Bay, where they commenced vessel upload. Simultaneously with ground operations, the supporting aviation TF conducted a 350-nautical-mile air movement involving multiple joint forward arming and refueling points across four different islands into the southern island of Panay. After consolidating, building combat power, and conducting troop-leading procedures, they air assaulted a raid force to a fifth island objective. Following the raid, the TF collapsed all combat power in country from four different camps back to the port in Subic Bay, closing and executing reverse RSOI of all helicopters, equipment, and soldiers. Again, all this was done with joint and partner forces over a period of just ninety-six hours (see figure, page 112).

This was a true rehearsal of U.S. force projection, illustrating U.S. resolve and demonstrated U.S. Army capabilities. Operations of this size, scope, and complexity are happening in every country our Pathways forces deploy to; these are a visible display of U.S. capabilities. Finally, they highlight the asymmetrical advantage: the American soldier.



CAB-combat aviation brigade
EECP-early entry command post
ID-infantry division
IN-infantry



Force package
- Division tactical command post
- Stryker brigade combat team (-)
- Aviation task force
- Logistics task force
- Enablers
- Approximately 1200 people
- Forty-one Strykers
- Eleven helicopters

Task force combined arms live fire exercise
- 125-kilometer road march
- Strykers, artillery
- Joint fires

Air assault
- 350 nautical miles
- Four joint forward arming and refueling points
- Four islands
- Raid

All events occurred over ninety-six hours.

(Graphic courtesy of author)

Figure. Brigade Combat Team Pacific Pathways Training Exercise

Observation #7: Posture, presence, and purpose. The value of our presence in theater, expressed by our Pathways forces in continual operations, cannot be overstated, nor can its true readiness be accurately measured exclusively in metrics. One example is a simple exchange I recently heard between another senior official and a BCT commander in the Philippines. The official asked how long it takes to get the Pathways force from the air and sea ports of departure to arrival at Fort Magsaysay.

The BCT commander's response was, "Within seventy-two hours we are up and operating. We take forty-eight hours with the logistics TF to offload, marshal, and move equipment from the port. The aviation TF builds up and flies on its own timeline, coordinating routes and airspace as they go. Then we take another twenty-four hours to close the force of forty-two Strykers, eleven helicopters, nearly one thousand soldiers, and all other vehicles and containers. We then match up soldiers with equipment after a 130-kilometer ground move to the training area at Fort Magsaysay. After that, we are ready to partner and train." Impressive, to say the least.

Conclusion

In the end, the presence of the Army in theater matters. It matters to our partners, allies, and adversaries alike. It is a telling and strong message when we take our most-ready forces—who are certified at combat training centers and postured by training at home station—and then invest that readiness into the region to increase both our partners and our proficiency. This investment of readiness provides purpose for our soldiers and leaders; you can see it in their eyes and their actions on the ground. Said another way, these operational deployments are being viewed at every level and by every soldier I engage with as a mission with a purpose.

Pacific Pathways is also a worthwhile investment of resources because it solves multiple problems for the Army and the Pacific Command combatant commander. Ultimately, it prevents conflict in the region; our

persistent engagement and presence in this massive area of responsibility is undoubtedly one of the main reasons we continue to avoid open and escalating conflict in the region. At the same time, the Pathways operations are building readiness and creating a generation of soldiers and leaders who are agile, adaptive, and prepared for whatever circumstances the future holds.

In fact, one of the most important benefits from these deployments is the incredible professional growth that our soldiers get from combining forces and leaders from different formations (e.g., USARPAC, I Corps, 25th ID, 7th ID, 593rd Sustainment Brigade, 10th Regional Support Group, National Guard and Reserve Component units, Special Operations Command Pacific, and units from the U.S. Marine Corps and Air Force). Their shared forward-deployed Pathways experiences help them form relationships built on trust that will last for the rest of their Army careers. Finally, this deployment experience of empowered soldiers may provide the most crucial long-term outcome for the Army by exemplifying desired leadership traits and values for our partners and allies to witness and to replicate in their own armies. ■

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

Article

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Suicides in the U.S. Military: Birth Cohort Vulnerability and the All-Volunteer Force

James Griffith[1] and Craig J. Bryan[1]

Abstract
This paper builds a case for examining suicide in the U.S. military relative to broad societal context, specifically, the unique experiences of birth cohorts relating to processes described by Durkheim's theory of suicide. In more recent birth cohorts, suicide rates have increased among teenagers and young adults. In addition, suicide rates of age intervals at a given time period have been reliably predicted by the size of the birth cohort and the percentage of nonmarital births—supposed indicators of Durkheim's diminished social integration and behavioral regulation. Consequences of these trends are likely more evident in the U.S. military due to having proportionally more individuals known to be at risk for suicide, that is, young males who are from nontraditional households. The all-volunteer force compared to draft force has fewer applicants to select, and proportionally more of applicants are accepted for military service. Consequently, more recruits having varied conditions now than before, perhaps including greater vulnerability to suicide, serve in the U.S. military. These points are further elaborated with supporting evidence, concluding with a call for new directions in suicide research, practice, and policy.

Keywords
military suicides, birth cohort, social integration, all-volunteer force

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Among the most challenging and puzzling issues the U.S. Army has faced among combat veterans returning from Iraq and Afghanistan since 2002 has been the unusually high number of suicides as compared to the number of such incidents associated with previous wars. In "Suicides in the U.S. Military: Birth Cohort Vulnerability and the All-Volunteer Force," originally published in *Armed Forces & Society* in 2015, authors James Griffith and Craig J. Bryan provide original research from which they develop unique and persuasive explanations for the underlying causes of the unusually high number of suicides occurring among veterans of the U.S. Army. In conjunction, they recommend mitigating solutions aimed at lowering the number of suicides. Their paper can be found at the below noted address:

http://afs.sagepub.com/content/early/2015/11/16/0095327X15614552.full.pdf+html

Soviet Union leader Vladimir Lenin sits in his Kremlin office, reading the *Pravda* (*Truth*) newspaper 16 October 1918 in Moscow, Russia. (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

Lenin's Formula for Agenda Setting

Col. William M. Darley, U.S. Army, Retired

We know that it is not at all necessary to have the sympathy of a majority of the people in order to rule them. The right organization can turn the trick.

—Roger Trinquier

Soviet Union founder Vladimir Ilych Lenin used three linked concepts to set a public-issues agenda that facilitated his seizure and consolidation of political power in Russia circa 1917. Familiarity with these tenets and their relationships is valuable to military strategic planners for two reasons. First, awareness may give coherence of understanding with regard to a specific methodology that has been used for more than a century by many diverse insurgent and terrorist groups as well as authoritarian regimes such as China, Russia, North Korea, Cuba, and Venezuela to seize political power and then exercise sociopolitical control once in

power. Second, the linkages between them help reveal the underlying ideology of many domestic lobbying and community organizations that operate in stable political states and use those tenets to shape the domestic sociocultural environment in which today's Western military planners must operate.

The relationship of the concepts is supported in this article by incremental development of a rudimentary model to help illuminate how each concept relates to others in the agenda-setting process. The model does not pretend to encompass all the myriad factors associated with the very complex phenomenon of garnering public support needed to prevail in political conflict. However, it is intended to help operational and strategic planners identify the broad, and sometimes difficult to discern, relationships among the concepts specified that continue to be employed by adversaries against the West and against the United States in particular.

Agenda Setting

For the purposes of this article, *agenda setting* is the complex process by which a few issues of public concern are culled from a wide universe of competing issues that then become the major focus of a given community's psychological orientation, discussion, debate, and opinion formation. Development of the model proposed here helps answer the essential question: How might a political activist (such as an insurgent revolutionary) set the public agenda in a manner conducive to obtaining specific political objectives? Answering this requires by necessity examining two other key questions in the course of the article: Who are the agenda setters that take it upon themselves to cull from all possible issues those that then become the focus of community interest? And, how do such agenda setters focus a population's attention on a narrowly chosen set of issues about which they want that population to think?

How Public Opinion Changes

Setting aside for the moment circumstances where the community is coerced into accepting an imposed agenda, most people in any polity are highly dependent on others for the substance of their opinions on issues outside the scope of their immediate day-to-day experience. A large body of research shows that the key decisions most people make in forming their opinion on public issues generally do not stem from their independent analysis of the nuanced details of those issues, but rather on their selection of the opinion leaders whom they choose to think for them. Thus, opinion swings inside groups with similar sociopolitical leanings more often than not are the product of the influence of shifts in opinions by a given group's respected opinion leaders and agenda setters rather than of individual group member analysis and consideration.[1] Consequently, for those seeking to either understand or to sway public opinion for political purposes, the most essential factor is to identify who a given community's key agenda-setting opinion leaders are, and how these may be swayed in their opinions to support the activist's agenda.

Why Many People Rely on Others to Think for Them

Although there is a universe of important issues about which any given individual might think and be concerned, many people are only able to concern themselves with and think in depth about a small fraction of them. It is not that individuals are necessarily uninterested in large community or national issues. Rather, it is that many people usually have other more pressing, time-consuming priorities that are the focus of their daily attention and energy, such as how to make a living or manage the challenges of raising families. For such, the issues of primary personal concern are so dominant and time consuming that there is little cognitive space for thinking about other issues that do not directly affect their personal lives in an immediate, threatening way (see figure 1 on page 116). Thus, that segment of a population who feels socially or morally obligated to have an opinion on greater social or national issues routinely seeks out surrogates to think for them, and subsequently formulates the details of the opinions they will adopt based on their faith and confidence in their chosen surrogate thinkers.

Agenda-Setting Opinion Leaders

The surrogate thinkers that act as

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community agenda setters for many people are generally of three types. First, there are the traditional community agenda setters. Throughout most of human history, agenda setters have been community leaders with whom other community members had personal contact. Such leaders include leading members of prominent families, charismatic teachers, local government officials, military or law enforcement officials, clergy, and informal as well as formal peer-group leaders, among others. They gain their influence either by inherited stature or from personal achievement as observed by the community.

However, starting with Gutenberg's printing press in 1439, a second type of agenda setter emerged—personalities involved in producing and editing mass media distributed from afar. These agenda setters set community agendas through the impersonal, long-distance influence of widely distributed appealing words, ideas, and images. Such powerful impersonal agenda-setting leaders have evolved in our own time to have great vicarious influence on community agendas because of the opinions reported through the media that do not involve transfer through immediate face-to-face contact. Since Gutenberg, mass media expanded the circle of agenda setters to encompass charismatic political theorists, philosophers and religious thinkers, educators, national or international activists, entertainment and sports figures, fashion figures, popular news reporters, and others with similar popular appeal. Though it remains argued whether media-figure influence or traditional person-to-person influence has greater sway, there is little doubt that media figures have become potent agenda setters through broad, but impersonal, contact with the public through mass media.[2]

On assessing just how influential media agenda setters actually have become, it is useful to highlight the work of media scholars Donald Shaw and Maxwell McCombs, whose exhaustive research has persuasively demonstrated the powerful influence mass media have on setting the public agenda in the modern world. Their conclusions, first demonstrated while researching the impact of media on elections in the United States, definitively established the immensely strong correlation between issues the media editorially select to cover and those that have pivotal influence during election cycles. Subsequently, the studies of Shaw and McCombs have been widely replicated by hundreds of other media and sociology scholars, the majority of which have arrived at similar conclusions.[3] Such subsequent research appears to validate that media have



(Graphic by Arin Burgess, *Military Review*)

Figure 1. Issues of Individual Interest

exceptionally strong, if not decisive, influence on framing the community agenda-setting process that selects the issues not only about which elections are decided but also about the social issues in general that become the popular focus of community concern, debate, and controversy. As Shaw and colleagues Thomas C. Terry and Milad Minooie noted in a recent article,

> What is agenda setting? Political scientist Bernard Cohen in the early 1960s discovered that what people knew about foreign affairs was closely related to the editorial selection of items covered in the news media they followed (i.e., media connect people and set a news agenda)....
>
> Cohen's research led him to argue that the press was not especially effective in telling people what to think but was exceptionally powerful in telling people what to think—and talk—*about*. This, in a phrase, is *agenda setting*: media frame and focus community interest on a discrete set of issue by means of regular news coverage.
>
> Since then, hundreds of media studies have confirmed the observation that news media

> influence which issues and topics people consider most important and are worthy of thinking and talking about, to the exclusion of other important issues and topics of possible interest available.[4]

Thus, two major types of agenda setters have evolved that overlap in modern society and mutually support each other in defining community agendas: those who set agendas through personal contact with members of the community, and those who set community agendas through the mass media (see figure 2).



(Graphic by Arin Burgess, *Military Review*)

Figure 2. Media-Focused Issues

However, there is a potent third category of agenda-setting agents that must be incorporated into the agenda-setting process. Lenin's theory includes those agents who are organized to *coerce* public focus on issues. The relationship of these three agenda setters will be discussed together as key elements of Lenin's theory below.

Lenin as a Media Theorist

The great influence that media have on defining community issues considered in public elections is highlighted by the relationship among key concepts in a political-influence process formulated by Lenin. Lenin originated his concepts while serving as leader of the Bolshevik branch of the Russian Communist Party in the lead-up to the Russian Revolution of 1917. To understand why he developed them, some background is necessary.

> Commencing in the late 1800s, there was much controversy concerning Marxist theory among European communist and socialist leaders. Discussions became heated and frequently characterized by personal attacks, innuendo, threats, and, not infrequently, violence. The sticking point that produced so much contention dealt with disagreements over interpretations of Marxist theory; whether Karl Marx had actually predicted the demise of capitalism via the process some referred to as economic determinism.[5] Frustrated European communist and socialist leaders increasingly questioned and critically analyzed why the end of history they believed Marx had predicted decades earlier had not come to pass. However, some resisted calls to revise interpretations of Marxist doctrine to conform to historical experience. The most vocal ideologues dogmatically insisted that the nature of capitalism and the forces driving it to inevitable destruction had only temporarily stalled but would regain momentum because of the inevitable natural forces of economic determinism.[6]
>
> For his part, Lenin bitterly repudiated the concept of economic determinism, labeling this concept "economism" and denouncing it as naïve faith in mysterious forces that would produce the inevitability of a spontaneous rise of the proletariat. He argued instead that such contentions were completely misinterpreting and distorting Marx's analysis. Rather, Lenin insisted, the evolving character of capitalism would inevitably produce nothing but the emergence of an opportunity for the proletariat to rise and seize the means of production.[7] Consequently, Lenin asserted, committed communists had the responsibility to organize and agitate for revolution and not merely wait for conditions to incubate by themselves spontaneously based on misplaced faith in so-called natural laws of economic determinism.[8]
>
> In an effort to promote this view more widely, Lenin wrote and published a monograph titled "What Is To

Be Done?"[9] In it, Lenin laid down a simple but profound prescription for successful political activism that provided a broad outline explaining how to organize a revolutionary political movement together with explaining the essential relationship of mass media to that movement and how media should be used to further political ends. This article has had enormous influence on political activism from his time to the present. In this monograph, Lenin describes the two key principles he asserted were required for fomenting revolution.

The Vanguard Party

Lenin maintained that the first of two key steps for advancing a political objective was to establish a *vanguard party*—a core group of highly disciplined "professional" activists (revolutionaries). The purpose of this core element within a political party was to work full time organizing and leading the political effort. Such a vanguard party was essential, Lenin asserted, because—in contrast to the orthodox faith of some dogmatic Marxists—he did not feel the proletariat would have the capacity to be anything but a courageous yet hapless mob unless carefully instructed, trained, and then tightly disciplined by a leadership organization. Without such a vanguard party, he maintained, a political movement would be led by amateurs and fail.

Among the principal responsibilities of the vanguard party was to educate the proletariat, instilling in them political and class consciousness. To do this, the vanguard party had to assume the role of instilling in the working class recognition of the class struggle at the same time it organized and expanded the movement by enforcing rigid and ruthless party discipline among recruits for the revolutionary cause.

> On the other hand, the organization of the revolutionaries must consist first and foremost of people who make revolutionary activity their profession … In view of this common characteristic of the members of such an organization … Such an organization must perforce not be very extensive and must be as secret as possible…. If we begin with the solid foundation of a strong organization of revolutionaries, we can ensure the stability of the movement as a whole and carry out the aims both of Social-Democracy and of trade unions proper.[10]

One might ask, if Lenin were alive today, what organizations might he recognize as the heirs of his vanguard-party concept? Subsequent to Lenin's day, one can hardly think of a successful revolutionary or insurgency movement of any consequence in the twentieth or twenty-first century that was not led by the equivalent of a vanguard party. Examples include Benito Mussolini's Fascist Party in Italy, Adolf Hitler's National Socialist Party in Germany, and Hugo Chavez's Fifth Republic Movement in Venezuela, to name just a small representation of such organizations. Elsewhere, Islamic radicals Sayyid Qutb and Abul Ala Maududi both posited that Islamic vanguard parties were necessary to lead the world's lost and wayward Muslim



(Graphic by Arin Burgess, *Military Review*)

Figure 3. Party-Focused Issues

community back to a restoration of Islamic society. For example, Qutb emphatically specified the need for an Islamist vanguard in his book *Milestones*:

> It is necessary that there should be a vanguard, which sets out with this determination, and then keeps walking on the path ….
>
> It is necessary that this vanguard should know the landmarks and the milestones of the road toward this goal …
>
> I have written "Milestones" for this vanguard.[11]

But, just as significantly, it can legitimately be argued that much of the character of modern-day political lobbying and community organizing is a direct heir of the Leninist concept that a political movement can only succeed if it is led by a professional organization of full-time agitators organizing and propagandizing for a cause.

The emphasis on creating vanguard-party-style leadership to facilitate organization and agitation is on prominent display among lobbying and activist organizations across the spectrum of political orientation in the West. In the United States, such examples of professional agitators and organizers include (or have included) the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN), the American Civil Liberties Union, People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, the National Rifle Association, the National Council of La Raza, and the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, to mention just a tiny fraction of such vanguard-party style groups.

Not surprisingly, the literature that often guides the activities of such lobbying groups and community-activist groups has been produced by professional community organizers and agitators like Saul Alinsky and Wade Rathke, whose writings reflect the Leninist imperative to build vanguard organizations together with occasional allusions to, and overtones of, Leninist jargon, thinking, and practice. For example, in his *Rules for Radicals*, Alinsky observes,

> A naked illustration of this point is to be found in Trotsky's summary of Lenin's famous *April Theses*, issued shortly after Lenin's return from exile. Lenin pointed out: "the task of the Bolsheviks is to overthrow the Imperialist Government. But, this government rests upon the support of the Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who in turn are supported by the trustfulness of the masses of people. We are in the minority. In these circumstances, there can be no talk of violence on our side." The essence of Lenin's speeches during this period was, "They have the guns and therefore we are for peace and for reformation through the ballot. When we have the guns, then it will be through the bullet." And it was.[12]

Indeed, Alinsky himself billed his book *Rules for Radicals* as nothing less than a guide for organizing and agitating for revolution by conducting activities that clearly resonate with overtones of Leninist-like strategies aimed at coercing a result from a political opponent through skillful organization, agitation, and propaganda (see figure 3).

Mass Medium Required for Revolution

Second, for the vanguard party to succeed, Lenin asserted that it was essential for it to control at least one influential mass medium. Consequently, Lenin stipulated that the vanguard party must get under its direct control a mass medium totally dedicated to promoting its cause. For this purpose, he called for establishment of what he termed an "all-Russia" newspaper. Why a newspaper? In an era when radio and telegraph were in their infancy and the telephone still being invented, the only true mass medium available was the newspaper. He describes the vital necessity of such a medium to political activism as follows:

> The publication of an all-Russia political newspaper must be *the main line* by which we may unswervingly develop, deepen, and expand the organization (viz., the revolutionary organization that is ever ready to support every protest and every outbreak)….
>
> A newspaper is not only a collective propagandist and a collective agitator, it is also a collective organizer. In this respect *it may be compared to the scaffolding* erected round a building under construction; it marks the contours of the structure and facilitates communication between the builders, permitting them to distribute the work and to view the common results achieved by their organized labour.[13]

In other words, the purposes of the "all-Russia" newspaper as outlined by Lenin were to provide employment to the members of the vanguard party as

they built the party and movement; and to serve as the party's instrument for organizing followers of the party, propagandizing the movement's cause, and agitating in multiple venues to undermine the existing sociopolitical order and set the conditions for the popular rise of the proletariat.

If Lenin were alive today, which instruments of communication would he seek to control in order to organize, agitate, and propagandize his cause, and which at the same time would serve as the scaffolding to build the party? If anything, Lenin was visionary and opportunistic. Therefore, there is no doubt that Lenin would have sought out the most state-of-the-art media available in an effort to focus public attention on his political objectives. Consequently, the vast potential for using the Internet and social media to reach millions as a rapid and cost-effective means for organizing, agitating, and propagandizing could not have failed to attract his attention. Though his program of modern activism might have included traditional media such as pamphlets and newspapers, he would more likely have focused on pursuing exposure through television and radio broadcasts, and especially through the Internet and social media.



Among the first steps the Islamic State (IS) took when establishing itself was to publish a glossy magazine, *Dabiq*, to serve as a principal organ for recruiting, organizing, propagandizing, and agitating for the IS cause. The first edition appeared in July 2014.

Not surprisingly, following Lenin's formula, the Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaida today employ the Internet in exactly the role the Leninist model envisioned for the media: as an instrument for recruiting, organizing, and synchronizing party activities, propagandizing their ideology, and agitating for their causes. For example, both al-Qaida and IS have a sophisticated webpage presence, each featuring a publication that serves the purpose of promoting and organizing for its agenda. Moreover, Lenin would have likely felt quite at home, understood well, and approved of the IS policy that encourages the Internet broadcast of beheadings in a calculated effort that serves the dual purpose of both terrorizing opponents as well as taunting and frustrating Western governments.

Subsequent to Lenin's day, one can hardly think of an identifiable revolutionary or insurgency movement with any resilience in either the twentieth or twenty-first century that did not feature a vanguard party with control or outright ownership of at least one mass medium tailored to its needs or the environment in which it operated. For example, the *Volksicher Beobachter* (*National Observer*) supported the rise of the National Socialist Party in pre-World War II Germany, *Pravda* (*Truth*) supported the Bolshevik consolidation of power in Russia, and *Granma* supported the communist party of Fidel Castro in his domination of Cuba. These are just a few such examples demonstrating the fusion Lenin stated was necessary between a vanguard party and control of a mass medium to usurp and then maintain political hegemony over a polity.

The Need for Cheka

Lastly, though not specifically mentioned in "Where to Begin?," Lenin added de facto a third principle to his revolutionary agenda-setting formula shortly after seizing power over Russia in 1917: stifling the formation of political opposition and any alternate political agenda setting by all means necessary.

It is noteworthy to observe that the first two principles of Lenin's theory largely depend on the free will of those hearing the revolutionary message to consider and decide upon what Lenin sought to convey. Consequently, the success of efforts to propagandize and agitate described by Lenin in "What is to be Done?" depended for their effectiveness on the skillful crafting and distribution of persuasive messaging together with alluring



(Graphic by Arin Burgess, *Military Review*)

Figure 4. Party-Focused and Cheka-Compelled Issues

activity. To paraphrase Shaw and McCombs, they were techniques that aimed to narrow the universe of things about which the targeted audience were collectively enticed to think about.

However, Lenin was not satisfied with depending on the free will of an audience to either accept or reject his revolutionary agenda, which would have only left open the possibility of other competing political agendas usurping his own through more appealing and skillful messaging and organization. Hence, the last principle of Lenin's theoretical model is straightforward coercion. Immediately after seizing power over Russia, Lenin instructed the ruthless Bolshevik loyalist Felix Dzerzhinsky to organize the *Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage*. Established on 20 December 1917 under the name *Cheka*, its whole purpose was to prevent political opposition to Bolshevist rule from emerging. Tactics ranged from state-sponsored public ridicule of political opponents, and media seizure and censorship, to vandalism, physical intimidation and attacks, kidnapping, torture, and murder. During Lenin's ensuing Red Terror campaign, estimates range from twelve thousand to two hundred thousand political opponents who were killed as Lenin tightened the noose around the public agenda.[14] And, as the Cheka took steps to crush political opponents, it walked arm in arm with the newly formed state propaganda ministry to ensure that the public agenda was set by Lenin himself and no other. With a disciplined vanguard party, state control of the media through the propaganda ministry, and the Cheka in place, Lenin no longer depended solely on the vagaries of persuasion to shape independent thought and free will among the Russian masses for setting the state agenda (see figure 4).

Subsequently, the Cheka became the model adopted by other socialist and fascist governments, as well as other diverse authoritarian regimes. For example, taking careful note of Lenin's formula, Italian dictator Benito Mussolini established a secret organization with the same mission of squashing political and media opposition after his seizure of power. Not surprisingly, in apparent honor of Lenin, he nicknamed that organization the Cheka.[15] Emulating Mussolini in turn, the National Socialists of Germany established first the Brownshirts, and shortly after that the Gestapo, both influenced by the Italian and Soviet Cheka models.

If Lenin were alive today, what organizations might he recognize as the heirs of the Cheka concept he fathered? The answer is: Cheka-like organizations are today ubiquitous, standard fixtures of every authoritarian state of consequence, including China, Iran, North Korea, Venezuela, and Cuba, among others. And, as

"Brownshirt" storm troopers (*Sturmabteilung*, or SA) burn the black, red, and gold flag of the newly established Weimar Republic 30 January 1933 in the streets of Berlin, Germany. Members of the SA wore distinctive brown uniforms and were frequently employed by officials of the Nazi party to break up the meetings of, and engage in street battles with, their political opponents, especially communists. (Photo courtesy of Bildarchiv Preussischer Kulturebesitz [Prussian Cultural Heritage picture archive])

Cheka heirs, they largely operate according to Leninist methodology, principally dedicated to stamping out or preventing the emergence of any hint of political opposition to their respective regimes, no matter how benign or remote a seeming challenge might be.

Perhaps more significant, the specter of Lenin's vindictive ruthlessness toward political opponents has also now become characteristic of many so-called nonviolent political activist groups operating in stable political states in the West. These use Leninist-style intimidation tactics, which, though they may not employ the same levels of violence as used by the Cheka and the Brownshirts, nevertheless reflect Cheka intolerance and methodology in their single-minded efforts to stifle political opposition and the threat of alternate competing agendas emerging from other organizations.

Such coercive tactics increasingly include use of the web and social media for unremitting personalized harassment of individuals. They also include systematic frivolous legal challenges through the courts, harassing demonstrations, picketing, stalking, civil disobedience aimed at unsettling public security and order, vandalism, disruption of public meetings including concerted efforts to prevent political opponents from being able to conduct public rallies or give speeches, and organized public ridicule through the electronic media (especially by co-opting sympathetic entertainment media). Moreover, personal intimidation threats against individuals or family members, sporadic physical attacks, and a variety of other activities that aim to impede a political opponent from effectively organizing and agitating for an alternate political agenda are sometimes also used. For example, recent organized efforts in the United States by diverse groups to disrupt or cause cancellation of various political rallies through violence and threats during the United States' current election cycle illustrate the continuing influence of Lenin's Cheka methodology on domestic community organizing and interest groups.

Supporters of the "Revolutionary Communist Party, USA" burn the U.S. flag outside the gates of the Quicken Loans Arena 20 July 2016 in Cleveland, Ohio. (Photo by Adrees Latif, Reuters)

Conclusion

As military officers look out over the panorama of competing insurgent, terrorist, and aggressive domestic activist causes (including the organizations and techniques behind so-called "Color Revolutions") across the global spectrum, the lesson is that no politically centered movement can long survive without being led by a vanguard party and without control (or the full sympathetic support) of at least one influential medium to organize, propagandize, and agitate for the cause. And, such movements are severely handicapped unless they attain the proactive ability to preclude the emergence of political opposition to them, or to stamp out their political opponents if such do emerge, by either force or harassment and ridicule.

Consequently, in authoritarian or nondemocratic unstable states, the closer a political movement is to achieving the ideal character of being led by a well-organized vanguard party that can influence opinion leaders, that controls at least one influential mass medium, and the greater its means to intimidate (or even crush) political adversaries through violent Cheka-like tactics, the greater the likelihood that that party will have effective control over the state. Similarly, in stable nonauthoritarian political states, the closer a political interest is to the ideal of maintaining collusion between a full-time vanguard party of professional organizers and agitators to lobby and agitate on its behalf and at least one major medium (over which it has virtual control) together with the means to intimidate or silence political competitors using largely diverse tactics of intimidation and harassment, the greater the likelihood that it will be able to dominate and dictate the domestic public agenda of the community or state.

U.S. military officers and senior noncommissioned officers should become familiar with the origin and employment of Lenin's principles and tactics of revolutionary activism as they are frequently employed today by insurgents, authoritarian regimes, and many domestic lobbying and community organizing groups in ways that pose a threat to national security. Moreover,

such activities are often used in tandem with so-called kinetic operations to achieve greater psychological and strategic effects. With such familiarity, military planners will be able to plan and operate more effectively in the current complex environment by understanding how key components of political activism by adversaries are often used in a systematic and synchronized way to achieve political objectives. ■

Notes

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1. Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice,* 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948), 137; Elihu Katz, "The Two-Step Flow of Communication: An Up-To-Date Report on an Hypothesis," *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 21, no. 1 (Spring 1957): 61–78 (anniversary issue devoted to twenty years of public opinion research); Elihu Katz and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, *Personal Influence, The Part Played by People in the flow of Mass Communications* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2006), 31–42.

2. George M. Beal and Joseph M. Bohlen, "The Diffusion Process," supplement to North Central Regional Publication No. 1 of the Agricultural Extension Services, *How Farm People Accept New Ideas, Special Report 15* (Ames, IA: Iowa State University, 1981), accessed 15 August 2016, http://www.soc.iastate.edu/extension/pub/comm/SP15.pdf. The relative influence of opinion leaders as opposed to media was examined in a 1959 study by Iowa State University researchers Joe Bohlen and George Beal, who concluded that shifts in opinion could be explained by an apparent five-step decision-making process observed among groups of farmers considering adoption of a new hybrid corn strain. They noted the steps of the process as awareness, information, or interest; evaluation; trial; and adoption. They concluded that media play an important role in the first two stages (awareness and information or interest); however, they play a less significant role in the last three stages, where opinion leaders communicating through interpersonal contact become the major factors leading to changes in opinion and behavior.

3. Maxwell E. McCombs and Donald L. Shaw, "The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 36(2) (1972): 174, doi:10.1086/267990, provides the first instance of such studies; for more examples see Maxwell E. McCombs, *Setting the Agenda: The Mass Media and Public Opinion*, 2nd ed. (Malden, MA: Polity, 2014); see also Donald L. Shaw, Bradley J. Hamm, and Thomas Terry, "Vertical vs. Horizontal Media: Using Agenda-Setting and Audience Agenda-Melding to Create Public Information Strategies in the Emerging Papyrus Society," *Military Review* 86(6) (2006): 13–25.

4. Donald L. Shaw, Thomas C. Terry, and Milad Minooie, "Military Communication Strategies Based on How Audiences Meld Media and Agendas," *Military Review* 95, no. 6 (November-December 2015): 17.

5. Stanley Pierson, *Marxist Intellectuals and the Working-Class Mentality in Germany, 1887-1912* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 33, 60–63; Karl Marx, *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1859), Preface; Cyril Smith, "Kautsky and 'Revisionism'; Philosophy and Bolshevism," Marx at the Millennium website, accessed 16 August 2016, https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/smith-cyril/works/millenni/smith2.htm; Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party* (New York: Rand School of Social Science, 1919), 28, accessed 16 August 2016, https://books.google.com/books/about/Manifesto_of_the_Communist_Party.html?id=TZE4AQAAMAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=kp_read_button&hl=en#v=snippet&q=grave-diggers&f=false. Marx states, "What the bourgeois therefore produces, above all, is its own grave-diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable."; Peter G. Stillman, "The Myth of Marx's Economic Determinism," Marx Myths and Legends website, April 2005, accessed 16 August 2016, https://www.marxists.org/subject/marxmyths/peter-stillman/article.htm.

6. Dick Geary, *Karl Kautsky* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1987), 3–14, 16–17, 20–29; Smith, "Kautsky and 'Revisionism,'" Marx at the Millennium website.

7. James E. Connor, ed., *Lenin on Politics and Revolution, Selected Writings* (New York: Pegasus, 1968), 189–95.

8. Ibid., 195.

9. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, "What Is To Be Done?," in *Lenin on Politics and Revolution*, ed. James E. Connor, 31–78.

10. Connor, *Lenin on Politics and Revolution*, 62, 67.

11. Sayyid Qutb, "Introduction," *Milestones* (Charleston, SC: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 1 January 2005), accessed 17 August 2016, https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B9UK4WbD_y24UTJhVG1OeGRTTlk/view?pli=1.

12. Saul Alinsky, *Rules of Radicals: A Pragmatic Primer for Realistic Radicals* (New York: Vintage Books, 1971), 37.

13. Lenin, "What Is To Be Done? The 'Plan' For an All-Russia Political Newspaper," Marxists Internet Archive website, accessed 17 August 2016, https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1901/witbd/v.htm.

14. "The Cheka," Alpha History website, accessed 17 August 2016, http://alphahistory.com/russianrevolution/cheka/#sthash.vGOssXfL.dpuf.

15. Brenda Haugen, *Mussolini, Fascist Italian Dictator* (Minneapolis: Compass Point Books, 2007), 68–69.

REVIEW ESSAY

Jacob L. Devers

A General's Life

James Scott Wheeler, University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky, 2015, 589 pages



Dr. John T. Kuehn

The guiding theme for Scott Wheeler's study on U.S. Army Gen. Jacob "Jake" L. Devers appears on the first page of this long overdue biography: "So, why is Jacob Devers a forgotten general?" Why, indeed? Devers finished World War II as a four-star general, like George Patton. He commanded one of only three Allied army groups in Europe, the Sixth Army Group, composed of one U.S. army and one French army. These facts alone should cause one to ask why he is not more widely remembered, especially since he was not relieved of command, nor did he suffer any defeats at the hands of the German forces he faced while in command.

Wheeler's book, therefore, follows the trend of revising the established scholarship about World War II—in this case, the scholarship on high command. The method is that of a traditional biography—birth to death. Devers's early years are covered in the traditional manner of tracing family roots and discussing those that influenced him most. For example, one of Devers's early character traits is his "puritanical" and countercultural aversion to alcohol and tobacco, which could be attributed to his mother Ella, and was noted "by his classmates at West Point."

Devers entered the artillery branch after graduation from West Point, serving in the pre-World War I Army in various postings. He was lucky enough to command three different types of artillery units: mountain artillery (using mules), regular horse-drawn artillery, and one of the first motorized artillery battalions. He missed a posting to France during World War I, having been deemed more important to the training effort of the many artillery officers at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, who were needed for the massive expansion of that combat arm during the war. Like Dwight Eisenhower, however, missing the "big show" in Europe did not seem to hurt his subsequent career, despite his concern that it would do just that.

The bulk of Wheeler's book concentrates on the critical period before and during World War II, and Devers's role as one of Gen. George C. Marshall's "go to guys." Devers's career was also helped by his long association and friendship with fellow artilleryman Gen. Leslie McNair, another one of Marshall's protégés and troubleshooters. McNair became the American Ground Forces commander and Devers's boss when he assumed overall command of the new Armored Force of the U.S. Army. In this section the reader learns of the numerous occasions in which Devers conflicted with Eisenhower, especially during Devers's 1943 trip to Africa, when Eisenhower probably believed Devers had been sent to relieve him. And, the section on Devers's command of the Sixth Army Group and the challenges of commanding a French unit is especially enlightening for anyone interested in high command in coalition warfare.

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Devers's character emerges throughout the text in Wheeler's "just the facts ma'am" approach to his subject. The very sparseness of the prose, and its lack of hagiographic commentary, highlights this remarkable man's integrity and generosity. For example, when Devers moved with his family to West Point after World War I to serve on the faculty, we learn that he and his wife Georgie had employed a former sergeant's wife, a part-Cherokee woman, as a servant in their quarters at Fort Sill. Wheeler does not embellish this, but we learn she had been divorced before the move, and it seems clear that Jacob and Georgie Devers were employing, in today's vernacular, a single mother with three young daughters to feed. We then learn that the couple moved this woman and her daughters into their home at West Point and took care of them until the woman married another sergeant.

Wheeler also makes clear throughout the book that Devers had no aversions to expecting much from his own family. Devers' long work hours and long separations must have been hard on his wife and daughter, but they too "soldiered on." This attitude reflects a different age, when military careerists like Devers were expected to put the Army and the Nation first and their families second. Devers was no different from his peers in this respect, but his easy-going, problem-solving nature is at the heart of Wheeler's thesis. Devers's willingness to solve the most difficult problems, and to maintain a sort of ruthless cheerfulness while he did it, rubbed others the wrong way, especially men like Eisenhower, Omar Bradley, and Patton.

Wheeler's minimalist approach even applies to his selection of photographs for the book. In one, Devers holds a trophy as a member of the War Department Polo Team. Next to him, with a stone face, if not a grimace, is Patton. Devers, on the other hand, presents his usual "smiling Jake" persona, accepting the trophy and looking like the most relaxed, comfortable person in the world. It is no wonder that he created a Cassius-like cadre who envied and begrudged him his success and ever-present cheerfulness.

An area in which Devers normally gets little credit is artillery development in the interwar period. Most U.S. military historians agree on the excellence of American artillery equipment, tactics, and procedures before and during World War II. Dr. Jonathan House wrote, "Between 1929 and 1941, a series of instructors at the Field Artillery School [at Fort Sill] gradually developed a means of concentrating any amount of available artillery fire on a target of opportunity. … Fire direction centers gave the U.S. Army a new and unprecedented degree of infantry-artillery integration."[1] After Devers's graduation from the Command and General Staff School, he reported to that very artillery school and served there until 1929. Wheeler argues that later innovators built on the foundational work of instructors who included Devers, which allowed this "unprecedented" application of firepower on the modern battlefield. Devers later commanded the Armored Force in the first years of World War II and proved instrumental in the adoption and introduction of the excellent 105 mm self-propelled artillery gun known as the "Priest" into the U.S. inventory.

Throughout the book, Wheeler maintains an objective tone about his subject and does not give in to "hero-worship" prose. However, by the end of the book, the reader has a clear idea about why Devers has been forgotten in the narrative of World War II. That he never wrote a self-serving autobiography reflects his "team" approach to things; he would emphasize the accomplishments of his subordinates and teams over highlighting his own achievements. One reason, perhaps, that Devers rubbed his contemporaries the wrong way is revealed in this passage by Wheeler at the end of the book: "Jacob Devers did not forget his boyhood friends or community. He did not cheat on his wife. He did not blame his subordinates for his own mistakes or failures. He was not … disloyal to his superior officers. He did not forget to take care of those who served him." The standard he set for himself separated him from his peers.

Devers lived an extremely long and healthy life, dying at ninety-two, but he never felt compelled to set the record straight, probably because he was happy with four stars and secure in the knowledge of his contributions to victory in World War II. Wheeler's book is highly recommended for all history audiences—an extraordinary story about an extraordinary man who simply did not see himself that way. ■

Note

1. Jonathan M. House, *Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th Century Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization*, Research Survey No. 2 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 1984), 75.

BOOK REVIEWS

A WARRIOR'S FAITH

Robert Vera, Thomas Nelson, Nashville, Tennessee, 2015, 240 pages

A Warrior's Faith is a biography of the incredible life of Ryan Job. It describes in detail Job's training to become a Navy SEAL and his service in Iraq until the tragic day when he was wounded by an enemy sniper. The book tells of his long road to recovery and, more important, how he faced his challenges. It describes the struggles of this wounded veteran, and how his personal relationships and enduring faith in God inspired many, including author Robert Vera, his close friend.



Vera compares Ryan Job's life to that of the biblical character Job. They both endured great loss and suffering but never allowed themselves to be seen as a victim. In fact, Job's struggle increased his faith and transformed his life in an incredible way. Vera goes into detail to explain how Job affected everyone around him with his spirit to live and his commitment to others. Despite his injuries, which included total blindness, Job climbed Mount Rainer, hunted elk, graduated college with honors, and married the girl of his dreams. A behind-the-scenes message of the book is how Job's life and friendship also transformed Vera's life.

Before Vera met Job, he felt as if his life was drifting. Vera left a successful twenty-year banking career and moved to Arizona. He took a complete leap of faith and decided to start an endurance training company. He wanted to affect people's lives and thought that helping them prepare for triathlons and other personal goals was a good way to start. Job and his wife had moved from San Diego to Arizona because a nonprofit group offered them a free apartment while Job completed his undergraduate degree and his wife attended a nurse anesthesiology program. Coincidentally (or not coincidentally), Vera met Job by way of an old friend from his hometown in Boston. This friend asked Vera to train his younger brother, Sean, who had recently left the Navy. As it turned out, Sean attended SEAL training with Job five years earlier and they were great friends. The three got together, and Vera and Job became fast friends. After a short time, Job asked Vera if he would help him train for his upcoming opportunity to climb Mount Rainer, and it marked the beginning of their journey together.

Vera believed he was able to witness God at work through Job's life. He witnessed how the most unlikely circumstances brought the two together, and how both were able to find purpose and strength through their relationship and their relationship with the Lord. Vera's life-long prayer had been that God would provide him a sign that he was on the right path, doing God's will; Job was God's answer to that prayer.

The book encourages the reader to believe that things happen for a reason. Vera repeatedly states that he does not believe in coincidences—they are simply God's way of working inconspicuously. The message is to have faith: ruthless faith, Job-like faith, faith so complete it transforms your life from ordinary to extraordinary, faith that allows you to press on with the certainty that you are never alone in your struggles. You may suffer great loss, as did Job of the Bible and Ryan Job, but the way you choose to respond can transform your life and the lives of others around you. Two of the lessons Vera learned from Job's life are "No matter how bad life gets, you are never, ever out of the fight," and "Make God your priority and everything else will fall into place."

Lt. Col. Robert B. Haines, U.S. Army, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THIRTY DAYS WITH MY FATHER
Finding Peace from Wartime PTSD
Christal Presley, HCI Books,
Deerfield Beach, Florida, 2012, 264 pages

Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is no longer the hot topic that it was just a few years ago. Our society tends to focus intently on a crisis for only a relatively short moment, and then it moves on to something else. That is truly a shame, because PTSD is not a here-today, gone-tomorrow type of challenge. Those who have been afflicted can learn to cope, but there is no erasing intense experiences and devastating memories. Some cope well, some not so well, and the difference is not necessarily the intensity of the experience. Much of coping resilience depends on what existed before the experience, what was built into the fabric of a person's personality. The wounds are also not limited to the individual with the direct experience; they can extend to family members—to spouses and children.



This is a story of a woman who suffered from what one might call "generational PTSD." Her father, a Vietnam War veteran, was one of those whose experiences in Vietnam left him not only scarred but also debilitated for life. That debilitation affected his wife and daughter, and his ability to maintain relationships with others beyond his family. Upon his return from war, he was not only rejected but also vilified by many citizens of the nation he served. We all know the horror stories of returning veterans being spat upon and referred to as "baby killers" or "war criminals" by their contemporaries. What most of us do not know about is the apparent duplicity of the very agency created to assist veterans returning from war, the Veteran's Administration (now the Department of Veteran's Affairs). Vietnam veterans were treated but were the lowest priority, and they often had to fight for the attention they received from an agency that apparently wished they would simply go away.

While Dr. Christal Presley's father figures prominently in the narrative, the central story is how she finally learned to cope with her own experiences as the child of a veteran with unresolved PTSD. While reading her narrative, it was natural to reflect on what are near-universal experiences of growing up: the highs and lows of a maturing process, including disappointments and genuine heartaches. Maturing from child to adult is hard enough, but when one mixes in the chaos and unpredictability of a parent who is not functioning well, the challenge can become overwhelming and can lead to dysfunctional behavior. PTSD *does* inflict generational wounds. Of course, PTSD is not the only potential source of such dysfunction; the side effects of parental addictions such as alcohol or drugs can lead to similar challenges. Dysfunctional parents tend to raise dysfunctional offspring, although *that is a tendency, not an inevitability.* Presley's narrative of her personal journey is one worth studying. It provides evidence not only that PTSD is generally treatable but also that the generational impacts of PTSD are treatable as well. Hers is a story of frustration, anger, bitterness, and resentment—transformed by an effort to understand, to let go of anger, to forgive, and to love. *Thirty Days with My Father* is a narrative worth reading, especially for those who have experienced PTSD personally.

Thomas E. Ward II, PhD,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

21ST CENTURY SIMS
Innovation, Education, and Leadership for the Modern Era
Edited by Benjamin F. Armstrong,
Naval Institute Press,
Annapolis, Maryland, 2015, 176 pages

Given recent Department of Defense efforts to stimulate and foster innovation, *21st Century Sims* is both timely and useful. Adm. Williams Sims is well known in Navy circles as "The Gun Doctor" for his work on improving U.S. naval gunnery practices and technology. Sims, however, did much more, and he should be remembered as an early twentieth-century innovator. Like author Benjamin F. Armstrong's previous book on

the more well-known maritime theorist and historian Adm. Alfred Thayer Mahan, *21st Century Sims* is an edited work that combines selected works by a naval theorist—Sims in this case—with commentary and analysis written by Armstrong. A part of the U.S. Naval Institute's 21st Century Foundations series, the purpose of this book is to stir professional discourse on theorists of the past and how their thoughts apply to the present and future.



21st Century Sims reveals how Sims's value transcends the Navy as an exemplar for successfully meeting the future through innovation, education, and leadership. The main six chapters of the book all address topics along these lines; however, all point back to innovation. Armstrong writes, "As one of the U.S. Navy's greatest innovators, and as a man who is not afraid to challenge the system, he offers an example that many of us can learn from today." This is a great point and needs to be emphasized, but Armstrong could have discussed Sims's pro-British views in more detail. While fighting against military conservatism is indeed a worthy and necessary endeavor, Sims perhaps went too far on occasion, straying too far into policy matters. In fact, his efforts earned him a reprimand from President William Taft and later caused friction with Adm. William S. Benson, the chief of naval operations. Perhaps, like J.F.C. Fuller, Adm. Hyman Rickover, and other innovators, friction is required—the question is balance.

After the main chapters of the book, Armstrong has a thought-provoking and innovative approach to the conclusion. Rather than including and analyzing another of Sims's articles, Armstrong includes a piece by Capt. Harry Baldrige. The reason this unusual approach works so well is the relationship between Sims and Baldridge. Baldridge's piece, essentially a eulogy to a shipmate and mentor, acts as a superb conclusion to the book, and it emphasizes the importance of mentorship.

Like the other books in the 21st Century Foundations series, this book is worth reading for naval and military audiences, as well as for those who are interested in innovation, especially innovation driven from within a large, established organization. Perhaps one of Armstrong's most salient points on Sims is that "true innovation and reform are about ideas and people. Reading and learning from past innovation and from reform leaders like Sims can provide both inspiration and important lessons learned for today's officers." Armstrong effectively combines a great selection of Sims's works, contextualizes these works well, and provides insightful commentary.

Lt. Col. Jonathan Klug, U.S. Army,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

HAMMERHEAD SIX
How Green Berets Waged an Unconventional War Against the Taliban to Win in Afghanistan's Deadly Pech Valley

Capt. Ronald Fry with Tad Tuleja, Hachette Books, New York, 2016, 400 Pages

Ronald Fry is a former U.S. Army Special Forces officer who commanded an operational detachment alpha (ODA) code-named "Hammerhead Six" in the Pech Valley of northeastern Afghanistan's Kunar Province in 2003 and 2004. In *Hammerhead Six: How Green Berets Waged an Unconventional War Against the Taliban to Win in Afghanistan's Deadly Pech Valley,* Fry chronicles the challenges he and his highly trained twelve-man team encountered during the early stages of what has become our nation's longest war.



Fry provides an entertaining yet relevant account of his team's exploits while undertaking a "struggle against Al Qaeda and the Taliban for the hearts and minds of the people." He provides an interesting perspective for those unfamiliar with unconventional warfare. Hammerhead Six internalized the Special Forces motto, *De Oppresso Liber* (To Free the Oppressed). Fry describes his team's effort to build bonds of friendship and mutual respect with the indigenous people of the Pech Valley. He asserts that unconventional warfare is "an emotional as well as a military investment."

Hammerhead Six was a national guard ODA from the 19th Special Forces Group (SFG) that included an intensive-care nurse, a police officer, a gem dealer, an engineer, and several entrepreneurs. The unique occupational diversity of Hammerhead Six provided multiple perspectives to problem solving. Additionally, several members were devout Latter-day Saint adherents who had served as missionaries providing humanitarian aid and community service to foreign communities. These missionary experiences proved to be invaluable with respect to understanding culture and the development of personal and professional relationships with the populace of the Pech Valley.

Fry's detailed and entertaining account of how Hammerhead Six pacified what was to become Afghanistan's "Valley of Death" is provocative. It is an account of the true value of mutual respect, understanding, and the importance of relationships in an effective counterinsurgency strategy.

Hammerhead Six: How Green Berets Waged an Unconventional War Against the Taliban to Win in Afghanistan's Deadly Pech Valley details a thought-provoking account of how Hammerhead Six established the first Special Forces "A" camp since the Vietnam War. Their exploits are both educational and entertaining. It is important to understand the perspective from which Fry relates his experiences in the Pech Valley. The Army has since come to take some of Hammerhead Six's tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) as doctrine. However, during the winter of 2003–2004, doctrinal TTP did not exist. Hammerhead Six executed the clear-hold-build methodology before it was routine. The lessons learned by Hammerhead Six remain relevant today. This book is a must read for the professional as well as the enthusiast.

Lt. Col. Robert C. LaPreze, U.S. Army,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

AFTER APPOMATTOX
Military Occupation and the Ends of War

Gregory P. Downs, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2015, 352 pages

Over the past century, reconstruction has been approached as political, legal, economic, and, most recently, as social history. In this very important book, Professor Gregory P. Downs reminds us that it is also military history, because reconstruction was primarily the military occupation of the South. While he does not disregard the vociferous political debates in Washington, Downs puts the Army front and center in the story of reconstruction. In doing so, he goes well beyond merely updating James Sefton's *The United States Army and Reconstruction, 1865-1877*. He illuminates the problematic role of coercion in shaping political and social change.

Downs demonstrates that in both legal and practical terms, the Civil War did not end in April 1865. He argues that between "battle time" and "peacetime," 1865 to 1871 was a period of "postsurrender wartime." After Appomattox, both President Andrew Johnson and Congress continued to use war powers to justify reconstruction and its military intrusion into civil governance in the South. The fight between the president and the Congress over control of the army of occupation resulted in Johnson's impeachment, congressional assumption of war powers, and the continuation of war for three more years.



Downs makes a compelling case that the "war" officially ended in 1871 when Congress permitted the seating of a Georgia delegation, the last representatives from a Confederate state to be seated. White Southern violence of course did not end after 1871, and the Grant administration had to rely on civil-rights legislation and not war powers to enforce federal authority. Federal courts and marshals did not have the same impact as military commissions and martial law on an unreconstructed South. The war continued with peacetime rules, and by 1877, ex-Confederates had "redeemed" the South.

Downs makes an important point that both the size and the disposition of the army mattered. As the Army reduced its strength, especially cavalry, it

consolidated its posts into cities and major towns. Thus, the army ceded control of the countryside to the rebel insurgents. Major violence sometimes prompted an increase of military presence, but rebellions were generally small-scale and short-lived events.

Downs shows that Republicans, in using military coercion to protect the rights of freedmen and women, were mindful of the threat such use of force meant for a republican system of government. As the author observes, "Republicans tried to go beyond the law and yet not risk destroying the law." This dilemma shaped the debates and indecision within the Republican Party. Moreover, with each election, Democratic opposition and Northern public apathy eroded lawmakers' ability to maintain the will and the means to enforce federal authority.

Reconstruction was a long, bloody, frustrating, and unsuccessful campaign against continuing rebel resistance. The conventional war ended slavery, but rebel insurgencies replaced it with "Jim Crow." Downs is skeptical that the Army occupation could have transformed a large, organized, and violently hostile population even with more force. The Army could not remake the South, but it offered some protection to freedmen as they established greater control over their families, working conditions, and churches. Reflecting on the coercion inherent in military occupation, Downs notes that "without reconstruction, the conditions of black people would have been far worse." Reconstruction was a profound tragedy but not a total failure.

Downs acknowledges that war powers, military commissions, and martial law continue to present troubling questions in balancing "dubious means" against "noble ends." Yet, he confesses, "Clean hands may simply preserve an unjust world." Downs reluctantly concludes, "The story of reconstruction's occupation reminds us that the dangerous, coercive tools of government may also—terribly—be the only liberating instruments within reach. Reconstruction serves as a warning that a government without force means a people without rights." This superb book serves as a reminder for military officers of the need for serious study of "military occupation and the ends of war."

Donald B. Connelly, PhD,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

HESSIANS
Mercenaries, Rebels, and the War for British North America

Brady J. Crytzer, Westholme Publishing, Yardley, Pennsylvania, 2015, 296 pages

In 1775, the British Empire was in a crisis. Open rebellion was occurring in the North American colonies. Years of conflict with France exhausted the British treasury and its armed forces, leaving few options to the Crown in addressing the rebellion. Faced with a nearly impossible decision, Britain elected to employ the armies of the Holy Roman Empire to augment its forces in suppressing the rebellion. Labeled erroneously as "Hessians," the soldiers of the Holy Roman Empire came from six separate German states. By 1776, there would be approximately eighteen thousand German soldiers in North America, and by the war's end, there would be over thirty thousand.



Author and historian Brady J. Crytzer explores the German experience in the American Revolution through the lives of three participants from vastly different walks of life. Here are the stories of a career soldier, Johann Ewald, captain of a Field Jager Corps, who fought from New York to Yorktown; Frederika Charlotte Louise von Massow, Baroness von Reidesel, who traveled along with her children from Europe to Canada to join her husband, Baron Fredrich von Reidesel; and Philipp Waldeck, chaplain in the Waldeck Regiment, who served in Florida and the Caribbean.

Ewald's observations and experiences provide an interesting and insightful look at the American Revolution through an outsider's perspective. While Ewald held Gen. Charles Cornwallis and other British leaders in high esteem, his diary entries expressed disappointment in Britain's hesitant approach in executing the war. He expressed belief that the brutal tactics employed by the British in the Carolinas actually undermined their Southern strategy to regain the South. He held

exceptional disdain for Brig. Gen. Benedict Arnold and his mismanagement of Hessian forces during the Battle of Portsmouth, Virginia.

Crytzer uses the journal of Baroness von Reidesel to provide an interesting account of the role played by Gen. Reidesel and his Hessian force in support of Britain's effort to gain control of the Champlain and Hudson River valleys. Like Ewald, Gen. Reidesel is critical of British strategy and advocates for more aggressive tactics in attacking patriot forces. Realizing the strength of patriot forces is increasing, Gen. Reidesel recommends to Gen. John Burgoyne an immediate withdrawal of British forces back to Canada. Burgoyne's procrastination results in the surrendering of his army at Saratoga. Crytzer describes the lavish lifestyle experienced by the Reidesel family for the remainder of the war.

Finally, Crytzer uses Waldeck's experiences to illustrate the war that took place in the Caribbean, in Florida, and along the Gulf coast. Waldeck's observations of British indecisiveness, disdain, and mishandling of its relationship with local allies, and the lack of a comprehensive strategy, resulted in British defeats throughout the area.

Hessians provides an alternative view of the American Revolution from the perspective of German soldiers who participated in it. This book is a must read for students and historians with an interest in the American Revolution. It would make a great companion to Rodney Alwood's *The Hessians*.

Jesse McIntyre III, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

FORTY-SEVEN DAYS
How Pershing's Warriors Came of Age to Defeat the German Army in World War I

Mitchell Yockelson, New American Library Publishers, New York, 2016, 400 pages

Forty-Seven Days is a historical summary of Gen. John J. Pershing and the U.S. First Army during the final days of the First World War on the Western Front. The book is well researched and written by one of America's preeminent World War I historians. I found the book to be entertaining and filled with interesting side stories of the American Expeditionary Force's (AEF) more colorful characters. The author used direct sources to highlight the service of famous names such as Douglas MacArthur, George Patton, Eddie Rickenbacker, George C. Marshall, Alvin York, Harry Truman, and many others. This not only made the book more entertaining but also connected the events and people of the AEF to later dramas of the twentieth century.

Aside from the entertainment value of *Forty-Seven Days,* the book clearly outlines the hard-fought battles of the U.S. First Army and later the Second Army during the Saint Mihiel and Meuse–Argonne offensives. Much attention is given to highlighting the hardship, chaos, and confusion the untested American First Army faced in the summer and fall of 1918. The author uses first-hand accounts to tell the reader graphic stories of World War I combat and to describe tensions among the senior officers at the division, corps, and First Army levels.



Forty-Seven Days does not cover the actions of America's first combat experiences in World War I such as at Soissons, Belleau Wood, and Chateau Thierry. In these battles, the American forces fought alongside French forces to thwart a massive German offensive in the summer of 1918. Instead, the book focuses entirely on the birth and development of the exclusive American Field Army (First Army) that fought as a separate and independent Army under the command of Pershing. Hence, the second part of the title: How Pershing's Warriors Came of Age.

My one critique of *Forty-Seven Days* centers on the book's slant toward pop history. In that, I mean that the author takes several tangents to tell anecdotal stories on some less than key players in the Meuse–Argonne offensive. For example, the author painfully jumps on the Gen. Patton bandwagon, spending more than six pages telling

Patton's life story up to that moment in 1918. Patton was a lieutenant colonel at the time; he was wounded on the first day of the Meuse–Argonne offensive and sat out the rest of the war in a hospital. His contributions to the offensive were insignificant as were those of the lightly skinned and unreliable Renault tanks that he led into battle. The tangent on Patton's life story is somewhat of a distraction and seems out of place when considering the magnitude of the Meuse–Argonne offensive.

More time and research could have been spent on other key players, such as Pershing's corps commanders. Much attention is given to Hunter Liggett, Robert Bullard, and Charles Summerall, but scarce information is provided on the careers and lives of George Cameron, John Hines, and Joseph Dickman. The author also alludes to the interpersonal frictions among the senior AEF commanders but does not stress enough how Pershing's own penchant for micromanagement and interpersonal rivalries plagued the command climate of the AEF.

Overall, this book was entertaining and full of interesting political and military stories, many of which are applicable today. Someone with limited knowledge of First World War history will find it fascinating, and it may lead him or her to a new interest in this often forgotten chapter in U.S. military history.

Lt. Col. Andrew P. Creel, U.S. Army,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

AN AMERICAN SOLDIER IN THE GREAT WAR
The World War I Diary and Letters of Elmer O. Smith

John DellaGiustina, Hellgate Press, Ashland, Oregon, 2015, 356 pages

Reminiscent of aspects from such books as *Citizen Soldiers* and *Poilu,* DellaGiustina's *An American Soldier in the Great War* provides a first-hand account of war as seen through the written record of the protagonist, Elmer O. Smith. Few books have covered the life of a soldier from enlisting through combat and back to demobilization as thoroughly as this book, particularly with as much primary source documentation. This is largely due to the familial link between the author and the subject, providing the former easy access to large amounts of material and people who knew (or heard stories of) Smith.

Aside from its foundation on primary sources, the main strength of this book is the approach DellaGiustina takes to frame each chapter, providing an introduction that places people, contemporary events, and basic explanations of military facts (e.g., ranks, the structure of units, and locations of posts) that are pertinent to the story. This serves to inform the reader of items that Smith would address in his diary and letters, and it improves understanding by providing context. While these items will slow down a reader well informed in the early twentieth century or the military, they are valuable for the uninitiated reader, most likely the author's primary audience.

The author provides a comprehensive look at the entire "war-making cycle" from the viewpoint of a participant in World War I. As a new researcher in the period, I found it valuable to understand mobilization, training, movement to the area of operations, tactical combat (to include becoming a casualty and medical care), completion of service, and demobilization. Based on my own interests, I especially enjoyed the introductions by DellaGiustina and his subject's letters on the process of mobilization and training. I imagine other readers would find more value in Smith's experiences in the trenches and fighting the key American battles in France.



The most disappointing aspect of this book stems from its strength in primary source material—the mundane and uninformative nature of most of the letters and diary entries tends to drown out the nuggets of knowledge. Significant portions of the quoted primary sources focus on the subject's health and pleasantries with family, with few insights as to training, combat, or other items that provide understanding as to the events in which Smith was a participant. The author would have been better served to more closely curate the

primary documents within the book to elucidate the historical themes he was trying to get across to his readers.

Overall, *An American Soldier in the Great War* would be an interesting read for those new to World War I and the military that served in that time, especially if a reader is interested in the human aspects from a first-person point of view. For all others, their time might be better served elsewhere.

Maj. Nathan K. Finney, U.S. Army,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

D-DAY
June 6, 1644: The Climactic Battle of World War II

Stephen Ambrose, Simon and Schuster, New York, 2014, 768 pages

Stephen Ambrose's trademark over many decades has been to incorporate all of the aspects of military operations into his works, and this extensive history is no exception. In addition to his emphasis on individual soldiers, sailors, and airmen and their personal narratives, he weaves in overviews of strategy, tactics, equipment, and organizations from the perspectives of both the Germans and Allies.

This book is no copy of the author's previous works on the same subject. Although readers familiar with him may recognize individuals who appeared elsewhere, those characters are presented in a fresh light, with new perspectives gleaned from over 1,400 exhaustive interviews—a trademark of the author's oral-history approach. In addition, over 150 photographs illustrate this edition, bringing the reader into the face of preparation for and execution of the most enormous military operation ever mounted.

This is not simply a work dedicated to covering the actual invasion events. It also provides a wide-ranging and insightful analysis of the issues facing both the Allies and Germany, such as the strategy and tactics (both offensive and defensive) employed; the preparation and development of specialized equipment to overcome Hitler's Atlantic Wall; analysis of the long-term planning conducted by the Allies beginning after the evacuation of British forces from Dunkirk; an overview of the massive deception plan (Operation Fortitude) conducted by the Allies, which strategically succeeded in altering both German preparation for and reactions to the Normandy invasion; and detailed characterizations of the senior military leadership on both sides.

And, as in any work by Ambrose, this book includes the perspectives and viewpoints of individuals. For example, he tells the stories of people who were thrust into battle and overcame difficulties such as chemical attacks during planning and execution, or who suffered because of them. The greatly detailed oral interviews conducted for this book allow readers to fully appreciate the flexibility and initiative displayed by the junior officers and men, which ensured eventual victory. These highly personal stories, interwoven so superbly into the larger stories, make this (and any book by Stephen Ambrose) so well worth reading. Readers can become part of events as they unfolded, gaining an understanding of and appreciation for the enormous scale of events and coming away with a somber realization that, in spite of the great resources and material advantages the Allies held, Operation Overlord was far from a sure thing.



It was America's citizen-soldiers who were thrown into this battle, making their accomplishments seem even more profound. Ambrose once wrote that Hitler was convinced the "amateurs" of the Allied armies could not defeat the professionals of his military. He was once again proven wrong. The soldiers, sailors, and airmen who carried out Operation Overlord were no superheroes, but they proved that with proper training, equipment, and motivation, this mission, as well as the subsequent conquest of Europe, could be successfully accomplished.

This book falls into the category of "must have" not only for the knowledge gained about D-Day and Operation Overlord but also for its relevance to the profession of arms. *D-Day* is a thoroughly researched

and documented history book that also captures the reader's attention and imagination.

Col. Richard D. Koethe III, U.S. Army, Retired, Myrtle Beach, South Carolina

THE THAI WAY OF COUNTERINSURGENCY

Jeff M. Moore, Muir Analytics LLC, Arlington, Virginia, 2014, 476 pages

In 2005, then-Lt. Gen. David Petraeus led a resurrection of counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine and education due to the worsening situation in Iraq. All but banned by the Army following the end of the Vietnam War, COIN now became the focus of Petraeus's Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate and was immediately integrated throughout the Command and General Staff Officer Course curriculum. However, the historic COIN experiences used to develop the new doctrine and to educate a new generation of officers were overwhelmingly drawn from Western sources. Missing was the non-Western experience; while there are published accounts of non-Western COIN, they are not commonly referenced by Western students and practitioners of COIN.



Dr. Jeff M. Moore's *The Thai Way of Counterinsurgency* fills some of this gap. Moore sets out to write the first objective, detailed, and comprehensive military analysis of the three counterinsurgencies that Thailand has fought since 1965. He differentiates his work by noting that previous analyses examined the Thai COIN fights individually, and they were mostly written by left-leaning academics who frequently used their analyses to criticize the Thai government. Moore wrote *The Thai Way of Counterinsurgency* for U.S. national-security personnel to continue their study of COIN, with the acknowledgement that in spite of the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and the drawdown in Afghanistan, insurgencies around the globe would continue to threaten U.S. interests.

Moore analyzes Thai counterinsurgency techniques through his "COIN Pantheon Model of Analysis," which is adapted from David Kilcullen's "Three Pillars of COIN" model. Moore's Pantheon Model consists of a foundation of *strategy*, upon which is laid a floor of *coordination*, which supports Kilcullen's three pillars (security, politics, and economics). Above the pillars is a ceiling of *insurgent capabilities and intentions*, which is covered by a roof of the *at-risk population*. Problematic in the graphic representation of his model is that the pillars appear to support the "ceiling" of *insurgent capabilities and intentions*, rather than combat them. Since only this section of the Pantheon Model represents the insurgency, it makes more sense to leave that out of the "building" and perhaps represent the *insurgent capabilities and intentions* as an outside force attempting to knock down the structure.

After explaining his model and defining key terms in the introduction, Moore provides Thailand's historical context in chapter 1. Moore then chronologically applies his Pantheon Model to each counterinsurgency in chapters 2–4. He provides an overview of each conflict and then breaks down the insurgency and the at-risk population, followed by details of the Thai COIN effort, explained through the Pantheon Model. The conclusion contains Moore's analysis of the totality of Thai COIN since 1965. Moore compares Thai COIN to the approaches described by "classic" COIN theorists David Galula and Robert Thompson and lays out his analysis according to his Pantheon Model. In effect, the conclusion is the meat of *The Thai Way of Counterinsurgency*, and all that comes prior is background and supporting evidence.

The Thai Way of Counterinsurgency is essential for all practitioners and students of security studies and irregular warfare. Moore's writing is easily comprehended and well paced. It does not delve so deeply into details that the reader would become lost or bored. There are many lessons here that can be

applicable in whole or in part for U.S. forces in current and future conflicts.

Lt. Col. Andrew M. Johnson, U.S. Army, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE BATTLE OF AN LOC

James H. Willbanks, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Indiana, 2015, 256 pages

Many books are written about the Vietnam War, but few are as poignant and relevant to the current global security situation as *The Battle of An Loc*. This well-written account of a style of battle that is playing out every day in the Middle East is relevant for U.S. advisors and our Middle Eastern allies. *The Battle of An Loc* is not just a riveting account of the event itself. James Willbanks's work provides background that enables those without a full understanding of the sociopolitical factors that led up to the battle to appreciate the effect it had on the Paris Peace Accords.



The author explores many topics of concern today, as the U.S. military redeploys to Iraq to battle the Islamic State. One such issue is the often-thorny relationship between the soldiers being advised and their advisors. *The Battle of An Loc* highlights the struggle of the United States to provide meaningful assistance to allies while simultaneously trying to extricate itself from an unpopular war abroad. The issue was one of maintaining a small troop presence and yet providing a link between U.S. airpower and the Vietnamese troops bearing the burden of the casualties in a seemingly endless war. The tale illustrates the challenges advisors faced in mentoring their allied counterparts, integrating air support into an operation, and propping up the flagging morale of allied troops in the face of overwhelming odds.

Filled with gritty details of sacrifice and bravery, one cannot help but feel immersed in this desperate battle. Unlike other books that are character centric, the author weaves in many details of the tactics employed by both forces, and he places the reader at the heart of the various commanders' decision-making processes. One example is a detailed account of the responsibilities that were assigned to the various pilots during the defense; from the B-52 bombers attacking marshalling areas to the AH-1 attack helicopters destroying enemy tanks in the city center, the narrative helps readers feel as if they were in the battle. The actions of the brave Vietnamese troops and U.S. Army and Air Force aviators chronicled in this work underscore the great feats that can be achieved with an effective security cooperation relationship.

The volume and depth of the sources that were used in the making of the book were impressive. The author included North Vietnamese and official U.S. Army records to accurately paint the entire picture of the battle, describing the objectives of both forces. Also included are an impressive array of maps and diagrams to assist the reader in understanding the battlefield geometry.

In the end, the author leads the reader through analysis of the strategic-level implications of the battle of An Loc and a judgement on the effectiveness of Vietnamization that, ironically, sealed the country's fate. Willbanks addresses the hazard posed in withdrawing U.S. troops and their awesome firepower out of a country before it was ready to assume responsibility for conducting a war. The underlying message of the book is that the challenges posed by politically appointed commanders, inept leadership, and tactical incompetence at higher levels can all be overcome with American airpower and advisors, tactical leadership, and firepower. This was true in An Loc, and yet the verdict is still out for the similar struggles we wage overseas. A must read for those in the military profession, Willbanks's account of this seminal battle has many facets that are worthy of discussion and emulation.

Eric McGraw, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

BLACK CAT 2-1
The True Story of a Vietnam Helicopter Pilot and His Crew

Bob Ford, Brown Books Publishing Group, Dallas, Texas, 2015, 276 pages

The UH-1 Huey helicopter is an icon of the Vietnam War. *Black Cat 2-1* is Bob Ford's autobiography describing his year as a UH-1

pilot in Vietnam during America's war there. Then-Lt. Ford served in the Republic of Vietnam from July 1967 through July 1968, flying out of Da Nang and Hue during his tour of duty.

The book briefly describes Ford's childhood and college years in Oklahoma. It also tells of his time at Fort Wolters, Texas, and Fort Rucker, Alabama, earning his silver Army Aviator wings. This short part of the book provides some background into Bob's upbringing and provides insight into his values and leadership style.



As promised by the title, most of the book focuses on Ford's time in Vietnam. He was assigned to the 282nd Assault Helicopter Company, stationed at Da Nang in I Corps' area of operations. After only six weeks in country, he earned his rating as an aircraft commander and was placed in charge of the company's Hue detachment, described by Ford as the "further-most northern aviation unit in Vietnam."

Much of the book consists of detailed stories of individual missions that Ford and his detachment flew, including combat assaults, casualty evacuation, VIP transport, and a very interesting recount of a downed-pilot pickup operation. His writing is descriptive and focuses on the people in the story. The book has a lot of military and aviation jargon, but not to the point of distraction. A brief glossary is included.

Being stationed at Hue, Ford had a front-row seat for the siege of Khe Sanh and the Tet Offensive. His accounts of the missions during this time are the most interesting parts of the book. He tells of flying combat assaults and resupply missions into Khe Sanh. He also describes fighting a three-day ground assault at Hue. Although *Black Cat 2-1* is mostly a story about aviation, Ford's story of his participation in the ground combat there is riveting.

Black Cat 2-1 has several pages of color photographs at the end of the book, with a page or two of photos or maps dedicated to nearly each chapter. The photos are very useful in helping illustrate Ford's narrative. Although it would have been less distracting to have the photos within each chapter, their quantity and quality are terrific—much better than most combat autobiographies.

Almost anyone with an interest in military history will find *Black Cat 2-1* an enjoyable read. In particular, those with a specific interest in either helicopter combat or the Vietnam War will especially appreciate the book. Ford's presence during a historically noteworthy time and place in that war increases the significance of his story. For these reasons, I highly recommend *Black Cat 2-1*.

Joseph S. Curtis, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

SACRED INTERESTS
The United States and the Islamic World, 1821–1921

Karine Walther, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 2015, 480 pages

Recent rhetoric has brought Islamophobia to the forefront of America's political discourse. In her thorough history of U.S. attitudes toward Islam, *Sacred Interests: The United States and the Islamic World, 1821–1921*, Karine Walther suggests that the hostility has deep roots in the early nineteenth-century history of America. She argues that a combination of renewed religious fervor during the Second Great Awakening, the mythology of manifest destiny, transnational relationships between informal actors, and the United States' initial foray into colonialism in the Philippines as a member of the "civilized family of nations" all combined to shape public and political notions of Islam as diametrically opposed to American values. This essentialist understanding of Islam helped shape a Manichean ideology of a clash of civilizations long before Samuel



Huntington's canonical post-Cold War work of the same name in 1998.

Sacred Interests emphasizes three themes. First, Walther builds on the works of Edward Said and Ussama Makdisi, arguing that the United States was just as complicit as Europe in propagating orientalism. Second, she demonstrates brilliantly that the informal power of transnational organizations, such as evangelical societies, was highly successful in shaping public discourse and the United States' actions toward Islam despite a generally noninterventionist foreign policy. Finally, Walther shows that during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, American discourse on Islam ignored the complexities taken for granted in Western identities, instead simplifying anything involving Islam to a "Muslim question."

Walther organizes her work chronologically, with three main sections. The first part explores the U.S. foreign policy response to the Eastern Question as first Greece and then other regions of the Ottoman Empire sought independence partly based on newly imagined visions of nationalism with Christianity serving as a rallying cry for international support. The second part focuses on U.S. diplomatic relations with the Moroccan government regarding Morocco's treatment of Jewish subjects. The final section examines the United States' initial experiment with settler colonialism and the disparity in policies toward Christians and toward Muslims in the Philippines at the turn of the twentieth century. Throughout, Walther emphasizes the irony of U.S. attitudes toward Islam in the world juxtaposed with internal debates over slavery and minority populations. Ultimately, Walther concludes by suggesting that these early experiences with Islam shaped attitudes and behaviors that endured through World War I and the Cold War, becoming further entrenched globally as the nascent transnational organizations from the nineteenth century became formal instruments of power in the twentieth century.

Overall, Walther's work is innovative in combining a wide range of sources to narrate a complex history of attitudes and beliefs about Islam in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. However, perhaps due to language limitations, she does not provide the Ottoman Empire or other nations' reactions to American attitudes. Despite this limitation, *Sacred Interests* reinforces the old adage that while history does not repeat itself, it does often rhyme. This is an important read for anyone trying to understand the relationship between public opinion and strategic policy in the Middle East.

Maj. Christopher J. Kirkpatrick, U.S. Army, Brooklyn, New York

FREDERICK THE GREAT
King of Prussia
Tim Blanning, Random House, New York, 2016, 688 pages

What happens to a military force when its leadership changes from a straitlaced, antiacademic, German man's man to a homosexual son of the French Enlightenment? In Frederick II of Prussia's case, that military force defeated the most powerful armies of Europe, conquered key territories, and changed the balance of power forever in the Holy Roman Empire. Tim Blanning, a noted University of Cambridge historian, has deftly demonstrated great skill in authoritatively writing about a warrior king full of talent and contradictions. His story about how Berlin became the center of the Germanic world is important reading for today's military strategists even if they think Carl von Clausewitz has already had the last word.



Prussia had few apparent resources before Frederick became sovereign in 1740. His father had thought he was effeminate and unfit to rule. Frederick was caught secretly slipping into a red silk dressing gown with gold brocade for private flute practices. Frederick William had his son's favorite friend executed in front of Frederick as part of a plan to mold him into a different sort of man. Upon gaining the throne, Frederick gambled at war and invaded the Hapsburg

Empire in a daring opportunistic move. As the book recounts, he used his advantages of unity of command and superior interior lines time and again against the French, Russians, Swedes, and Saxons, as well as the Hapsburgs. The Prussian Army was a formidable machine capable of performing extraordinary feats for a pragmatic leader who took little stock in the value of titles and other aids for less secure warlords. Frederick may have been forced into an early marriage, but he never allowed his wife into his inner court in Potsdam. He stayed away from the social life in Berlin, preferring to be in the field with his soldiers or talking to his public in their villages. His will and determination were as fierce as his sense of certainty about the sort of world he wanted to create. Prussia emerged as a slashing *Messer* (or knife) in his hand.

The one major irritation I had with the book was its organizational style by topics, which sometimes creates contextual whiplash and repetition of key facts. The content is still always very entertaining, for instance as Blanning describes a German noble who preferred to use the French language although he was far from a Francophile. Frederick colorfully used curse words when giving political directions to his courtiers. He also forced his Jewish subjects to buy royal-made porcelain to build up his national coffers. As a skeptical freemason, his tolerance of other faiths was calculated. He allowed a Catholic cathedral to be built in Berlin while he lobbied to be the defender of Protestant Germans. He ultimately could be as cruel as his father but all in the course of his pursuit of glory. Frederick wanted to teach the world by his example. It would be hard not to admit that Frederick the Great makes a strong case for avoiding lazy stereotypes.

James Cricks, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

SALADIN
The Sultan Who Vanquished the Crusaders and Built an Islamic Empire
John Man, Da Capo Press, Boston, 2016, 312 pages

John Man is a historian and travel writer. In *Saladin: The Sultan Who Vanquished the Crusaders and Built an Islamic Empire*, not only does he chronicle the life of Saladin, the iconic hero of Islam, but also he provides a thorough historical context of the twelfth-century Middle East. Man examines the virtues of Saladin the individual, as well as the persona of his iconic status.

Man details Saladin's birth in Tikrit, his rise to power in Egypt, his anticrusader campaigns, and his pauper's death—constantly providing a holistic historical perspective. Man consistently illustrates the ideological and political differences between the *Abbasid* (Sunni) and *Fatimid* (Shi'a) caliphates while demonstrating how the Frankish Palestinian kingdoms and the Ismaili Assassins influenced the region. Man describes in detail Saladin's use of both hard and soft power to gain control and then to render insignificant the Fatimid Caliphate. The book continues with a description and analysis of Saladin's meteoric rise within the Abbasid Caliphate and his confrontations with the Frankish crusaders, especially his nemesis Reynald de Chatillon.



Saladin: The Sultan Who Vanquished the Crusaders and Built an Islamic Empire is consistently footnoted with primary sources and is therefore easily referenced for further study of Saladin or this historical period. I found chapter 16, "A Brief History of Leadership," provided an excellent illustration of the leadership principles internalized by yet another iconic figure—this message resonates today. I found it interesting to read how Saladin was conditioned as a child by his environment, which included effective role models, to become the most significant figure in twelfth century Islam and a celebrated figure today. His ability to resonate with the common person as well as with the elite of his time is a testament to his leadership acumen.

I would recommend this book to anyone with an interest in the Middle East. It provides a solid historical perspective on early cultural and religious fault lines that still exist between Islam and Christianity. Additionally, Man provides the reader with a solid contextual analysis

of the internal political strife that existed within both Islam and medieval Christianity.

Lt. Col. Robert C. LaPreze, U.S. Army,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

BRADDOCK'S DEFEAT
The Battle of the Monongahela and the Road to Revolution

David L. Preston, Oxford University Press, New York, 2015, 480 pages

The fight between British forces and French forces with a large contingent of Native American allies along the banks of the Monongahela on 9 July 1755 remains one of the most lopsided defeats in British and American military history. For David L. Preston, professor of National Security Studies at the Citadel, the very name of the battle, *Braddock's Defeat,* used by the British and French (*la defaite de Bradok*) implies that British Gen. Edward Braddock III made errors that led to his defeat. Instead, Preston argues that the battle was more French Capt. Daniel-Hyacinthe-Marie Liénard de Beaujeu's victory than Braddock's defeat. Braddock's six hundred men were placed in an untenable position by Beaujeu from which no commander could have staved off defeat. Preston explicitly expands on Paul Kopperman's *Braddock at the Monongahela* from 1977 by extending the scope of the battle from the origins of the expedition to the consequences of its defeat. He builds on Kopperman's work by incorporating newly discovered accounts, especially from France, and also from Native Americans. He also walked the land, questioning older descriptions of the topography found in most previous histories.



Beaujeu led a relatively small force of French and Canadians augmented by a disciplined force of Native American allies from some twenty nations. Indeed, given the numbers of Native Americans and the importance of the battle to the strategies and politics of their tribes, the question of who was running the campaign and who was an auxiliary is open to interpretation. Preston takes direct aim at many of the long-accepted interpretations of the campaign, specifically on the character and competence of Braddock, and corrects errors concerning the terrain in key locations. Preston makes a solid case for the professional and even heroic advance of Braddock's column through terrain that the French thought impossible for an army to cross with siege artillery. He argues that Braddock was far from dismissive of his own Native American allies as well as of the colonials.

I find only minor issues to quibble about in this fine book. Preston argues that the Native Americans allied with the French somehow fought as disciplined light infantry and at the same time as individual warriors who followed Native American "captains" only when they wanted to. He claims Braddock was not tied to tactical ideas fitted to campaigning in Europe, but he admits Braddock saw the propensity of colonial soldiers to fight from behind trees as indiscipline. Braddock continued to insist through almost the entire three-hour-long battle that his soldiers fight in massed formations in the open.

Braddock's Defeat is part of Oxford University Press's Pivotal Moments in American History series, which takes as its foundation that certain events changed the trajectory of history. For Preston, the defeat of Braddock's expedition to the confluence of the Ohio and the Susquehanna Rivers to wrest it from French control set in motion a series of events and reappraisals that led British subjects on the North American mainland to see themselves as something other than English, with the perhaps inevitable result of the American Revolution. The defeat ended the illusion of British superiority and birthed a growing sense of "Americanism" among colonial subjects. Such an assessment is at odds with much of the historiography of the last five decades—that of Anglicization, which argued that the colonists were becoming more English, and the revolution was thus at heart an assertion of their rights as Englishmen. Instead, Preston perhaps unwittingly reasserts an older thesis, that by the close of the French and Indian War in 1763, colonists became this new thing called *American,* and thus rule by distant Britain was unnatural and unsustainable.

Barry M. Stentiford, PhD,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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

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

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

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

Photo courtesy of Harry S Truman Library & Museum

Survivors of the Amphing concentration camp on 4 May 1945 in Amphing, Germany, liberated by United States Third Army troops.

Yes, I am guilty otherwise than you think.
I should have known my duty earlier
And called evil by its name more sharply—
My judgment I kept flexible too long…
In my heart I accuse myself of this:
I deceived my conscience long
I lied to myself and others—
Early I knew the whole course of this misery—
I warned—but not hard enough or clearly!
Today I know of what I am guilty.

—Albrecht Haushofer, German poet and former Nazi, who turned against the Nazi Party. Arrested and placed in prison, he was executed by Schutzstaffel (SS) guards April 1945.