Military Review

THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF THE U.S. ARMY

NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2019

Military Review

THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF THE U.S. ARMY

November-December 2019, Vol. 99, No. 6
Professional Bulletin 100-19-11/12
Commander, USACAC; Commandant, CGSC; DCG for Combined Arms, TRADOC: Lt. Gen. Michael D. Lundy, U.S. Army

Provost, Army University, CGSC: Brig. Gen. Steve Maranian, U.S. Army
Director and Editor in Chief: Col. Katherine P. Guttormsen, U.S. Army
Managing Editor: William M. Darley, Col., U.S. Army (Ret.)
Editorial Assistant: Linda Darnell
Operations Officer: Maj. David B. Rousseau, U.S. Army
Senior Editor: Jeffrey Buczkowski, Lt. Col., U.S. Army (Ret.)
Writing and Editing: Beth Warrington; Dr. Allyson McNitt, Crystal Bradshaw-Gonzalez, Contractor; Amanda Hemmingsen, Contractor
Graphic Design: Arin Burgess
Webmasters: Michael Serravo; James Crandell, Contractor
Editorial Board Members: Command Sgt. Maj. Eric C. Dostie—Army University; Col. Rich Creed—Director, Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate; Dr. Robert Baumann—Director, CGSC Graduate Program; Dr. Lester W. Grau—Director of Research, Foreign Military Studies Office; Lt. Col. Greta Railsback—Director, Center for Army Profession and Leadership; Col. Christopher J. Keller—Director, Center for Army Lessons Learned; Thomas Jordan—Deputy Director, MCCoE; Mike Johnson—Deputy, Combined Arms Center-Training; Richard J. Dixon—Deputy Director, School of Advanced Military Studies
Consulting Editor: Col. Alessandro Visacro—Brazilian Army, Portuguese Edition

Submit manuscripts and queries by email to usarmy.leavenworth.tradoc.mbx.military-review-public-em@mail.mil; visit our webpage for author submission guidelines at https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Publish-With-Us/#mr-submissions.

Military Review (US ISSN 0026-4148) (USPS 123-830) is published bimonthly by the Department of the Army, Army University Press, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1293. Periodical postage paid at Leavenworth, KS, and additional mailing offices.

Yearly paid subscriptions are for $42 US/APO/FPO and $58.80 for foreign addresses and are available through the U.S. Government Publishing Office at https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/military-review-professional-journal-united-states-army.

POSTMASTER: Send address changes to *Military Review*, Army University Press, 290 Stimson Ave., Unit 1, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1293.

The Secretary of the Army has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business as required by law of the department. Funds for printing this publication were approved by the Secretary of the Army in accordance with the provisions of Army Regulation 25-30.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

KATHLEEN S. MILLER
Administrative Assistant
to the Secretary of the Army
1930310

JAMES C. MCCONVILLE
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Cover photo: Paratroopers with the 1st Squadron, 40th Cavalry Regiment (Airborne), 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Airborne), 25th Infantry Division, U.S. Army Alaska, huddle 20 February 2019 to protect a mock casualty from the rotor wash of a landing UH-60 Black Hawk MEDEVAC helicopter at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska. (Photo by Sgt. Alex Skripnichuk, U.S. Army)

Next page: Soldiers from Company A, 116 Brigade Engineer Battalion, position their M1150 Assault Breacher Vehicle 12 June 2019 during a live-fire training exercise at the National Training Center in Fort Irwin, California. (Photo by Cpl. Alisha Grezlik, U.S. Army)

2020 General William E. DePuy

Special Topics Writing Competition

This year's theme: "Finding the enemy in 2035—What technological, doctrinal, organizational, or other advances or changes must we make to find our adversaries on the battlefield of the future?"

Articles will be comparatively judged by a panel of senior Army leaders on how well they have clearly identified issues requiring solutions relevant to the Army in general or to a significant portion of the Army; how effectively detailed and feasible the solutions to the identified problem are; and the level of writing excellence achieved. Writing must be logically developed and well organized, demonstrate professional-level grammar and usage, provide original insights, and be thoroughly researched as manifest in pertinent sources.

Contest closes 20 July 2020

1st Place	$1,000 and publication in *Military Review*
2nd Place	$750 and consideration for publication in *Military Review*
3rd Place	$500 and consideration for publication in *Military Review*

For information on how to submit an entry, please visit https://www.armyupress.army.mil/DePuy-Writing-Competition/.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

November-December 2019
Volume 99 ◆ Number 6

Suggested Themes and Topics

General

- What operational and logistical challenges are foreseen due to infrastructure limitations in potential foreign areas of operation, and how can we mitigate them?
- What is needlessly duplicated in the Army (e.g., what should be done away with, how should the Army adjust, and how would it benefit)?
- What is the progress in development of Futures Command?
- Technology advancements and their application
- Case studies: How do we properly integrate emerging technology?
- What nations consider themselves to be at war or in conflict with the United States? How are they conducting war, and what does this mean for the Army?
- China case study: How does Japan's effort to establish the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" compare with current Chinese efforts to develop the "New Silk Road" and assert control over the South China Sea?
- Case study on civil-military operations: How does tactical-level military governance during occupation following World War II and Operation Iraqi Freedom compare?
- Update on status of the regional power rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran
- What are the security threats, concerns, and events resulting from illegal immigration globally?
- What must we do to create a more effective means of developing and maintaining institutional memory in order to deal with emerging challenges?
- What is the role for the Army in homeland security operations? What must the Army be prepared for?
- What is the role of the military in protecting natural resources?
- What are the potential adverse impacts on military standards due to factors associated with poor integration of new cultures, ethnicities, or racial considerations, and how can those impacts be mitigated?
- Case study: How is gender integration changing the Army and how it operates?

Large-Scale Combat Operations

How do we foster deep institutional focus on large-scale combat operations (LSCO)?

- Needed restructuring?
- See/understand/seize fleeting opportunities?
- Develop the situation in contact and chaos?
- Offset "one-off" dependencies and contested domains?
- Rapidly exploit positions of advantage?
- Survive in hyperlethal engagements (including attacks using weapons of mass destruction)?
- Continuously present multiple dilemmas to the enemy?
- Decide and act at speed?
- Fully realize mission command?
- What must be done to adjust junior leader development to a modern operational environment?
- Changes demanded to the professional development models of the officer and noncommissioned officer structure?
- Increased readiness challenges?
- Required adjustments that need to be made among the Army's support elements to reset for LSCO (e.g., personnel, logistics, medical, etc.)?
- What is the correlation between multi-domain operations and LSCO? Impact on the Army's training, readiness, and doctrine?
- What material solutions are required to fulfill the Army's unified land operations obligations in LSCO?
- Hypersonic weapons: What are their real capabilities? How do we defend against them?

Previous page: Spc. Scott Myers (*lower left*) reenlists 13 June 2019 during rappel training at Fort Drum, New York. (Photo courtesy of the 10th Mountain Division)

The Geoeconomic Dimensions of Russian Private Military and Security Companies

Maj. Thomas D. Arnold, U.S. Army

I believe that such companies are a way of implementing national interests without the direct involvement of the state … I think we could consider this option.

—Russian President Vladimir Putin

The U.S. military's lopsided defeat of Russian "mercenaries" and pro-regime forces near Deir al-Zour, Syria, in February 2018, brought Russian private military and security companies (PMSCs) to the forefront of popular attention.[1] The subsequent killing of Russian journalists investigating ChVK Wagner—the most notorious Russian PMSC—in the Central African Republic that same year only enhanced the mystique surrounding Russian PMSCs.[2] While these events have increased awareness of Wagner, they have inadvertently focused most analysis of the Russian PMSC industry toward a hybrid, or "nonlinear," warfare perspective devoid of historic and economic context.[3]

Maj. Thomas D. Arnold, U.S. Army, is a strategist assigned to the U.S. European Command as a joint operations planner. He holds a BS and an MBA from Louisiana Tech University and an MPA from Harvard University. He has served in command and staff positions in Iraq, Germany, Fort Polk, Afghanistan, and the Pentagon.

Russian PMSCs certainly play a role in Moscow's evolving concept of nonlinear warfare, but they also have geopolitical and economic—geoeconomic—utility that Russia is exploiting today.[4] For the purposes of this article, geoeconomics is defined as "the use of economic instruments to promote and defend national interests, and to produce beneficial results."[5] Looking beyond the Deir al-Zour incident, the geoeconomic role of PMSCs in the Kremlin's foreign policy becomes clear. Russia uses PMSCs to expand its influence abroad by supporting fragile states' sovereign governments, essentially trading security for access and concessions.[6] On and off the battlefield, Russian PMSCs also secure vital investments in security vacuums on behalf of private and state-owned businesses to support broader foreign policy objectives.[7] Despite a few notable embarrassments, modern PMSCs have served the Kremlin well, quickly moving from concept to reality. A holistic understanding of Russian PMSCs is important for military officers and policy makers because PMSCs will become an increasingly integral component of the Kremlin's foreign policy as evidenced by historical analysis and ongoing activities.

The remainder of this article explores the geoeconomic dimensions of the Russian PMSC industry. It begins by developing an analytical framework based on previous academic theory to facilitate comparative analysis of PMSCs. The article then provides a historical case study to highlight the similarities and dissimilarities between earlier PMSCs and their contemporary Russian counterparts. Next, the article provides a brief history of the Russian PMSC industry before drawing parallels between Soviet foreign policy and current activities. Finally,

the article examines the implications of Russian PMSCs to U.S. foreign policy and military strategy.

Analytical Framework

Researchers first took interest in the PMSC industry in the mid-1990s after Executive Outcomes (EO)—a South African PMSC covered in detail later—gained notoriety from a series of decisive campaigns to quell the long-running civil wars in Angola and Sierra Leone.[8] Like Wagner today, EO immediately captured the public's imagination, fueling speculation about the future of global power dynamics.[9] Despite their headline-grabbing exploits, EO and Wagner remain outliers.[10] With most attention focused on the extreme end of possibilities, it is important to remember that the industry offers a range of services, most of which are much lower on the spectrum of violence than combined arms maneuver.[11] A classification system based on observed activities and a client state's formal control over operations is essential for the comparison of individual companies across time and operational context in order to form a more accurate picture of individual actors and broader industry trends.

There have been three major periods of PMSC research: (1) from 1998 until 2003, research focused on describing the industry and determining its role in global affairs; (2) from 2004 until 2009, research turned toward U.S. contracting activities in Afghanistan and Iraq; and (3) from 2010 onward, academics have examined personal contractor experiences.[12] For individuals studying Russian PMSCs, earlier works focused on industry analysis and company classification remain the most useful. In 2001, P. W. Singer introduced a typology based on services and levels of force.[13] Singer's typology identifies three categories of PMSCs: *military support firms* offering sustainment support, *military consulting firms* offering advisory services and training, and *military provider firms* contracted to

Members of the Wagner Group pose for a photo circa 2018 in Syria. Over the last decade, many open-source reports have chronicled the ascendance of Russian private security companies like Wagner to become key instruments for achieving Russian foreign policy objectives through military coercion not officially traceable to the Russian government. Such companies offer a variety of services for hire; these include providing VIP protective services and military training as well as conducting actual combat operations. These companies now operate in a variety of locations throughout the world, most notably in Ukraine, Syria, Venezuela, Libya, and various other countries in Africa and the Middle East. (Photo courtesy of the Security Service of Ukraine)

Table 1. Modified Typology

	Private military and security companies			
	– <---------- Level of force ----------> +			
Type of company	Military support firm	Military consulting firm	Private security company	Private military company
Primary role	Sustainment	Force generation, intelligence, mission command	Defense and protection	Offense
Activities	Transportation Engineering Medical support Procurement Personnel services	Intelligence support Knowledge management Training support	Facility security Physical security Personal protection Convoy security Refugee protection	Combat Combat support Close air support Fire support
Notable examples	Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR)	Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI); Dyncorp	Blackwater/Xe/Academi	Executive Outcomes

(Table by author)

employ lethal force.[14] Singer's work remains one of the most influential studies of the industry; however, his typology is not without its critics.[15]

From a military perspective, Singer's typology has one critical flaw: it does not distinguish between lethal force contracted for defensive or offensive purposes. To a military audience, the difference is fundamental because the task and purpose of the contract drives everything from personnel and equipment to tactics, techniques, and procedures. Simply dividing Singer's military provider category into two—*private security company* (defensive in purpose) and *private military company* (offensive in purpose)—increases the utility of his basic typology without overcomplicating analysis.[16] Table 1 illustrates a modified version of Singer's "tip of the spear" typology, focusing on primary purpose, observed activities, and capability to employ lethal force.

Another way to characterize PMSCs is to consider a firm's lethal capabilities in relation to the degree of tactical control a client's military exerts over a PMSC's operations. Contemporary conflict zones host a multitude of private actors pursuing various objectives, but some PMSCs further their client's interests by employing lethal military force outside of a formal military command-and-control hierarchy. Figure 1 (on page 9) provides an analytical framework utilizing the modified Singer typology to classify PMSCs based on observed military capabilities along the X-axis. The Y-axis provides an estimate of a PMSC's integration within the client state's formal military command-and-control network.

Analyzing PMSCs by observed activities and state control while noting the operational context should be the preferred method of analysis.[17] Observation and context are essential because a contract review is unlikely, particularly when studying Russian PMSCs that might or might not be acting on Kremlin orders.[18] A Russian PMSC's services can vary by contract, thus cataloging activities over time and location is the best way of determining a firm's relative independence from Moscow at any given point. It should be noted that a PMSC can fit one label in one situation and another in a different context; that is, just because Wagner is labeled a private military company in Syria does not necessarily mean it will have the same role in Sudan.[19] The elaboration on Singer's PMSC typology illustrated in the provided framework can help military officers and policy makers capture the relevant details required to support rigorous policy and strategy discussions. Finally, a generally accepted



(Figure by author)

Figure 1. Analytical Framework

analytical framework facilitates comparative analysis of contemporary PMSCs to their peers and predecessors.

Executive Outcomes: A Case Study

Executive Outcomes (1989–1999) is legendary in the field of PMSC research. Still controversial twenty years after its demise, EO's notoriety stems from its financial motives, shadowy corporate connections, and battlefield successes. During its heyday, EO was soberly compared to the British East India Company and billed as the "only incorporated private mercenary army on earth that will … wage full-scale war on behalf of its client."[20] Despite being a well-worn topic in the literature, it is worth revisiting EO to compare modern Russian PMSCs to their most studied predecessor. The following case study is brief, avoiding the tactical details of EO's campaigns in Angola (1993–1996) and Sierra Leone (1995–1997). For a more in-depth read on EO, please consult the sources cited. The italicized text highlights major themes that converge with what is known about Russian PMSCs today.

Executive Outcomes was established in 1989 just before the South African security apparatus began its post-apartheid "disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, and reintegration (DDRR) process."[21] The DDRR process created *a large pool of trained personnel with limited employment opportunities*.[22] Despite the ready supply of potential recruits, EO offered a *relatively generous compensation package and carefully screened applicants*, often *hiring former special forces and intelligence operatives*.[23] To keep costs down, EO maintained a small permanent staff and built *specially formed teams for each contract*.[24] While EO was headquartered in Pretoria, South Africa, its exact *ownership and corporate*

connections remained opaque.[25] Despite its murky corporate connections, it is clear that EO's *operations were linked to securing natural resources in fragile states*.[26]

In addition to the above domestic factors, there were several external factors contributing to EO's rise. First, the post-Cold War disengagement from Africa created *persistent security vacuums* in many regions, forcing *fragile states to seek new security partners*.[27] Second, *conflict zones often overlapped with significant natural resource deposits*, creating opportunities for entrepreneurial security solutions.[28] Third, the *international community's collective inaction* accelerated the privatization of security in fragile states.[29] Finally, EO based its credibility on its *service to legitimate, or sovereign, governments* as opposed to the mercenary tradition of supporting coups.[30] Contrary to the Africa-centric research focus on EO's activities, its *operations were not limited to one region—it was a global phenomenon*.[31]

Operationally, EO functioned as a prime contractor for fragile states, but it also subcontracted its services to corporate partners.[32] Its brochures advertised services ranging from basic training to armored warfare.[33] The list of EO's reported activities place it on the extreme end of the PMSC spectrum, categorizing it as a true private military company and clear outlier. EO's observed activities are still surprising today: combined arms maneuver, psychological warfare, foreign internal defense, humanitarian assistance, and stability operations.[34] In addition to its known operations, EO may also have *discretely offered "boutique" services* (e.g., regime coup-proofing and hostage rescues).[35] EO's key advantage was its human intelligence and signals intelligence capabilities, which allowed it to maintain a small footprint, conduct targeted operations, and defeat numerically superior enemies.[36] Once EO secured its objectives, it could hold or transition control to other less capable but affiliated private security companies.[37] Ultimately, EO was the victim of its own success. Its increased notoriety spurred U.S. diplomatic and international pressure on contracting regimes as well as increased oversight and legal regulations at home.[38] The combination of international pressure and scrutiny led to EO disbanding in 1999; however, remnants of EO persist today.

While the case study above identifies common themes between EO and today's Russian PMSCs, it is also necessary to highlight the two most significant areas of divergence. First, EO operated on behalf of its corporate owners to earn a profit. Although Russian PMSCs seek profits, some—maybe many—take directions from the Kremlin to further the state's geopolitical interest regardless of profit.[39] These firms must be identified and tracked to better understand the Kremlin's intentions and internal patron-client dynamics. Second, EO was disbanded because of international pressure and increased regulation at home. Russian PMSCs operate in a legal gray area and appear to be just one of Moscow's methods of circumventing international sanctions and diplomatic pressure.[40] As an enduring fixture of Russia's foreign policy, identifying, tracking, and exposing all Russian PMSCs—not just Wagner—is essential to countering Russian malign influence. Table 2 (on page 11) shows the known and suspected Russian PMSCs.[41]

A Brief History of Russian Private Military and Security Companies

Recent headlines surrounding Wagner have made Russian PMSCs appear to be a contemporary phenomenon mostly tied to nonlinear warfare.[42] While PMSCs have played a supporting role in Ukraine and Syria, the history of modern Russian PMSCs is deeper than today's "gray-zone operations." The Kremlin's reliance on PMSCs predates Crimea's annexation by several decades, spanning the full range of imaginable services, from using "volunteers" as shock infantry to allegedly leasing out an entire air force for combat operations.[43] A general understanding of the Russian PMSC industry's evolution is required to better understand its support to Russian foreign policy—yesterday, today, and in the future.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, several Russian PMSCs entered the private market, with most functioning solely as private security companies. Established by former KGB and military officers, these privateers sought to leverage their past experiences and business connections forged during clandestine and overt Cold War missions.[44] They originally offered their services globally but quickly concentrated in Africa and Central Asia, focusing on security operations in support of various corporate and government clients.[45] Few if any of the earliest Russian PMSCs were directly affiliated with or controlled by the Kremlin.

While initial Russian PMSCs largely served corporate interests, Russian intelligence services quickly saw the potential of PMSCs to complement military forces in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. As early

Table 2. List of Known and Suspected Russian Private Military and Security Companies

Name	Potential agent of	Reported operating locations
Anti-Terror Group	Federal Security Service, *Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti* (FSB)	Iraq, Syria
ATK Group	—	Ukraine, Syria
Center R	—	Afghanistan, Indonesia, Iraq, Syria, Yugoslavia
E.N.O.T.	FSB	Azerbaijan, Serbia, Syria, Tajikistan, Ukraine
Fort Defense Group (FDG)	—	Afghanistan, Iraq
Feraks Group	—	Afghanistan, Iraq, Sri Lanka
MAR PMC	FSB	Ukraine
Moran Security Group	—	Maritime Security (Global), Syria
Patriot	Ministry of Defence	Burundi, Central African Republic, Syria
RSB Group	—	Libya, Nigeria, Senegal, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Ukraine
Sewa Security Service	Main Intelligence Directorate, *ГРУ* (GRU)	Central African Republic
ChVK Shchit	—	Syria
Vegacy Strategic Services	—	Maritime Security (Global), Syria
ChVK Wagner	GRU	Central African Republic, Libya, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, Yemen
Countries were ongoing Russian private military and security companies (PMSC) operations are suspected or alleged	Brunei, Gabon, South Sudan, Venezuela	
Countries with potential for ongoing or future Russian PMSC operations	Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Zimbabwe	

(Table by author)

as 1992, the Federal Security Service helped to organize Rubicon—one of the first reported Russian private military companies—to fight in Bosnia alongside the Serbs.[46] Shortly thereafter, reports surfaced that Russian mercenaries were fighting pro-democracy rebels in Tajikistan.[47] Additionally, Russia allegedly used PMSCs to maintain the frozen conflicts in Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh throughout the 1990s while its uniformed troops acted as peacekeepers.[48] International reporting on Russian PMSCs began to dry up shortly after 11 September 2001, but it clearly did not disappear.

In the beginning, Russian PMSCs were focused on two separate and distinct objectives: providing services to foreign clients for profit independent of Kremlin control or maintaining Russian influence in its "near abroad" in accordance with Kremlin instructions. Within the last decade, Moscow has rapidly fused these separate objectives and set its sights further afield toward fragile states beyond Russia's traditional sphere of influence. The convergence of objectives likely coincides with the increasing hybridization of Russian businesses and the continuing evolution of its "power economy" concept. Like a distorted vision of

soft power, power economy conceives PMSCs as geoeconomic tools to secure Russian national interests in fragile states.[49] As a noncoercive service offered to sovereign regimes (legitimacy is another issue), Russian PMSCs increase Moscow's influence and access abroad by simultaneously propping up fragile states and protecting Russian economic investments.[50] Key examples of Russian PMSCs propping up regimes to secure and protect economic concessions for the Kremlin are Syria (oil and gas), Sudan (gold), the Central African Republic (gold, uranium, and diamonds), and Venezuela (oil, gold, and arms deals).[51]

The historical evolution of PMSCs as Russian geoeconomic tools remains an open research project. A general appreciation of the industry's evolution in theory and practice provides valuable context for analysts today. Military officers and policy makers must understand that Russian PMSCs once operated independent of Kremlin control and that many still do. Although some Russian PMSCs are relatively benign, others are actively employed—and controlled—by Moscow to further Russia's malign interests abroad. Understanding that both types of firms can coexist is critical to confronting and addressing Russia's geoeconomic maneuvering in fragile states.

(Figure is republished with the permission of Stratfor, a leading global geopolitical intelligence and advisory firm. Figure originally found at https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/russia-putin-diplomacy-africa-great-power)

Figure 2. Russian Engagement of African Countries

Parallels to Soviet Foreign Policy

While modern Russia is far from being the Soviet Union, it did inherit the intellectual legacy of Soviet foreign policy and its geopolitical realities, notably an underperforming economy and strained relations with the West.[52] Examining Russia's Soviet past can be illuminating, particularly when exploring strategies Russia could use to pursue interests abroad without provoking a direct confrontation with the West. Under Leonid Brezhnev's leadership (1964–1982), the Soviet Union combined military assistance and long-term investments in developing nations to secure strategic resources in a manner similar to Russia's geoeconomic maneuvering today. Understanding the parallels between Russia's past and present is important for analysts studying the role PMSCs will likely play in the Kremlin's foreign policy going forward.

There were four major periods of Soviet foreign policy toward the developing world from 1953 to 1991:

- Under Nikita Khrushchev, economic assistance exceeded military aid with both flowing to ideologically aligned nations.

Operatives from Sewa, a private Russian security service, guard Central African Republic president Faustin-Archange Touadéra 4 August 2018 at the Berengo Palace, Central African Republic. Russian private military consultants also provide training to the Central African Republic Armed Forces. Russian private security firms are providing similar services to many countries throughout Africa, especially to those nations that have potential for reaching agreements on economic development of resources and trade with Russia. (Photo by Florent Vergnes, Agence France-Presse)

- From the mid-1960s to early 1970s, military aid became the predominant feature of Soviet assistance under Brezhnev; however, direct financial aid was replaced with economic investments in long-term projects in relatively stable countries not necessarily aligned with Soviet ideology.
- In the mid-1970s, Brezhnev changed course again, focusing almost exclusively on military aid to expand political influence abroad.
- Under Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviets consolidated economic resources and limited military aid in an attempt to forestall the impending collapse of the Soviet economy.[53]

Analysts often compare Vladimir Putin's domestic economic situation and policies to those of Brezhnev, but there are distinct similarities in their foreign policies as well.[54] Faced with a struggling economy when he came to office, Brezhnev turned economic assistance away from ideologically aligned nations and toward direct investment in long-term projects in developing but relatively stable nations.[55] These projects were almost exclusively consolidated in mineral and hydrocarbon extraction with guaranteed output that could replace cash repayment in lean times.[56] Cash flow and stability were the key factors driving Soviet aid under Brezhnev with military aid being less focused and situationally dependent.[57]

For the Kremlin today, providing stability to secure cash flow and strategic resources is key. As discussed earlier, Russia effectively trades PMSC services for access and economic concessions in resource-endowed fragile states. (Figure 2 on page 12 shows Russian priority engagements on the African continent.) Even though the contracts for these concessions are not publicly available, it is safe to assume that Moscow is pursuing long-term investments similar to Brezhnev's preferences. Additionally, while Putin shares autocratic tendencies with many of the regimes Moscow supports, investment

decisions are not ideologically driven. Instead, their focus is on promoting the last few competitive sectors of the Russian economy: arms, energy (nuclear and petroleum), and mineral extraction.[58] The final parallel between Soviet and contemporary foreign policy focuses on military technical assistance and advisors. In Soviet times, "advisor" was a euphemism for uniformed soldiers or intelligence operatives working for Moscow abroad.[59] Today, the military still performs this role; however, it is increasingly augmented by PMSCs providing "volunteers" or "instructors" in fragile states.[60]

Despite being fifty years apart, the geopolitical realities confronting the Soviet Union and modern Russia are strikingly similar. Familiar circumstances have pushed the Kremlin to pursue comparable methods; however, Moscow's tools appear subtler in 2019 than they were in 1969. Consequently, Western military officers and policy makers should expect Russian PMSCs to remain an enduring geoeconomic tool of Russian foreign policy because Russia's geopolitical situation—economic and diplomatic—is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.

Implications

This article explored the geoeconomic dimensions of the contemporary Russian PMSC industry through comparative and historical analysis. By focusing on similarities to previous conditions, operations, and policies, the article highlighted why PMSCs are likely to remain an enduring feature of Russian foreign policy off the battlefield. While Moscow will continue to deploy PMSCs to war zones, their true utility lies in resource-endowed fragile states on the verge of collapse—when their assets are most distressed and deeply discounted. Understanding how, why, and when the Kremlin will use PMSCs is important for military officers and policy makers as the joint force orients toward supporting U.S. government activities in competition below the threshold of armed conflict.[61]

Because Russia seeks to avoid direct military confrontation with the West, it will continue to send PMSCs into security vacuums and spread malign influence by propping up unsavory regimes for its own economic benefit. The U.S. military and intelligence communities, in coordination with allies and partners, must work together to identify, track, and expose Russian PMSCs and activities that are harmful to common national interests. It is only through awareness and exposure that the United States, its allies, and its partners can bring to bear their own security and geoeconomic tools to counter harmful PMSC activities.

Previously, indirect diplomatic and economic pressure was sufficient to disband EO. Given Kremlin patronage of select PMSCs, the United States and its allies might have to escalate sanctions and other existing measures to counter Russian exploitation efforts involving PMSCs. Again, the military and intelligence communities can assist by monitoring and enforcing sanctions on Russian PMSCs and associated actors. Finally, the joint force could be asked to address the underlying causes of instability by conducting counterterrorism operations, humanitarian assistance, and security cooperation activities to reduce Russian opportunities to exploit resource-endowed fragile states. A comprehensive and proactive approach to prevent security vacuums and address their causes is the best way to make Russian PMSCs unprofitable as corporations and foreign policy tools. ■

Notes

Epigraph. Vladimir Putin, quoted in Konstantin Bogdanov, "Private Military Companies in Russia: To Be or Not to Be," Russia Beyond, 12 April 2012, accessed 19 August 2019, https://www.rbth.com/articles/2012/04/17/private_military_companies_in_russia_to_be_or_not_to_be_15499.

1. For a brief discussion on why private military and security companies (PMSCs) are preferable, see Fabien Mathieu and Nick Dearden, "The Threat of Private Military & Security Companies," *Review of African Political Economy* 34, no. 114 (December 2007): 744–45, accessed 7 May 2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/20406461. The term "private military and security company" is preferable over mercenary and other variations on the corporate theme such as "private military firm," "private military company," etc., because it most accurately reflects the full range of services that individual firms can offer and is becoming the international standard. For the best open source account of the battle for Deir al-Zour, see Thomas Gibbens-Neff, "How a 4-Hour Battle between Russian Mercenaries and U.S. Commandos Unfolded in Syria," *New York Times* (website), 24 May 2018, accessed 3 March 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/24/world/middleeast/american-commandos-russian-mercenaries-syria.html.

2. Andrew Higgins and Ivan Nechepurenko, "In Africa, Murder of Journalists Puts Spotlight on Kremlin's Reach," *New York Times*

(website), 7 August 2018, accessed 3 March 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/07/world/europe/central-african-republic-russia-murder-journalists-africa-mystery-murders-put-spotlight-on-kremlins-reach.html.

3. Christopher R. Spearin, "Russia's Military and Security Privatization," *Parameters* 48, no. 2 (Summer 2018): 39–49, accessed 2 February 2019, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/Parameters/issues/Summer_2018/7_Spearin.pdf; James Bingham and Konrad Muzyka, "Private Companies Engage in Russia's Non-linear Warfare," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, 29 January 2018, accessed 4 February 2019, https://www.janes.com/images/assets/018/78018/Private_companies_engage_in_Russias_non-linear_warfare.pdf. For an exception to the warfare-centric analysis of Russian PMSCs, see Anna Maria Dyner, "The Role of Private Military Contractors in Russian Foreign Policy," Polish Institute of International Affairs Bulletin No. 64 (11135), 4 May 2018, accessed 1 February 2019, https://www.pism.pl/publications/bulletin/no-64-1135.

4. Sergey Sukhankin, "'Continuing War by Other Means': The Case of Wagner, Russia's Premier Private Military Company in the Middle East," The Jamestown Foundation, 13 July 2018, accessed 4 March 2019, https://jamestown.org/program/continuing-war-by-other-means-the-case-of-wagner-russias-premier-private-military-company-in-the-middle-east/.

5. Robert D. Blackwill and Jennifer M. Harris, *War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2016), 20. For a military-academic perspective on geoeconomics, see John F. Troxell, "Geoeconomics," *Military Review* 98, no. 1 (January-February 2018): 4–22.

6. For the attributes of state fragility and the comprehensive ranking of fragile states in 2019, see J. J. Messner et al., *Fragile States Index Annual Report 2019* (Washington, DC: Fund for Peace, 2019), accessed 9 April 2019, https://fragilestatesindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/9511904-fragilestatesindex.pdf. For the purposes of this article, fragile states are considered synonymous with weak, failing, and failed states as well as misgoverned, undergoverned, and ungoverned spaces.

7. Field Manual 3-90-1, *Offense and Defense Volume 1* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 2013), B-9. Given the operating locations and activities of Russian PMSCs, the standard military definition of secure is most appropriate. For a Russian academic's thoughts on PMSCs role in securing economic investments, see Pavel A. Shashkin, "Political Aspects of Mercenarism," *Bulletin of the Financial University* 5, no. 29 (2017): 47–55, accessed 29 June 2019, https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/politicheskie-aspekty-naemnichestva.

8. For an early account of Executive Outcomes, see Howard W. French, "Now for Hire: South Africa's Out of Work Commandos," *New York Times* (website), 24 May 1995, accessed 8 January 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/1995/05/24/world/now-for-hire-south-africa-s-out-of-work-commandos.html. Twenty years after disbanding, Executive Outcomes remains highly controversial. For assessments that examine its military decisiveness and effectiveness in Angola and Sierra Leone, see Herbert M. Howe, "Private Security Forces and African Stability: The Case of Executive Outcomes," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 36, no. 2 (June 1998), accessed 8 January 2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/161407; David Shearer, "Out Sourcing War," *Foreign Policy* 112 (Autumn 1998): 68–81, accessed 8 January 2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1149036; Ian D. Jefferies, "Private Military Companies—A Positive Role to Play in Today's International System," *Connections* 1, no. 4 (December 2002): 103–25, accessed 7 May 2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26322969.

9. P. W. Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 169–90.

10. Kevin O'Brien, "What Should and Should Not Be Regulated?," in *From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies*, ed. Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnardt (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 29–48.

11. For more on Wagner's presence and use of combined arms maneuver in Palmyra, Syria, see James Miller, "Putin's Attack Helicopters and Mercenaries are Winning the War for Assad," Foreign Policy, 30 March 2016, accessed 8 January 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/30/putins-attack-helicopters-and-mercenaries-are-winning-the-war-for-assad/. For Executive Outcomes's instructions to support all ground maneuver with close air support, see Al J. Venter, *War Dog: Fighting other People's Wars* (Philadelphia: Casemate, 2006), 390–91.

12. Birthe Anders, "Private Military and Security Companies: A Review Essay," *Parameters* 44, no. 2 (Summer 2014): 75–80, accessed 2 February 2019, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/Issues/Summer_2014/10_Anders_Article.pdf.

13. P. W. Singer, "Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and its Ramifications for International Security," *International Security* 26, no. 3 (Winter 2001-2002): 186–220, accessed 31 January 2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/3092094.

14. Ibid.; see also Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 88–100.

15. Aaron Ettinger, "After the Gold Rush: Corporate Warriors and The Market for Force Revisited," *International Journal* 69, no. 4 (December 2014): 559–69, accessed 7 May 2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24709423.

16. Kevin O'Brien, "License to Kill," *The World Today* 59, no. 8/9 (August 2003): 37–39, accessed 8 January 2019, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40477069; Sarah V. Percy, "This Gun's for Hire: A New Look at an Old Issue," *International Journal* 58, no. 4 (Autumn 2003): 721–36, accessed 7 May 2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/40203894; Sabelo Gumedze, "Regulating the Private Security Sector in South Africa," *Social Justice* 34, no. 3/4 (2007-2008): 195–207, accessed 7 May 2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/29768471. Disaggregating Singer's military provider firm into two separate categories—private security companies and private military companies—is an enduring theme for analysts studying PMSCs.

17. O'Brien, "License to Kill," 37–39.

18. Deborah Avant, *The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 17. This assertion is counter to Avant's ideal classification method based on contractual details.

19. For classification by activity and the fluid nature of PMSC offerings, see O'Brien, "License to Kill"; Avant, *The Market for Force*, 16–22.

20. David Shearer, "Dial an Army," *The World Today* 53, no. 8/9 (August 1997): 203, accessed 8 January 2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/40475967; Elizabeth Rubin, "An Army of One's Own," *Harper's Magazine*, February 1997, 44–55.

21. Rubin "An Army of One's Own"; Howe, "Private Security Forces and African Stability," 307; Shearer, "Out Sourcing War," 73; Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 102; Gumedze, "Regulating the Private Security Sector in South Africa," 195; William Reno, "African Weak States and Commercial Alliances," *African Affairs* 96, no. 383 (April 1997): 176, accessed 7 May 2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/723857.

22. French, "Now for Hire"; Reno, "African Weak States and Commercial Alliances," 173–74; Jeremy Harding, "The Mercenary Business: 'Executive Outcomes,'" *Review of African Political Economy* 24, no. 71 (March 1997): 88, accessed 7 May 2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/4006397; "Africa: Mercenary Markets," Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service, 4 October 1999.

23. Rubin, "An Army of One's Own"; Reno, "African Weak States and Commercial Alliances," 176; French, "Now for Hire"; Howe, "Private

Security Forces and African Stability," 310–11; Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 102–3; Kirsten Sellars, "Old Dogs of War Learn New Tricks," *New Statesman*, 25 April 1997, 24, accessed 7 May 2019, https://www.academia.edu/1969180/Kirsten_Sellars_Old_Dogs_of_War_Learn_New_Tricks_New_Statesman_London_25_April_1997_pp._24-25.

24. Shearer, "Out Sourcing War," 73; Sellars, "Old Dogs of War Learn New Tricks," 24; Singer, "Corporate Warriors," 199; Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 103.

25. Rubin, "An Army of One's Own"; Reno, "African Weak States and Commercial Alliances," 176; Harding, "The Mercenary Business," 88; Shearer, "Dial an Army," 203–4; Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 104–6; Philip Winslow, "The Business of War: Upmarket Mercenaries Help Regimes in Need," *Maclean's*, 6 November 1995, 36; David J. Francis, "Mercenary Intervention in Sierra Leone: Providing National Security or International Exploitation?," *Third World Quarterly* 20, no. 2 (April 1999): 323, accessed 7 May 2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/3992920; Steven Brayton, "Outsourcing War: Mercenaries and the Privatization of Peacekeeping," *Journal of International Affairs* 55, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 327, accessed 7 May 2019, https://www.jstor/stable/24358173.

26. Howe, "Private Security Forces and African Stability," 311–15; Francis, "Mercenary Intervention in Sierra Leone," 326; Brayton, "Outsourcing War," 312–15; Kevin Whitelaw, "Have Gun, Will Prop up Regime," *U.S. News & World Report* 122, 20 January 1997, 46; Sinclair Dinnen, "Militaristic Solutions in a Weak State: International Security, Private Contractors, and Political Leadership in Papua New Guinea," *The Contemporary Pacific* 11, no. 2 (1999): 279–303, accessed 7 May 2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/23717377.

27. Rubin, "An Army of One's Own"; Reno, "African Weak States and Commercial Alliances," 168–76; Howe, "Private Security Forces and African Stability," 325–26; Francis, "Mercenary Intervention in Sierra Leone," 322; Brayton, "Outsourcing War," 309; Herbert Howe and Aaryn Urell, "African Security in the Post Cold War Era: An Examination of Multinational vs. Private Security Forces," *African Journal of Political Science* 3, no. 1 (June 1998): 42–43, accessed 7 May 2019; https://www.jstor.org/stable/23489913.

28. Sellars, "Old Dogs of War Learn New Tricks," 15; Francis, "Mercenary Intervention in Sierra Leone," 322; Brayton, "Outsourcing War," 309; Ulrich Persohn, "The Impact of Mercenaries and Private Military and Security Companies on Civil War Severity between 1946 and 2002," *International Interactions* 40, no. 2 (2015): 197, 208–9, https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2014.880699.

29. Howe, "Private Security Forces and African Stability," 324–26; Shearer, "Out Sourcing War," 70; Singer, "Corporate Warriors," 193–5; Yekutiel Gershoni, "War without End and an End to War: The Prolonged Wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone," *African Studies Review* 40, no. 3 (December 1997): 62–65, accessed 7 May 2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/524966.

30. Rubin, "An Army of One's Own"; Sellars, "Old Dogs of War Learn New Tricks," 24; Howe, "Private Security Forces and African Stability," 330; Johannesburg, "Can Anyone Curb Africa's Dogs of War?," *The Economist* (website), 14 January 1999, accessed 8 January 2019, https://www.economist.com/international/1999/01/14/can-anyone-curb-africas-dogs-of-war.

31. For Asia, see Dinnen, "Militaristic Solutions," 279–80; David Issenberg, "Security for Sale," Asia Times, 14 August 2003, accessed 8 January 2019, http://www.sandline.com/hotlinks/security_for_sale.html. For the Middle East, see Kevin Whitelaw and Carey W. English, "Mercenaries Need Not Apply," *U.S. News & World Report* 122, no. 12 (31 March 1997): 47.

32. For Executive Outcomes's final role as a subcontractor, see Howe, "Private Security Forces and African Stability," 322; Dinnen, "Militaristic Solutions," 279–80; Robert Block, "African Supplier of Mercenaries Shuts, Says it Wants to Give Peace a Chance," *Wall Street Journal*, 11 December 1998.

33. Rubin, "An Army of One's Own"; Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 104.

34. For combined arms maneuver, see Venter, *War Dog*, 415–44, 513–52; Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 116. For psychological warfare, see Francis, "Mercenary Intervention in Sierra Leone," 327. For foreign internal defense, see Rubin, "An Army of One's Own"; Howe, "Private Security Forces and African Stability," 316; Francis, "Mercenary Intervention in Sierra Leone," 329. For humanitarian assistance and stability operations, see Rubin, "An Army of One's Own"; Harding, "The Mercenary Business," 92, 96.

35. Whitelaw, "Have Gun, Will Prop up Regime," 46; Issenberg, "Security for Sale."

36. Shearer, "Out Sourcing War," 73; Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 115–16.

37. Sellars, "Old Dogs of War Learn New Tricks," 24; Johannesburg, "Can Anyone Curb Africa's Dogs of War?"; Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 117; "Africa: Mercenary Markets"; David Shearer, "Privatizing Protection," *The World Today* 57, no. 8/9 (August 2001): 31, accessed 8 January 2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/40476572.

38. For international pressure, see Howe, "Private Security Forces and African Stability," 329; "Africa: Mercenary Markets"; Roger Moore and Linda de Hoyos, "Executive Outcomes' Ties to London and Bush," EIR International, 31 January 1997, 43; Sean Creehan, "Soldiers of Fortune 500: International Mercenaries," *Harvard International Review* 23, no. 4 (2002): 6–7. For regulation and contract oversight, see Howe, "Private Security Forces and African Stability," 327; "Africa: Mercenary Markets"; Johannesburg, "Can Anyone Curb Africa's Dogs of War?"; Block, "African Supplier of Mercenaries"; Gumedze, "Regulating the Private Security Sector in South Africa," 202; Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 118.

39. Mark Galleotti and Anna Arutunyan, "Commentary: Hybrid Business—The Risks in the Kremlin's Weaponization of the Economy," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), 20 July 2016, accessed 21 August 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-commentary-hybrid-business-weaponization-economy/27869714.html; see also Sukhankin, "Continuing War by Other Means."

40. For legal status overview, see Dyner, "The Role of Private Military Contractors"; for sanctions circumvention, see "Paper Views Africa, Middle East Flights of 'Kremlin Chef' Plane," BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, 8 February 2019.

41. For information on Anti-Terror Group, see Vyacheslav Gusarov, "Russian Private Military Companies as Licensed Tool of Terror," Inform Napalm, 24 November 2015, accessed 3 March 2019, https://informnapalm.org/en/russian-private-military-companies-as-licensed-tool-of-terror/; for information on Anti-Terror Group's ties to FSB, see Grzegorz Kuczynski, "Putin's Invisible Army," Warsaw Institute, 30 March 2019, accessed 29 July 2019, https://warsawinstitute.org/putins-invisible-army/.

For information on ATK Group, see Gusarov, "Russian Private Military Companies"; Kuczynski, "Putin's Invisible Army."

For information on Center R in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yugoslavia, see Kuczynski, "Putin's Invisible Army"; for information on Center R in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Yugoslavia, see Gusarov, "Russian Private Military Companies"; for information on Center R in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Indonesia, see Dyner, "The Role of Private Military Contractors."

For information on E.N.O.T. in Ukraine and its ties to FSB, see Kuczynski, "Putin's Invisible Army"; for information on E.N.O.T. in Azerbaijan, Syria, Tajikistan, Ukraine, see Gusarov, "Russian Private

Military Companies"; for information on E.N.O.T. in Azerbaijan, Serbia, Syria, and Ukraine, see Dmitry Nikitin, Rostislav Boguszewski, and Alina Volchinskaya, "The FSB Began to Detain the Participants of The E.N.O.T.," Daily Storm, 19 November 2019, accessed 5 May 2019, https://daily-storm.ru/obschestvo/fsb-nachala-zaderzhivat-uchastnikov-chvk-e-n-o-t; for information on E.N.O.T. in Azerbaijan, Syria, Tajikistan, and Ukraine, see Dyner, "The Role of Private Military Contractors"; for information on E.N.O.T.'s ties to FSB, see Ruslan Goreva, "The Army of Wild Geese," *Versia* (website), 29 January 2019, accessed 03 March 2019, https://versia.ru/pochemu-rossii-vygodnee-voevat-za-rubezhom-nelegalno.

For information on FDG Corp, see Kuczynski, "Putin's Invisible Army"; Nikolai Larin, "Business on Blood: What Is Known About Russian Private Military Companies," *Forbes* (Russia website), 8 February 2018, accessed 5 May 2019, https://www.forbes.ru/biznes/365421-biznes-na-krovi-chto-izvestno-o-rossiyskih-chastnyh-voennyh-kompaniyah.

For information on Feraks Group, see Dyner, "The Role of Private Military Contractors"; Kuczynski, "Putin's Invisible Army."

For information on MAR PMC, see Gusarov, "Russian Private Military Companies"; Kuczynski, "Putin's Invisible Army"; for information on MAR PMC ties to FSB, see Goreva, "The Army of Wild Geese."

For information on Moran Security Group, see Gusarov, "Russian Private Military Companies"; Kuczynski, "Putin's Invisible Army."

For information on Patriot in Barundi and ties to Russian government agencies, see Jakob Hedenskog, "Russia Is Stepping up Its Military Cooperation in Africa," Swedish Defence Research Agency Memo 6604, December 2018, accessed 5 May 2019, https://www.foi.se/rapportsammanfattning?reportNo=FOI%20MEMO%206604; for information on Patriot in Syria, Barundi, and ties to Ministry of Defence (MOD), see L. Todd Wood, "New Russian Mercenary Force Operating in Syria," Tzarism, 7 July 2018, accessed 3 August 2019, https://tsarizm.com/news/2018/07/07/new-russian-mercenary-force-operating-in-syria/; for information on Patriot ties to Russian government agencies, see Nils Dahlqvist, "Russia's (Not So) Private Military Companies," Swedish Defence Research Agency Memo 6653, January 2019, accessed 3 March 2019, https://www.foi.se/rapportsammanfattning?reportNo=FOI%20MEMO%206653; for information on Patriot in Central African Republic, Syria, and connections to MOD, see "PMC Rush: Russian Private Armies," Inform Napalm, accessed 1 August 2019, http://informnapalm.rocks/pmc_rush.

For information on RSB Group in Libya, see "Veterans to Ask Hague Court to Probe Russia's Use of Mercenaries," RFE/RL, 10 November 2018, accessed 05 March 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/reuters-report-veterans-ask-hague-court-probe-russian-use-of-mercenaries-syria-ukraine-central-african-republic/29592901.html; Vladimir Mukhin, "The Offensive of Haftar's Army Is Hindered by Ukrainian Military Men," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* (website), 7 April 2019, accessed 5 May 2019, http://www.ng.ru/world/2019-04-07/1_2_7550_lybia.html; for information on RSB Group in Nigeria, see "RSB Group in Nigeria," RSB Group Press Release, accessed 1 August 2019, http://rsb-group.org/news/rsb-groups-in-nigeria; for information on RSB Group in Senegal, see "Contact and Feedback," RSB Group, accessed 1 August 2019, http://rsb-group.org/contacts; for information on RSB Group in Serbia, see "Demining," RSB Group, accessed 1 August 2019, http://rsb-group.org/services/clearance; for information on RSB Group in Sri Lanka, see "RSB Group Base in Sri Lanka," RSB Group Press Release, accessed 1 August 2019, http://rsb-group.org/news/completed-formation-of-base-sri-lanka; for information on RSB Group in Ukraine, see Gusarov, "Russian Private Military Companies"; for information on RSB Group in Libya and Ukraine, see Kuczynski, "Putin's Invisible Army."

For information on Sewa Security Service in Central African Republic, see Andrey Kamakin, "Safari for Wagner," *Novaya Gazeta* (website), 12 June 2018, accessed 3 March 2019, https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2018/06/13/76787-safari-dlya-vagnera; Hedenskog, "Russia Is Stepping Up Its Military Cooperation in Africa"; for information on Sewa's potential ties to GRU, see Dahlqvist, "Russia's (Not So) Private Military Companies." Sewa is likely affiliated with ChVK Wagner and shares its ties to the GRU. GRU support is most likely administrative and logistical. GRU authority or tactical control of Sewa operations is likely limited or nonexistent.

For information on ChVK Shchitt, see Denis Korotkov, "Without Shield," *Novaya Gazeta* (website), 29 July 2019, accessed 1 August 2019, https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2019/07/28/81406-bez-schita.

For information on Vegacy Strategic Services, see Lukas Andriukaitis and Michael Sheldon, "A Deeper Look into Vegacy Strategic Services, LLC." Atlantic Council Digital Forensic Research Lab, 29 March 2019, 5 May 2019, accessed https://medium.com/dfrlab/a-deeper-look-into-vegacy-strategic-services-ltd-8985ba3eac52.

For information on ChVK Wagner in Central African Republic, Sudan, Syria, and Ukraine see Hedenskog, "Russia Is Stepping Up Its Military Cooperation in Africa"; Kamakin, "Safari for Wagner"; Eric Schmitt, "Russia's Military Mission Creep Advances to a New Front: Africa," *New York Times* (website), 31 March 2019, accessed 1 April 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/31/world/africa/russia-military-africa.html; for information on Wagner in Syria and Ukraine, see Gusarov, "Russian Private Military Companies"; for information on Wagner in Libya, Sudan, Syria, and Ukraine, see Sergei Khazov-Cassia and Robert Coalson, "Russian Mercenaries: Vagner Commanders Describe Life inside the 'Meat Grinder,'" RFE/RL, 14 May 2018, accessed 5 May 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/russian-mercenaries-vagner-commanders-syria/29100402.html; for information on Wagner in Central African Republic, Libya, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen, see Gabriella Gricius, "Russia's Wagner Group Quietly Moves into Africa," Riddle, 11 March 2019, accessed 5 May 2019, https://www.ridl.io/en/russia-s-wagner-group-quietly-moves-into-africa/; for information on Wagner in Libya, see Mukhin, "The Offensive of Haftar's Army"; for information on Wagner ties to GRU and operations in Central African Republic, Sudan, Syria, and Ukraine, see Dahlqvist, "Russia's (Not So) Private Military Companies"; for information on Wagner ties to GRU, see Kuczynski, "Putin's Invisible Army."

For information on countries where ongoing Russian PMSC operations are suspected or alleged, see RFE/RL, "Veterans to Ask Hague Court to Probe Russia's Use of Mercenaries"; Lukas Andriukaitis and Graham Brookie, "#PutinAtWar: Prigozhin Meets Libyan Military Officials," Atlantic Council Digital Forensic Research Lab, 24 November 2018, accessed 5 May 2019, https://medium.com/dfrlab/putinatwar-prigozhin-meets-libyan-military-officials-608ca4f-2b98e; "Reports: Russian Military Contractors Operating in Venezuela," RFE/RL, 25 January 2019, accessed 3 May 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/reuters-reports-russian-military-contractors-operating-in-venezuela/29731838.html; "Wagner Versus Patriot: Fighting for Mercenary Control," Warsaw Institute Russia Monitor, 12 July 2018, accessed 3 March 2019, https://warsawinstitute.org/wagner-versus-patriot-fighting-mercenary-control/.

For information on countries with potential for ongoing or future Russian PMSC operations, see Hedenskog, "Russia Is Stepping Up Its Military Cooperation in Africa;" Schmitt, "Russia's Military Mission Creep Advances to a New Front: Africa"; Sukhankin, "Continuing War by Other Means"; Kimberly Marten, "Into Africa: Prigozhin, Wagner, and the Russian Military," PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 561, January 2019, accessed 20 March 2019, http://www.ponarseurasia.org/

sites/default/files/policy-memos-pdf/Pepm561_Marten_Jan2019_0.pdf; Aaron Ross, "How Russia Moved into Central Africa," *Reuters*, 17 October 2018, accessed 27 October 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-africa-russia-insight-idUSKCN1MR0KA; Sukhankin, "Russian PMCs in Yemen: Kremlin-Style 'Security Export' in Action?," Jamestown Foundation, 12 October 2018, accessed 12 October 2018, https://jamestown.org/program/russian-pmcs-in-yemen-kremlin-style-security-export-in-action/; Irina Dolinina and Alesya Marokhovskaya, "Specials and Spices: Why Yevgeny Prigozhin's Plane Flies to the Middle East and Africa Almost Every Month," *Novaya Gazeta* (website), 4 February 2019, accessed 8 February 2019, https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2019/02/04/79417-spetsy-i-spetsii.

42. Bingham and Musyka, "Private Companies"; see also Owen Matthews, "Putin's Secret Armies Waged War in Syria—Where Will They Fight Next," *Newsweek* (website), 26 January 2018, accessed 3 March 2019, https://www.newsweek.com/2018/01/26/putin-secret-army-waged-war-syria-782762.html.

43. For shock infantry, read supposed firsthand accounts from Palmyra in Pierre Vaux, "Fontanka Investigates Russian Mercenaries Dying for Putin in Syria and Ukraine," The Interpreter, 29 March 2016, accessed 2 July 2019, http://www.interpretermag.com/fontanka-investigates-russian-mercenaries-dying-for-putin-in-syria-and-ukraine/; see also Bingham and Muzyka, "Private Companies," 13. For claims about Sukhoi's role in the Eritrean-Ethiopian War, see Singer, "Corporate Warriors," 205; "Russia Arms Eritrea, Ethopia Despite Possible Conflict—Russian Paper," BBC Monitoring Service Former Soviet Union, 16 April 2005.

44. Singer, "Corporate Warriors," 194; Peter Lock, "Military Downsizing and Growth in the Security Industry in Sub-Saharan Africa," *Strategic Analysis* 22, no. 9 (December 1998): 1393–426, https://doi.org/10.1080/09700169808458891; Mariyam Hasham, "Public Wars, Private Profit," *The World Today* 60, no. 6 (June 2004): 7–9, accessed 8 January 2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/40477178.

45. Issenberg, "Security for Sale"; Hasham, "Public Wars, Private Profit," 9.

46. Sergey Sukhankin, "War, Business and 'Hybrid' Warfare: The Case of the Wagner Private Military Company (Part One)," The Jamestown Foundation, 19 April 2019, accessed 25 June 2019, https://jamestown.org/program/war-business-and-hybrid-warfare-the-case-of-the-wagner-private-military-company-part-one/; Sergey Sukhankin, "From 'Volunteers' to Quasi-PMCs: Retracing the Footprints of Russian Irregulars in the Yugoslav Wars and Post-Soviet Conflicts," The Jamestown Foundation, 25 June 2019, accessed 25 June 2019, https://jamestown.org/program/from-volunteers-to-quasi-pmcs-retracing-the-footprints-of-russian-irregulars-in-the-yugoslav-wars-and-post-soviet-conflicts/.

47. "No Quarter," *Time*, 15 February 1993.

48. For Transnistria, see Matthew Owens, "Putin's Secret Armies Wages War in Syria—Where Will They Fight Next?," *Newsweek* (website), 17 January 2018, accessed 14 March 2019, https://www.newsweek.com/2018/01/26/putin-secret-army-waged-war-syria-782762.html; for Nagorno-Karabakh, see "Azerbaijan: Russian Hand," Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service, 11 June 1993; for both, see Dyner, "The Role of Private Military Contractors."

49. Sergey Sukhankin, "War, Business and Ideology: How Russian Private Military Contractors Pursue Moscow's Interests," The Jamestown Foundation, 20 March 2019, accessed 25 June 2019, https://jamestown.org/program/war-business-and-ideology-how-russian-private-military-contractors-pursue-moscows-interests/; Sukhankin, "Continuing War by Other Means."

50. Ibid.; Dyner, "The Role of Private Military Contractors."

51. Ty Joplin, "5 Countries Where Russia's Secret Mercenary Wagner Group Have Been Deployed," Al Bawaba, 12 February 2019, accessed 21 August 2019, https://www.albawaba.com/news/5-countries-where-russia%E2%80%99s-secret-mercenary-wagner-group-have-been-deployed-1250966; Sergey Sukhankin, "Beyond Syria and Ukraine: Wagner PMC Expands its Operations to Africa," The Jamestown Foundation, 20 April 2018, accessed 20 March 2019, https://jamestown.org/program/beyond-syria-and-ukraine-wagner-pmc-expands-its-operations-to-africa/; Sergey Sukhankin, "Are Russian Mercenaries Ready to Defend Venezuela's Maduro?," The Jamestown Foundation, 28 January 2019, accessed 20 March 2019, https://jamestown.org/program/are-russian-mercenaries-ready-to-defend-venezuelas-maduro/.

52. For a quick assessment of Russia's economic woes, see James Roberts and Ivan Benovic, "Russia's Economy Continues to Underperform," The Heritage Foundation, 19 November 2017, accessed 2 July 2019, https://www.heritage.org/international-economies/report/russias-economy-continues-underperform.

53. For the first three phases, see Gu Guan-Fu, "Soviet Aid to the Third World an Analysis of its Strategy," *Soviet Studies* 35, no. 1 (January 1983): 71–89, accessed 2 July 2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/151493. For the final phase, see Peter Lock, "The Withering Military in Sub-Saharan Africa: New Roles for the Private Security Industry?," *Africa Spectrum* 33, no. 2 (1998): 135, accessed 2 July 2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/40180336.

54. Chris Miller, "Putin Isn't a Genius. He's Leonid Brezhnev," *Foreign Policy* (website), 12 February 2018, accessed 9 March 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/02/12/putin-isnt-a-genius-hes-leonid-brezhnev/; Mariya Petkova, "Will Putin Follow in Brezhnev's Footsteps?," Al-Jazeera News, 24 March 2018, accessed 9 March 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/03/putin-follow-brezhnev-footsteps-180323164959435.html.

55. Guan-Fu, "Soviet Aid to the Third World," 73–81.

56. Colin W. Lawson, "Soviet Economic Aid to Africa," *African Affairs* 87, no. 349 (October 1988): 510, accessed 2 July 2019, https://www.jstore.org/stable/722891.

57. Ibid., 510, 518.

58. Samuel Ramani, "As the U.S. Disengages, Russia Ramps Up Aid and Arms Sales to Sub-Saharan Africa," World Politics Review, 29 March 2018, accessed 11 June 2019, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/insights/24457/as-the-u-s-disengages-russia-ramps-up-aid-and-arms-sales-to-sub-saharan-africa; Theo Neethling, "Russia is Expanding its Strategic Influence in Africa," Quartz Africa, 8 February 2019, accessed 11 June 2019, https://qz.com/africa/1546037/russia-is-expanding-its-strategic-influence-in-africa/.

59. Artemy Kalinovsky, "The Blind Leading the Blind: Soviet Advisors, Counter-Insurgency and Nation-Building in Afghanistan" (working paper #60, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC, January 2010), 4–9, accessed 12 July 2019, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/WP60_Web_Final.pdf.

60. Higgins and Nechepurenko, "In Africa"; "Sudan Coup: What's Next with Russian 'Advisers'?," Warsaw Institute, 12 April 2019, accessed 11 June 2019, https://warsawinstitute.org/sudan-coup-whats-next-russian-advisers/.

61. *Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 16 March 2018), 7–10, accessed 21 August 2019, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/joint_concept_integrated_campaign.pdf?ver=2018-03-28-102833-257.

A coalition soldier speaks with children 13 March 2018 at a market in Raqqa, Syria. The reappearance of vendors in Syrian markets is a sign of returning normalcy following the Syrian Democratic Forces' defeat of the Islamic State. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Timothy Koster, U.S. Army)

Order from Chaos

Inside U.S. Army Civil Affairs Activities

Maj. Assad A. Raza, U.S. Army

Since 9/11, civil affairs forces have consistently contributed to the success of military campaigns, from reassuring local Afghans after their liberation from the Taliban in 2001 to understanding Sunni grievances during the Sunni Awakening in 2006 that ultimately defeated al-Qaida in Iraq. In the

ongoing campaign against the Islamic State (IS), civil affairs forces working through interorganizational partners are stabilizing post-IS areas to deny IS reemergence and maintain coalition freedom of action.

Over the past eighteen years, commanders have learned that civil affairs activities enhance their understanding of the operational environment. For example, civil affairs personnel can help identify critical infrastructure, and they can develop local civil networks that

Department of Defense and U.S. Special Operations Command Directives

Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 2000.13, *Civil Affairs*, directs combatant commanders to conduct civil affairs operations in their areas of responsibility. This directive provides commanders the authority to integrate civil affairs forces with either military forces or interagency partners to support DOD and U.S. embassy objectives



(Original figure by French officer Lt. Col. David Galula, adapted by author. Population by percentage: 10 percent support the adversary, 80 percent are agnostic, and 10 percent support U.S. objectives. *Percentages represent populations. **Does not represent other intergovernmental organizations/nongovernmental organizations.)

Figure 1. A Modified Diagram of the 10-80-10 Theory

support U.S. efforts. Moreover, these efforts contribute toward a common understanding with interorganizational partners, which provides opportunities for all stakeholders to develop ways to mitigate civil vulnerabilities that complement U.S. military and whole-of-government objectives. Based on the knowledge gained from years of combat, civil affairs forces must now evolve and identify innovative ways to enable the U.S. Army (as part of a joint force) in the future multi-domain battlefield.

As the United States moves toward great-power competition, the U.S. Army must invest in future civil affairs capabilities to understand and influence civil networks and facilitate interorganizational cooperation in multi-domain operations. Additionally, civil affairs forces must contribute to the Army's calibrated force posture in an era of constant competition to help deter aggression, prevent conflict, and, if necessary, rapidly transition to support armed conflict should deterrence fail.

across the conflict continuum. For this reason, commanders can deploy civil affairs forces as a part of a joint task force or independently to support unified action in great-power competition.[1]

Using DOD Directive 2000.13, the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) developed USSOCOM Directive 525-38, *Civil Military Engagement*, which outlines a civil-military engagement program. USSOCOM Directive 525-38 supports DOD and U.S. embassy strategies, stating that civil affairs forces work by, with, and through unified action partners to shape conditions and influence indigenous populations and institutions to support a commander's objective within the operational environment.[2] These directives provide civil affairs forces the flexibility to work with interorganizational partners, which include U.S. government departments and agencies, local indigenous institutions, international and nongovernmental

organizations, and the private sector.[3] Hence, civil affairs forces are vital to build strong, indigenous military and civilian partners, which are essential for meeting future challenges such as countering Russian and Chinese expansion into vulnerable states.

Role of Civil Affairs

Civil affairs forces, whether conventional or special operations, are experts at three activities that are vital to shaping and influencing the operational environment: civil reconnaissance, civil engagement, and civil information management. Field Manual 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations*, defines these activities accordingly:

> **Civil Reconnaissance.** CR [civil reconnaissance] is a targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of specific civil aspects of the environment for collecting civil information to enhance situational understanding and facilitate decision making. Potential sources of civil information include areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE) assessments.
> **Civil Engagement.** CE [civil engagement] includes those planned and targeted interactions which promote the building of relationships between military forces, unified action partners, IPI [indigenous populations and institutions], and the interagency to reduce civilian impacts to ongoing or planned military operations and mitigate the military impact on the civilian population. … It may be in person or by other means of communication.
> **Civil Information Management**. Civil information management is the process whereby data relating to the civil component is gathered, collated, processed, analyzed, produced into information products, and disseminated. The data is used as civil considerations input into possible courses of action to determine the impact of military operations on the civil component of the OE [operational environment] and to provide updates on the civil component to enhance the commander's common operational picture (COP).[4]

The combination of these civil affairs activities provides commanders and unified action partners a shared understanding for the civil component of the operational environment. Civil affairs forces continually accomplish this through civil reconnaissance and civil engagement to develop an accurate picture of the civil environment and provide them critical context on the ground. The civil information collected is analyzed and integrated into the operations and intelligence processes to support the commander's decisions and ensure unity of effort toward mission accomplishment.

Recent Civil Affairs Activities

During the Global War on Terrorism, civil affairs forces have used information collected through a range of activities to improve commanders' understanding of the operational environment and facilitate information sharing with joint, interorganizational, and multinational (JIM) partners to leverage resources toward common objectives. As figure 1 (page 20) demonstrates, civil affairs activities range across all aspects of the civil component of the operational environment. Hence, civil affairs forces collect information from the civil component that overlaps pro-U.S./coalition areas and population centers that are sympathetic to U.S. adversaries' objectives. Therefore, civil affairs forces continuously gather and analyze civil information to enhance military commanders' understanding of the local sociopolitical dynamics of a complex operating environment. Civil affairs units share this information with JIM partners to facilitate cooperation in areas of mutual interest and establish trust with both civilian and military organizations.

In Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, civil affairs forces assisted with synchronizing humanitarian efforts to meet the immediate needs of the populations and to mitigate the effects of combat operations. Civil affairs forces in these contingency operations were often the first U.S. personnel on the ground collecting real-time information through civil reconnaissance and civil engagement activities. These activities

Maj. Assad Raza, U.S. Army, is an active-duty civil affairs officer serving at the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC). He holds a BA in psychology from the University of Tampa and an MA in diplomacy with a concentration in international conflict management from Norwich University. Raza has served with the 82nd Airborne Division, the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, and the 5th Special Forces Group.

Civil affairs officer Maj. Don Sculli, the executive officer of Company C, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, passes sodium chloride to a hospital worker 22 April 2003 at the Pediatrics and Labor Hospital in Najaf, Iraq. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Kyle Davis, U.S. Army)

provided the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) with essential information to plan U.S. foreign disaster relief efforts that helped alleviate suffering in these postconflict areas.[5]

In Afghanistan, civil affairs forces cooperated with private telecommunications companies in support of their efforts to provide cellular mobile services throughout the region. Civil affairs forces shared information with these private companies to help them identify secure areas to build telecommunication infrastructure. As these companies built cell towers in rural areas, their services complemented both the ground force commander's security objectives and local governance initiatives that generated job opportunities, increased communication, and led to local economic growth that aided with countering Taliban influence.[6]

In 2006, as improvised explosive device (IED) threats increased throughout Iraq, civil affairs forces became vital in the counter-IED fight. One of the core counter-IED efforts developed by the Joint IED Defeat Organization was to "attack the network."[7] Given civil affairs access and extensive local networks, it was easy to map the human geography and identify relationships based on commonalities such as family and cultural or business ties. As illustrated in figure 2 (page 23), identifying and disseminating these links and nodes across the human networks to other DOD entities provided commanders with an increased situational understanding.[8] Moreover, once this civil knowledge was triangulated with other critical information, it led to opportunities for lethal and nonlethal targeting to "attack the network." The latter, layered with persistent civil engagement and increased job opportunities for local populations, contributed to the desired security conditions and reduced violence observed in Iraq in 2010.

Early in the "Defeat IS" campaign in Syria, civil affairs forces used social media to monitor local populations' sentiment in IS-held areas. Cooperation among psychological operations, U.S. Central Command web operations, and civil affairs yielded a mechanism to analyze social media information on how both IS and coalition operations affected the local populations during the



(Figure from Maneuver Center of Excellence, Fort Benning, Georgia)

Figure 2. Interacting with Human Networks

air campaign. Also, the social media data was used to advise the commanders on local perceptions of coalition and partner force operations, to monitor movement of displaced civilians, and to increase collaboration for civil affairs activities with lethal and nonlethal targeting.[9]

Immediately after the liberation of Raqqa, Syria, on 20 October 2017, civil affairs forces assisted ground force commanders in assessing the post-IS operational environment.[10] These civil affairs teams working with the Syrian Democratic Forces gathered information on the status of local infrastructure from roads blocked by debris to monitoring the early return of locals to the destroyed area. Additionally, civil affairs extended the reach of USAID/Department of State (DOS) platforms through civil reconnaissance and civil engagements in liberated areas throughout Syria. The real-time information provided interagency partners with the necessary data to enhance programming coordination to meet the local populations' immediate needs as they started up the Syria Transition Assistance Response Team–Forward (START-FWD) unit. Once fully functional, this relationship enhanced the sharing of information and resources to achieve unity of effort toward accomplishing common objectives. An article in the Small Wars Journal stated,

> The Syria Transition Assistance Response Team–Forward (START-FWD) provides a good model for future endeavors. Recognizing the necessity to co-deploy State and USAID civilians with military forces to plan and monitor stabilization, humanitarian assistance and diplomacy activities with local partners, the Civil Military Support Element (CMSE) provided critical administrative and operational support to the Special Operations Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve (SOJTF-OIR) for START-FWD.[11]

The collaboration between START-FWD and the civil affairs forces was critical to the consolidation of gains in these post-IS affected areas of Syria.

As combat operations shifted in northeastern Syria, civil affairs forces also assisted with training local internal security forces with their civil-military operations. Building the internal security forces' civil-military operations capacity provided them the opportunity to increase their public support and foster legitimacy with the local populace. Additionally, this provided civil affairs teams another means to monitor and validate local grievances that could have contributed to instability in a highly vulnerable area due to deeply rooted Arab-Kurdish tensions. These activities also assisted psychological operations and public affairs activities by providing them the access and information necessary to issue positive media releases, both locally and internationally, to increase Kurdish partners' credibility in the "Defeat IS" campaign.

Operational Risks

Throughout the Global War on Terrorism, civil affairs forces identified several challenges that put these types of activities at risk. The potential risks identified below do not represent all possible risks that could impact the use of civil affairs forces, but they can be used to develop solutions to better optimize this unique capability in support of multi-domain operations.

Civil affairs versus lethal operations. The first challenge was that while civil affairs activities created sustainable outcomes, in the past, they were largely overshadowed by lethal operations. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction John F. Sopko's May 2018 report explicitly described how a U.S. Army Stryker brigade's aggressive actions in Kandahar, Afghanistan, were so counterproductive that they stalled any chance for success in their area of operations.[12] In the same report, Sopko described how U.S. special operations forces, later with the Village Stability Operations mission, defaulted to training Afghan Local Police (ALP), thus overshadowing the governance and development part of the mission:

> Not only were governance and development de-emphasized as ALP grew, even the idea of representative governance within the ALP itself became secondary. For example, according to Colonel Bradley Moses, commander of the 3rd Special Forces Group, the rapid development of the ALP meant some ALP were not indigenous to the village or village cluster they were assigned to protect, undermining a fundamental premise of the program. As one military official noted, "Both at the strategic and operational level, doing VSO [Village Stability Operations]/ALP right took a backseat to doing it fast."[13]

Civilian-military teams. A second challenge was the timely establishment of civilian-military teams that included representatives from DOS and USAID. History has proven that integrated civilian-military teams were necessary to consolidate gains immediately post-hostilities; examples of this include the U.S. Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support Program in Vietnam, the provincial reconstruction teams in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the collaboration between civil affairs forces and START-FWD in Syria. However, the creation of these teams must happen early on as troops are preparing for deployment stateside to optimize collaboration and establish a shared understanding between civilian and military counterparts prior to deploying abroad. The early coordination can provide commanders a better understanding of policy and funding sources prior to conducting military operations. Early coordination will also assist military planners with forecasting requirements to help with the movement of resources and establishing processes for humanitarian assistance in support of DOS or USAID.

Inflexible funding. A third challenge was the lack of flexible funding for civil affairs forces in Syria to quickly relieve human suffering and manage collateral damage to support the joint force's freedom of action. In Iraq and Afghanistan, civil affairs forces used the Commander's Emergency Response Program funds to implement quick projects to support a commander's initiative. However, once the DOD made money a "weapon system" in 2009, commanders felt pressured to spend money loosely with no criteria for measuring effectiveness because they viewed money spent as progress on the ground, as shown in figure 3 (on page 25).[14] The shortage of trained civil affairs forces to advise commanders on effective use of funds combined with some commanders not taking civil affairs advice contributed to the suboptimal application of the program. Overspending and a lack of measuring projects' effectiveness has contributed to civil affairs' dependency on USAID and other agencies to identify resources that complement commanders' objectives. However, this dependency comes with a risk, as commanders may



(Figure from Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Department of Defense)

Figure 3. Afghanistan Commanders' Emergency Response Program Disbursements (CERP) from 2004 to 2017

not have the resources or funding necessary to support their military operations.

Information sharing. The last issue is the constant challenge of information sharing between all stakeholders, from interagency to the private-sector and even between military organizations. Some of the challenges include overclassification of DOD products, access to databases, and organizational attitudes within supported commands. These challenges delay the sharing of civil information with partners that civil affairs must synchronize with to work in areas where interests intersect. The delay or lack of information sharing also prevents partners, especially multinational partners, from sharing information with civil affairs forces that can fill information gaps or the sharing of resources, hence limiting a commander's understanding of the operational environment and not fully optimizing the use of interorganizational partners to achieve unity of effort.

Seize the Opportunity

As the U.S. Army evolves to conduct multi-domain operations across the conflict continuum, it must invest in its civil affairs forces to operate across multiple domains. Furthermore, the Army must include civil affairs operations early on as part of its engagement strategy to contest adversaries' influence and compete more effectively at levels below armed conflict. Persistent civil engagement early on is vital, as civil affairs forces are critical in understanding the human geography and leveraging civil networks for the successful execution of military operations. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028*, highlights the importance of understanding local infrastructure and civil networks:

> **Analyze operational environment and civil networks.** All echelons of forward presence forces conduct terrain analysis and familiarization of friendly territory threatened by an adversary. This effort builds the necessary information that allows the Joint Force Commander to visualize the three-dimensional, multi-domain environment at a level of detail for tactical execution and operational planning. Dense urban terrain requires additional preparatory intelligence activities to understand the human, social, and infrastructure details. The field army focuses IPB [intelligence preparation of the battlefield] on select urban areas that are likely to be of critical strategic and operational importance in conflict.[15]

Civil affairs forces at all echelons are vital in conducting civil engagement to promote the relationship between military forces and the civil component.

Civil affairs forces at all echelons are vital in conducting civil engagement to promote the relationship between military forces and the civil component. In multi-domain operations, civil affairs must perform civil engagement activities across the cyber domain and the information environment to achieve a position of relative advantage for the joint force and unified action partners during competition or armed conflict.[16] TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 states that "engagement enables U.S. forces to outmaneuver an adversary cognitively as well as physically and virtually to deter, counter, and deny the escalation of violence in competition, and defeat the enemy if armed conflict cannot be avoided."[17]

The knowledge gained since 9/11 has demonstrated the importance of technology in the operational environment. The critical need for reliable connectivity through cell phones and wireless broadband contributes to stabilizing and consolidating gains. Connectivity assists those impacted by hostilities to find displaced family members, enable relief and humanitarian assistance, and create economic and educational opportunities during recovery efforts. Also, the internet provides civil affairs forces another means to monitor local sentiments, triangulate data on sources of instability, and share critical information with indigenous and nongovernmental partners to leverage their resources. Therefore, the Army must identify, develop, and integrate emerging technologies to enable civil affairs activities through multiple domains. New technologies are essential for civil affairs to acquire, process, and share critical information to help understand and affect the future operational environment.

Over the last decade, social media has played an increasingly critical role in swaying political outcomes. For this reason, civil affairs forces should work closely with other U.S. government agencies to identify a common platform that is compatible with DOD and DOS systems to monitor and analyze local sentiments in the operational environment. A common platform would assist with maintaining situational understanding, evaluate civil trends, and effectively target those civil components that threaten U.S. efforts with JIM partners to sustain the initiative in competition and achieve military and whole-of-government objectives.

In closing, then TRADOC commander Gen. Stephen J. Townsend wrote in the preface to TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1,

> In a new era of great-power competition, our nation's adversaries seek to achieve their strategic aims, short of conflict, by the use of *layered stand-off* in the political, military, and economic realms to separate the U.S. from our partners. Should conflict come, they will employ *multiple layers of stand-off* in *all domains—land, sea, air, space and cyberspace—* to separate U.S. forces and our allies in time, space, and function in order to defeat us.[18]

In great-power competition, civil affairs forces are essential to understanding civil networks and building partner capacity, which will enable the expansion of the competitive space to deter conflict and help position the joint force to rapidly transition to armed conflict if necessary. However, according to Jay Liddick, Thurman Dickerson, and Linda K. Chunga, "Current civil affairs structure, doctrine, equipment, and training are inadequate to combat future near-peer threats. The current civil affairs force was designed and rapidly reorganized to support the Army's modularity concept of the early 2000s."[19] Hence, the U.S. Army must re-examine and invest in its civil affairs forces to maximize this unique capability in future multi-domain operations. ■

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

Notes

1. Department of Defense Directive 2000.13, *Civil Affairs* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], updated 15 May 2017), accessed 29 May 2019, http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/200013_2014.pdf.

2. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Directive 525-38, *Civil Military Engagement* (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: USSOCOM, November 2012).

3. Joint Publication 3-08, *Interorganizational Cooperation* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 12 October 2016).

4. Field Manual (FM) 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 17 April 2019), 1-3—1-4. In addition, FM 3-57 defines civil affairs activities as "activities specifically planned, executed, and assessed by Civil Affairs that support the commander in order to synchronize, coordinate, and integrate indigenous populations and institutions, unified action partners, and interagency" (1-3).

5. "USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance Factsheet," U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), 1, accessed 29 May 2019, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/OFDA_Fact_Sheet.pdf. According to USAID, "USAID/OFDA leads and coordinates the U.S. Government's humanitarian assistance efforts overseas."

6. Javid Hamdard, *The State of Telecommunications and Internet in Afghanistan 6 Years Later (2006-2012)* (Washington, DC: USAID, March 2012), accessed 29 May 2019, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1871/The%20State%20of%20Telecoms%20and%20Internet%20%20in%20Afghanistan%20(2006-2012)%20Low-Res.pdf.

7. U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services–Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigation, *The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization: DOD's Fight against IEDs Today and Tomorrow* (Washington, DC: House Armed Services Committee, November 2008), accessed 29 May 2019, https://armedservices.house.gov/_cache/files/c/f/cfddccb2-fc15-4a3d-b7e3-50fe3ea68eca/D09F-0BEF55D1B39D2CC196408918781D.jieddo-report-11-08-vf.pdf.

8. "MCoE Network Engagement," Maneuver Center of Excellence, accessed 29 May 2019, https://atn.army.mil/getattachment/Network-Engagement/Network-Engagement/MCoE-Network-Engagement-Graphic.pdf?lang=en-US.

9. Karen Parrish, "CENTCOM Counters ISIL Propaganda," Department of Defense News, 6 July 2016, accessed 29 May 2019, https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/827761/centcom-counters-isil-propaganda)/.

10. U.S. Central Command, "Syrian Democratic Forces Liberate Raqqah," news release no. 17-409, 20 October 2017, accessed 29 May 2019, https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/1349047/syrian-democratic-forces-liberate-raqqah/.

11. Kevin Melton et al., "A New U.S. Framework for Stabilization: Opportunities for Civil Affairs," Small Wars Journal, accessed 29 May 2019, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/new-us-framework-stabilization-opportunities-civil-affairs?fbclid=IwAR3mff2w9bd0_YapN_0rW0_LZzL-Buy-Eiyw0Am1F9eMX6or_By58X04v7WQ.

12. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, *Stabilization: Lessons from The U.S. Experience in Afghanistan* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, May 2018), 63, accessed 29 May 2019, https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/lessonslearned/SIGAR-18-48-LL.pdf.

13. Ibid., 115–16.

14. Ibid., 91–95.

15. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028* (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 6 December 2018), 28.

16. Ibid., C-10.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid., iii.

19. Jay Liddick, Thurman "Scott" Dickerson, and Linda K. Chung, "Calibrating Civil Affairs Forces for Lethality in Large Scale Combat Operations," Small Wars Journal, accessed 29 May 2019, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/calibrating-civil-affairs-forces-lethality-large-scale-combat-operations.

Empathetic Leadership

Understanding the Human Domain

Chaplain (Maj.) John McDougall, U.S. Army

A true leader has the confidence to stand alone, the courage to make tough decisions, and the compassion to listen to the needs of others.

—Anonymous

You have just arrived to your new assignment and stepped into a key billet in a joint organization. Unlike your last job, where everyone wore the same uniform and shoulder insignia, you quickly realize the diverse experiences and expectations of your team.

Your deputy is an officer from an allied nation, and your first interaction was cold and formal, almost curt. You thought you were polite and positive, so you struggle to account for her response. You think, "Is this part of her personality or culture? Or is it just the result of a rough day? Is she like this toward everyone or just toward me?"

Your senior enlisted advisor is from a sister service, and while you really hit it off, you can sense some frustration. He is aggressive and self-confident, attributes that have served him well but are liabilities here. As you reflect, you wonder, "How does he feel about this assignment and his role in it? How does he perceive his coworkers and subordinates?"

The civilian administrative assistant has seventeen years in this command, and you are the seventh officer to hold this position during his tenure. While clearly knowledgeable and well-connected, you sense in him an air of superiority bordering on disdain. Though initially irritated, you ask yourself, "What would it be like to be in his situation? What assumptions has he made about me?"

Leadership is not easy. Each individual that we work with is a complex set of personality and experiences, hopes, and fears. While every good leader tries to get to know his or her soldiers, only the truly exceptional ones go beyond the surface level. They pay close attention to verbal and nonverbal cues, and ask tough questions to better understand the experience, perspective, and feelings of individuals. In short, they have honed and applied the skill of empathy, a critically important but often misunderstood element of leadership.

Unfortunately, while more and more professions are incorporating empathy into their practice, the U.S. military has mostly avoided the topic. Sure, it holds a small place in our leadership doctrine and in our flag officers' speeches, but we still fail to comprehend what empathy is and why it is so important for leaders. We propagate an unspoken belief that this skill is necessary only for caring professionals—doctors, nurses, clergy, and counselors—and is of no tangible benefit to the profession of arms.[1]

Yet, at its heart, empathy is about understanding people—namely how one's worldview (cognitive) and emotions (affective) drive behavior.[2] It is primarily a mental task—the detailed observation of human terrain, comparable to a commander's careful study of contour lines on a map—and thus can be developed. Former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and retired U.S. Army Gen. Martin Dempsey asserted it to be an important acquirable skill: "Effective Leaders have a sense of empathy. They listen. In listening they learn. In learning they become empathetic."[3] Like other critical skills, we will grow in empathy as we practice it.

Is there another profession that needs to grasp the complex human domain more than the military, where trust is our currency and lives hang on our decisions? How can we expect to influence and motivate diverse members of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) and multicomponent organizations to accomplish inherently emotional missions without first seeking to learn what makes them tick?[4] This article will argue that today's military leader must properly understand, develop, and apply empathy to build cohesive teams and make better decisions in future operating environments.

Understanding Empathy

To avoid the common misconceptions about empathy, it is helpful to look at its origins and recent use. Nineteenth-century German psychologist Theodore Lipps coined the term "in-feeling" to describe the ability of a counselor to imaginatively enter the thoughts, emotions, and perspectives of a client both to build rapport and gain understanding.[5] Since that time, the emphasis on empathy has expanded throughout the medical profession. Doctors and nurses try to assume the viewpoint of the patient in order to provide more considerate care. In recent years, empathy has even moved into the boardroom as corporate executives try to better understand their employees and customers. These examples are useful both for the truths they affirm and the misconceptions they dispel.

First, empathy is not about one's own feelings of sadness or overwhelming concern. The psychologist who is thinking of his or her feelings is not paying attention to those of his or her clients. As retired U.S. Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal recently explained,

Chaplain (Maj.) John McDougall, U.S. Army, is a veteran of both Iraq and Afghanistan. A West Point graduate, he has served over ten years in airborne and ranger assignments including the 173rd Airborne Brigade, the 82nd Airborne Division, and the 75th Ranger Regiment. He has a Masters of Divinity from Multnomah Biblical Seminary.

Previous page: Gen. James C. McConville, then vice chief of staff of the Army, listens to views of soldiers assigned to 6th Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, 22 July 2019, during his visit to Fort Bliss, Texas. (Photo by Spc. Matthew J. Marcellus, U.S. Army)

"Empathy is not sympathy. It doesn't mean that you rub [your soldiers'] bellies and ask them how they feel every morning. What it means is that you can see [the situation] through their eyes."[6] Military leaders must not confuse empathy with "going soft." The goal is to learn what motivates a person or group. What leader, no matter how gruff, could honestly say, "I don't want to understand my soldiers or environment better"? While sincere concern and compassion may occur as a by-product, empathy is about gaining understanding, not generating personal feelings.[7]

Nor is empathy about having shared experiences with others. It is unlikely that the doctor had the same procedure as his or her patient nor that the executive had the same purchasing experience as his or her customer, but that does not preclude them from taking an empathetic perspective. It is not necessary to "walk a mile in another man's shoes" to imagine what it might be like for an individual and respond accordingly.[8] In the military, we often have similar personal or professional experiences as our subordinates. However, the sentiment of "I know what you are going through" paradoxically inhibits empathetic learning as the leader exports his or her own thoughts and feelings into the situation, rather than looking for new insights. While commonalities can aid understanding, in truth, we learn more when we minimize apparent similarities and take a mental posture of curiosity.

The professional, therefore, applies empathy to gain understanding and make better decisions. His or her goal is not to generate sympathy nor to find common ground but to create better outcomes for those he or she serves. As psychiatrist and business consultant Prudy Gourguechon instructs, "Empathy is a neutral data-gathering tool that enables you to understand the human environment within which you are operating … and therefore make better predictions, craft better tactics, inspire loyalty, and communicate clearly."[9] If this skill can work in civilian occupations, could it also benefit the profession of arms?

Empathy in Doctrine

In 2006, while heavily engaged in stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. Army reconsidered its leadership doctrine and asked the question, "What are we missing?" After surveying the operational environment and the challenges facing commanders, it was decided to add "empathy" under the character portion of the Army Leadership Requirements Model.[10]

Was it right to do so? The inclusion of such a "soft" concept into Army leadership doctrine has puzzled and surprised military insiders and outside observers alike.[11] We still perceive it as an emotional ability rather than an analytic tool to build stronger teams and make better decisions. This collective error begins with the way we have addressed empathy in doctrine. Perhaps that is why empathy remains such a marginalized aspect of Army instruction and culture, despite regular pleas to expand its role.[12]

First, we continue to conflate empathy and sympathy; the former is a cognitive process, while the latter is an emotional reaction. The definition of empathy provided in Army Doctrine Publication 6-22, *Army Leadership*, is sound, if not simplistic: "Identifying and understanding what others think, feel, and believe."[13] However, the subsequent clarifying doctrine only muddies the issue, encouraging leaders to "genuinely relate to another person's situation" and even "share … someone else's feelings."[14] The problem with this concept of empathy is twofold: it presumes shared experiences or emotions where they may not exist, and where they do exist, it encourages the leader to go beyond being a curious observer to an emotional participant, a counseling lapse known as overidentification. Recently, this conflation was evident when a former brigade commander cautioned a class of midgrade officers that empathy is a potential weakness when one is moved to have too much compassion.[15] This statement shows a confusion of the concept since deeper understanding is never a liability. It is important to distinguish the ability to grasp the feelings, motives, and perspective of another person from one's personal, emotional response.

Second, we categorize empathy as a leader attribute (i.e., what a leader is) rather than a competency (i.e., what a leader does). The distinction is subtle but important because, for the most part, we do not train attributes, especially character attributes. We may talk about their importance and briefly assess them on evaluations, but we do not put a concentrated effort into their development. Moreover, we wrongly assume that most character traits are innate and cannot be developed. As a battalion commander told his newly arrived chaplain, "I am not very empathetic. I need your help to know when I'm being too tough."[16] While his

Vice Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Bill Moran speaks to sailors 3 August 2018 during an all-hands call at Naval Base San Diego, California. Moran also visited San Diego-based ships USS *Harpers Ferry* (LSD 49), USS *Stockdale* (DDG 106), USS *Montgomery* (LCS 8), and USS *Ardent* (MCM 12) to speak with sailors about the current and future status of the Navy as well as to receive feedback on Navy programs, policies, and procedures. (Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Nancy C. diBenedetto, U.S. Navy)

self-awareness is commendable, he chose to delegate a weakness rather than strengthen it. Perhaps this is due to our perception of empathy as an intrinsic attribute, which some possess and others lack, rather than an important skill that a leader can practice and develop.

Third, we view empathy primarily within organic military units. The emphasis in doctrine is that commanders use empathy in order to better care for soldiers, Department of the Army civilians, and families.[17] While important, this perspective is much too narrow, minimizing its utility in JIIM organizations and partnerships, as well as in the operational environment.[18] In fairness, Army leadership doctrine does hint at empathy's broader applications, including "local populations, victims of natural disasters, and prisoners of war."[19] Yet, this interpersonal skill has not expanded into other facets of doctrine relating to the human domain, from developing cohesive teams to influencing foreign populations.

Applying Empathy

A military leader can—and should—use empathy to better understand his or her formation. This applies not just to individuals but to the collective emotions, thoughts, and perspectives of subordinate units as well. If leadership is "the process of influencing people," then the ability to understand the needs and desires of others is critical to leadership.[20] This task is difficult enough with a relatively homogenous group of service members within an organic unit. It is significantly more so in a JIIM organization with, for instance, a company of Navy Seabees, a contingent of National Guard logisticians, a team of FBI agents, and a battalion of Polish paratroopers, who each have his or her own unique culture, beliefs, and goals.

In 2011, the RAND Corporation published the results of a study titled "Developing U.S. Army Officers' Capabilities for Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Environments." As a part of the research, the authors of the study interviewed over one hundred military officers and civilian officials to determine what knowledge, skills, and abilities are necessary for success in

a JIIM environment. While empathy was not specifically mentioned, the majority of respondents identified "people skills" as the most critical attribute in these situations:

> Interpersonal and other integration skills tend to be of primary importance in JIIM environments, in which success usually requires voluntary collaboration between independent organizations that are frequently pursuing different agendas.[21]

Understanding these diverse perspectives is an essential skill for a leader to possess in order to align various goals toward a common end state.

Just as a commander can use empathy to better understand his or her organization, he or she can apply the same skill to map the human terrain in the operational environment. The ancient Chinese war theorist Sun Tzu famously posited the critical importance of knowing both your enemy and yourself.[22] Surely, this principle extends beyond the science of war to the equally important human domain. Understanding the people in an area of operations—whether enemy, friendly, or neutral—require a posture of curiosity and the willingness to ask and answer empathetic questions:

- What has been their life experience to this point?
- How do they see the world and their role in it?
- What do they hope to achieve? What do they fear to lose?[23]

This type of empathy goes beyond mere cultural understanding or awareness in current operational doctrine.[24] While the study of culture can assist with empathy, it remains an outside perspective of what "they" think or believe. Empathy, in contrast, seeks to understand from the inside by temporarily seeing the world from another perspective.[25]

Furthermore, the University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, has developed an excellent, empathetic tool that helps leaders see both themselves and their adversaries, as Sun Tzu prescribed. In this model, called the "4 Ways of Seeing," an observing group asks two questions about its own perceptions: How do we see ourselves? How do we see them? This is followed by two questions about the perspective of the observed group: How do they see us? How do they see themselves?[26] This fairly simple, but challenging, exercise can help a leader to overcome his or her own bias and grasp the viewpoint of another person, the very essence of empathy. The insight derived from this interrogative process can lead to better decision-making and ultimately, success in the operational environment.

Empathy is a powerful tool for understanding the human domain, both at home and abroad. There is, however, an important step between empathy and sound decisions. Fundamentally, the ethical question is: What should I do with these empathetic insights? One option is to dismiss the new understanding and proceed without concern for the impact on others. Still another response is to weaponize empathy, using it to gain leverage against a peer or to manipulate a subordinate. Neither action is consistent with the ethical values of the U.S. Army nor does either engender a relationship built on trust, the bedrock of our profession. Those who use empathetic understanding in this way are apathetic and callous; they are the epitome of toxic leaders.

A third reaction is to apply empathetic understanding to seek the best possible outcome for all parties. While this could be motivated by compassion and concern, as we have discussed, this type of feeling is not essential. Choosing to weigh the feelings and desires of another person in decision-making could derive from any one of the three major ethical models: a responsibility to care for subordinates and others (duty ethic), an adherence to personal or collective moral ideals (virtues ethic), or a desire to improve the situation for the people involved (consequentialism). Therefore, far from being "soft," empathy is a leadership tool to gain an understanding of the human domain and make sound moral decisions that will benefit the organization and positively shape the environment.

Conclusion

Empathy is the least understood trait of the Army Leadership Requirements Model but is arguably among the most important. Since war is "a fundamentally human endeavor," it is critical that commanders understand the human domain in order to build cohesive teams based on trust and to influence foreign populations.[27] The Army needs empathetic leaders who can apply this skill to difficult leadership and operational situations.

We need, therefore, to improve and elevate the role of empathy in U.S. Army doctrine. Within leadership doctrine, we must clarify its definition as an emotionally neutral skill used to better understand people. Empathy should also have a prominent place in doctrine related to building trust, especially when the cultural differences are great as in JIIM organizations or when operating with local nationals. Furthermore, we need to expand this concept into other aspects of Army operations that could significantly benefit from empathetic insight. These include, but are not limited to, information operations, civil affairs, public affairs, regionally aligned forces, security forces assistance brigades, and intelligence preparation of the battlefield. These operations require empathetic understanding; cultural awareness alone is insufficient.

Secondly, we need to emphasize the development and evaluation of empathetic skill in leaders. In the institutional domain, we ought to take full advantage of precommissioning and Noncommissioned Officer Education System opportunities to teach young leaders what empathy is and how it enables better understanding

Previous page: Lt. Col. Lyle Bernard, 30th Infantry Regiment, a prominent figure in the second amphibious landing behind enemy lines on Sicily's north coast, provides a personal update to Lt. Gen. George S. Patton on the ground situation 10 July 1943 near Brolo, Sicily. (Photo courtesy of the National Archives)

and decisions in the human terrain. In the operational domain, we need to coach and evaluate leaders to employ empathy as part of their leadership in both garrison and the operational environment. Lastly, we must encourage the self-development of empathy by using it as an important selection criterion for command and other key leadership billets. If people are central to both leadership and warfare, we need leaders who can decipher human terrain just as well as they can interpret a map.

The human domain is complex. Army leaders need empathy to better understand the experiences, perspectives, and feelings of people and thus make better decisions. Our soldiers deserve it, and our future success depends on it. ■

Notes

Epigraph. Though commonly attributed to Gen. Douglas McArthur, the original author of this quote is unknown.

1. Harry C. Garner, "Empathy: A True Leader Skill," *Military Review* 89, no. 6 (November-December 2009): 84.
2. Roman Krznaric, *Empathy: Why It Matters, and How To Get It* (New York: Penguin, 2014), 10.
3. Martin Dempsey, "'Heads Down, Thumbs Up' Is No Way to Go Through Life. We Need Our Leaders to Show Respect, Humility, and Inclusiveness," Task and Purpose, 2 February 2018, accessed 17 March 2019, https://taskandpurpose.com/we-need-our-leaders-to-show-respect-humility-and-inclusiveness.
4. Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22, *Army Leadership* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 2012 [obsolete]), 1-2 and 1-5.
5. F. Ioannidou and V. Konstantaki, "Empathy and Emotional Intelligence: What Is It Really About?," *International Journal of Caring Sciences* 1, no. 3 (September-December 2008): 119.
6. "General Stanley McChrystal: Great Leaders Have Empathy and Discipline," Inc., video, accessed 12 February 2019, https://www.inc.com/stanley-mcchrystal/the-2-traits-military-leaders-and-entrepreneurs-share.html.
7. ADRP 6-0, *Mission Command* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 2012 [obsolete]), 2-77.
8. Prudy Gourguechon, "Empathy Is an Essential Leadership Skill—and There's Nothing Soft about It," *Forbes* (website), 26 December 2017, accessed 2 February 2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/prudygourguechon/2017/12/26/empathy-is-an-essential-leadership-skill-and-theres-nothing-soft-about-it/#5dcdd4ab2b9d.
9. Ibid.
10. Jon J. Falleson, phone interview with author, 9 January 2019.
11. Garner, "Empathy," 84.
12. Gerald F. Sewell, *Emotional Intelligence for Military Leaders: The Pathway to Effective Leadership* (self-pub., CreateSpace, 2014), 7.
13. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-22, *Army Leadership* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 2012 [obsolete]), 23.
14. ADRP 6-22, *Army Leadership*, 3-17; Field Manual 6-22, *Leader Development* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], June 2015), 7-25.
15. Group conversation with author, 28 February 2019.
16. Carson Jump, phone interview with author, 16 March 2019.
17. ADRP 6-22, *Army Leadership*, 3-17.
18. George M. Schwartz, letter to the editor on "Empathy: A True Leader Skill," *Military Review* 90, no. 1 (January-February 2010), 131.
19. ADRP 6-22, *Army Leadership*, 3-20.
20. ADP 6-22, *Army Leadership*, 3.
21. M. Wade Markel et al., "Developing U.S. Army Officers' Capabilities for Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Environments" (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2011), accessed 23 March 2018, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9631/index1.html.
22. Sun Tzu, *The Art of War: The Oldest Military Treatise in the World*, trans. Lionel Giles (Leicester, UK: Allandale Online, 2000), 11.
23. The author's questions based on the "6 Empathetic Questions" in *The Red Team Handbook*, version 9.0 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies, 2018), 85.
24. ADRP 5-0, *The Operations Process* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 2012 [obsolete]), 1-36 and 1-37.
25. Kevin R. Cutright, *Empathy for Carnivores* (monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2013), 8.
26. "4 Ways of Seeing," in *The Red Team Handbook*, 79.
27. ADP 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, July 2019), 1-4.



Female Myanmar Army soldiers march during the seventy-third Armed Forces Day parade 27 March 2018 in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar. (Photo by U Aung/Xinhua/Alamy Live News)

Integration of Women and Gender Perspective into the Myanmar Armed Forces to Improve Civil-Military Relations in Myanmar

Lt. Col. Miemie Winn Byrd, EdD, U.S. Army Reserve, Retired

For the first time in more than half a century, ninety-two female military cadets (nonmedical) graduated from Myanmar's Army Officer Training School in Yangon, Myanmar, in August 2014.[1] Since then, over four hundred female officers and seven hundred noncommissioned officers and enlisted soldiers have been placed in service within the Myanmar armed forces, officially known as the

Tatmadaw, accounting for 0.2 percent of total estimated personnel strength.[2]

Following Myanmar's independence from the British in 1948, women were largely excluded from military service (though they were recruited to the military during the 1950s to serve primarily in the medical field). Despite this, Myanmar women have held an influential and important role in their indigenous society. There is a well-known line from a William Ross Wallace poem that states, "for the hand that rocks the cradle is the hand that rules the world," meaning that women have great influence and authority.[3] Accordingly, Myanmar women have contributed significantly to the political, economic, social, and cultural development of the nation throughout its history. They traditionally have held prominent positions in the business, education, literary, and fine arts sectors. Eminent historical figures include Ludu Daw Amar, a well-respected writer, journalist, and activist; Nawin Daw Thein Tin, who organized a boycott against foreign products at the Nationalist Women's Conference; and Burmese writer, historian, and teacher Mya Sein, the sole female delegate selected to attend the 1931 Burma Round Table Conference in London.[4] Other revered and celebrated examples of women in Myanmar society include "anyeint pwe" Burmese dancer Liberty (Laybarti) Ma Mya Yin; Burmese music instructor Saw Mya Aye Kyi; founder of the weekly newspaper *Independent Weekly* Ma San Youn (whose pen name "Independent" Daw San was better known); Burmese novelist Dagon Khin Khin Lay; famous twentieth-century Burmese writer Journal Kyaw Ma Ma Lay; and, of course, State Counsellor of Myanmar Aung San Suu Kyi.[5]

Despite the glorious history of women's significant contributions to Myanmar society, modern-day Myanmar women face many barriers to fully participating in the political and security sectors, even though they make up more than half of the fifty-two million population in Myanmar. (According to the 2014 population and housing census, the female population outnumbered the male population by 4 percent [52 percent versus 48 percent].) And yet, female representation and participation in the nationwide peace negotiation process accounts for only 17 percent, significantly lagging behind the targeted 30 percent.[6] Moreover, as previously stated, women account for only 0.2 percent of the total personnel of the Myanmar armed forces.

The speed and spread of Myanmar's peace, prosperity, and progress depends on the elimination of violent conflicts in its border areas. However, bringing peace to these regions has been extremely slow (almost to a stalemate with some of the ethnic armed groups). As the peace process creeps forward at a snail's pace, the increased participation of Myanmar women should be seriously considered to quicken the stride. According to data from the Center for Foreign Relations, women and civil-society's participation in the peace negotiations increases the chance of success by 36 percent, and obtained peace is more enduring.[7] In order for Myanmar women to participate effectively in the peace process, they must be given opportunities to upgrade their capability and capacity. Opportunity to serve in the armed forces is one of the ways to elevate their capability, capacity, and experience to participate in the security sector.

The purpose of military organizations is not to improve women's equality but to win the nation's wars and prevail against enemies. Thus, Myanmar must be cognizant of this purpose when advocating for the integration of women and gender perspectives into the military. They must clearly be able to demonstrate the benefits of increased effectiveness in achieving an organization's primary purpose through the integration of women and gender perspectives. The integration of women into the military is beyond *equality*; rather, it is to improve the *quality* of the force.

During a combined military exercise in February 2018, Myanmar Commander-in-Chief of Defense Services Min Aung Hlaing explicitly stated that the Tatmadaw is in the process of building a "standard military."[8] In this effort, the Myanmar armed forces are taking major steps toward modernization of the military for increased capability and combat power. Combat power generally derives from "physical factors (the means,

Lt. Col. Miemie Winn Byrd, EdD, U.S. Army Reserve, retired, serves on the board of governors of the Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies at Claremont McKenna College as an adjunct fellow in Honolulu. She received a BA in economics and accounting from Claremont McKenna College, an MBA from University of Hawaii, and an EdD in education leadership from the University of Southern California. She served twenty-eight years in the U.S. Army Reserve as a civil affairs officer and was mobilized from 2003 to 2007.

meaning the size and materiel of the organization), conceptual factors (doctrine or the way the means are employed), and morale factors (the will of the soldiers)."[9] In this equation, many armed forces naturally tend to overemphasize hardware and equipment, and not enough on conceptual and morale factors. Integrating women and gender perspectives into the military can create opportunities to revise conceptual and morale factors and adapt organizational culture and structures to maximize effectiveness.[10] Additionally, by opening the armed forces to women, the qualified pool of candidates will increase and in return may solve the problem of recruitment shortfalls to maintain all-volunteer armed forces.

Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing (*left*), commander-in-chief of the defense services, attends a graduation ceremony August 2014 for the nearly one hundred female cadets graduating from the Defense Services Academy in Myanmar. The cadets were the first female officers to go through the program since 1961. (Photo courtesy of Myanmar Ministry of Information)

Integrating gender perspectives and women into the Myanmar military can bring additional capabilities and capacity that can improve the effectiveness of operations in the increasingly complex operational landscape. Drawing on the experience from the United States, female soldiers, sailors, and airmen of the U.S. Armed Forces have provided specific competencies and perspectives that improve the conduct of operations. An excellent example is the American female code breakers of World War II, who gave a definite advantage to the Allied forces and contributed to the victory.[11] In U.S. combat units, women have been able to increase the information gathering and analysis capabilities of units, as well as implement a gender perspective in the area of operations. For example, the female engagement teams in Iraq and Afghanistan were able to gain valuable information and intelligence because they could engage with local women and children within the area of operations, a valuable asset that Robert Egnell discusses in his paper "Women in Battle: Gender Perspectives and Fighting,"

> Gaining access to local women not only allows a unit to develop a better understanding of local conditions and culture, it can also improve the unit's relationship with the community, its perceived legitimacy, and force protection of troops.[12]

The United Nations, likewise, acknowledges that female officers and soldiers are essential for certain tasks in peace and stabilization operations. The United Nations experience has shown that the female peacekeepers are more effective at addressing the specific needs of female combatants during demobilization and reintegration. They are also more effective at interviewing survivors of gender-based violence and interacting with local women in communities where the women may not be comfortable with speaking to male peacekeepers.[13]

Given the significant role Myanmar women have played historically in the anticolonial and independence movements, they can again serve as an accelerant for building twenty-first-century professional armed forces to actualize the vision of the commander-in-chief of defense services. In other militaries, the integration of women has transformed the culture of combat units, the fabric of unit cohesion, and the way combat and violence are employed. Many organizational behavior studies

have found that diverse and inclusive teams consistently outperform homogeneous teams, especially in dealing with complex problems, because such teams "encourage greater scrutiny of each member's actions, keeping their joint cognitive resources sharp and vigilant."[14]

Myanmar military could be one of the catalysts to strengthen the country's civil-military relations since male dominance in the military was cited as one of the key contributing factors that created friction between the military and other civilian organizations, especially during humanitarian crises and armed conflicts.[17] Female military liaison officers could serve as a bridge between the military and civilian organizations. Including female service members on public affairs and civil affairs teams can also improve the Myanmar armed forces' image and its relationship within the areas of operations and surrounding communities, which can significantly contribute toward building trust at the foundational level. In a democratic system of governance, public trust is an essential component. Military organizations that are able to garner trust from the public generally enjoy legitimacy and, in turn, are able to develop a positive and cooperative civil-military relationship—an indispensable ingredient for effective national security.

"This culturally embedded belief can create a daunting obstacle for female commissioned and noncommissioned officers to achieve significant leadership positions within the male-dominated armed forces."

In order to reap the full benefits of integrating women and gender perspectives into military organizations, the implementation must include specific policies and mechanisms for women to achieve leadership and decision-maker positions within the organization. Traditionally, male-dominated organizations have certain masculine organizational cultures and structures that can serve as barriers to successful attainment of leadership and decision-maker positions for women. Pervasive and subtle second-generation bias that is embedded in stereotypes and organizational practices can disadvantage women from rising to the top.[15]

The Myanmar culture, which is inseparable from localized Buddhist religious belief, associates men with higher status than women. This association influences the way the Myanmar people in general perceive the status of men and women outside of religion. This culturally embedded belief can create a daunting obstacle for female commissioned and noncommissioned officers to achieve significant leadership positions within the male-dominated armed forces. Additionally, a lack of thoughtful accommodation for child bearing and child rearing could also create a significant drop-off point for women. Such drop-offs will further diminish already small numbers of female service members selected for higher command positions. Research has shown that a critical mass of 30 percent is needed in order to see the full benefits of female integration and gender perspective within the organization and at leadership levels.[16] However, the drop-offs and second-generation bias can impede the attainment of 30 percent.

The diversity created by integrating women into military organizations can improve an organization's performance. Increased female participation in the

The recent integration of women into the Tatmadaw is a very positive start, but more is needed to realize the full benefits. Currently, women are serving in administrative, logistics, and information communication technology roles and are restricted from operational positions. Most of them are posted in the garrison headquarters as support staff. Such limited roles do not prepare the female officers to be competitive for advancement into higher ranks and decision-maker levels. As noted in the United States, female soldiers are able to sharpen the effectiveness of stability operations, counterinsurgency operations, counterterrorism operations, and postconflict reconstruction operations. Many of the twenty-first century armed forces have successfully integrated women into their organizations. Myanmar could apply some of the lessons learned from others' experiences to integrate women effectively and reap the full benefits of their inclusion.

Gender-friendly policies at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels are required to ensure the success of the integration. At the strategic level, the Myanmar military should set interim targets for recruitment as the roadmap to reach the "magic" number, 30 percent of the total force. At the operational level, it should develop policies that will expand the role of female officers and soldiers into more military specialties to include combat positions. Policies for maternity leave and child care should be thoughtfully reviewed and upgraded. Tactical level policies should include required gender-sensitive training programs for leaders and commanders to prevent gender-based discriminations, to ensure respect for diversity, and to promote unit cohesion and morale. These policies will help prevent discrimination based on second-generation bias and will ensure the professional advancement of female soldiers. Again, many of these policies could be drawn (with some adjustments to fit the Myanmar context) from other militaries that have successfully integrated women.

Although organizational, cultural, and mindset changes are never easy and quick in any context, such changes are now extremely necessary to keep up with rapidly evolving national, regional, and global security environments. Security organizations that practice adaptability and flexibility are most likely to succeed in achieving their mission. The inclusion of women in the Myanmar armed forces can contribute toward building a twenty-first century "standard military" by leveraging impressive talent offered by more than 50 percent of the nation's citizenry. The additional skill sets and unique perspectives presented by the female military service members may be the precise element that is needed to win the peace and achieve comprehensive security for a newly democratic Myanmar in an increasingly complex security landscape. ■

Notes

1. "For First Time in 50 Years, Burma's Military Welcomes Women Officers," The Irradaddy, 29 August 2014, accessed 25 April 2019, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/first-time-50-years-burmas-military-welcomes-women-officers.html.

2. Anonymous source; "Myanmar Military Strength," Global Fire Power, accessed 25 April 2019, https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=myanmar. A total personnel strength was estimated at 406,000 by Global Fire Power.

3. William Ross Wallace, "The Hand That Rocks the Cradle Is the Hand That Rules the World," in *Beautiful Gems of Thought and Sentiment*, ed. Henry Davenport Northrop (Boston: The Collins-Patten, 1890).

4. "1931–1932: Miss May Oung (Daw Mya Sein) Attending the 1931-2 Burma Round Table Conference in London," Lost Footsteps, accessed 25 April 2019, https://lostfootsteps.org/en/history/miss-may-oung-daw-mya-sein-attending-the-1931-2-burma-round-table-conference-in-london.

5. Kin Thida Oung, *A Twentieth Century Burmese Matriarch* (self-pub., 2007), 63; Chie Ikeya, "The Life and Writings of a Patriotice Feminist: Independent Daw San of Burma," in *Women in Southeast Asian Nationalist Movements*, ed. Susan Blackburn and Helen Ting (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2013), 25 and 32.

6. "Women's Roles in Peace Processes: Explore the Data and Read In-Depth Profiles of Major Peace Processes from 1990 to Present," Council on Foreign Relations, accessed 25 April 2019, https://www.cfr.org/interactive/womens-participation-in-peace-processes/explore-the-data.

7. Ibid.

8. Shawn Crispin, "Mynamar's Military Just Wants to be Normal," Asia Times, 15 February 2018, para. 16, accessed 25 April 2019, https://cms.ati.ms/2018/02/myanmars-military-just-wants-normal/.

9. Robert Egnell, "Gender Perspectives and Military Effectiveness: Implementing UNSCR 1325 and the National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security," *PRISM* 6, no. 1 (March 2016): 76, accessed 9 October 2019, https://www.inclusivesecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Gender-Perspectives-and-Military-Effectiveness.pdf.

10. Robert Egnell, "Women in Battle: Gender Perspectives and Fighting," *Parameters* 43, no. 2 (Summer 2013): 34, accessed 9 October 2019, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/issues/Summer_2013/4_Egnell_Article.pdf.

11. Liza Mundy, *Code Girls: The Untold Story of the American Women Code Breakers of World War II* (New York: Hachette Books, 2017).

12. Egnell, "Gender Perspectives and Military Effectiveness."

13. Ibid.

14. David Rock and Heidi Grant, "Why Diverse Teams are Smarter," *Harvard Business Review* (website), 4 November 2016, para. 7, accessed 16 April 2019, https://hbr.org/2016/11/why-diverse-teams-are-smarter.

15. Herminia Ibarra, Robin J. Ely, and Deborah M. Kolb, "Women Rising: The Unseen Barriers," reprint, *Harvard Business Review*, September 2013, accessed 17 April 2019, https://hbr.org/2013/09/women-rising-the-unseen-barriers.

16. "Why Diversity and Inclusion Matter: Quick Take," Catalyst.org, 1 August 2018, accessed 28 May 2019, https://www.catalyst.org/research/why-diversity-and-inclusion-matter/.

17. Donna Winslow, "Strange Bedfellows in Humanitarian Crisis: NGOs and the Military," in *Twisting Arms and Flexing Muscles: Humanitarian Interventions and Peacebuilding in Perspective*, ed. Natalie Mychajlyszyn and Timothy M. Shaw (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2005), 116.

A paratrooper takes a selfie with his cell phone 11 December 2010 before boarding a C-17 aircraft at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Selfies have become ubiquitous among millennials and more recent generations. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Sharilyn Wells, U.S. Army)

Motivating and Educating Millennials

Sgt. Maj. Kanessa Trent, U.S. Army

Editor's note: This is an updated version of an article previously published in the April 2019 edition of the Journal of Military Learning.

Educators and senior leaders in the U.S. Army must know how to identify with, understand, and adapt to the needs of the millennial generation to ensure Army education achieves the required core objectives. Understanding the common and defining characteristics of millennials and of future generations enhances the learning environment. Understanding generational differences allows for a more informed staff and faculty. Professional military education (PME) instructors must consider generational differences and individual learning preferences for efficacy.

As of February 2019, the millennial generation comprised 82 percent of the U.S. Army, according to Headquarters, Department of the Army Personnel Military Strength Analysis and Forecasting Directorate. Moreover, millennials are the largest generation in U.S. history. Their birth years are generally accepted to run from 1980 to 2000, which totals nearly seventy-eight million live births.[1] Clearly, the characteristics and collective themes that define this generation will be important to all educators committed to tailoring their educational approach to be most effective for this generation's learning. This will require awareness of the widespread misconceptions and misunderstandings about this generation that may cause unnecessary confusion in the adult education system.[2]

Purpose and Importance

This article focuses specifically on education and generational considerations for this important segment of the U.S. Army. To properly address the learning needs of this generation, all instructors and Army leaders who are responsible for the education, training, and the professional development of soldiers throughout their careers need to understand the myths, stereotypes, and trends of millennials and the next generation of soldiers, Generation Z. Considering the overwhelming proportion of young adults in the military, integrating what is known about this and future generations of soldiers into revisions to PME and Army learning models will directly benefit soldiers, the institution, and readiness by ensuring soldiers are best prepared for current and future missions.

As S. Clinton Hinote and Timothy J. Sundvall noted, taking the time to understand the fundamental values, beliefs, and views that shape this generation will only provide better cohesion.[3] For the Army, a review of literature and subsequent qualitative and quantitative research regarding educational approaches best suited for millennials will highlight ways senior leaders can educate and motivate millennial soldiers to leverage the current generation's strengths and directly influence lifelong education requirements for the foreseeable future. Ultimately, application of appropriate educational approaches in both brick-and-mortar and distance-learning environments, whether in garrison or on the battlefield, will improve the Army's readiness as it prepares for large-scale combat operations with near-peer adversaries.

Literature Review

To identify potentially relevant literature, the keyword search included academic and peer-reviewed databases related to education and millennials. The search included the following key terms: millennials, Generation Y, Generation Z, generation gaps, adult education, motivation, learning models, U.S. Army, lifelong learning, change in adult education landscape, technology and education, Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development System, and workplace education. These terms allowed for a comprehensive examination of the literature, research, studies, and exploration of the millennial generation to provide recommendations to advance the U.S. Army's approach to educating millennials who currently make up the preponderance of the active duty force.

The libraries and databases used to gather information, studies, research, and literature included the Pennsylvania State University Online Library; ERIC (ProQuest); ProQuest Education Journals; Google Scholar; El Paso Public Library Westside Branch; Amazon Books; the U.S. Army's homepage and subsequent databases; and Headquarters, Department of the Army G-1 (personnel) database and intranet portal.

This search focused on literature published since 2006 to conduct a current analysis of the millennial generation's educational practices, desire to learn, and classroom behaviors specific to lifelong learning. An exhaustive review of early research beginning shortly after the first millennials were born, 1980

Sgt. Maj. Kanessa Trent, U.S. Army, has served in a variety public affairs positions from brigade to four-star command. She currently teaches in the Department of Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational at the Sergeants Major Course. She holds a master's degree in adult education and lifelong learning from Pennsylvania State University, a master's degree in leadership studies from the University of Texas–El Paso, and a BS in journalism with a double minor in marketing and mass communication from Thomas Edison State University. She has deployed to Haiti, Panama, Bosnia, and Afghanistan, as well as to more than a dozen countries across the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Trent was the Department of the Army's 2002 Journalist of the Year.

being the earliest, was also important in establishing, reviewing, and highlighting trends over time specific to this group of adult learners.

The literature review examined the significant work of education pioneers and other subject-matter experts in the field of adult education. Specifically, David A. Kolb provided the initial theoretical foundation for experiential learning, while *The Handbook of Adult and Continuing Education* provided the context, the history, and current philosophies surrounding experiential learning and adult education.[4] Finally, William Strauss and Neil Howe's book *Generations: The History of America's Future, 1584 to 2069*, provided information for this article regarding understanding generational differences and how they affect learning and motivation over time.[5]

Comparative Methods of Analysis: Who Are the Millennials?

Understanding the characteristics of millennials identified through empirical studies helps to understand how the nuances of generational differences impact learning.

The idea of generational differences was introduced in Strauss and Howe.[6] The authors present a model based on the assumption that the year they were born and the generation in which they were raised form a person's approach to everything in life. Each generation has distinctive frames of reference, including values, attitudes, and traits that influence how they see work, life, and health.[7]

It is important to understand the generation's perspectives and trends regarding motivation and education. Specifically, these are significant considerations for the Army as it strives to motivate and educate millennials. Strauss and Howe and other social philosophers define a generation as a cohort group with common traits and characteristics.[8] Strauss and Howe expand and "base the length of a generational cohort-group on the length of a phase of life."[9]

The millennials are the largest generation in U.S. history with nearly seventy-eight million young adults born between 1980 and 2000.[10] Although the term "millennials" is the generally accepted designation for this generation, other terms are also widely used: Generation Y, Generation iY, Generation Z, the Digital Generation, the Internet Generation, Nexters, Screenagers, Bridgers, Electronic Natives, the Net Generation, and the Sunshine Generation.[11] Even within this group, nuanced differences exist between the first and second decades as a result of pervasive access to digital technology.

Thom S. Rainer and Jess Rainer conducted a study that included 1,200 millennials in the United States; the research included only those born in the first decade (1980–1991) of the generation.[12] The research participants were demographically representative of the U.S. millennials population as a whole. The findings coincide with similar research studies showing that millennials are multitaskers and tech savvy, desirous of instant gratification and recognition, and focused on work-life balance and flexibility, collaboration, and career advancement. In addition, millennials have unique learning differences that require development to be aligned with their needs.[13]

The Rainer and Rainer study identified some overarching characteristics about this generation and what it collectively values.[14] Its findings suggest that millennials are a generation that have tremendous hope for the future. Three out of four millennials believe it is their role in life to serve others.[15] Additionally, they are a generation that, as a whole, want to make a positive difference for the future on a grand scale.[16] That millennials are the "trophy generation" (where everyone gets a trophy) and that they have been raised by "helicopter parents" (parents who hover and help oversee every decision they make) influenced their view of themselves, of the world, and of what is possible. This generation was told routinely they were special; that the individuals of this generation were the "wanted" generation of children and were therefore raised to believe they could become anything that they want, no matter what their natural abilities or their limitations. As a consequence, they are generous, adventurous, protected, sheltered, and diverse, and yet they tend to be incredibly harmonious. They view themselves as civic-minded peacekeepers and have a strong desire to achieve greatness for themselves and their communities. They work well in teams, and they thrive in groups and on teamwork because they have been raised to believe that is the best way to approach anything and everything—from sports to schoolwork. This generation expects problems to be solved in a participatory and collective manner.[17] Millennials value diversity (racial and cultural) and push for tolerance and equality more so than generations before them; they firmly believe in openness and acceptance. Rainer and Rainer further noted that "the

Millennials represent the most racially and ethnically diverse nation in America's history."[18]

A 2008 research project titled "Gaining the Edge: Connecting with the Millennials" echoes those common cohort characteristics and considers the impact on U.S. Air Force recruiters.[19] When collectively assessing how the U.S. Army recruits millennials and expects a commitment of lifelong learning, understanding how best to educate this generation, and the next, has great importance for the institution.

Millennials in the U.S. Army

With 82 percent of the U.S. Army from the millennial generation, the characteristics and collective themes that define it are important to all Army educators. This includes awareness of widespread misconceptions and misunderstandings about this generation that cause unnecessary confusion in the adult education arena.[20]

Table 1 provides the breakdown of the active duty Army force numbers in several categories. The top half shows the number of total soldiers in the active duty Army as of 28 February 2019. The breakdown is specific to gender, enlisted soldiers, commissioned officers, warrant officers, and cadets (who will commission following college graduation). The total active duty Army force numbers for each category respectively are highlighted for a collective total of 470,623 soldiers. Millennial soldiers, born between 1 January 1980 and 31 December 2000, total 410,308 soldiers, or 82 percent of the active duty Army's current force.

Table 1. Breakdown of Millennials in Active Duty Army as of 28 February 2019

Total active duty Army force

	Female	Male	Total
Enlisted	54,100	320,940	375,040
Commissioned officers	14,674	62,236	76,910
Warrant officers	1,362	12,797	14,159
Cadets	1,038	3,476	4,514
Total	**71,174**	**399,449**	**470,623**

Millennials

	Female	Male	Total
Enlisted	50,271	293,920	344,191
Commissioned officers	10,904	42,658	53,562
Warrant officers	824	7,693	8,517
Cadets	879	3,159	4,038
Total	**62,878**	**347,430**	**410,308**

(Table by author; information provided by Headquarters, Department of the Army Personnel Military Strength Analysis & Forecasting Directorate)

U.S. Army's Projected Population in 2025

Table 2 (on page 44) highlights the projected population for the active duty Army force numbers in the year 2025. The table is categorized into four generations—baby boomers, Generation X, millennials, and Generation Z—who will serve either as enlisted soldiers, officers, or cadets in 2025. The chart shows both the numbers and percentages for each category. This includes those who would serve from Generation Z (those with a date of birth between 1 January 2000 and 31 December 2019). This breakdown projects the numbers for each category, respectively, with a collective total of 490,000 soldiers. In 2025, enlisted soldiers are expected to make up 45.1 percent, while officers are projected to make up 20.4 percent of all the force. Most notable is that 100 percent of cadets—those in

Table 2. Projected Population of Active Duty Army for Calendar Year 2025 as of 28 February 2019

Total Army force projections 2025					
	Birth years	**Age range in 2025**	**Enlisted**	**Officers**	**Cadets***
Baby boomers	1940–1959	66–85	—	—	—
Generation X	1960–1979	46–65	2.2%	7.5%	—
Millennials	1980–1999	26–45	52.7%	72.1%	—
Generation Z	2000–2019	6–25	45.1%	20.4%	100.0%
Millennials	1980–1999	—	208,792	64,383	—
Total force	—	—	**396,190**	**89,297**	**4,513**

(Table by author; information provided by Headquarters, Department of the Army Personnel Military Strength Analysis & Forecasting Directorate; *projected)

college—will be from the next generation by 2025. It is important to note that the *National Defense Strategy* could change this projection, given the need for the Army to grow or decrease in size in the next eight years.

Motivating and Educating Future Generations and Implications for Education

The millennials are on track to become the United States' most educated generation. In 2007, the twenty-five- to twenty-nine-year-old age group was entirely comprised of millennials, and 30 percent had attained a college degree.[21] This has significant implications and impacts for the readiness of the U.S. Army as well as the education process and learning styles of these millennial student-soldiers. The autonomy expected of student-soldiers in a learning environment, especially given the emphasis on the Army's learning model, may be a challenge with this generation.[22]

Millennials appreciate big-picture understanding, new information, and rapid application to help them learn quickly and perform well on the job. Millennials wish to understand the context and motivations behind the learning requests of others in order to commit to learning. The overall view of materials empowers them to determine how much time they will invest in new learning and how engaged they will be in the process. Additionally, Kevin S. Thompson discusses the need for this generation to have learning support preferences due to their upbringing with "helicopter parenting" and the need to understand the immediate application of acquiring new knowledge.[23] Millennials typically prefer not to be detailed and in-depth in their educational pursuits. In fact, millennials are focused on what they want to learn and why and are quite interested in applying new knowledge to work with significant discussion.[24]

As the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) looks for new, creative, and cost-effective ways to create an environment of continuous education, having a baseline understanding of what individually motivates these generations will ensure PME and Army Leader Development Program courses evolve to meet the needs of the organization specific to the majority of the soldier-student population. Specifically, creating interactive and entertainment-based educational tools, rather than the prescriptive and individually focused self-structured development curriculum that is meant to force soldiers to continually educate, is a likely output of developing and improving senior leaders' understanding and appreciation for generations that are much different than their own.

Millennials prefer having the option to learn independently or in small groups to deepen their

understanding of new information. Thompson notes that millennials focus on what they want to learn and expect to be told upfront the important application of the curriculum.[25] Without an understanding of the value of the learning, millennials may disengage from the learning process prior to meeting established learning objectives. While they value independent learning in some contexts, complete independence is not a characteristic that they cherish.[26] This is important for educators to recognize because this generation requires substantial and "significant discussion" before applying new knowledge to work and respond well to "structured content delivery and the ability to resubmit work to improve grades."[27] This also has significant implications for course curriculum designers in classroom, distance learning, and blended learning environments. For those who educate student-soldiers in the U.S. Army, recognizing this trait is important because social and cognitive presence as well as autonomy will all be affected.

To establish healthy training and educational programs that contribute to the well-being of organizations, the learning styles, values, and preferences of each generation must be considered.[28] Laura Holyoke and Erick Larson's findings "showed that teachers and trainers of adult learners need to be aware of generational characteristics when developing lesson plans and training materials. Combining generational understanding with current adult learner theory provides a unique teaching as well as learning experience."[29] Holyoke and Larson also looked at readiness to learn, orientation to learning, and motivation to learn.[30] Of particular interest and worthy of consideration is the suggestion that teachers allow students to personalize their assignments so that they are relevant to their real-life situation and employment. Additionally, Thompson discusses the need for this generation to have learning support preferences due to their upbringing with hovering parents and the need to understand the immediate application of acquiring new knowledge.[31] Thompson's research found that millennials respond well and may perform better when a learning support system is in place.[32]

Experiential Learning and Millennials

Army leadership recognized education curriculum and delivery needed to be redesigned in order to match the decentralized decision-making processes used on the battlefield and in garrison. To ensure readiness and survivability in situations involving life or death, soldiers must possess the necessary skills and resources to critically analyze information and make sound decisions. Therefore, the Army redesigned its approach to formal education. The Army learning concept (ALC) is outlined in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-2, *The U.S. Army Learning Concept for 2015*. The approach to education focuses primarily on adaptability and readiness.

> The model would develop adaptable Soldiers and leaders who have the cognitive, interpersonal, and cultural skills necessary to make sound judgments in complex environments. The model must have an adaptive development and delivery system, not bound by brick and mortar, but one that extends knowledge to Soldiers at the operational edge is capable of updating learning content rapidly and is responsive to Operational Army needs. The model must be capable of sustained adaptation.[33]

This idea was a dramatic shift for the U.S. Army from teacher-centered to learner-centered environments and focuses on the experiences of student-soldiers and how they can critically apply knowledge in real-world situations. The ALC closely models David Kolb's experiential learning theory.[34] In practice, the ALC is applied as the Army Learning Model (ALM), defined as follows:

> The Army's adaptive, continuous learning model that is routinely improved to provide quality, relevant, and effective learning experiences through outcome-oriented instructional strategies that foster thinking, initiative, and provide operationally relevant context which extends learning beyond the learning institution in a career-long continuum of learning through the significantly expanded use of network technologies.[35]

The U.S. Army currently uses the ALM to design, develop, and implement professional military education courses. Redesigned PME curriculum extends learning beyond the institution by incorporating blended learning environments through which student-soldiers are able to engage in formal education without the

traditional access restrictions of regardless of time or distance. As a result, lifelong learning is no longer merely a slogan or catchphrase; it is an apt description of soldiers' expectations and instituted measures to ensure continual professional learning and development.

Kolb's learning theory incorporates four learning styles: accommodating, diverging, converging, and assimilating.[36] Understanding learning styles is important not just for individual students but also for the instructor. An understanding of learning styles allows the facilitators to create a learning environment that is respectful of every student; open to all students' ideas, ways of thinking, and experiences; and considerate of how every person learns differently. The ALM and Kolb's experiential learning theory help the instructor establish such a classroom environment, one in which each student feels comfortable sharing and debating ideas to pave the way for a better noncommissioned officer corps and Army. Specifically, the instructor must ensure that each student feels valued and contributes routinely regardless of the topic or subject matter. To accomplish this, facilitators not only must gain commitment from their students to actively engage in the learning process but also must show that, as educators, they too are devoted to improving their knowledge, intellectual abilities, and their overall growth in learning alongside the student-soldiers. The teacher can assist every student's journey and success by encouraging creativity, critical thinking, honest dialogue, and meaningful and facts-based debates to help shape a more strategic assessment of whatever topic is being taught. The ALM allows for experiences to inform the subject matter and drive student-centered, dialogue-directed learning.

Fostering creativity in employees (soldiers and student-soldiers) is a useful and effective way to maintain readiness and competitiveness for the organization. To accomplish its mission, the Army must be capable of adapting to the ever-changing operational requirements. To do that, ensuring employee creativity, enthusiasm, and critical thinking must be a priority. George Lazaroiu states that when workers are enthusiastic about their work for the sake of the work itself, rather than being motivated by the expectation that their work will bring about some kind of reward, the results are better.[37] Motivating student-soldiers throughout their lifelong learning process in the Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development System program is a cornerstone of effective education practice.

“Facilitators not only must gain commitment from their students to actively engage in the learning process but also must show that, as educators, they too are devoted to improving their knowledge, intellectual abilities, and their overall growth in learning alongside the student-soldiers.”

Deborah L. Roberts, Lori R. Newman, and Richard M. Schwartzstein conducted extensive research into the intergenerational tension between teachers and learners in the medical profession education.[38] Collectively, they offer twelve tips for facilitating millennials' learning. Key recommendations include understanding the concept of generational differences and the potential intergenerational tension that may impact learning. The data also recognized that, unlike previous generations, millennials require constant guidance and reminders to apply critical thinking skills. Specifically, the authors note that this generation of learners are used to fun, game-like, interactive, and engaging materials that often have an appealing look and feel.[39]

It is important to note that not all researchers on the subject agree with the assertion that the attributes and characteristics of this generation are altogether different from previous generations. Specifically, some contend that the tenets of motivation in the classroom remain largely unchanged. The challenge is ensuring educators and administrators understand millennials and how to connect with them to best motivate and subsequently educate them. However, this does not necessarily require new approaches toward motivation. For example, Raymond A. Katzell and Donna E. Thompson examined various

A soldier with 1st Squadron, 32nd Cavalry Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), operates his character within the *Virtual Battlespace System* 12 February 2015 during a training event at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. The intent of the event is to provide soldiers with intelligence training to better provide feedback while on patrols. (Photo by Sgt. Samantha Parks, U.S. Army)

motivational theories and practices, and they created a chart of useful and sensible approaches that are still immensely relevant to motivating learners in the classroom.[40]

Application/Recommendations for Research/Implications

There are numerous recommendations for continued research specific to how millennials learn and what motivates them to do so.

TRADOC should continue to look at this generation from a PME angle and consider the implications of how the institution as a whole is reacting to "how" it is teaching and the "who"—the target population of millennials. Another consideration is to have the Center of Army Lessons Learned begin consolidating operational feedback from the combat training centers and the centers of excellence across the Army to look at new initiatives in education. One example might include looking at how unit organization leadership at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, has encouraged the use of Khan Academy (an educational organization that provides free instructional videos on various subjects for students and educators) as a method to reach its younger generation. TRADOC should consider the benefits of this practice, which incurs no cost to the government. The potential benefit may yield and codify best practices that have emerged to share across the entire Army force. Additionally, designing curriculum that leverages various digital technologies to connect with, even entertainment-based mediums, advances the knowledge of soldiers, and builds on their experiences to be more critical thinkers and leaders, which must be a top priority for educators in the U.S. Army.

Furthermore, the individuals of Generation Z, the next generation of soldiers, are currently in their early teen years. Understanding what that cohort expects from an education perspective is critical for the Army. Research predicts that Generation Z might create a disruption in higher education: "It is anticipated that

Gen Zers will continue to prefer practical and hands-on learning given their desire for meaningful experiences. This predisposition will continue to raise the bar on active learning classrooms and pedagogy."[41]

Edutainment

According to Eric P. Werth and Loredana Werth, one of the best ways to motivate and educate millennials is through the use of gaming technology in the classroom, both in the traditional sense and online.[42] Interestingly, the authors highlight the U.S. Army's "America's Army" education program to assist with recruiting as one of the most prominent and effective ways to integrate the skill sets and know-how of gaming into the academic environment. The authors note that America's Army was developed in 2002 in order to directly pursue the target audience of potential recruits—millennials. In fact, others who work within TRADOC have noted the importance of incorporating what has been termed "edutainment" as a primary source of reaching this generation of student-soldiers.

Keith Ferguson, an instructional designer for TRADOC, wrote in a December 2016 article that the Army needs to embrace "edutainment," a term he defines as a combination of education and entertainment, which the Walt Disney Company began using in 1948.[43] He further explains that "Disney was attempting to educate as well as entertain at a time when many other educational products such as filmstrips, movies, and other multimedia forms were primarily focused on education and information."[44] Ferguson adds that for millennials, learning is most effective when it is entertaining, and "if the content and delivery of education is not entertaining enough, it may not be appreciated or valued."[45] Others experts in education echo this sentiment and suggest the following:

> Those involved in education or training at any level must be both cognizant of the characteristics of Millennials and competent in the educational practices shown to be effective with this generation. Instructors should take it upon themselves to research the Millennial generation and develop plans on how their current practices could be altered to better meet the needs of these individuals.[46]

Clearly, not all classroom presentations can be edutainment based. However, where appropriate, incorporation of these ideas can enhance learning and increase retention by making learning fun and memorable.

Conclusion

Millennials currently make up the significant majority of the U.S. Army and will continue to do so for the next twenty years. Understanding the keys to educating and motivating this generation is imperative for the growth and development of soldiers as well as the readiness of the Army itself in order to retain its best and brightest. Designing curriculum that leverages various digital technologies, even entertainment-based media, to connect with, advance the knowledge of, and build on soldiers' experiences to be more critical thinkers and leaders must be a top priority for the leaders in this organization. Holding tight to practices of the past limits the Army's ability to create a true learning environment and a mentality of lifelong learning in its members. Willingness to understand, appreciate, and value the millennial generation's ways of absorbing and applying new information is essential in maintaining competitiveness, adaptability, flexibility, and evolution for soldiers and the U.S. Army as a whole. ■

Notes

1. Thom S. Rainer and Jess Rainer, *The Millennials: Connecting to America's Largest Generation*, 1st ed. (Nashville: B & H, 2011).

2. Eric P. Werth and Loredana Werth, "Effective Training for Millennial Students," *Adult Learning* 22, no. 3 (2011): 12–19, https://doi.org/10.1177%2F104515951102200302.

3. S. Clinton Hinote and Timothy J. Sundvall, "Leading Millennials: An Approach that Works," *Air & Space Power Journal* 29, no. 1 (2015): 131–38, accessed 23 August 2019, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ/journals/Volume-29_Issue-1/C-Hinote_Sundvall.pdf.

4. David A. Kolb, *Experiential Learning: Experience as the Source of Learning and Development* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Financial Times Press, 1984); Carol E. Kasworm, Amy D. Rose, and Jovita M. Ross-Gordon, eds., *Handbook of Adult and Continuing Education* (Los Angeles: Sage, 2010).

5. William Strauss and Neil Howe, *Generations: The History of America's Future, 1584 to 2069*, 1st ed. (New York: William Morrow, 1992).

6. Ibid.

7. Karen Denard Goldman and Kathleen Jahn Schmalz, "Builders, Boomers, Busters, Bridgers: Vive la (Generational) Difference!,"

Health Promotion Practice 7, no. 2 (2006): 159–61, https://doi.org/10.1177/1524839906286595.

8. Strauss and Howe, *Generations*.

9. Ibid., 60.

10. Rainer and Rainer, *The Millennials*.

11. Tim Elmore, *Generation iY: Our Last Chance to Save Their Future*, 1st ed. (Atlanta: Poet Gardener, 2010); Paula Garcia and Jingjing Qin, "Identifying the Generation Gap in Higher Education: Where Do the Differences Really Lie?," *Journal of Online Education* 3, no. 4 (April/May 2007), accessed 23 August 2019, http://nsuworks.nova.edu/innovate; Rainer and Rainer, *The Millennials*; Strauss and Howe, *Generations*.

12. Rainer and Rainer, *The Millennials*.

13. Kevin S. Thompson, "Organizational Learning Support Preferences of Millennials," *New Horizons in Adult Education & Human Resource Development* 28, no. 4 (2016): 15–27, https://doi.org/10.1002/nha3.20158.

14. Rainer and Rainer, *The Millennials*, 6–7.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid., 80.

19. Kay A. Smith, "Gaining the Edge: Connecting with the Millennials" (research report, Montgomery, AL: Air War College, Air University, 2008), accessed 23 August 2019, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a540122.pdf.

20. Werth and Werth, "Effective Training for Millennial Students."

21. Rainer and Rainer, *The Millennials*, 3.

22. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet (TP) 525-8-2, *The U.S. Army Learning Concept for 2015* (Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC, 2011 [obsolete]), 46.

23. Thompson, "Organizational Learning Support Preferences of Millennials."

24. Ibid., 23.

25. Ibid.

26. Rainer and Rainer, *The Millennials*.

27. Thompson, "Organizational Learning Support Preferences of Millennials," 22.

28. Laura Holyoke and Erick Larson, "Engaging the Adult Learner Generational Mix," *Journal of Adult Education* 38, no. 1 (2009): 12–21, accessed 26 August 2019, https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/EJ891074.pdf.

29. Ibid., 18.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. TP 525-8-2, *The U.S. Army Learning Concept for 2015*, 16.

34. Kolb, *Experiential Learning*; Alice Y. Kolb and David A. Kolb, "Learning Styles and Learning Spaces: Enhancing Experiential Learning in Higher Education," *Academy of Management Learning & Education* 4, no. 2 (2005): 193–212, accessed 23 August 2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/40214287.pdf.

35. TP 525-8-2, *The U.S. Army Learning Concept for 2015*, 46.

36. Alice Y. Kolb and David A. Kolb, *The Kolb Learning Style Inventory*, Version 3.1 2005 Technical Specifications, Case Western Reserve University (Boston: Hay Group, Hay Resources Direct, 2005), 44.

37. George Lazaroiu, "Work Motivation and Organizational Behavior," *Contemporary Readings in Law and Social Justice* 7, no. 2 (2015): 66–75.

38. Deborah L. Roberts, Lori R. Newman, and Richard M. Schwartzstein, "Twelve Tips for Facilitating Millennials' Learning," *Medical Teacher Journal* 34, no. 4 (2012): 274–78, doi.org/10.3109/0142159X.2011.613498.

39. Ibid.

40. Raymond A. Katzell and Donna E. Thompson, "Work Motivation: Theory and Practice," *American Psychologist* 45, no. 2 (1990): 144–53.

41. Persis C. Rickes, "Generations in Flux: How Gen Z Will Continue to Transform Higher Education Space," *Planning for Higher Education* 44, no. 4 (July-September 2016): para. 60.

42. Werth and Werth, "Effective Training for Millennial Students."

43. Keith H. Ferguson, "That's Edutainment: Connecting with the Youngest Generations of Soldiers," *Association of the United States*, 13 December 2016, para. 7, accessed 26 August 2019, https://www.ausa.org/articles/%E2%80%99s-edutainment-connecting-youngest-generations-soldiers.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid., para. 6.

46. Werth and Werth, "Effective Training for Millennial Students."

Military Transformation

Effort and Institutional Commitment

Col. Paul E. Vera Delzo, Peruvian Army

Soldiers from the Peruvian Army's 1st Multipurpose Brigade carrying a simulated casualty 10 May 2018 during a multisector earthquake response exercise in Peru. (Photo courtesy of Ministry of Defense of Peru)

At the beginning of 2019, Gen. Jorge Céliz Kuong, commanding general of the Peruvian Army, declared that institutional transformation had begun. This news is of great importance to the members of this military institution since this process will entail changes that will impact not only the future of the organization but also the careers of its personnel. Nevertheless, a lack of knowledge about what an institutional transformation means could generate doubts and resistance. It is thus essential to define its meaning and differentiate it from terms such as reengineering and modernization, which are often mistakenly used instead.

The commander of the Peruvian Army, Gen. Jorge Orlando Céliz Kuong, gives a presentation February 2019 at U.S. Army South about the vision, direction, and transformation process of the Peruvian army. (Photo by Marcos Ommati, *Diálogo Americas*)

This article examines the meaning of military transformation, differentiating it from other processes that also involve changes; offers a proposal consisting of coherent steps to follow in order to achieve the aim of transformation; and intends to generate ideas and options for strategic leaders involved in institutional transformation.

Understanding the Meaning

Reengineering, modernization, and transformation are processes that involve changes for the institution implementing them. These terms must not be confused since each of them involves a different magnitude, impact, purpose, and scope (see figure 1, page 53).

On the one hand, reengineering is a management tool through which the internal processes of an enterprise are revised and radically designed, thereby obtaining significant improvements in productivity, speed, costs, and quality, among other benefits.[1] However, what reengineering does not necessarily reflect is whether the organization is in a position to face future changes within the strategic environment. In other words, after conducting an appropriate reengineering process, the organization could improve its business, yet it may not necessarily be in the right business. In fact, many enterprises have ceased to exist by failing to anticipate changes in the strategic environment.

On the other hand, military modernization is a process that seeks to reduce gaps in existing capabilities, providing qualitatively improved capabilities and reducing the institution's costs. Consequently, this process entails the replacement of existing military technology with significantly more capable technology.[2] Yet modernization is more than the simple acquisition of modern materiel, given that attainment of increased military effectiveness demands that the new materiel must be properly linked to an appropriate organization, concept of operations, set of tactics, command-and-control systems, and supporting infrastructure, among other things.[3] In other words, military modernization implies changes in the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy of the institution. Nevertheless, these changes are not as radical as those generated during a military transformation, particularly with regard to organizational culture.

The Royal Spanish Academy, the official institution of the Spanish language, defines the word "transformation" as the action and effect of transforming, that is to change someone or something in form, converting it into something else.[4] For this reason, the term "military transformation" is commonly understood as the "profound change" of a military institution, a term not attributed to the making of modest improvements.[5] In this regard, the U.S. Department of Defense defines military transformation as "a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people, and organizations."[6] Military transformation is therefore a long-term progression that involves new concepts, doctrine, processes,



(Figure by author)

Figure 1. Processes that Involve Change

capabilities, organizations, technology, and trained personnel to handle these changes but principally involves a profound change in the organizational culture.[7]

Several factors must be evaluated to determine the type of change that an organization needs. While some institutions only require reengineering to improve their processes or modernization to close gaps and develop better capabilities, other institutions require a transformation in order to accomplish profound changes and create a new institution capable of successfully facing the future challenges of the strategic environment. Undoubtedly, reengineering and modernization should be considered during a transformation process but not vice versa.

The Way to Follow

Although scientific advances contribute to the development of new technologies, which in turn have unequivocal and beneficial effects upon humanity, these can also lead to new security threats. Currently, in order to be effective, states must face new challenges and threats through the rational use of all elements of national power. For that purpose, armed forces must be prepared not only to face the new challenges and threats to national security but also to effectively fulfill the complementary roles assigned by a state. Consequently, the fulfillment of new roles and technological advances force military institutions to be engaged in either modernization or transformation processes that allow them to support the achievement of a state's objectives.

Although military transformation may be the firm intention of a military institution, this process will only begin with the consent of the country's top political decision-makers. All transformation requires the allocation of additional resources that allow for profound changes, especially in the area of modernization. For this reason, the military transformation begins with a political decision and with the allocation of resources that allow its implementation.[8]

Likewise, the transformation of a military institution cannot be planned and executed outside the framework of an integral transformation of the defense sector, which includes the transformation not only of all military

services but also the organization or command that groups them during the planning and execution of joint operations.[9] However, some questions must be raised: How is this military transformation achieved? What steps must be followed?

To address these questions, based on the experience of military institutions executing similar processes, the following eight logical steps, depicted in figure 2, are presented to achieve a successful military transformation.



(Figure by author)

Figure 2. Steps to Achieve a Military Transformation

Step 1: Reaffirm Values

The strategic leaders of a military institution play a key role in the process of military transformation; therefore, knowledge and good practice of strategic leadership are fundamental to the success of this process. Strategic leadership is defined as "the process used by a leader to affect the achievement of a desirable and clearly understood vision by influencing the organizational culture, allocating resources, directing through policy and directive, and building consensus."[10]

Leading change is one of the main responsibilities of the strategic leader. If the environment is changing at an increasingly faster pace, strategic leaders need to develop organizations that can change quickly to align with the environment. Nevertheless, leading change is not an easy task, especially because it may face resistance from those accustomed to the current system. To overcome this resistance, strategic leaders must reaffirm the values of the military institution. Emphasizing values, people, a sense of commitment, and service to the nation helps personnel understand that the essence of the institution will not change.

To this end, the institution needs to reinvest itself in a profound sense of its own values, reinforcing its commitment to a solid ethical foundation.[11] Likewise, it is imperative to identify those values that help the organization to prosper, since values grant the strength, direction, and stability required during periods of confusion and modification. The essential truth is that leadership is based on values; however, when dissonance exists between declared values and those actually practiced by leaders, rejection and a lack of trust result among members of the organization.

Step 2: Define the Vision

Stephen J. Gerras, editor of *Strategic Leadership Primer*, indicates that strategic leaders "must be agile enough to learn from the past, adapt to current circumstances, and anticipate the future"—one of the greatest challenges that strategic leaders face.[12] Even though the future cannot be predicted, strategic leaders must explore scenarios or plausible hypotheses about how the environment might evolve. In other words, it is critical to craft a context within which an institution can properly perform to create its own future. First, the future must exist in the strategic leader's mind before it can be proactively communicated to the organization. This intellectual change guides the physical change of the transformation. Without this initial work of intellectual change, the physical change will become unfocused and have a reduced probability of success.[13]

The term "vision" suggests the elaboration of a mental image of what the organization will look like in the future. Vision provides not only a sense of identity but also a sense of purpose, direction, and motivation to the members and activities of an organization.[14] Consequently, the defining vision must be one of the

first steps required to execute an institutional transformation. Once the vision is expressed, the methods and resources to achieve it must be identified.[15]

Values and vision facilitate change, innovation, and growth while providing members of an organization with a foundation against which they can act, learn, and progress. The creation of vision is a collaborative effort that begins with strategic leaders.[16] For this purpose, the strategic leader is normally supported by a technical group within the organization. Once the leader approves and appropriates the vision, it must be communicated and clearly understood by its organizational members.

Step 3: Create a Team

Another major challenge in the development of military transformation is the need to think of the future while simultaneously attending to current problems in the organization. During the transformation process, the institution does not cease to function, and the principal effort of its leaders is normally focused on tackling daily matters. On this point, it is necessary to observe that assigning the tasks of leading and synchronizing the efforts of a transformation to an existing directorate within an institution will create work overload.

Strategic leaders cannot transform the institution alone. Creating the future is a team effort. For this reason, the strategic leader must create a new organization focused exclusively on the future and the attainment of institutional transformation. This new organization, integrated with civil and military experts in different areas, must provide the unity of command and unity of effort needed to promote agility in the process of transformation and to synchronize the actions of all actors involved. Similarly, as in the case of the Colombian national army's "Transformation Command for the Future" (created in 2015) and the U.S. Army's Futures Command (created in 2018), this new organization will need to depend directly on the strategic leader of the institution, because it will be responsible for articulating the future of the military institution and for providing continuity to the process. The placement of this organization within the structure of the institution will be a clear indicator of its importance and priority.

Step 4: Change the Organizational Culture

Military transformation principally engages significant changes in the organizational culture (e.g., beliefs, habits, values, attitudes, and traditions existing in the military institution). Without a doubt, the most important and difficult change to achieve is the change in mentality of the members of the institution. Transformation should facilitate a culture that fosters leadership, education, organization, processes, values, and attitudes that promote meaningful innovation.[17] This process creates new areas and competences in a way that allows its constituents to identify or create new ways of doing things.

As manifested by Gordon R. Sullivan and Michael V. Harper, authors of *Hope Is Not a Method: What Business Leaders Can Learn from America's Army*, the change must first happen within the minds of the people; only then can it be applied to the structures, processes, performances, and results of the organization.[18] Consequently, it can be affirmed that institutional transformation begins with changes in the organizational culture. For this purpose, the nature of the new organizational culture must be defined to answer some essential questions: What are the new values, beliefs, and assumptions that must be adopted by members of the organization? What new behaviors will lead to these changes in culture?

Once culture is defined, efforts should focus on identifying and implementing those actions that allow this change to materialize. The shift of culture in mature organizations such as military institutions is very difficult since it requires time, great effort, and perseverance. To allow this process, Edgar Schein, contributor to *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, proposes a method to systematically embed and reinforce a culture.[19] Embedding mechanisms place the assumptions (values, beliefs, etc.) in the organization while reinforcing mechanisms support these assumptions. Both mechanisms are important and useful if employed jointly. For example, a commander who discerns the

Col. Paul E. Vera Delzo, Peruvian Army liaison officer to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, holds master's degrees from the U.S. Army War College and the National Defense University of Argentina, and a doctorate in business administration. He has completed the Senior Executives in National and International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School. He has been a professor at the Argentine Army War College and a military observer at the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea.



(Figure by author)

Figure 3. Step Five: Develop a Strategy

importance of honesty (reinforcing mechanism) among his or her staff will only obtain the desired impact if he or she acts honestly (embedding mechanism).

Step 5: Develop a Strategy

During the transformation process, strategy is as important as values and vision, since action without strategic direction lacks sense. In the context of military transformation, strategy is the set of concepts that relates the means to the ends to produce actions (ways) that lead to deep changes. The institution must therefore define a strategy that allows the achievement of the vision within the context of organizational values.[20] The development of the strategic concept is critical since it describes how the transformation is intended to be achieved, explaining the roles and relations of its key players, the allocation of resources, and the establishment of priorities and timelines (see figure 3).

To achieve a transformation, it is necessary to identify and change the vital processes of the institution. In the case of the U.S. Army in the 1980s, during the transformation process after the Vietnam War, Chief of Staff Gen. Carl E. Vuono identified six critical and interrelated processes that then became essential to ensure a long-lasting transformation: (1) recruiting and retaining quality soldiers, (2) developing leaders, (3) training units, (4) modernizing the force, (5) creating the right kinds of units, and (6) developing doctrine for the employment of the force.[21]

Step 6: Develop Leaders

A military institution's soldiers are important, yet the leaders who guide them are vital. Consequently, the quality and growth of a military institution's leaders must be a part of any strategy formulation for the execution of a transformation process. The development of leaders (both military and civil) is fundamental for the military institution, given that it must build subordinates who assume responsibility for their own actions and are capable of acting independently. This is the true sense of empowerment.[22] To empower is to give someone authority, influence, or knowledge to do something, but above all, it is to bestow responsibility.[23]

If the leaders of a military institution are important, the strategic leaders are fundamental. These leaders play a

Peruvian soldiers rappel from a helicopter 24 November 2018 during *Exercise Olas Solidarias* (Solidarity Waves Exercise) in Peru. The U.S. Navy partnered with Peruvian armed forces and civilian agencies in the rapid-response exercise. The goal of the exercise was to demonstrate an integrated response by many government resources to a natural disaster and to strengthen interoperability and improve relations between the two nations. (Photo courtesy of Ministry of Defense of Peru)

key role in the transformation process because they are responsible for defining the vision, reaffirming the values, and leading the change of the organization. For this reason, the formation and development of strategic leaders must be prioritized through training and empowerment. Strategic leaders must train and mentor future leaders of the institution because they will be responsible for giving continuity to the transformation process. Therefore, one of the principal jobs of strategic leaders is to develop subordinates who will lead the organization when the leaders leave.[24]

Step 7: Formulate Doctrine

Once the transformation process is initiated, several drivers will demand that profound changes commence promptly, especially changes related to organization, training, and modernization of the institution. However, it is not logical to implement these types of changes without a clear sense of direction. At this juncture, doctrine acquires particular importance since it will give coherence,



(Figure by author)

Figure 4. Step Seven: Formulate Doctrine

sense, and impetus to the transformation process. Military doctrine is defined as "fundamental principles by which military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives."[25] For this purpose, doctrine consists not only of fundamental principles but also of tactics, techniques, and procedures including terms and symbols. In fact, doctrine represents the collective wisdom of the institution and provides a common language so that its members may communicate among themselves.

The changes in the strategic environment, including new roles and technologies, force the military institution to write a new doctrine that includes a wider range of operations and military actions. During the transformation process, it is therefore essential that doctrine is formulated to efficiently fulfill all roles assigned by a state. This new doctrine must not only successfully enable current challenges and threats but also, and above all, those of the future (see figure 4). For example, no one would want to repeat the experience of the French army, who during World War II formulated a doctrine and organized, equipped, and trained units for the wrong type of war.[26] In other words, the army prepared itself to fight another World War I (a past, relatively static war) but not the warfare it actually confronted (blitzkrieg, or lightning war).

Doctrine is the collective comprehension of how the institution will combat and carry out other operations and military actions. For this reason, doctrine guides the manner in which the institution is organized, trained, and modernized.[27] Modernization and reorganization of the institution should not be initiated if a new doctrine has not first been formulated.

Normally, the transformation process begins with sequential actions. For example, as learning about the impact of new technologies increases, transformation tends toward modernization. Subsequently, when new doctrine is combined with new technology, transformation expands to encompass the redesign of tactical units.[28] Thereafter, these sequential actions convert themselves into simultaneous and synchronized actions, above all when transformation includes each critical process of the organization.

Step 8: Learning and Continuing Change

Transformation is a process that emphasizes maintaining continuity, making appropriate changes, and

growing to become a different institution.[29] Nevertheless, appropriate changes require time since they must first be experimented, learned, and improved. This is of particular importance in determining the new organization, equipment, and training of the tactical units.

Another challenge that faces military transformation is the need to secure continuity in the change process. To achieve this, strategic leaders of the institution must create consensus among its members. Otherwise, changes will endure only as long as the person who promoted or implemented them lasts. The creation of consensus is achieved through ongoing communication and participation of the institutional members, primarily those persons who in the future will replace the current strategic leaders.

Transformation must base itself on positive and aggressive actions, guided by vision and consistent with the values of the institution, but, above all, these must be actions that institutional members can see and understand.[30] For this reason, members of the institution must be kept informed to avoid the spread of rumors and negative attitudes. Equally important is the speed at which changes are accomplished (not so slow that its impact is imperceptible, nor too quick so it does not saturate the organization).

Conclusion

Military transformation is an arduous process that requires time and involves the use of profound changes to convert the institution into something qualitatively better while preserving its essence. As this article has shown, transformation calls for the reaffirmation of values, the definition of a vision, the creation of a team, the change of the organizational culture, the identification of strategy, the development of leaders, the formulation of doctrine, and the constant willingness to learn. To this end, the permanent effort and commitment of both an organization's members and its political decision-makers are required to successfully face the diverse challenges of military transformation. ■

Notes

1. Michael Hammer and James Champy, *Reingeniería* (Bogotá, Colombia: Editorial Norma, 1994), 34.
2. Daniel Gouré, "Winning Future Wars: Modernization and a 21st Century Defense Industrial Base," The Heritage Foundation, 4 October 2018, accessed 16 March 2019, https://www.heritage.org/military-strength/topical-essays/winning-future-wars-modernization-and-21st-century-defense.
3. Ibid.
4. Real Academia Española (Royal Spanish Academy), s.v. "transformar" [to transform], accessed 16 March 2019, http://dle.rae.es/?id=aJbn4er.
5. Paul K. Davis, "Military Transformation? Which Transformation, and What Lies Ahead?," in *The George W. Bush Defense Program: Policy, Strategy and War*, ed. Stephen J. Cimbala (Lincoln, NE: Potomac Books, 2010), 11.
6. *Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2003), 8, accessed 16 March 2019, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=446223.
7. Harold W. Gehman Jr. and James M. Dubik, "Military Transformation and Joint Experimentation: Two Views from Above," *Defense Horizons*, no. 46 (December 2004): 2, accessed 16 March 2019, http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/defensehorizon/DH-046.pdf?ver=2016-11-15-092815-493.
8. Paul E. Vera, "Transformación en el Ejército del Perú: ¿Tendencia o Necesidad?" [Transformation in the Peru Army: Trend or Necessity?], *Pensamiento Conjunto*, 2018, 85, accessed 29 May 2019, http://www.esffaa.pe/revista/2018-3/index.html.
9. Ibid.
10. U.S. Army War College Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, *Strategic Leadership Primer*, ed. Stephen J. Gerras, 3rd ed. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2010), 2.
11. Gordon R. Sullivan and Michael V. Harper, *Hope Is Not a Method: What Business Leaders Can Learn from America's Army* (New York: Broadway Books, 1997), 58.
12. Gerras, *Strategic Leadership Primer*, 20.
13. Sullivan and Harper, *Hope Is Not a Method*, 80.
14. Gerras, *Strategic Leadership Primer*, 21.
15. Ibid., 22.
16. Ibid.
17. *Military Transformation*, 8.
18. Sullivan and Harper, *Hope Is Not a Method*, 81
19. Edgar H. Schein, "Chapter 13," in *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 3rd ed. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2004).
20. Sullivan and Harper, *Hope Is Not a Method*, 99.
21. Ibid., 95.
22. Ibid., 68.
23. Real Academia Española (Royal Spanish Academy), s.v. "empoderar" [to empower], accessed 20 March 2019, https://dle.rae.es/?id=ErreFb4.
24. Sullivan and Harper, *Hope Is Not a Method*, 213.
25. John Spencer, "What Is Army Doctrine?," Modern War Institute, 21 March 2016, accessed 20 March 2019, https://mwi.usma.edu/what-is-army-doctrine/.
26. Sullivan and Harper, *Hope Is Not a Method*, 33.
27. Ibid., 10.
28. Ibid., 103.
29. Ibid., 98.
30. Ibid., 10.

Trailblazers of Unmanned Ground Vehicles

Defense Threat Reduction Agency and Marine Corps Warfighting Lab

Lt. Col. A. C. Turner, U.S. Army

We need to change where it makes sense, adapt as quickly as possible, and constantly innovate to stay ahead of our adversaries. Our ability to adapt more quickly than our enemies will be vital to our future success.

—Gen. Robert Neller,
Commandant of the Marine Corps

Necessity is the Mother of Innovation

The Canadian Corps' victory at the Battle of Vimy Ridge on 12 April 1917 was, at that point, the largest territorial advance of any Commonwealth force during World War I. The Canadian forces' success was due to the confluence of a new form of artillery tactics called "creeping barrage" and the proliferation of the wristwatch. The Battle of Vimy Ridge illustrated how an existing and innocuous technology such as the wristwatch coupled with changes in tactics created overmatch and subsequent dominance against German forces (see the sidebar on page 61). Fast forward 102 years and several wars—tactical innovations within the U.S. military need to adapt and overmatch adversaries at a rate inconceivable in 1917. To accomplish this, adaptability

requires ingenuity, partnership, collaboration, and exploitation of existing technology.

A brief examination of the U.S. military's twenty-first-century medium-weight unmanned ground vehicle (MUGV) and the eight years of collaborative efforts amongst Department of Defense (DOD) and industry partners illustrates how eight years of collaboration allowed nontraditional industry partners to develop innovative solutions to wicked problems (see figure 1, page 63).[1] This article also highlights opportunities for the Army's maneuver support formations to capitalize on other DOD research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) to inform both the fielded force concepts and the future force concepts.[2]

The first military MUGV, the Gladiator Tactical Unmanned Ground Vehicle, made its debut in 2004 as a teleoperated unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) with the primary focus to support dismounted marines across a range of military operations.[3] Six years later, and after observing lessons learned from the Army's MUGV acquisition endeavor with the Future Combat System, the DOD UGV community of interest was ready to showcase its latest MUGV: the Ground Unmanned Support Surrogate (GUSS). GUSS was an optionally manned platform consisting of a commercially available Polaris chassis and existing government-owned architecture.[4] The application for GUSS was simple: to assist marines on the battlefield. From 2011 to 2016, the U.S. military made numerous incremental improvements to its MUGV portfolio, sometimes at pace with commercial industries and at other times dabbling in the world of science fiction. While GUSS and its successors were suitable prototypes for the current operating environment, they did not address the changing character of war nor how to fight a war. The U.S. Army's latest operating concept, *The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028*, provides a framework for how the Army intends to *compete*, *defeat*, and *win* in the future operating environment.[5] Before delving into the DOD's most recent MUGV collaboration, it is necessary to briefly describe what robotic governance exists within the DOD during the twentieth century.

Consortium of Innovation

The goal of the DOD Joint Robotics Program (JRP) was to increase the focus of robotics on operational requirements while enabling an interservice coordination and governance forum. After twenty-five years as a directly funded program, the JRP ended in 2013 but not before the majority of its projects became either a system of systems or a stand-alone project within other DOD programs. Despite the end of JRP, new MUGVs from the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL) and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)—the combat support agency of the DOD—J9-CXW Weapons and Capabilities Division (DTRA/CXW)—as well as an unlikely partnership with a high performance race car company, emerged in 2014. MCWL's MUGV, called Expeditionary Modular Autonomous Vehicle, and DTRA/CXW's Modular Autonomous Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction System Increment A (MACS-A) are multiyear projects that leverage organizational investments in autonomy, platform

Tactical Innovation

Timepieces and Artillery

Up until the start of World War I, timepieces were not only a display of wealth but also gender classification—women wore wristwatches and men used pocket watches. The evolution of the pocket watch began in the late nineteenth century as a practical, tactical tool worn by officers to synchronize movement and maneuver. Halfway through World War I, traditional tactics to defeat trench warfare plateaued significantly and the Allied forces needed a new method of bombardment to regain momentum. Traditional bombardment, a standard barrage, was predictable but not effective against German bunkers, and provided German forces ample time to return to their defensive lines before Allied forces reached the front lines. A "creeping barrage" provided a defensive screen for the advancing infantry. However, it required meticulous planning and numerous rehearsals to execute synchronization between infantry and artillery.

A U.S. Army Pacific soldier walks down a trail 22 July 2016 while controlling an unmanned vehicle as part of the Pacific Manned Unmanned–Initiative at Marine Corps Training Area Bellows, Hawaii. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Christopher Hubenthal, U.S. Air Force)

Soldiers with 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, prepare to enter a mock insurgent-held structure with the aid of a 310 Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle piloted by another soldier 15 November 2018 at Fort Drum, New York. (Photo by Staff Sgt. James Avery, U.S. Army)

development, and system integration of payloads for interoperable autonomous platforms. The year 2013 also marked an inflection point where commercial development in robotic and autonomous systems (RAS) influenced, if not surpassed, military MUGV technology. Diffusion of RAS technology became the catalyst for Pratt & Miller Engineering's partnership with TORC Robotics, MCWL, and DTRA/CXW and the creation of the Pratt & Miller Engineering Defense Division.[6]

Solution Agonistic Requirements

We're finding we can be quicker by working with industry and being a little less prescriptive in finding what type of technology is available, and opening up to … nontraditional industry partners as we go forward by providing them a problem statement.

—Gen. James McConville, Army Vice Chief of Staff[7]

In an attempt to deliver a nonprescriptive materiel solution, DTRA analyzed various operating environments where potential customers' missions could benefit from capabilities within its MACS-A program.[8] DTRA's iterative solution agnostics approach and partnership with MCWL shortened the RDT&E timeline. The MCWL's leveraging of the U.S. Navy's set-based design concept to flesh out requirements that would generate materiel and nonmateriel solutions for the future operating environment was critical to this collaborative effort. The set-based design not only produced tangible outcomes but also assisted decision-makers with making trade-offs relative to future capabilities. The application of set-based design methodology is important to the U.S. Marine Corps because its budget is 16 percent of the average of all three services combined. A prime example of converting an idea (littoral operations in a contested environment) into a usable product is the transformation of the Navy's USS *San Antonio* (LPD-17) into an LX(R)-class amphibious warfare ship.[9] Set-based design allowed both the U.S. Marine Corps and the Navy to understand not only what the cost was in dollars but also the tradeoff cost vis-à-vis capabilities—such as how many square feet of vehicle storage to forgo in order to obtain another two to four knots of speed. Understanding these trade-offs led to the design of MCWL's Expeditionary Modular Autonomous Vehicle. Together, all partners used an



(Figure by author)

Figure 1. Timeline of the U.S. Military's Twenty-First-Century Medium-Weight Unmanned Ground Vehicle

existing government-owned architecture to create a platform that was payload agnostic, reusable, agile, lethal, and autonomous (see figure 2, page 64).

Envisioning Future Maneuver Support Formations

No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.

—Carl von Clausewitz[10]

The physics of warfare require Army formations to support maneuver forces. Whether those formations are a platoon of MUGVs or manned formations, the employment of RAS will be part of the calculus as the commander decides how to manage risk. The capability of a commander to employ manned-unmanned teams (MUMTs) exemplifies the disruptive innovation that garners more emphasis within boutique Army formations, specifically maneuver support forces. (Not because of burgeoning and trending phases such as robotic integration of artificial intelligence or the need for U.S. military forces to establish convergence across all domains but because of the principles behind multi-domain operations [MDO] and the Army military strategy.) Adhering to MDO and Army military strategy principles of increased lethality, increased readiness, doctrine, and tactics,



(Figure by Marine Corps Warfighting Lab)

Figure 2. Expeditionary Modular Autonomous Vehicle Payload Variations

Lt. Col. A. C. Turner, U.S. Army, is the commander of 1st Battalion (Engineer), 395th Regiment. She holds a BS from Roger Williams University, an MS from Missouri University of Science and Technology, and an MMAS from the Command and General Staff College. Her previous assignments include serving as the Engineer Modernization Branch chief for the U.S. Army Chief of the Engineers and as a Chief of Staff of the Army Strategic Study Group fellow in the Army Future Studies group and the Army Modernization Task Force.

maneuver support forces are better prepared to provide assured mobility to maneuver forces conducting subterrain and ground operations. Reducing the aperture to a combat engineer company conducting a minefield breach illustrates the exponential growth of capability within a brigade combat team (BCT). Figure 3 (on page 65) illustrates how today's echelons above brigade's combat engineer company structure and the rules of allocation conduct a minefield breach with a mine-clearing line charge (MICLIC).[11]

Using the same force structure, but replacing a traditional MICLIC with a MICLIC on a MUGV chassis, a combat engineer company is three times more lethal and effective in its MUMT employment than today (see figure 4, page 66). Ostensibly, the combat engineer company's three platoons can explosively provide a breach for all four of the BCT's combined arms battalions (see figure 5, page 67). The proliferation of MUGV MICLICs within a combat engineer company not only provides a 1.1 modernization solution but also causes multiple breach dilemmas for adversaries while increasing the BCT's lethality, speed, and operational reach.[12] In addition to providing mobility and maneuver



(Figure by author)

Figure 3. Current Force Structure of a Minefield Breach

overmatch for the BCT, this option allows the engineer regiment to use the remaining force structure to alleviate strategic mobility shortfalls and improve the support of the *National Defense Strategy*. This theoretical application of a MUGV MICLIC becomes a trailblazing capability that not only changes the way maneuver support formations are organized and fight but also how those same formations acquire and train talent; thus, spurring a potential identity crisis and provoking pushback from laggards.[13]

The raison d'être of maneuver support formations is to provide capabilities that enable maneuver forces to maintain momentum and deliver lethal effects against an adversary. Therefore, it ought not to matter whether that capability is a revolutionized fifty-six-person, echelons-above-brigade sapper company, a company of robots, or a MUMT. Rather, what matters is if existing technology and research fosters overmatch. Then Chief of Staff of the Army Gen. Mark A. Milley's address at the 2016 Association of the United States Army Dwight David Eisenhower Luncheon drives home the aforementioned point:

> War tends to slaughter the sacred cows of tradition, of consensus, of group-think and myopia. The next war will be no different. Those of us, or those nation states that stubbornly cling to the past will lose. They will lose that war, and they will lose it in a big way. … And it's better for us to slaughter our sacred cows ourselves, rather than lose a war because we're too hidebound to think the unthinkable.[14]

The DTRA and MCWL's MUGV program provides an opportunity for maneuver support

regiments to leverage existing DOD RTD&E efforts (time, money, and expertise) to address current shortfalls and deliver a solution to the maneuver commander faster.

Always in Motion

Armies rely so much on past experiences to validate current practices that they are often regarded as inherently conservative organizations, resistant to meaningful change and innovation. … Yet armies have often stood at the cutting edge of technological, organizational, and methodological change, for in the violent competition that marks their trade, survival has often gone to the smartest and most innovative force rather than to the largest or best armed one.

—Jeffrey J. Clarke, Chief of Military History[15]



(Figure by author)

Figure 4. Revolutionized Echelons-Above-Brigade Combat Engineer Company

Prior to the War Office issuing wristwatches to all Commonwealth combatants in 1917, few foresaw the transformative role of wristwatches in military operations and civilian society. The same could be said about UGVs' likely impact on tactical innovation in MDO. Much like the wristwatch and trench warfare, MUGV MICLICs possess the capability to provide accuracy and reliability during a combined arms breach.

The MUGV MICLIC is an example of the U.S. military exploiting existing technology and collaborating with industry and DOD partners to create feasible alternatives for the commander to increase lethality, increase readiness, improve doctrine, and change tactics. The Battle of Vimy Ridge showed what was within the realm of possibility by underpinning "creeping barrage" with the proliferation of wristwatches. While the MUGV MICLIC has yet to be developed, the concept of reducing risk, establishing overmatch, and generating production volume is unarguably hard to dismiss. ■



(Figure by author)

Figure 5. Hypothetical Manned-Unmanned Teams Concept of Operations for a Minefield Breach Supporting a Combined Arms Battalion

Notes

Epigraph. Robert B. Neller, foreword to *Marine Corps Operating Concept: How an Expeditionary Force Operates in the 21st Century* (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, September 2016), 3.

1. The U.S. Navy uses four categories to describe unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs): small (less than 400 lb.), lightweight (400 lb. to 1 ton), medium (1 ton to 15 tons), and large (above 15 tons). The Army uses four categories as well, but the weight classification differs: micro UGV (less than 10 lb.), small (10 lb. to 200 lb.), medium (200 lb. to 1.5 tons), and large (above 1.5 tons). This article will adhere to the Navy's classification as it is congruent with the U.S. Army's Robotic Combat Vehicle modernization efforts.

2. *Future force concepts* address future military problems and drive capability development. *Fielded force concepts* address current problems with existing or readily available capabilities.

3. *Teleoperated* means that a human controls all the UGV's movement via a control unit and visual systems. An *autonomous* movement describes a UGV that is both self-sufficient and executes missions without any human interaction. A *semiautonomous* platform can perform an autonomous function such as obstacle avoidance and navigation but may require a human interface to employ weapons.

4. Government-owned architecture includes, but is not limited to, navigation systems, control units, mapping software, system integration software, and platforms.

5. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028* (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 6 December 2018).

6. It is important to distinguish between *diffusion* and *adoption*. Diffusion is a phenomenon describing how innovation spreads and by whom. Adoption describes the stages that individuals complete prior to finally accepting a product, process, or ideology.

7. Jon Harper, "Army Revamping Intellectual Property Policies," *National Defense Magazine* (website), 21 August 2018, accessed 1 February 2019, http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2018/8/21/army-revamping-intellectual-property-policies.

8. Department of Defense, *Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 President's Budget Submission: Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Defense-Wide* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, February 2012), 70, accessed 26 July 2019, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/documents/defbudget/fy2013/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/Defense-Wide_PB_2013_1_FINAL_RDTE.pdf.

9. The transformation entailed testing various parameters to determine the maximum size of an amphibious platform in the hull of the ship and if

that platform could perform its task and purpose as designed without compromising the ship's key performance parameters.

10. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Eliot Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 579.

11. One sapper company, which is capable of conducting three mechanical breaches, consists of three sapper platoons, thirteen armored personnel carriers, and three mine-clearing line charges. In order to support more than a battalion task force during a combined arms breach and provide redundancy to account for attrition at each vehicle lane, the maneuver commander would need capabilities from two sapper companies.

12. Department of the Army, *Report on the U.S. Army Modernization Strategy, Directed by Section 1061 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 30 April 2018), 2. The *Report on the U.S. Army Modernization Strategy* breaks down materiel solutions into three categories: 1.0—Close the Gap, 1.1—Achieve Overmatch, and 2.0—Strengthen Overmatch.

13. Everett Rogers, *The Diffusion of Innovation* (New York: The Free Press, 2003). Rogers categorizes adopters as either innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority, or laggards. Innovators are willing to take a risk as their risk tolerance facilities the "fail often and fail early" mentality. Early adopters are individuals who use a product or procure technology as soon as it is available (e.g., individuals/investors who buy the first generation of Teslas or Apple and Microsoft products). Using the smartphone as an example, the early majority are individuals who have used smartphones prior to smartphone usage reaching 39 percent in 2012. The late majority approach innovation with exceptional levels of skepticism even as they join the fray after the majority of society has adopted the innovation. Laggards, the last of the five categories, are averse to change agents and are wedded to "traditions" and the status quo.

14. Mark A. Milley, "Address at the AUSA's Dwight David Eisenhower Luncheon" (speech, Washington Convention Center, Washington, DC, 4 October 2016), accessed 28 June 2019, http://wp-swps.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/20161004_CSA_AUSA_Eisenhower_Transcripts.pdf.

15. Jeffrey J. Clarke, foreword to *A History of Innovation: U.S. Army Adaptation in War and Peace*, ed. Jon T. Hoffman (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2009), v.

A Last Moment Caught

Tom Sheehan

It comes again,

without prejudice,

in another millennium:

I know the weight of an M-1 rifle

on a web strap hanging on my shoulder,

the awed knowledge of a ponderous steel helmet

atop my head, press of a tight lace on one

boot, wrap of a leather watch band

on my wrist,

and who stood beside me

who stand no more.

Three soldiers from the 3rd Battalion, 34th Infantry Regiment, 35th Infantry Division, crouch behind rocks 11 April 1951 to shield themselves from exploding mortar shells near the Hantan River in central Korea. (Photo courtesy of the U.S. Army Signal Corps via the Library of Congress)

Approximately six thousand Russian soldiers and military cadets, many dressed in Red Army World War II uniforms, march in a parade 7 November 2011 through Red Square in Moscow honoring the seventieth anniversary of the end of World War II. Since first assuming office, Russian President Vladimir Putin has made a concerted effort to marshal history in the cause of promoting Russian pride, patriotism, and support for the military. (Photo by Alexander Zemlianichenko, Associated Press)

Mobilizing History to Promote Patriotism and a New Past

Robert F. Baumann, PhD

We must do everything so that today's children and all our citizens are proud that they are the heirs, grandchildren, great-grandchildren of the winners. Knew their country and their families to understand that this is part of our life.

—Vladimir Putin

History, military history in particular, has emerged in Russia as a primary means of the patriotic mobilization of society. Russians have long felt a deep attraction to historical accounts of great national figures, heroic struggles in wartime, and

distinctive contributions to world culture and science. However, during the twentieth century under the Soviet regime, the full exploration of historical themes operated under severe state-imposed constraints. Not surprisingly, a special fascination with history broke out shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, or USSR) and was prompted in part by the release of previously concealed documents late in Mikhail Gorbachev's presidency. For seven decades, the dictates of Soviet ideology not only put historical analysis in a straightjacket but also condemned thousands of notable Russians from the past, good and bad alike, to obscurity or portrayal as one-dimensional caricatures. Suddenly, in the late 1980s, what had been buried for so long burst into the open and aroused enormous curiosity. For military historians, opportunities to discuss the actions of White forces against the Bolshevik Revolution or the actions of late imperial military leaders generated a significant buzz.

More broadly, the expanding popularity of history was related to the search for a sense of identity. For over seventy years, the Soviet state mandated an interpretation of the past that—even if based on solid scholarship—preempted rounded, thoughtful analysis and serious debate. Still, it did provide a sense of historical place for Russians at the leading edge of human progress. The purportedly scientific tenets of Marxism-Leninism provided the framework for the unfolding narrative of class struggle, revolutions, and the progressive role of the Soviet state in the march to the future. Expression of Russian national identity and patriotism occurred openly when it was useful to the state, such as during the Great Patriotic War. At other times, it was restricted in favor of platitudes about Soviet greatness, the abolition of bourgeois national chauvinism, the construction of developed socialism, and so on. Left out were many achievements of Imperial Russia, particularly during the late nineteenth century.

Robert F. Baumann, PhD, is the director of the graduate degree program and professor of history at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He holds a BA in Russian from Dartmouth College, an MA in Russian and East European studies from Yale University, and a PhD in history from Yale University. He is the author of numerous books, book chapters, and scholarly articles. He is also the writer and producer of a documentary film on the U.S. and multinational peacekeeping mission in Bosnia.

A rough line of demarcation in Soviet historiography was the War of 1812, when Russia thwarted the invasion by the army of Napoleonic France. That which came before, most notably the centralization of the Russian state, often warranted favorable depiction if it could be construed as marking a positive step in Marxist social evolution. What followed, above all the rise of bourgeois capitalist society, generally drew criticism unless it was associated with the emerging revolutionary movement or the defense of Russian soil as at the siege of Sevastopol in the Crimean War. Accordingly, the Russian Orthodox Church was an obstacle to revolutionary progress, and thus harmful. In turn, the army, particularly ordinary soldiers, did the noble work of defending the Russian state, which would become the vessel of revolutionary progress. Meanwhile, Russian territorial expansion across the steppe, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Siberia fit the official account as part of the normal historical process of modernization and thus was beneficial overall to newly incorporated populations. After all, by joining their destinies to that of Russia, they took part in the October Revolution and the development of the first socialist society. To a large degree, this concept of the family of Soviet nationalities rested on the "lesser evil" formula. As explained by Konstantin Shteppa, "The evil was charged exclusively to tsarism and was scarcely mentioned, while the Russian people, in its relations with non-Russians, were credited with rendering all manner of services, which alone were made the subject of historical study."[1]

Following the assignment of the Institute of History to the Communist Academy in 1929, historical accounts of the Soviet era itself remained rigidly stultifying, with little leeway to stray from officially prescribed interpretations. Competing views, tolerated during the preceding decade, lost all support, and their proponents began to find their way into exile.[2] Cleansed of debate, the historical profession became a virtual chorus hailing the wise leadership of the Communist Party. Boiled down, there was the story of doggedly devoted workers and peasants, toiling to bring forth socialism. The party formed the vanguard, ever devoted to the well-being of the people. Then, of course, there were the enemies, often disguised as friends but exposed by the perpetual vigilance of the organs of state security. This view provided historical cover for Joseph

Stalin's purges, a grim reality known to those who survived it. However, this part of the Soviet past and much more found no mention in published histories. The official portrayal of history began to dissolve as Gorbachev's policy of *glasnost* (sometimes rendered in English as openness or candor) allowed the publication of previously forbidden information.[3]

In the spring of 1988, the Soviet state abruptly revised the national history curriculum and even canceled school exams since the old textbooks had lost credibility. Some fifty-three million school children from the ages of six to sixteen suddenly learned that all of the history they had been taught was full of distortions about Stalin and many other aspects of their country's past.[4] This was incredibly disorienting, especially in a school regime that presented all curricular material with a sure sense of authority and certainty. From that moment forward, exploration of the national history has been a common voyage of discovery for Russians. Energized by popular interest, history has come to provide an excellent focal point for the mobilization of patriotic feeling.

This article will address the patriotic role of Russia's history in three parts. First, it will review the use of history in the former Soviet Union for the purpose of inculcating patriotic values. Second, it will describe the search for iconic figures and moments as Russia reinvents its origin myths. Third, it examines the specific use of military history and the role of the Russian Military-Historical Society in contemporary Russia.

Patriotic Education in the USSR

From the moment of the October Revolution in 1917, the emergent Soviet state lavished attention on ways to mobilize the population to the cause. In the first months of its existence, the Bolshevik regime led by Vladimir I. Lenin faced a pressing need to expand its political base. The painful truth was that the Bolsheviks staged a coup in Petrograd, as Saint Petersburg came to be called during World War I to erase the aura of German influence, and proclaimed a revolution. Though enjoying the support of workers' organizations in Petrograd and Moscow, the Reds could count on few allies across the country as a whole.

The most urgent immediate task was to find soldiers for the Workers and Peasants Red Army. The best place to look

To Leningrad

Ahead! Ahead! We have a right to revenge! Let our triumph say:

To Leningrad! To the city of Russian fame, To the life and honor of my nation!

There is a flag drenched with blood above us, The eternal city of the Neva is ahead of us, To Leningrad, the great and wonderful!

The hour of revenge has struck!

Our enemies will not live, we will never forgive them! All our valor requires this— Don't let them survive, don't let them go! Don't give them anything but death!

The hour has struck, and with stern courage, We are moving, shoving aside thousands of obstacles, The pride of glorious Leningrad, Commander Poliakov's soldiers.

Holy revenge takes us to a bloody battle. Let's now win the battle, comrades!

To Leningrad! To the city of Russian fame, To Russia, to our Motherland![3]

—Alexander Prokofiev

(Translated by Shushanna Baumann)

Two Soviet soldiers, one armed with a Degtyaryov machine gun, in the trenches of the Leningrad Front 1 September 1941 before an offensive. (Photo by Vsevolod Tarasevich, RIA Novosti via Wikimedia Commons)

for recruits was to seek soldiers from among the ranks of the rapidly disintegrating tsarist army. As men deserted the front in droves, able-bodied fighters were not in short supply as long as they could be won over to the cause.[5] The state of art of communications at the time led inevitably to an emphasis on posters and simple slogans that directly addressed popular concerns. At the top of the list was a pledge to withdraw Russia from the World War I alliance against Germany and Austria-Hungary. Additional promises related to distributing food, establishing workers' control of the factories, and granting land to the peasants. Leon Trotsky, the first head of the Red Army, traveled the length and breadth of the country in an armored train to spread the message of the revolution. A gifted orator, Trotsky was a master motivator.[6]

Overall, the Bolsheviks entered a war of ideas against the White Guard counterrevolutionary forces with two natural advantages. First, the White forces dragged behind them the baggage of everything that was wrong with the tsarist regime. Unable to adapt to changing times, they failed utterly to craft a consistent or attractive message. Second, the Bolsheviks had accumulated long experience as a tiny revolutionary party with negligible resources. Consequently, the art of propaganda absorbed unrelenting attention and became an integral part of their DNA. For the Bolsheviks, everything was political, and politics always demanded skillful analysis of their target audience. Best of all, they had what today would be called "message discipline." They had a coherent story and stuck to it. If it did not quite conform to the facts, no would know anyway. Moreover, the Communist Party that emerged from Bolshevism organized itself along military lines. Contrary to the ideology, the party was a strictly hierarchical organization. The rank and file membership reached down into every office, factory floor, school room, scientific laboratory, and army unit. They served as a transmission belt for Lenin's, and subsequently Stalin's, directives.

In the years following victory in the Russian Civil War, the Bolsheviks transformed the struggle into a valiant narrative about ideologically committed warriors fighting for the good of the people. Official history—no other kind was allowed—depicted acts of extraordinary sacrifice and heroism. When the Soviet Union opened for business in 1922, it faced monumental economic and social challenges. The devastation resulting from World War I and the Russian Civil War left an enormous rebuilding effort. Because the general level of public education was low, a massive enlightenment program proved necessary. However, this afforded the regime a great opportunity to create its own historical and political narrative. Under the circumstances, posters and cinema were the most effective tools for mobilizing the population to embrace the challenges ahead.[7]

The foremost example of cinematic propaganda is the creative work of the renowned Russian filmmaker Sergei Eisenstein. An early revolutionary enthusiast, Eisenstein enlisted in the Red Army and willingly lent his talents to the cause of promoting Bolshevik ideals. Making films about history and historical figures became the principal vehicle for this effort. During the Russian Civil War, his contribution took the form of supporting the work of an army theatrical group.[8] Subsequently, in the 1920s, Eisenstein went to work on a series of films concerning the revolution itself. The most successful of these was *Battleship Potemkin*, the story of the mutiny by Russian sailors against their officers and the tsarist regime during the Revolution of 1905. This production won acclaim even in the West, and several decades later in 1958, it would be declared by none other than Charlie Chaplin as "the best film in the world."[9]

Over time, Eisenstein would discover that his artistic inclinations did not always coincide with the dictates of emergent proletarian culture. During the filming of *Ten Days That Shook the World*, the title by which it became known to Western audiences, Eisenstein found himself compelled to leave out important scenes in order to comply with officially dictated reinterpretations of the revolutionary role of Trotsky.[10]

By far the most spectacular instance of harnessing Eisenstein's talents to the work of patriotic mobilization was the film *Alexander Nevsky*. Released at a propitious moment in 1938, the film depicted the exploits of the famed Russian prince of Novgorod who defeated the Teutonic knights in the thirteenth century. The subtext of the film, barely beneath the surface, is an instructive parable about Western (particularly German) aggression

Next page: A scene from Sergei Eisenstein's 1927 film *October: Ten Days That Shook the World* depicts in heroic terms the Bolshevik-led revolution that overthrew the Czarist government of Russia. (Photo courtesy of Sergei Eisenstein and Grigori Aleksandrov via Wikimedia Commons)


ФРАКЦІЯ
ВСЕМІРНАЯ

and the struggle to protect Mother Russia at all costs. An enormous hit, the movie nevertheless became inconvenient in 1939 with the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which established a state of nonaggression between the Soviet Union and Adolf Hitler's Germany.[11] In any case, as a result of Eisenstein's work, the storyline of Nevsky as the savior of Russia became cemented in the popular mind to the point that he remains one of the most-revered figures in Russian history to this day. Of course, viewers could not miss the hint that Nevsky and Stalin represented a common historical type in their defense of Russia.[12]



Movie poster for *Alexander Nevsky* (1938).

While film was playing its accorded role, the actual planned crafting of a suitable history advanced in equal measure. One fundamental step was the ousting of Mikhail Pokrovsky as the de facto dean of Soviet historians. A champion of the revolution, Pokrovsky's fault had been to harshly dismiss imperial Russian history as a long story of oppression toward not only workers and peasants but also subject nationalities. By 1934, Stalin desired a new, seamless narrative that connected selected admirable elements from the past to the glorious march to a Soviet future. As described by historian Martin Malia, "The Old Regime was to be viewed not as a Russian past but as the past of a radical new entity, the Soviet Union."[13] Historical figures such as Nevsky and Peter the Great deserved honor based on their record as architects of the powerful Russian state that would be rebranded by Lenin and the Bolsheviks.

In 1938, Stalin himself offered a guiding hand to historians and party members alike with his publication of *History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)*, which in praise of its relative brevity became widely known as the "Short Course."[14] This work connected the dots in a Russian historical timeline. It offered a tale of inevitable development on the road to the grail of intellectual enlightenment—Marxist-Leninist theory—of which Stalin was depicted as the wisest authority and proponent.

By the late 1930s, Soviet artists, cinematographers, writers, composers, and so on belonged to officially sanctioned unions. The twist was that rather than protect the interests of their members, these unions existed to ensure the arts served the interests of the Communist Party. Rewards were ample for those who played along, but those who could not make this adjustment vanished into obscurity or spent time in the labor camps of the Gulag.[15]

Stalin's influence over Soviet education and patriotic propaganda would in many respects endure until the end of the Soviet Union but did undergo some change after his death in 1953. The emergence of Nikita Khrushchev as the undisputed leader of the party in 1956 brought a moderate de-Stalinization to many aspects of society. Signaled by his ironically famous "secret speech" of 1956 to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in Moscow, a partial relaxation of state controls allowed the publication of Alexander Solzhenitsyn's *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, a classic vignette of life in a Soviet prison camp. Surprising nuances appeared in cinematography as well. Sergei Bondarchuk's film *The Fate of Man* appeared in 1959 featuring a lead character who was riddled with character flaws and self-doubt but could be cast as a hero due to his determination and resilience.[16] In a sense, he became an appropriate metaphor for Russia after the long nightmare of purges and war.

To be sure, however, Khrushchev was himself a product of Soviet culture and had no intention of allowing a drift toward the decadence of arts and culture as seen in the West. Socialist realism remained the approved

philosophy underwriting Soviet artistic endeavor, and Khrushchev did not hesitate to police the line between what was allowable and what was not.

Russian History Today

Early in his first presidency, Vladimir Putin resolved that patriotic education would be a priority under his leadership. In 2001, his regime published its first five-year plan for this purpose. As a testament to his consistency on the subject, Putin remarked in 2016 that "love of country" was the essential element in Russian unification.[17]

In contrast to past eras, contemporary historians in Russia have little to fear from censors. Longtime Russia scholar Stephen Cohen bluntly asserts in a recent work, "There is almost no historical censorship in Russia today."[18] This does not mean that Putin's government does not take an interest. However, rather than punish dissenting or unflattering interpretations, the Russian government offers gentle encouragement to take a patriotic line. To the extent that there is enforcement of a certain orthodoxy, it is often based on democratic impulses. That is to say that most of the public, to some degree in response to official promotion of certain patriotic or nationalistic themes, can actively assist the authorities in curbing dissent.

Consider, for example, the eruption of indignation surrounding the planned release of the 2017 film *Matilda*, which focused on a romantic affair between the prince and future tsar Nicholas II and a Polish ballerina, for whom the film is named. Though taking some license, the film accords with known history, dwelling on character traits that would manifest themselves during the crisis of war and revolution, such as Nicholas's own lack of self-assurance.[19] What is most interesting is that the film generated an outcry not because it was unexceptional as a work of art but rather because it touched a nerve concerning the way Russians prefer their leaders to be remembered and respected. The fact that Nicholas was officially sainted by the Russian Orthodox Church in 2000 probably contributed in some way to the furor. Still, the movie appeared in theaters even though it did not enjoy a long, successful run.

By way of contrast, it is easy to note the fate of another film, this one made in Britain, *The Death of Stalin*. Simultaneously grim and wacky, this film did not reach Russian theaters. For those who revere Stalin's memory, and there are quite a few in Russia today, the storyline is deliberately disrespectful. On the other hand, for those familiar with the history of the period including the terror of the purges and the struggle for succession after Stalin's demise, the biting humor resonates loudly. What probably doomed the film in Russia was its sarcastic take on the paranoia and depravity pervading the Soviet leadership.

More to the liking of the public and the regime have been films such as the 2008 movie *Alexander: The Nevsky Battle,* which highlights the leader who was rated as the greatest Russian historical figure of all time according to a 2009 television survey. Peter the Great and Stalin came in second and third, respectively.[20] Of course, the timing of it all was highly propitious for Nevsky.

In the meantime, another patriotic genre, sports films, has made a significant impact. The 2017 basketball film *Going Vertical* commemorated the Soviets' stunning, and extremely controversial, victory over the United States in the 1972 Olympic gold medal clash. In addition to dodging the controversy, the movie relied heavily on "ugly American" stereotypes to fire up audiences. A more recent, and slightly more nuanced, film is *Legenda*. The film concerns the life and hockey exploits of Soviet great Valeri Kharlamov, up to the moment of the Soviet national team's shocking triumph over their heavily favored Canadian counterparts in game one of the historic Super Series of 1972.

Outside the realm of the arts, probably the best known and controversial expression of patriotic mobilization involves placement of an enormous statue of Vladimir the Great on the hillside overlooking Moscow. The context in this instance is particularly important. At issue is Russia's conflict with Ukraine. Both countries claim lineage reaching back to Vladimir, who Christianized the Kievan Rus'—forerunners of Ukrainians and Russians alike—in 988. The story of neat historical continuity ended, however, with the obliteration of Kievan civilization by the Mongol armies of Genghis Khan in 1242. No real successor state emerged for over two hundred years until the rise of Muscovy. Geography, among other factors, poses some challenges to this interpretation. Moscow is, of course, a long way from ancient Kiev, whereas modern Ukraine occupies the same real estate as the ancient civilization that it claims as its own heritage.

The well-known early twentieth-century Russian historian George Vernadsky, who emigrated during

the revolution and finished his career as a professor at Yale University, was an important proponent of the view that the Muscovite Russian state was a successor regime of the Mongols and indeed was profoundly shaped in its outlook by the experience of Mongol rule.[21] Indeed, Vernadsky emerged as one of the early advocates of the idea that Russia was a distinctive Eurasian civilization. This perspective has attained a significant following in Russia today.[22]

Late Imperial Russian nationalists long argued that Ukrainians were barely a distinct people, never mind the heirs of Kievan civilization. The Revolution further clouded the issue. Anxious to demonstrate their respect for minority nationalities of the former Russian Empire, the Bolsheviks conferred on Ukraine the status of a full republic of the USSR—in principle on the same level as Russia. The Soviets also encouraged the development of a distinct national history in Ukraine, albeit at the same time that they inflicted man-made famine and the horrors of agricultural collectivization on the unfortunate population. In any case, a monument to Vladimir the Great went up in Kiev long before its counterpart appeared in Moscow.[23]

Russia's seizure and largely unrecognized annexation of Crimea brought to a head the historical disagreement. The phrase "Crimea is Russia" soon appeared on T-shirts. Meanwhile, cultural disputes that had lain more or less dormant surfaced once again. In the international arena, Russia tried to sell its Ukrainian action as a reunification comparable to the reunification of Germany at the conclusion of the Cold War. To Russia's surprise, perhaps, Germany was not buying the comparison.[24]

Above: Screenshot of the movie *Going Vertical*, also known as *Three Seconds*, which is a 2017 Russian sports drama film directed by Anton Megerdichev about the controversial victory of the Soviet national basketball team over the 1972 U.S. Olympic team—ending the United States' sixty-three-game winning streak—at the Munich Summer Olympics. The Russian state is encouraging film and other artistic endeavors to promote Russian national pride and also to adopt anti-Western themes. (Photo courtesy of *Going Vertical*; information courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

Right: Russian veteran Alexei Stefanov and his wife Lyudmila Stefanova pose during an interview 30 January 2013 in Moscow in which he recalled his participation in the Battle of Stalingrad between Nazi Germany and its allies and Red Army that began in mid-1942 and ended in February 1943. The tremendous costs to Russia as a result of World War II (referred to in Russia as the "Great Patriotic War") and the heroism displayed by the Russian military in turning back the Nazi invasion continue to be dominant themes in the writing and artistic expression of Russian public figures and cultural leaders. Surviving members of the war are revered and constantly held up to the public as exemplars of Russian patriotism that should be emulated. (Photo by Alexander Zemlianichenko, Associated Press)

Military History

Military history has long been central to Russia's national narrative. Particularly in light of the long political and social struggles they have experienced, Russia's exploits on the battlefield have been a huge source of affirmation. Writing about Soviet society in his 1976 edition of *The Russians*, journalist Hedrick Smith devoted an entire chapter to the phenomenon of Russian patriotism. As he put it, "In an age grown skeptical of undiluted patriotism, Russians are perhaps the world's most passionate patriots."[25] Victory in the Great Patriotic War, as it is remembered to this day, still provides a kind of validation that overrides misgivings about the misery of Stalinism, economic failures, rampant alcoholism, population decline, and depressing statistics about life expectancy.

During the Soviet era and even today, though perhaps to a slightly lesser extent, Russians have a deeper fondness for poetry than any other people I have encountered. Patriotic poetry, particularly about the sacrifices of the war, moves Russians emotionally in a way few others can comprehend. References to the *Rodina*, or motherland, stir feelings of abiding affection for Russian heritage and homeland. It may sound hokey, but it is true, and it serves as compelling evidence of deep continuities in Russian culture. It is also vital to remember that many citizens of non-Russian nationalities who populate the same civic-cultural orbit—encompassed by the nonethnic words *Rossiane* or *Rossiiskie*, as oppose to *Russkie* (which is the ethnic term of reference for Russians)—share this sense of emotional connection. Smith wrote of the resonance of words like *nash* (ours) and *chuzhoi* (foreign or alien).[26] They have no less power forty years later. In fact, one of the patriotic youth organizations born in the Putin era was the now-defunct *nashi* (plural form of ours).

The Soviet state prioritized focus on the inculcation of patriotism among the youth. Organizations such as the Young Pioneers bore resemblance to

Russia

By Nikolai Alexandrovich Druzhkov
Translated by Shushanna Baumann

Russia
My life –from the wellspring of Rus'
With blue eyes, like the sky
My life where sad old chapels are
With images that lost their polish
An icon with hand painted likeness
And the ground has miraculous strength
It is a luminous moment in heaven
This word sounds like a nightingale
Russia

This word caresses my ear,
This word is beating in my heart.
A rooster will crow at dawn
And fog will appear in meadows.
The sun will rise above the Earth gently.
The crunch of a branch will break the silence.
A hawk takes flight from a rock above the river
Frightened geese will gaggle.

No one will be able to break the
Connection between generations,
Devotion through the centuries
To our ancestors will not fade,
Mother Russia is a kind mother
Who will never forget her son.

I am not afraid to argue with fate,
I walk above a precipice, along the ledge,
I am whispering this fair name—Rus',
I am not losing hope for life.

"Rus', Russia," I am whispering to the Sky,
I repeat these words in my dream as prayers,
And I am crying,
But I don't know the reason.

РОССИЯ
Жизнь моя — родниковая Русь
С голубыми, как небо, глазами.
Постаревших часовен грусть
С потускневшими образами.
У икон — рукотворный лик,
У земли — чудотворная сила.
Это вечности светлый миг —
Соловьиное имя Россия.
Это имя ласкает мне слух,
Это имя под сердцем стучится.
На заре прогорланит петух,
И туман на лугах заклубится.
Встанет солнце над миром легко,
Тишина тонкой веткою хрустнет.
Ястреб камнем взлетит
над рекой —
Загогочут испуганно гуси.

Связь времен никому
не разъять:
Верность предкам в веках,
не остынет.
Мать-Россия, как добрая мать,
Никогда не забудет о сыне.

This poem was written circa 2000 in the Russian city of Tula. It can be found at http://medtsu.tula.ru/PZ/2011_2/20.pdf. The word Rus' refers to the ancient Russian people dating back to the ninth century. Shushanna Baumann holds a graduate specialist's degree from the Southern Federal University in Russia and was a translator at the 2014 Olympics in Sochi, Russia. (Graphic elements courtesy of freepik.com)

organizations in the West but with even stronger emphasis on national loyalty. In a state where all production aligned with official goals, the manufacture of children's toys and games reflected the proper attitudes. One interesting example was a board game titled *Voennaia taina*, or "military secret," based on the tale of a patriotic lad during the Russian Civil War. The hero, a boy called Mal'chish-Kibal'chish, endures interrogation by enemies of the October Revolution but never gives up his secret and dies a brave death. I purchased a version produced in 1981, but the story itself was much older.[27] To provide a fair context, I remember learning in grade school the patriotic American story of Nathan Hale, whose last words when facing hanging by the British for espionage were allegedly: "I only regret that I have but one life to lose for my country."[28] However, it seemingly never occurred to any U.S. game manufacturer to produce an associated board game, particularly with young children as an intended audience. On the other hand, Hale's statue still graces the Yale University campus where Hale studied shortly before the American Revolution.

Cover of a 1981 Russian board game *Voennaia Taina* (Military Secret), which is based on the tale of a young patriot during the Russian Civil War. (Photo courtesy of the author)

The oldest paramilitary youth organization in the USSR was best known by the abbreviation DOSAAF (*Dobrovol'noe obshchestvo aviatsii, armii I flota*), which in English is referred to as the Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army, Air Force, and Navy. Founded under another name in 1927, the organization expired with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Also important in molding the patriotic outlook of young Soviets was the *Komsomol*, the youth wing of the Communist Party. Participation in secondary school was vitally important for those aspiring to attend a college or university (see appendix A). Conversely, interest in the Orthodox Church, today a pillar of Russian identity once again, was a ticket to rejection.

Although he was hardly the first to say so, Smith believed that Marxism-Leninism followed directly in the wake of Orthodox Christianity in conferring on Russians a sense of moral distinctiveness, even chauvinism.[29] Today the Orthodox Church, after seven decades of marginalization under Soviet rule, is once again a pillar of Russian national identity.[30] Official support for the church, reflected in part by the erection or restoration of major cathedrals in the center of Moscow, has been generously reciprocated by leading Orthodox clergy. The church has aligned itself with Russian policy initiatives and has also served as an outreach agency to strengthen links with Orthodox Christians abroad. Orthodoxy has also deepened its association with the military, as evidenced by a spectacular project to construct a new cathedral specifically for members of the armed forces.

The calculated convergence of certain streams of Russian cultural and social life around patriotic messages is striking. Another significant manifestation of this trend is the linking of sport and patriotism in ways reminiscent of the Soviet era. Beginning with Stalin himself, Soviet officials viewed success in the international athletic arena as a highly effective means of enhancing national prestige and proving the potency of their political-economic system. The Soviet state focused resources on the development of highly competitive athletes and teams in all Olympic sports and by the 1960s came to dominate the medal rankings.[31] Because the Olympics were by design replete with nationalistic displays from the opening parade to flag-raising ceremonies at the conclusion

At the invitation of General Secretary of the Central Committee of Communist Party of the Soviet Union Yuri Andropov, U.S. girl Samantha Smith (*center, holding purse*) visits the USSR in July 1983 to take part in an all-Union Artek Young Pioneer camp. The Young Pioneer movement in the Soviet Union was an effort to create a youth organization similar to the Boy Scouts but with greater emphasis on promoting unquestioning devotion and obedience to the Soviet communist state. Recently, the Russian government has moved to restore similar youth movements within Russia for the purpose of promoting Russian patriotism and support for military service. (Photo by Yuryi Abramochkin, RIA Novosti via Wikimedia Commons)

of each event, they constituted the ideal venue for the propagation of Soviet messages.

Had everything gone according to plan, the culmination of Soviet sporting triumphs would have been the Moscow Olympiad in 1980. As one who was living in Moscow during 1979–1980, I can attest to the palpable sense of anticipation. Articles flooded the daily newspapers. Billboards, calendars, and countless souvenirs appeared many months in advance of what the government intended to be a gigantic symbol of international validation. Of course, the Soviets' ill-fated intervention in Afghanistan triggered an American-led boycott and deflected considerable attention away from the games and instead toward yet another Cold War dispute. Subsequently, the Soviets reciprocated by boycotting the Los Angeles games in 1984. Still, the point remains that notwithstanding claims to the contrary, for the Soviet regime sport was an active front in the international struggle to win hearts and minds.

After 1991, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the near collapse of the Russian economy, athletic achievement declined along with the economies of the former Soviet republics. The loss of funding led to the closure of training facilities, the emigration of top coaches, and slumping performances in competition. The loss of identity was vividly reflected in the fielding of Olympic squads under eccentric labels such as "Unified Team" in 1992. During the winter and summer games that year, twelve former Soviet republics agreed to send combined teams. Only the three Baltic republics—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—refused to participate under the common banner.



An artist's rendition of the future Main Cathedral of the Russian Armed Forces, intended as the center for patriotic spiritual education, which is due to open 9 May 2020 near Patriot Park in Moscow. (Image courtesy of the Russian Ministry of Defense)

When Putin successfully brought the 2014 Winter Olympics back to Russia in the city of Sochi, it marked a historic comeback. Russian citizens were duly proud. The games were a success in spite of adverse publicity about the last-minute completion of tourist facilities and serious graft in the completion of related construction projects. Fortunately, perhaps reflecting the lessons of 1980, Russia deferred its hotly controversial seizure of Crimea until after the closing ceremonies.

Recognizing that its athletic traditions provide a powerful rallying point for expression of national feeling, Russian publishers have paid more attention to the subject in recent years. For instance, *Futbol kotoryi my poteriali: ne prodazhnye zvezdy epokhi SSSR* (The Football We Lost: Priceless Stars of the Soviet Epoch), a nostalgic look back at the roster of Soviet era soccer stars, appeared in 2017. In a similar vein, *Khokkei: rodonachal'niki I novichki* (Hockey: Progenitors and Novices), an anthology of reminiscences by the great hockey coach Anatoli Tarasov, appeared in 2015. Both works evoke cherished memories for the generation of fans who lived through the late Soviet years and provide a sense of past athletic glory for a young generation that exhibits some infatuation with a bygone era.

Still, nothing rivals military history when it comes to galvanizing the patriotic spirit in Russia. In the 1990s, there was a surprising rush to republish old works from the imperial period that were long out of print. Biographies of once-famous figures such as Gen. Mikhail D. Skobelev, a hero of the war with Turkey and the Central Asian campaigns of the 1870s, appeared in new editions. Soon military publishing houses got into the act as well. A notable example, but just one among very many, would be *Voennaia elita rossiiskoi imperii 1700–1917* (The Military Elite of the Russian Empire), which reached bookstores in 2009.[32] Reference works of this type, offering brief depictions of campaigns and commanders, have both addressed and fueled rising interest in Russia's imperial military past.

This in no way means that there has been a de-emphasis of the Soviet military past. Rather, there is a visible attempt to fuse Russian and Soviet military history into a single stream. Perhaps the most striking illustration was the surge of interest in the role of White counterrevolutionary armies during the Russian

Russians participate in a 2011 reenactment of the 1812 Battle of Borodino, in which the Russian Imperial Army dealt a strategic defeat to Napoleon Bonaparte's invading French forces. Such reenactments receive official Russian government support and are used as tools for reinvigorating and promoting a patriotic national narrative emphasizing the continuity of Russian sacrifice in war and a legacy of military success. (Photo by Rulexip via Wikipedia)

Civil War. Leaders of the White movement had been officially cast into darkness and consigned to the role of self-serving villains in their opposition to the glorious October Revolution toward progress. The rehabilitation of White generals, including the publication of some of their works, suggests a kind of historical reconciliation vaguely resembling American post-Civil War narratives extolling the sacrifices of both sides. Three decades ago, the idea of simultaneous praise for such opposing figures as Mikhail Tukhachevskii and Anton Deniken would have been unimaginable.

Officially established by presidential decree Number 1710 in 2012, the Russian Military-Historical Society, or RMHS, has branches across the country. Honorary members include retired Gen. Makhmut A. Gareev, noted military theorist and president of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences, as well as Vladimir Medinsky, the minister of culture. Sponsored lectures, conferences, reenactments, youth history camps, and museum displays are part of a deliberate effort to build patriotic feeling and support for the Russian military. Its official website promotes recent movies such as *Tigers*, which is about tank combat in World War II, as well as recently published books. In all, the orchestration of a rich array resources is highly impressive.[33]

Equally interesting is the fact that Putin's picture graces the front page of the website along with a quote emphasizing the importance of remembering those who served their country in the past. In fact, Putin himself is a product of the cultivation of patriotic feeling through official messaging. A well-known 1970s television series titled *Seventeen Moments in Spring* featured a heroic Soviet spy known as Sterlitz, who embodied the call to selfless sacrifice in the service of his country. Commissioned by none other than Yuri Andropov, head of the *Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti* (commonly referred to as the KGB), the twelve-part serialized program attracted huge

audiences and was undoubtedly well-known to Putin, who would launch his own KGB career just two years later. Incredibly, Putin would actually play the part of a Sterlitz-like figure in a subsequent KGB-produced documentary about espionage. Anyhow, in 1999, the Russian newspaper *Kommersant* polled readers as to what film character they thought could serve as a model for the next Russian president. Among the top responses was Sterlitz, falling just behind Georgi Zhukov, the Soviet Union's most famous general and a figure whose role was often reprised on film.[34] The Putin presidency began only months later, so one could argue that the people got what they wanted.

> "Sponsored lectures, conferences, reenactments, youth history camps, and museum displays are part of a deliberate effort to build patriotic feeling and support for the Russian military."

What they evidently want more of today is military history. The RMHS website notes active projects related to festivals, book publication, fundraising, research projects, collection of memorabilia, protection of monuments, and various forms of disseminating knowledge about Russian history. Battlefield reenactments of imperial era clashes such as Borodino are really big. Meanwhile, it is worthwhile to illustrate the nature geographical distribution of activities in progress. In March 2019, the Museum of the Great Patriotic War in Kazan, capital of the Republic of Tatarstan, featured a lecture on the role of citizens of the republic in the valiant defense of Leningrad during the siege. A book on the same theme appeared in 2005, titled *Tatars in the Great Patriotic War and the Blockade of Leningrad: For the 60th Anniversary of Great Victory and the 1000th Anniversary of Kazan*.[35] One noteworthy aspect of the lecture and book is the weaving together of the themes of national sacrifice and the participation of the Tatar people in the common struggle against fascism. Equally striking is the book dedication to the one thousandth anniversary of Kazan, which implicitly melds the streams of Russian and Tatar history. In short, Tatars are part of a civilizational stream that is not only Russian at its core but also embraces most of the populations of Eurasia.

Meanwhile, the activities of the Tatarstan regional branch of the society are focused on youth. The regional web page proudly announced in May 2018 that four youths from Tatarstan would be selected on the basis of active participation in local research projects for a trip to the celebrated youth camp Artek on the Black Sea coast of Crimea. Activities included an ecological quest, performances by well-known artists and orchestras, and even a flash-mob event titled "Russia—My Motherland." Not incidentally, participants would also develop presentations on the participation of relatives during the Great Patriotic War.[36]

In 2019, the RMHS of Bashkortostan, Tatarstan's neighboring republic, promoted a meeting of the regional branch at the Museum of Military Glory in Ufa, the capital city. Featured events included an address by the noted military historian, Ramil Rakhimov.[37] An especially interesting aspect of the RMHS of Bashkortostan is that, like Tatarstan, it is a predominantly minority republic. The Tatars and Bashkirs, ethnic cousins with closely related Turkic languages, are both historically Muslim populations that have often been in the vanguard of independent cultural movements. For example, both republics were among the first within the Russian Federation to proclaim sovereignty after the dissolution of the USSR. Since that time, and particularly under Putin, regional autonomy has been significantly reduced.

Another characteristic event was a 2018 round table discussion concerning the eightieth anniversary of the obscure antifascist national resistance liberation movement against the Nazis in occupied territories. Presentations included a report on the secret intelligence course operated by the Communist International (Comintern) School in Ufa during the war as well as the participation of graduates in the liberation of Eastern Europe toward the end of war. The Comintern, of course, was the abbreviated name given to the Communist International, which functioned as an

umbrella organization for communist parties around the world under Moscow's leadership. During the war, as part of the general plan to remove critical institutions out of the path of the Nazi invasion, the school relocated from Moscow to Ufa. Particularly striking during the meeting was discussion of the battle to win the competition over historical memory, which was deemed particularly important in the present global political context.[38]

To date, Russian scholars have published little on the activity of the Comintern School, particularly during its residence in Ufa. One reason for this is that Stalin officially dissolved the Comintern as a diplomatic gesture to his Anglo-American allies during the middle of World War II. Another reason, in all probability, is that the Soviet Union exploited the Comintern as an instrument of its own foreign policy. Moreover, the idea of an international antifascist resistance movement launched in 1938 is highly problematic in light of the 1939 Nazi-Soviet pact alluded to earlier. Undeterred, the Ufa chapter announced a one hundredth anniversary conference on the Comintern for 2019.

The history of the Comintern has long been tricky for Russian scholars. The late Yale scholar of Soviet Russia, Wolfgang Leonhard, wrote an exceedingly interesting memoir about his experiences in the Comintern School under the title *Child of the Revolution*, which was first published in German in 1955. Leonhard and his mother, a communist, fled Berlin for the Soviet Union after Hitler's rise to power in 1933. Though his mother was arrested in Stalin's purges in 1936, young Wolfgang was allowed to continue his education. With the German invasion of Russia, the Soviet authorities sent him to the Comintern School in Ufa, where he learned the tradecraft of a professional ideologist and apparatchik. At the end of the war, the Soviets deployed him to Germany where he became an early cadre of the new East German regime. Realizing that communism in Eastern Europe was quickly assuming the Stalinist form he knew only too well, Leonhard escaped first to Yugoslavia and then to the West. At Yale, he was an ardent critic of the Soviet Union and its form of socialist dictatorship. Needless to add, Leonhard did not come up as a potential role model during the Ufa roundtable.[39]

In any case, the RMHS cites fourteen objectives for its activities (see appendix B). Objectives three and four are most pertinent to this article. The former emphasizes the cultivation of selfless dedication to the motherland and respect for its defenders among Russian youth. The latter calls for stimulation of patriotic feeling, particularly among youth nearing the age of military service. The remaining objectives deal with the necessary administrative functions related to promotion, coordination, research, acquisition of resources, and the overall educational mission.[40] The RMHS is by every indication a well-organized endeavor.

Overall, importance of history in Russia today lies in its role in not only shaping the identity of the population but also in the way that identity shapes behavior. The emphasis on loyalty to Russia's heritage and traditions influences everything from support for the existing regime to willingness to serve in the armed forces of the Russian Federation. History is a wonderful vehicle for this purpose, especially if those in charge have the power to shape the narrative. ■

Author's note: Whenever practical, the author adheres to the Library of Congress system of transliteration from Cyrillic to Latin letters; exceptions include spellings of names, terms of reference, or places that are commonly accepted in English and therefore more familiar to American readers.

Notes

Epigraph. "Russian Military-Historical Society," accessed 15 September 2019, https://rvio.histrf.ru.

1. Konstantin Shteppa, "The 'Lesser Evil' Formula," in *Rewriting Russian History*, ed. Cyril Black (New York: Vintage Books, 1962), 111–17. This formula made it possible to see Russia's expansion not as colonial imperialism but as the deliverance of neighboring peoples from a greater evil, conquest by foreign powers. This anthology of writings on different topics as treated by Soviet historians offers a rich perspective on the competition for primacy in the field. For an excellent discussion of the Soviet histories of non-Russian peoples, see Lowell Tillett, *The Great Friendship: Soviet Historians on the non-Russian Nationalities* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1969).

2. Cyril E. Black, "History and Politics in the Soviet Union," in Black, *Rewriting Russian History*, 6–8.

3. For a good discussion of openness, see Walter Laqueur, *The Long Road to Freedom: Russia and Glasnost* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1989), 48–77. Laqueur points out that the concept of glasnost was not new and indeed had a place in Russian intellectual tradition. Much debate attended the proper limits of disagreement

about history in 1987. A number of prominent historians such as Alexander Samsonov and Yuri Afanasiev spoke out about the failure of Soviet history to come to grips with the reality of Stalinism.

4. Laqueur, *The Long Road to Freedom*, 48; as reported in the United States, see Michael Parks, "History Exams Cancelled for Soviet Youngsters," *The Los Angeles Times*, 11 June 1988. The original official announcement in the Soviet Union appeared in *Izvestiia* on 10 June 1988.

5. For good coverage of the opportunity provided by the collapse of the Russian Imperial Army, see Alan Wildman, *The End of the Russian Imperial Army. The Old Army and the Soldiers' Revolt March-April 1917* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980).

6. For an old standard account of Leon Trotsky's role, see Isaac Deutscher, *The Prophet Armed. Trotsky: 1921-1929* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1959).

7. See Richard Taylor, "A Medium for the Masses: Agitation in the Soviet Civil War," *Soviet Studies* 22, no. 4 (April 1971): 562–74.

8. Ron Briley, "Sergei Eisenstein: The Artist in Service of the Revolution," *The History Teacher* 29, no. 4 (August 1996): 525.

9. Ibid., 528.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid., 532–33.

12. John Haynes, "Brothers in Arms: The Changing Face of the Soviet Soldiers in Stalinist Cinema," *The Modern Language Review* 95, no. 1 (January 2000): 162.

13. Martin Malia, *The Soviet Tragedy. A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917–1991* (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 235.

14. Ibid., 237.

15. Ibid., 238.

16. Haynes, "Brothers in Arms," 155.

17. International Crisis Group, "Patriotic Mobilization in Russia," Report No. 251 (4 July 2018), 3.

18. Stephen Cohen, "Historical Monuments, From Charlottesville to Moscow," in *War with Russia? From Putin and Ukraine to Trump and Russiagate* (New York: Hot Books, 2019), Kindle.

19. Zbigniew Rokita, "In the Name of Matijlda," *New Eastern Europe*, no. 2 (2018): 32–35, accessed 26 August 2019, http://neweasterneurope.eu/2018/02/26/in-the-name-of-matilda/ (subscription required).

20. "Positive Views of Stalin on the Rise," RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, 11 April 2018, accessed 26 August 2019, https://rferl.org/a/positive/a/positive-views-of-stalin/29159116.html.

21. For a discussion of Vernadsky's influence, see Charles Halperin, "George Vernadsky, Eurasianism, the Mongols and Russia," *Slavic Review* 41, no. 3 (Autumn 1982): 477–93, accessed 26 August 2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2497020.

22. See Marlene Laruelle, "Russia as an Anti-liberal European Civilization," in *The New Russian Nationalism: Imperialism, Ethnicity and Authoritarianism 2000-2015*, ed. Pal Kolsto and Helge Blakkisrud (Edinburgh, Scotland: Edinburgh University, 2016), 275–97, accessed 26 August 2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3366/j.ctt1bh2kk5.17.

23. See, for example, Shaun Walker, "From One Vladimir to Another: Putin Unveils Huge Statue in Moscow," *The Guardian* (website), 4 November 2016, accessed 26 August 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/04/vladimir-great-statue-unveiled-putin-moscow.

24. Liana Fix, "A German Riddle Wrapped in a Mystery inside an Enigma," *New Eastern Europe*, no. 2 (2018): 349–50, accessed 5 September 2019, http://neweasterneurope.eu/2018/02/26/german-riddle-wrapped-mystery-inside-enigma/ (subscription required).

25. Hedrick Smith, *The Russians* (New York: The New York Times, 1973), 303.

26. Ibid., 310.

27. First published in 1980, one version of the story written for children by Arkadii Gaidar reappeared in 1988 with a production run of 2.5 million. See Arkladii Gaidar, *Skazka o voennoi taine, o Ma'lchishe-Kibal'chishe I ego tverdom slove* [Tale of the military secret about little boy Kibalchish and his sacred word] (Moscow: Detskaia literatura, 1988).

28. Among the more recent works about Nathan Hale is Alexander Rose's *Washington's Spies: The Story of America's First Spy Ring* (New York: Random House, 2006). Much has been written over the years concerning the life and exploits of Hale, who used to be a standard figure in history textbooks. In any case, his famous last words are unverifiable.

29. Smith, *The Russians*, 311.

30. For a concise discussion of the way the Orthodox Church fits within Putin's concept of Russian identity and patriotism, see Mark Galeotti and Andrew Bowen, "Opening Gambit: Putin's Empire of the Mind," *Foreign Policy*, no. 206 (May-June 2014): 16–19, accessed 26 August 2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24577406. The authors also stress the establishment of "Rossiiskii state nationalism" that transcends Russian ethnicity.

31. Robert F. Baumann, "The Central Army Sports Club: Forging a Tradition in Soviet Ice Hockey," *The Journal of Sports History* 15, no. 2 (Summer 1988): 151–66.

32. P. M. Portugal'ski and V. A. Runov, eds., *Voennaia elita Rossiiskoi imperii 1700–1917. Entskilpedicheskii spravochnik*. [Military elite of the Russian empire] (Moscow: Veche, 2009).

33. The RMHS website is worth checking out. See *Rossiiskoe voenno-istoricheskoe obshchestvo* [Russian Military-Historical Society], accessed 26 August 2019, https://rvio.histrf.ru/. Notably, the official title of the organization uses the word *Rossiiskoe*—not *russkoe*—indicating that Russian military history is based on cultural affinity and participation in a common cause rather than an ethnically framed narrative. In point of fact, the society's presence is well established in many regions that are not predominantly Russian.

34. "Was the Soviet James Bond Vladimir Putin's Role Model?," BBC, 10 May 2017, accessed 26 August 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-39862225.

35. Rakhim Teliashov, *Tatary v velikoi otechestvennoi voine I blockade Leningrada. K 60-letiiu Velikoi Pobedy I 1000-letiiu Kazan*i (Saint Petersburg, Russia: 2005).

36. "Shkol'niki Tatarstana otpravilis' v 'Artek'" [Tatar school children sent to Artek], Russian Military-Historical Society, 28 May 2018, accessed 26 August 2019, https://rvio.histrf.ru/soobshestvo/post-9180.

37. "Obshchoe sobranie regional'noe otdelenie rossiiskogo voenno-istoricheskogo obshchestva v respublike Bashkortostan" [General meeting of the regional branch of the military history society of the republic of Bashkortostan], Russian Military-Historical Society, 15 February 2019, accessed 26 August 2019, https://rvio.histrf.ru/soobshestvo/post-11002.

38. "V respublikanskom muzee boevoi slavy respubliki Bashkortostan proshel kruglyi stol Rol' dvizheniia soprotivleniia v osvobozhdenii Evropy ot natsizma," Russian Military-Historical Society, 13 December 2018, accessed 26 August 2019, https://rvio.histrf.ru/soobshestvo/post-10547.

39. Wolfgang Leonhard, *Child of the Revolution* (London: Collins, 1957). Leonhard's mother was eventually released years after Stalin's death.

40. "Tasks," Russian Military-Historical Society, accessed 4 September 2019, https://rvio.histrf.ru/activities/objectives.

Appendix A

Military-Historical Camp: Tasks

- Education of the young patriots of the Fatherland on the basis of traditional values of Russian society
- Spiritual development of teenagers education of the basic moral qualities—honesty, sense of teamwork, diligence, commitment, sense of responsibility. Disclosure and develop children's creative and intellectual abilities
- The formation and support of an informed interest in the study of Russian military history and preservation of monuments of the military-historical heritage
- Initiation of children and adolescents to the study and preservation of Russian military history and military-historical heritage, promotion of historical military knowledge and military traditions
- Assistance to formation of children and adolescents active citizenship, patriotic, state ideology
- Propaganda of the days of military glory of Russia, raising the prestige of service to the Fatherland, the formation of today's successful image of the military, a positive attitude to the Armed Forces and other security agencies of the younger generation
- Basic military and physical training, obtaining and consolidation of the basic skills and knowledge of human behavior in natural conditions

Военно-исторические лагеря

ЗАДАЧИ

- Воспитание молодых патриотов Отечества на основе традиционных ценностей российского общества
- Духовное развитие подростков, воспитание основополагающих нравственных качеств – честности, чувства коллективизма, трудолюбия, обязательности, чувства ответственности. Раскрытие и развитие у детей творческих и интеллектуальных способностей
- Формирование и поддержка осознанного интереса к изучению военной истории России и сохранению памятников военно-исторического наследия
- Приобщение детей и подростков к изучению и сохранению отечественной военной истории и военно-исторического наследия, популяризации военно-исторических знаний и воинских традиций
- Содействие формированию у детей и подростков активной гражданской позиции, патриотического, государственного мировоззрения
- Пропаганда Дней воинской славы России, поднятие престижа служения Отечеству, формирование современного успешного образа военного, позитивного отношения к Вооруженным Силам и другим силовым структурам у подрастающего поколения
- Начальная военная и физическая подготовка, получение и закрепление основных навыков и знаний поведения человека в естественных условиях

Source: "Tasks," Rossiiskoe voenno-istoricheskoe obshchestvo [Russian Military-Historical Society], accessed 17 September 2019, https://rvio.histrf.ru/activities/lager.

Appendix B

Russian Military-Historical Society:Tasks

1. Assistance to the governmental institutions of the Russian society in the development and implementation of state policy, target and other programs and projects, improvement of legislation and normative legal base in the sphere of military-historical activities.
2. The formation, support and direction of public initiatives in a comprehensive and profound study of the historical military past of our Motherland.
3. Education of citizens, especially youth and young adults, in the spirit of love, devotion and selfless service to the Motherland, respect for the Defender of the Fatherland, to the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
4. Stimulation of members of the Society, other persons involved in the study of military historical heritage in an active military-Patriotic education of Russian citizens, particularly those of military and preinduction age.
5. The integration and coordination of activities of organizations and individuals involved in the study of military history, or contributing to the expansion of military-historical knowledge.
6. The establishment of regional offices of Companies, organizations and movements, clubs, cultural centres and other entities involved in military-historical projects.
7. Preservation, promotion and dissemination of military-historical knowledge in the light of modern information and innovative technologies.
8. To preserve and promote the historical and cultural military-historical heritage of Russia, archival, museum and library collections relating to military history topics. Active implementation of the publishing and information activities.
9. Support the activities of existing centres of military culture — the military-historical museums, libraries, archives and other institutions, the creation of new museums, exhibition complexes, cultural centers and associations.
10. The preservation and restoration of all types and kinds of monuments of military history of Russia.
11. The development of military-historical reconstruction in Russia. The support of the military-historical clubs and associations. A military-historical reconstructions of battles and memorable events of Russian military history.
12. Participation in the military archaeological excavations on the fields of former battles, where the most important historical events.
13. Attracting the attention of Russian and international public to the unique historical-cultural and historical-military objects and monuments of the Russian Federation for the intensive development of tourism in Russia.
14. The development of military-sports clubs and organizations.

ЗАДАЧИ

1. Содействие государственным институтам российского общества в разработке и реализации государственной политики, целевых и иных программ и проектов, совершенствовании законодательства и нормативной правовой базы в сфере военно-исторической деятельности.
2. Формирование, поддержка и направление общественной инициативы на всестороннее и глубокое изучение военно-исторического прошлого нашей Родины.
3. Воспитание граждан России, особенно молодежи и юношества, в духе любви, преданности и беззаветного служения Родине, уважения к Защитнику Отечества, Вооруженным Силам Российской Федерации.
4. Стимулирование членов Общества, других лиц, занимающихся изучением военно-исторического наследия, на активное военно-патриотическое воспитание граждан России, особенно лиц призывного и допризывного возраста.

5. Объединение и координация деятельности организаций и лиц, занимающихся изучением военной истории, или содействующих расширению военно-исторических знаний.
6. Создание региональных отделений Общества, организаций и движений, кружков, историко-культурных центров и других структур, занимающихся военно-историческими проектами.
7. Сохранение, пропаганда и распространение военно-исторических знаний с учетом современных информационных и инновационных технологий.
8. Сохранение и популяризация исторического и культурного военно-исторического наследия России, архивных, музейных и библиотечных фондов, относящихся к военно-исторической тематике. Активное проведение издательской и информационной деятельности.
9. Поддержка деятельности имеющихся центров военно-исторической культуры — военно-исторических музеев, библиотек, архивов и других структур, создание новых музейных, выставочных комплексов, историко-культурных центров и объединений.
10. Сохранение и восстановление всех видов и наименований памятников военной истории России.
11. Развитие военно-исторической реконструкции в России. Поддержка военно-исторических клубов и объединений. Проведение военно-исторических реконструкций сражений и памятных мероприятий Российской военной истории.
12. Участие в проведении военно-археологических раскопок на полях бывших сражений, в местах наиболее важных исторических событий.
13. Привлечение широкого внимания российской и международной общественности к уникальным историко-культурным и историко-военным объектам и памятникам Российской Федерации для интенсивного развития туризма в России.
14. Развитие военно-спортивных обществ и организаций.

Source: "Tasks," Rossiiskoe voenno-istoricheskoe obshchestvo [Russian Military-Historical Society], accessed 17 September 2019, https://rvio.histrf.ru/activities/objectives.

For those interested another work by Dr. Robert Baumann, *Military Review* suggests "A Central Asian Perspective on Russian Soft Power: The View from Tashkent," which analyzes the Russian soft power approach to Uzbekistan. To view this article from the July-August 2018 edition of *Military Review*, please visit https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/July-August-2018/Baumann-Asian/.

For more on Russian government-sponsored youth movements, *Military Review* recommends "Young Army Movement: Winning the Hearts and Minds of Russian Youth" by Maj. Ray Finch, a Russian-area specialist. To view this article from the September-October 2019 edition of *Military Review*, please visit https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/September-October-2019/Finch-Young-Army/.

Providing for the Common Defense

The Assessment and Recommendations of the National Defense Strategy Commission



A study conducted by the National Defense Strategy Commission, an independent agency whose board is appointed by the House and Senate Armed Services committees, has concluded that the Defense Department is not financially or strategically set up to wage two wars at once and could even lose a war against China or Russia individually. The report opines that "changes at home and abroad are diminishing U.S. military advantages and threatening vital U.S. interests. Authoritarian competitors—especially China and Russia—are seeking regional hegemony and the means to project power globally. They are pursuing determined military buildups aimed at neutralizing U.S. strengths." Also, that "the security and wellbeing of the United States are at greater risk than at any time in decades. America's military superiority—the hard-power backbone of its global influence and national security—has eroded to a dangerous degree. Rivals and adversaries are challenging the United States on many fronts and in many domains. America's ability to defend its allies, its partners, and its own vital interests is increasingly in doubt. If the nation does not act promptly to remedy these circumstances, the consequences will be grave and lasting." The report, *Providing for the Common Defense: The Assessment and Recommendations of the National Defense Strategy Commission,* can be accessed at https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2018-11/providing-for-the-common-defense.pdf.

Shadows of War

Violence along the Korean Demilitarized Zone

Capt. Michael Anderson, U.S. Army

As the Korean War raged in its final years over the terrain that would eventually divide North and South Korea, Gen. James A. Van Fleet, commander of the Eighth Army, told his superior, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgeway, then commander of the United Nations (UN) Forces, "Communist forces will violate the terms of the treaty as they have in the past by improving their potentialities for unexpected renewal of aggression."[1] Accordingly, from the armistice in 1953 to the 1990s, danger, violence, and death typified American military service along the demilitarized zone (DMZ), the area along the 38th parallel between the communist Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (South Korea, or ROK). The hostilities and hazards continued beyond the Korean War cease-fire, resulting in over two hundred U.S. casualties, including nearly one hundred fatalities. Without unification between the two governments, the threat and danger ebbed and flowed over time but always remained.

The ongoing violent struggle along the DMZ has taken the lives of many Americans, affected even more, and stands as an important aspect of U.S. Army history. This hazardous duty is often completed without the normal awards and recognition given to soldiers serving in other dangerous postings. There are no campaign streamers or parades, and there is limited and largely retroactive recognition of wartime service with combat patches and combat badges for DMZ conflict, but these omissions do not take away the truth behind the dangerous duty many American soldiers conducted in the years after the 1953 armistice in Korea.

Ending the War and Instituting the DMZ

Less than a year after hostilities began on 25 June 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued guidance on 27 March 1951 regarding the question of a DMZ. They directed the DMZ to comprise an area twenty miles wide and to be centered along, or just north of, the 38th parallel (based on the exact battle lines at the time of any armistice signing). Ridgeway's consultations with his subordinate, Van Fleet, on what area best fits the criteria for a DMZ drove the final years of the conflict. As early as 23 June 1951, Soviet Union overtures for peace negotiations came to the United States; however, the war dragged on for another two years.[2]

Cease-fire talks progressed, and on the morning of 27 July 1953, Lt. Gen. William Harrison Jr., senior delegate for the UN Forces, signed the armistice in the presence of the North Korean delegation. Gen. Mark W. Clark, UN Forces commander, noted this was a purely military cease-fire, leaving it to the diplomats to determine the lasting political solution. He further emphasized that there would be no UN withdrawals or lowering of its guard along the DMZ until a permanent solution materialized.[3]

By mid-June 1954, Clark's hopeful political solution died with the failure of the delegation talks in Switzerland, as both Korean governments stubbornly affirmed that unification and elections were impossible without one side's complete abdication, leaving only the cease-fire armistice.[4] The Korean War cost the UN Command over 500,200 soldiers, with 94,000 killed. The United States lost 33,629 soldiers while 103,284 were wounded and 5,178 were missing in action or prisoners of war at the time of the cease-fire. The ROK lost 58,217 soldiers with 175,743 wounded. North Korean and Chinese forces losses remained unclear, with estimations as high as 1.5 million.[5] Estimations placed civilian losses in both North and South Korea at over a million each.

Though achieving minor territorial changes, the UN Forces preserved the ROK. In the end, the DMZ narrowed to four kilometers due to the insistence of North Korea, although the UN held firm to making the geography align with the stabilized battlefront, rather than defaulting back to the exact 38th parallel.[6] Called by many American soldiers "the loneliest spot in the world," the DMZ stretched

Capt. Michael Anderson, U.S. Army, is assigned to the Directorate of Operations, Readiness, and Mobilization, Headquarters, Department of the Army G-3/5/7. He holds a BA from the University of Central Florida (double major in history and political science [international relations]) and an MA in military history from Norwich University.

Previous page: U.S. and South Korean troops inspect the bodies of North Korean special forces infiltrators killed during the January 1968 "Blue House" [name of the presidential residence] assassination raid in Seoul against South Korean President Park Chung-hee. Of the thirty-one attackers, most were killed, one was captured alive, and one other escaped back to North Korea. (Photo from Korean Newsletter, https://president.jp/articles/-/23398)

across one end of the peninsula to other from the Sea of Japan on the east to the Yellow Sea on the west, split by the Imjin River and rolling terrain.[7]

(Original map by Rishabh Tatiraju via Wikimedia Commons; modified by Arin Burgess, *Military Review*)

Korean Demilitarized Zone

The Quiet War: Violence along the DMZ from 1966 to 1969

The first major outbreak of violence along the DMZ following the cease-fire erupted while American focus was concentrated on Vietnam. Taking advantage of American resources divided between Europe and Vietnam, the North Korean communist regime under Kim Il-sung intensified efforts to undermine and destabilize the ROK government and inspire an uprising through a robust infiltration campaign. These incidents, labeled the "Quiet War" by South Koreans, marked the most violent episodes of the postwar DMZ.

Prior to the renewed North Korean infiltration in 1966, only eight U.S. soldiers died along the DMZ in isolated, uncoordinated exchanges of gunfire.[8] In October 1966, the first confrontations along the DMZ saw occasional gunfire exchanged along the South Korean sections of the DMZ. In multiple small-scale engagements along the east, central, and western sections of the DMZ, North Koreans killed twenty-eight ROK soldiers in a series of raids; there were no Americans involved. However, in the early hours of 2 November 1966, North Korean infiltrators ambushed an eight-man U.S. 2nd Infantry Division patrol. The ambush was one of the deadliest engagements along the DMZ and the first major action involving Americans. With small arms and grenades, North Koreans killed seven Americans and one Korean Augmentation to the United States Army (KATUSA) soldier. The North Koreans bayoneted and shot some of the bodies before looting them of ammunition, weapons, and souvenirs, including taking Pvt. David L. Bibee's watch as he played dead. Bibee, who was knocked unconscious in the opening explosions, was unknowingly left alive and later told reporters, "I played like I was dead. The only reason I'm alive now is because I didn't move."[9] That evening on 2 November 1966, in the South Korean section of the DMZ, another ambush took place, killing two South Korean soldiers.[10]

In a growing Cold War that stretched from Eastern Europe to Southeast Asia and the Korean DMZ, the delicate situation on the DMZ required balancing defense without sparking an increase in hostilities. The balance preserved the potential for political and peaceful resolution of the ongoing Korean dispute, meaning the best answer was often the presence of *manpower* versus the use of *firepower* along the DMZ. Historically, this contradicted normal U.S. approach to warfare.[11] In 1966, North Korean attacks totaled forty-two, but the violence followed a seasonal pattern, dropping in the winter months and peaking in springtime.[12]

The Third Tunnel of Aggression, or Third Infiltration Tunnel, is one of four known tunnels crossing under the border between North Korea and South Korea and extending south of Panmunjom. This photo was taken 10 August 2011 inside the tunnel. (Photo by Daugilas via Wikimedia Commons)

The American response came in January 1967 from Gen. Charles H. Bonesteel, commander of the combined U.S. and ROK forces, with a focus on stemming North Korean infiltration.[13] The combined U.S. and ROK forces established an innovative and enduring infiltrator "net" in the DMZ. The net consisted of four parts: forward patrols, integrated guard posts, an improved physical barrier along the DMZ, and pre-positioned quick-reaction forces. Forming the patrolling portion of the net, squad- and platoon-sized elements went out for up to twenty-four-hour periods, with each company within the areas assigned to American forces along the DMZ having a patrol out at all times. They moved during daylight and established ambushes at night.[14] The improved physical barrier, a ten-foot-tall chain-link fence with triple-strand concertina wire along the top remained formidable, and a raked sand path on the southern side highlighted any infiltrator foot traffic. A nearly 120-yard open area beyond the sand path was laced with mines and tanglefoot wire.[15] Engineers cleared grounds and installed searchlights and sensors, increasing visibility between guard posts. Another innovation came from the Army importing buckwheat, the white blooms of the grain making thermal signatures more detectable when using night vision.[16]

Bonesteel emphasized the physical barrier was not meant to stop infiltrators but rather to hinder them and alert forces of intrusions for rapid application of the reaction forces to catch them.[17] By the nature of their purpose and demand for mobility, these quick reaction forces typically came from mounted units with limited air mobility. Although successful for Bonesteel's stated purpose, the barrier fencing faced funding challenges, spanning only two of the ten divisional fronts along the DMZ (one U.S. infantry division and nine ROK divisions held positions along the southern portion of the DMZ).[18]

Even with the increasing violence, it was 30 July 1968, roughly eighteen months later, when Bonesteel received all required funding to complete the barrier fence across the length of the DMZ.[19]

Rotating units along the DMZ was also implemented under Bonesteel to counter North Korean infiltration. Rotation allowed soldiers to rest while providing training opportunities in the latest patrolling techniques and equipment. While behind the DMZ, units combined these patrolling drills with actual rear area security sweeps, supporting the South Korean-led counterinsurgency efforts.[20]

Despite these efforts, the North Korean infiltration continued. From May 1967 to January 1968, American forces in South Korea suffered fifteen casualties and sixty-five injuries in over three hundred reported violent incidents.[21] South Korean casualties topped one hundred killed and two hundred wounded.[22] In May 1967, North Korean infiltrators blew up a U.S. barrack.[23] The skies above the DMZ saw North and South Korean jets sparring, and the seas along the coast saw engagements between the two small-boat navies, resulting in increased casualties between the two sides without U.S. involvement. Dealing with seaborne infiltration along the South Korean coastline, an area twenty-eight times as large as the DMZ, was wholly a South Korean endeavor.[24]

On 30 October 1968, the South Koreans repulsed the largest landings yet by North Korean special operations teams, significantly breaking the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's effort to foment insurrection in the South. One hundred twenty communist infiltrators landed on eight separate beachheads along the Ulchin-Samcheok village to facilitate guerrilla units undermining the South Korean government. Within two weeks, the South Koreans killed 110 Korean People's Army (KPA, the de facto army of North Korea) special operations officers and captured seven more at the cost of losing sixty-three of their men, including twenty-three civilians.[25]

After recovering from the failure of their seaborne-based subversion, a specially trained North Korean infiltration team of twenty-six personnel penetrated the U.S. section of the DMZ on 17 January 1968. Its mission was to assassinate the South Korean president in his residence, the Blue House, with a secondary target of the U.S. embassy compound. However, local South Korean woodcutters alerted authorities. A diligent policeman grilled the infiltrators, foiling their attack less than a mile from the Blue House. The multiday hunt was the costliest part of the incident, as the would-be assassins fled north. During this pursuit, three Americans died and three were wounded, while sixty-eight South Koreans died and sixty-six were wounded including soldiers, police, and civilians. The North Korean infiltrators suffered twenty-three killed, one captured, and two missing in action (presumed dead), comprising the entire force.[26] However, a KPA survivor of the infiltration stated that getting through the U.S. zone was "quite easy."[27] The 1968 attempt was the final mass-scale infiltration by the KPA.

From more than seven hundred actions in 1968, barely over one hundred incidents occurred in 1969.[28] The first months of 1969 had multiple infiltration attempts across the DMZ fail without losses to South Korean or American forces. The intensity of North Korean hostility dropped off as precipitously as it had spiked in 1966. The spring campaign season saw an increase in skirmishing between the forces along the DMZ but fewer attempts at infiltration. There would not be any more major offensive operations such as those made during the Quiet War.

The KPA's attacks in 1969 largely consisted of ambushing common laborers in the DMZ. On one occasion, KPA forces killed one laborer, with two additional dying when the medical evacuation helicopter crashed after takeoff. In mid-October, a team of North Korean soldiers patrolling the DMZ ambushed four Americans soldiers foolishly driving in a Jeep through the DMZ with a white flag.[29] This ambush signaled the last American deaths in the final days of the Quiet War.

Between 1966 and 1969, seventy U.S. lives were lost and 111 soldiers were wounded, with the ROK force suffering 299 fatalities and 550 injuries. In comparison, 397 KPA soldiers were killed, twelve were captured, and thirty-three defected to the south. The total wounded remains unknown.[30] A memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated, "These men serving along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) are no longer involved in cold war operations. They are involved … in combat where vehicles are blown up by mines, patrols are ambushed, and psychological operations are conducted."[31] A newspaper quoted one U.S. soldier saying, "There's a war here too," referring to the focus on Vietnam.[32]

Tunnels, Trees, and Gunfights

The early 1970s saw limited violence with virtually all of it in the South Korean zones. However, even as the violence decreased, a new dimension emerged with the first

discovery of a North Korean tunnel. On 20 November 1974, a South Korean patrol discovered a tunnel reaching a kilometer into the DMZ, resulting in a short gunfight without injuries. A North Korean device exploded five days later during the investigation of the tunnel, killing U.S. Navy Cmdr. Robert M. Ballinger and his South Korean counterpart as well as injuring five other Americans.

company composed of 166 soldiers, of which roughly a hundred were American, at Camp Kitty Hawk near the JSA town of Panmunjom.

Typical of duty on the DMZ, a simple activity such as trimming a forty-foot tall Normandy poplar tree could turn violent without warning. In June 1976, while trying to trim trees, a firefight between South Korean troops

> These men serving along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) are no longer involved in cold war operations. They are involved … in combat where vehicles are blown up by mines, patrols are ambushed, and psychological operations are conducted.

This marked the beginning of a subterranean battle between North Korean tunneling and U.S. and Republic of Korea detection and countertunneling efforts. A joint U.S. and ROK tunnel neutralization team equipped with seismic equipment served as the main countereffort. A second tunnel discovered in March 1975 and a third discovered in November 1978 via a tip provided by a North Korean defector indicated the longevity of the threat. The third tunnel reached four hundred meters into South Korea, less than two miles from an American base.[33] The massive tunnels had electricity and had an estimated capacity to move ten thousand to thirty thousand troops an hour with up to four soldiers marching abreast.[34] In March 1990, another tunnel was discovered stretching across the DMZ at 225 feet below the surface.[35] The tunnels remained an ongoing source of danger with the tunneling and countertunneling hazards adding to the inherent danger of contact with the North Koreans.

In the summer of 1976, a bloody firefight occurred that began with a simple task of trimming a tree blocking the American view in the Joint Security Area (JSA) of the "Bridge of No Return," where prisoners of war were exchanged following the 1953 armistice. The JSA sat squarely in the center of the DMZ where the two sides met in small huts and wooden structures to discuss issues. The Americans and their allies worked daily face-to-face with North Korean counterparts in the eight hundred-yard wide JSA. Five officers and thirty enlisted American soldiers manned the JSA at any given time. These soldiers came from the special JSA

and North Korean infiltrators resulted in three deaths to both sides. Then on 5 August, both Korean forces exchanged machine-gun fire. This led to the rescheduling for the tree trimming from 7 August to 18 August. The JSA commander, Capt. Arthur Bonifas, was a Vietnam veteran with only three days left on the DMZ before returning to the United States. Under the prevailing atmosphere of the time, he decided to personally plan and lead the rescheduled detail.[36]

Bonifas arrayed his company for the event, having one platoon approximately seven hundred meters south near checkpoint 4, another platoon on standby near the JSA compound, and his remaining platoon off duty. The captain took with him Lt. Mark T. Barrett, the leader of the platoon stationed just south of the bridge, twelve South Korean laborers (to trim the offending branches), and a small guard detail armed with ax handles for clubs (according to the armistice rules, only officers carried pistols within the JSA) with a ROK officer serving as a translator.

Ten minutes after the tree trimming detail began, eleven North Korean soldiers arrived to investigate the activities near the bridge. After confirming it was only a tree trimming detail, they backed away, returning a few moments later with a truck carrying twenty more KPA soldiers with metal pipes and clubs. When told by a North Korean officer to cease working, the American officers ignored him and signaled the South Korean laborers to continue working. A moment later, the North Korean officer screamed out in Korean, "Kill him!" and struck Bonifas from behind, knocking him to the ground.

North Korean soldiers attack a tree-pruning crew 18 August 1976 at the Joint Security Area within the demilitarized zone separating North Korea and South Korea in Panmunjom, Korea. In this incident, two United Nations Command guard officers of the U.S. Army, Maj. Arthur G. Bonifas and 1st Lt. Mark T. Barrett, were beaten to death by a gang of more than thirty North Korean security guards. (Photo from Hum Images/Alamy Stock Photo)

As the guard from the nearby American outpost watched through binoculars, he saw the North Koreans swarm the fallen Bonifas, beating him to death with metal pipes and clubs, while Barrett fled to a nearby ravine pursued by several club-wielding North Koreans. Meanwhile, the South Korean laborers fled, dropping their tools, and were chased and beaten by KPA soldiers who picked up their tools and began swinging them in their brutal assault.[37]

The attack lasted four violent minutes. The JSA response force arrived too late to influence the actual hostilities. They evacuated the mortally wounded Bonifas and recovered Barrett's body, found bludgeoned in the ravine. Four other American soldiers suffered wounds along with five South Koreans in the incident.[38]

The response resulted in Operation Paul Bunyan, an 813 soldier task force entering the JSA, giving the North Koreans a symbolic and unprecedented short three-minute notification on 21 August. With three B-52 bombers flying overhead, helicopters landed in an open field next to the old tree, and the task force, armed with chainsaws and axes and supported by Cobra helicopter gunships, cut it down in forty-five minutes. They left behind a waist-high, four-foot diameter stump where the poplar tree once stood while a hundred North Koreans passively watched from across the bridge.[39]

Another cause of heightened tensions were defections from North Korea, which commonly occurred and at times resulted in short spurts of violence along the DMZ, emphasizing the unpredictability of daily duty and showing the instantaneous danger soldiers faced. One such violent incident began shortly before noon on Friday,

23 November 1984, when a Soviet citizen employed by the Soviet embassy in Pyongyang took a North Korean propaganda tour of Panmunjom. During the tour, Vasily Yakovlevich Matuzok, a twenty-two-year-old linguist for the embassy, suddenly sprinted from the group. Having planned his defection for over two years, he made his run as soon as he noticed a lack of attention from the KPA guards. Immediately, twenty to thirty North Koreans began chasing him, as he yelled in English, "Help me! Cover me!"[40] The North Koreans pursued Matuzok over a hundred yards into the southern portion of the JSA while firing at him. Only sidearms were authorized in the JSA, but the KPA soldiers began firing automatic rifles at the defector.[41] Pvt. Michael A. Burgoyne and KATUSA partner, Cpl. Jang Myong-ki, heard the commotion as they were escorting a South Korean labor party. Quickly getting the unarmed workers to safety, the two moved to a helipad near Matuzok's hiding spot in a clump of bushes. The two guards drew their pistols, engaging the pursuing North Koreans. Burgoyne said, "I opened fire at about fifteen [KPA soldiers] and they all stopped and started firing at me." Hiding behind a tree, Burgoyne's fire killed one of the first two North Koreans firing at Matuzok. Burgoyne was less than ten feet from Jang when the KATUSA was struck by a bullet just below the right eye, killing him. Shortly thereafter, in the intensifying gunfire, Burgoyne was struck by a bullet in the neck.[42]

The firefight rapidly escalated in a matter of seconds as ten Americans and the KATUSAs exited checkpoint 4, engaging the North Koreans. Two more soldiers from checkpoint 5 engaged the KPA soldiers, all firing .45 caliber semiautomatic pistols. This fire drove the KPA soldiers into an isolated area called the "Sunken Garden."

Less than one minute after Matuzok crossed over and the firing began, the leader of the platoon on shift, Lt. Thomas Thompson reported the shots fired and started the process to get the motorized, more heavily armed, quick reaction force (QRF) moving from their position at Camp Kitty Hawk.

At 1140, the QRF dismounted a hundred meters from checkpoint 2 in the JSA with three squads of nine riflemen and an attached machine gun team. While the QRF maneuvered into position, Spc. Jon Orlicki lobbed forty-millimeter grenades from his M203 launcher into the "Sunken Garden," killing at least one North Korean and injuring others. The commander of the JSA security force, Capt. Bert K. Mizusawa, orchestrated an envelopment of the isolated KPA soldiers by reinforcing the guard posts and swung the squads of Staff Sgt. Richard Lamb and Staff Sgt. Curtis Gissendanner over open ground. This group encountered an unarmed civilian, who they quickly identified as Matuzok, and passed him to the platoon sergeant for handling. Mizusawa continued maneuvering his forces, and Lamb's squad came within fifteen meters of the North Koreans before the KPA soldiers started raising their hands in surrender. While this was happening, the North Korean command team in the JSA frantically called their UN counterparts and requested a cease-fire. The request quickly went up to the UN Command in Seoul, whose priority was to maintain the armistice and mitigate any lasting impacts from incidents affecting ongoing talks, and it was approved.[43]

The entire firefight lasted forty-five minutes, the first ten minutes being the most intense. The toll rested with one South Korean killed, one American wounded, three North Koreans killed, and one wounded North Korean. After the November shootout, an American soldier stationed along the DMZ said, "It makes it all a lot more real."[44]

Gunfire exchanges remained a common violent occurrence along the DMZ even after 1984, with South Koreans facing the most danger and fewer involving Americans; the phased withdrawal of American forces from guard posts and checkpoints along the DMZ into camps miles away left only a small contingent within the JSA. The violence shifted to major confrontations at sea centered on the coast and nearby islands, with limited air incidents.[45] The remaining land-based danger consisted of unregistered minefields; on 4 August 2015 two South Korean soldiers were injured by mines outside their gate as they departed on a DMZ patrol.[46]

The Question of Combat Recognition

During the height of the Quiet War, the Joint Chiefs of Staff designated the area north of the Imjin River and south of the DMZ as a hostile fire zone, making troops eligible for combat awards and additional pay. However, the criteria for receiving these combat awards, such as the combat infantryman badge being awarded to infantrymen having directly engaged the enemy in combat, had stricter qualifications compared to the same awards for those serving in Vietnam.[47] The additional criteria in the February 1995 edition of Army Regulation 600-8-22, *Military Awards*, which governed

the awards for service in Korea, stated the soldier had to have "served in the hostile fire area at least 60 days and been authorized hostile fire pay … Been engaged with the enemy in the hostile fire area or in active ground combat involving an exchange of small arms fire at least 5 times."[48] Exceptions to this additional stipulation, which were different than that for soldiers in Vietnam, did not apply to those killed or wounded. In these cases, the requirement of five engagements and the sixty-day requirement were waivable. For the wounded, it could only be waived "when it can be clearly established that the wound was a direct result of overt hostile action."[49]

For the first time since the 1953 cease-fire, soldiers serving in the DMZ received combat recognition, including hostile fire pay, an overseas service bar for six months of service, and a combat patch (to be worn on their right sleeve) as well as the combat infantryman badge and combat medical badge. Prior to 1 April 1968, service on the DMZ was no different from garrison duty elsewhere, and combat pay and combat awards were only given posthumously or to the wounded. If the soldier was not killed or wounded in an engagement, it was like it never even happened.[50] Beyond the Quiet War, recognition was tied specifically and directly to events rather than duty locations as with other cases. Though dangerous, other violent actions along the DMZ, however sporadic and isolated, were not immediately recognized by the Army.

Support from Congress, DMZ veterans, and families created enough momentum that the Army reassessed the recognition of dangerous duty along the DMZ, resulting in policy adjustment on 18 May 2000 that authorized combat awards and combat patches. This first change applied only to the firefight to protect and rescue Soviet defector Matuzok on 23 November 1984 in the JSA specifically. This was only the second time the Army provided combat recognition to actions on the DMZ after the armistice. Shortly following this, the Army issued and upgraded seventeen awards for the November 1984 firefight on 29 June, including four Silver Stars, which were awarded to Capt. Bert K. Mizusawa, Staff Sgt. Richard Lamb, Spc. Jon Orlicki, and Pvt. Mark Deville.[51]

Following the evolving perspective on DMZ duty, the Army continued to change its overall policy on combat awards. On 3 June 2005, the Army issued a memorandum revoking previous special requirements placed on actions along the DMZ with regards to combat badges, even allowing retroactive submissions for the awards with documentation proving the events met the standard criteria applied to combat awards in other locations. The change stated, "The special requirements for award of the CIB [Combat Infantry Badge] for service in the Republic of Korea … are hereby rescinded. Army veterans and service members who served in Korea subsequent to 28 July 1953 and meet the CIB criteria … may submit an application … for award of the CIB." The same changes applied for the Combat Medical Badge as well.[52] These changes further solidified in the republication of the Army's military awards regulation on 11 December 2006 with the date range for Korea extended to cover 4 January 1969 to 31 March 1994.

The other major identifying feature for combat recognition is a unit patch on the right shoulder from when one served, commonly known as a combat patch. This decoration has remained steadily over time and Army Regulation 670-1, *Wear and Appearance of the Uniform*, has always kept it very exclusive stating, "Also between 1 April 1968 and 31 August 1973, for those personnel who were awarded the Purple Heart, combat infantryman badge, combat medical badge, or who qualified for at least one month of hostile fire pay for service in a hostile fire area in Korea."[53] Like the specific exception for the combat badges, the Army also authorized the combat patch for soldiers "who participated directly in the firefight with North Korean guards at the Joint Security Area, Panmunjom, Korea" on 23 November 1984, as a result of Matuzok defecting to the JSA.[54] This recognition was an important step in bringing attention to this dangerous event.

Conclusion

Danger and bravery typified service along the DMZ that has separated communist North Korea from democratic South Korea since the 1953 armistice of the Korean War. American soldiers served resolutely, facing the ever-present threat of violence and death in an isolated location far from home. During this duty, these soldiers displayed discipline, doing their dangerous work without official combat recognition. From the Quiet War of the late 1960s, through the tenuous violent incidents scattered through the 1970s and into the 1980s, the U.S. soldiers stationed along the DMZ served with distinction and courage equal to those in more recognized hot spots around the world. Over time, the Army recognized the oversight and authorized combat

recognition for service along the DMZ during specified time frames. At first, this was done with inequality compared to other theaters, but in the early 2000s, the Army altered its position; it retroactively made requirements the same across Army service for time spent along the violent and dangerous DMZ and all other combat zones. Finally, since 1953, nearly one hundred deceased Americans and numerous wounded veterans received due recognition for their service along the remote DMZ. ■

Notes

1. James F. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction: The First Year* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1992), 399–400.
2. Ibid., 402.
3. Walter G. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1992), 490.
4. Ibid., 497.
5. Ibid., 501.
6. Ibid., 504; Hannah Fischer, *North Korean Provocative Actions, 1950–2007*, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report No. RL30004 (Washington, DC: CRS, 20 April 2007), 3.
7. Rick Atkinson, *The Long Gray Line: The American Journey of the West Point Class of 1966* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989), 420.
8. Vandon E. Jenerette, "The Forgotten DMZ," *Military Review* 68, no. 5 (May 1988): 34.
9. Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, "The Quiet War: Combat Operations along the Korean Demilitarized Zone, 1966-1969," *Journal of Military History* 64, no. 2 (April 2000): 442–43.
10. Daniel P. Bolger, "Scenes from an Unfinished War: Low-Intensity Conflict in Korea, 1966-1969," Leavenworth Papers No. 19 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 1991), 37–39.
11. Ibid., 53.
12. Sarantakes, "The Quiet War," 444.
13. Bolger, "Scenes from an Unfinished War," 46.
14. Ibid., 47.
15. Ibid., 49.
16. Sarantakes, "The Quiet War," 453.
17. Bolger, "Scenes from an Unfinished War," 50–51.
18. Ibid., 29, 51.
19. Ibid., 78.
20. Ibid., 54–55.
21. Jenerette, "The Forgotten DMZ," 36.
22. Bolger, "Scenes from an Unfinished War," 61.
23. Ibid., 54, 61; Jenerette, "The Forgotten DMZ," 36.
24. Bolger, "Scenes from an Unfinished War," 55–57.
25. Ibid., 86–87.
26. Bolger, "Scenes from an Unfinished War," 63–65.
27. Sarantakes, "The Quiet War," 447.
28. Jenerette, "The Forgotten DMZ," 41; Bolger, "Scenes from an Unfinished War," 95.
29. Ibid., 107–8.
30. Ibid., 112–13.
31. Jenerette, "The Forgotten DMZ," 36–37.
32. Sarantakes, "The Quiet War," 445.
33. Fischer, *North Korean Provocative Actions, 1950–2007*, 7.
34. Ibid.
35. Office of the Korea Chair, *Record of North Korea's Major Conventional Provocations since 1960s* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 25 May 2010), 3, 7, 11; Atkinson, *The Long Gray Line*, 420.
36. Atkinson, *The Long Gray Line*, 422, 425–26; Fischer, *North Korean Provocative Actions*, 6.
37. Atkinson, *The Long Gray Line*, 426–27.
38. Ibid., 431; Fischer, *North Korean Provocative Actions*, 6; Office of the Korea Chair, *Record of North Korea's Major Conventional Provocations since 1960s*, 3.
39. Atkinson, *The Long Gray Line*, 434; Office of the Korea Chair, *Record of North Korea's Major Conventional Provocations since 1960s*, 3.
40. Clyde Haberman, "3 Koreans Killed as Soldiers Trade Shots in the DMZ," *New York Times* (website), 24 November 1984, accessed 10 July 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/1984/11/24/world/3-koreans-killed-as-soldiers-trade-shots-in-the-dmz.html; Thomas Hanson, "A Forty-Minute Korean War: The Soviet Defector Firefight in the Joint Security Area, Panmunjom, Korea, 23 November 1984," The National Museum of the United States Army, 31 March 2017, accessed 10 June 2019, https://armyhistory.org/a-forty-minute-korean-war-the-soviet-defector-firefight-in-the-joint-security-area-panmunjom-korea-23-november-1984/.
41. Haberman, "3 Koreans Killed as Soldiers Trade Shots in the DMZ."
42. Paul Shin, "U.S. Soldier Describes Korean Firefight," United Press International, 25 November 1984, accessed 11 July 2019, https://www.upi.com/Archives/1984/11/25/US-soldier-describes-Korean-firefight/2114470206800/; Hanson, "A Forty-Minute Korean War."
43. Hanson, "A Forty-Minute Korean War."
44. Clyde Haberman, "DMZ Defector Says He Acted Freely," *New York Times* (website), 27 November 1984, accessed 10 July 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/1984/11/27/world/dmz-defector-says-he-acted-freely.html.
45. Fischer, *North Korean Provocative Actions*, 12–16, 18–19, 23, 25–26.
46. John M. Glionna, "In South Korea, Land Mines Remain a Threat," *Los Angeles Times* (website), 23 December 2009, accessed 10 July 2019, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2009-dec-23-la-fg-korea-landmines23-2009dec23-story.html; Choe Sang-Hun, "South Korea Accuses the North after Land Mines Maim Two Soldiers in DMZ," *New York Times* (website), 10 August 2015, accessed 10 July 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/11/world/asia/north-korea-placed-mines-that-maimed-2-south-korean-soldiers-at-dmz-seoul-says.html.
47. Sarantakes, "The Quiet War," 445.
48. Army Regulation (AR) 600-8-22, *Military Awards* (Washington: DC: Government Printing Office, February 1995 [obsolete]), 25; the current AR 600-8-22 is dated 5 March 2019.
49. Ibid.
50. Bolger, "Scenes from an Unfinished War," 76.
51. Hanson, "A Forty-Minute Korean War."
52. Headquarters, Department of the Army, memorandum, "Changes to the Combat Infantryman Badge and the Combat Medical Badge and the Establishment of the Combat Action Badge," 3 June 2005, historians files.
53. AR 670-1, *Wear and Appearance of the Uniform* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 2014 [obsolete]), 31.
54. Ibid., 34.

An M8 Light Armored Car is used to conduct reconnaissance during World War II circa 1944. The M8, sometimes referred to as the Greyhound, was provided to cavalry units as a reconnaissance vehicle. It could travel at speeds of 55 mph and had excellent on-road mobility, which made it especially useful for operations on the well-developed road systems of Europe. It was equipped with a long-range radio and was armed with a 37 mm gun and either a .30-caliber or .50-caliber machine gun. The M8 proved very versatile and was widely used by cavalry units for reconnaissance and to support screening missions both during World War II and for decades after the war. (Photo courtesy of War History Online, www.warhistoryonline.com)

Fighting Forward

Modernizing U.S. Army Reconnaissance and Security for Great Power Conflict

Maj. Nathan Jennings, U.S. Army

The U.S. Army is currently grappling with a critical gap in its capability to win expeditionary wars against near-peer adversaries. As the institution reorients on potential large-scale ground combat operations against opponents like Russia and China, it is forming a consensus, once again, that its corps and divisions require echeloned reconnaissance and security (R&S) forces to shape conditions in flank and deep areas for follow-on maneuver by brigade combat teams (BCTs). This necessity, which requires dedicated combined arms teams to enable freedom of action, sustain operational tempo, and preserve formation cohesion for higher tactical commands, remains an essential requirement for U.S. joint forces to penetrate, dislocate, and disintegrate adversary area denial defenses.

The Army's dearth of ground cavalry at higher tactical echelons reflects wider unpreparedness for conflicts of larger scope, intensity, and duration following prolonged counterinsurgency campaigns in the Middle East. Paralleling reorganizations of artillery, air defense, aviation, and engineer echelons, the force divested its armored cavalry regiments (ACRs) and division cavalry squadrons (DIVCAVs)—which were specifically designed to enable corps and division maneuver—between 2003 and 2011 in favor of creating standardized armored, Stryker, and infantry BCTs. As argued by Gen. Mark Milley, the Army's thirty-ninth chief of staff, these kinds of transitions have risked the institution's "ability to conduct ground operations of sufficient scale and ample duration to achieve strategic objectives."[1]

The resulting capabilities gap consequently requires either acceptance of the current approach with corresponding mitigation or a substantial reorganization of the Army's R&S architecture across multiple echelons. Numerous corps and division command-post exercises, in addition to historical insights from Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Persian Gulf War, the Korean War, and the Second World War, have shown that newer surveillance and collection technologies will remain unable to fully replicate the value of forceful reconnaissance by ground cavalry formations.[2] Moving forward, the Army can explore several relatively cost-neutral options for addressing the problem: maintain the current R&S BCT doctrine, reorganize all BCT cavalry squadrons into modernized ACRs and DIVCAVs, convert select BCTs into modular cavalry groups, or convert select BCTs into reconnaissance-strike task forces.

Echeloning Reconnaissance and Security

Any discussion of echeloned R&S begins with recognizing differences in the means required to shape deep operations for corps and divisions and those required to enable close combat by brigades and battalions. For three- and two-star tactical commands, this has historically meant resourcing powerful, combined-arms formations with dedicated aviation and long-range fires to allow contested information collection across expanded frontages and depths.[3] While brigade and battalion scouts also habitually leverage air and ground fires to increase reach and lethality, cavalry formations at higher tactical levels, as the "eyes and ears" of senior commanders, require greater enhancement to allow increased maneuver independence and tactical responsiveness.

The 1991 Persian Gulf War, for example, illustrated how cavalry at corps and division levels could echelon operations to enable the decisive defeat of an entrenched, armored opponent. In that desert conflict, the 2nd and 3rd ACRs executed aggressive reconnaissance-in-force actions ahead of the VII Corps and XVIII Airborne Corps while arrayed DIVCAVs followed to facilitate forward passage of lines and guide their respective divisions' attacks.[4] The result was an informed approach where synchronized scouts enabled a massive and fatal envelopment of the defending Iraqi forces in southern Iraq. As stated by the VII Corps' 1991 *Operation Desert Shield/Storm After Action Report*, this experience validated that the U.S. Army's order of battle needed "armed and armored recce at every level … battalion through corps."[5]

This enduring requirement finds expanded historical relevance in the massive offensives of the Second World War. In 1944 and 1945, as the U.S. Army advanced into France and Germany, it employed echeloned cavalry to shape forward conditions. While field armies provided corps with mechanized cavalry groups (MCGs) comprising two squadrons with wheeled

Maj. Nathan Jennings is a U.S. Army strategist and a history instructor at the Command and General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He served two combat tours in Iraq, taught history at the U.S. Military Academy, and served as a strategic planner in Afghanistan. Jennings holds an MA in history from the University of Texas at Austin and an MMAS from the School of Advanced Military Studies.

M113 personnel carriers from E Troop, 2nd Battalion, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, conduct operations against North Vietnamese forces May 1970 in Kampong Cham Province, Cambodia. (Photo courtesy of Dave R. Watters, http://www.11thcavnam.com/Photos/Dave%20Watters/Dave_Watters.htm)

vehicles and light tanks, the armored divisions each owned a mechanized squadron and the infantry divisions owned a motorized reconnaissance troop. The MCG in particular provided senior tactical commanders with a modular "pool" of reconnaissance forces that could operate while consolidated or dispersed to empower main efforts. Throughout the conflict, the Army deployed thirteen MCGs and sixteen divisional squadrons to Europe.[6]

R&S echelonment has likewise proved valuable in more decentralized campaigns. Harkening back to its frontier origins, the 11th ACR provided the III Corps and Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, with three highly mobile armored squadrons that specialized in dispersed patrolling, route security, and if required, shock attack as they fought a determined guerrilla resistance. The regiment's unique combined-arms capabilities proved critical in repelling Viet Cong attacks in the Saigon area during the Tet Offensive in 1968.[7] Three decades later, as the United States countered a strong insurgency in Iraq, the 3rd ACR demonstrated similar value by providing the coalition with an economy of force option for securing expansive and peripheral Iraqi areas like Al Anbar and Tal Afar.

This type of echelonment reached maximum effectiveness during the 1980s and 1990s through organic integration of air-ground cavalry teams designed to extend the operational reach and enable tempo for corps and divisions. By pairing rotary wing with ground scouts under Army of Excellence and AirLand Battle reforms, cavalry organized to conduct deep reconnaissance, lethal counterreconnaissance, and durable flank security against peer threats with increased capacity for wide-ranging maneuver. As noted by U.S. Army Armor School historian Robert Cameron, "Air scouts used their superior speed to cover long distances and warn of imminent threats," while ground partners "maneuvered in their wake to develop situations and provide more detailed information."[8]

Looking to build on proven ACR and DIVCAV strengths, their successors—in whatever form they take—must integrate traditional combined-arms approaches with newer cross-domain capabilities. These emergent additions, which may include cyber-electronic, informational, space, and special operations means, offer potential to empower R&S actions with vastly expanded operational reach and responsiveness.[9] In coming decades, modernizing cavalry formations may also leverage advances in artificial intelligence, remote and autonomous platforms, hypersonic fires, powered armor, and camouflage technologies to reconceptualize information collection in a multi-domain context with correspondingly miniaturized signatures and increased lethality.

Despite these aspirations, immediate solutions to the Army's R&S capabilities gap must be grounded in reality. This means accepting limitations that likely include no organic manned aviation in ground cavalry formations due to force-wide constraints, continued reliance on heavy armored platforms for forceful reconnaissance, logistical constraints in ability to operate deep and independently for extended durations, and most importantly, requirements for any reorganization to be relatively cost-neutral to the Army's overall force structure. However, within these parameters, and if the institution is willing to embrace twenty-first-century innovation, there remains promising possibilities

for re-creating a dynamic cavalry architecture to support all Army tactical echelons.

Options for R&S Solutions

Four relatively cost-neutral options for addressing the Army's R&S capabilities gap follow.

Maintain the R&S BCT initiative. This doctrinal concept, which emerged as a stopgap measure to account for the loss of ACRs, DIVCAVs, and ill-fated battlefield surveillance brigades, represents the Army's current method for enabling corps and division maneuver. According to Army Techniques Publication 3-91, *Division Operations*, a BCT is "tailored with additional assets to give it increased capabilities for information collection and sustainment" while benefiting from "a training relationship with units that have the capabilities of fire support, short-range air defense, engineers, and extended range UAS [unmanned aircraft systems]."[10] Although 1st Stryker BCT, 4th Infantry Division, ably tested the concept in 2017, the experience revealed challenges in rapidly adapting standard brigades to the complicated methodologies of reconnaissance-in-force and guard missions.

The R&S BCT initiative, despite withering criticism, nevertheless holds unrealized value for the Army as an expedient solution. It first acknowledges resource constraints on creating new units while retaining a pool of generalized armored, Stryker, and infantry BCTs for employment across a larger spectrum of contingencies that may not require forceful information collection at echelon. It also leverages time-tested doctrine and institutional experience to empower select brigades to execute cavalry missions when provided multiyear training and augmentation programs. If executed as doctrinally intended, each corps maintains one brigade that is "organized and trained" as an R&S BCT for immediate employment on behalf of Army or joint force commanders.[11]

Despite these prescriptions, the ad hoc solution has proved inadequate. While the excursion in 2014 demonstrated that standard BCTs require enormous lead time, training, augmentation, and integration to effectively fulfill the role, none of the Army's corps have maintained a rotation of assigned and trained R&S BCTs.[12] Furthermore, there is serious debate over whether the complexity of executing echeloned route, zone, and area reconnaissance, in addition to contested screen, cover, and guard tasks, can be fully mastered by soldiers and formations who are not permanently optimized for that mission. This leads to larger questions about the R&S BCT's realistic ability to enable timely and decisive decisions by senior tactical commanders in strongly contested environments.

Reorganize BCT squadrons into ACRs, DIVCAVs, and brigade reconnaissance troops (BRTs). This option would reflect a total reorganization of the entire BCT cavalry force to empower corps and divisions to proactively

M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks of the 3rd Armored Division move out on a mission 15 February 1991 during Operation Desert Storm. A Bradley Fighting Vehicle can be seen in the background. (Photo by Photographer's Mate Chief Petty Officer D. W. Holmes II, U.S. Navy)



(Figure by author)

Figure. Modular Cavalry Group

shape "deep fights" against peer threats. The recreation of modernized versions of legacy ACRs and DIVCAVs, similar to Army of Excellence reforms that echeloned scouts specifically to fight Warsaw Pact armies in Europe in the 1980s, would shift the preponderance of Army R&S ground forces to higher tactical levels.[13] Mirroring evolutions in the 1990s that built on late Cold War echelonment, this design would leave each BCT with a BRT and each maneuver battalion with a current scout platoon to enable success in close combat.[14]

This type of dramatic reorganization would prioritize the increasing importance for corps and divisions to decisively and rapidly disintegrate sophisticated area-denial defenses as a prerequisite for follow-on BCT success. Similar to the scouts who enabled corps and divisions in Operation Desert Storm, modernized ACRs and DIVCAVs would conduct reconnaissance, counterreconnaissance, guard, and cover missions across expansive depths and frontages while, in theory, reducing BCT requirements for forceful information collection. Furthermore, the revitalized cavalry echelonment would leverage advanced cross-domain cooperation to allow more effective neutralization of enemy reconnaissance-strike networks that currently threaten to stymie expeditionary air and ground maneuver.

Despite the clear benefit to senior commanders, reducing each BCTs' current cavalry complement from a full squadron to a single troop would come with an obvious cost: limited ability to execute forceful, rapid, and broad information collection at the brigade level. While the recent addition of a third maneuver battalion in each BCT could partially compensate, the issue may become acute when they operate along wide frontages or lengthy corridors that could stress DIVCAV capacity to shape future conditions. The reconfiguration would essentially require corps and divisions to employ tailored battlefield frameworks, as they did under AirLand Battle doctrine, where forward ACRs and DIVCAVs converge multi-domain effects to both dominate deep areas and mitigate BCT limitations.[15]

Reorganize select BCTs into modular cavalry groups. A third option, which would require less force-wide reorganization, would be to convert two or three BCTs into redesigned cavalry groups with modular cavalry squadrons (see figure). Similar to the MCG of World War II, this approach could employ a flexible "pooling" concept where groups either enable

corps-level maneuver as consolidated R&S commands or potentially detach self-contained ground squadrons to support specific division operations. Building on past success, modernized cavalry groups would enjoy independent ability to conduct forceful reconnaissance, counterreconnaissance, and flank security actions with cross-domain lethality on behalf of habitually aligned corps and temporarily partnered divisions.[16]

This reorganization would yield many advantages once provided by the ACR/DIVCAV/BRT echelonment without incurring the worst of the costs. While a modular concept could simultaneously address the R&S capabilities gap currently afflicting both corps and divisions, it would also allow BCTs to retain their organic cavalry squadrons to enable close maneuver. By combining echelonment, the economy of design, and optionality to align both form and function, the cross-domain approach would orient the Army's tactical order of battle—from battalion to corps—toward winning contests of breadth and depth. It would also reflect a marginal shift in combat power from the main body to forward reconnaissance-strike capacity with a greater focus on fighting deep to enable sustained tempo.

However, like all resource decisions, converting select BCTs into corps-controlled cavalry groups would bring disadvantages. The most obvious drawback would be a minor reduction in the Army's overall complement of general purpose combat brigades, which are more easily adapted to a wider range of contingency operations. A second, though more manageable, issue would be potential unfamiliarity between detached cavalry squadrons and temporarily aligned divisions when coupled for operations with reduced notice. Although the groups would probably require fewer personnel than BCTs (due to replacement of most infantry companies with cavalry troops), the reorganization would likewise incur reduced ability to fight in complex terrain without significant augmentation.

Reorganize select BCTs into reconnaissance-strike task forces. A final option would be to adopt a more aspirational and forward-thinking approach to creating technologically advanced, multi-domain formations designed to survive, fight, and win in combat environments of the future. This concept would field cavalry-based teams with marginally less emphasis on heavy armor and premium ability to operate dispersed, in depth, and with greater access in joint and coalition fires.[17] Similar to the emerging Multi-Domain Task Force initiative, reconnaissance-strike task forces would represent an innovative solution for leveraging emerging technologies across all U.S. military services and operational domains.[18] The potential result would be a combined arms team specifically designed to dislocate and disintegrate enemy networks with unprecedented responsiveness and operational reach.

Building on the versatility and agility of the MCG option, an advanced reconnaissance-strike concept would employ a decentralized and modular unit structure to enable joint task force efforts. Designed to operate in deep areas for greater durations with fewer logistical constraints, the formation could combine armored, light, and aerial scouts with robust inclusion of cyber, space, air, maritime, robotics, artificial intelligence, special operations, and informational specialists to allow the maximum application of cross-domain effects.[19] More importantly, the experiment would provide a "blank slate" to create a ground-based R&S unit that is purpose-built to serve as the nucleus of a joint forces penetration team while fighting for information across multiple domains simultaneously.

Despite its attractiveness, this kind of futures concept would incur risk by planning an unprecedented formation based on emerging and predicted technologies. Reliance on more maneuverable platforms with reduced logistical constraints—that is, trading degrees of protection for enhanced mobility—could also incur tactical risk during contested reconnaissance operations. In terms of firepower, overreliance on joint fires and electronic warfare could invite disadvantages during counterreconnaissance actions. Yet despite potential challenges, trends in technology and warfare may nevertheless empower, and indeed compel, miniaturized and dispersed lethality. At the very least, the task force may serve as a modernization objective for adapting traditional ground forces to multi-domain operations.

Toward Fighting Forward

The U.S. Army has, as noted in *The U.S. Army Concept for Multi-Domain Combined Arms Operations at Echelons Above Brigade 2025-2045*, a "perpetual requirement to gain and maintain contact throughout all domains" while "preventing an adversary or enemy from gaining positions of advantage."[20] This means addressing critical R&S gaps that threaten success in large-scale ground combat. While the Army could redouble efforts to improve its current R&S BCT concept, it could also reimagine the legacy ACR/DIVCAV/BRT structure or convert select BCTs or reconnaissance-strike forces into flexible cavalry groups.

Soldiers of the 2nd Battalion, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, supported by a Bradley Fighting Vehicle, cautiously advance into a bunker area 26 March 2005 during a raid on the Hateen Weapons Complex in Babil, Iraq. (Photo courtesy of the Department of Defense)

Either way, the Army should take action to create echeloned units—with cross-domain fires in direct support—that are optimized to provide freedom of action and enable tempo across competitive landscapes.

This imperative finds expanded relevance in how the Army contributes to joint and multinational campaigns. Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*, states that the "rapid application of joint combat power may be required to enter a theater (through joint forcible entry) or to delay, impede, or halt an enemy's initial aggression and to deny an enemy its initial objectives."[21] This means that even as joint task forces continuously extend battlefield geometry with multi-domain effects, they need combined arms ground teams capable of fighting to gain information in increasingly expansive deep areas. Cavalry formations, if empowered with robust and practiced cross-domain capabilities, remain ideal instruments for extending ground-based operational reach to support joint campaigns of larger scope and scale.

Army R&S forces also make important tactical contributions to coalition efforts. While many NATO and bilateral allies maintain general-purpose combat brigades, very few field combined arms teams optimized to execute forceful reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance at higher tactical levels.[22] This means that R&S BCTs or equivalent cavalry formations will remain a critical addition to large multinational operations that feature contested information collection at depth. In regions like East Europe, the Persian Gulf, and East Asia, where corps and divisions may have to operate across expansive contiguous and noncontiguous terrain, the coalition demand for combined arms scouts at echelon and the Army's contrasting deficiency is becoming increasingly problematic.

These considerations move beyond operational considerations and into enduring requirements to maintain institutional knowledge. The loss of ACRs and DIVCAVs, in addition to decades of counterinsurgency focus and lapses in the R&S BCT initiative, means that the Army is rapidly losing its organizational base of experience for executing R&S at expanded scale and complexity.[23] While cavalry squadrons in BCTs have retained—and

improved—tactical expertise in enabling close maneuver in recent years, their absence at corps and division levels is risking the Army's ability to aggressively shape conditions along deeper axes and wider frontages against peer adversaries in Persian Gulf War-sized conflicts.

Given the scope of the problem, potential answers to the Army's R&S shortfalls must evolve in the context of integrated doctrinal, material, and cultural solutions. Similar to how it combined Army of Excellence reforms that fielded modernized combat platforms, expanded air-ground teaming, and redesigned ACR/DIVCAV echelonment with emerging AirLand Battle concepts, forthcoming solutions must be equally forward-thinking and comprehensive.[24] With its emerging multi-domain operational concept, the Army now has another opportunity to modernize a purpose-built order of battle that combines new technologies, echeloned formations, and flexible doctrine to enable success across extended battlefields of time and space.

The Army's R&S dilemma ultimately reflects an enduring requirement to bridge forceful information collection across the tactical and operational levels of war. Recognizing the increasing importance for corps and divisions to proactively influence outcomes in deep areas early and decisively, the availability of dedicated and echeloned cavalry formations with cross-domain enablers will, in part, inform the Army's preparedness to penetrate, disintegrate, and dislocate sophisticated adversary defenses. If past conflicts reveal the importance of fighting forward with combined-arms teams, the battlefields of the future will surely require the same, and the absence of dedicated solutions to pressing capabilities gaps may exact a heavy price. ■

Notes

1. "Milley: Army Not Fully Ready for Large-Scale Combat," Association of the United States Army, 7 April 2016, accessed 3 July 2019, https://www.ausa.org/news/milley-army-not-fully-ready-large-scale-combat.

2. David Barno and Nora Bensahel, *The Future of the Army: Today, Tomorrow, and the Day after Tomorrow* (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, September 2016), 11.

3. Field Manual (FM) 17-95, *Cavalry Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 24 December 1996 [obsolete]), 1-5; William S. Nance, "Lost Sabers: Why We Need Operational Cavalry and How to Get It Back," *eARMOR* 123, no. 4 (October-December 2014): 51–55.

4. Robert S. Cameron, *To Fight or Not to Fight? Organizational and Doctrinal Trends in Mounted Maneuver Reconnaissance from the Interwar Years to Operation Iraqi Freedom* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010), 316–17.

5. James A. Bynum, *Operation Desert Shield/Storm After Action Report* (Fort Belvoir, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Science, 27 June 1991), slide 3FX39.

6. Cameron, *To Fight or Not to Fight?*, 71.

7. Donn A. Starry, *Mounted Combat in Vietnam* (1978; repr., Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002), 73, accessed 12 July 2019, https://history.army.mil/html/books/090/90-17-1/CMH_Pub_90-17-1.pdf.

8. Cameron, *To Fight or Not to Fight?*, 293.

9. Nathan Jennings et al., "The Return of Cavalry: A Multi-Domain Battle Study," *eARMOR* 128, no. 3 (Summer 2017): 18–22.

10. Army Techniques Publication 3-91, *Division Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 2014), 1-9.

11. Ibid., 1-8.

12. Curt Taylor and Joe Byerly, "Raider Brigade White Paper—Fighting for Information in a Complex World: Lessons from the Army's First Reconnaissance and Security Brigade Combat Team" (18 September 2017), 2.

13. John L. Romjue, *The Army of Excellence: The Development of the 1980s Army*, TRADOC Historical Monograph Series (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1997), 94–95.

14. FM 17-95, *Cavalry Operations*, 1-10, 1-18–1-21.

15. Rumjue, *The Army of Excellence*, 11, 94–95.

16. Joseph J. Dumas, "Modern Application of Mechanized-Cavalry Groups for Cavalry Echelons above Brigade," *eARMOR* 131, no. 3 (Fall 2018): 3–4.

17. Douglas A. Macgregor, *Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997), 79–81.

18. Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., "New Army Unit to Test Tactics: Meet the Multi-Domain Task Force," Breaking Defense, 21 March 2017, accessed 5 July 2019, https://breakingdefense.com/2017/03/new-army-unit-to-test-tactics-meet-the-multi-domain-task-force/.

19. Jennings et al., "The Return of Cavalry," 18–22.

20. *The U.S. Army Concept for Multi-Domain Combined Arms Operations at Echelons above Brigade 2025-2045: Versatile, Agile, and Lethal*, version 1.0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], September 2018), 14, accessed 5 July 2019, https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/documents/ArmyEABConcept.pdf.

21. FM 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 6 October 2017), 1-13.

22. Daniel Gouré, *Addressing NATO's Near-Term Capability Gaps* (Arlington, VA: Lexington Institute, June 2018), 8–9, 11.

23. Taylor and Byerly, "Raider Brigade White Paper—Fighting for Information," 17.

24. Rumjue, *The Army of Excellence*, 39–40, 85–89.

Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Bran Ferren, the cofounder and chief creative officer of Applied Minds, observe a conceptual operations center 15 November 2013 during a tour of the facility in Glendale, California. (Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Daniel Hinton, U.S. Navy)

Global Contingency Plans

A New Look at War Planning

Lt. Col. Dan Sukman, U.S. Army

Future conflict will be transregional, multidomain, and multifunctional. …
… OPLAN development is not going to give you the kind of broad options globally that you need to have to fight a transregional fight.
—Gen. Joseph F. Dunford Jr., U.S. Marine Corps

The United States is engaged in a continual competition below the threshold of conflict with its adversaries. These conflicts are global and occur in every domain. There is a risk that the nature of these competitions can boil over into armed conflict. The current planning paradigm of regionally developed contingency plans is not sufficient for the

joint force. To mitigate this risk, the joint force should formulate a sustainable process for the development and execution of global contingency plans.

In July 2018, the Department of Defense published Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3100.01D, *Joint Strategic Planning System*.[1] This document is the method used by the chairman to communicate how he or she will execute responsibilities under Title 10 (see figure 1, page 111). The recent update to the instruction introduces and explains the process of global campaign plans and cross-functional teams. Although CJCSI 3100.01D explains the ideas behind global integration, the joint force must rapidly develop concepts and doctrine to bring global integration into fruition.

Global Contingency Planning

Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020 detailed a central idea of global integration.[2] The idea focused on joint force capabilities forming, evolving, dissolving, and reforming at times and locations of our choosing. Employing forces within this construct requires global planning at an echelon above combatant commands that can simultaneously direct the services.

According to CJCSI 3100.01D, global integration is "the arrangement of cohesive joint force actions in time, space, and purpose, executed as a whole to address transregional, multi-functional challenges across all domains."[3] The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act imposed a regional U.S. approach to global military operations, but the trend toward increasing globalization and the emergence of multi-domain adversaries has outpaced this approach.[4] Simply put, the problems we face as a nation and as a military will rarely fit conveniently within the boundaries of the Unified Command Plan map.

As the joint force looks at the ways we will fight our adversaries, we have two choices. The first is to fight as our adversaries would expect us to, which is to deploy forces into the operational areas of our adversaries, thus allowing them to fight on internal lines of communication. This predictable method risks vertical escalation, as fighting an adversary within their homeland turns a conflict into a war for national or regime survival. A global approach may not be necessary in all cases of conflict but is certainly necessary when confronting peer and near-peer adversaries in a resource-constrained environment.

The second option is to fight our wars asymmetrically (to pit America's strengths against its adversaries' weaknesses). In this respect, the United States holds a series of asymmetric advantages at the operational and strategic levels. These include a global network of alliances and partnerships, which enable a global U.S. military footprint. Further, the U.S. military has capabilities that enable global reach in terms of force projection as well as lethal and nonlethal targeting. These asymmetric advantages should drive strategic military planning that turns conflict against any adversary into a conflict that is global in nature.

In 1981, Gen. Donn Starry described how the U.S. Army should understand how modern conflict extended the battlefield in both distance and time.[5] Time was reflected in the ability to campaign, and space was defined as the theater of operations. Starry's concept centered on the tactical level and depth of the battlefield in force-on-force engagement.[6] Global plans represent a culmination of this idea. They allow for effects against enemy forces beyond rear areas of the battle—forces and capabilities not directly engaged in the conflict. Moreover, this extension of the battlefield allows for actions with allies and partners not directly engaged in military operations who can provide assistance and enable activities such as force flow and sustainment.

Operationalize the *Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning*

In March 2016, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) approved and published the *Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning*. Within this concept is a detailed description of how conflict and major combat operations must link to actions with other

Lt. Col. Daniel Sukman, U.S. Army, is a strategist and a member of the military faculty at the Joint Forces Staff College. He is a former Military Fellow at the William and Mary Project for International Peace & Security, and a member of the Military Writers Guild. Sukman earned master's degrees from Webster University and Liberty University. He served with the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), United States European Command, the Army Capabilities Integration Center, and the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command.



(Figure from Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3100.01D, *Joint Strategic Planning System*, 20 July 2018)

Figure 1. The Joint Strategic Planning System

nations in various geographic combatant command areas of responsibility (AORs) during periods of cooperation (see figure 2, pages 112–113).[7] For example, execution of combat operations in Afghanistan often required cooperation with other nations such as Russia to open the Northern Distribution Network or with Pakistan for overland and overflight rights. Global contingency plans may expand this idea to include major combat operations in multiple AORs, in addition to historical cooperation activities.

The execution of global contingency planning demands participation from every geographic and functional combatant command. During the process, each combatant command identifies ways in which he or she can contribute to the action. Further, each command examines existing requirements to determine where he or she can recommend places of acceptable risk to the secretary of defense. Put more succinctly, the military will have to select what missions it can support outside of the global contingency plan. Participation in the global contingency plan is not limited to combatant commands; each of the military service branches, the National Guard Bureau, and the Coast Guard must contribute to the effort.

Linking the Operational and Institutional Aspects of Conflict

Institutional planning is paramount for global integration. Institutional planning is where a nation's military services develop plans to produce materiel and nonmateriel capabilities, to include planning for technology and personnel to execute the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war.[8] Globally integrated planning melds strategic and operational planning with institutional planning.

Campaign plans and contingency plans developed by combatant commands typically fall into the operational level of war. What will enhance the dialogue between the chairman and the secretary of defense is an integration of institutional, or service, plans with operational contingency plans. For instance, actions must occur in the services prior to the execution of time-phased deployment data. This may include



Figure 2. Geographic Combatant Commands' Areas of Responsibility

mobilization of reserve component forces, "stop-move" and "stop-loss," and the decision to halt professional military education such as the Army's Command and General Staff College and each of the services' respective war college.[9] These decisions are not unique to our nation's military history, as stop-loss and stop-move were necessary steps for the 1991 Gulf War, the operations in the Balkans, and Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.[10]

Risk

The joint force has an elaborate risk management system, best defined in CJCS Manual 3105.01, *Joint Risk Analysis*. Risk in global plans is different from historical



(Figure by Arin Burgess, *Military Review*)

risk articulation in two ways. First, ownership of global risk belongs to the secretary of defense and the commander-in-chief, with appropriate advice from the chairman, respectively. Second, global risk must include risk to the institutional force and its ability to prepare for future conflict. Figure 3 (on page 115) displays "the nested direction and missions and their sources (left) along with the nested associated risks (right)."[11]

Planning at the global level is all about risk identification and risk mitigation. The capabilities of the joint force do not allow us to be everywhere at all times. Key capabilities and enablers from strategic lift to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance are always in high demand. Global planning requires a prioritization of these platforms to execute the contingency while mitigating other ongoing operations, from deterrence to competition below conflict. Further, global planning prioritizes all ongoing missions for the secretary of defense, allowing him or her to choose what missions are appropriate to assume risk.

The development of global contingency plans comes with three levels of risk. The first two are the standard risks to mission and to force. But aligning global capabilities toward one plan places a risk on the services. Thus, risk to institutions joins mission and force as the third risk. While historically, the service secretaries and service chiefs maintained responsibility for institutional risk, the burden moves to the secretary of defense and the chairman in a global construct. As all services contribute to the war fight, the secretary and the chairman maintain the higher-level perspective.

> Planning at the global level is all about risk identification and risk mitigation. The capabilities of the joint force do not allow us to be everywhere at all times.

Recommendations

The joint force should consider six distinct actions to enable global integration. First, the joint staff should develop a global planning doctrine. Second, the joint force must continue to employ and leverage joint planners who retain a global perspective on joint operations. Third, the joint force should account for global plans within the joint strategic planning system. Fourth, the joint force should adjust its staff structure to ensure that planning capability exists for global contingency plans. Fifth, the joint staff, in line with the services, should develop a method to account for institutional readiness. Finally, the joint force should adjust its joint exercise schedule to conduct tier 1 exercises at the global level.

Global-planning doctrine. There is no planning doctrine for the development of globally integrated plans. While some aspects of the joint planning process (JPP) are a part of global planning, other aspects of JPP are irrelevant. The development of a global contingency plan would still need to go through the design and mission analysis phase, similar to JPP. Products such as an operational approach with an accompanying problem statement, lines of effort, and desired conditions are critical. Moreover, understanding the facts, assumptions, and limitations remain paramount in any planning effort.

There is no course of action development in global contingency planning because global plans belong to the secretary of defense. While combatant commanders control the fight within their respective AORs, should the joint force conduct a global contingency plan, decisions on the prioritization and allocation of resources will occur in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) or the chairman's office, executing his or her explicitly delegated authorities as the global integrator. Combatant commands will execute daily operations with the forces they have, but linking military actions across the globe will occur in Arlington, Virginia. The secretary will not look for courses of action but rather decision points to execute preplanned options.

Leverage key joint planners. Global planning relies on planners from each respective combatant command and service to form a planning team. Further, augmenting this planning team are a cohort of joint planners from the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC) in Norfolk, Virginia. Together, this planning team uses its cumulative knowledge to build a global plan. The weakness of this construct is that outside of the Joint Staff and JECC, planners at geographic combatant commands do not necessarily bring a global perspective to the table. Moreover, planners on these teams tend to have knowledge applicable to either institutional planning or operational planning but not both.

In 2018 and into 2019, members of JECC's Joint Planning Support Element supported the joint staff in a series of global planning events. Planners from the JECC were paramount to global planning as the JECC's mission and day-to-day operations continually employ planners across every geographic combatant command. JECC planners provide a unique and broad perspective uncommon to planners who work and represent the interests constrained by AOR boundaries. Other critical joint planning enablers include the Joint Information Warfare Center, the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, the Joint Electronic Warfare Center, and the Joint Warfare Analysis Center.[12]



(Figure from Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3105.01, *Joint Risk Analysis*, 14 October 2016)

Figure 3. Framing—Identifying Risk to What?

Joint strategic planning system. Whereas numbered contingency plans are viewed through the lens of a branch plan from a theater campaign plan, global contingency plans are a branch plan of a global campaign plan. And just as global campaign plans look across Unified Command Plan boundaries and functional command seams, so should global contingency plans. The chief obstacles that the joint force faces in the development of global contingency plans are the current powers granted to coordinating authorities and the lack of a true contingency planning capability at the global level.

Force structure and alignment. Each problem set that requires a global campaign plan comes with a requisite global integrator. The coordinating authority is generally a geographic combatant commander. However, global coordinators are limited in authority and cannot compel services or other combatant commands to reallocate resources or capabilities. The joint force requires the capability and authority to lead planning efforts of both combatant commands and the services to develop global contingency plans. This authority and capability may need a place either within the joint staff or at the OSD level. In addition to enhancing the planning capabilities of the joint staff, combatant commands require additional global planning capabilities. This may mean creating requisite global integration branches or divisions within each combatant commands' J-5 (strategy, plans, and policy) directorate. Indeed, these organizations would look beyond the scope of their own theaters and global campaign plan responsibilities and participate in planning sessions led by the global integrator.

Then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Joe Dunford delivers opening remarks 16 October 2018 during the third Chiefs of Defense Conference that he has hosted to counter violent extremist organizations at the Gen. Jacob E. Smart Conference Center, Joint Base Andrews, Maryland. (Photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Dominique A. Pineiro, U.S. Navy)

The creation of global campaign plans did not force an across-the-board increase in every combatant command planning directorate. Internal restructuring of each combatant command has generally been able to meet the requirement of continually supporting global planning, which produces and updates global contingency plans. However, this requirement creates the need for more joint planners who think at the strategic level. Moreover, there is precedent for creating an organization that can execute true global planning such as Britain's Permanent Joint Headquarters in Northwood, which is a model of command element planning and controlling global operations.[13]

Institutional readiness. The current method of determining readiness across the joint force is to measure a given command's ability to execute its warfighting mission. These methods fail to measure how prepared each of the services are to adjust to a major conflict with lines of effort that span the globe. It would be prudent to add an institutional layer of readiness that includes an understanding of how well the services can (1) expand force structure to include equipment and end strength, and (2) rapidly change service training for conflicts the United States is engaged in (e.g., major combat operations or counterinsurgency). Adopting a method to measure service readiness to support global conflict is a key step to meld actions in the operational and institutional aspects of war.

Global exercises. In the recent CJCS Notice 3500.01, *2017-2020 Chairman's Joint Training Guidance*, the chairman identified joint training as a key action to enhance global integration.[14] The joint force requires a venue to exercise both global campaign plans and global contingency plans. Where each combatant command currently holds a tier 1 exercise to train on theater-level plans, the joint force should leverage said events for a global exercise.[15] These global exercises would include active participation from the joint staff, OSD, and multiple combatant commands. The Chairman's Joint Training

Guidance calls for the active participation of senior leaders to include national level leadership. These training initiatives are, in fact, an ongoing effort by the joint staff but require sustained momentum.

Conclusion

Senior civilian and military leadership in the Department of Defense now recognize the planning gaps and seams in the Unified Command Plan's combatant command paradigm. Enemies and adversaries of the United States do not limit their courses of action to align with our command-and-control construct. The joint force in sync with the services must be ready to fight any future adversary on a global battlefield, across all AORs, and in all domains. The development of capabilities to support the building and exercising of global contingency plans is a necessary step for the future of the joint force.

America's distinct and overwhelming military advantage is the ability to think and act globally for an almost indefinite amount of time. As the next cohort or echelon of senior leaders assume responsibilities as service chiefs or command at combatant commands, each must understand the paradigm shift. Planning and execution constrained by geographic combatant command boundaries place undue burdens and limitations on the joint force. ■

This article represents the author's views and not necessarily the views of the U.S. Army or Department of Defense.

Notes

Epigraph. Joseph F. Dunford Jr., "Gen. Dunford's Remarks and Q&A at the Center for Strategic and International Studies" (speech, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, 9 May 2019), accessed 25 October 2018, http://www.jcs.mil/Media/Speeches/Article/707418/gen-dunfords-remarks-and-qa-at-the-center-for-strategic-and-international-studi/.

1. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Instruction 3100.01D, *Joint Strategic Planning System* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense [DOD], 20 July 2018), accessed 25 October 2018, http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Instructions/CJCSI%203100.01D.pdf?ver=2018-08-10-143143-823.

2. *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020* (Washington, DC: DOD, 10 September 2012), accessed 17 October 2018, http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/ccjo_jointforce2020.pdf?ver=2017-12-28-162037-167.

3. CJCS Instruction 3100.01D, *Joint Strategic Planning System*, A-1.

4. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-433, 100 Stat. 992 (1986).

5. Donn A. Starry, "Extending the Battlefield," *Military Review* 61, no. 3 (March 1981): 32–50, accessed 24 June 2019, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/online-publications/documents/1981-mr-donn-starry-extending-the-battlefield.pdf.

6. For a complete reading of Gen. Donn Starry's work, read Lewis Sorley, ed., *Press On! Selected Works of General Donn A. Starry*, vol. I (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009), accessed 24 June 2019, https://usacac.army.mil/cac2/repository/featured/Starry.pdf.

7. *Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning* (Washington, DC: DOD, 16 March 2018), accessed 24 June 2019, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/joint_concept_integrated_campaign.pdf?ver=2018-03-28-102833-257.

8. Daniel Sukman, "The Institutional Level of War," The Strategy Bridge, 5 May 2016, accessed 18 October 2018, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2016/5/5/the-institutional-level-of-war.

9. Wikipedia, s.v. "stop-loss," last modified 15 September 2017, accessed 17 July 2019, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stop-loss_policy. Stop-loss is defined as "the involuntary extension of a service member's active duty service under the enlistment contract in order to retain them beyond their initial end of term of service (ETS) date and up to their contractually agreed end of active obligated service. It also applies to the cessation of a permanent change-of-station move [stop-move] for a member still in military service.

10. Charles A. Henning, "U.S. Military Stop Loss Program: Key Questions and Answers," Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report No. R40121 (Washington, DC: CRS, 28 April 2009).

11. CJCS Manual 3105.01, *Joint Risk Analysis* (Washington, DC: DOD, 14 October 2016), B-7, accessed 15 July 2019, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Manuals/CJCSM%203105.01%C2%A0.pdf?ver=2017-02-15-105309-907.

12. A full list of joint enablers is provided in Joint Publication 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 31 January 2018), II-8.

13. The geographic combatant command system is unique to the United States. While budget and force structure limitations drive one joint command for allies such as Britain, the United States could use its Permanent Joint Headquarters as an exemplar.

14. CJCS Notice 3500.01, *2017-2020 Chairman's Joint Training Guidance* (Washington, DC: DOD, 12 January 2017), accessed 25 October 2018, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/training/cjcsn3500_01.pdf?ver=2017-12-29-171252-833.

15. A tier 1 exercise is national-level and combatant-command-level training designed to train said organizations at the strategic and operational level of war. A full description of each tier (1–4) can be found in CJCSI 3500.01H, *Joint Training Policy for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, DC: DOD, 25 April 2014), B-6, accessed 24 July 2019, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Instructions/3500_01.pdf?ver=2016-02-05-175034-967.

~~THE SEVEN COMMANDMENTS~~

~~1. WHATEVER GOES UPON TWO LEGS IS AN ENEMY.~~

~~2. WHATEVER GOES UPON FOUR LEGS, OR HAS WINGS, IS A FRIEND.~~

~~3. NO ANIMAL SHALL WEAR CLOTHES.~~

~~4. NO ANIMAL SHALL SLEEP IN A BED.~~

~~5. NO ANIMAL SHALL DRINK ALCOHOL.~~

~~6. NO ANIMAL SHALL KILL ANY OTHER ANIMAL.~~

~~7. ALL ANIMALS ARE EQUAL.~~

ALL ANIMALS ARE EQUAL BUT SOME ANIMALS ARE MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS

The title of this article is derived from the final "commandment" mandated by the self-appointed leaders of a group of revolutionist animals depicted in George Orwell's *Animal Farm*, published in 1945. The allegory is a morality tale in which Orwell warns against recurring patterns of emerging self-appointed elites leading revolutionary movements in the rise and evolution of early twentieth-century authoritarian regimes. In it, Orwell describes a mythical revolution on an English farm that begins with the farm animals driving their human overlords out and establishing an egalitarian animal-centric society. The ensuing social order is collectively devised to ensure all animals benefit equally from their shared labor on the farm. It degenerates, however, when pigs assume leadership roles and gradually evolve into human-like beings that betray the revolution by assuming the exploitative role formerly filled by human overseers. The tale concludes with the eradication of the former seven commandments originally established by the collective that were supposed to guide animal life under the revolution, and their replacement with the one self-serving commandment mandated by the former pigs who form the new elite.

All Socialists Are Equal, but Some Are More Equal Than Others

Edward A. Lynch, PhD

What makes a revolutionary? It is standard theory among political scientists that revolutions occur when conditions in a society have become intolerable, and the people living in that society see no peaceful path to improvement through normal political channels. In addition, those who would support a revolution must feel that they are not only deprived but also deprived unjustly. Put differently, they must feel not only desperate but also wronged.

While these preconditions are necessary for revolutionary change to begin (to say nothing of having a chance of succeeding), they are not sufficient causes. A revolution must have leadership to distinguish itself from similar spasms of political violence. Mark Hagopian distinguishes revolution from revolt, coup d'état, and secession.[1] The distinguishing feature of revolution is a focused, self-conscious leadership made up of men and women with a clear vision of the sort of society that they would like to see rise from the ashes of existing society.[2]

Crane Brinton describes the characteristics of these revolutionary leaders in some detail. For the most part, revolutionary visionaries perceive a world that can be made perfect. (Not simply better than the existing world in which they live, but perfect.) For the revolutionaries of France in 1789 and Russia in 1917, human beings themselves can be made perfect. Brinton compares this belief to the way "men have been observed to behave before when under the influence of active religious faith." He goes on, "[Revolutionaries] all sought to make all human activity here on earth conform to an **ideal** pattern [emphasis added]."[3]

But this perfection can only be achieved in a collective way, under the influence of ideal social, economic, and political circumstances. Modern revolutionaries differ from traditional Christian believers, who perceive an ideal afterlife and usually limit the achievement of perfection to that afterlife. Perfection, for traditional religious believers, is not possible here on Earth. For modern revolutionaries, however, earthly perfection is the goal and the embrace of that goal, without hesitation or uncertainty, is one of the distinguishing characteristics of a true revolutionary, according to Brinton. He refers to this unshakeable faith in societal perfection as the "apocalyptic vision." In the case of revolutionaries like Maximilien Robespierre and Karl Marx, postrevolutionary society will be one in which not some but all societal ills are cured. Some revolutionary theorists contend that once the revolution takes place, however, its details

Edward A. Lynch, PhD, is an associate professor of political science at Hollins University in Roanoke, Virginia, and a specialist in Latin American politics. He teaches U.S. foreign policy, international relations, U.S. global strategy, and a course in Model UN. He also advises the Hollins University Model UN Club. Lynch holds a BA from St. Joseph's University and an MA and a PhD from the University of Virginia. He is the author of two books on religion and politics in Latin America and numerous articles on African politics and U.S. foreign policy toward Africa. He worked on Capitol Hill for four years, serving in the Reagan White House, and is a well-known commentator on state and local politics in Virginia.

(Composite graphic by Arin Burgess, *Military Review*; graphic elements courtesy of freepik.com)

are defined, personal vices will disappear, including greed, not because the revolutionary regime outlaws such things but because the people living after the revolution will no longer desire vice in any form.

Even for revolutionaries who do not believe in such an apocalyptic vision, it is necessary to appear to believe in a future made perfect to justify the sacrifices and bloodshed that must necessarily accompany wholesale societal transformation. Even desperate people will be hesitant to embrace revolutionary violence for only marginal changes for the better. Men and women in seemingly hopeless situations are more likely to grasp at any improvement, no matter how small, that can offer hope. Reformers, for this reason, have always been the enemies that revolutionaries fear far more than the oppressors of the old regime.[4]

For those possessed of this revolutionary apocalyptic vision, therefore, the path to earthly perfection is marked not only by the willingness to embrace violence but also by an almost monkish personal asceticism. In revolutionary England, for example, card playing, dancing, theatre performances, and most other forms of entertainment were banned. In Russia, the only forms of entertainment permissible to the Bolsheviks were those created by the Russian Revolution to the service of the revolution. Englishmen and Russians were assured that such restrictive laws were only necessary to prevent a small (but threatening) number of counterrevolutionaries from tainting the perfect society that was under construction. For true revolutionaries, avoiding card playing should be no more difficult than avoiding taking poison.

In this regard, revolutionary leaders often preach the importance of sacrifice with zeal and often a penchant for coercion unmatched by traditional religious and moral authorities. The man in the street must be convinced that he only embraced his former vices because of societal pressure and bad examples. At the same time, people must be convinced of the nobility, as well as the necessity, of personal sacrifice on behalf of the perfect society that revolution promises. Thought of as part of the path to earthly nirvana, what appear to be acts of sacrifice are anything but deprivations. Eliminating personal vices will not result in the sense of loss but rather in a thrilling sense of fulfillment.

Che Guevara, the Argentinean Marxist who would play such a vital role in the Cuban Revolution, expressed the ideal of revolutionary asceticism in very clear terms: "The guerrilla fighters should be required to go to bed and get up at fixed hours. Games that have no social function and that hurt the morale of troops and the consumption of alcoholic drinks should both be prohibited."[5] He added, in a different context, "The true revolutionary is guided by a great feeling of love. It is impossible to think of a genuine revolutionary lacking this quality."[6]

Che's Cuban colleague, Fidel Castro, decades into his revolution, told his fellow Cubans of the link between personal morality and revolutionary fidelity: "[Revolution] is defending the values one believes in at the cost of any sacrifice; it is modesty, selflessness, altruism, solidarity and heroism; it is fighting with audacity, intelligence and realism; it is never telling a lie or violating ethical principles."[7]

Vietnamese revolutionary leader Ho Chi Minh was just as clear in his demand for moral as well as political devotion to the revolution. In a 1952 essay titled "To Practice Thrift and Oppose Embezzlement," Ho wrote, "We want to build a new society, a free society where all men are equal, a society where industry, thrift, integrity, and uprightness prevail." He continued, "The duty of the cadres is to love and take care of every fighter and to value and save every cent (sic), every bowl of rice, every work hour of their compatriots."[8]

But Ho, in the same essay, also foreshadowed what Marxist revolutionaries would find to be an unpleasant and inconvenient reality—not everyone desires the level of self-sacrifice demanded by revolutionary fervor. He said,

> To have a good crop we must weed the field, otherwise the rice will grow badly in spite of careful plowing and abundant manuring. To be successful in increasing production and practicing thrift, we must also weed the field, that is, root out embezzlement, waste, and bureaucracy. Otherwise, they will harm our work.[9]

A Less-Than-Perfect Reality

Just as desperate social, economic, and political conditions are not enough to bring about revolution, so too a revolutionary leadership, no matter how dedicated and how thoroughly infused with revolutionary zeal, is also not sufficient to bring about a successful revolution. At least one additional element is necessary. This element is the employment of men and women who are skilled in, and accustomed to, violence. Brinton notes, correctly, that a decadent, divided, and self-doubting old regime ruling elite is vital to the chances for success of any revolution. Put differently,

revolutions cannot succeed in a society in which the ruling elite is ready, willing, and able to use uninhibited violence to repress revolutionary actions.

Thus, when thousands of Tunisians marched against long-time dictator Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, and the military leadership made it clear that they would not open fire on unarmed demonstrators, the Jasmine Revolution succeeded. On the other hand, when thousands of Syrians marched against long-time dictator Bashir al-Assad, they found that the Syrian military was perfectly willing to open fire. Barring massive outside assistance, the Syrian revolution will fail.

All but the most decadent and sclerotic old regime leadership are likely to put up some kind of a fight when the leadership class perceives a genuine threat from a revolutionary movement. The old regime may respond with arrests of revolutionary leaders, with more general reprisals against all of its citizens or perhaps against some segment of society perceived to be supporting the revolutionaries, or even with massive violence designed to intimidate the people of an entire nation.

Portrait of Maximilien de Robespierre (1790), oil on fabric, anonymous artist, Musée Carnavalet, Paris. Robespierre was one of the leaders of the French Revolution that brought about the fall of the French monarchy in August 1792. A zealous advocate for establishing a French republic and perfecting society, he became notorious for his obsessive determination to achieve his objectives with seeming indifference to the human cost; this was manifested by his instigation of numerous executions of his political opponents. (Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

Whatever level of violence the old regime elites employ, revolutionaries must counter with their own brand of violence or face irrelevance (or even extinction). Scholarly and idealistic visionaries of revolution, however, are often ill-equipped, ill-prepared, and ill-suited to perform the necessary violence themselves. Thus, leaders with revolutionary vision must necessarily make common cause with people who know how to perpetrate violence if revolution is going to succeed.

The obvious problem is that the people of violence are unlikely to fade into the background once the old regime has been ousted. Experience has shown that their continued presence in the revolutionary movement is an ongoing challenge to the direction of that movement, since chances are good that the experts in violence never shared the ideals of the visionaries, and at best, have no interest in the remaking of society after the revolution succeeds. This dilemma leaves visionary leadership with two choices. First, the people of violence can be purged using other experts in violence. The best example may be Adolf Hitler's "Night of the Long Knives" when the paramilitary *Sturmabteilung* (SA) was destroyed by the more committed *Schutzstaffel* (SS). Elsewhere, Francisco Franco, during the Spanish Civil War, made sure that the most ardent members of the Falange (the Spanish fascist party) were sent to the front lines of battle.

The second choice is to appease and co-opt the violent partners, keeping them inside the revolutionary movement against the time when violence may be needed again. In the meantime, they will have to be satisfied with more earthly rewards. And this opens the door to corruption. Lucrative government jobs, access to government contracts, and positions in government that provide opportunities for extortion are all rewards likely to be expected from those who believe, often correctly, that absent their violent contributions, the revolutionary government would never have had the chance to govern.

Thus, the pure asceticism of early revolutionary fervor is unlikely to last long after revolutionaries seize power. Vladimir Lenin was still very much alive when the Soviet government imposed rationing on most Soviet citizens but opened special stores for party members only. Those exclusive retail outlets, filled with products that most citizens could not acquire, lasted throughout the existence of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Revolutionary leaders Ernesto "Che" Guevara (*left*) and Fidel Castro salute admirers in 1961 after having successfully overthrown the Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista. Comrades in arms, both Castro and Guevara promoted public personas calculated to project ascetic self-deprivation and self-sacrifice in solidarity with the oppressed peoples for whom they reputedly fought both in Cuba and elsewhere. However, their private lifestyles diverged diametrically from their public images. After the death of Guevara in Bolivia, Castro went on to lead a secretive, but opulent, lifestyle that he took great pains to hide from the Cuban public and the world. (Photo by Alberto Korda/Museo Che Guevara via Wikimedia Commons)

Revolutionaries in Power: Living the High Life

Castro, especially in the early years of his regime, liked to portray himself as an austere exemplar of the kind of self-sacrifice he and other revolutionaries demanded from the people they ruled. Castro seldom allowed himself to be photographed unless he was wearing his signature fatigues. An unkempt beard added to the impression of a hunted fugitive and ascetic warrior monk who cared little for creature comforts but devoted himself wholly to avoiding assassination attempts and working for the benefit of the Cuban people. However, his actual lifestyle was starkly different.

In 2006, after almost fifty years of leading the Cuban people, Castro's personal fortune was estimated at over $900 million by *Forbes* magazine. Like the missionaries in James Michener's novel *Hawaii*, "They came to the islands to do good, and they did right well."[10] Among other expenditures, Castro used government money to rebuild his childhood home, which had burned down in 1954. While it is not unusual for leaders to wish to have an iconic birthplace, Castro's childhood home was rebuilt as a luxurious multi-room structure at the center of a five hundred-acre sugar plantation. The reconstructed building was turned into a Castro museum.[11]

Purportedly because of the many attempts on his life, Castro maintained several homes around Cuba during the forty-nine years he personally ruled the island. In 2005, he retired from active government and ceded power to his brother Raúl Castro. Fidel then relocated to Punto Cero, a seventy-five-acre estate that at one time was an exclusive Havana golf club. While he described Punto Cero as a "fisherman's cottage," a former Castro bodyguard said the estate, walled and gated like a military installation, contained abundant fruit trees, grazing cows, and greenhouses.

Joseph Stalin

A mugshot and information card on Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin circa 1911 from the files of the Tsarist secret police in Saint Petersburg, Russia. Stalin was a loyal and fanatical supporter of Vladimir I. Lenin's Bolshevik faction of the Communist Party that prevailed in the 1917 Russian Revolution. A skilled and violent criminal by nature, he became Lenin's trusted agent for organizing bank robberies, kidnappings, protection rackets, and other illegal activities to fund prerevolutionary Bolshevik operations. However, after the revolution, his penchant for violence and threatening demeanor toward party rivals led Lenin to distrust him, going so far as to warn other party leaders about the lengths to which he thought Stalin might go to achieve his personal political ambitions. However, despite Lenin's efforts to quietly undermine the growing power of Stalin, upon Lenin's death, Stalin went on to eliminate his rivals and become the new leader of the Soviet Union. Subsequently, he was responsible for repression on a heretofore unparalleled scale, including hundreds of thousands of executions, ethnic cleansing through extermination and mass deportations, and artificially causing famines that killed millions of ethnic Russians as well as other citizens living under rule of the Soviet empire. (Photo courtesy of a Tsarist police document via Wikimedia Commons)

But this huge estate, so reminiscent of the homes of the previous Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista and other prerevolutionary elitists, whom Castro had overthrown, was not Castro's only island residence. He also owned a large home in Cayo Piedra (very close to the Bay of Pigs) and a third home at Coleta del Rosario that included a private marina. La Deseada, another luxurious house in Pinar del Río, was used primarily for one of Castro's favorite pastimes: duck hunting.

Juan Reinaldo Sánchez was Castro's personal bodyguard for seventeen years and saw the dictator's real lifestyle more closely than anyone in the world. Sánchez authored an exposé titled *The Double Life of Fidel Castro: My 17 Years as Personal Bodyguard to El Lider Maxim* in which he revealed, among other things, the exact locations of

Castro's multiple properties around the island. According to Sánchez's account, the dictator owned twenty homes in addition to the Cayo Piedra private island, where he kept his private yacht, the *Aquarama II*.[12] The yacht was powered by four motors, gifts from Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev.[13] Sánchez asserts that few people were allowed to visit Castro at Cayo Piedra except for his immediate family, friendly communist dictators, and friendly American journalists such as Barbara Walters and Ted Turner (neither of whom revealed to the world the luxurious lifestyle of the Marxist dictator).[14]

Access to the total revenue of a medium-sized nation, even one as strapped as Cuba, might seem like a sufficient income for even a corrupt leader, but Castro felt the need to supplement his salary further with a hefty second income from running drugs into the United States.[15] Sánchez detailed a conversation between Castro and Gen. José Abrantes, Cuba's minister of the interior, which Sánchez heard on the recording device Castro kept in his private office. The conversation involved methods of increasing the flow of drugs into the United States and increasing the flow of profits to Castro. The revelation shocked the still-idealistic Sánchez. "In a few seconds," he wrote, "my whole world and all my ideals came crashing down." The hero of the Cuban revolution was organizing cocaine trafficking, "directing operations like a real godfather."[16]



The Double Life of Fidel Castro: My 17 Years as Personal Bodyguard to El Lider Maxim, published in 2014 by authors Juan Reinaldo Sánchez and Axel Gyldén; translated by Catherine Spencer.

The fall of the Soviet Union, and the consequent end to the generous subsidies that Cuba had been receiving, forced Castro to seek at least apparent rapprochement with the West. But the culture of corruption continued. Foreign investors who opened hotels were required to pay the salaries of the workers directly to the state. Government officials took the lion's share of the money, giving the chambermaids, waiters, clerks, and managers a fraction of their salaries, which was paid in worthless pesos.[17]

Sánchez's credibility can be established in two ways. First, his coauthor for *The Double Life* was French journalist Axel Gyldén, an experienced reporter with the left-leaning news magazine *L'Express*. Gyldén acknowledges the possibility of strong bias but insists that he checked Sánchez's claims and found that they held up to scrutiny. He told *The Guardian*, "This is the first time someone from Castro's intimate circle … has spoken. It changes the image we have of Fidel Castro and not just how his lifestyle contradicts his words, but of Castro's psychology and motivations."[18] Even more persuasive evidence of Sánchez's reliability exists in his treatment by Castro. When Sánchez asked to be released from his job as bodyguard, Castro had him thrown into prison for two years. Sánchez sums up his indictment of the Cuban leader: "Fidel Castro let it be known and suggested that the revolution gave him no rest, no time for pleasure and that he ignored, indeed despised, the bourgeois concept of holidays. He lies."[19]

Counterrevolution in Nicaragua. President Daniel Ortega is best known for his leadership of the Sandinista regime in the 1980s, when Nicaragua was undergoing a bitter civil war while at the center of the Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. Sandinista mismanagement of the economy and a highly unpopular draft resulted in a devastating electoral defeat for Ortega in Nicaragua's first free elections in February 1990. Undeterred by an election in which he lost every precinct in the country, Ortega shed the army fatigues of the 1980s, substituted a white shirt and jacket, and ran for president in 1996 and 2001, both times unsuccessfully. In 2001, his candidacy was devastated by charges brought by his stepdaughter that he had sexually abused her starting when she was eleven years old.[20] Ortega angrily denied the charges but also refused to give up his legal immunity as a former president to answer the charges in court.

After his loss in 2001, Ortega conspired with President Arnoldo Alemán to alter the constitution so

Former Cuban leader Fidel Castro (*left*) talks with Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (*center*) and Fidel's brother, Cuban President Raul Castro, 24 February 2010 at Punto Cero near Havana. Punto Cero is a prerevolution golf course property that had been seized by Fidel Castro in the 1970s and converted into his personal residence. In time, Castro also appropriated a number of other equally extravagant residences in prime locations in Cuba using as justification that constant assassination attempts made it necessary for him to move around frequently to various locations. Subsequently, Lula was convicted of extensive corruption in Brazil and is currently imprisoned. (Photo by Ricardo Stuckert-PR/Handout/Reuters)

that a presidential candidate who won 35 percent of the popular vote would not have to stand in a run-off election.[21] In 2006, with only 38 percent of the vote, Ortega returned to the presidency. He had added an outward commitment of Christianity to his political persona but remained committed to socialism. However, it would quickly become apparent (at least to most observers) that he was even more committed to building his personal wealth.[22]

Much of the money that does come to the government of Nicaragua escapes any kind of scrutiny or accountability. For example, Albanisa, the state-owned oil company, has received between $4 billion and $6 billion in illicit funding in the past ten years. Most of these funds have come from Venezuela, governed by fellow socialists Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro, but tracking the dollars after they get to Managua is nearly impossible. It is clear that they have not been plowed back into the Nicaraguan economy, which is the poorest nation in the hemisphere after Haiti.[23] An investigation by an independent Nicaraguan newspaper showed that Albanisa "has devised a sophisticated scheme of transferring funds and indirect subsidies to other related businesses."[24]

The relationship, both political and financial, between Nicaragua and Venezuela strengthened when Chávez announced the formation of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our Americas to counter the influence and power of the United States. Ortega brought Nicaragua into the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our Americas bloc almost immediately and began receiving subsidies in the neighborhood of half a billion dollars annually. Critics describe the annual gift as a "personal slush fund" for Ortega.[25] The Venezuelan contributions do not appear in the national budget.[26]

An even more mysterious source of funds came to light in 2013, when Ortega stood side-by-side with

shadowy Chinese billionaire Wang Jing and announced a $50 billion deal for the construction of a new canal to rival the Panama Canal. Six years later, with not a single spadeful of earth dug, the Cocibolca Group, a union of civic organizations, issued a statement saying that the project had been "plagued by illegalities, irregularities, signs of government corruption, and illicit enrichment of some people linked to the government." The group alleged that the well-connected were buying up property along the canal route with the intention of reselling it to the government at inflated prices.[27]

The well-connected speculators probably lost money, since the Chinese company supposedly leading the project closed its Hong Kong office in 2018 and had not updated its website since 2017. However, the money that changed hands when the deal was signed is still unaccounted for, and the fact that Ortega took such a large personal role in the negotiations leaves little doubt in the minds of Nicaraguans about the destination of those funds. Suspicion about Ortega's role was even raised by Sergio Ramírez, who had served as Ortega's vice president during the Sandinista era.[28]

As with Castro, the lifestyle of Ortega and his wife Rosario Murillo seems at odds with the image he promotes through the media as an austere, dedicated socialist. For one thing, even after losing the election in 1990, Ortega never vacated the mansion he took over as the president's residence in 1979. He has lived there ever since.[29] His wife is rarely seen in public without a ring on each finger and multiple necklaces.[30] As hundreds of thousands of Nicaraguans lived on $2 per day, she used public funds for an art project called the Trees of Life in Managua.[31] These are huge, stylized trees made of metal, painted bright yellow, and decorated with thousands of light bulbs. They are estimated to cost $25,000 each.[32] Her often mystical and New Age pronouncements, and her seemingly dominant influence over her husband, have prompted Nicaraguans to nickname her *La Chamuca* (the demon or witch).[33]

Ortega has moved expertly to prevent any serious accountability. Even a report from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) could only categorize blocs of income that came from Venezuela, with over $35 million simply marked, "Other Projects."[34] As part of his deal with Alemán, Ortega got the right to name judges. He proceeded to pack the country's supreme court and had it declare that the constitutional provision against a third term as president was a violation of Ortega's human

Nicaraguan Vice President Rosario Murillo, along with her husband President Daniel Ortega (*not shown*), greet supporters 13 October 2018 at a march called "We walk for peace, with faith and hope" in Managua, Nicaragua. Murillo is widely referred to by the Nicaraguan people as "La Chamuca," meaning the demon or witch. Although the sobriquet is popularly used as a derogatory metaphor, in fact, she has organized conferences on witchcraft, parapsychology, and folk medicine, and made spirited defenses of both witchcraft and the practice of magic in public life. Apart from promoting her personal interests, she has worked with her husband to amass a fortune in real estate, banking interests, and monopolistic control of Nicaraguan mass communications that is estimated at approximately $1 billion. This has been done by exploiting their Nicaraguan government offices for kickbacks, bribes, insider contracting, and other unethical and illegal business activities. The fortune has been accumulated in a nation that is regularly singled out by the United Nations and other international organizations as among the poorest in the world. (Photo by Oswaldo Rivas, Reuters)

Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega (*center*) gestures to supporters while flanked by his wife, Vice President Rosario Murillo (*left*), and Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro 10 January 2017 during his swearing-in ceremony at Revolution Square in Managua, Nicaragua. Maduro was instrumental in enabling the Ortegas to consolidate dictatorial control over the Nicaraguan economy and security forces using Venezuelan oil money as leverage. (Photo by Oswaldo Rivas, Reuters)

rights, paving the way for the former Sandinista to remain president for life. The effort brought Nicaraguans into the streets (where some pulled down the Trees of Life) amid shouts of "¡Ortega vendepatria!" ("seller of the fatherland," a traditional insult in Latin America for corrupt leaders).[35] One observer summed up Ortega's attitude toward private businesses: "His logic is, 'If I can have a bank, why should you have it?'"[36] Resentment toward Ortega is particularly strong among those who still believe in the socialist promises of Sandinismo. One former colleague told *The Irish Times*, "Ortega has betrayed the revolution. He is no longer a socialist but a capitalist."[37]

Ortega and his wife's holdings have become quite impressive. They own or control several television stations and an advertising agency, and they have a controlling interest in the country's oil industry. In some cases, one or more of their seven children nominally control the businesses. One son, Laureano, works for PRONicaragua, a supposedly private agency that promotes foreign investment. He was deeply involved in the negotiations for the proposed canal. He also used his wealth to stage a lavish production of Giuseppe Verdi's opera *Rigoletto*, contracting with his sister to provide the costumes.[38]

In what may be thought of as the ultimate abandonment of his socialist past, Ortega also owns a luxury hotel in Managua and a private security firm that protects the homes of the wealthy.[39] While some of Ortega's businesses are nominally independent, the founder of the Banco Central de Nicaragua (Central Bank of Nicaragua) avers that the network "blurs the lines between his Sandinista Party, the state, and the private sector."[40] According to documents published on WikiLeaks, the U.S. government said Ortega received "suitcases full of cash" from Venezuelan officials.[41]

In addition to subverting the courts, Ortega and his wife also control government advertising dollars, which they can use to reward or punish newspapers and radio stations for their loyalty or lack of loyalty. Licenses to buy

newsprint also go through them.[42] Control of the courts permits the harassment of political opponents and also allowed Ortega to escape trial for his alleged serial rape of his stepdaughter when he got a friendly judge to declare that the statute of limitations had run out.[43]

Perhaps because of the time and effort necessary to look after these varied (and profitable) business interests, Ortega was caught by surprise by a huge budget deficit in the spring of 2018. To bring some balance to the national budget, he announced deep cuts in the country's social security program. The announcement led to huge protests, bringing thousands of people into the street. Ortega at first seemed genuinely stunned by the uprising and hastily backed off the pledge to cut benefits.[44]

> The situation has gotten so obvious to most Venezuelans that they have invented a new word, "enchufado" (well-connected) to refer to those who benefit personally from access to government money.

However, it soon became plain that the social security cuts were only a small part of the problem, according to the demonstrators. Many cited the pervasive corruption of the regime, starting with Ortega and his wife.[45] The demonstrations continued and Ortega, some say at the bidding of his wife, responded with deadly force. More than three hundred Nicaraguans were killed, two thousand more were injured, sixty thousand more were forced into exile, and seven hundred were arrested.[46]

Former Sandinista Vice President Sergio Ramírez summed up his view of his former governing partner: "He came back [in 2006] intending never to leave, [bolstered by] a lack of scruples and a ton of money from Venezuela."[47] Sofía Montenegro, a Sandinista feminist leader, added, "The Sandinistas [under Ortega] are closer to Don Corleone's Mafia than a political party."[48]

Ruining Venezuela. Presidents Hugo Chávez (1999–2013) and Nicolás Maduro (2013–present) inherited a country with one-fourth of Earth's oil reserves, three growing seasons a year, a prime location for trade with both North and South America, an infrastructure second to none in South America, a thriving tourist trade, and a functioning civil service. Now, twenty years since Chávez came to power in a disputed election, Venezuela is an economic failure. Inflation is running close to 1,000,000 percent. Nine of ten Venezuelans live in poverty. Over one million have left the country to take their chances in the impoverished border areas of Colombia and Brazil.

Chávez won the support of the people of Venezuela in the 1998 election by promising to use the country's vast oil wealth to benefit the poor and to put an end to the corruption that infected both major parties in Venezuela and brought the nation's politics to a chaotic standstill. And like Castro and Ortega, Chávez portrayed a public disdain for wealth and personal luxury and gave the impression he would eschew the comforts that come with the presidency.

The reality, once again, was different. By the time of Chávez's death in 2013, he had amassed a personal fortune between $1 and $2 billion, according to a study by the Criminal Justice International Associates. Shedding his stated commitment to austere, revolutionary living, he used government money to buy himself a $65 million personal airplane after he visited Qatar on a plane used by the royal family and decided he wanted one just like it.[49] (As a candidate, Chávez had promised to get rid of all government airplanes.) He had also created a circle of friends, relatives, and associates who were welcome to share in the bounty that illicit oil money provided. Consistent with his impatience with oversight, he named his minister of energy the president of the state-run oil company Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA). In effect, the PDVSA president is overseeing himself.[50] The situation has gotten so obvious to most Venezuelans that they have invented a new word, "enchufado" (well-connected) to refer to those who benefit personally from access to government money.[51]

Like his friend Ortega, Chávez moved immediately after becoming president to weaken the structures of accountability in what had been a thriving democracy with a robust system of checks and balances.[52] Chávez proposed the election of a special constituent assembly, ostensibly for the purpose of writing a new constitution. Using various methods of fraud and

Top: While Venezuelans are starving, President Nicolás Maduro enjoys a lavish meal and smokes a cigar at Nusr-Et, the restaurant of Turkish celebrity chef Nusret Gökçe, commonly known as "Salt Bae," 18 September 2018 in Instanbul. (Screenshots courtesy of @nusr_et, Instagram)
Bottom: A man eats the food he scavenged from inside trash bags 27 February 2019 in Caracas, Venezuela. (Photo by Carlos Jasso, Reuters)

intimidation, he packed the assembly with his own supporters (and family members), ultimately controlling 121 of its 131 seats.[53] Chávez then decreed that the constituent assembly would replace the elected National Assembly of Venezuela.

Also like Ortega, Chávez received some of the harshest criticism from former political allies who became disenchanted with his self-enrichment. As stated by José Rojas, Chávez's former minister of finance, "The loss of autonomy of the Venezuelan Central Bank

and the disorder in the management of the financial resources on the part of the government will lead to a significant national crisis."[54] Cristopher Figuera, Chávez's former intelligence chief, told the *Washington Post* that Chávez's successor, Nicolás Maduro, and members of Maduro's family are involved in money laundering and corruption, even taking money to allow Hezbollah cells to operate in Venezuela.[55]

Besides insisting on controlling the levers of government, Chávez also insisted on total control of the country's only important export: oil. With Chávez's friends and supporters running the state oil company, PDVSA, oil production dropped by 25 percent between Chávez's inauguration and his death, according to the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries.[56] With global oil prices dropping at the same time, the entire Venezuelan economy went into a tailspin. The Chávez government made things worse and opened up fabulous avenues of corruption for the enfuchado by controlling the exchange rate for U.S. dollars. In brief, government officials decided who had to buy dollars at the real exchange rate (over one thousand bolívars to the dollar in 2013) and who could buy them at the "official" rate of ten to the dollar.[57] Venezuelan journalist Carlos Ball estimated that the enfuchado may have profited $600 million from this scheme.[58]

The situation has gotten worse under Maduro, who became president when Chávez died in office. In 2018, Transparency International rated Venezuela as the twelfth most corrupt country in the world.[59] The Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project named Maduro its "2016 Man of the Year."[60] As early as 2012, the country's total reliance on oil has forced it to import two-thirds of its food, even though thousands of acres of arable land remain untilled.[61] The World Justice Project ranked Venezuela in last place among Latin American countries based on respect for the rule of law.[62] Consistent with the need for a corrupt dictator to share the wealth with those who might oppose him, Maduro has given prominent military commanders control over the distribution of food and key raw materials. A general in the Venezuelan National Guard has taken over PDVSA.[63]

The results in Venezuela are stark. The IMF reported in 2016 that the country had the world's worst economic growth, worst inflation (the currency lost 99 percent of its value from 2012 to 2016), and ninth-worst unemployment rate. It also has the world's second-worst murder rate and an infant mortality rate that has gotten one hundred times worse since 2012.[64] At the same time, Venezuela has dropped to dead last in the Economic Freedom of the World Index.[65] Millions of Venezuelans have been reduced to begging, prostitution, and even grave robbing.[66]

A corrupt comeback in Argentina? Castro and Chávez, as venal as they were, are no longer a threat to the freedom or well-being of their people. Such is not the case with former Argentinian President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, who recently had a court appearance for corruption the same week she announced her candidacy for the country's vice presidency.

Fernández de Kirchner was elected president in 2007 after serving as first lady during her husband Néstor Kirchner's four-year presidency. The two are from the Justicialist Party, successors to the Peronist party of the mid-twentieth century. They both were swept into office on a wave of discontent and fear brought about by the country's 2001 debt default and economic and social crisis. They blamed the crisis on corruption and promised to remove both corrupt officials and the temptations of corruption.

For all of the despair and trepidation brought on by the 2001 crisis, the underlying Argentinian economy was undergoing an agricultural export boom by the time Fernández de Kirchner became president.[67] Policies aimed at reducing the government's role in the economy would have resulted in both greater foreign direct investment and fewer temptations for corruption. In addition, the Kirchners benefitted from widespread goodwill in the United States, which resulted in efforts by the George W. Bush administration to assist efforts to repair the Argentinian economy.[68]

Neither Fernández de Kirchner nor her husband, however, made any effort to limit the intervention of Buenos Aires in economic decisions. They attacked international trade as a malevolent force and economic data collection as a right-wing conspiracy. Imitating the failed policies of Argentinian Gen. Juan Perón, they used the profits from a commodities boom to expand payments to politically favored Argentinian citizens through programs that became unsustainable once the boom ended.[69]

Instead, more social programs meant a greater need for tax money, which led to stronger incentives to avoid paying taxes, which led to more opportunities for

Argentinian Senator Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, former president of Argentina, speaks 30 May 2018 during a senate session on the proposed increases of natural gas tariffs in Buenos Aires, Argentina. (Photo by Charly Diaz Azcue, Argentinian senate communication)

business people and government officials to collude. For example, Fernández imposed a 35 percent tax on soybean exports, supposedly to keep the staple food from leaving the country. Farmers, however, saw it differently. "We had a saying," one farmer told the *New York Times*, "For every three trucks that went to the port, one was for Cristina Kirchner."[70] By 2015, when Fernández de Kirchner left office at the end of her second term, Argentina was, again, in an economic tailspin, and legends about official corruption were once again a major topic of conversation.

As always, the root of corruption in Argentina was a government monopoly. Dozens of business people ran afoul of the law for paying large bribes to Fernández de Kirchner and her government officials in return for exclusive bidding rights on expensive public works projects. In August 2018, after Fernández de Kirchner left office, Argentinians awoke to the news that twenty-six formerly untouchable business people had been arrested and that the multiple homes of their former president had been raided by investigators.[71]

An accidental discovery had led to the wave of arrests. A judge learned of the existence of notebooks kept by Oscar Centeno, a driver for a ranking official in the Ministry of Federal Planning, which contained details of the driver's pickups and deliveries of bags of cash around Buenos Aires. The "Notebook Scandal" became known to Argentinians when the judge ordered a public report that exposed a "criminal organization made up of public officials."[72] The organization, the report documented, "between the years of 2008 and 2015 [the years the Kirchners were in office] sought the payment of illegitimate sums of money from numerous private citizens, many of them public works contractors."[73] Centeno's meticulous records indicate that he delivered about $160 million from 2005 to 2015.[74]

With a new law allowing reduced sentences in return for information, revelations about corruption reached higher and higher. In one instance, the owner of an industrial conglomerate confessed to paying a bribe of $600,000 in return for permission, delivered in a decree from Fernández de Kirchner herself, to control the operation (and fees) of a major commercial waterway.[75]

Another major corruption story emerged in 2016 when José López, a former secretary of public works under Fernández de Kirchner, entered a convent just outside Buenos Aires carrying Rolex and Omega watches, plus an automatic weapon.[76] He was arrested some hours later while trying to stuff nearly $9 million in cash (plus €150,000) into bags.

> Dozens of business people ran afoul of the law for paying large bribes to Fernández de Kirchner and her government officials in return for exclusive bidding rights on expensive public works projects.

At the start of 2015, an even more serious allegation was leveled at Fernández de Kirchner when Alberto Nisman, a criminal prosecutor, charged that she had conspired with the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran to derail an investigation into the 1994 bombing of a Jewish organization in Buenos Aires.[77] (The attack remains the deadliest terrorist attack on Argentinian soil, with eighty-five killed and over three hundred wounded.)[78] According to Nisman, in spite of strong anti-Iran rhetoric from Fernández de Kirchner at the United Nations and elsewhere, she had agreed to bury the investigation in return for favorable terms on Iranian oil and promises from Iran to buy Argentinian goods at inflated prices. However, the night before Nisman was due to present his evidence to the congressional committee, he was found dead of a gunshot wound in his apartment.

In another far-fetched scenario, in May 2019, Fernández de Kirchner made a surprise announcement that she would seek the vice presidency (most observers expected her to go for the presidency) in the same week that she appeared in court for the first of eleven trials on charges of official corruption. This particular trial was to hear allegations of Fernández de Kirchner creating an illegal association for the purpose of channeling fifty-one public works projects to Lazaro Baez, a businessman and friend.[79] The official charge read, "[Fernández de Kirchner] damaged the interests entrusted to her by violating her duty to administer and faithfully take care of the assets of the state that were under her responsibility."[80] The total value of the contracts is estimated at nearly $1 billion.[81]

It is not clear just how much this corruption affected the personal lifestyle of Fernández de Kirchner. However, her personal fortune is estimated at $660 million.[82] She was also found to be in possession of priceless historical documents, such as letters from Latin America's independence leaders. She claimed the artifacts were gifts from Russian President Vladimir Putin.[83]

Argentinian constitutional law prevents Fernández de Kirchner from being seriously inconvenienced by even the most serious charges. As a former president, she is a senator for life. As such, she enjoys near-total immunity from incarceration. It would take a two-thirds vote from the senate to remove her from office and imprison her. If she is elected vice president, the chances of her paying any price for her corruption will drop even further.[84]

In spite of all the credible stories about corruption under Fernández de Kirchner and about her personal profit from some of those ventures, her party won the October 2019 elections and she will return to public office.[85] While the wave of arrests in August 2015 outraged Argentinians to a degree not seen in decades, the anger has long since subsided.[86] Supporters of her successor, President Mauricio Macri, feel let down by the incumbent, less well off than they were four years ago, and not nearly as fearful of a return to "Kirchnerismo."[87]

Corruption and Oppression

Dictatorship and corruption almost naturally go together. It is the nature of a dictator, or an aspiring dictator, to weaken or destroy the instruments of accountability, since such instruments are, by their nature, limitations on the power of the man or woman at the top. Just as dictators prefer to have no checks on their power to rule over others, they also prefer to have no checks on their ability to enrich themselves. As we have seen, the corrupt rulers worked sedulously to free themselves from any effective oversight.

Before the late twentieth century, however, even though corruption and dictatorship went together just as frequently, the results of corruption tended

to be less dire than in our own time. Venezuela, for example, had endured dictatorships for much of the first century and a half of its independent existence, but the level of suffering did not approach what its citizens are living through today. Venezuelan dictators like Juan Vicente Gomez and Marcos Perez Jimenez enriched themselves (and their friends) while in office, but they did not impoverish the entire country in the process.[88] Nicaraguan doctor Anastasio Somoza Debayle was both corrupt and brutal, but even his enemies acknowledged that apolitical Nicaraguans could survive, and even thrive, under his dictatorship. The same could be said for Francisco Franco in Spain, another heavy-handed dictator but whose worst personal vices seemed to be watching too much television and betting in football pools.

It is important to keep in mind that some of the worst dictators in history, like Lenin and Hitler, did not live a lavish, ostentatious lifestyle. Dictators of the totalitarian stripe sometimes have little or no time for creature comforts, given their revolutionary zeal to overhaul society to achieve their apocalyptic visions. Traditionally, therefore, social scientists could offer some consolation to those living under corrupt dictators. Personal corruption, first of all, requires a reasonably productive private sector so that there would be wealth for the dictator to steal. Second, a focus on personal gain tended to weaken the dictator's focus on violent societal transformation.

In the twenty-first century, however, this consolation is no longer available. While Castro did combine personal vice with a murderous apocalyptic vision, there is no evidence that Ortega, Chávez, Maduro, or Fernandez are single-mindedly interested in overhauling their respective societies. Yet the people in those societies, especially in Nicaragua and Venezuela, are suffering horribly in large part because of the corruption of their leaders.

There are reasons for this relatively new linkage between personal corruption at the top and terrible hardship at the bottom. First, the level of personal corruption is far higher than it was a century ago. Today's dictators are not satisfied with fortunes in the millions; only billions of dollars will do. (As early as 1997, it was estimated that over $100 billion of Venezuela's oil income had disappeared.)[89] As we have seen, greed at this level outstrips the productive capacity of a country as naturally wealthy as Venezuela. Second, corruption at the very top of the governing pyramid invariably results in mid- to lower-level officials also seeking illicit wealth. When the scale of corruption rises at the top, it also rises at the subordinate levels, furthering the unsustainable drain on the national economy.[90] Third, one hundred years ago, there were no institutions like the IMF and the World Bank to provide billions of dollars in debt relief and other forms of aid, which resulted in inadequate oversight and an almost nonexistent ability to punish leaders who misdirected loans from international institutions to their own accounts.

Fourth, and finally, dictators in our own time come to power with a vision, perhaps an apocalyptic vision, of how to remake society. Even if they lack such a vision, today's dictators must appear to have a vision of a perfect or near-perfect world to attain power. If an aspiring revolutionary does have an apocalyptic vision, he or she will soon be disappointed in the possibility of actually creating the new world he or she envisions. Thus, unable to safely relinquish their power, they settle for personal enrichment. For those without a vision, the temptation to enrich themselves comes much sooner and is much harder to resist.

Thus, the link between dictatorship and corruption will continue as will the hypocrisy of those professing concern for the downtrodden masses in their society while amassing personal fortunes. Understanding this link is the first step to combatting it. ■

Notes

1. Mark. N. Hagopian, "What Revolution is Not," in *The Phenomenon of Revolution* (New York: Harper & Row, 1978).

2. Ibid., 296–304.

3. Crane Brinton, "Types of Revolutionists," in *The Anatomy of Revolution* (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), chap. 4.

4. Vladimir Lenin, *What is to be Done?* (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1963).

5. "Che Guevara (1928-1967)," CSuiteMind, accessed 15 July 2019, https://csuitemind.com/biography/show/che-guevara/.

6. Waylon Lewis, "Che Guevara: True Revolution is Love," Elephant Journal, 7 March 2011, accessed 15 July 2019, https://www.elephantjournal.com/2011/03/che-guevara-true-revolution-is-love/.

7. Fidel Castro Ruz, "May Day Speech" (speech, Plaza de Revolucion [Revolution Square], Cuba, 1 May 2000), accessed 11 July 2019, http://

www.fidelcastro.cu/en/discursos/speech-mass-rally-called-cuban-youths-students-and-workers-revolution-square-occasion.

8. Immanuel Ness and Zak Cope, eds., *The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Imperialism and Anti-Imperialism* (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016), 96.

9. Ibid.

10. James A. Michener, *Hawaii: A Novel* (New York: Dial Press, 2014), 415.

11. Keith Flamer, "10 Surprises about Fidel Castro's Extravagant Life," *Forbes* (website), 26 November 2016, accessed 24 July 2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/keithflamer/2016/11/26/10-surprises-about-castros-extravagant-life/#7f27d9b16d76.

12. Ronald Radosh, review of *Fidel Castro, Obama's Buddy: Defender of Fidel*, by Juan Reinaldo Sánchez, Israel Commentary, 10 August 2015, accessed 25 July 2019, https://israel-commentary.org/fidel-castro-obamas-buddy/.

13. Juan Reinaldo Sánchez, *The Double Life of Fidel Castro: My 17 Years as Personal Bodyguard to El Líder Máximo* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2015), 3.

14. Ibid., 12.

15. In the 1980s, when I was a White House consultant for the Office of Public Liaison in Central America, the Drug Enforcement Agency and then U.S. Sen. Paula Hawkins exposed Cuba's role in facilitating drug shipments from Colombia. However, the State Department, arguing that the evidence was not conclusive, prevented me from publishing a White House document on the matter.

16. Sánchez, *The Double Life of Fidel Castro*, 231. Castro would eventually blame the drug trafficking on Cuban Gen. Arnaldo Ochoa, a military hero from Cuba's intervention in the Angolan Civil War and therefore a rival to Castro. Ochoa was executed after a brief trial. See also Juan O. Tamayo, "Arnaldo Ochoa — A Problem for Castro Brothers 25 Years Ago," *Miami Herald* (website), 22 June 2014, accessed 10 September 2019, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/article1967653.html.

17. Radosh, review of *Fidel Castro, Obama's Buddy*.

18. Kim Willsher, "Fidel Castro Lived like a King in Cuba, Book Claims," *The Guardian* (website), 20 May 2014, accessed 24 July 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/21/fidel-castro-lived-like-king-cuba.

19. Ibid.

20. Francisco Goldman, "The Autumn of the Revolutionary," *New York Times* (website), 23 August 1998, accessed 24 July 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/23/magazine/the-autumn-of-the-revolutionary.html.

21. Roy Foster, review of *The Dead Republic*, by Roddy Doyle, *Irish Times* (website), 7 May 2011, accessed 24 July 2019, https://www.irishtimes.com/culture/books/after-the-revolution-1.647737.

22. Ortega did manage to fool some. A U.S. Embassy official described him in 1998 as "oblivious to finances." See Goldman, "The Autumn of the Revolutionary."

23. Ryan Berg, "Washington Needs a Nicaragua Strategy," RealClearWorld, 12 July 2019, accessed 24 July 2019, https://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2019/07/12/washington_needs_a_nicaragua_strategy_113058.html.

24. Chris Kenning, "A Year into Nicaragua Crisis, Uncertainty and Skepticism Prevail," Al-Jazeera, 16 April 2019, accessed 24 July 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/year-nicaragua-crisis-uncertainty-scepticism-prevail-190416172049648.html.

25. Jon Lee Anderson, "The Comandante's Canal," *The New Yorker* (website), 2 March 2014, accessed 24 July 2019, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/03/10/the-comandantes-canal.

26. Foster, review of *The Dead Republic*.

27. Raquel Carvalho, "Activists Renew Calls for Controversial $50 Billion Nicaragua Canal Project to be Cancelled as Chinese Tycoon's Cash Runs Dry," *South China Morning Post* (website), 30 June 2019, accessed 24 July 2019, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/3016639/activists-renew-calls-controversial-us50-billion-nicaragua.

28. Anderson, "The Comandante's Canal."

29. Goldman, "The Autumn of the Revolutionary."

30. Anderson, "The Comandante's Canal."

31. Tracy Wilkinson, "Nicaragua's First Lady is a Powerful Partner of President," *Los Angeles Times* (website), 24 March 2015, accessed 10 September 2019, https://www.latimes.com/world/mexico-americas/la-fg-nicaragua-trees-20150524-story.html.

32. Louis Emanuel, "How Daniel Ortega Squeezed the Life out of his Socialist Dream—and Left Nicaragua on the Brink of Civil War," *The Telegraph* (website), 13 August 2018, accessed 24 July 2019, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/08/13/daniel-ortega-squeezed-life-socialist-dream-left-nicaragua/.

33. Andrew Anthony, "How I Woke Up and Smelt the Coffee," *The Guardian* (website), 4 November 2006, accessed 24 July 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/theobserver/2006/nov/05/features.review27.

34. Tim Rogers, "Venezuela's Chávez Bankrolled Nicaragua with $1.6 Billion Since 2007," *Christian Science Monitor* (website), 7 April 2011, accessed 24 July 2019, https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2011/0407/Venezuela-s-Chavez-bankrolled-Nicaragua-with-1.6-billion-since-2007.

35. Anderson, "The Comandante's Canal."

36. Ibid.

37. Foster, review of *The Dead Republic*.

38. Jon Lee Anderson, "The Playbook," *The New Yorker* 94, no. 26 (3 September 2018).

39. Foster, review of *The Dead Republic*.

40. Blake Schmidt, "A Dispute in Nicaragua Reopens Old Wounds," *New York Times* (website), 13 November 2010, accessed 24 July 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/14/world/americas/14nicaragua.html?searchResultPosition=14.

41. "Nicaragua's Ortega Wins Party Support for Re-Election," Reuters, 26 February 2011.

42. Tina Rosenberg, "The Many Stories of Carlos Fernando Chamorro," *New York Times* (website), 20 March 2009, accessed 24 July 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/22/magazine/22Nicaragua-t.html.

43. Sergio Ramírez refers to this control as "judicial gangsterism." See Alejandro Varela, "Ramirez Predicts Corruption if Ortega Wins in Nicaragua," EFE News Service, 1 November 2006; Rosenberg, "The Many Stories of Carlos Fernando Chamorro."

44. Kenning, "A Year into Nicaragua Crisis, Uncertainty and Skepticism Prevail."

45. Carrie Snyder, "Is History Repeating in Nicaragua?," *The Globe and Mail* (website), 20 July 2018, accessed 25 July 2019, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-is-history-repeating-in-nicaragua/.

46. Berg, "Washington Needs a Nicaragua Strategy."

47. Jude Webber, "Nicaragua: Daniel Ortega's Last Stand?," *Financial Times* (website), 21 August 2018, accessed 25 July 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/65a32bd0-a462-11e8-8ecf-a7ae1beff35b.

48. Rory Carroll, "Second Coming of the Sandinistas Turns Sour," *The Guardian* (website), 10 January 2009, accessed 25 July 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jan/11/nicaragua-world-ortega.

49. Gustavo Coronel, "The Corruption of Democracy in Venezuela," *USA Today Magazine*, March 2008.

50. Ibid.

51. Maxim Lott, "Lifestyles of the Rich and Socialist: From Chávez to Castro, Leaders who Lived the High Life," Fox News, 11 March 2019, accessed 17 July 2019, https://www.foxnews.com/politics/lifestyles-of-the-rich-and-socialist-from-chavez-to-castro-leaders-who-lived-the-high-life.

52. Coronel, "The Corruption of Democracy in Venezuela."

53. Cristina Marcano and Alberto Barrera Tyszka, *Hugo Chavez: The Definitive Biography of Venezuela's Controversial President* (New York: Random House, 2007), 130.

54. Coronel, "The Corruption of Democracy in Venezuela."

55. Helen Mukchina, "Agence France-Presse: Venezuela's Former Spy Chief Says Maduro Could Yet Fall," *Kyiv Post* (website), 25 June 2019, accessed 25 July 2019, https://www.kyivpost.com/world/agence-france-presse-venezuelas-former-spy-chief-says-maduro-could-yet-fall.html.

56. Peter Wilson, "Venezuela's PDVSA Oil Company is Bloated, 'Falling Apart,'" *USA Today* (website), updated 28 May 2012, accessed 25 July 2019, https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/world/story/2012-05-28/venezuela-oil/55248628/1.

57. Matt O'Brien, "There Has Never Been a Country That Should Have Been so Rich but Ended up This Poor," *Washington Post* (website), 19 May 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/05/19/there-has-never-been-a-country-that-should-have-been-so-rich-but-ended-up-this-poor/.

58. Coronel, "The Corruption of Democracy in Venezuela."

59. "Corruption Perceptions Index 2018," Transparency International, accessed 17 July 2019, https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018.

60. "Person of the Year: Nicolás Maduro—2016 Man of the Year in Organized Crime and Corruption," Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, accessed 18 July 2019, https://www.occrp.org/en/poy/2016/.

61. Wilson, "Venezuela's PDVSA Oil Company is Bloated."

62. "Venezuela ocupa último lugar de naciones latinoamericanas analizadas" [Venezuela takes last place in analyzed Latin American nations], Mérida Digital, 8 March 2014, accessed 25 July 2019, https://wwwmeridadigital.blogspot.com/2014/03/venezuela-ocupa-ultimo-lugar-de.html?m=0.

63. Brian Ellsworth and Mayela Armas, "Special Report: Why the Military Still Stands by Venezuela's Beleaguered President," Reuters, 28 June 2019, accessed 25 July 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-military-specialreport/special-report-why-the-military-still-stands-by-venezuelas-beleaguered-president-idUSKCN1TT1O4.

64. O'Brien, "There Has Never Been a Country That Should Have Been so Rich but Ended up This Poor."

65. James Gwartney et al., "Economic Freedom of the World in 2016," chap. 1 in *Economic Freedom of the World: 2018 Annual Report* (Vancouver, Canada: Fraser Institute, 2018), accessed 18 July 2019, https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/economic-freedom-of-the-world-2018.pdf.

66. Rodrigo Abd, "Venezuela's Misery Doesn't Even Spare the Dead in Maracaibo," Associated Press, 18 June 2019, accessed 25 July 2019, https://www.apnews.com/cadb01f1c0ca4012ae17c46c0a240061.

67. Kenneth Rogoff, "Populists Ride, Latam's Economies to Fall," *The Daily Star* (website), 18 June 2019, accessed 25 July 2019, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Opinion/Commentary/2019/Jun-18/485465-populists-rise-latams-economies-to-fall.ashx.

68. Peter Hakim, "Kirchner Deserves US Goodwill," *Financial Times*, 23 July 2003, quoted in Inter-American Dialogue, accessed 11 September 2019, http://archive.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=1454.

69. Peter S. Goodman, "Argentina's Economic Misery Could Bring Populism Back to the Country," *New York Times* (website), 10 May 2019, accessed 25 July 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/10/business/argentina-economy-macri-populism.html.

70. Ibid.

71. Daniel Politi, "'Beats Watching Netflix': Graft Scandal Engrosses Argentina and Heralds Change," *New York Times* (website), 25 August 2018, accessed 25 July 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/25/world/americas/argentina-corruption-notebooks-kirchner.html.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid.

74. Agence France-Presse, "Top Argentine Court Confirms Kirchner Trial to Start Tuesday," France24, 16 May 2019, accessed https://www.france24.com/en/20190516-top-argentine-court-confirms-kirchner-trial-start-tuesday.

75. Politi, "Beats Watching Netflix."

76. Abd, "Venezuela's Misery Doesn't Even Spare the Dead in Maracaibo."

77. Jay Akbar, "Argentina's President Cristina Kirchner Formally Accused of Covering up Iran's Role in 1994 Bombing that Killed 85 People," *Daily Mail*, 13 February 2015, accessed 10 September 2019, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2952776/Argentina-s-president-Cristina-Kirchner-formally-accused-covering-Iran-s-role-1994-bombing-killed-85-people.html.

78. Dexter Filkins, "Death of a Prosecutor," *The New Yorker* (website), 13 July 2015, accessed 25 July 2019, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/07/20/death-of-a-prosecutor.

79. "Martin Baez and Other Defendants, on Trial for Public Works in Santa Cruz," CE Noticias Financieras, 8 May 2019.

80. Ibid.

81. "Cristina Fernandez's First Corruption Trial Confirmed for Next Tuesday," MercoPress, 17 May 2019, accessed 10 September 2019, https://en.mercopress.com/2019/05/17/cristina-fernandez-s-first-corruption-trial-confirmed-for-next-tuesday.

82. "Argentina's Ex-President Cristina Fernandez Charged in Corruption Case," Euronews, updated 27 December 2016, accessed 10 September 2019, https://www.euronews.com/2016/12/27/argentina-s-ex-president-cristina-fernandez-de-kirchner-charged-over-corruption-allegations-during-her-time-in-office.

83. "Kremlin Spokesman Opts to Give No Comment on Putin's Presents to Argentina's Kirchner," TASS, 27 May 2019, accessed 11 September 2019, https://tass.com/politics/1060224.

84. Luis Andres Henao, "AP Explains: Corruption Trial Against Argentina's Fernandez," Associated Press, 23 May 2019, accessed 25 July 2019, https://www.apnews.com/ba478ffc79bf47f1aa6718464a2b0f1e.

85. Benedict Mander, "Macri Struggles to Fix Economy Ahead of Elections," *Financial Times*, 12 June 2019.

86. Jonathan Gilbert, "Air of Graft around Ex-Argentine Government Arouses Fury," *New York Times* (website), 6 August 2016, accessed 25 July 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/07/world/americas/graft-ex-argentine-government-fury.html.

87. Kenning, "A Year into Nicaragua Crisis, Uncertainty and Skepticism Prevail."

88. Coronel, "The Corruption of Democracy in Venezuela."

89. Ibid.

90. To give one example, a former minor Venezuelan government official, using insider contracts to acquire oil money, became wealthy enough to spend $1.6 million on two pistols once owned by Simón Bolivar. See Coronel, "The Corruption of Democracy in Venezuela."

REVIEW ESSAY

Bombs without Boots

The Limits of Airpower

Anthony M. Schinella, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C., 2019, 391 pages



Kevin Rousseau

In *Bombs without Boots: The Limits of Airpower*, Anthony M. Schinella considers whether airpower can deliver a decisive victory without committing external ground combat forces. This is a question fraught with potential controversy, in part because, as political scientist Colin Gray explains, "Those who would judge the relative contribution of airpower to a campaign, war, or passage of diplomacy in peacetime can make the mistake of underrating the significance of the historically specific situation."[1] Schinella understands the significance of context and the importance of setting appropriate metrics.[2] He grounds his analysis squarely within a specific historical situation by carefully framing his approach to focus on "a particular kind of airpower employment: those in which an external air force intervenes in a conflict without using its own ground combat forces."[3] Schinella thus proceeds to critically evaluate "what is becoming a preferred mode of U.S. military intervention—dropping bombs from the skies without committing boots on the ground," granting his book a useful relevance to policymakers and military decision-makers.[4]

Schinella analyzes five post-Cold War airpower interventions to provide a sober assessment of the capabilities and limitations of airpower. In each of these cases, ranging from Bosnia in 1995 to Libya in 2011, airpower did indeed win battles and achieve important objectives. However, Schinella explains that the costs of these campaigns also proved higher than expected, and the long-term consequences fell demonstrably short of their strategic goals.

Schinella opens with a discussion of strategy that sets the stage for the analysis to follow. He identifies critical questions for decision-makers to consider before embarking on an intervention. For example, is the objective "to alter the behavior of an adversary regime or to overthrow it"?[5] Is the air campaign focused on targeting national-level infrastructure or deployed

military forces? As he elaborates later with the Kosovo campaign, "when the goals set out are numerous, expansive, and unspecific, it becomes increasingly unlikely that any military operation, no matter how successful, can achieve them all."[6] Before committing forces, decision-makers must first get the strategy right by setting clear and attainable strategic objectives.

The Balkans provide Schinella his first two case studies. In Bosnia, NATO airpower appeared decisive but "was just one of a convergence of factors that brought about the peace, and it has been international presence and engagement on the ground that has since kept the peace."[7] The Croat and Bosnian ground proxies proved competent enough to exploit the opportunities created by NATO airpower.[8] While the Bosnia conflict demonstrated the effectiveness of airpower in support of capable local ground forces, Kosovo revealed the limits of airpower when paired with a weak proxy ground force.[9] Despite the greater use of U.S. and NATO airpower in Operation Allied Force, the weak ground proxy in Kosovo "was largely unable to capitalize on the opportunities the NATO air campaign created."[10] Although Kosovo is sometimes cited as an ideal example of the promise of airpower fulfilled, the outcome was the result of a combination of factors.[11]

One of the great strengths of the book is how Schinella expertly weaves his analysis of the different case studies together to produce insightful conclusions on the overall employment of airpower. For example, he analyzes the use of airpower during the initial operations in Afghanistan by comparing it with the air campaigns in Bosnia and Kosovo. As in the Balkans, planners in Afghanistan faced similar challenges when calibrating their airpower support to an indigenous ground proxy that possessed its own independent and sometimes contradictory objectives.[12] Afghanistan also showed that although indigenous ground proxy forces played a key role, they were effectively augmented by the introduction of designator-equipped special operations forces who supported them by calling in precise, real-time strikes. Schinella also warns that even if airpower alone achieves initial military victory, "if the outside intervener does not put boots on the ground in the aftermath, it largely relinquishes control over what happens on the ground thereafter."[13]

Israel's 2006 campaign in Lebanon provides the book's extreme case of an air intervention with no proxy ground force, and it exemplifies what can go wrong when strategists misalign ends and means. As Schinella explains, "Airpower was not an effective tool for the mission Israel was trying to accomplish. Standoff fires could not stop Hezbollah rocket fire into Israel, either through coercion of the leadership or destruction of the launchers."[14] Lacking clear objectives and adopting the wrong measures of progress, it was difficult for Israeli leaders to assess the air campaign's success.[15]

Libya provides a "useful case study of the relative roles of external airpower and indigenous ground forces."[16] Relying on an indigenous ground force can be an attractive option, but Schinella warns that doing so the "long-term outcome of a well-intended intervention is thus likely to hinge much less on the capabilities and intentions of the interveners than those of the proxies."[17] Schinella assesses that strategic stalemate resulted in the long run due to the relative weaknesses of both Libyan adversaries and their respective ground forces.[18] In the aftermath of Libya, unlike Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, there was no stabilization force deployed to preserve the results.[19] Like Israel in Lebanon, it is unclear that the mission was the correct one and the campaign was undertaken without a clear understanding of the objectives.[20] Schinella notes that as in Kosovo, "This was not a victory by airpower, but a victory made possible by airpower."[21]

Schinella's overall conclusion is that "airpower interventions can succeed without committing external ground combat forces—but only under the right circumstances."[22] To help understand whether the circumstances are favorable, Schinella closes with six considerations for policy-makers contemplating a "bombs without boots" model. Is there a clear achievable and desirable end state beyond the military operation itself? What is the operational environment like? Are adequate and appropriate military forces available, along with required basing options? Is there a reliable proxy force? What are the nature and capabilities of the

Kevin Rousseau is the distinguished chair for national intelligence studies at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has a BS from the U.S. Military Academy, an MS in strategic intelligence from the Defense Intelligence College, an MMAS in strategic studies from the School of Advanced Military Studies, and a JD from the George Mason University School of Law.

adversary? Are we prepared to employ boots on the ground after the bombs to secure what has been won, or is the intent to simply leave things in the hands of the proxy forces?

This is more than a book on airpower—it is a study of strategy and the proper alignment of ends, ways, and means. As Gray notes, airpower is often "judged to have 'failed' or to have demonstrated serious limitations because too much or the wrong performance was expected of them in specific historical contexts."[23] Airpower does have its limits, and *Bombs without Boots* sheds light on how not recognizing these limits can lead to costly strategic miscalculations. Airpower can only be as successful as the strategy it is wielded to support, and as Schinella warns, "A military success achieved quickly from the skies followed by a lasting policy failure on the ground will ultimately prove to be no success at all."[24] ■

Notes

1. Colin Gray, *Airpower for Strategic Effect* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2012), 13.
2. Anthony Schinella, currently serving as the National Intelligence Officer for Military Issues, has extensive experience assessing the effectiveness of military campaigns. For example, some of his work is highlighted in Steve Coll's *Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America's Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan* (New York: Penguin Press, 2018), 297.
3. Anthony Schinella, *Bombs without Boots: The Limits of Airpower* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2019), 2.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., 83.
7. Ibid., 37.
8. Ibid., 41.
9. Ibid., 11.
10. Ibid., 94.
11. Ibid., 95.
12. Ibid., 136.
13. Ibid., 159.
14. Ibid., 216.
15. Ibid., 221.
16. Ibid., 225.
17. Ibid., 295.
18. Ibid., 258.
19. Ibid., 273.
20. Ibid., 283.
21. Ibid., 286.
22. Ibid., 287.
23. Gray, *Airpower for Strategic Effect*, 14.
24. Schinella, *Bombs without Boots*, 303.

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

Response to "Reinvigorating the Army's Approach to Command and Control Training for Mission Command (Part 3)" and "Do Large-Scale Combat Operations Require a New Type of Leader?"

(*Military Review*, September-October 2019)


Reinvigorating the Army's Approach to Command and Control

Training for Mission Command (Part 3)

Gen. Stephen J. Townsend, U.S. Army
Maj. Gen. Douglas C. Crissman, U.S. Army
Col. Jason C. Slider, U.S. Army
Col. Keith Nightingale, U.S. Army, Retired

To view this article, visit https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/September-October-2019/Townsend-Mission-Command-III/.


Do Large-Scale Combat Operations Require a New Type of Leader?

Maj. Dana M. Gingrich, U.S. Army

To view this article, visit https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/September-October-2019/Gingrich-LSCO-Leader/.

Master Sgt. Karlen P. Morris,
U.S. Army, Retired

After reading the latest issue of the *Military Review,* I want to comment on something. The articles "Reinvigorating the Army's Approach to Command and Control Training for Mission Command (Part 3)" and "Do Large-Scale Combat Operations Require a New Type of Leader?" seem to be missing something, the discussion about Maj. Gen. John S. Wood, commander of the 4th Armored Division.

Gen. Wood was referred to as the "American Rommel." His troops loved him and from my twenty years of correspondence with Brig. Gen. Albin F. Irzyk, he was dumbfounded that leaders today do not know of Gen. Wood or study him. In a conversation with Gen. Irzyk, he told me this,

> "Of all the leaders that I ever meet he is the greatest. He is the greatest not because of one reason or two reasons but for many reasons. First of all, he loved his troops and his troops loved him. Secondly, he was a fabulous trainer, he trained. On top of that, he was a superb tactician. What more or greater package could you have than that? How many great leaders can have only one or two elements but not all three? I spoke at a dedication of a building at

Ft. Knox in 1991 and I started off by saying that there are hundreds and hundreds of books and millions of words written about leadership. You can throw them all away and study Gen. Wood. He had it! He is the greatest leader I have ever known and I will say this over and over again until the day I die. What is tragic is that so few know. Today there are numerous generals here and there that the general public knows about but relatively no one has heard about Gen. Wood. And the greatest irony of it all was he was relieved, a division commander relieved in combat. Here is a guy that did everything right, plus."

Those few of us that were around in the late 1990s and early 2000s know of Gen. Wood and we know about Mission Type Orders. It's old school to us. This all stems from the 4th Armored Division, its commander, Maj. Gen. John S. Wood, and the many officers of that combat division that filtered through the Army after WWII. I would love to see *Military Review* go back and look at Gen. Wood or reprint some articles which may cover him and his leadership style. ■

CORRECTION TO PREVIOUS ARTICLE

Correction to "Do Large-Scale Combat Operations Require a New Type of Leader?" (*Military Review*, September-October 2019)

https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/September-October-2019/Gingrich-LSCO-Leader/

Lt. Gen. Omar Bradley was not in command of First Army on 16 December 1944. Lt. Gen. Courtney Hodges was in command of First Army. Bradley commanded the 12th Army Group, which at that time was comprised of the First, Third, and the newly born Ninth Armies. Thanks to Lt. Col. John Perkowski, U.S. Army, retired.

Military Review

WRITE FOR US

Do you have an interest in, ideas about, or knowledge you would like to share regarding technology advancements in the military? How well is emerging technology being integrated into the Army?

Military Review is seeking papers on this topic for inclusion in future issues or for publication exclusively online. To learn how to publish in *Military Review*, see our Article Submission Guide at https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/MR-Article-Submission-Guide/.

TITLE INDEX

AUTHOR INDEX

SUBJECT INDEX



UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE®

Statement of Ownership, Management, and Circulation (Requester Publications Only)

1. Publication Title	2. Publication Number	3. Filing Date
MILITARY REVIEW (ENGLISH)	1 2 3 - 8 3 0	August 31, 2019
4. Issue Frequency	5. Number of Issues Published Annually	6. Annual Subscription Price (If any)
BI-MONTHLY	6	N/A

7. Complete Mailing Address of Known Office of Publication (Not printer) (Street, city, county, state, and ZIP+4®) — Contact Person: Miguel Severo; Telephone (Include area code): (913) 684-9338

ARMY UNIVERSITY PRESS/MILITARY REVIEW
290 Stimson Avenue, Unit 2, Bldg 225, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1254

8. Complete Mailing Address of Headquarters or General Business Office of Publisher (Not printer)

Same as above

9. Full Names and Complete Mailing Addresses of Publisher, Editor, and Managing Editor (Do not leave blank)

Publisher (Name and complete mailing address)
MCCLAFFLIN & ESSEY PRINTERS
4509 Beech Road
Temple Hills, MD 20748-6705

Editor (Name and complete mailing address)
Col Katherine P. Guttormsen
290 Stimson Avenue, Unit 2, Bldg 225, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1254

Managing Editor (Name and complete mailing address)
William Darley
290 Stimson Avenue, Unit 2, Bldg 225, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1254

10. Owner (Do not leave blank. If the publication is owned by a corporation, give the name and address of the corporation immediately followed by the names and addresses of all stockholders owning or holding 1 percent or more of the total amount of stock. If not owned by a corporation, give the names and addresses of the individual owners. If owned by a partnership or other unincorporated firm, give its name and address as well as those of each individual owner. If the publication is published by a nonprofit organization, give its name and address.)

Full Name	Complete Mailing Address
N/A	
Publication published in accordance with Title 44 and Army Regulation 25-50	290 Stimson Avenue, Unit 2, Bldg 225 Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1254

11. Known Bondholders, Mortgagees, and Other Security Holders Owning or Holding 1 Percent or More of Total Amount of Bonds, Mortgages, or Other Securities. If none, check box. → ☒ None

Full Name	Complete Mailing Address
N/A	N/A

12. Tax Status (For completion by nonprofit organizations authorized to mail at nonprofit rates) (Check one)
The purpose, function, and nonprofit status of this organization and the exempt status for federal income tax purposes:
☐ Has Not Changed During Preceding 12 Months
☐ Has Changed During Preceding 12 Months (Publisher must submit explanation of change with this statement.)

PS Form 3526-R, July 2014 [Page 1 of 4 (See instructions page 4)] PSN: 7530-06-000-8855 PRIVACY NOTICE: See our privacy policy on www.usps.com



13. Publication Title: MILITARY REVIEW (ENGLISH)	14. Issue Date for Circulation Data Below: MAY/JUN 2019	
15. Extent and Nature of Circulation	Average No. Copies Each Issue During Preceding 12 Months	No. Copies of Single Issue Published Nearest to Filing Date
a. Total Number of Copies (Net press run)	4234	4027
b. Legitimate Paid and/or Requested Distribution (By Mail and outside the mail) (1) Outside County Paid/Requested Mail Subscriptions stated on PS Form 3541. (Include direct written request from recipient, telemarketing, and Internet requests from recipient, paid subscriptions including nominal rate subscriptions, employer requests, advertiser's proof copies, and exchange copies.)	988	526
(2) In-County Paid/Requested Mail Subscriptions stated on PS Form 3541. (Include direct written request from recipient, telemarketing, and Internet requests from recipient, paid subscriptions including nominal rate subscriptions, employer requests, advertiser's proof copies, and exchange copies.)	0	0
(3) Sales Through Dealers and Carriers, Street Vendors, Counter Sales, and Other Paid or Requested Distribution Outside USPS®	2862	2861
(4) Requested Copies Distributed by Other Mail Classes Through the USPS (e.g., First-Class Mail®)	384	640
c. Total Paid and/or Requested Circulation (Sum of 15b (1), (2), (3), and (4)) ▶	4234	4027
d. Non-Requested Distribution (By mail and outside the mail) (1) Outside County Nonrequested Copies Stated on PS Form 3541 (Include sample copies, requests over 3 years old, requests induced by a premium, bulk sales and requests including association requests, names obtained from business directories, lists, and other sources)	0	0
(2) In-County Nonrequested Copies Stated on PS Form 3541 (Include sample copies, requests over 3 years old, requests induced by a premium, bulk sales and requests including association requests, names obtained from business directories, lists, and other sources)	0	0
(3) Nonrequested Copies Distributed Through the USPS by Other Classes of Mail (e.g., First-Class Mail, nonrequestor copies mailed in excess of 10% limit mailed at Standard Mail® or Package Services rates)	0	0
(4) Nonrequested Copies Distributed Outside the Mail (Include pickup stands, trade shows, showrooms, and other sources)	0	0
e. Total Nonrequested Distribution (Sum of 15d (1), (2), (3) and (4))	0	0
f. Total Distribution (Sum of 15c and e) ▶	4234	4060
g. Copies not Distributed (See Instructions to Publishers #4, (page #3)) ▶	0	0
h. Total (Sum of 15f and g)	4234	4860
i. Percent Paid and/or Requested Circulation (15c divided by 15f times 100) ▶	100%	100%

* If you are claiming electronic copies, go to line 16 on page 3. If you are not claiming electronic copies, skip to line 17 on page 3.

PS Form 3526-R, July 2014 (Page 2 of 4)



UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE®

Statement of Ownership, Management, and Circulation (Requester Publications Only)

16. Electronic Copy Circulation	Average No. Copies Each Issue During Previous 12 Months	No. Copies of Single Issue Published Nearest to Filing Date
a. Requested and Paid Electronic Copies ▶	0	0
b. Total Requested and Paid Print Copies (Line 15c) + Requested/Paid Electronic Copies (Line 16a) ▶	4234	4060
c. Total Requested Copy Distribution (Line 15f) + Requested/Paid Electronic Copies (Line 16a) ▶	4234	4060
d. Percent Paid and/or Requested Circulation (Both Print & Electronic Copies) (16b divided by 16c × 100) ▶	100	100

☒ I certify that 50% of all my distributed copies (electronic and print) are legitimate requests or paid copies.

17. Publication of Statement of Ownership for a Requester Publication is required and will be printed in the November/December 2019 issue of this publication.

18. Signature and Title of Editor, Publisher, Business Manager, or Owner
Katherine P. Guttormsen
COL, EN (48A)
Director, Army University Press
Date: August 31, 2019

I certify that all information furnished on this form is true and complete. I understand that anyone who furnishes false or misleading information on this form or who omits material or information requested on the form may be subject to criminal sanctions (including fines and imprisonment) and/or civil sanctions (including civil penalties).

PS Form 3526-R, July 2014 (Page 3 of 4) PRIVACY NOTICE: See our privacy policy on www.usps.com

Staff Sergeant David G. Bellavia

MEDAL OF HONOR

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

In a 25 June 2019 White House ceremony, President Donald J. Trump presented former Army Staff Sgt. David Bellavia with the Medal of Honor for his heroic service as a squad leader in support of Operation Phantom Fury on the night of 10 November 2004 in Fallujah, Iraq. By coincidence, 10 November 2004 also happened to be Bellavia's twenty-ninth birthday.

Bellavia's unit, 3rd Platoon, Company A, 2nd Battalion, 2nd Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, was tasked with clearing out twelve buildings occupied by insurgents. The soldiers began kicking in doors, searching and clearing houses, and destroying enemy weapons. The first nine buildings were clear of the enemy and easily secured, but the tenth revealed enemy troops hidden behind concrete barricades who quickly opened fire on Bellavia's unit.

Bellavia assumed control of the situation; he provided suppressive fire while his men evacuated the building, and he only exited the building once all of his men had left. However, enemy fire still rained down from the building's roof, and even when a Bradley Fighting Vehicle arrived to help suppress the enemy fire and drive the insurgents further into the building, Bellavia wanted to ensure that no enemy remained alive. He reentered the house, followed only by *TIME* magazine reporter Michael Ware, and killed an insurgent poised to fire a rocket-propelled grenade at his unit. Bellavia continued fighting through the building, killing three other assailants and wounding another before becoming badly wounded himself.

In the end, Bellavia's heroic intervention resulted in the deaths of four insurgents and a badly wounded fifth. With blatant disregard for his own safety, Bellavia's unselfish actions saved the lives of his platoon members. Those actions were noted during the ceremony as "in keeping with the finest traditions of military service and reflect great credit upon [Bellavia] and the United States Army."

Bellavia bears the unique distinction as the first living Iraq War veteran to receive the Medal of Honor. During the ceremony, Trump commented that Bellavia "exemplifies the same warrior ethos that gave his grandfather and all the heroes of Normandy the strength to defeat evil exactly seventy-five years ago."

On 26 June 2019, senior leaders from the Department of Defense and the Army again recognized Bellavia during a Hall of Heroes induction ceremony at the Pentagon. ■

Graphic courtesy of the U.S. Army.

AN ARMY UNIVERSITY PRESS PUBLICATION

https://www.armyupress.army.mil
PB-100-19-11/12
Headquarters, Department of the Army
Approved for public release
Distribution is unlimited–Distribution A

PIN: 205909-000