Military Review

THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF THE U.S. ARMY

NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2021

Military Review

THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF THE U.S. ARMY

November-December 2021, Vol. 101, No. 6
Professional Bulletin 100-21-11/12
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Military Review (US ISSN 0026-4148) (USPS 123-830) is published bimonthly by the Department of the Army, Army University Press, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1293. Periodical postage paid at Leavenworth, KS, and additional mailing offices.

Yearly paid subscriptions are for $42 US/APO/FPO and $58.80 for foreign addresses and are available through the U.S. Government Publishing Office (GPO) at https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/military-review-professional-journal-united-states-army.

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The Secretary of the Army has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business as required by law of the department. Funds for printing this publication were approved by the Secretary of the Army in accordance with the provisions of Army Regulation 25-30.

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2129505

Cover photo: Leaders from the 1st Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment, observe as paratroopers exit a U.S. Air Force C-17 Globemaster to join the fight 3 May 2017 during a Joint Forcible Entry Operation exercise at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Anchorage, Alaska. Hundreds of U.S. and Royal Canadian Air Force paratroopers jumped during the exercise, held in conjunction with the biennial U.S. Air Force Alaska Command exercise Northern Edge and in preparation for training at the Joint Readiness Training Center in Fort Polk, Louisiana. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Daniel Love, U.S. Army)

Next page: Japanese soldiers with the Japan Self-Defense Forces form together 1 July 2018 during a beach insertion rehearsal at Pyramid Rock as part of the 2018 Rim of the Pacific exercise on Marine Corps Base Hawaii. (Photo by Sgt. Zachary Orr, U.S. Marine Corps)

ARMY UNIVERSITY PRESS

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Special Topics Writing Competition

This year's theme was "Contiguous and noncontiguous operations: pivoting to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command—the Army's role in protecting interests against adversaries who can contest the U.S. joint force in all domains."

WINNERS!

1st Place

"The Theater Army and the Consequence of Landpower for the Indo-Pacific"

Maj. Tim Devine, U.S. Army

2nd Place

"Support the Fight!"

1st Lt. Joshua Ratta, U.S. Army

3rd Place

"Decentralized Deterrence"

Mr. Frank Hoffman

Honorable Mention

"Concerted Alliance Building: The Solution to Ensuring 'A Free and Open Indo-Pacific' in a Multi-Polar World"

2nd Lt. Jose Aguilar, U.S. Army

For information on the Depuy Writing Competition including the 2022 theme and how to submit an entry, visit https://www.armyupress.army.mil/DePuy-Writing-Competition/.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

November-December 2021
Volume 101 ◆ Number 6

Suggested Themes and Topics



Large-Scale Combat Operations/ Multi-Domain Operations

- Division as a formation
- Air and antimissile defense
- Deep operations
- Information advantage/military deception
- Field Manual 3-0—competition continuum (competition, crisis, conflict)
- Multi-domain task force
- Recon and security/cavalry operations
- Protection and security (air defense artillery, engineer, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, cavalry)

Joint Operations

- Air/sea/land integration
- Joint/long-range precision fires
- Air and antimissile defense
- Joint forcible entry

Europe/Central Command/ Indo-Pacific Command

- Contiguous and noncontiguous operations
- New operational environment: adversaries operating in their "near abroad" (close proximity to own borders)
- Peer and near-peer adversaries contesting U.S. joint force in all domains

Other Topics

- Military role within interagency responses to the COVID-19 pandemic and other natural or humanitarian disasters
- What is the role for the Army/Reserve components in homeland security operations? What must the Army be prepared to do in support of internal security? Along our borders?
- Role of security force assistance brigades (SFAB) in the gray-zone competition phase drawn from experience of an SFAB in Africa or Europe
- What must be done to adjust junior leader development to the modern operational environment?
- What logistical challenges does the U.S. military foresee due to infrastructure limitations in potential foreign areas of operation, and how can it mitigate them?
- Defending against biological warfare—examination of the war waged by other than conventional military weapons

Soldiers assigned to 2nd Battalion, 87th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, prepare their ski equipment 24 August 2021 during Southern Vanguard 2021 in Portillo, Chile. Soldiers learned mountain survival skills, including skiing, as part of the exercise between the U.S. Army and Chilean Army. (Photo by Pfc. Joshua Taeckens, U.S. Army)

Units from the 25th Combat Aviation Brigade and 25th Infantry Division Artillery participate in a joint live-fire exercise with U.S. Marine Corps units 30 December 2020 during Operation Wardog Kila at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. The 25th Infantry Division consistently demonstrates its readiness to accomplish any mission set through its active engagement with joint and international partners to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific. (Photo by Sgt. Sarah D. Sangster, U.S. Army)

The Theater Army and the Consequence of Landpower for the Indo-Pacific

Maj. Tim Devine, U.S. Army

The Indo-Pacific is the focal point of military competition among great powers where adversaries like China, Russia, and North Korea increasingly contest the U.S. joint force in all domains. Adm. Chris "Lung" Aquilino, the new head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, agrees with the bold statement by his predecessor that "the erosion of conventional deterrence is the greatest danger to the United States in the region."[1] But given national policy that labels the Indo-Pacific as the priority theater and tags China as the pacing threat, the U.S. Army has struggled to communicate why landpower matters in a region characterized by oceans, seas, and straits, and against an adversary that few expect to fight on land. Policy makers have backed an approach to restore conventional deterrence largely by procuring more advanced naval, air, and space platforms like unmanned surface vessels, fifth-generation stealth fighters, and early warning satellites.[2] However, to help cover these investments, the Army's topline has been slashed by $3.6 billion, which raises security concerns across the globe but acutely in the Indo-Pacific.[3] The decline in landpower investments, made worse by tightening defense spending, poses a grave concern because only landpower can generate the foundation of conventional deterrence. Advanced platforms from other services undeniably provide enhanced coercive capability, but the U.S. Army and landpower uniquely underpin the joint force's coercive credibility to apply all forms of military power across all domains.

As defense policy analyst Andrew Krepinevich argues, deterrence works—by denial or by punishment—when the threat of or actual use of force prevents an adversary from pursuing a desired action.[4] Further, Krepinevich perceives "a growing reliance on conventional forces to underwrite deterrence against non-nuclear forms of large-scale aggression."[5] One way to illuminate landpower's vital contribution to conventional deterrence, and the broader value of the Army in the Indo-Pacific, centers around three intertwined and nonreplicable sets of roles performed by one of the least understood, yet most essential, Army echelons—the theater army. First, as America's theater army for the Indo-Pacific, U.S. Army Pacific conducts the bulk of the joint force's endless administrative and support requirements that no organization from any service has the capability, capacity, or desire to perform. Second, the theater army shapes and influences the terrain of military competition by expanding the competitive space alongside security partners and extending the operational reach of the joint force. Finally, the theater army prevents emerging crises from irreversibly harming U.S. interests and, most critically to national defense, allows the joint force to prevail in all forms of land warfare including large-scale combat operations. The other services' advanced platforms all perform key roles, but without decisive landpower to integrate and enable all domain capabilities, the joint force will never achieve the secretary of defense's urgent desire to establish "integrated deterrence."[6]

Administer and Support Enduring Needs of the Force

The Army has routinely formed organizations meant to address the hefty administrative and support tasks associated with raising and maintaining armies. However, today's theater armies do far more than their organizational predecessors. The Army has historically formed organizational units by function or geographic boundaries under a department system. Departments date to the American Revolution and have been used in one form or another since. For example, prior to World War I, the Southern Department organized and supplied a force commanded by Brig. Gen. John J. Pershing to pursue Pancho Villa in Mexico.[7] Around the same time, the Army formed the Hawaiian Department, which expanded during World War II into U.S. Army Forces Pacific Ocean Areas, evolving later into U.S. Army Pacific.[8] Having scrapped the department title, today, both functional and geographic Army Service Component Commands (ASCC) continue to perform the enduring administrative and support tasks colloquially known as Title 10. But as newly refreshed doctrine explains, "every combatant command has an ASCC,

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and the theater army is the ASCC for the geographic combatant commander."[9] In other words, a theater army functions as a geographic ASCC, not the other way around. This fact is widely misunderstood yet incredibly important because unlike past departments, theater armies do far more than administration and support.

Nonetheless, the ASCC roles are extensive due to their associated authority. The secretary of the Army delegates an authority granted by Title 10 of the U.S. Code known as administrative control, or ADCON, to the theater army's commanding general.[10] Thus, U.S. Army Pacific exercises this authority to perform functions for Army forces and footprints throughout the region like organizing and deploying units, training and supplying troops, servicing and maintaining equipment, and constructing military infrastructure.[11] Additionally, ADCON allows the theater army to handle the bulk of theater intelligence data to support operational missions and coordinate for cyber support to protect networks. ADCON also involves administrative actions like finance and discipline, mobilization of reserve component forces, and regional health care for hundreds of thousands of soldiers, civilians, dependents, and retirees.[12] As the ASCC to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, the theater army offers the combatant commander an entry point into the program and budget, since the bulk of the joint force's purchasing power lies with the services. For example, the six-year, $27 billion Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) prioritizes land-based air and missile defenses and long-range precision fires, but this is "not a separate fund."[13] The services finance closing these gaps out of their base budgets unless expressly appropriated by Congress, and regrettably, the Army received zero dollars in the $5 billion PDI appropriations request for fiscal year 2022.[14] Yet, the joint force requires substantially more investment in landpower aside from select PDI initiatives. The Army, with its declining budget and zero dollars appropriated thus far from PDI, is the only service investing in the "transformation of landpower in the Indo-Pacific."[15]

> "The theater sustainment command supports joint operational areas by conducting the bulk of fuel and supply distribution, deploying forces, distributing equipment, and providing extensive troop life support like food and water subsistence."

ADCON is not a command authority, but it allows the theater army to serve as the primary enabler for joint force operations and activities at multiple echelons. Gen. Joseph Dunford, a marine, once referred to the Army as the "linchpin" of the U.S. military. "I use that word—linchpin—deliberately," Dunford said during his recent tenure as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "because the Army literally has been the force that has held together the joint force."[16] Much of his sentiment stems from a sweeping set of external support requirements—Army support to other services and Department of Defense Executive Agent responsibilities—largely performed by the theater army's unique theater-enabling commands. For example, the theater sustainment command supports joint operational areas by conducting the bulk of fuel and supply distribution, deploying forces, distributing equipment, and providing extensive troop life support like food and water subsistence.[17] Meanwhile, the Army Air and Missile Defense Command integrates a dispersed and highly survivable land-based network of short-, medium-, and long-range defenses against ballistic missiles and counterair threats. By comparison, the Army is responsible for more executive agent requirements than all military services, defense agencies, and Department of Defense field activities combined—but upon which they all greatly depend.[18]

U.S. Army Pacific is the critical link that integrates Department of the Army initiatives to address the joint force's most urgent landpower needs. For example, by providing the institutional Army with insights into a rapidly evolving operating environment, the theater army influences force development and design changes,

doctrine overhaul, and concept development needed to maintain, or in some cases regain, asymmetric advantage. U.S. Army Pacific's training areas offer the potential to replicate the large-scale collective training at the Army's combined training centers. Moreover, these archipelagic, jungle, mountain, and arctic training environments present unique opportunities to live, operate, and fight in the unforgiving terrain of the priority theater—terrain that Pacific War veteran Eugene Sledge viscerally described as "so unbelievably rugged, jumbled, and confusing."[19] Additionally, the theater army coordinates with the Army's global sustainment and logistics network by managing billions of dollars in pre-positioned stock, conducting depot-level maintenance, and directing contractor support for all levels of joint and multinational operations and training. The Army's first multi-domain task force, under the operational control of U.S. Army Pacific, exemplifies how the theater army experiments with and rapidly employs long-range sensing and fires, artificial intelligence, and machine-learning-enabled capabilities for the joint force in all domains, including cyber and space. Furthermore, U.S. Army Pacific has the potential to serve as a key integrator for each service's ongoing experimentation and future concept development like the Army's Project Convergence, the Navy's Project Overmatch, and the Air Force's Advanced Battle Management System and Agile Combat Employment. This is possible because the theater army provides the landpower that interconnects all joint

Soldiers of the 97th Transportation Company, 7th Sustainment Brigade, and civilian contract workers load an Avenger Air Defense System assigned to 1st Battalion, 174th Air Defense Artillery Regiment, onto an Army Watercraft System 28 July 2021 in support of Exercise Forager 21 at Naval Station Guam. Exercise Forager 21 is a U.S. Army Pacific exercise designed to test and refine the theater army's ability to flow landpower forces into the theater, execute command and control of those forces, and effectively employ them in support of our allies, partners, and national security objectives in the region. (Photo by Spc. Olivia Lauer, U.S. Army)

force activities and sets the theater to enable the full range of military operations.

Shape and Influence the Terrain of Military Competition

U.S. Army Pacific must set conditions not only for all U.S. land forces to operate *on* land but also for the entire joint force to operate *from* land. This is no small task considering that in ten years, two-thirds of the world's population will live in the Indo-Pacific, an area that covers half of the globe.[20] In 2014, Gen. Vincent Brooks, the first four-star commanding general of the theater army since its elevation to a four-star command, implemented a joint directive designating U.S. Army Pacific as the Theater Joint Force Land Component Command.[21] This standing designation bestows coordinating authority to synchronize and integrate the planning and training among all U.S. land forces in theater, which includes Army, Marine Corps, and special operations forces.[22] The designation is significant for two reasons. First, the theater army coordinates the joint force's day-to-day operations and activities on land—the only domain where people live—which is central to influencing the amorphous human dimension of military competition. Second, considering the Army's corresponding effort to develop the joint concept for contested logistics, the theater army coordinates much of the joint force's intratheater force projection activities while providing the bulk of intratheater logistics during joint operations.

Adversaries increasingly contest the joint force throughout the region and in all domains, but the terrestrial landscape of military competition revolves around information, influence, and people. Unlike the other services that are platform-based, the Army is people-based, and as the chief of staff of the Army, Gen. James McConville, has expressed, "People are the Army."[23] For example, the regionally aligned security force assistance brigade presents multiple dilemmas to the People's Liberation Army by deploying and employing U.S. troops on the ground in South Asia, Oceania, and inside the first island chain in Southeast Asia. Concurrently, these forces provide hands-on education, training, advising, and assistance that directly addresses our allies' and partners' most vital self-interests: defending their sovereign borders and protecting their populations. In other visible displays of U.S. commitment, the theater army embeds land forces, like those conducting operations in Pacific Island nations, with State Department-led country teams across the region. These forces conduct military information support operations, among many other mission sets, to directly counter Chinese, Russian, and North Korean corrosive

misinformation and disinformation campaigns. The use of cyber tools, flyovers, or freedom of navigation operations all have their effects, but the Army excels at the rudimentary, yet nonreplicable, ability to gain and maintain influence through person-to-person exchanges and persistent engagement with populations.

The theater army's exercises and events bind the region's landpower network and sets the mortar for complex regional security architectures. A recent RAND report concluded that successful U.S. deterrent relationships hinge on clear displays of commitment and a clear advantage in local balance of forces.[24] U.S. Army Pacific's security cooperation activities, like the annual Talisman Sabre exercise with Australia and other multinational partners, do both. Moreover, since 2014, U.S. Army Pacific has annually combined several of these previously standalone events into a premier large-scale, joint, and multinational operation known as Operation Pacific Pathways. As a congressional report highlights, Army officials stated that Pathways "builds readiness at multiple command echelons; increases exercise complexity for partners … supports the rebalance of forces to the Pacific with a persistent forward presence; and allows the Army to experiment with capabilities."[25] Additionally, Army-sponsored senior leader conferences, like the annual Indo-Pacific Army Chiefs Conference and the Indo-Pacific Landpower Conference, not only clearly demonstrate commitment, but they also create opportunities for foreign military sales, promote interoperability, and encourage other nations to choose the United States as the security partner of choice. Finally, for over twenty-five years, the National Guard's State Partnership Program has formed bonds with countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Vietnam.[26] Access gained through the landpower network has allowed the joint force to strengthen its operational footing throughout the region but notably inside the first island chain—an area, where the joint force is widely considered to be "out of position."[27]

The operational reach of other services' platforms largely depends on a backbone of sustainment and logistics provided by the theater army. From Oceania to the Arctic and South Asia to the Pacific homeland, U.S. Army Pacific provides common-user logistics and land transportation, constructs and maintains forward basing and marshaling areas, coordinates contract support requirements, and pre-positions equipment, supplies, and transportation assets. Paradoxically, Army watercraft systems in the Indo-Pacific conduct the lion's share of ship-to-ship transfers, ship-to-shore transfers, and intratheater transport of personnel and cargo.[28] Consequently, U.S. Army Pacific exemplifies joint interdependence, which is defined as "the purposeful reliance by one Service on another Service's capabilities to maximize complementary and reinforcing effects of both (i.e., synergy)."[29] William T. Johnsen, professor at the U.S. Army War College, suggests that no single source of military power will dominate the future security environment. Instead, Johnsen argues, "the key question will be how to best blend the components of military (and usually national) power to provide the desired result."[30] With a plan to restore conventional deterrence hinging on advanced platforms, continued joint interdependence will rely on foundational capabilities that only the theater army can provide, whether in competition, crisis, or likely wars of the future.

Prevent and Prevail in Crisis and Conflict

As military competition intensifies, the theater army offers a persistent advantage to the joint force: leadership. With augmentation, U.S. Army Pacific can function as a four-star combined joint task force headquarters over joint and multinational coalitions. It can also provide the land component command for joint and multinational forces in a joint operations area, like U.S. Army Japan during the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster in 2011 or U.S. Tenth Army on Okinawa during "the longest and largest battle of the Pacific War," Sledge writes.[31] Like their department predecessors, theater

Previous page: Soldiers with 1st Battalion, 1st Air Defense Artillery Regiment, fire an MIM-104 Patriot to destroy a drone target 16 July 2021 during Exercise Talisman Sabre 2021 at Camp Growl in Queensland, Australia. This was the first time the MIM-104 Patriot had been fired on Australian soil. Army forces operating in the Indo-Pacific bring a unique blend of key multi-domain capabilities that enable the joint force. (Photo by Lance Cpl. Alyssa Chuluda, U.S. Marine Corps)

Soldiers with 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, 25th Infantry Division, and Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Armed Forces) make their way to an objective 7 August 2021 during joint training exercise Garuda Shield 21 at Baturaja Training Area, Indonesia. (Photo by Spc. Rachel Christensen, U.S. Army)

armies can constitute field armies should the need arise, representing the joint force's sole capability to exercise command and control over multiple corps-sized elements. Exercising the command authority known as operational control, or OPCON, U.S. Army Pacific permanently leads the U.S. military's largest combatant commander-assigned force—a quarter of the Total Army's combat power—including a corps, several tactical divisions, and multiple general officer-led enabling commands. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Army forces have delivered huge wins promoting American leadership and values by distributing medical supplies and administering vaccines throughout the region.[32] Furthermore, theater army planners excel in leading contingency planning efforts by integrating the fundamental aspects of landpower into joint wargaming, operations, and plans. Doing so offers tailorable, scalable, flexible deterrent options to prevent adversaries from achieving gains through opportunistic aggression. However, the intermittent need to deploy, sustain, and lead forces during a crisis or contingency chiefly depends on the theater army's permanent ability to provide security to the joint force.

The theater army delivers the critical security architecture needed to operate within all contested domains. U.S. Army Pacific leads the joint force's efforts in counter-unmanned aircraft systems, chemical and biological defense, and enterprise-wide warning and mass notification—all significant sources of strategic vulnerability. The multi-domain task force provides a host of integrated capabilities that enable advanced platforms, like a Ford-class carrier, to degrade and penetrate adversaries' antiaccess and area denial (A2/AD) bubbles. Advanced Army cyber tools and long-range hypersonic and antiship missiles offer protection over extreme distances. Emerging network capabilities, like those within the Army's Capability Set '25, offer the joint force a concealable, survivable, and distributed "network that is more expeditionary and mobile but can pass and

process massive amounts of data."[33] Furthermore, as other services undergo reforms, their reliance on Army capabilities will likely increase, particularly in base security, protecting populations, and defending Pacific homeland areas like Hawaii and Guam. For example, the chief of naval operations favors "divesting non-core Navy missions like Aegis Ashore," but aside from Aegis Afloat, the joint force would then lean exclusively on the Army to provide ballistic and cruise missile defense.[34] Likewise, the Marine Corps elected to scrap its tanks, along with much of its organic artillery and rotary aircraft, but doing so greatly increases the burden on the Army to protect and support any-sized Marine element once ashore.[35] This raises the oxymoronic issue that while the demand for landpower increases, the Army's budget slips into decline.

> The Army is the only force capable of permanently seizing, occupying, and defending the associated ports, airfields, and staging areas of advanced platforms because they are all located on land.

U.S. Army Pacific's forward posture showcases U.S. strategic commitment and solidifies the joint force's operational footing to project power. In an early trip to northeast Asia, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin remarked that the United States' alliance with South Korea "has never been more important."[36] The Army's fixed presence on the peninsula has been the cornerstone of conventional deterrence against North Korea for nearly seventy years, where the only active U.S. field army greatly reduces the risk of transitioning from competition to armed conflict.[37] Likewise, Japan hosts U.S. Army Japan, a subordinate Army force, which not only oversees critical forward-deployed signal, sustainment, aviation, and artillery units but also offers the ability to establish a forward operational command post should the need arise. U.S. Army Alaska hosts similar capabilities but also includes units that specialize in extreme cold weather and high-altitude environments, which is relevant given intensifying military competition in the Arctic. In Southeast Asia, the Army has expanded its presence around the South China Sea. One recent example includes the "total package" sale of Strykers to Thailand that includes vehicles, maintenance, training, and spare parts.[38] For decades, U.S. Army special operations forces have been a mainstay in the Philippines, conducting counterinsurgency operations against groups like Abu Sayyaf and the Islamic State.[39] The Navy can draw on the Army's positive influence in the Philippines as it pushes to restore a naval base at Subic Bay, strategically vital given the scarcity of deepwater ports nearby.[40] Army posture equals stronger security relationships but, as one posture study points out, it also allows for "high volume force flows for major wars."[41]

Should conventional deterrence fail in the Indo-Pacific, the joint force must be ready to prevail in war. Only the Army can provide the scale of mass, depth of multifunctional capabilities, and permanence of land forces required for an all-domain conflict. Future battlegrounds, while impossible to predict in detail, will likely involve localized, distributed forms of data-driven, fast-paced, and protracted violence without discounting the possible employment of strategic weapons. All forms of power have their limits in war, but as Lukas Milevski, a leading scholar on military strategy, writes, "Land power alone enables the take and exercising of control."[42] Considering the focus on advanced technology, the Army is the only force capable of permanently seizing, occupying, and defending the associated ports, airfields, and staging areas of advanced platforms because they are all located on land.[43] Though few policy makers expect to fight the Chinese on land, the fact remains that China's military center of gravity remains the People's Liberation Army, the largest standing ground force in the world.[44] Further, the risk of a Russian military incursion is not isolated to Europe, and as U.S. Indo-Pacific Command admits, "North Korea remains our most immediate threat."[45] The land domain in the Indo-Pacific remains primordial to U.S. interests, not

only because of the strategic value of strongpoints and key terrain but also because it includes U.S. sovereign territory. Above all else, the Army must defend the U.S. homeland and protect the American people. Altogether, the theater army ensures that the joint force can deploy, fight, and win against enemy armies in all terrestrial environments, under any adverse condition, and for the duration of any conflict.

Conclusion

Advanced platforms undeniably provide enhanced coercive capabilities, but no other service can replicate the essential and inherently fundamental roles of the U.S. Army—the Nation's only force capable of providing and sustaining landpower. Retaining asymmetric advantages relies on advanced technologies and platforms, but fully restoring conventional deterrence and achieving "integrated deterrence" requires the attendant transformation of U.S. landpower in the Indo-Pacific. Platforms have yet to extract their dependence on the land—Arleigh Burke-class destroyers must port, surveillance aircraft eventually touch down, and overhead persistent infrared satellites continuously communicate with ground terminals. Having evolved significantly from past geographic departments, theater armies now are the "linchpin" for the joint force, exemplifying joint interdependence and providing the foundational capabilities that amplify the joint force's coercive credibility across all domains. The theater army competes day-to-day by presenting multiple dilemmas to adversaries, strengthening joint force integration, and solidifying the region's landpower network. U.S. Army Pacific defends the Pacific homeland, protects the American people, and prepares to fight and decisively defeat our Nation's enemies in the land domain—which remains the elemental battleground in war. By administering and supporting the enduring needs of the force, shaping and influencing the terrain of military competition, and preventing and prevailing in crisis and conflict, the theater army represents and cements the indispensable value of the Army and landpower for the Indo-Pacific. ■

Notes

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Dr. Fred Hiebert from the National Geographic Society provides training on the 1954 Hague Convention and an overview of cultural heritage in Afghanistan to U.S. civil affairs personnel preparing to deploy to Afghanistan in 2010. Organized by the U.S. Committee of the Blue Shield, such training is led by experts with on-the-ground experience. (Photo © U.S. Committee of the Blue Shield)

Planning for Culture

Incorporating Cultural Property Protection into a Large-Scale, Multi-Domain Exercise

Scott M. Edmondson, PhD
Patricia L. Fogarty, PhD*
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Over the past several decades, the United States has demonstrated repeatedly the might of its armed forces. Superior technical training and advanced weaponry have produced arguably the best military in the world. At the same time, the United States has struggled to defeat insurgencies and build lasting peace despite overwhelming military dominance. Failure to understand the culture of our allies and our adversaries, or what H. R. McMaster has called "strategic narcissism," is a big part of the problem.[1] Although there has been much progress on this front since 2005, relevant and effective cultural training for military personnel across the services still presents a challenge.[2] Moreover, such training does not regularly get translated into practice in military planning and operations. Therefore, we support a different approach in both method and content, one which extends beyond the classroom or the briefing slide. Incorporating cultural property protection (CPP) injects as part of the regular challenges that participants encounter in exercises an effective way to integrate cultural understanding into military operations. Our participation in the Blue Flag/Joint Warfighting Assessment 2018 (BF/JWA-18) provides a good example.[3] Through CPP, we argue, participants provide commanders with effective recommendations on how to apply concepts of culture that add a vital dimension to situational awareness relevant to achieving strategic goals and guide how to collect further relevant information.

Why CPP Matters

Great military thinkers from Sun Tzu to Thucydides and Carl von Clausewitz acknowledged the importance of culture and cultural property in warfare, particularly as it pertains to morale and will. In addition to the pithy wisdom of "know thy enemy," Sun Tzu's maneuver warfare encouraged restraint and "preservation over destruction."[4] Thucydides demonstrated the dangers of adopting an "ends justifying the means" approach.[5] Likewise, Clausewitz, in his paradoxical trinity, understood the significance of passion and will.[6] The more war touches the people, the more violent it becomes. While some modern air power theorists like Giulio Douhet have argued that the destruction of cities and cultural property would break the morale of the adversary, conflicting evidence suggests that it may actually strengthen an adversary's resolve and escalate conflict by posing an existential threat to cultural identity.[7]

Contemporary CPP efforts have their origins with the well-known "Monuments Men" of World War II. Known officially as the Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives program, the group consisted of an international cadre of individuals with the knowledge, experience, and determination to seek out and protect works of art threatened during the war. The Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives branch was created under the civil affairs and military governments sections of the

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Allied armies. Currently, U.S. Army Civil Affairs, in collaboration with the Smithsonian Cultural Rescue Initiative, trains personnel through the 38G program to enhance capability.[8]

operationally—decision-makers might find the easier path of least resistance to justify action (or inaction) on the grounds of "military necessity," a provision allowed under the legal parameters of the 1954 Hague

"It is vitally important to bear in mind strategic considerations that go beyond strictly legal obligations. Strategy defines the use of means and ways to reach a desired end. That end is almost always a political one."

CPP concerns received attention recently over artifacts and sites in Iraq and over the extensive damage to the archaeological site and museum of Palmyra in Syria. However, only a handful of U.S. military personnel with appropriate qualifications have deployed to support CPP efforts throughout the course of wars waged since 2001.[9]

International Agreements on Preservation of Culture in War

International support for CPP derives more generally from the law of armed conflict, and more specifically from the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and its Second Protocol (hereinafter 1954 Hague Convention).[10] These are reinforced through the work of Blue Shield International and its national-level committees.[11] The 1954 Hague Convention and its First Protocol requires "States Parties" (the ratifying countries) to protect movable and immovable elements of cultural property at all times during periods of peace *and* conflict, and commits member militaries to peacetime training for CPP. The Blue Shield and its national committees' role is to carry out the work outlined in the 1954 Hague Convention. For example, along with an associated network of heritage professionals, the U.S. Committee of the Blue Shield assisted in the protection of cultural property in the NATO air campaign in Libya in 2011, compiling a list of cultural property sites and disseminating it to military partners.[12]

In the heat of battle, however, CPP may appear to present unwelcome complications to the targeting decision process. As a result—tactically and

Convention and the law of armed conflict.[13] However, the course of action potentially could prove both shortsighted and detrimental to the overall mission. It is vitally important to bear in mind strategic considerations that go beyond strictly legal obligations. Strategy defines the use of means and ways to reach a desired end. That end is almost always a political one. Consequently, tactical, operational, and strategic plans should be nested together, and the manner in which the war is fought should support, not undermine, political objectives when applicable.[14]

Numerous recent experiences have demonstrated how culturally offensive actions at the tactical or operational level can have a profound influence in complicating the achievement of strategic objectives (e.g., the intensely adverse domestic, international, and regional reaction to Abu Ghraib abuse, the Baghdad museum looting, and U.S. landing and basing forces in the Babylon archaeological site).[15] Consequently, the impacts of potential cultural affronts and sensitivities should be anticipated as much as possible in advance.

Among these are, first, the court of international public opinion and necessary strategic messaging. Careless endangerment or damage to cultural property of host nations can lead to force protection issues and jeopardize alliances and partnerships on both a regional as well as global level.

Second, on a practical level, failure to protect cultural treasures may enable adversaries because looted artifacts often generate funds to support adversaries by selling them on the lucrative antiquities black market.[16]

Third, destruction of cultural monuments, intentional or not, can dramatically complicate efforts for negotiated peace and escalate conflict.[17]

Fourth, many nations generate a great deal of profit from tourism from monuments, museums, nature preserves, and significant architectural sites. Their destruction can delay postconflict economic recovery and social reconciliation because an important source of local and national funding has been cut off, hindering stabilization efforts and making it harder to "win the peace."[18]



The Blue Flag/Joint Warfighting Assessment 2018 in which the cultural property protection team participated was a computer-driven exercise conducted in a controlled area with many wall-mounted map screen arrays similar to those depicted in a different exercise shown above featuring salient developments as the exercise progressed. (Screenshot taken from video by Sr. Airman Mychal Fox, U.S. Air Force; William Lewis; and Tech. Sgt. Scott Olguin, U.S. Air Force)

Unfortunately, discussions with U.S. military personnel over the past four years revealed that few have heard of the 1954 Hague Convention or the Blue Shield, yet most were aware of the higher profile cases of cultural property destruction, were eager to protect cultural heritage as much as possible, and appreciated the positive second- and third-order effects of such actions. Nevertheless, they also expressed frustration over the practical aspects of CPP, such as vetting potential targets in the midst of conflicts in which adversaries were using such as shields, or estimating the great effort and drain on combatant resources required to protect national museums and their collections.

Many in the military may even see these latter sorts of dilemmas, in particular, as the responsibility of the Department of State, nongovernmental organizations, or the host-nation government. However, these other entities "don't have guns" and cannot act in contested environments without the security provided by the military. That noted, it should be clear that both due to the changing nature of military activity and our U.S. responsibilities as signatories of the 1954 Hague Convention, airmen and their joint partners need to be prepared to address cultural heritage dilemmas in the operational environment.

Lt. Dale Ford (*left*) and Sgt. Harry Ettlinger were among the "Monuments Men" who in 1945 helped repatriate a Rembrandt self-portrait found among a trove of art in a German salt mine. (Photo courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration)

Challenges on Educating the Force

As professional military education faculty of the Air Force Culture and Language Center (AFCLC), we accept CPP education and training as part of our mission, especially in the absence of specific units or training programs dedicated to CPP in the U.S. Air Force. However, we are realistic about the benefits that may result from one-off lectures, videos, or computer-based training, as well as the increasing burden of ever-growing mandatory training requirements. Research and practice from other militaries and services indicate that CPP success requires consideration at every step in planning, executing, and analyzing operations.[19] Furthermore, to paraphrase Gen. George S. Patton, the force needs to "train like we fight." Since we know CPP plays a critical role at tactical, operational, and strategic levels of warfare, we must prepare airmen for their encounters with cultural heritage at those levels rather than in the abstract. CPP dilemmas can serve as concrete reminders of the enduring importance of the human domain, a critical domain to include when exercising and planning for multi-/all-domain operations.

Initial Overtures to Join the Team

With those goals in mind, AFCLC approached the 505th Combat Training Squadron (CTS) at Hurlburt Field, Florida. The 505th CTS commander suggested Blue Flag as an ideal exercise to incorporate CPP dilemmas, and invited us to collaborate in providing realistic and rich content that would challenge the training audience to think about the operational *environment* (beyond the screens and monitors) as well as the tasks

they were to accomplish.[20] One of many exercises the 505th CTS coordinates, Blue Flag is an operational-level exercise for air and space operations centers held yearly with different geographic combatant commands.

had combined professional expertise in anthropology, history, art history, museum studies, European studies, exercise and wargaming, strategic military decision-making, and international law pertaining

> We thus built a team that combined professional expertise in anthropology, history, art history, museum studies, European studies, exercise and wargaming, strategic military decision-making, and international law pertaining to cultural heritage.

In 2018, the first year AFCLC supported the exercise, the U.S. Army's Joint Warfighting Assessment (JWA) combined with Blue Flag and resulted in BF/JWA 18-1.

Approximately 5,500 U.S. and coalition personnel participated. For the Air Force, the 603rd Air and Space Operations Center at Ramstein Air Base served as the primary training audience, with six three-star U.S. Army commands, the U.S. Navy 3rd Fleet, and U.S. Army Special Operations Command also taking part in the combined joint exercise.[21] The exercise scenario entailed an attack on a NATO ally in Europe, which would trigger Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. The overall objective was to practice multi-domain command and control and "fight as a single, cohesive, and multinational division against a near-peer adversary … to foster interoperability and … multi-domain operations."[22]

Preparation of the Cultural Property Injects

Effective implementation of CPP training injects into a multi-domain exercise requires careful preparation, particularly in choosing appropriate personnel, knowing the area of operations (AOR), and writing plausible inject materials. We gathered a team diverse in experience and large enough to support implementation of scenarios via multiple syndicates. For BF/JWA-18, our team consisted of five civilians: four from the U.S. Department of Defense (including a retired U.S. Air Force colonel) and Dr. Paul Fox from the UK Committee of the Blue Shield, also a retired colonel in the British Army with a PhD in history and visual culture. We thus built a team that to cultural heritage. Such broad theoretical, regional, and practical experience was necessary to support an exercise that involved "162 organizations representing the militaries of the United States and nine North Atlantic Treaty Organization partners."[23]

A benefit of a large and diverse team that included military experience became clear when we realized that the Air Force training audience would not be colocated with the exercise controllers. The situation called for someone with an understanding of air and space operations centers to observe the training audience and relay what was happening to the rest of the team. We could track the training audience's actions from the exercise headquarters, but we wanted to be able to track their deliberations and their decisions to refrain from acting, both of which are essential to understanding how CPP takes place.

In the year preceding the exercise, members of the team attended planning conferences to facilitate collaboration with exercise leaders and conducted a field study of the AOR. Designing realistic, plausible, and effective CPP training injects required specific content knowledge of the culture of the region and a firm understanding of exercise scenarios. With support from the AFCLC, the authors visited the region to bolster their familiarity with the geographic and cultural context of the exercise. The site study included roughly twenty internationally or locally recognized cultural locations, ranging from UNESCO world heritage sites to small, local museums; from nature preserves to historic neighborhoods; and religious pilgrimage destinations ranging from national cathedrals to roadside shrines.[24] The trip also involved discussions

with national and local heritage professionals, and the diversity of our academic backgrounds fostered an interdisciplinary approach to the region. While we recognize a short site visit cannot substitute for longer term ethnographic engagement, firsthand experience of the AOR was invaluable in building our knowledge of the tangible and intangible cultural heritage and interwoven cultural identities of the people in the region, resulting in more realistic injects. For example, we explored how nationally and locally important sites might be contested by different ethnolinguistic and national groups. In times of conflict, such sites might be utilized by an adversary for tactical, operational, and strategic effects. Part of our CPP mission is to prepare airmen to anticipate those possibilities and counter them with appropriate responses.

“We explored how nationally and locally important sites might be contested by different ethnolinguistic and national groups.”

The site study proved a crucial element in the team's success in writing suitably detailed injects. Firsthand experience allowed meaningful and specific assessments of the terrain, generating greater appreciation of the local and regional importance of sites that otherwise might be reduced to points on a map and highlighting more subtle elements like structural instability or proximity to other infrastructure. Drawing from this research, we assembled seven cultural property injects.[25] These included the recovery of looted national treasures; placing radar arrays, GPS jammers, or other “tempting” targets on sensitive cultural sites; and a false flag attack on a significant site. Although of great religious and national importance to the host nation, the temporary nature of the latter site prevented its inclusion in no-strike lists, created a blind spot for our personnel, and wound up elevated to command-level consideration right as the exercise began.

In another instance, we recommended that the Red Team controllers put a radar array on a hilltop where a fifteenth-century structure and national landmark was located.[26] Satellite imagery suggested precision munitions could safely eliminate the enemy asset while preserving historical structure, but our site visit revealed structural weaknesses not apparent in satellite photos. Any attack risked severely damaging not only the hilltop structure but also several surrounding sites and artifacts of both national and international significance, potentially jeopardizing relations with coalition partners. Drawing from the actual history and culture of the AOR, the specificity of the injects added realism and enhanced their training value. In contrast to notional or generic sites or those taken from a database without the context to understand what they represent, specific examples demonstrated the real-world complexities of decision-making and weighing the relative (strategic) “worth” of eliminating a target versus the potential blowback of destroying a particular site or artifacts even if determined to be legal and of military necessity. Such elements help to reinforce the concept that combat occurs not in a vacuum but in a space inhabited by real people with their own complex cultures and histories and should be considered in operational planning. A second benefit of visiting the AOR was that the knowledge we developed enabled flexible responses to the evolving needs of the three-week exercise.

The Academics' Learning Curve

A second part of preparation included building our understanding of inject design, the exercise planning process, and the computer programs used by exercise controllers. As academics, we had a lot to learn about storyboards, timelines, training objectives, and training audiences before creating credible and useful injects that would get “play” in the overall scenario as the exercise evolved.

Through our field site visit and other research, we could envision situations in which CPP could become

Nicole Giannattasio makes a presentation to the September 2018 Military Cultural Heritage Action Group Conference based on an applied exercise for conference participants hosted and devised by the Smithsonian Cultural Rescue Initiative. An AY19 Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) student, Giannattasio was attending this conference as part of an elective, Cultural Heritage in Conflict, taught at Air War College and ACSC. (Photo courtesy of the authors)

a factor, but our injects needed to align with the flow of the larger exercise and provide opportunities to practice specific skills or processes. To that end, team members attended BF/JWA-18 planning.[27] The overall objective of BF/JWA-18 was to practice multi-domain interoperability in a near-peer conflict, but each inject of the scenario had to support that by engaging certain audiences in training for their roles in air and/or land operations.[28] Key to this process was determining which training audience (e.g., Judge Advocate General's [JAG] Corps, civil affairs, public affairs, targeteers, or higher command) we wanted to respond to a particular inject and what we wanted them to *do* in terms of concrete activities that go beyond abstract or general awareness of the concepts. Appropriate responses might include running a target option through the chain of command, requesting appropriate satellite imagery, planning movement of troops to avoid sensitive sites, or countering false claims of property destruction.

Our mandate (in line with our motive of getting people to think about CPP when planning operations) was not to create new training objectives but to integrate culture and CPP into existing ones. The more an inject was tied to the commander's desired training objectives, facilitated opposing force needs, or fit the scenario, the more likely it found play. Well-crafted injects prepared in advance to meet particular training needs helped convince reluctant syndicate partners, and demonstrated how CPP could be integrated into the exercise to enhance rather than distract from fundamental training objectives.

Our coordination and planning occurred mostly with the 505th CTS prior to the exercise, so our injects were primarily related to air operations. While there

The remains of a Libyan air defense battery sit in the shadow of an ancient Roman fort 29 September 2011 after being destroyed by precisely targeted NATO attacks in Ras Almargib, Libya. Five air defense batteries defending a radar installation were destroyed with little damage to the archaeological site. (Photo by © Dr. Joris D. Kila. Used with permission)

Cultural Property Protection Success in Libya

During the NATO bombing campaign against Libya 19 March 2011–31 October 2011, forces of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi stationed a radar station on the top of a hill near Leptis Magna, the remains of an ancient Roman fort near the city of Khums, Libya, now called Ras Almergib. The radar station was protected by a circle of five antiaircraft batteries, that were placed next to the Roman walls still standing up and varying from two to three meters in height. When the cultural emergency mission team visited the location 29 September 2011, it found six heaps of metal rubbish; all military installations had been completely destroyed but the Roman walls and the vaults situated next to the antiaircraft weapons had little visible damage beyond small surface scratches obviously caused by pieces of shrapnel from munitions that had destroyed the anti-aircraft battery. Local archaeologists accompanying the team found the visit to the top a great moment since it was their first time at this location to which access was strictly forbidden under the former regime. The location of the site had been passed to NATO planners. The Ras Almergib case demonstrated that NATO was able to execute precision bombardments when cultural property was at stake in Libya. The case demonstrates the importance of providing map coordinates of such sites to limit damage in the event of future such operations. (Vignette provided by Dr. Joris D. Kila, *The Hague*, 6 October 2021)

were some introductory conversations early on, for the most part, coordination with U.S. Army personnel, international partners, and the training audience occurred at the Grafenwoehr Training Area (U.S. Army Garrison Bavaria, the exercise headquarters) in the days immediately preceding the start of the exercise and during the exercise itself.

This led to another learning curve about the Army's approach to the exercise, air-land coordination, and the participation of international partners. In short, keeping up with "who was doing what, where, when, how, and why" presented daunting challenges. For example, during planning conferences, a particular area of the AOR was to be limited to the lead-up section of the exercise, which was slated to end before our first inject. Instead, activity in that location extended well beyond the lead-up portion of the exercise and therefore we lacked appropriate injects for it. We likewise knew nothing about the absence of certain training audiences critical to CPP injects. Therefore, despite our best advance efforts, we still arrived at Grafenwoehr with much to learn about the combined and joint nature of the exercise.

Exercise Execution

During the exercise itself, our preparation strategies helped us adapt and respond to new situations and controllers' changing needs over the three weeks of BF/JWA-18. Having several members of the team with different subject-matter expertise served us on multiple fronts. CPP injects require cross-coordination with multiple subgroups of the controllers and training audience. For example, we worked with the Red Team controllers to ensure the injects fit the training narrative, the Blue Team air response cell to track actions of the Air Force training audiences, Red and Blue media groups to convey the impact of CPP in public opinion, the intelligence cell for generating imagery and other information, public affairs to get the necessary information approved for release to the training audience, and JAG personnel in both higher command and the

training audience to coordinate legal advice on CPP matters. Each group held daily meetings, sometimes concurrently, and maintaining the relevancy of our injects required coordinating with all of them. With four team members at exercise headquarters, we sometimes lacked sufficient numbers to simply cover the meetings, much less work in depth with each group.

Recruiting team members with different disciplinary and work backgrounds helped us bridge the gaps between military and civilian approaches to CPP. Dr. Paul Fox's military service and experience in the CPP community proved particularly valuable. Having multiple team members also enabled us to split up tasks based on our disciplinary and personal specialties. Fox focused on working with the JAGs and ensured that the correct language from the 1954 Hague Convention was used when discussing States Parties and their delegates, rights, and responsibilities. Our European historian excelled in writing news stories and "intel reports" to prompt the training audience into action. Others also wrote press releases and supporting materials for the injects, and updated and tracked events through the necessary computer programs and websites. We all made ourselves available to attend regular meetings of different committees and answer requests for information when contacted by the training audience. BF/JWA-18 was especially busy in this way because it involved joint and combined forces, with the U.S. Army and Air Force controlling different elements of the exercise and with coalition partners in the training audience.

Upon arrival at exercise headquarters at Grafenwoehr Training Area, our team also found an unexpected but welcome partner in Lt. Col. Deborah Molnar, who was leading the U.S. Army Green Cell, a new addition to the Joint Warfighting Assessment.[29] Our partnership with the Green Cell enhanced our reach with leaders and training audiences, aided our understanding of different elements of the exercise, and generated further opportunities to inject CPP. They could often transmit regional, cultural, and CPP information through the Army chain of command more efficiently than we could, and we provided them with cultural background to enhance their storylines and injects. In one example, at the behest of their commanding officer, the Green Cell devised an inject pertaining to civilians fleeing the battlespace as the blue forces advanced. We had designed an inject around a fictional archive of government documents to illustrate that heritage sites do not have to be "old" or "art" or towering monuments; such archives can just be important to the culture, history, and governance of the local population, particularly when heritage and land rights are disputed. We proposed merging the archive inject with the Green Cell's displaced civilians inject to complicate the response for the training audiences. Which would they attend to first, or whom would they delegate to deal with each one? Would the advancing forces pay attention to the inject and redirect their ground troops around the archive so as not to damage it in crossfire?



Dr. Scott Edmondson works on delivering cultural property protection content to exercise participants by interacting with higher headquarters controllers to provide appropriate exercise interjects during Blue Flag 2019. (Screenshot taken from video by Petty Officer 2nd Class Hunter S. Harwell, U.S. Navy)

In the end, the training audience successfully dealt with both, and the injects served exercise controllers' purposes as well by moderating the speed of advancing blue forces. U.S. Army Brig. Gen. Joel K. Tyler, the commanding general of the Joint Modernization Command at the time of BF/JWA-18, named the CPP team an essential element of the JWA 18 Green Cell, and recommended that future Green Cells be staffed to support CPP.

partnership in which we contributed our cultural expertise and learned from their intel expertise and resources. As a side benefit, they helped us decode the several types of mapping coordinates in regular usage.

While advance preparation in cultural content and exercise procedures proved crucial to success, cultural agility and flexibility were equally important. During the exercise, we conducted our own open-source research into heritage sites in regions previously predicted to

Although not specifically identified in the Blue Flag/Joint Warfighting Assessment 2018 exercise, the Regional Museum in Suwalki, Poland, is one example of an invaluable cultural site that would be at great risk in the event of a large-scale conflict in Europe. Among its other treasures, the Regional Museum in Suwalki has permanent archaeological exhibits depicting artifacts from the early history of the region. (Photo courtesy of the Regional Museum in Suwalki)

Nevertheless, there were periods of downtime during the exercise when the simulators were not online, when controllers were shifting from one phase of the exercise to another, or when our injects were not in play. These turned out to be opportunities to put our other preparation and collective experience to use. One opportunity for collaboration arose with the Army intelligence cell. We offered to use our knowledge of the AOR to enhance some of their intel products created for the training audience for more realism, and they accepted. This resulted in a particularly fruitful

be outside the scope of the exercise to offer culturally important solutions to controllers when they asked what was out there. We adapted our existing injects to the evolving scenario context. For example, near the end of the exercise, the planners sought a targeting inject requiring strategic-level decision-making. They wanted to capitalize on the presence of several general officers visiting the Air Force training audience to offer the trainees a chance to adjudicate a targeting dilemma with the general officers' assistance. We modified an inject dealing with the looting of museum items (attempting to recover them

and conducting strategic messaging) to place the looted artifacts in a convoy with a Red Team VIP traveling to a religious site also serving as a military headquarters (in the exercise scenario). To target either the convoy or the site, personnel had to recognize the risk posed to important cultural items, the potential negative impact the loss of these items might have on a negotiated peace agreement, the impact to postconflict recovery, and the potential legal implications of such actions. By international law, senior military leaders must approve any actions that endanger cultural items.

The Regional Museum in Suwalki, shown in this 7 September 2012 photo, is in Suwalki, Poland, a small city at the heart of the Suwalki Gap, commonly identified among military strategists as a likely Russian invasion corridor to separate the Baltic states from NATO member states to the west if conflict broke out in the region. It is one example of an invaluable cultural site that would be at great risk in the event of a large-scale conflict in Europe. (Photo by Adrian Piekarski via Wikimedia Commons)

Our team then served as role-players for this particular inject, speaking to military personnel who called "higher headquarters" for information about the treasures. Our observer with the training audience served as a direct conduit of information between the general officers at the training location and our team at the controller's location. He relayed information from the debate over that particular targeting dilemma and was on the spot when the general officers asked how they could get more information. We were better positioned to provide that information in detail after seeing the collection in person; we could respond to questions about the items' cultural and national importance beyond the general information one might find on Wikipedia. As a result, our team supported these senior decision-makers with critical cultural intelligence and proved the concept that even in the "high-end fight," CPP matters and often quickly elevates to strategic-level considerations. Therefore, by drawing on the breadth of our team, our site visit knowledge, and our pre-exercise preparation of diverse types of injects, we were able to meet controllers' needs *and* develop CPP concerns into a key element of the third week of the exercise.

Summary and Conclusions

To say we learned a lot in the preparation and execution of BF/JWA-18 is an understatement of the highest



An example of an integrated exercise timeline for events and injects that included the appearance of large numbers of displaced civilians in the battle space. (Photo courtesy of the authors)

magnitude. However, it is well worth the time and effort for civilian heritage professionals and academics to enter the world of large-scale military exercises for the dividends it pays. In our case, for example, we developed relationships with the 505th CTS that held through Blue Flag 19-1 and Blue Flag 20-1, the latter of which was canceled due to the COVID-19 pandemic. These sorts of civil-military coordination efforts are crucial for any CPP scenarios to be accepted and included in future exercises with the 505th CTS or more widely in the military. We built on our knowledge of the exercise development process and inject creation process for the later Blue Flags, and we were able to integrate our injects much more easily in the flow of the design and execution process. Our goal was to gain acceptance for CPP injects as a normal part of planning for and exercising operations, and to a small extent, we achieved it. Success for one or two years does not equate to long-term continuity, as anyone who works with the military knows. Rotation of personnel and changes to requirements necessitate an ongoing commitment to working with senior leaders, operational units, professional military education institutions, training squadrons, and individual airmen to ensure that we educate and train our personnel for the inevitable intersections of cultural heritage assets and military operations.

Furthermore, CPP is one of many skills that make up cultural competence, but one that makes sense to military personnel, since they have usually seen firsthand the negative effects of not protecting cultural heritage. CPP serves as an ideal "gateway" to other cultural competence skills and more abstract concepts, and yet still forces planners to consider culture's complex influences beyond more simplistic "dos and don'ts." During both Blue Flags we participated in, people came to us not only with questions about cultural heritage and property but also with questions about the cultures of the regions in general. Therefore, CPP injects and our presence at the exercises serve multiple ends for the exercise personnel and the training audiences. Bringing cultural awareness and CPP to military training and education can be an uphill battle, one that seems to wax and wane through the years, depending on national security strategies and current conflicts. We hold that culture will always be important because our allies and adversaries are people who draw from their cultures

to make decisions about warfare, partnerships, and even daily interactions with our personnel. Cultural property and heritage are elements of culture that everyone has a stake in protecting; we urge others to take up this cause for military education and training, and hope that by presenting our lessons learned, we might help bridge the gap between academia and military practice for others. ■

Notes

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20. Without the support of leadership at the 505th Combat Training Squadron, this proof of concept would not have been possible; special thanks to Lt. Col. Matt McKinney and John Drain.

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23. Ibid.

24. We would also like to thank those staff and participants from the Language Enabled Airman Program at the Air Force Culture and Language Center who helped us learn about the region and shape our itinerary, and Martin Perschler, PhD, program director, U.S. Ambassadors Fund for Cultural Preservation, Cultural Heritage Center, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (SA-5), U.S. Department of State.

25. These scenarios were conducted in the virtual training world and all troop movement occurred within the confines of the military bases where the exercise participants had gathered. No historical sites or national treasures were ever put at risk.

26. This is the section of the exercise controlling group that is dedicated to forming the movements of the opposing force. Red Team and Blue Team are commonly used to represent adversaries and allies, respectively.

27. At first, the exercise was limited to the U.S. Air Force, but early in 2018, the Army added its joint warfighting assessment to the overall scenario, making the exercise truly focused on multi-domain interoperability.

28. See Krisjand Rothweiler, "#Wargaming for Strategic Planning," The Strategy Bridge, 29 March 2017, accessed 25 March 2021, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/3/29/wargaming-for-strategic-planning. Blue Flag is a training exercise, not a wargame. A wargame does not include actual movement of troops or materiel, and the outcomes of a wargame are not a foregone conclusion. This gives planners and players the opportunity to test different courses of action and weigh different outcomes. An exercise has clear training objectives that participants must practice. The exercise scenarios are largely predetermined (e.g., whether or not forces can repel an adversary or evacuate U.S. citizens), and the success of the exercise depends on how (and how well) the personnel run processes and tasks.

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Russia's Soft Power Projection in the Middle East

Anna L. Borshchevskaya

Editor's note. *This article is a slightly modified version of chapter 1 of* Great Power Competition: The Changing Landscape of Global Geopolitics, *a collection of articles compiled and published in December 2020 by the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, an imprint of the Army University Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The author of the article examines in detail the origin and evolution of Russian "soft power," a concept coined by Harvard Professor Joseph S. Nye Jr., who defined it as a nation's ability to get what it wants "through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attraction of the country's culture, political ideals, and policies." Nye went on to say that when a nation's "policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, [its] soft power is enhanced." The author compares and contrasts the current Russian view of soft power with that of the former Soviet Union and also with the modern-day West, especially as it is developed and employed under the guidance of Russian President Vladimir Putin. This is a timely overview of one of the most important features of current international conflict. To view the entire collection of articles, which treats a range of other topics dealing with international competition, visit https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/great-power-competition-the-changing-landscape-of-global-geopolitics.pdf.*

Political scientist Joseph S. Nye Jr. defined soft power as "the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attraction of the country's culture, political ideals, and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced."[1] For a state to be successful, according to Nye, hard power is necessary; but it is also important to shape long-term preferences of others and project values. Soft power projection helps attract partners and allies.[2]

Historically, the Kremlin always emphasized hard power. During the Soviet era, the following phrase encapsulated so many aspects of Soviet life it became a trope: "If you don't know, we will teach you; if you don't want to, we will force you."[3] In more recent history, Moscow has focused on hard power projection; the brutal suppression of Chechnya's struggle for independence, the 2008 war with Georgia, the 2014 annexation of Crimea from Ukraine, and the 2015 military intervention in Syria to save Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad all highlight Moscow's preference for hard power. Indeed, in private conversations, Western policymakers often argue that Russia has no power to attract. The Kremlin has yet to treat its own citizens well—let alone those of other countries. An oft-cited example of Moscow's inability to attract is that generally people do not dream of immigrating to Russia; rather, they tend to dream of emigrating from Russia to developed democracies, contributing to Russia's brain drain.

In this context it may be tempting to conclude that Russia does not project soft power at all. Yet the reality is more nuanced. Moscow, while abusive to its own citizens, devotes a great deal to soft power projection—often more so than to hard power. However, it defines soft power on its own authoritarian terms. While much attention has been devoted to these activities in the West and the post-Soviet space, the Middle East provides fertile ground for Russian efforts, which have received far less attention.

For nearly two decades under Vladimir Putin, Moscow consistently focused on soft power projection

in the region and cultivated an image of a neutral powerbroker and peacemaker, as well as a business partner. In addition to diplomacy, trade, and tourism, Moscow projects its influence through the Russian Orthodox Church, culture centers, major sports events, Chechnya's strongman Ramzan Kadyrov, and Kremlin-controlled propaganda outlets such as RT and Sputnik. Moscow cultivates attraction by projecting authoritarian values, which resonate in a region with little history of democracy. Through this soft power projection, Moscow cements leverage to secure influence at the expense of the West.



Moscow's Authoritarian Interpretation of Soft Power

A major source of confusion about Russia and soft power is Moscow's interpretation of the term. According to Nye himself, the Kremlin is failing "miserably" because it is attempting to project soft power using the state and with a zero-sum approach.[4] To succeed, Russia (and China) in his view, "will need to match words and deeds in their policies, be self-critical, and unleash the full talents of their civil societies. Unfortunately, this is not about to happen anytime soon."[5] Framed this way, it would seem the Kremlin and soft power just do not go together. Yet Moscow has its own broad authoritarian interpretation of the term. It is ultimately pragmatic and aimed at building leverage. This includes projection of values—just not democratic ones. This is why it is zero-sum and government-led, and why this approach runs counter to Nye's definition. Indeed, both democracies and the Kremlin fund nonprofit organizations—a soft power tool; but where democracies are open and transparent, those funded by the Kremlin are opaque and subversive.

Russian pro-Kremlin academic Sergei Karaganov argues that the Kremlin definition of soft power is different from that of the West. "Russian political leaders have largely interpreted the soft power concept in a very instrumental and pragmatic way," he wrote. "Many Chinese and Russian soft power initiatives often pursue overtly pragmatic, interest-based goals rather than aim to take into account international partners' interests."[6] Karaganov indicated that this broader interpretation of soft power "contradicts Nye's definition because [Nye] excludes coercion as well as economically driven influence ('payment' in his terminology) from soft power."[7] In the Russian interpretation, these are acceptable soft power instruments. Russian scholars note that the terms "soft power," along with "foreign policy image," have taken a prominent position in Russia's policy discourse; Russian analysts discussed over the years the need for Russia to better project soft power.[8] Moscow always cared about its image—domestically and internationally.

Perception of legitimacy by others especially mattered to the Kremlin, though differently from how Western governments understand the idea and how to pursue it. In early years when the Bolsheviks consolidated power, they took small steps first then watched for outside reactions; when there was little to none, they proceeded to larger domestic atrocities. Nye himself acknowledged that after World War II, the Soviet Union's communist ideology found an appeal in Europe and the Third World. The Soviet Union presented its ideology as a better and

legitimate alternative to that of the West and pushed moral equivocation between the two. Leaders carefully cultivated select foreigners as "useful idiots" who would present the Soviet Union in a highly skewed if not entirely fictitious light. Among the most famous of these is perhaps Pulitzer Prize-winning *New York Times* journalist and Stalin apologist Walter Duranty, whose reporting helped Stalin hide from the world his 1932–33 crime of state-led famine in Ukraine. Furthermore, the Kremlin cultivated other sources of attraction. Russian analyst Innokenty Adyasov wrote, "Yury Gagarin was the best instrument of Soviet soft power: never, perhaps, in the post-war world was sympathy toward the USSR [Union of Soviet Socialist Republics]so great … the personality of the earth's first cosmonaut had an impact."[9] The Soviet Union also used soft power tools like major sporting events as opportunities to improve its international image—and spared no expense, human or financial.

The Russian Diaspora as a Soft Power Tool

The Soviet Union fell but the Kremlin even under Boris Yeltsin had a policy toward Russia's diaspora, which it would soon instrumentalize as a soft power tool.[10] Israeli journalist and author Isabella Ginor recalled an interview she conducted with then Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev in 1995 in Jerusalem. It is illustrative of the difference between Western and Kremlin approaches to soft power regarding the country's "compatriots"—Russian speakers living abroad:

> IG: You mentioned Russia's commitment to protect "Russian speakers" everywhere. I'm a Russian speaker. Does that include me?
> AK: Of course.
> IG: But I never requested Russia's protection.
> AK: No one is asking you.[11]

The issue of Russians and Russian speakers is compounded by profound confusion about term definitions, which often gets lost in translation. In English, "Russian" can mean either an ethnic Russian or a Russian citizen—there is no distinction. In Russian, "russkiy" means ethnic Russian and "rossiyanin" is a Russian citizen. A Russian-speaking Ukrainian or Jew, for example, would be a "rossiyanin"—a Russian citizen—but not a "russkiy." Yet in official documents, people write "russkiy" rather than "rossiyanin" as a nationality.[12] Even in everyday speech, Russian speakers routinely use the two terms interchangeably. For the Kremlin, the Russian-speaking diaspora has been a soft power tool, yet as Mikhail Suslov writes, "The understanding of Russian 'compatriots' abroad' has never been the same."[13] When Putin presented his illegal Crimea annexation in March 2014 as a "rescue" of Russia's "compatriots" in Ukraine, he also played on and reinforced confusion over the definition of a Russian "compatriot"; he defined nationality in terms of language and ethnicity.[14]

Soft Power Emphasis under Vladimir Putin

Moscow turned to soft power early into Putin's first presidency, with a major focus on the immediate post-Soviet space. Fiona Hill, a prominent Russia scholar and former Russia advisor to President Donald Trump, wrote in August 2004 that Moscow's soft power projection efforts in the former Soviet Union produced clear results:

> There is more to Russia's attractiveness than oil riches. Consider the persistence of the Russian language as a regional lingua franca—the language of commerce, employment and education—for many of the states of the former Soviet Union. … Then there is a range of new Russian consumer products, a burgeoning popular culture spread through satellite TV, a growing film industry, rock music, Russian popular novels and the revival of the crowning achievements of the Russian artistic tradition. They have all made Russia a more attractive state for populations in the region than it was in the 1990s. … Instead of the Red Army, the penetrating forces of Russian power in Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Central Asia are now Russian natural gas and the giant gas monopoly, Gazprom, as well as Russian electricity and the huge energy company, UES—and Russian culture and consumer goods. In addition, private firms—such as Russia's Wimm-Bill-Dann Foods—have begun to dominate regional markets for dairy products and fruit juices.[15]

Indeed, the results of Moscow's soft power efforts were so significant in the early Putin years that, according to Hill, they outweighed Moscow's hard power projection. "Since 2000, Russia's greatest contribution to the security and stability of its vulnerable southern tier has not been through its military presence on bases, its

troop deployments, or security pacts and arms sales," she wrote.[16] Thus Putin focused on image projection far more than observers may have realized, and in those years it appeared to pay off. But these years also saw the rise of peaceful color revolutions in the post-Soviet space that the Kremlin perceived as orchestrated by the United States. They also touched the Middle East, with Lebanon's Cedar revolution. For the Kremlin, the most significant was Ukraine's Orange revolution of November 2004 to January 2005. In this context, Moscow increasingly worked in the former Soviet Union to consolidate power among Russia's "compatriots." For the Kremlin, "protection," or "rescue," of Russian compatriots from fictional enemies was the perfect pretext to justify aggression, and events to promote Russian language and culture served as a pretext for cementing leverage inside the target countries, positioning Moscow as a decision-maker. In this sense, compatriots were a soft power tool under the Kremlin's definition of the term; the Kremlin would protect them whether they asked to be protected or not. The southern tier has been important both in terms of Russia's interest in what it called the "near abroad" and a "privileged sphere of influence," but also because it connected to the Middle East. Historically, the Kremlin considered itself vulnerable in this region. For this reason, both czarist Russia and the Soviet Union looked for ways to protect this "soft underbelly." For the Soviet Union and for Putin's Russia, this also meant undermining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) southern flank.

As for Russian-speaking "compatriots," although the majority reside in post-Soviet space, the Kremlin talked about it in global terms. In the Middle East, immigrants from Russia and the former Soviet Union quickly added approximately one million to Israel's population; at the end of the Cold War, this total hovered just under five million.[17] In more recent years, Putin routinely emphasized that Russia and Israel had a "special relationship" primarily because of Israel's Russian-speaking immigrants.[18] Putin closely studied the fall of the Soviet Union, as did Yevgeny Primakov, former chief of Soviet security services and later Russia's prime minister in Boris Yeltsin's government. Both came to believe that from a purely strategic perspective, the Soviet Union made a mistake by antagonizing Jews, especially the Jewish population in the USSR. The year 2004 saw not only Ukraine's Orange revolution but also Russia's return as an international donor; over the years, the country increasingly cultivated this role. These events had a profound effect on the Kremlin. A reference to Russia in the West as a "re-emerging donor" became common.[19]

In December 2005, Moscow also launched Russia Today ("Rossiya Segodnya" in Russian, eventually renamed RT) as its flagship propaganda outlet for projecting its narrative to overseas audiences and discrediting the West. "When we designed this [RT] project back in 2005," Vladimir Putin said in an interview years later, "we intended introducing another strong player on the world's scene … but also try, let me stress, I mean—try to break the Anglo-Saxon monopoly on the global information streams."[20] Thus, the Kremlin cast a wide net with its soft power projection.

Aggression Accompanied by Soft Power Projection

With time, Putin grew more ostensibly aggressive in his foreign policy—aggressiveness accompanied by efforts to improve Russia's image. Putin's February 2007 speech at the Munich Security Conference sent a clear signal of this more aggressive foreign policy posture.[21] Yet in June the same year, he approved the Concept on Russia's Participation in International Development Assistance, which presented "a strategic vision of the substance and priorities of

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Russia's policy concerning the provision of international financial, technical, humanitarian, and other aid to facilitate socioeconomic development of recipient countries, help resolve crisis situations caused by natural disasters and/or international conflicts, and strengthen Russia's international position and credibility."[22] The document listed regional priorities that went beyond the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to include the Asia-Pacific, Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. With regard to the Middle East specifically, the document prioritized "strengthening of relations."

> Let me remind you that 'soft power' is all about promoting one's interests and policies through persuasion and creating a positive perception of one's country, based not just on its material achievements but also its spiritual and intellectual heritage.

The following year, Russia's January 2008 Foreign Policy Concept focused not only on the Kremlin's traditional themes of a multipolar world, perceived American domination, and a stated goal for Russia to become "an influential center in the modern world"; it also emphasized soft power in general and its use to achieve these goals and strengthen Russia's international position:

> Together with the military power of States, economic, scientific and technological, environmental, demographic, and informational factors are coming to the fore as major factors of influence of a state on international affairs… Economic interdependence of States is becoming one of key factors of international stability…Strengthening of international position of Russia and solution of the tasks related to the establishment of equal mutually beneficial partnerships with all countries, successful promotion of our foreign economic interests and provision of political, economic, information and cultural influence abroad require the use of all available financial and economic tools of the state and provision of adequate resources for the Russian Federation's foreign policy.[23]

Although the document addresses "mutually beneficial partnerships," it is important to remember to read between the lines. Moscow pays lip service to these ideas but in reality, tends to see partners as subjects. Yet in this context it is clear that Moscow understood the importance of projecting soft power and was intent on using it to achieve its goals. Following Moscow's aggression against Georgia in August 2008, the Kremlin launched a massive propaganda campaign to boost its international image, especially in the West. Russian officials discussed using soft power as a foreign policy driver that year and noted that Putin and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov had done the same on multiple occasions.[24]

In September 2008, a month after Moscow's aggression that led to a war with Georgia, Putin issued a decree creating the Federal Agency on the Affairs of CIS Countries, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation—Rossotrudnichestvo for short. By its own description, "the activities of Rossotrudnichestvo and its overseas agencies are aimed at implementing the state policy of international humanitarian cooperation, facilitating the spread abroad of an objective view of modern Russia."[25]

The next month, Lavrov gave an interview on the eve of a major international conference on Russian compatriots living abroad. He said that soft power is gaining greater importance and highlighted that Moscow should be using it specifically in relation to its "compatriots." In the same interview, Lavrov described the victim as the criminal—he talked of Georgia's "aggression" against Southern Ossetia.[26] Rossotrudnichestvo's activities, for their part, raised concerns among law enforcement agencies in democratic countries about possible intelligence operations. Just as RT was a propaganda channel, Rossotrudnichestvo would be another instrument of the Russian state—anything but objective, contrary to its official pronouncements. Such methods stood in stark contrast to how democratic societies projected their values, yet they fit within the Kremlin interpretation of soft power.

The year 2012 marked several milestones in Russia, including with regard to the Kremlin's soft power projection. In late 2011 to early 2012, massive anti-Putin protests erupted throughout the country—the largest since the fall of the Soviet Union. In addition to famously blaming U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton for "giving the signal" for protesters to come out, Putin penned a series of articles in the mainstream Russian press. He outlined his vision for the country, including on economic and foreign policy fronts, and focused on Russia's problems, especially the Arab Spring. When discussing his foreign policy vision, Putin talked about improving Russia's image, including the need to promote a positive and "accurate" image of Russia abroad.[27] Soon after in July that year, he raised the importance of using soft power at a high-level meeting with Russian ambassadors and permanent representatives in international organizations:

Let me remind you that "soft power" is all about promoting one's interests and policies through persuasion and creating a positive perception of one's country, based not just on its material achievements but also its spiritual and intellectual heritage. Russia's image abroad is formed not by us and, as a result, it is often distorted and does not reflect the real situation in our country or Russia's contribution to global civilization, science, and culture. Our country's policies often suffer from a one-sided portrayal these days. Those who fire guns and launch air strikes here or there are the good guys, while those who warn of the need for restraint and dialogue are for some reason at fault. But our fault lies in our failure to adequately explain our position. This is where we have gone wrong.[28]

Thus, in February 2013, Russia officially incorporated soft power into its foreign policy toolkit while indirectly putting the blame on the United States for what it perceived as destabilizing soft power projection—a consistent Kremlin theme. This interpretation highlighted the Kremlin's own spin on the concept of soft power:

> Soft power, a comprehensive toolkit for achieving foreign policy objectives building on civil society potential, information, cultural, and other methods and technologies alternative to traditional diplomacy, is becoming an indispensable component of modern international relations. At the same time, increasing global competition and the growing crisis potential sometimes creates a risk of destructive and unlawful use of "soft power" and human rights concepts to exert political pressure on sovereign states, interfere in their internal affairs, destabilize their political situation, manipulate public opinion, including under the pretext of financing cultural and human rights projects abroad.[29]

Moscow's evolution in terms of soft power application coincided with a new stage of aggression in international affairs when it illegally annexed Crimea from Ukraine in March 2014 and began a covert war in Eastern Ukraine. Yet Moscow continued to care about its international image, orchestrating a referendum in Crimea under the barrel of a Russian gun to create a perception of legitimacy for its actions. Moreover, RT channels began broadcasting in the United Kingdom, France, and Germany to continue promoting the Kremlin viewpoint in the West, which was rightfully outraged by Kremlin activities. Senior Russian officials such as Lavrov continued to talk about the importance of using soft power in the years after.[30]

Moscow's success (or lack thereof) in the post-Soviet space and the West warrants a separate discussion. As the Kremlin grew increasingly aggressive toward its neighbors over the years and employed a variety of tools to destabilize and divide Western democracies, Moscow's image became arguably mixed at best. Moscow succeeded in annexing Crimea and fighting a war in Eastern Ukraine, but it also brought Ukrainians closer together and consolidated their efforts to join the West. The overall feelings of Russian-speaking "compatriots" toward Russia itself tended to be mixed. That Russia remained under sanctions was also a testament to widespread negative Western views of Putin's Russia. The Kremlin continued to use its soft power tools through government-controlled organizations presented as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or, more accurately, GONGOS (government-organized nongovernmental organizations, a term that emerged in the post-Soviet space); culture centers; and information operations that continue to destabilize democracies and cement the Kremlin's influence in the post-Soviet space. This massive effort should be taken seriously. In this sense, the Kremlin's grip was growing. At the same time following Moscow's Crimea annexation, the G-8 kicked Russia out as a member, and at the time of this writing, an invitation for reentry does not appear forthcoming. While U.S. President Trump called for Russia's readmittance, Germany and other European countries rejected such a move. That said, the situation may change as France and Germany continue to pursue a reset with

Russia and if more voices in the United States and the West broadly call for a reset with Russia.[31] Regardless, the Middle East has been a different story.

Leveraging through Soft Power in the Middle East: Diplomacy, Tourism, and Trade

Once Putin succeeded Yeltsin, he worked steadily and consistently to return Russia to the Middle East, as envisioned some years earlier by Yevgeniy Primakov. A skilled Arabist who was Russia's prime minister in the late 1990s, Primakov held notions of a "multipolar" world also promoted by other Russian officials. In this view, Russia should not let the United States dominate any region, least of all the Middle East. Russia's June 2000 Foreign Policy Concept defined Moscow's Middle East priorities largely in terms of soft power—"to restore and strengthen positions, particularly economic ones"—and noted the importance of continuing to develop ties with Iran.[32] The January National Security Concept also highlighted "attempts to create an international relations structure based on domination by developed Western countries in the international community, under U.S. leadership."[33] The November 2016 version highlighted the importance of the Middle East in Russian foreign policy and named "external interference" (a euphemism for the United States) as a major cause of regional instability.[34] These documents, together with those mentioned in previous sections, show both Moscow's intent to become a major player in the region from the very beginning, and its emphasis on soft power as a key instrument in achieving this aim.

Putin's approach to the region was pragmatic from the very beginning—not unlike his overall approach to soft power. He worked to build and maintain ties with virtually every major actor in the region and, by 2010, had already built good relations with all regional governments and most key internal opposition movements.[35] Through Putin's efforts, Russia regained political, diplomatic, and economic influence in the region.

Among his soft power instruments, he emphasized trade, especially arms and hydrocarbons but also goods such as foodstuffs, along with growing Russian tourism, diplomatic exchanges, and provision of high-technology goods such as nuclear reactors, and in some cases major loan forgiveness, such as $13.4 billion debt forgiveness to the Syrian regime. Over the coming years, Turkey, Egypt, and Israel emerged as top destinations for Russian tourists, which especially mattered to Turkey's and Egypt's economies. It was a tap Putin could turn on and off. When Russian tourists could not go to Turkey and Egypt, many went to Tunisia. Tunisian Tourism Minister Selma Elloumi Rekik said, "We also note that the growth of the Russian market is continuing; it was not a temporary phenomenon as some claimed but a real trend that we can capture and encourage."[36] Morocco aimed to attract as many as two million Russian tourists by 2020.[37] While initial numbers were in the tens of thousands, such stated aspirations matter.

Moscow also built leverage through construction of Turkey's and Egypt's nuclear power plants. Moscow's continued strategic search for port access also mattered in terms of Russia's strategic levers of influence. Moscow and Cairo signed an industrial free-trade zone; while the primary purpose was likely political, the economic dimension is also worth mentioning.

In the Persian Gulf area especially, Moscow's soft power projection focused on financial instruments, getting Gulf leaders more interested in Russian weaponry, encouraging sovereign wealth fund agreements, and organizing business councils and traveling exhibits that created forums for Russian-Arab commercial deals.[38]

Moscow paid pensions to former Soviet citizens living in Israel—even as it had no money to adjust Russian citizen pensions for inflation. This was another example of Moscow's pragmatic soft power projection that had little to do with genuine concern for people—compounded by the fact that the dollar value was largely symbolic, approximately $200 a month.[39]

Moscow also recognized West Jerusalem as Israel's capital before Washington recognized Jerusalem in its entirety.[40] Senior regional leaders routinely paid their respects to Putin in Moscow, and this trend increased over the years. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, for example, made more trips to Moscow than to Washington during the Obama and Trump presidencies. Israeli high-tech goods were an important component of Putin's relationship with the Jewish state.

In sum, Putin's pragmatic approach was more successful than that of the Soviet Union's ideological blinkering.[41] Unencumbered by ideology, Putin offered a clear and simple narrative as an alternative to the West—a narrative on an authoritarian, anti-Western great power that resonated with the region's leaders. Putin's September 2015 military intervention in Syria officially returned

Russia as a key region player and positioned Putin as a regional powerbroker. Soft power alone could not do that. Yet without his previous years of investing in relationships and building influence as Putin had done, Putin would not have been able to take full advantage of the chance that Syria had presented him; he had invested in the groundwork that created receptivity to Moscow on a deeper level, and beyond Syria alone, and especially in the context of American retreat from the region that began under the Obama administration. Indeed, it is the broader overall emphasis on Putin as peacemaker, a regional powerbroker—in itself a projection of soft power, of Russia's image—that continued to play a key role in his success in the region beyond the use of his military. This earned him often-begrudging respect in the region for sticking to his guns—ironically, while simultaneously cultivating an image of a neutral broker—and also clearly picking a side in Syria and sticking by his promises. As Jeune Afrique noted, Moscow earned a reputation among the region's leaders for not intervening in domestic affairs and, most importantly, keeping its promises.[42]

Ironically, Moscow's success in the Middle East was an example of how soft and hard power reinforced each other—seemingly consistent with Nye's argument for soft power. Putin enabled and protected Syria's Assad, who was responsible for one of the worst humanitarian tragedies since World War II; and more broadly across the region, Moscow's influence perpetuated low-level instability and reinforced the region's antidemocratic proclivities, showing just how different Moscow's interpretation of soft power was from that of Western analysts like Nye. Ultimately, Moscow's soft power efforts were to build pragmatic, hardnosed leverage in the region. As prominent Lebanese journalist Hussam Ittani wrote:

> It was believed that Russia's intervention would completely wreck relations between it and Arab countries that support the Syrian opposition. Russian diplomacy, however, succeeded in shifting Arab attention towards issues that concern them both, such as energy. Russia has, throughout this period, maintained its policy on sensitive issues that concern Arabs, such as the Palestinian cause. Pragmatism, therefore, dominated Russian-Arab relations and both parties succeeded in averting a clash by adopting a list of priorities, although not ideal, that reflects the balance of power on the ground.[43]

Leveraging through Soft Power in the Middle East: The Orthodox Church and Cultural Outreach

Diplomacy and economic leverage are critical elements, but the Kremlin also resorted to other tools. The Russian Orthodox Church was a subtle and critically important soft power tool in the Middle East, in the backdrop of Putin's multipolar world vision for the Middle East—to counter perceived Western hegemony, imperialism, and moral degradation.

The Kremlin aligned the Russian Orthodox Church with the state as both a domestic and foreign policy tool, and revived Russia's historical mission as the main protector of Eastern Orthodox Christianity in the Middle East. The idea was not entirely separate from "protection" of Russian "compatriots" abroad in a sense of presentation of both as under threat—a claim that could sound more credible in the Middle East than in the former Soviet Union.

Jerusalem always mattered to the Russian Orthodox Church, both to czarist and especially imperial nineteenth-century Russia. At the time, the Church exercised influence over Greek, Armenian, and Arab Orthodox communities in the Ottoman Empire. It funded schools, churches, and hostels in Palestine and Syria.[44] Under Putin, the Russian Orthodox Church attempted to revive the idea, along with broader historic notions of Russia as the "Third Rome," with its own spin in terms of connections to state foreign policy of expansion into the Middle East. The church in this context presented itself as a unifying force for all Christians in the region and the main pillar of stability protecting Christian communities. This was among the many reasons why the church and the Kremlin cultivated ties with Israel.

In a 2015 presidential decree, Putin created the President Putin Palestinian Organization for Culture and Economy, a school in Bethlehem.[45] According to Israel Defense, approximately 500 Palestinian children attended in 2017. The school opened under the auspices of the Orthodox Imperial Society, originally founded by Czar Alexander III and restored in its official name in May 1992. Indeed, for Russian Patriarch Kirill, the reestablishment of the society was critically important; seven years earlier, the Israeli government returned to Russia a building associated with this society—a mark of Russia's prestige and influence in Israel.[46] In January 2019, Mahmoud Abbas, the president of the Palestinian

National Authority, met with the head of the Orthodox Imperial Society of Palestine; according to Russian chief propaganda outlet RT, the society would work to bring more Russian pilgrims to Palestine.[47]

In Lebanon, Moscow courted the country's relatively large Christian community, mainly via the Orthodox Gathering (al-Liqaa al-Orthodoxi), founded in 2011. The most prominent member of this group, Elie Ferzli, was Lebanon's deputy parliament speaker and former information minister who was a long-time supporter of the Assad regime. In January 2014, a Russian parliamentary delegation—including Sergei Gavrilov, head of a Duma committee that focused on "defending Christian values," and Russian ambassador Alexander Zasypkin—stopped in Lebanon en route to Syria and met with members of the Orthodox Gathering and other figures.

Gavrilov called on the stakeholders to form a joint council with the goal of "activating cooperation on all levels."[48] In October and November 2017, they held a spate of meetings that resulted in calls for closer cooperation with Orthodox entities in Lebanon, including the Orthodox Gathering. According to Deutsche Welle, the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society (IOPS)—a tsarist-era NGO that was revived after the fall of the Soviet Union—had become "the centerpiece of the Kremlin's activity" in Lebanon.[49]

The Church also played an important role in Russia's Syria campaign. Patriarch Kirill and other Russian priests praised Putin's efforts while some Russian priests blessed war planes that went to Syria and sprinkled holy water on missiles. They compared Russia's Syria campaign to "holy," or "sacred war"—characterizing the intervention as a fight against terrorism, a "holy" fight that should unite everyone.[50] Kirill also linked the fight against terrorism in the Middle East with the Soviet Union's fight against fascism during World War II—a critically important Kremlin theme to consolidate Russian society domestically; this also played a major role in its links with Israel. Kirill's May 2016 statement is illustrative:

> We know that the victory in the Great Patriotic War was a righteous victory. … This is why from the very beginning the Great Patriotic War was named as a sacred [or holy] war, that is the war for the truth. … God grant that this ideal of the Christ-loving army never leaves our people, our Armed forces. And today, when our warriors take part in hostilities in the Middle East, we know that this is not aggression … this is a fight against the terrible enemy in itself evil is not only for the Middle East, but for the whole human race. This evil we call terrorism today, … today the war on terror is a holy war.[51]

The church also continued to develop ties within Syria. In September 2018, for instance, Kirill met with the grand mufti of Syria.[52] In May that year, a group of children "of fallen Syrian soldiers" came to Moscow at the invitation of Combat Brotherhood, an all-Russian veterans' organization. They met with Kirill at Moscow's Christ the Savior Cathedral and performed the famous Russian song from the World War II era, "Katyusha," in Arabic and Russian.[53]

In addition, the Russian Orthodox Church cultivated a perception of establishing "a stable relationship with all religious faiths in the region."[54] Thus, the church's efforts were not limited to the Christian world alone; it also cultivated ties with its Muslim counterpart in the region. For example, Kirill repeatedly described ISIS as an extremist organization that warped the true meaning of Islam and called for a broad alliance in the region to fight extremism—a call that was similar to Putin's calls for a broad multilateral coalition to fight terrorism.

Separately from religion, Moscow promoted Russian culture throughout the region, primarily through cultural centers run by Rossotrudnichestvo and the Russkiy Mir Foundation. These agencies, however, may have had wider goals in mind pertaining to serving as intelligence fronts and tools for general subversion. Russian culture centers have become common throughout the region—for example, in Kuwait, Lebanon, and Tunisia—and their number is growing.[55] In Lebanon, for example, press reports indicated more would be forthcoming. Anecdotally, these centers often provide genuinely useful services, such as ballet classes. Several years ago, a Russian culture center in Kuwait hosted a Soviet movie night; to the surprise of many, the room was packed. As part of Moscow's growing relations with Morocco, the Russian departments of culture and foreign affairs planned a major festival of Russian artists in Agadir, while King Mohammed VI granted Moroccan nationality to a Chechen mixed martial arts (MMA) fighter, Mairbek Taisumov.[56]

Moscow's Syria intervention, not unlike interventions in the post-Soviet space, saw the rise of Kremlin attempts to improve its image with regard to its activities there. Thus, approximately a dozen Russian humanitarian organizations mushroomed in Assad-controlled areas of Syria,

secular and religious, Christian and Muslim. The Russian Defense Ministry largely coordinated distribution of aid around Syria.[57] Moscow's main purpose for these organization was political, rather than humanitarian; while the miniscule aid distribution produced little substantive change, it generated positive news coverage for Moscow. These organizations did not go through the same level of scrutiny as Western organizations seeking permission to work in Assad-controlled areas. Indeed, this situation was reminiscent of Moscow's involvement in efforts to bring Syrian refugees home from Lebanon; the few who did return often faced brutal treatment from the Assad regime. The refugee situation remained unresolved—while Moscow positioned itself as indispensable and gained leverage over all parties.

"Russia's very identity developed in close proximity to the Middle East and Islam. Moscow likes to present itself as a country that culturally understands the region better than the West, comes with no colonial baggage, and was an alternative to Iran."

Leveraging through Soft Power in the Middle East: Muslim Russia and Propaganda

Russia's very identity developed in close proximity to the Middle East and Islam. Moscow likes to present itself as a country that culturally understands the region better than the West, comes with no colonial baggage, and was an alternative to Iran. Moreover, as Russia's overall population declined, its sizable Muslim majority of roughly twenty million has been growing, adding to the reasons why Moscow wanted to cultivate the Middle East. Moscow appealed to the self-interest of the region's leaders who felt comfortable dealing with Putin. Moreover, Middle East officials do not worry about the Russian equivalent of a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act when dealing with Moscow. Russia's ties to the Kurds went back approximately two hundred years and remained critically important.[58]

Chechen republic leader Ramzan Kadyrov has been another tool of Moscow's soft power projection. Putin installed Kadyrov in 2009; two years later, Kadyrov's horses began racing in the Dubai World Cup and he began to cultivate a positive image with Middle East leaders and make business connections.[59] In May 2017, the United Arab Emirates-backed Sheikh Zayed Fund opened in Grozny and pledged $300 million to be spent over the next decade for small and medium business enterprises in Chechnya. The next year, a luxury hotel, The Local, opened in Chechnya. It was the first North Caucasus region hotel sponsored by a foreign funder, the Fabulous Abu Dhabi Hotel Management Company. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed attended the opening ceremony. Egypt's national football team stayed in this hotel during the World Cup, which Russia hosted that summer. Kadyrov, just like the Orthodox Church and secular Moscow organizations, also funded humanitarian ventures in the Muslim world.

In 2020, the Muslim World League (MWL) for the first time launched an international conference on religious peace and coexistence in Moscow. The fifth session, held in Grozny, discussed the foundations of Russia's religious and ethnic relations and the country's relationship with the Islamic world.[60] The MWL chose Russia for the summit because in its view, the country had been a model of religious and ethnic harmony in recent years. In April 2020, Moscow and Grozny hosted "Islam: A Message of Mercy and Peace." Representatives of over forty-three countries attended this conference on Islam and according to Kremlin-run Regum, described Chechnya as one of the most "dynamically developing regions" and Russia as "the best friend of Islam and doesn't pursue a policy of double standards" (an indirect reference to the United States).[61] At the conference, Kadyrov received a number of awards and titles, such as "hero of Islam" and "star of Jerusalem."[62] It may be premature to talk about tangible achievements beyond lofty pronouncements, but Moscow's approach to working with the league contrasts with Europe's choice to expel it.[63]

Russian information manipulation has been another important though unnoticed element of Russia's soft power projection in the region.[64] Dmitry Kiselyov, a key Kremlin propagandist, once described journalism as a warfare tactic. His description encapsulated Moscow's interpretation of soft power: "If you can persuade a person, you don't need to kill him. Let's think about what's better: to kill or to persuade? Because if you aren't able to persuade, then you will have to kill."[65]

The Middle East—a region with little history of a free press, inherently distrustful of the West, accustomed to government-controlled media and conspiracy theories—was arguably predisposed to Russian influence more so than democratic societies. The two most visible Kremlin outlets in the region were RT Arabic and Sputnik Arabic. As mentioned in the earlier section, RT came out in Arabic after it was introduced in English, which shows the direction of the Kremlin's thinking early on. The RT and Sputnik objectives were to build legitimacy for the Kremlin and discredit the West. While the two outlets typically sowed confusion and played on conspiracy theories, their Middle East efforts emphasized building legitimacy through reporting local news such as human-interest stories and sometimes coverage of Russia itself, all to boost Moscow's image. In its coverage of the situation in Syria, for example, RT Russia portrayed Syria as dysfunctional, a country that needed someone to come and fix things, and Russia as somewhat on the side, not directly involved.[66]

Another key feature of Moscow's efforts was an emphasis on social media targeting the region's large youth bulge. Moscow clearly invested significant resources in its Arabic propaganda, more so than in other regions. While it may not get as much bang for its buck in the Middle East as elsewhere, Russia's long-term investment in youth could pay off in the long run. Indeed, one recent Arab Youth Survey found that 64 percent of young Arabs saw Russia as an ally, while only 41 percent said the same about the United States. Moreover, the perception of the United States as the enemy had nearly doubled since 2016.[67] In Turkey, Sputnik played a critical information operations role.[68] Furthermore, given the media environment in Turkey, some of the best Turkish journalists went to work for Sputnik radio; even pro-Western and anti-Recep Tayyip Erdoğan analysts admitted that Sputnik produced quality work, even as they recognized its propaganda component. More to the point, many saw Russian media as the only independent alternative in President Erdoğan's Turkey. Lastly and more recently, RT and Sputnik increasingly partnered with local regional media outlets to enhance their legitimacy. Thus, in September 2018 Egypt's state-controlled *Al-Ahram* entered a partnership with Sputnik. *Al-Ahram*'s history as the voice of the Arab nationalist movement had symbolic meaning. It embedded Sputnik deeply within the narrative of traditional Arabic-language media. Morocco's News Agency (MAP) and Sputnik signed an agreement "to strengthen bilateral cooperation" in December 2018; and in May 2020, Sputnik and Radio and the United Arab Emirates' WAM news agency signed a memorandum of understanding to exchange information.[69]

Moscow's Arabic propaganda remains an under-studied subject. More than anything, however, the Kremlin's inroads in the region's information space highlight Western own narrative problem in the Middle East and to the extent that the Kremlin's narrative resonates, the West has yet to put up an equally competitive alternative.

Conclusion

The Kremlin is committed to methodically building leverage throughout the Middle East. It uses all tools in its arsenal and intends them to reinforce each other, and while the Russian military matters, Moscow's soft power approach that supports its hard power efforts has been the most effective—within the confines of Moscow's own definition of soft power. From a broader strategic perspective, the U.S. is increasingly shifting toward great power competition. But policymakers and analysts disagree on whether the Middle East is a distraction from this competition or an arena for it. Moscow for its part, however, unambiguously sees this region as crucial to its great power competition with the United States in particular, and the West more broadly.

Moscow's authoritarianism together with great power ambitions stand fundamentally at odds with those of liberal democracies, and thus their goals in terms of attraction, and means to attain them, also fundamentally differ from those of democratic governments and societies. The deeper underlying issue with Moscow's soft power projection is whether democratic or authoritarian values are ultimately more attractive—and how much sway Moscow's leverage holds. The answer to some extent depends on how well each side makes its case in the context of current global

resurgence of authoritarianism. If the West doesn't compete for the Middle East, the relationships Moscow continues to cultivate on multiple levels throughout the Middle East and North Africa will over time pose an overall greater strategic challenge to American interests beyond this region. ■

Notes

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Foreign Area Officers

The Roles of an Indispensable Asset in the Army's Competition and Allies' and Partners' Strategies

Lt. Col. Andrus "Wes" Chaney, U.S. Army

In August 2018, I arrived in Côte d'Ivoire to serve as the senior defense official/defense attaché. Unfortunately, my predecessor had left several months earlier, and my first order of business was to begin reestablishing relationships with the host-nation military members. One of my first meetings was with the Ivoirian military chief of defense, and that hour-long meeting was in French. The meeting went well, but he had one request; he wanted the United States to conduct another joint

combined exchange training exercise in his country. His main desire was to expose his soldiers to the "most professional, most experienced, and most lethal Special Forces in the world."[1]

I left the meeting and began discussions with my combatant command headquarters on how to fulfill the request. This experience is not unlike any other meeting a foreign area officer (FAO) has experienced. FAOs work in all ranges of military activities and operations, which sometimes change on a whim. My experience was in a stability environment. Some prior examples of other FAOs conducting similar actions include when Col. Joseph Stillwell served as a military attaché in China during the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 and when Brig. Gen. Jack Leide reported on events unfolding in Tiananmen Square in 1989. From Stillwell's time in China in the 1930s to my time in Côte d'Ivoire in 2018, U.S. Army FAOs have represented the secretary of defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the chief of staff of the United States Army (CSA), the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency in embassies throughout the world.

The CSA's Paper #1, *Army Multi-Domain Transformation Ready to Win in Competition and Conflict*, and Paper #2, *The Army in Military Competition*, establish the CSA's vision of how the Army will transform to adapt to the joint operating environment of 2040.[2] As the Army executes these visions, the FAO Branch stands prepared at the point of the spear to be the strategic enablers of this vision in Army and joint units and at over 150 U.S. embassies worldwide. FAOs are at the forefront of engaging in great-power competition alongside U.S. allies and partners. Every day, FAOs are setting the conditions on the ground and providing the long-term relationships the Army needs to win in the joint operating environment.

Over the past seventy-five years, FAO Branch has adapted its selection criteria, systems, and training pipeline to better prepare FAOs to serve the Army with distinction. Therefore, whether working with allies and partners through expanding the landpower network by engaging and training, equipping and enabling, advising and assisting, or demonstrating core competencies such as combined exercises or power projection reform, FAOs are trained and prepared to enable the Army's vision and mission.[3]

The FAO career field has made improvements over the past seventy-five years, creating better strategic enablers for the Army. Additionally, there have been changes to the training pipeline that a previous CSA attempted without fully understanding the prescribed long-term effects while also suggesting a few minor additions. FAOs play important roles in military competition and in shaping the military strategies of allies and partner strategies.

Famous FAOs

Historically, the United States has significantly benefited from two men who acted as a French FAO and a Prussian FAO, respectively—Marquis de Lafayette and Baron Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben. These two men represented their nation's military and diplomatic corps while providing security assistance to our Continental Army and acting as soldiers/statesmen. They did this through training by day with their foreign counterparts and dining by night with the senior leaders. They did this in a language other than their native tongues, in a foreign culture, and by understanding the vocabulary and experiences of privates as well as the general officers of a foreign military.

One of the most admired general officers that the FAO career field attempts to emulate is Gen. Joseph Stillwell. Stillwell served in China before and during the Second World War and was credited with working effectively from the lowest private to ambassadorial ranks. Like Lafayette and Steuben, Stillwell immersed himself in a foreign army, understanding the culture, language, history, geography, leadership, strategies, and the nuances and differences between his military and the military of the host nation he was serving. His ability to do this and then communicate to his senior leaders quite possibly laid the groundwork for the future establishment of the FAO Functional Area 48 (FA48).

Previous page: Capt. Louis Cascino, a foreign area officer from the Office of Security Cooperation in Gabon, addresses members of the Gabonese Armed Forces 9 December 2016 during the graduation ceremony of a five-week counter illicit trafficking course at Camp Mokekou, Gabon. (Photo by 1st Lt. Monica Witt, U.S. Marine Corps)

Who Are These Strategic Enablers? What Do They Do, and Why Is Their Training So Necessary?

"Like unicorns and wood sprites, rarely seen yet often discussed, the military's Foreign Area Officer corps is among the least understood of the many secondary officer career fields."[4] FAOs are the Army's forward-deployed strategic enablers "grounded in the profession of Arms; deliberately accessed, trained, educated and developed to provide leadership and expertise in diverse organizations in [the Army], joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environments; who advise senior leaders as regional experts; and who offer unique warfighting competencies—cross-cultural capabilities, interpersonal communications, and foreign-language skills—that are critical to mission readiness of the Army in today's dynamic strategic environment."[5] FAOs serve primarily in joint billets throughout the world such as the Joint Staff, U.S. embassies, and the National Security Council; in all geographic combatant commands (GCC) and Army Service Component Commands (ASCC); and in such Department of Defense agencies as the Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and Defense Threat Reduction Agency, while also serving in institutional and operational Army billets.

Lt. Col. Andrus "Wes" Chaney, U.S. Army,
serves as the foreign area officer (FAO) branch chief at the U.S. Army Human Resources Command, Fort Knox, Kentucky. He holds a BA from the University of North Carolina at Charlotte in political science and a Master of International Public Policy from Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. Prior to becoming a FAO, Chaney served with the 1st Infantry Division deployed to Kosovo and later to Iraq in 2004. He later served as a military transition team–team leader in Eastern Afghanistan in 2008. As a FAO, he served as the security cooperation officer to the U.S. Embassy Djibouti, as a desk officer and branch chief for Eastern and Southern Africa for U.S. Army Southern European Task Force, Africa, and most recently as the senior defense official/defense attaché to Côte d'Ivoire.

Strategic Enablers of Military Competition and Allies and Partners

FAOs primarily serve the Army through their forward presence embedded daily with U.S. allies and partners and are stationed throughout the world at U.S. embassies. Through their forward presence and assignments within the interagency, joint staff, and as foreign liaison officers to our allies, FAOs enable the Army's operations, activities, and actions to advance or impede military competition. FAOs do this by understanding partners' and allies' motivations and capabilities, understanding the operational environment, building military-to-military relations, and enabling capacity building to improve our allies' and partners' interoperability with the United States.[6] FAOs enable GCCs and ASCCs to assist our partners during times of crisis, disaster, and humanitarian needs through their roles as the representatives of the secretary of defense, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and CSA to our partner nations throughout the world. FAOs also work in regional security structures such as the African Union, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, NATO, the European Union, and Western Hemisphere Institute for Security to understand relationships and enable interagency coordination. FAOs also assist with providing the Army with a greater understanding of foreign militaries' capabilities.[7]

Selection to the FAO Functional Area

FAOs are recruited from Regular Army branches at the rank of captain once they have completed their key developmental billet. Officers desiring to transfer into the FAO functional area (FA) do so through the Voluntary Transfer Incentive Program (VTIP). The average selection rate of the 948 basic branch officers who requested to be transferred from 2016 to 2020 was only 41 percent, or 390 out of 948.[8]

After selection into the FA, new FAOs are assessed into one of the eight areas of concentrations (AOC): 48B (Western Hemisphere), 48D (South Asia), 48E (Europe/Eurasia), 48F (China), 48G (the Middle East/North Africa), 48H (Northeast Asia), 48I (Southeast Asia), and 48J (Sub-Sahara Africa). In September 2022, FAO Branch will consolidate 48F, 48H, 48I, and 48D to create Asia-Pacific (48P). This

U.S. Army Lt. Col. Chris Pateras (*left*), foreign area officer in Bogotá, Colombia, details the daily routine of cadets enrolled at the military college with Colombian Army Brig. Gen. Eduardo Enrique Zapateiro (*second from right*), director for Colombian military cadets, 18 August 2016 at The Citadel in Charleston, South Carolina. (Photo by Sgt. Brian Calhoun, U.S. Army National Guard)

will ensure FAOs are best positioned to support the *National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy,* GCCs, and Army priorities while enhancing understanding of global power competition and the Russia/China problem set.

Once assigned an AOC, new FAOs complete the same level of training that the Language and Area Training Program (LATP) officers completed in 1945: language training, an in-region training program, and a master's degree to prepare them for an assignment in their AOC. This training pipeline requires a minimum of two-and-one-half to four years of training and is regularly critiqued for being too long and too expensive. Still, it is ultimately a worthwhile investment for the Army because it prepares FAOs for military competition with another nation or collaboration with our allies and partners.

FAO Training Pipeline

When the Army deploys a single strategic enabler forward, it should have complete confidence that the soldier is highly qualified and trained. The FAO training pipeline, established in 1945, has stood for seventy-five years as the measurement of training for our strategic enablers. FAOs must have the language skills necessary to communicate in the country of their assignment. These language skills are not just the essential-for-survival level skills; they are at the nuanced cultural level, requiring a 3/3/2 on the Defense Language Proficiency Test.[9] Some FAOs often serve as interpreters for our senior Army leaders during their key leader engagements or translators for the president of the United States. Understanding and translating language nuances is vital for a FAO to enable communication between our Army general officers and their partner-nation counterparts. Language is a crucial pillar of being a successful FAO; however, language fluency is not the only core aspect of developing a skilled FAO.

Col. Greg Ebner (center), head of the Department of Foreign Languages at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, assists Spc. Tauhid Davis with his Arabic assignment 6 July 2016 at the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center in Presidio of Monterey, California. Ebner attended the institute in 1996–1997 as part of his training to become a foreign area officer and returned on a ninety-day developmental assignment at the institute's Continuing Education Directorate. (Photo by Patrick Bray)

The in-region training year, which can be as short as three months but generally is up to twelve months, is the cornerstone of a FAO's training pipeline. Upon achieving fluency in a foreign language, FAOs live and travel throughout their AOC. This year of travel and research allows each FAO trainee to improve and use their language skills with native speakers while exposing the FAO to foreign domestic and international policies, interagency personnel, and processes at U.S. embassies abroad.

The culmination of the two-and-one-half to four-year program is a master's degree at a civilian institution designed to bring together the history, culture, religion, geography, politics, and defense lessons learned into a one-year intensive study on the FAO's assigned region.

Over the past seventy-five years, the FAO Proponent Office added two other pillars to the FAO training pipeline. These pillars are the Joint Foreign Area Officer Course (JFAOC) and Intermediate Level Education. Intermediate Level Education has been an Army requirement for generations, while JFAOC became a FAO Proponent Office requirement started around 2010 to ensure FAOs were well-grounded in their career field. JFAOC brings together FAOs from four services to provide a basic orientation to the FAO career field and familiarize FAOs and their family members with aspects of a FAO career.

Upon completion of the five-pillared training program, FAOs are assigned to their first tour. This assignment ranges from an assistant Army attaché or security cooperation officer at a U.S. embassy to a country desk officer at a combatant command or ASCC, or to the many different agencies that deploy forces globally.

After completing this training pipeline, FAOs have quickly moved from finishing company

command and reading, learning, and executing U.S. Army doctrine at the tactical level to reading, learning, experiencing, and advising U.S. Army leaders at the operational and strategic levels. Over their next two decades, from senior captain to general officer, FAOs will continue to develop their tradecraft per the Department of Army Pamphlet 600-3, *Officer Professional Development and Career Management*.[10]

> Foreign area officers have quickly moved from finishing company command and reading, learning, and executing U.S. Army doctrine at the tactical level to reading, learning, experiencing, and advising U.S. Army leaders at the operational and strategic levels.

During the rest of their careers, FAOs will advise senior civilian and military leaders, enable geographic combatant commanders to execute their campaign plans, and facilitate setting the theater for ASCC commanders. FAOs do this by assisting the CSA with winning in competition through ensuring the United States remains the security partner of choice, collaborating with allies and partners daily, establishing presence and posture through agreements and understandings, upholding U.S. national interests, and sharing intelligence and understanding of the joint operating environment.[11]

Seventy-Five Years of Institutional Changes

The first U.S. military officers assigned to FAO-type assignments served in 1899 when the United States sent permanent military attachés to the United Kingdom, France, Switzerland, and Russia.[12] Over the next fifty-seven years, the United States expanded military attaché assignments to sixty-seven other nations, with "166 Attaché posts in 71 countries: 68 Army, 45 Navy, and 53 Air Force personnel."[13]

In the years before the Second World War, the U.S. Army had military attachés assigned in several strategic posts around the world. These officers reported to the "Military Intelligence Division (MID) of the War Department General Staff (WDGS) in Washington."[14] Before World War II, the first attachés lacked a formal training program compared to the current five-pillared FAO training pipeline, and "many officers considered attaché duty a career dead-end."[15]

After the Second World War, in 1945, the U.S. Army established the LATP "to provide officers with high-level staff potential with knowledge of language and areas to form sound intelligence estimates and to provide command decisions."[16] The LATP was renamed the Foreign Area Specialist (FAST) Program in 1953 and managed in the same fashion as the LATP until 1972.

On "March 10, 1972, to acknowledge the collaboration with security assistance, the Department of the Army Chief of Staff approved a merger of the Military Assistance Officer Program (MAOP) and FAST to form the Foreign Area Officer Management System (FAOMS). As the year closed, FAOMS identified an estimated 900 positions for the consolidated program."[17] On 19 June 1972, Gen. W. C. Westmoreland said, "The consolidation of the two programs resulted from their basic similarities. Each is concerned with developing top-quality officers to serve worldwide in command, staff, advisory, and attaché positions requiring them to have area expertise, linguistic proficiency, socio-economic and political awareness, and a sound professional military background."[18] Compared to the nine hundred officers identified in the new FAOMS system of 1972, today, there are 1,174 Army FAOs.[19]

From 1972 to 2012, the Department of Defense; Headquarters, Department of Army (HQDA) G-35 FAO Proponent Office; Army G-1; and Human Resources Command made four significant changes that significantly prepared FAOs to be better strategic enablers for the U.S. Army. First, in 1997,

the Army G-1 made the FAO Branch a single-track career field, which ended the dual-track and officers changing back and forth between their basic branch and FAO assignments. This increased the readiness rate of FAOs, increased promotion rates by eliminating FAOs competing with basic branch officers, and

> We tried to equate the acquisition process of a foreign area officer (FAO) to [that of a] major weapons system. It takes years, and it is not until a FAO reaches more senior positions that their true impact is felt.

assigned officers to the FAO Branch, which permanently established a pool of officers who can now serve multiple FAO assignments and perfect their trade skills.

Next, in 2007, the Department of Defense established the senior defense official/defense attaché position at a majority of U.S. embassies throughout the world. This change established a clear chain of command at the embassy instead of the two separate, sometimes competing offices, the Defense Attaché Office and Security Cooperation Office. This change drove the third change by HQDA in 2012, which further developed and established a professional development timeline in the Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3. This timeline established the need for FAOs to serve in multiple assignments as attachés, security cooperation officers, staff officers, and culminate as a fully trained and experienced Army FAO colonel. This new guidance eliminated the possibility of officers staying their entire career in one assignment area, which created stovepiped FAOs who could not work in all aspects of the joint operating environment.

The Human Resources Command conducted the last significant change in 2011, which drastically changed how new FAOs were selected. Under the FAOMS program, officers were somewhat randomly chosen for overseas assignments, then decades later (from 1985 to 2011), they were selected through a functional designation board. Both methods lacked adequate screening of candidates resulting in poor talent management of FAOs at the major to lieutenant colonel ranks. This resulted in significant manning gaps throughout the branch. The U.S. Army transitioned in 2011 from the legacy functional designation board process, for transfers from FAOs' primary branch to an FA, to the VTIP. The VTIP process allows the FAO FA to be more selective in its selection of new candidates "because it is better able to take into consideration special skills, not in an officer's performance file … The application process allows officers to advertise themselves and vie for the branch or functional area of their own choosing."[20] This resulted in the FAO FA recruiting a higher quality of officers that achieved one of the consistently highest promotion rates to major.[21]

FAOs Need to Contribute to the War Effort: A Strategic Gap in Understanding the FAO Functional Area

FAOs and infantry officers are not equivalents in the Army. They each serve the Army in two very different but equally important ways, and their skill sets are not interchangeable, especially at the O-5 (lieutenant colonel) and above levels. During the Iraq and Afghanistan war periods, Gen. George W. Casey questioned the relevancy of the FAO FA's contribution to the war effort.

From 2008 to 2010, Casey "was frustrated that while we were an Army at war, we had FAOs spending years in training and not committing to the war effort."[22] At the same time, a domino effect of an increase in Army FAO requirements from 2003 to 2008 combined with FAOs filling Worldwide Individual Augmentation System taskers created a shortage of available FAOs.[23] Fewer FAO officers selected for promotion to major after selection through the functional designation board process further complicated this situation. This domino effect led to "the Army's

decreasing ability to fill Joint FAO billets and caught senior Army leadership by surprise, drawing attention to the average 40-months of time FAOs spent in Trainees, Transients, Holdees and Students (TTHS) status during their initial training period."[24] This led Casey to direct a review of the FAO training pipeline and to order the FAO Proponent Office to find ways to reduce the time FAOs spent in training.

The review looked at potentially creating an online version of the Joint Military Attaché School and reducing the civilian graduate school time. This effort also resulted in an "all officers must deploy to a war-zone concept," which was understandable given the Army's needs during two major wars. However, this resulted in FAOs pulled out of their region of specialty and placed into an area of concentration they had no familiarization with or training. While it was important for FAOs to support the war effort, this attempt to reduce the training pipeline and the requirement that all officers deploy to a war zone displayed a lack of understanding of FAO missions and how to deploy them strategically. Stillwell was not taken from China to serve in Germany during the Second World War; instead, strategic leaders recognized his skills, relationships, and cultural understanding as a strategic weapon best used in the AOC he was trained.

This CSA-level focus brought into question the ability to adjust the time FAOs spent in training. Since Casey questioned the length of the FAO training pipeline, the FAO community has tweaked the five-tiered training pipeline to address some of the senior Army general officers' concerns. Primarily, the branch reduced the length of time a FAO spends in graduate school from eighteen or twenty-four months to twelve months. Overall, through all of these changes over the past seventy-five years, the FAO Branch's training pipeline has evolved to create FAOs who become indispensable assets, are directly on the point of the Army's strategies, and are fully capable of enabling the execution of the Chief of Staff Papers #1 and #2.

Conclusions

It takes over one decade to develop one FAO colonel professionally. "We tried to equate the acquisition process of a FAO to [that of a] major weapons system. It takes years, and it is not until a FAO reaches more senior positions that their true impact is felt."[25] FAOs are people, but their training and experiences make them strategic weapons that must be deployed and managed as such. Any future changes to the FAO training pipeline should continue to be reforms that are a part of a FAO "proponent-driven change that is deliberately planned, analyzed, and executed in the best interests of the Army and also the entire FAO career field."[26] Changes, such as reducing the five-pillared training program, or consolidating or creating new areas of concentration, have decades-long effects that sometimes outlast a recent strategy change. A training pipeline that has existed for seventy-five years has proven its worth not only within the U.S. Army but also throughout the entire Department of Defense. Any future adjustments to that pipeline should continue to be cautiously and judiciously approached. Trying to create quickly trained, half-certified, or "part-time" FAOs only results in a less than qualified FAO providing questionable strategic guidance to our senior leaders.

One slight change to this training pipeline should be the mandatory attendance of all FAOs to Joint Professional Military Education, Phase II (JPME II). Fifty-nine percent of FAO billets are joint, and one would think that almost all FAOs would be 3L, joint qualified officers. However, as of 2020, only 26 percent of Army FAOs were 3A, joint duty assignment, qualified. Only 12 percent had attended JPME II, a majority of which were at the numerous military war colleges.[27] Attending JPME II, such as the Joint and Combined Warfighting School, before a joint assignment would give Army FAOs the joint planning experience that a majority of them lack. Other courses that can serve FAOs are the Army War College's distance learning Defense Planners and Defense Strategy Courses. If FAOs were to attend these three courses during their major to lieutenant colonel years, they would be better prepared to integrate with other joint and Army staff officers on operational planning teams and in other staff functions.[28]

FAOs are primarily known and recognized for their specialty by Army colonels through generals, not privates through majors. Rank plays a significant role in how Army senior leaders perceive a FAO; an Army FAO major is often briefing two- to four-star generals, ambassadors, deputy or assistant secretaries, and host-nation chiefs of defense. These FAO majors become colonels and generals, possessing the culmination of almost two decades of training and regional

and interagency experience that no other Army officers have, making them indispensable assets to the Army and strategic enablers of the CSA's military competition and allies and partners strategies. ■

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Army Human Resources Command, the Department of the Army, or the U.S. government.

Notes

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Starved prisoners stand in a concentration camp 7 May 1945 a day after they were liberated by the 80th Infantry Division of the U.S. Army in Ebensee, Austria. (Photo by Lt. Arnold E. Samuelson, U.S. Army, courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration)

Planning to Prevent Genocide

Lemkin's Warning and Eichmann's Crimes

Lt. Col. Michael H. Hoffman, U.S. Army Reserve, Retired

The word *genocide* was first coined in 1944 by European expatriate lawyer Raphael Lemkin living in America. That was the year he warned the world of the ultimate purpose behind accounts of shocking atrocities on a mass scale being reported out of Europe, where the nondescript and seemingly unnoticeable *Schutzstaffel* (SS) Lt. Col. Adolf Eichmann had quietly put in place the last components of his criminal-style operational planning that played a key part in Nazi perpetration of the Holocaust. This article, considered in combination with a reading of modern U.S. joint doctrine, offers insights for commanders and planners who may be tasked to mitigate or prevent entirely the repetition of such horrors in future operational environments.

Genesis of a Concept

At the outset, readers may find useful some background on how this article came about. Since 2011, I partnered with expert staff from the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum to offer a genocide prevention elective for students enrolled in the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College core course. During my research, the significance of Lemkin to any discussion of the modern concept of genocide became pronounced. As a result of his influence, Lemkin's name and ideas figure prominently in the genocide prevention elective from the start.

The world acquired its initial understanding and definition of genocide through his insight derived from his determination to expose mass atrocities of the kind being committed in all theaters by the Axis prior to and during World War II. Lemkin apparently had no military experience but discerned, in Axis actions in Europe toward targeted minorities and other civilian populations under their control, a repeating pattern of similarities in organization and methods in the war crimes being committed that he determined could not be coincidental.[1] He identified a clear connection between reports of widespread Nazi German atrocities in Europe and policies and directives that were imposed in Nazi-occupied nations or that were imposed by their collaborators. Consequently, Lemkin was among the first to clearly discern and warn the world of the full implications of these developments, namely those of a new type of deliberately organized crime against entire groups of people, a crime with no legal name that had now emerged in Europe. He subsequently coined the word "genocide" to describe the phenomenon he had identified.[2]

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Another Key Figure

At the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, the students take guided tours of the museum's Permanent Exhibition right after they are introduced to the concept of genocide as developed by Lemkin. However, in addition, it soon became apparent to me during those tours that another individual figured repeatedly, in this instance as a perpetrator of many of the crimes as the story of the Holocaust was shown through the exhibits. Among those identified as having responsibility for the Holocaust, Adolf Eichmann repeatedly surfaces, sometimes, it may appear on passing observation, as only a seemingly minor figure in the many historical events leading up to and during the Holocaust as recounted in the exhibits. However, on closer examination, Eichmann was far more than a minor, faceless, compliant criminal participant who was "following orders."

Eichmann: More than Just a Functionary

Eichmann had no formal training in anything like twenty-first-century military operational planning. However, he possessed what can only be viewed as an intuitive criminal talent for understanding how to use methods similar to operational planning in order to make possible the murder of millions.

While more visible and prominent senior Nazi leaders were responsible for ordering and directing that the Holocaust take place, a key mid-level officer they relied on to actually organize and oversee the operational implementation of their genocidal criminal plan was Eichmann. His role in planning and carrying out

the actual implementation of the Holocaust began in 1939.[3] By 1944, and by then far into this genocidal process, he had carefully worked out and put in place the last of the planning elements that were then employed in an attempt to destroy what was left of the Jewish population of Europe.

Students of modern operational art and design should take note of Eichmann's background during the 1930s and 1940s as a useful character study that may help to illuminate some of the kinds of personality types and traits that U.S. intelligence agencies should look for among individuals who emerge in environments conducive to a rise of genocidal tendencies. These include a particular penchant and talent for bureaucratic organization, fanatical dedication to a cause, sterile ruthlessness in personal relationships, a complete lack of empathy for people outside one's own ethnic group, and a peculiar type of shrewd intelligence that enables them to carry out barbaric acts with extreme efficiency. As disturbing as it is to comprehend, Eichmann's record serves as a warning to not underestimate and discount out of hand a seemingly bland personality behind which may be great learning skills and operational insights totally focused on committing war crimes.

SS-Obersturmbannführer Adolf Eichmann, head of the Reich Security Central Office, was principal organizer for the deportation of Jews to the Auschwitz concentration camp in German-occupied Poland. Believed to have been taken in 1942, the image shows Eichmann in his lieutenant colonel's uniform. (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

Genocide Defined and Distinguished from Other Crimes

Nearly a century ago, the record reveals Lemkin and Eichmann both had intuitive perceptions regarding the effective use of concepts resembling important aspects of modern operational art; one used his to warn of genocide and the other to commit genocidal crimes.

In Lemkin's case, he was not engaged in planning or conducting operations but rather in conducting penetrating analysis of the Nazi regime and its use of what we can today identify as criminal use of familiar forms of operational art. In doing so, he unmasked for any who would listen the intended Nazi end state as he categorized the details of the actual programmatic system underway of synchronized political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) activity focused collectively on mass murder and cultural annihilation of the Jews in Europe along with other groups of people targeted under Nazi ideology for destruction.

After first proposing the term "genocide," Lemkin became a powerful idea leader in the drive for its official acceptance and recognition as an international crime.[4] Lemkin had proposed a different description of genocide in 1944, but the definition found in the 1948 Convention is the one universally accepted today. It is legally defined in Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948:

> In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within

the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.[5]

Setting aside the above definition, it is also important to understand that there are other discrete categories of international crimes that are not technically genocide but that should be understood in their relation to genocide as legally defined. Such recognition is important to prevention planning since some malign activities can be confused with others in a legal sense. Like genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes often entail mass carnage and suffering but in circumstances that do not meet the specific, currently accepted definition of genocide and that may not match the identified categories of protected groups, as set out in the Genocide Convention.

Photograph of Raphael Lemkin taken sometime between 1947 and 1959. (Photo courtesy of the New York Public Library Digital Collection)

Broadly speaking, many crimes involving mass atrocities are defined as "crimes against humanity" but may not meet the specific legal elements set out in the Genocide Convention. War crimes also include a wide range of violations of the laws and customs of war involving targeting, and breach of the legal protections afforded for civilians, wounded and sick combatants, and prisoners of war.[6]

In a practical sense, awareness of the differences in defining such acts legally during operational deployments is vital since commanders and staff must be able to distinguish in a legal sense what they may encounter initially. Additionally, they also must be alert to recognizing when one category of these large-scale mass crimes is morphing into another as events transpire and circumstances change.

It should therefore be obvious that legal advice is always essential in planning to meet any of these threats, but a broad general awareness that there are distinctions underscores the fact that the crimes sometimes take place in differing operational environments.[7] This is also germane because, as is seen in Lemkin's analysis from 1944, not all methods of genocide rely entirely on military force; some rely heavily on nonmilitary methods as well.

Of note, to aid commanders and staffs, some guides have been developed to advance mass atrocity prevention doctrine and practice.[8] In addition, the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum has published a valuable guide that explores options for genocide prevention.[9] However, leaders and planners still need historical case studies to help them develop their practical understanding of such threats.

One Unique Case Study: Genesis and Maturation of Lemkin's Warning

Lemkin was the first to fully visualize crimes reported out of Nazi-occupied Europe as genocide and alert the world. As noted above, at the same time, Eichmann was formulating and implementing his own operational

methods to perpetrate the crime identified by Lemkin that is now called genocide.

Lemkin was born in Poland in 1900, one of three children in a Jewish family.[10] He was first influenced to think about threats to humanity when he read Henryk Sienkiewicz's *Quo Vadis* at a young age and when he heard about an attack on the Jewish community in nearby Bialystok.[11] Anti-Semitic mob attacks like the one in Bialystok in 1906 were called pogroms and were frequent.[12] The impact was not lost on him.

> Lemkin drew on his legal materials to visualize and articulate long-term Nazi goals even before political and military strategists perceived and described them.

By the time he graduated law school in 1926, Lemkin was thinking deeply about the Ottoman massacres of Armenians in 1915 and the absence of any means of international legal redress for such crimes. "At Lwow University, where I enrolled for the study of law, I discussed this matter with my professors. They evoked the argument about sovereignty of states. 'But sovereignty of states,' I answered, 'implies conducing an independent foreign and internal policy, building of schools, construction of roads, in brief, all types of activity directed toward the welfare of people.' Sovereignty, I argued, 'cannot be conceived as the right to kill millions of innocent people.'"[13]

Following graduation, Lemkin pressed on with his critical assessment of the problem. He adopted an analytical approach like one employed by modern-day U.S. field grade officers, as identified in Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations*: "Operational art is the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means."[14]

By 1933, he felt impelled by the dangerous situation in Europe to present his ideas at an international penal conference in Madrid. He later reminisced, "I felt the time was ripe for me to put before the conference my idea, which had been maturing for so many years. Now was the time to outlaw the destruction of national, racial, or religious groups."[15] As a result of his proposal, he was forced out of the official Polish delegation under pressure from an anti-Semitic paper that attacked his proposal, along with opposition to his participation from the Polish minister of justice. Though Lemkin was not allowed to attend, his report circulated at the conference. It documents his continuing focus on the problem.

He later recalled that he "formulated two new international law crimes to be introduced into the penal legislation of the thirty-seven participating countries, namely, the crime of *barbarity*, conceived as oppressive and destructive actions directed against individuals as members of a national, religious, or racial group, and the crime of *vandalism*, conceived as malicious destruction of works of art and culture because they represent the specific creations of the genius of such groups."[16] These proposal were steps forward but not to be his ultimate warnings or recommendations.

Six years later, Lemkin was a refugee. He had fled Poland at the beginning of World War II, found interim refuge in Sweden, and was fortunate to secure admission to the United States in mid-1941 to accept a teaching appointment at Duke University School of Law.[17] Early 1942 found him in Washington, D.C., working as a consultant for the Board of Economic Warfare.[18] He lobbied, sometimes at very high levels, to warn of the genocide in Europe and worked desperately to complete his book detailing the crimes even as they unfolded.[19]

Lemkin's effort to fully grasp what was happening in Europe had already begun back in Sweden, where he worked through old business contacts to begin collecting copies of Nazi occupation laws. He continued to assemble such documents after he arrived in the United States. When *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe* was published in 1944, his first paragraph in the book focused on those sources.

Axis rule, he argues, "is covered by a network of laws and regulations which create the instrumentalities of a most complete administrative control and coercion. Therefore these laws of occupation are an extremely valuable source of information regarding such government and its practices."[20]

His methodology in *Axis Rule* incorporates a systems approach that resembles the PMESII favored in our twenty-first-century doctrine. Notably, reports on the dire situation of the Jewish population in Europe were already widely known, but Lemkin drew on his legal materials to visualize and articulate long-term Nazi goals even before political and military strategists perceived and described them.[21]

An examination of chapters I–VII of *Axis Rule* demonstrates that Lemkin analyzes his evidence to shed light on Nazi use of instruments that he identified as administration, police, law, courts, property, finance, and labor to meet their objectives. The book provides an equally insightful look at the specific application of these instruments of power and coercion in each country occupied by Axis powers.[22]

Lemkin reported the Nazis were leveraging those sources of power to commit genocide. In concept, Lemkin's analytical model of Axis sources of genocidal power resembled some basics of formulating modern joint doctrine. Our current doctrine highlights the use of instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—to achieve lawful and ethical goals.[23]

Next, in chapter VIII, "The Legal Status of the Jews," Lemkin reports that "the Jewish population in the occupied countries is undergoing a process of liquidation (1) by debilitation and starvation, because the Jewish food rations are kept at an especially low level; and (2) by massacres in the ghettos."[24] In chapter IX, his introduction to the concept of genocide, he reports these crimes in more detail.[25]

Lemkin then introduces genocide in chapter IX to mean "the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group."[26] Expanding on that, Lemkin explains that "generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except when accomplished by mass killings of all members of a nation. It is intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves."[27] Lemkin draws on a systems approach to explicate the relationship of the elements within the process of programmatic genocide.

His writing shows that Lemkin had an intuitive grasp of center of gravity (COG) analysis as it is described in our modern doctrine, including JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*, which states, "The COG is the source of power or strength that enables a military force to achieve its objective and is what an opposing force can orient its actions against that will lead to enemy failure."[28] In 1944, Lemkin made the following similar observation on German war aims: "The objective of this scheme is to destroy or to cripple the subjugated peoples in their development so that, even in the case of Germany's military defeat, it will be in a position to deal with other European nations from the vantage point of numerical, physical, and economic superiority."[29]

Apply COG analysis to Lemkin's observation and it becomes apparent that genocide may result even if some members of a targeted population survive but their center of gravity as a people is destroyed. This is backed by language in the Genocide Convention prohibiting "acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part"; in other words, this treaty includes genocidal crimes that might directly impact some but not all members of the group.[30]

Also consider the striking similarities between modern PMESII and Lemkin's findings on "Techniques of Genocide in Various Fields."[31] In the early twenty-first century, JP 3-0 offers this on PMESII and the operational environment (OE): "One way to think of the OE is as a set of complex and constantly interacting political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) systems."[32]

In 1944, Lemkin set out his findings on "techniques of genocide" in this order: political, social, cultural, economic, biological, physical, religious, and moral.[33] This was Lemkin's PMESII equivalent that he used to forecast the common features of genocide and send out his warning to the world.

He explores each technique in detail in chapter IX of *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*. Here, largely in Lemkin's own words, is a synopsis of the techniques:

1. Using the political technique, "in the incorporated areas … local institutions of self-government were

destroyed and a German pattern of administration imposed."[34]

2. The social technique was "accomplished in part by the abolition of local law and local courts and the imposition of German law and courts." In Poland and Slovenia, "the intelligentsia and the clergy were in great part removed from the rest of the population and deported for forced labor in Germany."[35]
3. Using the cultural technique of genocide in some areas, "the local population is forbidden to use its own language in schools and in printing." Further, "the population has also been deprived of inspiration from the existing cultural and artistic values. Thus, especially in Poland, were national monuments destroyed and libraries, archives, museums, and galleries of art carried away."[36]
4. The economic technique of genocide, he found, "creates difficulties in fulfilling cultural-spiritual requirements. Furthermore, a daily fight literally for bread and for physical survival may handicap thinking in both general and national terms." Lemkin identified that "it was the purpose of the occupant to create such conditions as these among the peoples of the occupied countries, especially those peoples embraced in the first plans of genocide elaborated by him—the Poles, the Slovenes, and the Jews."[37]
5. The biological technique of genocide was sought by "a policy of depopulation." This included "measures calculated to decrease the birthrate" of other groups, and "endeavoring to encourage the birthrate of the Germans."[38]
6. The physical technique of genocide, he reported, included first, "racial discrimination in feeding" everywhere. "Rationing of food is organized according to racial principles throughout the occupied countries." As Lemkin noted, "The result of racial feeding is a decline in health of the nations involved and an increase in the deathrate." This technique of genocide was also characterized by the "endangering of health" of groups who were "deprived of elemental necessities for preserving health and life."

Lemkin reported on Jews forced into life-threatening crowding and deprivation in ghettos, and deadly mass deportation of Poles "in unheated



To view a digital copy of *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress*, visit https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k9443228.textelmage. (Photo courtesy of Gallica, the digital library of the National Library of France)

Defendant Adolf Eichmann takes notes as he sits inside a booth made of bulletproof glass 29 May 1961 during his trial in Jerusalem. (Photo courtesy of the Israel Government Press Office)

cattle trucks and freight cars" under harsh winter conditions. Lemkin also identified "mass killings" as the third physical technique of genocide, which he reported was "employed mainly against Poles, Russians and Jews, as well as against leading personalities from among the non-collaborationist groups in all the occupied countries." Also, he reported, "The Jews for the most part are liquidated within the ghettos, or in special trains in which they are transported to a so-called 'unknown' destination."[39]

7. The religious technique of genocide involved attempts to "disrupt these national and religious influences." In his reference to other systematic religious attacks, in addition to those underway against Jewish communities, Lemkin noted that this sometimes involved "systematic pillage and destruction of church property and persecution of the clergy, in this way the German occupying authorities have sought to destroy the religious leadership of the Polish nation."[40]
8. The moral technique of genocide was calculated "to weaken the spiritual resistance of the national group" by way of "an atmosphere of moral debasement within this group." Lemkin wrote of German attempts to inflict this form of genocide by promoting use of pornography and excessive alcohol consumption, and by facilitation of gambling.[41]

Within a year of publication of his book, the war in Europe was over, and unfortunately, the accuracy of Lemkin's awful assessment was fully vindicated by widespread investigations.

Meanwhile, his health was in decline, and he learned that his parents had perished in the Holocaust.[42] However, this did not slow Lemkin, who put all his energy into promoting the adoption of the Genocide Convention and then encouraging its ratification.[43]

His name faded in the years following his death in 1959. Nevertheless, today, he is widely respected among legal scholars and historians as the driving force behind the Genocide Convention.

Eichmann's Crimes

While Lemkin was using his intuition and talent to alert the world to genocide, Eichmann was using his intuition and talent to perpetrate targeted systematic mass murder on an almost unimaginable scale.

As a matter of background, Eichmann was born in Germany in 1906. He worked as a salesperson in the 1920s and 1930s until joining the SS in 1934. In 1938, he took charge of an office in Vienna that was set up to organize the expulsion of Austria's Jewish population. In 1941, he was appointed director of an SS office of "Jewish Affairs" in Berlin. From that point, he became responsible for a massive program for deporting Jews from across Europe to lethally overpacked ghettos and death camps.[44]

Unfortunately, the writer Hannah Arendt has had an oversized influence on the scholarly perception of Eichmann's actions and role in the Holocaust, and this carries massive consequences for understanding the mechanisms of genocide. Her book *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* led many to conclude uncritically and without deeper investigation that he was indeed "banal," merely uncreatively and unquestioningly following orders. She judges him only as an ordinary man who "shows his utter ignorance of everything that was not directly, technically and bureaucratically, connected with his job, and also shows an extraordinarily faulty memory."[45] She dismisses him as an individual of no particular ability, but then contradicts herself by noting of Eichmann, "For the first time in his life, he discovered in himself some special qualities. There were two things he could do well, better than others: he could organize and he could negotiate."[46]

Arendt goes on to say, concerning Eichmann's key role in organizing rail transport to the death camps, that "Eichmann was troubled by no questions of conscience. His thoughts were entirely taken up with the staggering job of organization and administration in the midst not only of a world war but, more important for him, of innumerable intrigues and fights over spheres of authority among the various State and Party offices that were busy 'solving the Jewish question.'"[47]

Her observations have been damaging in assessing Eichmann's actual role in the Holocaust because she dismisses him as basically a nobody, elevated to authority only because of his penchant for merely faithfully and unimaginatively carrying out orders. However, in her assessment, she fails to answer an essential question about him: "Why would his superiors have entrusted a banal person of the limited intellectual and creative abilities she ascribes to him with organizing and overseeing a massive criminal plan of unprecedented size and complexity?" In this she fails to grasp the actual reality of the nondescript Eichmann as the gifted, murderous practitioner of operational art he was, who used his organizational skill and intuitive understanding of bureaucracy to organize systematic genocide with industrial-style efficiency on a scale without precedent in human history.

No form of equivalence of underlying purpose is intended by taking note of uncomfortable similarities between modern military practices related to improving organizational effectiveness in military planning and execution of operations, and Eichmann's methods for organizing and conducting genocide. Quite the contrary, one of the underpinning assumptions about U.S. military organization and operations is the assumption that they are being executed for a moral and humanitarian purpose. However, organizational processes are disinterested in themselves; similarly organized processes using similar devices and concepts can be used for achieving good or evil.

While Lemkin was uncovering the genocidal system in Europe, SS Lt. Col. Eichmann was playing a key role in devising and implementing it. He was a staff officer, but his authority derived from the SS chain of command. It gave him power to formulate and cajole the implementation of Nazi Germany's genocidal plans by way of railroad transport to the ghettos and death camps.[48]

Where Lemkin's writings and career give a clear view of his thought process leading up to adoption of the Genocide Convention, Eichmann's thought process leading up to genocide is murky and largely reliant on the evidence of what he did not on a written record that he left. Not surprisingly, what Eichmann did say and write is notoriously unreliable. However, some insight can be gleaned from the records of his police interrogation and trial in Israel from 1960 to 1961.[49]

Eichmann revealed something of the development of his criminal "operational art" when he was questioned by Avner Less, a chief inspector in the Israel Police. Eichmann bragged about setting up an efficient bureaucratic system in Vienna to deal with Jewish applicants seeking to escape from Nazi Austria.[50] Though he tried to deny any responsibility for the mass killings that came later, he admitted being present when victims were killed with exhaust fumes at Chelmno and admitted to visiting other killing centers including Auschwitz and Treblinka.[51]

> An operational approach to genocide prevention should provide insights necessary to protect our Nation and also help our friends and others in need against such threats coming from enemies who operate under no form of moral restraint.

His awareness was a foundation for his visualization and methods. Eichmann's record documents his use of familiar operational concepts but for purposes at odds with all civilized norms. His crimes were committed using planning concepts that look like forms of operational design and interorganizational coordination.

In our joint doctrine, "Operational design is the analytical framework that underpins planning. Operational design supports commanders and planners in organizing and understanding the OE as a complex interactive system."[52] Early on, Eichmann built a complex system to manage expulsion of the Jewish people from Austria. As German goals shifted from deportation to murder, Eichmann adapted his approach to genocidal purposes.

In 1943, he was sent to Poland to survey the ruins of the Warsaw Ghetto following the famous uprising there, and then to Denmark to investigate the successful escape of most of the country's Jewish population to Sweden. When Eichmann arrived in Hungary in 1944, he drew on his observations and experience to organize a phased "interorganizational" plan for the deportation, enslavement, and murder of that country's Jewish population.[53]

Eichmann used a systems approach to arrange mass transport to the death camps. He was constantly engaged in criminal planning involving the SS and other organizations. This system could be described as one of "intergovernmental" and "multinational" approaches to genocide. Eichmann also provided staff support for the Wannsee Conference in January 1942 where the SS enlisted the support of a number of government ministries in the destruction of Europe's Jews.[54]

In our joint doctrine, "interorganizational planning and coordination is the interaction among elements of DOD; participating USG [U.S. government] departments and agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government departments and agencies; international organizations; NGOs [nongovernmental organization]; and the private sector to achieve an objective."[55] Eichmann used such forms of cooperation for malign purposes.

Eichmann added to his criminal perspective by learning to cultivate cooperation for Jewish deportations from local officials in German-occupied foreign territory.[56] His office in Berlin was constantly coordinating for trains to transport victims to the death camps, arranging for the confiscation of victims' property, and coordinating cross-border arrangements with foreign offices for deportation to the camps.[57] To get a sense of his operational reach, it is useful to look at the verdict reached in his 1961 trial before the District Court of Jerusalem in Israel.

Eichmann went into hiding at the end of the war and escaped to Argentina, where he lived until Israel's Mossad caught up with him in 1960. They flew him to Israel, where his trial began the following year on charges brought under Israeli and international law.

On 12 December 1961, the court convicted him, in part for crimes that he committed "together with others" that were specifically directed against the Jewish people including the responsibility for the murder of millions, forcing millions into deadly living conditions,

mass deportations, robbing millions of their property, and taking measures to prevent childbearing.[58] His appeal was denied by the Israeli Supreme Court on 29 May 1962. Eichmann was hanged 31 May 1962.[59]

Conclusions

A critical assessment providing greater insight into how Eichmann was able to orchestrate crimes on such a massive scale has been hampered for sixty years. Unfortunately, Hannah Arendt's "banal" Eichmann thesis has deflected some valuable intellectual energy away from developing a better-informed investigation of his crimes.[60] Eichmann used his own, self-taught form of operational art. He combined that with his ability to draw on Nazi Germany's instruments of power to help bring about the murder of millions of European Jews.

On the other hand, Raphael Lemkin, though noted for his great influence in the field of international law, remains underappreciated for his prescient insight into Nazi goals as events unfolded in Europe prior to and during World War II. Though he did not influence the direction of the Allied war effort, his example should be kept in mind and illuminate how today some civilian practitioners who are engaged in human rights and humanitarian protection work should be better heeded since they may have a profound grasp of the challenges where identification and prevention of genocide and other mass crimes of violence in the contemporary world are concerned.

Additionally, serious students of genocide prevention should understand that war criminals are often skillful military practitioners of what may be conceived of as operational art—including Eichmann. Genocide and similar mass crimes are complex and require such skilled—though morally bankrupt—individuals to organize and execute them. The essential involvement of individuals who have such skills should be kept in mind by anyone tasked to plan and conduct genocide prevention operations. With the above noted, it is disturbingly clear that Eichmann effectively applied organizational and planning efficiency to achieve genocidal objectives that were inherently devoid of law, morality, or humanitarian ethics. Unfortunately, modern events have revealed that the emergence of Eichmann was not a unique historical phenomenon.

We tend to look at the concept of genocide prevention from the operational perspective of potential rescuers. However, we can also draw on that perspective to improve human rights and humanitarian conduct among partner forces who look to us for support. Ultimately, an operational approach to genocide prevention should provide insights necessary to protect our Nation and also help our friends and others in need against such threats coming from enemies who operate under no form of moral restraint. Other individuals, resembling Eichmann in their characteristics, have frequently emerged on the world stage since World War II. Consequently, modern-day practitioners of operational-level warfare would be well served to take note of Eichmann's background, and the defining features of his character, as traits that may help to discern other seemingly "banal" perpetrators among adversarial groups who, in reality, are key players in organizing and perpetrating similar horrific international crimes. ■

Notes

1. Philippe Sands, *East West Street: On the Origins of "Genocide" and "Crimes against Humanity"* (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 2016), 149.

2. Raphael Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944), 79.

3. "Adolf Eichmann: Key Dates," United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, accessed 30 June 2021, https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/adolf-eichmann-key-dates.

4. Raphael Lemkin, *Totally Unofficial: The Autobiography of Raphael Lemkin*, ed. Donna-Lee Frieze (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013), xiv–xv.

5. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 2, 12 January 1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, accessed 18 June 2021, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%2078/volume-78-I-1021-English.pdf.

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7. For a summary of each of the three categories of crimes, see Sarah Sewell, Dwight Raymond, and Sally Chinn, *Mass Atrocity Response Operations: A Military Planning Handbook* (Cambridge, MA: Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, Harvard Kennedy School, 2010), 103–5, accessed 21 June 2021, https://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/MARO-Handbook-091117.pdf; *Mass Atrocity*

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10. Lemkin, *Totally Unofficial*, x.

11. Ibid., xi, 17.

12. Vladimir Levin, "Preventing Pogroms: Patterns in Jewish Politics in Early Twentieth-Century Russia," in *Anti-Jewish Violence: Rethinking the Pogrom in East European History*, ed. Jonathan Dekel-Chen et al. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011), 95–96.

13. Lemkin, *Totally Unofficial*, 20.

14. JP 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 17 January 2017), II-3, accessed 6 July 2021, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_0ch1.pdf.

15. Lemkin, *Totally Unofficial*, 22–23.

16. Lemkin, *Axis Rule,* 91.

17. Lemkin, *Totally Unofficial*, 41–106.

18. Ibid., 112–13.

19. Ibid., 114–17.

20. Lemkin, *Axis Rule*, ix.

21. Ibid., 77–78, 89.

22. Ibid., xvii–xxxviii. For a summary, see the highly detailed table of contents.

23. JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 12 July 2017), 1-12–1-15.

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27. Ibid.

28. JP 5-0, *Joint Planning* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 1 December 2020), IV-22.

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31. Lemkin, *Axis Rule*, 82.

32. JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, IV-3.

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34. Ibid., 82–83.

35. Ibid., 83.

36. Ibid., 84–85.

37. Ibid., 85–86.

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39. Ibid., 87–89.

40. Ibid., 89.

41. Ibid., 89–90.

42. Lemkin, *Totally Unofficial*, 117, 180; Sands, *East West Street*, 345.

43. Sands, *East West Street*, 361.

44. Ibid., 361n3; "Adolf Eichmann: Key Dates," United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, accessed 30 June 2021, https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/adolf-eichmann-key-dates.

45. Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (New York: Penguin Books, 1977), 54.

46. Ibid., 45.

47. Ibid., 151.

48. David Cesarani, *Becoming Eichmann: Rethinking the Life, Crimes, and Trial of a "Desk Murderer"* (Boston: Da Capo Press, 2007), 119.

49. Ibid., 424.

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51. Ibid., 77–78.

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53. Cesarani, *Becoming Eichmann*, 165.

54. Ibid., 112.

55. JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*, 1-24.

56. Cesarani, *Becoming Eichmann*, 165–66.

57. Ibid., 120–23.

58. Leon Friedman, ed., "Judgment of the District Court of Jerusalem (12 December 1961), The Eichmann Trial," in *The Law of War: A Documentary History*, vol. 2 (New York: Random House, 1972), 1627, 1654–55.

59. Ibid., 1657, 1687.

60. Bettina Stangneth, *Eichmann before Jerusalem: The Unexamined Life of a Mass Murderer*, trans. Ruth Martin (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), xxii–xxv.

Domain Awareness Superiority Is the Future of Military Intelligence

Chief Warrant Officer 4 Robert M. Ryder, U.S. Army Reserve

Not long after the turn of the century, powers in Europe fought each other in a great world war using dreadfully archaic tactics and formations against rapidly evolving technology. Predictably, casualties were appallingly unspeakable on all sides, with tens of thousands of victims per day of major combat operations. Somewhat unexpectedly, battlefield lethality had increased tenfold over previous conflicts waged just a few years earlier due to rapid improvements in newly automated, quick-fire, highly accurate weapons, massed effects and fires, and machines developed during a rushed technological revolution in industry, information, and communications. Decision cycles became increasingly compressed as decisive points approached at extraordinary speeds, equating to nearly impossible reaction time requirements that shocked leaders and demoralized troops. Likewise, the world recoiled in horror at the lethal devastation unleashed upon its unprepared armies through this disruption in military affairs. The year was 2028.

This photo shows the urban area surrounding the medieval *Kölner Dom*, or Cologne Cathedral, 24 April 1945 in Cologne, Germany, after it had been completely devastated by intense bombing and shelling during high-intensity conventional fighting for control of the city near the end of World War II. Due to the greatly enhanced destructiveness of modern conventional weapons, future large-scale combat operations would likely result in similar if not greater damage to urban areas. (Photo courtesy of the U.S. Department of Defense)



(Screenshot of motion graphic by William Norris, U.S. Army Training Support Center)

Figure 1. U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028

> Through the coming Revolution in Intelligence Affairs, machines will become more than just tools for information collection and analysis. They will become intelligence consumers, decision-makers, and even targets of other machine intelligence operations.[1]

Why Is Domain Awareness Not Already a Doctrinal Term?

Surprisingly, the term "domain awareness" is not formally known in Department of Defense organizations, doctrine, or lexicon, nor is it clearly defined in a wider sense, despite its creeping, informal acceptance into modern vernacular.[2] Its defining and subsequent adoption by the intelligence community, however, would solve a significant doctrinal gap in developing multi-domain operations (MDO) and joint all-domain operations (JADO) concepts. This doctrinal gap was created when two unstoppable forces—the information revolution and the nascent revolution in intelligence affairs—not only created the cyber domain (and artificial intelligence possibilities) but also created a domain which now crosses into all others, making a domain awareness concept increasingly relevant.

There are four physical domains (sea, air, land, space) and one functional domain (cyber and the electromagnetic spectrum [EMS]) encompassed in the MDO/JADO concept, which are collectively known as the five operational or warfighting domains (see figure 1). The desire for the rapid convergence of massed effects simultaneously (and at times continually) across several domains at decisive moments in a global, complex operating environment equally necessitates an exceptional, omniscient-like awareness.[3]

There is no unifying terminology for the type of intelligence support now required to meet multi-domain operational needs. The idea of "domain awareness superiority" logically follows; this intelligence-specific concept bridges the 2018 *National Defense Strategy*

reference to "information superiority" and the 2020 joint warfighting concept of "information advantage," which ostensibly leads to operational "decision dominance" (see figure 2).[4]

Current U.S. Army MDO doctrine is based primarily on two documents, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet (TP) 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028*, and Chief of Staff Paper #1, *Army Multi-Domain Transformation: Ready to Win in Competition and Conflict*, and the relatively new concept of combined joint all-domain command and control (CJADC2) in U.S. Army parlance (or joint all-domain command and control [JADC2] in U.S. Air Force's).[5]

Air Force JADC2 planning doctrine emphasizes the "tension" of balancing between the exploitation of knowledge a decision maker already has versus exploring new knowledge, or the same tension between intelligence (explore) and operations (exploit). While more possible in the long competition phase preceding crisis and conflict, I argue this idea of balance is impossible in a hyperactive battlespace experiencing persistent contact and which will necessitate the near-real time intelligence collection and instantaneous analysis and targeting across all domains.[6] As the Chief of Staff Paper #1 warned in March 2021, "In competition and conflict, joint operations will experience continuous disruption of command and control (C2) from the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), space, and cyber domains."[7]

Historically, the terms "common operating picture" or commander's "situational awareness" have been used to portray a simpler semblance of domain awareness when there were just three primary domains. These older concepts, however, are too generalized and do not accurately describe a commander's information needs and future warfare, which will necessarily be highly automated, networked, and roboticized—a frenetic, hyperlethal battlespace distributed across all domains.

In July 2020, the emerging joint warfare concept included a working definition of information advantage, which was "the [operational] ability to integrate the information capabilities of space, cyber, the EMS, and cognitive activities to increase the commander's awareness and understand faster than RED [the opposing force], while inhibiting RED's ability to so the same."[8]

Domain awareness and domain awareness superiority are the intelligence-related concepts supporting information advantage that include kinetic and nonkinetic targeting of our adversary's ability to also achieve domain awareness superiority.

The June 2019 *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* explains in an unclassified section: "The Joint Force will enable Information Advantage through knowledge of itself, its opponents, and the environment in which it fights. This advantage allows the Joint Force to moderate tempo against technologically peered adversaries."[9] Knowledge of "itself," or the joint force, is "enterprise domain awareness," as described later in this article.

Commanders must know of which domains they do not have sufficient awareness to properly task intelligence warfighting systems. They will need to close these intelligence gaps to enable their operational elements to converge on targets in one or more



(Figure by author)

Figure 2. Domain Awareness Is the Unifying Concept Between Intelligence and Operations

(Graphic courtesy of Lockheed Martin)

domains rapidly, simultaneously, and at times, continually. Domain awareness is key to JADO, whereas situational awareness is a lesser concept that more accurately refers to the interplay of battlespace effects on the joint force and the joint force's effects on the battlespace in near real time. Domain awareness creates situational awareness, while the converse may not necessarily be true.

TP 525-3-1 acknowledges the joint force has two major technical shortfalls in achieving convergence: the lack of a joint visualization and decision support tool (i.e., common operational picture), and the lack of joint sensor-to-shooter synchronization capabilities that enable any joint shooter to see all intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and targeting data. Again, domain awareness is the key to help solve both problems.[10] But first, we need to define it.

Defining Domain Awareness

"Domain awareness" is a compound construction of two nouns, "domain" and "awareness," where domain functions as an adjective to describe awareness. What a domain is depends on context. Relevant modern definitions include a field, realm, sphere, or a range of knowledge, activity, influence, responsibility, or a physical region characterized by specific features.[11]

Awareness is simpler; it is the quality or state of realization, perception, knowledge, or understanding that something is (or is not) happening or exists (or does not exist).[12] By taking key elements of all of the preceding definitions and concepts, the proposed definition follows:

> Domain Awareness is having operational knowledge of a particular sphere of concern, and understanding its interactions with other domains in a given environment. By extending Domain Awareness across all domains, the Intelligence Community Enterprise and organic, joint ISR and operational sensors enables superior Domain Awareness through the timely creation and sharing of multidisciplined intelligence data at all classification levels through directed or automated dissemination mechanisms in near real time.[13]

Operational warfighting domains are not the only domains that fall under the overall domain awareness concept. Other domains may include functional or conceptual domains like medical, financial, political, human, legal, executive, and more. Some domains, like the five operational domains, are external to an organization, whereas the functional domains can be internal factors affecting an organization, or are external domains to manage. For example, policy and legal (i.e., statutory authorities or intelligence oversight governance) domains often play an outsized, fundamental role in an intelligence organization's operations, and play into a definition of enterprise domain awareness. Know yourself, in other words. As Sun Tzu might have said if he was alive today,

> It is widely said that if you have Domain Awareness Superiority and also Enterprise Domain Awareness you will not be defeated in a hundred battles; if you do not have Domain Awareness Superiority but do have Enterprise Domain Awareness, you will win one and lose one; if you do not have Domain Awareness Superiority nor Enterprise Domain Awareness, you will be imperiled in every single battle.

The Army is a system of systems and is a large enterprise with a combat mission delegated by various statutes that authorize policies that govern the enterprise's operations. There is a system of budgeting, execution, and regulatory oversight that directly affects the enterprise capabilities and the employment of those capabilities. In essence, these internal domains affect the operational environment during competition in peace and conflict in war (i.e., always). The proposed definition of enterprise domain awareness for an intelligence entity is having institutional knowledge of all the operational domains on which an organization has intelligence data and knowing how internal domains of policy, capabilities, operations, and others influence the organization's ability to generate operational domain awareness.[14]

Goodbye Situation Awareness, Hello Domain Awareness Superiority

Artificial intelligence (AI) and its subdiscipline machine learning are emerging and future technologies that will enable the realization of domain awareness. These technologies will process, exploit, and disseminate the torrent of sensor and intelligence information collecting against information requirements in all operational domains in near-real time. A National Geospatial Intelligence Agency director estimated that the agency will need the equivalent of eight million imagery analysts by 2037 to process and make sense of the volume of imagery information that will be available by then.[15] When ultimately paired with augmented cognition, human intermediaries will play a crucial role in managing domain awareness and domain awareness superiority processes, including sensor-to-shooter interactions. These humans-in-the-loop will ultimately need to be enabled through cyberware and brain-computer interfaces.

In June 2020, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence released the first framework for the intelligence community's ethical use of AI and machine learning, which followed on from the January 2019 release of its augmented intelligence using machines strategy initiative.[16] The U.S. House Armed Services Committee released their *Future of Defense Task Force Report* in September 2020. This somewhat dire report argues for a "Manhattan Project" in defense-related AI, mandated Department of Defense spending on AI systems, and for the United States to lead international efforts on the practical and ethical uses of AI for defense purposes.[17]

The incorporation of AI into the military and national security realms will fundamentally change the way wars are fought and won. Whichever nation triumphs in the AI race will hold a critical, and perhaps insurmountable, military and economic advantage.

—Future of Defense Task Force Report 2020[18]

The key to focus the military intelligence enterprise as we progress—and as our competitors and adversaries likewise pursue these technologies—is the goal of superior domain awareness. This goal is the raison d'être of why and what we are trying to accomplish in military intelligence support to MDO; we are moving far beyond just the creation of situational

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awareness for human decision-makers. We are moving into all-domain awareness leading to information advantage and decision dominance.

Long-term technological or informational overmatch on peer or near-peer adversaries is likely to be an unrealistic goal, but the potential for superior domain awareness will be achievable under at least some conditions. One condition where it may not be, however, is if our adversaries develop faster computing and smarter AI, though enemy domain awareness capabilities can be degraded and deceived through cyber effects or attacks in the EMS or against ISR—as well as against ours. Domain awareness superiority could be an intermittent phenomenon, with both sides grasping it momentarily before the other side takes it back through automated attacks and integrated all-domain effects.

Domain awareness will be key when employing increasingly robotized, automated forces that necessarily rely on high-fidelity information on all domains. The systems that produce domain awareness capability must be high fidelity, redundant systems generating and providing highly accurate information to sensors and shooters. Otherwise, unresolved ethical considerations involving the use of lethal autonomous weapons will prohibit our developing them, let alone our destroying them on the battlefield. Further, expect the proliferation of small, low-Earth-orbit satellite sensors to enable friendly and adversarial domain awareness and imagine a multipronged, robust antisatellite capability to automatically destroy them and satellites in all orbits at the onset of hostilities.[19] Defeating intelligence collection systems that enable adversarial domain awareness and domain awareness superiority will be a top priority on the way to decision dominance.

On Bias

Within any given decision cycle in a hyperactive engagement, the side with domain awareness superiority should win most battles, even when disadvantaged in a correlation of forces. One key to achieving domain awareness superiority is going to be ongoing, objective assessments of "consciousness"—of how one's domain awareness exists across a qualitative or semiquantitative spectrum.[20] We must develop and emplace quality assurance systems that attempt to objectively discover blind spots in ISR coverage, data, and intelligence gaps, military deception, and various other undesired biases and confounding variables. The ultimate risk is assuming domain awareness superiority exists, when it may just exist as a form of incomplete situational awareness.

> We need a common focal point to keep us on track developing the systems and processes to allow us to keep pace with the onrushing future: domain awareness superiority.

One significant obstacle of true domain awareness is the concept of data bias, where AI algorithms focus only on data that is easily collected, accessible, favored, or particularly suitable to automation (i.e., electronic intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, geospatial intelligence, or signals intelligence metadata).[21] For instance, human intelligence is not particularly suitable for automation (in either collection or analysis), and similarly, neither is communications intelligence—yet. The promise of AI suggests the ability to parse this type of unstructured intelligence will occur, however, along with the correlation of publicly available and open-source, intelligence-derived data and information. Nonetheless, data bias will continue to be a vast problem that is difficult to solve.

There may also be bias in measurement information (e.g., accuracy or precision due to calibration error, spoofing, or resolution), legacy database field mismatch, legacy database entry errors, and others such as data and target revalidation. Deception is another pitfall. Only AI and an unbiased domain awareness baseline will enable the detection of sophisticated and cheap swarms of AI-facilitated denial and deception operations.

> Using the Manhattan Project as a model, the United States must undertake and win the artificial intelligence race by leading in the invention and deployment of AI while establishing the standards for its public and

private use. Although the Department of Defense has increased investment in AI and established the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center to assist with the transition and deployment of AI capabilities, cultural resistance to its wider adoption remains. Congress and the Department of Defense must take additional action to overcome these barriers.[22]

The Future All over Again, but Much Sooner Than We Expect

We are rapidly headed toward algorithmic warfare whether we like it or not, and we must learn the lessons of the impacts of the Industrial Revolution had on large-scale combat operations in the two world wars; the impacts from the information revolution will almost certainly be the same. Recall the advancements in both information and space technologies over the past fifteen years and similarly project forward to imagine 2035. Assume a realized breakthrough in quantum computing somewhere in that time frame, and the future will be on us. Accordingly, we need a common focal point to keep us on track developing the systems and processes to allow us to keep pace with the onrushing future: domain awareness superiority.

True domain awareness superiority is predictive, not just descriptive (which it fundamentally needs to do well). It will predict enemy courses of action and be able to preemptively queue ISR at automatically generated named areas of interest designed to confirm or deny the most likely actions, as well as warn joint targeteers to prepare for associated fires or effects missions and feed them the required domain awareness information. Domain awareness superiority is joint and will naturally feed information to all sensor-to-shooter systems so the transition to more automated targeting is realized. Defining the domain awareness superiority concept and incorporating it into doctrine will help focus the Army intelligence enterprise to meet the Army's 2035 MDO AimPoint Force objectives and drive change across the entire Department of Defense for JADO. ■

Notes

1. Anthony Vinci, "The Coming Revolution in Intelligence Affairs: How Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Systems Will Transform Espionage," *Foreign Affairs* (website), 31 August 2020, accessed 16 June 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-america/2020-08-31/coming-revolution-intelligence-affairs.

2. Maritime Security Policy Coordinating Committee, *National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness for the National Strategy for Maritime Security* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, December 2013), iv. The phrase "maritime domain awareness" has been in common use



For those readers interested in supplemental information including detailed explanations and analysis of evolving concepts related to multi-domain operations and domain awareness dominance, see Army Futures Command Pamphlet 71-20-1, *The Army Futures Command Concept for Maneuver in Multi-Domain Operations 2028,* at https://api.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/2021/01/20/2fbeccee/20200707-afc-71-20-1-maneuver-in-mdo-final-v16-dec-20.pdf.



To view *The Aim Initiative: A Strategy for Augmenting Intelligence Using Machines*, visit https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/reports-publications/item/1940-the-aim-initiative-a-strategy-for-augmenting-intelligence-using-machines.

for decades, and is used in national security contexts, such as the 2013 *National Maritime Domain Awareness Plan for the National Strategy for Maritime Security*. In this context, maritime domain awareness is "the effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States."

3. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet (TP) 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028* (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, December 2018), 20. The joint all-domain operations tenet of convergence is "the rapid and continuous integration of capabilities in all domains that optimizes effects to overmatch the enemy through cross-domain synergy and multiple forms of attack, all enabled by mission command and disciplined initiative."

4. Merrick E. Krause, "Decision Dominance: Exploiting Transformational Asymmetries," *Defense Horizons* No. 23 (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, February 2003), accessed 22 June 2021, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/defensehorizon/DH-023.pdf. "Decision dominance" is a still-emerging term that has drifted from how it was first described by Krause in February 2003, as a state where a commander can deny an adversary decisional options while maintaining his own; Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., "Army's New Aim Is 'Decision Dominance,'" Breaking Defense, 17 March 2021, accessed 16 June 2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/03/armys-new-aim-is-decision-dominance/. As of March 2021, Army Futures Command Gen. Mark Murray describes it as "the ability for a commander to sense, understand, decide, act, and assess faster and more effectively than any adversary."

5. *Army Multi-Domain Transformation: Ready to Win in Competition and Conflict*, Chief of Staff Paper #1 (Arlington, VA: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 16 March 2021) (hereinafter CSA March 2021).

6. Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-99, *Department of the Air Force Role in Joint All Domain Operations* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Curtis E. Lemay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, 8 October 2020).

7. CSA March 2021.

8. Joint Staff J-5 representative, personal communication with author, July 2020. "RED" refers to the opposing force.

9. Ibid.

10. The word "awareness" appears just three times in TP 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028*, all in appendix D on dense urban terrain, twice in the form of situational awareness, and once in State Department awareness.

11. *Oxford English Dictionary Online*, s.v. "situational," accessed 1 July 2021, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/situational.

12. *Oxford English Dictionary Online*, s.v. "awareness," accessed 1 July 2021, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/awareness.

13. Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 22 October 2018). By "operational knowledge," the author intends to convey flexibility within a limited conceptual range. Generally, operational knowledge is that knowledge, which when operationalized, enables tactical force employment to achieve strategic objectives. It encompasses the entire spectrum of knowledge management: the deliberate discovery, capture, storage, sharing, utilization, monitoring, and (re)creation of knowledge; or, in other words, having the knowledge required to conduct successful operations. See Giulio Valente and Alessandro Rigallo, "An Innovative Approach for Managing Competence: An Operational Knowledge Management Framework," in *Knowledge-Based Information and Engineering Systems: 7th International Conference, KES 2003, Oxford, UK, September 2003, Proceedings, Part I*, ed. Vasile Palade, Robert J. Howlett, and Lakhmi Jain (Berlin: Springer, 2003), accessed 16 June 2021, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-540-45224-9_136.

14. CSA March 2021. The Army Continuum Analysis (ACA) is a form of Enterprise Domain Awareness. The ACA is the term given to the iterative process of using wargames, scenarios, and data analysis to drive deep future doctrine development in conjunction with developing capabilities and force generation.

15. Robert Cardillo, "Small Satellites—Big Data" (remarks, Utah State University, Logan, UT, 7 August 2017), accessed 16 June 2021, https://www.nga.mil/news/Small_Satellites_-_Big_Data.html.

16. Patrick Tucker, "New Intelligence-Community AI Principles Seek to Make Tools Useful—and Law-Abiding," Defense One, 23 July 2020, accessed 16 June 2021, https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2020/07/new-intelligence-community-ai-principles-seek-make-tools-useful-and-law-abiding/167163/; "Artificial Intelligence Ethics Framework for the Intelligence Community, v. 1.0 as of June 2020" (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence [ODNI], June 2020), accessed 16 June 2021, https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/AI_Ethics_Framework_for_the_Intelligence_Community_10.pdf; *The Aim Initiative: A Strategy for Augmenting Intelligence Using Machines* (Washington, DC: ODNI, 16 January 2019), accessed 16 June 2021, https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/reports-publications/item/1940-the-aim-initiative-a-strategy-for-augmenting-intelligence-using-machines.

17. U.S. House Armed Services Committee, *Future of Defense Task Force Report 2020* (Washington, DC: U.S. House Armed Services Committee, 23 September 2020), accessed 16 June 2021, https://armedservices.house.gov/_cache/files/2/6/26129500-d208-47ba-a9f7-25a8f82828b0/6D5C75605DE8DDF00137129 23B4388D7.future-of-defense-task-force-report.pdf.

18. Ibid.

19. Defense Intelligence Agency, *Challenges to Security in Space* (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, January 2019), accessed 16 June 2021, https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/Space_Threat_V14_020119_sm.pdf.

20. Such as no awareness, low awareness, partial awareness, moderate awareness, etc., or a percentage-based estimate.

21. Mike Mullane, "Eliminating Data Bias from Machine Learning Systems," Medium, 13 November 2018, accessed 16 June 2021, https://medium.com/e-tech/the-impact-of-data-bias-on-machine-learning-4875498b9f84.

22. U.S. House Armed Services Committee, *Future of Defense Task Force Report.*

Maj. Daniel Bourke, task force executive officer for 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment, briefs the command team 17 July 2019 during Exercise Hamel, part of Exercise Talisman Saber at McLachlan assembly area, Shoalwater Bay Training Area, Rockhampton, Queensland, Australia. Exercises like Talisman Saber provide effective and intense training to ensure U.S. and Australian forces are capable, interoperable, and deployable on short notice and are combat ready. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Nicolas A. Cloward, U.S. Army)

The Levels of War as Levels of Analysis

Andrew S. Harvey, PhD

The primary purpose of any theory is to clarify concepts and ideas that have become, as it were, confused and entangled.
—Carl von Clausewitz

Many field grade officers and Command and General Staff Officers' Course (CGSOC) students have difficulty distinguishing between the levels of war. This article attempts to clarify the levels of war by proposing that they should

be thought of as levels of analysis. Many disciplines have found utility in using levels of analysis to clarify thinking and as an approach to research and analysis. It seems reasonable to believe that approaching the levels of war as levels of analysis will do the same for CGSOC students. The advantages of this approach will be discerned by looking at the levels of war and common issues students have with them, the levels of analysis framework (to include the unit of analysis issue), and the benefits of using the levels of war as levels of analysis to clarify thinking.

The concept of levels of war has a long history, starting with Carl von Clausewitz, who identified two levels: strategy and tactics.[1] Aleksandr A. Svechin, an officer in the 1920s Soviet Red Army, first proposed the concept of an operational level of war.[2] However, the U.S. Army did not adopt the operational level of war as doctrine until 1982 in Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*.[3]

Current doctrine regarding the levels of war can be found in both Joint Publication (JP) 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States,* and JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*.[4]

> The three levels of warfare—strategic, operational, and tactical—link tactical actions to achievement of national objectives. There are no finite limits or boundaries between these levels, but they help commanders design and synchronize operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks to the appropriate command. The strategic, operational, or tactical purpose of employment depends on the nature of the objective, mission, or task.[5]

This description from JP 1 sets out the basics and also illustrates the epistemological issue inherent in the doctrinal concept. There are three levels of war (a classification construct), but "there are no finite limits or boundaries between these levels."[6] This is an issue for students when they try to identify which level of war a particular mission or task or objective belongs in. For students, the issue is classifying which *category* applies, and although the levels of war are not really categories, categories are commonly how students approach the levels of war. Doctrine tries to clarify the issue with the caveat that "the strategic, operational, or tactical purpose of employment depends on the nature of the objective, mission, or task."[7] That is to say, *the purpose* of the action or objective is what determines the level of war. However, that does not completely rectify the epistemological classification problem. When there is no clear delineation of the limits or boundaries between the levels of war, it is still rather tricky to correctly classify the purpose. Doctrine in JP 1 creates a problem with how students can understand and use the levels of war in their thinking (see figure 1, page 77).

"When there is no clear delineation of the limits or boundaries between the levels of war, it is still rather tricky to correctly classify the purpose."

JP 3-0 does not help to clarify the issue and in fact reinforces the problem. A positive contribution, however, is the warning against the unit of analysis issue. The warning reiterates that there are three levels of war and that there are no fixed limits or boundaries between them. The student is warned against including the unit of analysis (e.g., echelon of command, size of units, types of equipment) in the levels of war classification. That is a useful warning because students often will make the unit of analysis mistake and conflate the echelon of command, size of units, or types of equipment with a particular level of war. On the other hand, the classification problem is still based on the nature of the task, mission, or objective. The place where JP 3-0 reinforces the epistemological problem is when it states,

> For example, intelligence and communications satellites, previously considered principally strategic assets, are also significant resources for tactical operations. Likewise, tactical actions can cause both intended and unintended strategic consequences, particularly in today's environment of pervasive

and immediate global communications and networked threats.[8]

Given that there are no fixed limits or boundaries between the levels of war, how does the student differentiate between them when strategic assets have tactical applications and when tactical actions have intended and unintended strategic consequences? A tactical action with an intended strategic consequence (purpose) would, from the explanation in JP 1 and JP 3-0, place that *tactical* action at the *strategic* level of war. Notice also that in this explanation from JP 3-0 that the operational level of war is not mentioned. It is no wonder that many CGSOC students in the Department of Distance Education have difficulty distinguishing between the levels of war; the doctrine has an inherent epistemological issue regarding the clarity of the delineation between the levels (see figure 2, page 78).

There are two common issues students have with the levels of war. First, they will often combine the levels of war. That is, they do not make any distinction between strategic (national and theater), operational, and tactical; the most common mistake is they will combine the strategic and operational levels. Those levels are the ones they have the least experience with. The other common error is mistaking actions or objectives at one level for those done at another level, either higher or lower. The result of these errors is analysis that is confused and entangled. The errors prevent students from thinking clearly through problems dealing with operational art and are a hindrance to their ability to



(Figure from Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*)

Figure 1. Levels of Warfare

This graphic shows the levels of war as a distinct hierarchy with marginally overlapping areas between the strategic and the operational and between the tactical and the operational. In this hierarchical structure, there is no overlap between the tactical and the strategic as suggested by the description in Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*.



(Graphic by DeEtte Lombard, CGSOC C200 lesson plan, academic year 2019–2020; reference Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*)

Figure 2. Three Levels of War

This graphic of the levels of war from a lesson plan in the Command and General Staff Officers' Course (CGSOC) C200 course shows a version of the distinct hierarchy graphic from Joint Publication (JP) 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, on the left but presents the levels of war as nested or embedded on the right. This would indicate that the tactical and operational levels are contained within the strategic level and that the tactical level is contained within the operational level. That graphic would better fit the example from JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*. On the other hand, if the levels are nested and embedded rather than distinct with a marginal overlap, how does the student differentiate between them?

grasp key concepts. Most students think about, and make connections with, their professional military experiences to provide context to new information. The usual approach is to relate the new concepts in CGSOC to a tactical framework since the majority of students' military experiences are at that level. This is a natural response and a common heuristic, but it leads to hasty generalizations and biased interpretation of information. There is little recourse currently to assist students struggling to understand the levels of war except to point them back to doctrine. What is needed is a new way to clarify and present the levels of war in a way that assists students in absorbing the concept in a new framework without trying to make connections to their tactical experiences. A framework used in quite a few disciplines is called the level of analysis. That framework can assist CGSOC students to clarify their thinking and analysis.

The level of analysis is a tool found in various social sciences (e.g., political science, sociology, psychology, anthropology) that helps the scholar define the scale and scope of his or her research.

> In any area of scholarly inquiry, there are always several ways in which the phenomena under study may be sorted and arranged for purposes of systemic analysis. Whether in the physical or social sciences, the observer may choose to focus upon the parts

> or upon the whole, upon the components or upon the system.[9]

The example used here is from an international relations theory in political science, the field that this author is most familiar with. In political science, the level of analysis problem was described by J. David Singer in 1961, but he only described two levels: the international system and the state.[10] Kenneth N. Waltz, in *Man, the State, and War* and in *Theory of International Politics,* proposes three levels of analysis that are now most commonly used: the individual, the state, and the international system.[11] These three levels allow a scholar to investigate phenomena from very different perspectives. For example, if the individual level of analysis is selected, then the research would focus on what the individual decision-maker does in terms of policy and why he or she made that decision. If the state level of analysis is chosen, then the focus would be on the internal workings of the state and how bureaucracies and groups make decisions (e.g., Graham Allison's work on the Cuban Missile Crisis[12]). If the international system is chosen, then the research would focus on the structure of the system and the interactions between actors in the system (e.g., looking at the structure of alliances and treaties prior to World War I).

The utility then of selecting a level of analysis is methodological; it allows the scholar to structure his or her research in a way that is clear and rational. It prevents concepts and ideas from becoming confused and entangled by limiting what is under investigation to those things that fit within its scope. If a scholar uses the international system as a level of analysis, that choice prevents, for example, the personality of the German Kaiser (individual level of analysis) to be considered as a factor in the international system of alliances and treaties prior to World War I. This does not mean that any one level of analysis is superior; on the contrary, all levels or perspectives regarding a subject are necessary to more fully understand it. However, using levels of analysis provides clarity and focus when examining complex subjects.

To further improve clarity in analysis, the military scholar must be aware of another concept known as the unit of analysis. The level of analysis is not the same as the unit of analysis. The unit of analysis is the object that is the focus of the analysis; it is the thing studied. What is important is that the unit of analysis "depends on the level of inquiry."[13] A unit of analysis could be individual(s), group(s), organization(s), state(s), or a system. The unit of analysis depends on the framework of the analysis, which is the level of analysis. If a soldier is looking at the strategic level of analysis, his or her unit of analysis might be *the actions of* a theater commander, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or the secretary of defense. It could also be *the actions of* a corporal, sergeant, or junior officer when *those actions* are at the strategic level. This meshes with doctrine as noted above regarding the unit of analysis and the levels of war when JP 3-0 states,

> Echelon of command, size of units, types of equipment, and types and location of forces or components may often be associated with a particular level, but the strategic, operational, or tactical purpose of their employment depends on the nature of their task, mission, or objective.[14]

This is the doctrinal equivalent of stating that the unit of analysis depends on the level of analysis (level of war). Using the levels of war as levels of analysis fits doctrine and helps to clarify it.

There are several benefits of using the levels of war as levels of analysis. First, it clarifies doctrine. It clears up the epistemological issue described previously. This is rather simple and yet not intuitive to most students. Most students try to fit the information they are given into a level of war as a *category* during their analysis. Treating the levels of war as levels of analysis would require students to *first* determine the scope and limitations of each level of war in a given scenario *prior* to conducting any analysis of the subject. It changes the student's focus from trying to sift information into loosely defined and overlapping categories *during* analysis to starting his or her analysis with a framework having predetermined parameters for what defines each level of analysis/level of war. As with the social sciences, use of levels of analysis clarifies the scope

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M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks of the 3rd Armored Division move out on a mission 15 February 1991 during Operation Desert Storm. An M2/M3 Bradley can be seen in background. (Photo by Photographer's Mate Chief Petty Officer D. W. Holmes II, U.S. Navy)

of research and analysis by clearly describing what is to be the subject of investigation *prior to* analysis. The example from JP 3-0 describing a *tactical* action at the *strategic* level of war would be clarified. The unit of analysis is not the determinant. If the student is using the strategic level of war as a level of analysis, then that action would simply be seen as a strategic action regardless of which echelon of command or unit conducted the action. In fact, *the actions* (unit of analysis) conducted by a tactical unit can be tactical, operational, or strategic. That is much clearer. This is simply a change in approach and not a change in definition or parameters (scope) of each level of war.

Doctrine in JP 1 already establishes the parameters (scope) of each level of war in such a way that each can be used as a level of analysis. The strategic level of war involves national (or multinational) guidance and resources to achieve national- or theater-level objectives. The strategic level of analysis would analyze any actions taken that involve national (or multinational) guidance, resources, or objectives and end state. The operational level of war involves planning and execution of campaigns and major operations using operational art to achieve military objectives. The operational level of analysis would analyze any actions taken that involve operational art and planning and execution of campaigns and major operations. The tactical level of war involves the planning and execution of battles and engagements by the "ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and the enemy to achieve combat objectives."[15] The tactical level of analysis would analyze any actions taken that involve those activities.

A good example is Operation Desert Storm. When the levels of war are set as levels of analysis using the parameters in doctrine, it becomes clear that VII Corps was functioning at the tactical level of war (planning and executing battles and engagements using "the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and the

enemy to achieve combat objectives"[16]). It is instantly clear that the objectives or actions (battles and engagements) and not the echelon of command (Corps) determine the level of war when applying the levels of war as levels of analysis.

There is then a final question of whether to view the levels of war as a hierarchy or as nested and embedded. Another aspect of the utility of using the levels of war as levels of analysis is that both approaches can be used. As with levels of analysis in political science (individual, state, and international system), an individual is embedded or nested within the state, which is also embedded or nested within the international system, but there is a hierarchy in terms of scope that expands from the individual, to the state, to the international system. Whether the levels of war can be considered as a hierarchy or as nested and embedded is a function of how the framework of the level of war as a level of analysis is used. Students can and should become comfortable with both ways of viewing the levels of war.

Conclusion

Students have repeatedly demonstrated difficulty understanding and applying the levels of war in their coursework. That is because there is an epistemological issue with current doctrine and the students' approach to the levels of war as categories to be used during the analysis process. They also often use their experiences at the tactical level as a heuristic, but that causes hasty generalizations and biased interpretation of information. These problems cause confused and entangled thinking, resulting in poor analysis. Using the levels of war as levels of analysis provides a method to clarify students' thinking. This is a departure from the current approach primarily in terms of process. The main difference is changing the student's view of the levels of war from that of several categories used in the analysis process, to levels of analysis considered as a framework to be applied to a scenario *prior to* the analysis. This will assist in eliminating the unit of analysis issue often made by students, as well as removing the epistemological issue of unclear boundaries between the levels of war. ■

Notes

Epigraph. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 132.

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5. JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States,* I-7.

6. Ibid., x.

7. Ibid., I-7.

8. JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, I-12.

9. David J. Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," *World Politics* 14, no. 1 (1961): 77, https://doi.org/10.2307/2009557.

10. Ibid., 80–84.

11. Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959); Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

12. Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 1st ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).

13. Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, 4th ed. (Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, 2009), 31.

14. JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, I-12.

15. JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States,* I-8.

16. Ibid.

The Jungle

Thinking About the Division's Role in Unit Training Management at the 25th Infantry Division

Maj. Chris Mattos, U.S. Army

As the Army's premier jungle experts and America's Pacific division, it is only appropriate that the 25th Infantry Division think about training management using the jungle itself as a metaphor. The jungles of Hawaii and those that inhabit the United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) area of responsibility are broken down into four structural layers, which we might use as a physical construct to think about training management, readiness, and even leader development. The four layers are the emergent layer (division), the canopy (brigade), the understory (battalion/squadron), and the forest floor (company/battery/troop and below).

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The Jungle Metaphor

The emergent layer of the jungle reaches up and out from the canopy in direct contact with the sun's harshest rays, soaking up water with the jungle's most resilient foliage to help the vegetation below survive periods of drought. The trees that extend to the emergent layer are some of the jungle's oldest and strongest, as they are constantly exposed to strong winds and rainfalls. The animals that live in the emergent layer must be agile, able to survive with limited protection from the elements, and able to traverse the jungle's most treacherous heights.

In the canopy, we find a dense network of vegetation that creates a protective layer over the understory and forest floor. The canopy protects the lower two levels from wind, rain, and harsh sunlight, creating the humid and stable environment that allows life to flourish below. The leaves at this layer have adapted to repel water to the lower levels. And while the emergent layer relies on the wind to spread seeds, the canopy-level plants rely on fruit to be dropped and ingested by the animals below to regenerate organic matter. These ideal conditions in the canopy create a thriving ecosystem of life across countless species.

In the understory, we find conditions that are even more dark, still, and humid. Plants here are much shorter and larger to help soak up the sunlight and rainfall that has passed through the canopy. Here, food and life is ample; animals enjoy safety from the elements and camouflage from predators.

And finally, on the forest floor, we find the most dynamic conditions in what would appear to be the quietest layer of the jungle. The forest floor is the darkest part of the jungle, making it the most challenging for plants to grow. But the floor is also where a great degree of activity occurs that sustains life in the jungle. The foliage

Soldiers from 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment (Gimlets), 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, conduct company evaluations in movement to contact, attack, and defense operations 13 March 2020 during deployment to Kahuku Training Area, Schofield Barracks, Oahu, Hawaii. (Photo by Photo by Pfc. Jessica Scott, U.S. Army)

that falls to floor decomposes and regenerates to provide nutrients to the rest of the jungle. Countless species rely on the regenerative processes that occur here to survive and thrive. Here we see a vast network of interconnected root systems that allows the many plant and fungi species to communicate, adapt to changing conditions, and share resources in a massive symbiotic symphony of regeneration and growth.

Unit Training Management

The term "unit training management" (UTM) is a universal part of the U.S. Army lexicon. And although the term is frequently used and generally understood, what exactly is training management? For the purposes of this article, what exactly do we mean when we talk about training management at the division level? Although the discrete components are explained in detail, anyone would be hard-pressed to find a concise Army definition of the term in any of the current or former 7-0 series doctrine. *The Leader's Guide to Unit Training Management,* published by the Combined Arms Center in December 2013, defines UTM as "the process commanders, leaders and staffs use to plan unit training and identify the resources needed to plan-prepare-execute-assess training."[1]

At brigade and below levels, UTM is most often described through its primary component systems and processes: the 8-step training model, the T-week construct, unit training plan development, etc. UTM is also described as a parallel planning process that aligns with troop-leading procedures at company and below levels, and the military decision-making process at battalion and above levels. Further, UTM is often, and should be, described as an interconnected system that aligns with both the "plan-prepare-execute-assess" operations framework as well as the

A soldier rappels from a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter 22 April 2021 during a ten-day air assault course at the 25th Infantry Division Lightning Academy at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. In addition to rappelling, students learned about sling loading operations and aircraft operations during the course. (Photo by Spc. Jessica Scott, U.S. Army)

commander's activities in the operations process, "understand-visualize-describe-direct-lead-assess."

Thinking About Training Management at the Division Level

While this largely scientific approach to understanding UTM is critical and serves our brigade and below echelons well, we must ask if this approach is applicable at the division level. Like the emergent layer of the jungle, we might think about the division's role in UTM as more than just the managers of another planning process.

The division headquarters, including the command team and the staff, has a significant responsibility to shape the training environment for the "canopy" below. The division exercises several critical duties in this model. First, the division shapes the training environment that creates the conditions for mission-essential task proficiency growth and the overall growth of training readiness. The division is the conduit between the executors of training and the operational environment, which includes higher headquarters' (HHQ) guidance and intent, the physical terrain, the enemy, the information domain, and resources availability, which may include land, ammo, money, facilities, transportation, fuel, and most importantly, time.

As it would in a tactical operation, the division performs as the shaping mission command node, providing guidance and intent, controlling the deep fight, defining the battle space, providing enabling assets, managing operational tempo (OPTEMPO), weighting efforts, and synchronizing activities. The division leverages its whole-of-staff capacity and its relationships with both HHQs and adjacent units to create the conditions in which UTM can be conducted efficiently. Further, the division is responsible for change management, finite resource prioritization, and clearly defining and communicating requisite training end states in order to build and sustain training readiness. The division protects the lower echelons from the naturally occurring known and unknown changes in the environment.

While the division shapes the training atmosphere through annual training guidance, policy, and long-range synchronization, the brigade, or the canopy layer, is focused on multiechelon and multiformation prioritization, resourcing, and deliberate planning. The brigade fits within the division's vision and guidance to provide direction and an explicit description of the desired capability end states for each subordinate element within each of the relative event horizons that drive their unit training plan. Battalions, or the understory layer, take this framework and provide specific focus and direction for each of the company's unique requirements. Where the brigade generally plans and allocates resources, the battalion prioritizes and delivers those resources, including time, to the companies. The company and below, or forest floor layer, forecasts, requests, and consumes those allocated resources in order to meet unit training objectives under the direct supervision of company-level leaders.

Unique Training Management Dynamics in the 25th Infantry Division

In the 25th Infantry Division (25th ID), there are several unique dynamics that impact the training management landscape. First, as one of the Army's divisions outside of the continental United States (CONUS), we are task organized with two infantry brigade combat teams (IBCTs), each with two infantry battalions and a cavalry squadron; a CONUS infantry division is typically organized with three IBCTs, each with three infantry battalions and a cavalry squadron. In addition, in the last several years, the 25th ID redesigned its two Stryker brigade combat teams to be IBCTs. With the loss of the Strykers also came changes to our security cooperation partnerships in the Pacific. Some of our primary partners were in the process of fielding Stryker variants in their own armies, making other Stryker-capable formations a more preferred partner to those nations. When this change in the security cooperation landscape occurred, the 25th ID's role in major annual exercises like Pacific Pathways also changed. These strategic-level shifts had several down-trace impacts on how our two-IBCT divisions could maintain training readiness in a given fiscal year.

In one training year, the 25th ID conducted a collective training exercise (CTE) called Lightning Forge that served as a brigade external evaluation in preparation for an annual collective training center (CTC) rotation to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) in Fort Polk, Louisiana. It also supported a several-month rotation to the Pacific in support of Pacific Pathways in which a predominance of one IBCT as well as a portion of the division staff, the combat aviation brigade (CAB), the division artillery brigade, and the division support brigade (DSB) all deployed to multiple Pacific countries

to conduct partnered training. This means that every year, one IBCT conducts three back-to-back major events: the CTE, the CTC rotation, and the Pathways rotations. This is to allow the other IBCT to build training readiness through home station collective training in preparation for the following year, where it becomes the primary training audience for the next iteration of those same three events. The CAB, division artillery brigade, and DSB continuously support these events regardless of which IBCT is the focal unit, in addition to its routine unit training requirements like aerial gunnery, sustainment gunnery, and artillery gunnery tables. Many of these events occur simultaneously with Pacific Pathways in order to ensure the division continues to build readiness across all metrics versus atrophying during major engagements in the Pacific.

In addition to these three major events, the division also conducts expert infantryman badge training, expert soldier badge training, and expert field medic badge training. It also participates in multiple joint and multinational command post exercises and multiple additional partnership engagements that fall outside of the Pacific Pathways umbrella. All of this is on top of normal steady state home station training requirements like mandatory Army Regulation (AR) 350-1, *Army Training and Leader Development*, training, marksmanship qualification densities in accordance with the integrated weapons training strategy, individual warrior skills training, collective training like situational training exercises, field training exercises, and live-fire exercises (LFXs) at the team through battalion echelons. All the while, units are tasked to modernize, conducting multiple new equipment training and new equipment fielding events. And if that were not enough, at all times multiple units in the division are on standby to support crisis response requirements in the area of responsibility, which requires a host of emergency readiness deployment exercise drills.

The second unique dynamic derives from our command relationships to our HHQs. The 25th ID is the only non-Forces Command (FORSCOM) division in the Army. We have a combatant command relationship to USINDOPACOM, we are assigned to Army Pacific (which is the Army Service Component Command to USINDOPACOM), and we have an operational control relationship to I Corps. This command relationship dynamic is unique to the 25th ID and expands its support requirements to multiple stakeholders.

> “Not unlike many other Army training areas, but certainly more so in Hawaii, there are a multitude of environmental, cultural, and community-based considerations that our training planners must also account for.”

The third dynamic unique to the 25th ID is a function of its role as the U.S. Army Hawaii command as well as its physical geographic location. The commanding general of the 25th ID simultaneously serves as the U.S. Army Hawaii commander, and he is administratively responsible for multiple Army entities located in Hawaii to include U.S. Army Garrison Hawaii, the 9th Mission Support Command, 8th Theatre Sustainment Command, 18th Medical Command, 500th Military Intelligence Brigade, 94th Air and Missile Defense, and 311th Theatre Signal Command. Further, the 25th ID also has habitual relationships and supports external training requirements for adjacent units such as the Hawaii Army National Guard, University of Hawaii Reserve Officer Training Corps, Special Operations Forces, U.S. Air Force, and U.S. Marines. These relationships bring with them a host of additional training support requirements as well as unique training opportunities.

Lastly, the island itself creates unique training management challenges. Transportation to the mainland for CONUS-based training exercises like JRTC typically incurs several additional weeks of movement for rolling stock and equipment. This also requires utilization of limited logistics support vessel capabilities. The relatively small size of Oahu as well as the high demand for limited range and training facilities makes land resource forecasting and allocation uniquely cumbersome. Not unlike many other Army training areas, but certainly more so in

Soldiers with the 25th Infantry Division conduct a river crossing June 2020 during training at the Jungle School at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. (Photo courtesy of 25th Infantry Division)

Hawaii, there are a multitude of environmental, cultural, and community-based considerations that our training planners must also account for. Finally, our largest training area, the Pohakuloa Training Area, resides off-island some two hundred kilometers across the Pacific Ocean on the "Big Island," again increasing logistical and transportation planning factors for our brigades and battalions.

Approaching Training Management Hurdles

These challenges (and often opportunities) make long-range training planning and synchronization unique in the 25th ID. Without proper forecasting, these factors have the potential to overburden our two IBCTs as well as the limited support capacity of the division artillery, CAB, and DSB. As part of the comprehensive effort to prioritize people and to increase the overall readiness of the force, the Army is helping divisions achieve this predictability.

In the past several decades, we have witnessed the Army transition across several readiness models to include the Army force generation model, regionally aligned forces, objective training assessment, and the sustainable readiness model. This year, the Army has unveiled the Regionally Aligned Readiness and Modernization Model (ReARMM) as the marquee readiness model that will guide the Army into the future. The model aims to synchronize training, mission requirements, and modernization efforts while aligning forces to specific geographic combatant commands in order to maximize readiness and predictability. The model will be driven by the universal implementation of the Army synchronization toolset that will serve as the Army-level system of record to input, track, project, and synchronize training, mission, and modernization requirements across the force.

At the division level, we have also begun to transform, refine, and improve our systems and processes to execute the division-level training management philosophy previously outlined and set the conditions for a transition to ReARMM. The first step was defining what we wanted our two-year training model to look like for the division. Given the two-IBCT set and the multitude of requirements defined above, we created a predictable doctrinal template that uniformly laid out in time and space when major events should occur in order to give subordinate units maximum planning predictability.

Second, we developed annual direction of attack plans that pre-identified and forecasted known friction periods in order to allow the staff to begin shaping and mitigating risk much earlier in the planning cycle. Using event-based planning horizons and critical mission drivers (like command post exercises, CTEs, CTC rotations, Warfighter exercises, force modernization windows, and crisis response missions), we were better able to account for recurring high-risk periods, especially centered on periods of transition. Further, it was clear that as a division, planning efforts were generally stovepiped both within the operations enterprise and across the staff. We implemented a routine operations synchronization event and a semiannual division-level resourcing conference aimed at synchronizing efforts across the organization.

These events have been designed to nest and feed into routine division-level training management processes like our annual training guidance publication, semiannual training briefs, and training resourcing integration conferences. In addition, they nest and feed into the Army synchronization and resourcing process, which most notably includes the semiannual Army synchronization and resourcing conference and Army modernization and equipping conference. These efforts, in addition to our endeavors to reform our orders process, develop a company-battery-troop training meeting handbook, and create a division digital training guide, have significantly assisted the division in performing more as the "emergent layer" in service to the "canopy" and below layers. They have better allowed us to shape the future training environment by substantially improving predictability, prioritizing and synchronizing efforts, and allocating precious resources efficiently and effectively. All of this is in the pursuit of improving the lethality of the force through building and sustaining readiness.

As we look to the future of the division under both ReARMM and the new "People First!" strategy, we are also beginning to ask some hard questions about what the future of our JRTC rotations may look like for the 25th ID.[2] First and foremost, in line with the Army senior leader's message to the force, we are thinking about the cost benefit of sending an IBCT from the 25th ID to JRTC. Our primary mission is to conduct persistent engagement with regional partners to shape the environment and prevent conflict across the USINDOPACOM region. Thus, we must consider the extent to which we can build training readiness during collective training at home station with Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center support and during Pacific Pathways. This allows for the potential to train and certify units in a jungle environment, to give us more flexibility to conduct force modernization, and also to significantly reduce the financial cost, equipment readiness risk, and high OPTEMPO costs to our soldiers and families associated with conducting a JRTC rotation, CTE, and Pathways deployment in the same year (especially given the two-IBCT set). If Forces Command looks to reduce the echelon at which it focuses training at JRTC, it may be possible to accomplish many of training objectives here in the Pacific that we would otherwise accomplish at JRTC, all the while saving a lot of time, resources, and stress on the soldiers, families, and equipment.

However, given the assumption that the 25th ID will continue to execute JRTC rotations as planned, there is the potential to allow brigades to conduct platoon LFXs and company combined arms LFXs at home station, whereas LFX days at JRTC could be used as force-on-force contingency training. Field training exercises are where organizations build multiechelon mission command and tactical proficiency. Training proficiency (to include live-fire confidence) can and should be focused on squads and platoons, culminating at most with company situational training exercises and company combined arms LFXs prior to attending a CTC rotation. Battalion- and brigade-centric proficiency can be exercised and assessed using home station CTEs, virtual or constructed mission command exercises, Pacific engagements, and mobile external evaluation (i.e., Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center). Brigade external evaluations do not necessarily need to be JRTC prerequisites, although that training time should still be used to train and certify at least to the company level prior to any given JRTC rotation. In the potential absence of a JRTC rotation, that CTE window should be used to build repetition at the appropriate echelon in accordance with upcoming Pacific Pathways requirements and as nested with the annual training guidance.

The last paradox we are trying to reconcile is the tension between the Army's transition to preparing for large-scale combat operations (LSCO) against potential near-peer competitors and the Army's shift toward focusing on the company level and below lethality while assuming risk at the battalion and above levels. In the LSCO environment, as well as in ReARMM, the division

is the central maneuver unit. Thus, it could be argued that from an operational perspective, we should be focusing on brigades and divisions across all warfighting functions and mission command competencies.

Further, it could be posited under this paradigm that divisions should also be the central focal point as the rotational unit at JRTC. This position, however, does not meet the intent of the current "People First!" strategy that aims to simultaneously increase small-unit lethality while decreasing OPTEMPO and reduce stress on soldiers and families. Because of this seemingly competing dynamic, as a division, it is becoming even more important that we are able to do both well. Our ability to understand this new operating and training environment, shape guidance accordingly, and synchronize activities in time and space has become all the more critical. We need to find creative ways to build and retain strategic overmatch both in our technological capabilities and in our tactical and operational proficiency while simultaneously meeting the Army's guidance to build readiness by truly putting our people first.

"We need to find creative ways to build and retain strategic overmatch both in our technological capabilities and in our tactical and operational proficiency while simultaneously meeting the Army's guidance to build readiness by truly putting our people first."

Readiness

Depending on the venue, reference, or discussion topic, we all tend to think and talk about readiness in very different ways. AR 525-30, *Army Strategic and Operational Readiness,* defines readiness as "the ability of U.S. military forces to fight and meet the demands of the NMS [*National Mission Strategy*], with unit readiness defined as "the ability of a unit to perform as designed."[3] In the 25th ID, we think and talk about readiness as an essential component of the commanding general's operational approach, which is comprised of four primary lines of effort: people, partnerships, readiness, and innovation/modernization.

The readiness line of effort, "Train, Deploy, Fight, Win!," is defined as the ability to "sustain an agile and ready force capable of maintaining persistent engagement with regional partners to enable a free and open INDOPACIFIC that is prepared to rapidly deploy, fight, and win in a large scale combat operations anywhere in the world."[4] The line of effort is divided into four sublines of effort: (1) operational readiness, defined as "ensuring assigned forces are capable of deploying regionally and worldwide with little notice"; (2) training readiness, defined as "units are trained, certified, and ready to execute their METL [mission essential task list] tasks"; (3) manning, defined as "units are sources to meet training and deployment readiness objectives"; and (4) equipment readiness, defined as our "equipment, property, supply stocks, and management processes enable units to maintain constant operational readiness."[5] The ultimate end state of this line of effort is that every "light fighter" in the 25th ID is physically fit, mentally tough, and highly trained as jungle operations experts to deploy, fight, and win in LSCO anywhere in the world. This framework has served as an essential primer to assist the division in thinking about readiness, but it is also clear that these definitions do not completely encapsulate the intangible essence of readiness that we also aim to improve upon.

We believe that readiness is more than just projected PSRT ratings.[6] Although these projections may serve as reliable indicators of readiness, true readiness resides in our organization's ability to perform as a cohesive team in austere conditions. We rest firmly upon a foundation of trust as the fundamental bedrock of the profession of arms. In practice, we are talking about putting a soldier and his or her fire team on short notice, on a far-away objective, in all conditions, with the maximum opportunity for success.

This means that both the soldier and his or her parent organizations must be "ready" across a host of domains. And those readiness conditions must exist prior to those soldiers stepping onto that hypothetical objective because

Soldiers with Charlie Battery, 3rd Battalion, 7th Field Artillery Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, demonstrate the M777 Howitzer capabilities 19 October 2020 during a visit by Lt. Gen. S. K. Saini, vice chief of the Army Staff of the Indian Army, on Schofield Barracks East Range, Hawaii. (Photo by Spc. Jessica Scott, U.S. Army)

it will be far too late to build readiness once their boots hit the mud. Those soldiers must be physically and mentally prepared for the rigors of the operational environment. They must be emotionally and spiritually healthy, resilient, and capable of overcoming the challenges of combat. They must be personally ready to maintain their personal finances, awards, records, evaluations, and personal affairs while deployed. They cannot have anything hanging over their heads when they step onto that objective. They must know that their families are safe, cared for, and happy. Their equipment must be in top-notch condition, and they must have faith in their equipment, not only knowing how to use it but also knowing that it works and that they can rely on it when it counts. They must be trained and proficient in all of the skills and expertise they will need when they encounter the enemy. And perhaps most importantly, they must have faith in *each other*. This leads us to the critical discussion on the most important component of readiness that the division, as well as the Army, has been aggressively focused on, *trust*.

People and Trust

Although the components of readiness described above are certainly essential elements of organizational and soldier combat readiness, we understand that all of this is meaningless without trust. Trust is the intangible equalizer that makes or breaks organizational effectiveness and readiness. In many ways, our high OPTEMPO and overemphasis on training readiness has allowed a gap in trust to develop across the Army as we seemingly lost sight of a simple truth: our people are our greatest asset.

In line with the Army's efforts to reestablish people as our first priority, the 25th ID has taken great strides to reconnect with its soldiers in order to continue to cultivate a culture of trust that will indelibly increase its lethality and operational readiness. If its formations are stricken with corrosive diseases like sexual assault and harassment, racism, and suicide, how can it really be ready to fight tonight, even if its PSRT ratings look good on paper? If we do not have faith in each other, if we do not truly know each other

and really care for one another, how can we really perform as a cohesive team when it counts?

In the past several months, leaders at all levels have placed a renewed sense of urgency on tackling this concept. We have directed leaders at all levels to find ways to not only better manage OPTEMPO to alleviate the burden on lower-echelon leaders and reduce stress on soldiers and families, but we have also aggressively pursued leader-to-soldier engagement. This is more than just performing counseling or getting to know our soldiers. It is about reestablishing the right culture, a culture where every soldier, every leader, and every family member feels equally accountable to our greatest goal of achieving zero sexual assaults/harassments, zero equal opportunity incidents, and zero suicides.

In line with our HHQs and the Army-wide cultural change effort, we have implemented monthly readiness days and annual readiness weeks. These events aim to provide safe spaces for healthy and open dialogue, guided discussion, and improved leader-soldier engagement. The normal stresses of Army life, taken together with the constant bombardment of social crises in the past few months, has taken a toll on our formations. These events have helped to begin critical dialogue and have had a major impact on our formations. Leaders at all echelons continue to leverage creative solutions to provide quality engagements in their units. And while we recognize that these events alone cannot change the Army culture, they have helped serve as a catalyst for change. Small-unit leaders across the division recognized during these events that their soldiers need more of this type of engagement from them on a more routine basis; they helped all of us remember in the midst of all of these training requirements that our most important commitment is to each other.

In February, the division also conducted an inaugural squad leader forum. This event spanned several weeks and provided a full day of activities for all of the squad and section leaders from each battalion in the division. During these forums, squad leaders worked together to better understand what putting people first really means. They worked to better understand how we can better care for our soldiers, how we can build and maintain cohesive teams, and how we can overcome the identified impediments to be successful in those first two endeavors. This event served as a powerful opportunity for the division command team and leaders at echelon to hear the perspectives of our junior NCOs who have the most profound direct impact on our light fighters. Moving forward, the division is taking the feedback received during these forums and building a long-term certification process to better assist, educate, and enable squad leaders to better care for their soldiers.

Leader Development

A significant part of our effort to change culture is leader development strategy. In Field Manual 6-22, *Leader Development*, the Army defines leader development as "the deliberate, continuous, sequential, and progressive process—founded in Army Values—that grows Soldiers and Army Civilians into competent and confident leaders capable of decisive action. Leader development is achieved through the lifelong synthesis of knowledge, skills, and experiences gained through the training and educational opportunities in the institutional, operational, and self-development domains."[7] And while this definition certainly captures leader development as a process, we again ask how we can think about leader development as a mindset. In the article "Leadership Development: A Review in Context" by David V. Day, the author separates leader development and *leadership* development. He describes leader development as an investment in human capital, teaching-coaching-mentoring subordinates to prepare them for their current and future jobs.[8] But he also takes an interesting approach to thinking about *leadership* development, in which we might think about the effort in terms of investing in social capital.[9] This means that we focus on establishing a cultural mindset of growth vice purely focusing on individual skills and attributes. In this model, the organization becomes a leadership factory where subordinates are empowered and intrinsically motivated to add value to the development of their subordinates, peers, and superiors alike without formal direction to do so. In this model, the community of practice is the central focal point, not the individual. The organization as a whole becomes an environment in which growth and development are core values that supersede routine task accomplishment.

This new leadership development framework requires us to also distinguish between the manager and the leader. Managers are focused on transactional task accomplishment, organization performance, and meeting the routine demands of the job. In contrast, leaders are transformational; they drive their teams to achieve a culture of peak performance through idealized influence, intellectual

stimulation, individualized consideration, and inspirational motivation. They are true role models of the espoused values of the organization, they stimulate growth in their followers, they deeply empathize and care for their people, and they inspire those around them to achieve excellence. They rely firmly on the referent power earned though trust, strength-of-relationship, and rapport rather than the power granted by their rank, expertise, or ability to reward and punish. These leaders see leadership as a negotiated social contract between themselves and their followers rather than a mandate afforded by their position.

As a critical component of our effort to prioritize people in pursuit of attaining true readiness as described above, we again ask how the division serves as the "emergent layer" to help shape this culture of leadership development. Like this upper layer of the jungle, the division cultivates the soil for regeneration, it provides the sunlight, water, and nutrients that enable life to flourish, and it creates the ideal conditions for the layers below to do the same.

In the 25th ID, the division has unequivocally placed people as its number one priority, with leadership development as a significant part of that effort. From the commanding general down, leaders at all echelons have provided enormous command emphasis on their leadership development programs. This shift in culture has manifested itself across the operational, institutional, and self-development domains. Our light fighters enjoy countless operational growth opportunities while conducting partnership engagements in the Pacific and in Hawaii. Our multinational training exchanges, training events, and exercises routinely provide our soldiers with high-impact and unique experiences. In addition to CONUS-based schools and online training, our Hawaii-based Lightning Academy provides our soldiers with ease of access to a multitude of institutional development opportunities including but not limited to the Small Unit Ranger Tactics program, the Jungle Operations Training Course, and the Air Assault Course.[10]

Further, staff training programs and leader professional development at echelon have significantly improved tactical-level expertise and operational/strategic-level awareness. Leaders are sharing developmental readings, initiating professional dialogues, and teaching/coaching/mentoring their junior leaders. But most encouraging is that soldiers and leaders alike are taking the initiative to do the same through self-development and developing their subordinates without HHQ direction. This infectious culture of *leadership* development and a growth mindset has steadily become a foundational pillar of this division. As a learning organization, we continue to rethink how we are truly prioritizing our people to help our units and the Army remain ready to meet the increasingly complex demands of the future operational environment.

Conclusion

The rapid pace of disruption in the modern era has taught us one critical lesson: we must change to survive. The Army continues to adapt to the demands of the operational environment, and like the jungle continuously evolves, we too must endeavor to deliberately change in order to maintain our operational relevance and capability. We have to change the way we train and fight, the way we think and plan, and the way we act and treat each other. At the 25th ID, we are inviting new innovative approaches across all formations and practices to help our division remain the premier fighting force in the Pacific theater and the Army's foremost jungle experts. ■

Notes

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Student brigade staff members, Maj. Kyle Stillwell (*left*), Maj. Jon Macrae, and Maj. Nate Dams (*right*) gather around a map to analyze combat reports before making a tactical decision 14 May 2019 during a classroom exercise at the Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Strong relationships developed during the school can be leveraged at the tactical and operational levels by cohort staffing. (Photo by Shane Perkins, Command and General Staff School)

A Value Proposition

Cohort Staff

Maj. Jerard Paden, U.S. Army

It became apparent that an effective network involves much more than relaying data. A true network starts with robust communications connectivity, but also leverages physical and cultural proximity, shared purpose, established decision-making processes, personal relationships, and trust. Ultimately, a network is defined by how well it allows its members to see, decide, and effectively act. But transforming a traditional military structure into a truly flexible, empowered network is a difficult process.

—Gen. Stanley McChrystal

The Army can improve the effectiveness of its field grade officers and the organizations they work for by changing how it builds seminars at Command and General Staff College (CGSC). The *cohort staff* concept would build CGSC seminars based on unit of next assignment and then deliver the seminar to a single corps or division. It capitalizes on the relationships developed over the course of ten months and prolongs them for use at the tactical and operational levels. Large organizations such as corps and divisions face many issues, but good team dynamics and external networks can address those issues, and cohort staffing meets those needs.

The Trouble with Large Organizations

Gen. Stanley McChrystal observed that the strength of a network is the strength of an organization. A network is "a usually informally interconnected group or association of persons."[1] Networks are a means to leverage individual relationships toward a common end. Teams, by contrast, are built on formal relationships and are often obligatory. You may not get to decide who is on your team, but you do get to decide who is in your network.

This distinction between a team and a network is important when dealing with large organizations. Large organizations are those in which individuals infrequently interact with each other because they are rarely involved in joint production.[2] Those organizations are measured more by their structure than the number of people assigned. Large organizations merit increased scrutiny because they have several correlated issues such as degradation of communication, degradation of trust, and degradation of efficiency.[3] Teams and networks can help mitigate these problems.

Part of managing large organizations with diverse requirements is the formation of teams that can manage the work.[4] However, the creation of teams alone does not solve the communication, trust, and efficiency gaps common in large organizations. Teams can develop poor internal relationships and will usually underperform unless a team leader takes corrective actions such as setting a positive example or enforcing collaboration.[5] The interaction between multiple teams confounds the issue. Just as one team has its own dynamics, teams that interact with each other may compete for resources, the boss's attention, prestige, or any number of perceived benefits. Intermediate leaders, those responsible for multiple teams, balance out these issues and can even improve the individual efficiency of those teams.[6]

Commanders Need Better Teams

Corps and divisions need strong teams. A fiscal year 2020 Mission Command Training Program report cites several reasons that high-level staffs fail. Prominent among these is a struggle to create shared understanding that stems from a lack of practice working together.[7]

The Army defines shared understanding as "a common approach to the conduct of operations, a common professional language, and a common understanding of the principles of mission command."[8] Commanders and their staffs establish a common understanding by working through the operations process and training their staff. However, it is difficult to assess a staff outside of a full-scale exercise. A company commander might take his or her soldiers to a range to gauge rifle marksmanship, but divisions and corps find it much harder to execute realistic collective training. These staff training opportunities are scarce at corps and division levels because they require significant effort across the organization. Simulated operations require the use of a tactical battle rhythm, an opposing force, a response cell, a planning cycle, and an execution. Often, the first time many staffs fully simulate operations is during a Warfighter exercise. This places commanders in a highly visible, and expensive, exercise with relatively little understanding of where their organization stands. Division and corps commanders must fight for those touchpoints to assess their organizations.

The frequency of turnover compounds the difficulties in building shared understanding. The shelf life on shared understanding is short. Units that conduct

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Warfighter exercises in September and October (immediately after the summer turnover) tend to underperform those who have worked together longer because the teams are constantly in flux.[9] Teams struggle to learn their group dynamics after the summer move cycle, when the teaching and learning process begins anew.

to address the training needs of all their teams, much less collective training of the organization writ large. Cohort staffing provides a COS with a team that has already walked through Bruce Tuckman's forming, storming, norming, and performing model of group development.[11] Though this team is relatively

"The Army calls members of networks by many names: mentor, battle buddy, friend, connection, classmate, etc. The usefulness of a network is in leveraging those relationships for the good of the organization."

These two challenges are interrelated. Staffs struggle to have shared understanding because they struggle to practice together. Their practice exercises are not always as effective as desired because the gain in shared understanding does not last very long. The current method is not producing the desired results. The Army needs better teams on staff, and it needs to generate them in a different way.

Cohort Staffing Builds Better Teams

CGSC builds seminars of sixteen individuals. Over the course of ten months, the groups learn how to participate in planning and execute nine military decision-making process exercises. CGSC balances each seminar to include individuals from many different branches. This balance injects expertise, showcases branch relationships in planning, and exposes students to alternative points of view. The groups learn to communicate, build trust, and increase both individual and group efficiency through these military decision-making process cycles. However, upon graduation, the Army breaks up the teams, dispersing the individuals to different posts and gaining commands. There is an opportunity for change.

Individuals are not as important as teams in terms of organizational effectiveness. A team of individual high performers will not necessarily be as useful as a team of average performers who have developed good team dynamics.[10] The Army recognizes the importance of team dynamics; much of a division chief of staff's (COS) duties consist of training his or her subordinate teams. However, the chiefs are challenged

small compared to the rest of the staff, it represents a positive step toward shared understanding and group practice. Cohort staffing provides a team that is performing and battle ready—a team immediately useful to the COS and to the commander.

Good Networks Improve Organizations

The difference between a team and a network is the degree of obligation. Teams are formal structures, often purpose built to solve problems. Networks are voluntary by nature and often cross formal boundaries set by organizations. The Army calls members of networks by many names: mentor, battle buddy, friend, connection, classmate, etc. The usefulness of a network is in leveraging those relationships for the good of the organization. To add value, networks must combat the flaws of large organizations, namely poor communication, flagging trust, and inefficiency.

Networks improve communication. As an organization grows, the quality of information transfer degrades.[12] Larger organizations struggle to communicate relevant information, and cooperative communication generally decreases.[13] This degradation is why commanders craft vision statements, hold formations, and talk directly to soldiers. It is also the reason a phone call is better than an email and why counseling is most effective when done face-to-face. Personal networks that operate alongside official channels increase the quality of communications for two reasons. First, shared relationships increase the willingness to share information.[14] This does not mean that people are deliberately holding information back,

Leaders of the 42nd Infantry Division, New York Army National Guard, conduct a rehearsal of concept drill 4 October 2017 during a Warfighter exercise at Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania. Cohort staffing can improve a unit's communication, trust, and efficiency at the tactical and operational levels. (Photo by Capt. Jean Marie Kratzer, U.S. Army National Guard)

only that they will be more talkative with people they are comfortable with. Second, the communication that occurs supplements official channels and therefore broadens the situational understanding that the organization possesses.[15] By getting high-quality information to a broad audience, effective networks assist the organization in achieving shared understanding.

Networks improve trust. The Army identifies trust at the heart of the profession of arms.[16] Trust is the perception that others will not take advantage of a person's vulnerability.[17] There exists a professional trust that all men and women in service to the Army have the best interests of the organization at heart. However, there is a difference in vertical trust in a leader and horizontal trust in a peer. Hierarchical organizations such as the Army place great emphasis on vertical trust, and this can sometimes degrade horizontal trust.[18] Networks, by contrast, are neither horizontal nor vertical because individual relationships determine their character regardless of formal boundaries. Trust is generally higher in small groups.[19] Therefore, those things that soldiers regulate in their formal relationships can find resolution with the informal ones in their networks.[20] Research has yet to identify a concrete link between individual trust and organizational-level trust. However, evidence exists that people who have learned to trust each other are more apt to cooperate in general.[21] In this way, soldiers with supportive networks will tend to support others in the organization and benefit the team.

Networks improve efficiency. Larger organizations enable people to sink into the background and not contribute as much as they otherwise would in a more visible setting.[22] The term for this behavior is "social loafing." This means that the quality of individuals in active roles must increase, and savvy leaders will accrue connections up and down the chain of command to get the support they need to be successful. If leaders can get those people "in the circle," then those active relationships can do work for the organization. The adage that you are only as good as who you know is a tired one, but there is no denying that well-connected people can boost productivity.[23] At battalion level and above, officer effectiveness is based on the

ability to create relationships and leverage them to solve problems.[24] When people commit to working together, regardless of the organizational chart, their activity increases. They can circumvent loafing behavior and decrease the inefficiency inherent in large organizations.

None of this is to say that teams do not achieve these objectives. A good team has open communication, members trust and benefit from each other, and they bolster each other's efficiency by focusing on the problems at hand.[25] Networks do not have a monopoly on organizational effectiveness. However, networks are important pieces of large organizations because the combination of multiple teams produces a complexity that is difficult to manage. Cross-team relationships become just as important as team-internal relationships and, when working for the good of the organization, aid the efforts of team leaders and commanders alike.

Cohort Staff Builds Better Networks

Networks and teamwork can be transformative, but the truth is that some team dynamics are poor. Some teams will have high performance, others relatively less, and often it takes an external presence to modify poor team dynamics.[26] The bonds of professionalism will keep a dysfunctional team together, but no one wants to be a part of a struggling group for long. There is certainly evidence that working with people you dislike negatively impacts performance, especially in hierarchical organizations where it is hard to avoid those people.[27] However, cohort staffing mitigates the probability of poor group dynamics because it builds relationships differently than those built in the operational force. The difference is the effect of psychological safety.

Most people understand the concept of trust, but psychological safety is a longer view of teamwork and network building. Psychological safety is the ability to act in a certain way without perceived blows to status, self-image, or career.[28] Where trust is the feeling that *others* will not take advantage of *an individual's* vulnerability, psychological safety is the feeling that *a person* does not need to regulate *his or her* vulnerability. Psychological safety is a group dynamic and develops through shared learning experiences. Said differently, trust is about others doing the right thing, and safety is about learning to let one's guard down. Any environment can generate psychological safety, but learning environments are especially good at it. Part of the reason is the mediating effect of the instructor. Properly trained, instructors can improve student-to-student relationships and mitigate poor social behaviors.[29] This is not to say that all instructors mediate relationships well nor that non-instructors cannot do so. But consider that instructors have fewer competing priorities than commanders and that the academic setting is much more malleable than the operational environment. Consider also that one of the best ways to increase psychological safety is through the small-group dynamic.[30]

The Army is moving to small-group instruction wherever it can. Smaller groups enable people to communicate with fewer inhibitions, and they are generally more psychologically safe—a big deal when it comes to collaboration and learning together.[31] The idea that people who put themselves "out there" learn more has considerable face value and bears out in the research. Communicating with openness, without fear of moderating oneself, is a contributor to team success.[32] A high level of psychological safety may not equal success, but it is an indicator of a good relationship. Good relationships, in turn, increase the probability that individuals will continue to work together even if they are no longer on the same team.

Small-group learning environments build effective teams and develop the relationships that lead to networks. The Army has invested in face-to-face CGSC, even during the COVID pandemic, because there is something valuable in getting a few people in the same room to wrestle with education. The Army diminishes that value by dispersing the students at the end of CGSC when it might preserve or prolong that value by sending those seminars to the same organization.

Not every relationship carries the same weight. There is no requirement to like the people in a network, though friendship tends to increase communication quality.[33] Leaders would be foolish to burn bridges with each other when those relationships might be useful. Ten months of practicing staff work, regardless of personal feelings, can serve individuals and organizations well.

Why the Division and Corps?

So, what organization is right? CGSC balances seminar composition by bringing together the

different branches of the Army. This balance is important, but it also limits what organizations could benefit. Under certain circumstances, a brigade might be able to receive sixteen personnel of different branches at once. However, consistency of personnel requirements suggests that divisions or corps are more appropriate. Divisions and corps are also appropriate given the Army's refocus on the division and corps as tactical organizations. Finally, divisions and corps have the advantage of size. The gaining unit has the flexibility to disperse the group to the subordinate battalions and brigades; the Army needs majors at many levels. A corps or division would still reap the benefits of the network because networks are all about external and informal relationships that endure across organizational lines.

Have We Done This Before?

The concept of packaging teams is not new, and academia has experimented with the concept for decades. The "house," or more modern "pod" system, is a regular construct where students stay generally with the same class throughout their education. The effect is that students feel less isolated and produce better quality results.[34] Even students that are not traditionally "cohortian," such as those writing PhD dissertations, have benefitted from the model with an increase in learning and completion rates.[35] Many civilian academic organizations have embraced the cohort system, and it remains a viable choice today.

Military experiences with cohorts are infrequent, and the British are responsible for what little experimentation there is. In 1914, the standing British

Army was filled out with "Pals battalions" that enabled recruits to serve in locally formed units. Potential officers received commissions, and the battalions trained together prior to deployment to Europe. The organizations were not entirely local, and the War Department directed many of the men who volunteered and received commissions to fill out other units.[36] The impact of these cohorts will never be understood because a majority served in the Somme. This concentrated the catastrophic losses in the towns from which these battalions hailed, and the War Department transitioned to conscription for the remainder of the war.

A second, different British experiment was less intentional. The "Travelling Circus" describes a habit used in their army up through the twentieth century. When commanders received a promotion, they had the option of bringing their staff with them to the next level.[37] This preserved the group dynamic, but it ruined the organization that the commander had just left. It also often meant pushing out staff officers at the next higher level to make room.

Cohorts bear some resemblance to the Revolutionary War through the Civil War practice of recruiting forces

Infantrymen of the 10th Battalion, East Yorkshire Regiment, march 28 June 1916 near Doullens, France, three days before the start of the Battle of the Somme. The heavy losses sustained by the "Pals battalions," had significant effects on the British towns in which they were formed, and the British Army ended the practice of using cohort units with the beginning of conscription. (Photo from the Imperial War Museum © IWM Q 743)

Students plan for a division-level defense in a contested region 5 February 2019 during the Advanced Operations Course at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The cohort staff concept would build CGSC seminars based on unit of next assignment and then deliver the seminar to a single corps or division. (Photo by Danielle Powell, Army University Press)

from particular regions. However, the resemblance ends there. Standing armies did not receive deliberately trained cohorts of officers. Commanders were either local elite who had handpicked their staff or those who had experience in the Army. The Revolutionary and Civil Wars were both times of crisis, making officer development and the battlefield one and the same.

Cohorts already exist in the Army, though they serve a different function. Human Resources Command (HRC) uses the cohort model to manage officers by year group, but the size of the cohort means that very little, if any, relationships develop because of year group cohort. It remains an administrative and statistical tool, not a developmental one. The truth of the matter is that there is not enough data. Cohort staffing is most like the Pals battalions of World War I, whose primary purpose was recruitment, not combat effectiveness. The lives lost at the Somme and subsequent dilution of the officer and enlisted teams counterbalanced any positive inertia to have come from it. The Army has not done this before, but innovation is fundamental to war, and innovators seize opportunity.

Recognizing an Opportunity

There is a direct correlation between strong relationships and performance, and those relationships provide a clear return on investment. However, it is not economical to stand up an organization that develops three-person teams with salient learning experiences that feature shared goals, shared knowledge, and shared respect mediated by a socially nuanced instructor. Perhaps command teams are worth that investment, but the Army at large must work within existing means. Good stewardship means making the most of available resources, and CGSC is a partially tapped resource. The following steps provide a broad scheme to test cohort staffing.

Step 1: Gather information. HRC controls the Assignment Interactive Module 2 (AIM2) and assigns

movers against units. HRC identifies two to three test divisions and one test corps and obtains their personnel requirements for the outbound resident CGSC class. HRC relays these requirements to the Combined Arms Center (CAC). The CAC generates straw-man small-group seminars that place the needs of one organization within the same seminar and communicates the numbers to HRC. All prospective students within that seminar will move to the same corps or division after CGSC.

Step 2: Generate buy-in. HRC requests volunteers for corps and divisional preferences based on the straw-man requirement. HRC selects from among the volunteers and supplies the names to the CAC to fill small groups. HRC informs the students from the outset of their participation in the pilot. In return for participation, the volunteers know their division or corps of assignment (though not necessarily the station or job) prior to arrival at CGSC. Ideally, corps and divisions can guarantee the station, but this is not required. HRC removes the selected students from the AIM2 marketplace for the post-CGSC summer move cycle.

Step 3: Let it happen. Place the volunteers into their seminars. Organize seminars as a population A, going to division; a population B, going to corps; and a population C, control with normal AIM2 participation. To control the experiment, there should be no alteration to instruction between seminars and no special training given to the instructors of the different populations.

Step 4: Follow-up. Execute surveys of the students involved, as well as the gaining organizations, over the span of several years. This research will take several pilot CGSC cycles to become statistically meaningful. Ultimately, answer the question on whether the relationships built in CGSC translate to gains in retention, job satisfaction, and job performance.

Conclusion

Large organizations have the cards stacked against them. Their size reduces the effectiveness of communication, makes trust harder to generate, and decreases the effectiveness of many individuals. Good teamwork combats these trends in smaller organizations, but large organizations must manage multiple teams. This places a premium on good team dynamics, and the role of leaders in large organizations is to develop those teams. However, good teamwork alone does not counteract the weight of large organizations. Leaders need networks. Networks improve communication channels, foster trust, and increase the effectiveness of organizations. Networks perform outside and alongside teams to keep large organizations operating at high standards.

Cohort staffing builds good teams, and it builds good networks. CGSC is an ideal venue for cohort staffing because it trains seminars over the course of ten months in precisely the activities that corps and divisions can benefit from. It does so in a small-group format under the supervision of an instructor. This combination builds practiced teams that communicate well, trust each other, and maximize efficiency.

Therefore, it is appropriate that the Army intentionally build and then use CGSC seminars in the operational force. Cohort staffing requires no alteration to the program of instruction. It can answer relevant research questions on the nature of long-term teams and networks. It can improve the effectiveness of corps and division staffs. Implementing a trial of cohort staffing is simply good stewardship. ■

Notes

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Paul Lowry et al., "The Impact of Group Size and Social Presence on Small-Group Communication," *Small Group Research* 37, no. 6 (December 2006): 657. The authors demonstrate that communication in smaller groups scores higher than large group communication in appropriateness, openness, richness, and accuracy; Dennis Devine et al., "Teams in Organizations: Prevalence, Characteristics, and Effectiveness," *Small Group Research* 30, no. 6 (December 1999): 699–703, https://doi.org/10.1177/104649649903000602. The authors examine the prevalence and effectiveness of different types of teams and conclude that larger teams increase conflict and reduce performance.

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8. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, July 2019), 1-8. Shared understanding is often included alongside the concept of mutual trust and collaborative communication. It is an active effort.

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12. Lowry, "The Impact of Group Size and Social Presence," 657. Smaller groups score higher on communication quality.

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14. Wing Chow and Lai Chan, "Social Network, Social Trust and Shared Goals in Organizational Knowledge Sharing," *Information and Management* 45 (2008): 463, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.im.2008.06.007. The authors show a positive correlation between the size and quality of a social network and the willingness to share information.

15. ADP 6-0, *Mission Command*, 1-8. Shared understanding is achieved through collaboration. Collaboration is multiple people and organizations working together toward a common goal. Collaboration extends beyond the Army team.

16. Charles Allen and William Braun III, "Trust: Implications for the Army Profession," *Military Review* 93, no. 5 (September 2013): 83. The authors demonstrate that the Army requires, and has generally sustained, trust at the individual and organizational level.

17. Amy Edmondson, "Psychological Safety, Trust, and Learning in Organizations: A Group-Level Lens," in *Trust and Distrust in Organizations: Dilemmas and Approaches,* ed. Roderick M. Kramer and Karen S. Cook (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2013), 239–72. The author defines trust as others-oriented and that it is related to feeling vulnerable to the actions of others.

18. Laporta et al., "Trust in Large Organizations," 337. The authors independently test earlier research from Fukuyama and show that vertical trust in an organization is at odds with horizontal trust between family and peer groups.

19. Roderick Kramer, "Trust and Distrust in Organizations: Emerging Perspectives, Enduring Questions," *Annual Review of Psychology* 50 (1999): 585. The author cites previous work by Kaori Sato (1988) and others that show a decline in trust as group size increases.

20. Patricia Sias and Erin Gallagher, "Developing, Maintaining, and Disengaging from Workplace Friendships," in *Friends and Enemies in Organizations: A Work Psychology Perspective*, ed. Rachel Morrison and Sarah Wright (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), 80. The authors argue that workplace friendship networks increase employee problem resolution, satisfaction, and retention.

21. Kramer, "Trust and Distrust," 582. The author conducts a literature review of trust in organizations and conclude that people who have learned to trust other individuals will become more disposed to trust people in general. This is because trust becomes a social decision heuristic that reduces the psychological cost of continued trust; Sias and Gallagher, "Workplace Friendships," 81. The authors show that friendships that arise in the organization tend to increase a person's identity with that organization. This leads people with many friends in an organization to engage in more altruistic behavior with respect to the organization.

22. Lowry, "The Impact of Group Size and Social Presence," 637. As group size increases, so does social loafing. This degrades

the effectiveness of individuals because they perceive diminished responsibility and therefore do not need to contribute as much.

23. Oriana Bandiera, Iwan Barankay, and Imran Rasul, "Social Connections and Incentives in the Workplace: Evidence from Personnel Data," *Econometrica* 77, no. 4 (July 2009): 1073, https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA6496. The authors' experiments show that increased social connectivity to managers increases individual performance; Bertucci et al., "The Impact of Size on Achievement," 269. Social support, in the form of connections, increases achievement, persistence, problem-solving, and many other factors associated with high performance.

24. Terron Wharton, "How to Fail as a Major," Army.mil, 23 October 2018, accessed 15 June 2021, https://www.army.mil/article/212870/how_to_fail_as_a_major. The author argues that most problems are solved by discussion between peers and that officers must cultivate relationships to be successful.

25. Aki Aapoaja et al., "The Characteristics of and Cornerstones for Creating Integrated Teams," *International Journal of Managing Projects in Business* 6, no. 4 (2013): 699, https://doi.org/10.1108/IJMPB-09-2012-0056. The authors develop characteristics of good project teams for the construction industry. They communicate knowledge freely, they do not take advantage of one another because they are in the "same boat," and they share individual objectives which increases the likelihood of achievement.

26. Connie Gersick and J. R. Hackman, "Habitual Routines in Task-Performing Groups," *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes* 47, no. 1 (1990): 93, https://doi.org/10.1016/0749-5978(90)90047-D. The authors suggest several methods an external authority might use to intervene in struggling teams, especially those teams whose habits operate contrary to achieving the team's goal.

27. Giuseppe Labianca and Daniel Brass, "Exploring the Social Ledger: Negative Relationships and Negative Asymmetry in Social Networks in Organizations," *Academy of Management Review* 31, no. 3 (2006): 603, https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2006.21318920. The authors indicate that hierarchical organizations pose their own issues with bad relationships because subordinates often cannot remove themselves from those relationships.

28. Edmondson, "Psychological Safety," 241. The author distinguishes the concept of trust from psychological safety. Psychological safety is a self-focused attribute of groups rather than an others-focused attribute.

29. Joseph Allen et al., "Observations of Effective Teacher-Student Interactions in Secondary School Classrooms: Predicting Student Achievement with the Classroom Assessment Scoring System—Secondary," *School Psychology Review* 42, no. 1 (2013): 76–98, https://doi.org/10.1080/02796015.2013.12087492. The authors describe the impact that instructors have on student-student relationships in terms of fostering appropriate team development. Effective instructors improve teamwork between students, not just between the teacher and student.

30. Edmondson, "Psychological Safety," 270. The limits of psychological safety is the transition between large organizations (where people only infrequently work together) and small teams (approximately twenty for this study).

31. Ibid., 242. The author conducts a literature review and agrees with Edgar H. Schein that psychological safety thwarts learning anxiety.

32. Sehoon Kim, Heesu Lee, and Timothy Paul Connerton, "How Psychological Safety Affects Team Performance: Mediating Role of Efficacy and Learning Behavior," *Frontiers in Psychology* (July 2020), https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01581. The authors demonstrate that psychological safety is positively correlated with learning activity. In turn, learning activity is also positively correlated with team efficacy.

33. Sias and Gallagher, "Workplace Friendships." 81. Coworkers with relationships external to a working relationship will communicate with higher quality in terms of relevant information and accuracy of transfer.

34. Michael Brennan, "Fostering Community through the House System at Most Holy Trinity Catholic School," *Journal of Catholic Education* 15, no. 2 (March 2013): 348, http://dx.doi.org/10.15365/joce.1502112013. Implementation of a house system resulted in an increase in the depth of student-student relationships as well as a vertical connectedness with students no longer in their class (team).

35. Paul Burnett, "The Supervision of Doctoral Dissertations Using a Collaborative Cohort Model," *Counselor Education and Supervision* 39 (September 1999): 49, https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1556-6978.1999.tb01789.x. The cohort model reduced isolation, improved completion rates, increased knowledge levels, and improved product (proposal and dissertation) quality.

36. Peter Simkins, "Pals Battalions," International Encyclopedia of the First World War, last updated 29 March 2018, accessed 15 June 2021, https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/pals_battalions. The War Department struggled to accommodate the influx of volunteers. Following the Somme, the losses in these units devastated the towns from which they hailed and the War Department moved to conscription only.

37. William Slim, "Higher Command in War" (April 1952), in *Military Review* 70, no. 5 (May 1990). Sir William Slim addressed the Command and General Staff College class of 1952 and asked that they always be wary of the size of their headquarters. He related the British "Flying Circus" and warned against stealing too much capability from subordinate commands.

Striking the Balance between Contiguous and Noncontiguous Areas of Operation at the Division and Corps Levels

Maj. Graham Williams, U.S. Army

For Army planners, conducting the military decision-making process (MDMP) is often an exercise in chaos. Planners simultaneously gather tools, dissect orders, update running estimates, and conduct numerous briefs. One of the most important, and often overlooked, steps of MDMP is the method planners use to divide areas of operation (AO). Corps and division planners receive a tract of land from their higher command and are asked to plan within the confines of specified boundaries. As planners progress through course-of-action development, they begin to parcel out this land into seemingly logical slices. Simply put, dividing AOs becomes a form of terrain management whereby planners must consider, in time and space, how the battle will progress within their assigned AO.

While lines on maps have meaning for planners and subordinate units, they are not immovable objects set in stone. Parceling AOs must be a dynamic and rapidly changing process that reflects the tempo of large-scale combat. Although a simple task, the way in which planners conduct terrain management could have significant implications on the conduct of warfighting. Planners must understand that managing terrain is a dynamic and ever-changing process that can both enable and hinder how units conduct large-scale ground combat. Doctrine helps us understand when linear and nonlinear or contiguous and noncontiguous AOs are optimal. Psychological concepts illuminate why planners might take a simplistic approach when creating AOs, and history illuminates some examples of terrain management during large-scale combat.

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Contiguous and Noncontiguous Framework Doctrine

The definition of a contiguous framework from Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*, highlights the propensity for planners to think linearly (see figure 1, page 105).[1] The contiguous framework focuses on the retention of terrain when there are linear obstacles along the forward edge of the battle area. The example given in FM 3-0 is a river. A river acts as a natural obstacle between friendly and hostile forces that restricts the movement of combatants. Logically, this makes sense for the deep and close fight. If the enemy is on the other side of the river, the friendly force's security area is on the near side and the fire support coordination line is tied to the terrain. But the way in which planners divide the AO for the deep and close

fight might not make sense for the remainder of the AO. How each unit's AO is crafted should be dictated by other factors such as threat, physical terrain, and human terrain (e.g., large population areas).

Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, *Operations*, expounds on contiguous and noncontiguous AOs. Simply put, when a boundary separates units, they are contiguous. If subordinate commands do not share a boundary, they are noncontiguous.[2] One of the most important characteristics of noncontiguous AOs is that the higher headquarters retains responsibility for areas not assigned to subordinate units.[3] Originally from FM 3-0, figure 2 (on page 106) is an example of corps planners partitioning their AO and assigned division AOs based on the noncontiguous framework. In this representation, corps planners have accepted that they are responsible for the land in and around the division and around the consolidation area. Therefore, if a threat developed in these areas, the corps would have to dedicate information collection assets, fires, or combat power against it.



CSA–Corps support area
DOD–Department of Defense
DSA–Division support area
FSCL–Fire support coordination line
NSC–National Security Council
O-LOC–Operational line of communications
POTUS–President of the United States
S-LOC–Strategic line of communications

(Figure from Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*)

Figure 1. Contiguous Corps Area of Operations

At the corps and division levels, there is a propensity to think linearly when assigning AOs. As planners begin to understand the problem during MDMP, they take a reductionist and linear approach, using contiguous boundaries when drawing lines on a map to separate AOs. Typically, the division reconnaissance elements own a large swath of land closest to the enemy, followed by maneuver units responsible for AOs around population or key terrain-focused objectives. More times than not, these boundaries rarely change through the conduct of operations during the combat phases, or the boundaries that change are those that have units engaged in the deep and close fight (e.g., during Phase III, Dominate).[4] While the lead elements go on the offensive to conduct wet-gap crossings, the maneuver enhancement brigade is tasked to secure a tract of terrain in the division rear.

According to the Center for the Army Lessons Learned, the division's plan for the rear area is generally a fait accompli. When corps and division planners array forces in a linear fashion (contiguous), they relinquish control of that land and attempt to manage it through the subordinate headquarters.[5] While the maneuver enhancement brigade might be able to control operations in an assigned AO, there are

certain tasks associated with the rear area that require division or corps execution.[6]

There could be any number of reasons why divisions make these planning pitfalls. First is the propensity to think linearly as planners conduct mission analysis and course-of-action development. Second is that the greatest threat is in the deep and close fight. The corps and division focus resources on the greatest threat and contribute to facilitating the next maneuver action. The division does this with fires, information collection, and combat power.



CSA–Corps support area
DOD–Department of Defense
DSA–Division support area
JSOA–Joint special operations area
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(Figure from Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*)

Figure 2. Noncontiguous Corps Area of Operations

Applicable Theories

Planners are problem solvers guided by doctrine, experience, and collaboration. When planners begin MDMP, they try to "make sense of the mess," or manage the tremendous amount of information provided by their higher command. There are challenges planners have with managing the deluge of information and turning it into a coherent and cogent order. There are several cognitive factors that influence how planners solve the problem of terrain management. Three important principles are system thinking, multifaceted problems, and reductionism.

System thinking. Cognitively, planners are at odds with themselves. They try to reduce information to its simplest form and find ways to relay it to others while attempting to understand it themselves. During mission analysis, planners tend to compartmentalize small problems causing them to lose sight of larger problems; for example, dividing planning efforts by warfighting function.[7] Engineers concern themselves with terrain, the maneuver planner focuses on friendly maneuver elements, the intelligence planner immerses himself or herself with the enemy, and so on. This could result in planners unaware of a system's combined properties that are more distinct than its parts.[8]

Nowhere is this more evident than with AOs. Planners tend to view AOs as linear uncomplicated problems. But planners should consider an AO as a system and a combination of multiple nonlinear relationships that should not be overlooked. Nonlinear relationships are difficult for the brain to comprehend; therefore, planners tend to shy away from them.[9] Dividing the AO for terrain management is one of the most critical steps

that shapes how the battle will progress. By not viewing an AO as a system and understanding its interrelations, planners are placing arbitrary lines on a map that lack context.

Multifaceted problems. When planners examine the orders from their higher headquarters, they wrestle with multifaceted problems. According to Dietrich Dorner, there are certain ways humans deal with multifaceted problems that apply to planners. These include organizing a list of problems, deconstructing complex situations, focusing on solving central problems, ranking ordering problems in terms of importance and urgency, and delegating.[10]

> Areas of operation (AO) involve human terrain, physical terrain, weather, and the interaction between all elements within. But when planners struggle to understand multifaceted problems, they tend to think of AOs in a linear and undynamic manner.

A unit's AO is also a multifaceted problem. AOs involve human terrain, physical terrain, weather, and the interaction between all elements within. But when planners struggle to understand multifaceted problems, they tend to think of AOs in a linear and undynamic manner. The unit is given a portion of land to manage and planners begin to segment off sections for subordinate units. Generally, planners segment AOs based on easily recognizable terrain. For example, a main service route is a clear and present dividing line between units. Furthermore, while the boundaries in the deep might change, the rear area hardly changes.

During MDMP, examples from Dorner's ways humans deal with multifaceted problems emerge. Regarding terrain management as a simple and "low-threat" problem is evidence of deconstructing a complex situation. Other examples are the division focusing on solving central problems by tasking a subordinate unit to manage the land. Planners also rank order effort by assigning main and supporting efforts.

Reductionism. Reductionism is another way in which planners seek to understand systems and multifaceted problems. Reductionism equates the rules humans use to discern objects, people, and things to better understand perspective, reduce ambiguity, and construct visual worlds.[11] The goal of reductionism is to allow individuals to extract the same essential information from the environment.[12] When planners conduct terrain management, it is an attempt to reduce the terrain to a simplistic form that is intended for a wider audience such as commanders and subordinate units. These audience members do not have the same level of understanding of the problem that the planners do, so they focus on the importance of the reduced parts. By reducing an AO into parts, there is the potential that planners, and the wider audience, lose the understanding of the part's additive relations with one another. Therefore, each section of the AO loses its significance in its own right.[13] The doctrinal contiguous AO framework is an example of this. When planners reduce AOs into contiguous sections, there is a greater potential to lose perspective across the division's AO. It is not until combat commences (e.g., current operations) that planners are able to reconstruct the AO based on actions that transpire in the subordinate's areas. It is also here where the dynamic nature of the AO presents itself.

Historical Examples

While it is difficult to find historical examples that exemplify these points, other examples show the dynamic nature of AOs and the ability of units to adapt to the changing operational environment. These include Operation Market Garden, the German army's actions in the eastern front during World War II, and the conflict in Afghanistan.

In the article "Reconsidering Rear Area Security," Mark Gilchrist claims that Operation Market Garden is a lens for how planners must reconsider concepts of rear area security that exist in modern war.[14] Gilchrist


Operation
Market Garden
The Allied Plan
Allied armor units advance
Military symbol of deployed troops
Urquhart
0 1 2 5 10 km
Almere
Nunspeet
Harderwijk
Epe
Ermelo
Putten
Deventer
Apeldoorn
Amersfoort
Barneveld
Zutphen
Zeist
Voudenberg
Scherpenzeel
Driebergen-Rijsenburg
52
Hakewell-Smith
Ede
1
Urquhart
Veenendaal
Wolfheze
Doesburg
Oosterbeek
Arnhem
Wageningen
Renkum
Culemborg
Westervoort
Duiven
Didam
1 Po
Sosabowski
Elst
Zevenaar
Bemmel
Druten
Geldermalsen
Beneden-Leeuwen
Beuningen
Nijmegen
Wijchen
Groesbeek
Kranenburg
Kleve
82
Gavin
Malden
Grave
's-Hertogenbosch
Cuijk
Gennep
Goch
Vught
Heeswijk Dinther
Uden
Veghel
Schijndel
Boekel
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Gemert-Bakel
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Taylor
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Rest
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Valkenswaard
Fanningen
Reuver
XII
Richie
XXX
Horrocks
Budel
Weert
Lommel
Harmont-Achel
Heythuysen
Hasten
Lille St. Hubert
VIII
O'Connor
Roermond
NEDERLANDE
DEUTSCHLAND

argues that nonlinear and noncontiguous concepts resonate with "great captains of history."[15] What is often lacking is a concept that connects the fighting echelon, the logistics, and the command-and-control nodes that enable nonlinear and noncontiguous battlespace.[16] The operators who planned Operation Market Garden made significant assumptions about the flaws in how the Wehrmacht operated in its rear area. What Allied planners did not expect was the rapid response of German army with the emerging airborne threat in its rear. The German rear was not a static and separate combat operation occurring in forward areas.[17] Gilchrist explains that Gen. Matthew Ridgeway acknowledged that the Allied assumptions about how the Wehrmacht operated during previous withdrawals proved to be incorrect.[18] Gilchrist also warned that planners must understand the gaps and implications of noncontiguous battle spaces if they hope to mitigate vulnerabilities in the future.[19]

The German army in the eastern front is an example of how elements balance contiguous and noncontiguous boundaries while operating. By October 1942, the Wehrmacht penetrated 1,075 miles into the Soviet Union and attempted to control a front from the Barents Sea to the Caucasus Mountains.[20] The German army occupied contiguous positions along a broad and linear front until the Soviet's counteroffensives in the winter of 1941–1942.[21] As Soviet elements advanced westward, German planners had to adapt and adjust to the rapidly changing AOs. In some areas, German elements transitioned to noncontiguous defensive pockets. In the Demyansk Pocket, one hundred thousand German soldiers were sustained for several months during the winter.[22] Higher headquarters planners were able to allocate Luftwaffe support via bombers and transport planes from airfields both in and outside of defensive positions.[23] The German high command assumed responsibility for the land around the Demyansk Pocket and sustained operations by dedicating assets to support subordinate units.

One final historical point about contiguous and noncontiguous AOs is with recent wars in Afghanistan. These Afghan wars are clearly examples of nonlinear and noncontiguous combat. However, they display the challenges planners and maneuver elements face with terrain management. If we examine the Afghanistan operating environment for both the Soviet and U.S. armies, we can better understand potential challenges for planners who manage an AO. Like the challenges the Soviets faced in World War II, the United States' struggle in Afghanistan was for control of lines of communication.[24] Units operated in and around some form of base and attempted to control the service routes between these bases. Each of these units had an assigned contiguous AO and tactical tasks associated with it. However, the units' ability to effectively control or secure their AOs was

Operation Market Garden: The Allied Plan

Operation Market Garden was a hastily prepared plan that lacked detailed planning, especially with regard to logistics and communications. Additionally, intelligence reports of German armored divisions in the area were disregarded. The operation made assumptions that were overly dependent on meeting tight timelines over unfamiliar territory and consequently lacked flexibility. The result was most aspects of the plan went wrong. Airdrops were miles from the objective, underpowered radios could not communicate in the terrain, cutoff British elements around Arnhem ran out of ammunition and supplies, and tank formations that were supposed to relieve Arnhem before the Germans could react were slowed by crowds of euphoric Dutch townspeople and by having to move over treacherously narrow road systems that made them especially vulnerable to German antiarmor. As a consequence, the ambitious and costly operation is generally regarded as a failure, having both failed in its objectives while also stalling the momentum of the Allies on the western front from reaching Berlin ahead of the Russians. It is a good historical example of stovepiped thinking among staff planners who were unable to anticipate the impact of their own planning within the context of broader awareness of overall staff challenges imposed by the situation. (Map by W.wolny via Wikimedia Commons)

overestimated. Units dedicated resources to support convoys, patrols, and limited operations that temporarily extended their security bubble. Therefore, planners must challenge the assumptions made when providing a tactical task to a unit and be comfortable using a noncontiguous framework in the rear area.

Considerations for Future Planning

This article aims to present psychological, doctrinal, and historical factors that influence how planners view terrain management. The following are some recommendations for planners when considering how to develop AOs:

- AOs are multifaceted problems that require attention throughout operations. Planners cannot focus all their cognitive effort on fighting the close fight.
- Planners must avoid taking a reductionist or simplistic approach when dividing AOs. Planners should strive to understand the additive relationship each AO has with one another.
- Planners should not consider contiguous or noncontiguous AOs as a dichotomous relationship. Rather, if the nature of the AO warrants it, allow the rear area security element to operate in a noncontiguous manner while maneuvering elements in the close fight operate in a contiguous one.
- AOs must be able to shift rapidly to a noncontiguous framework, allowing divisions and corps to commit resources to maintain tempo.
- Planners should provide subordinate units a tactical task that correlates to the scope and scale of their assigned AO.

When conducting MDMP, planners must remember doctrine can guide staff through the process. It must also be acknowledged that doctrine is open to interpretation and should not be rigidly applied to operations. Planners must also be cognizant that seemingly simple tasks, like terrain management, might have significant impacts on how divisions and corps conduct large-scale ground combat. ■

German *Flakpanzer* IV *Möbelwagen*, or self-propelled antiaircraft guns, of the 9th SS Panzer Division move to help halt the Allied attempt to seize the bridge over the Lower Rhine River during the Battle for Arnhem, Netherlands, September 1944. The presence of German armor had a decisive effect on the outcome of the battle. (Photo by Willi Höppner, courtesy of Bundesarchiv via Wikimedia Commons)

Notes

1. Field Manual 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], 2017), 6-28.
2. Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 2019), 4-4.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., 1-12. Joint doctrine identifies five phases of an operation.
5. Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Handbook 18-04, *Mission Command in the Division and Corps Support Area* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL, December 2017) accessed 3 June 2021, https://usacac.army.mil/organizations/mccoe/call/publication/18-04.
6. Ibid.
7. Robert Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998).
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Dietrich Dorner, *The Logic Of Failure: Recognizing and Avoiding Error In Complex Situations* (New York: Basic Books, 1989).
11. Eric R. Kandel, *Reductionism in Art and Brain Science: Bridging the Two Cultures* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 61–76.
12. Ibid.
13. David C. Witherington, "Self-Organization and Explanatory Pluralism: Avoiding the Snares of Reductionism in Developmental Science," *Research in Human Development* 11, no. 1 (January 2014): 22–36, https://doi.org/10.1080/15427609.2014.874763.
14. Mark Gilchrist, "Reconsidering Rear Area Security," The Strategy Bridge, 17 September 2017, accessed 8 June 2021, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/9/17/reconsidering-rear-area-security.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. David M. Glantz, "The Soviet-German War 1941-1945: Myths and Realities: A Survey Essay, 2001 October 11" (paper presentation, 20th Anniversary Distinguished Lecture, Clemson University, SC, 11 October 2001), 8, accessed 3 June 2021, https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1216&context=sti_pubs.
21. Ibid., 11.
22. Joel S. A. Heyward, "Stalingrad: An Examination of Hitler's Decision to Airlift," *Airpower Journal* (Spring 1997): 24, accessed 3 June 2021, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA529777.pdf.
23. Ibid.
24. Julian Thompson, *The Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed Conflict* (Oxford, UK: Brassey's, 1991).

Professional Development Is about the Profession, Not the Professional

Maj. David Armando Zelaya, U.S. Army

In the spring of 1941, Albert C. Wedemeyer found himself as a planner deep within the bowels of the War Department. He was a tall man, some might say gangly, with his hair parted near the center. He had unassuming features more akin to a schoolteacher than a soldier. During the 1920s and 1930s, he had meandered across the U.S. Army, reading and learning along the way. On the eve of World War II, this seemingly unremarkable major would create the framework for the most challenging mobilization in U.S. history.[1]

Wedemeyer's Army was different. Leaders saw past the individual mistakes, upward mobility was not a given, assignments varied, and the institutions instilled a sense of professional belonging. Unfortunately, Wedemeyer would not make it in today's Army though given the current threat of large-scale combat operations, today's Army could certainly use him. The Army's current model for professional development focuses on improving the individual skills of professionals. Unfortunately, the Army's current professional development would



A photo of Albert C. Wedemeyer—presumedly as a lieutenant colonel circa 1941—taken around the same time he was assigned to the Pentagon to write the Victory Program. (Photo courtesy of the U.S. War Department)

not only ignore Wedemeyer, but it would also alienate and shun him.

To avoid losing the next generation of Albert C. Wedemeyers, Army leaders should adopt a professional development model that attempts to develop better professionals by developing a better profession. The approach improves individuals by improving organizations. An organizational approach would require a change in perspective. Leaders would need to see that professional development is not about the professional; professional development is about the profession.

Tensions and Perspectives

In his book *On Grand Strategy*, John L. Gaddis wrote that tactics and strategy find themselves in tension when their ends are misaligned.[2] The tension between tactics and strategy places professional development under particular strain. Several recent reviews of U.S. Army leadership found that professional development is chronically misaligned. According to those studies, despite increased funding and senior leader emphasis, junior leaders continue to rate U.S. Army professional development as wanting.[3] It is clear that there is a gap between junior and senior leaders, but what if the gap is not the issue? Perhaps senior leaders are instead missing a bridge that connects these distant shores.

Building bridges is no easy task. When engineers build a bridge, they must first understand the nature of the banks they hope to traverse. In the context of leader development, tactics and strategy are distinct perspectives. A tactical perspective of professional development focuses on the professional. A strategic perspective, however, concentrates on the profession.

The Tactical Perspective

Perspectives on professional development are shaped by their environments. A tactical perspective on professional development arises in a tactical environment characterized by limited time, space, and resources.[4] Tactical perspectives arise from what is affectionately called the "knife fight."

Wedemeyer and the Victory Program

Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer was a visionary thinker who helped shape the Allied path to victory in World War II. He was both the primary author of the Victory Program, which provided the basic plan for mobilizing the United States for war overall, and was a key planner of the D-Day invasion. His education and training had prepared him for these planning responsibilities. In the late 1930s, Wedemeyer had attended the German Kriegsakademie as a U.S. military exchange student, the German equivalent of Fort Leavenworth's Command and General Staff School. Thus, as Germany initiated its expansionist war in Europe in the late 1930s, he was among the very few ranking officers in the Army who intimately understood the origins of the changes to the battlefield that had occurred due to Germany's revolutionary prewar development of mobilized blitzkrieg doctrine and tactics, and their limitations. As the inevitability of the United States becoming involved in the new European war became apparent, Gen. George C. Marshall recognized in then Lt. Col. Wedemeyer not only unique strategic vision but also great intelligence and a penchant for meticulous planning. Consequently, Marshall gave Wedemeyer the task of overseeing the writing of the overall strategic plan that would guide U.S. strategy in the coming war. The subsequent Victory Program was completed in the summer of 1941. As the chief author of the Victory Program, Wedemeyer advocated that the United States defeat of Germany's armies in Europe as its first priority before turning to completing the Asian war. The plan contained an estimate of the number of units that the United States would require as well as an estimate of the massive logistical requirements necessary to successfully conduct the war. Wedemeyer's plan was adopted and expanded as the war progressed. Initially, it became the impetus for the massive national industrial mobilization that was required. Additionally, the plan contained actual battle plans, including a call for early concentration of forces in England in preparation for a cross-channel invasion into France at the soonest chance. Despite his European focus, Wedemeyer was not given the opportunity to command troops in Europe but instead was transferred to the Burma-China Theater, where he replaced Gen. Joseph Stilwell as commander of U.S. troops. There he similarly acquired a reputation for diplomacy and strategic vision, especially with regard to the implications of the civil war occurring in China.

Tactical leaders perceive and influence their immediate surroundings. They relate to others in their environments directly. Tactical leaders also face several problems simultaneously and are forced to "kill the alligator closest to the boat." Their capacity to look beyond their immediate needs is constrained by resources. Therefore, it can be a challenge for them to shape their environments into the future.[5]

> The U.S. Army has outlined lethality and agility as the two objectives of professional development. An operational approach to professional development should, therefore, have two analogous lines of effort.

The tactical perspective focuses on individual attributes and competencies. U.S. Army doctrine encapsulates an individual focus in its leadership requirements model.[6] The premium placed on individuals leads to unexpected incentives. From the tactical perspective, the constant loss of individuals due to permanent changes of station makes it costly to invest in long-term development at the expense of more immediate requirements. From a tactical perspective, the benefits of professional development are difficult to realize and could very well not be worth the cost. That is not to say that tactical leaders cannot overcome the tactical perspective, or that most leaders do not value leader development. Many fight the good fight; the point is that their environment does not make it easy.

Wedemeyer certainly did not make it easy for his leaders. As a young lieutenant, he became entangled in a drunken incident that led to his removal from leadership. Instead of taking the time to address Wedemeyer's deficiencies, his leadership sent him elsewhere to be somebody else's problem. Luckily for Wedemeyer, a leader with a strategic perspective saw the value in him beyond the short term.

The Strategic Perspective

After being fired, Wedemeyer was taken in by Brig. Gen. Paul Malone as an aide-de-camp.[7] Malone saw something in Wedemeyer that transcended Wedemeyer's situation.[8] Wedemeyer's time with Malone seemed to be an inflection point. Wedemeyer would continue his career in assignments off the beaten path that broadened his experience in unique ways.[9] These opportunities were not preplanned; Wedemeyer's path was like a drunken walk, dictated by wayward chance and emergent opportunity. Few people would have had the perspective to predict that his path would be of any use to the military, but Malone took a chance. He must have seen Wedemeyer's long-term potential. It is that kind of strategic perspective that the U.S. Army needed going into World War II.

The strategic perspective is as much a product of its environment as the tactical perspective. The strategic perspective can also be defined in terms of time, space, and resource availability. Strategic horizons extend further into time than tactical horizons. The strategic limit in time is not an absolute barrier; it is based on how long it takes to shape the environment to gain an advantage.[10] A strategic lens also transcends traditional spatial constraints. It accounts for multiple domains of action and hunts for opportunities. While the strategic perspective views resources along a broader scope in space and time, it must still contend with scarcity.

The scarcity in question, however, is a scarcity of options instead of a scarcity of resources. The strategic perspective leverages resources to shape the environment to yield increased options to achieve an objective.[11] Limits imposed by the environment and resources matter in that they limit available options. In the case of professional development, a strategic perspective seeks not to develop individuals; it instead attempts to shape the organizational environment to increase the probability of generating developed individuals. The strategic perspective understands that organizational environments endure through time regardless of personnel movement. Additionally, it understands developed individuals are a means to create an environment that perpetuates more developed individuals.

Tactical and Strategic Systems

Systems theory underpins the logic that connects tactical and strategic perspectives.[12] Systems theory

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F. D. R.'S WAR PLANS!

REDS BEGIN NEW DRIVE TO BREAK VISE ON MOSCOW

Strike at Nazi Line South of Leningrad.

BULLETIN.

BERNE, Switzerland, Dec. 4 (Thursday).—A special bulletin from Moscow early today announced soviet forces had launched a heavy attack along the entire northern line from Kalinin to Leningrad in a terrific effort to crush the German threat against Moscow. The main fighting was believed to be in the Lake Ilmen district 120 miles southeast of Leningrad where Russian forces were reported breaking thru the German lines on the Volkhov river.

(Maps on Page 17.)

LONDON, Dec. 4 (Thursday) (AP).—Russian troops were reported early today to have captured two Italian divisions which the Germans, falling back west of Rostov, had thrown into the path of the soviet steamroller.

The Italians, identified as members of the Union and Tuscan divisions, "hardly reached the battle lines before they began giving themselves up as prisoners," Moscow said. "They complained of absence of warm clothing and food."

A Moscow radio announcement said German Field Marshal Fyvald von Kleist's rear guard meanwhile was attempting a desperate delaying action in the suburbs of Taganrog, 40 miles west of Rostov, while the main Nazi retreat stretched on toward Mariupol, 60 miles farther west.

It was claimed 40 more villages have fallen to the great Red counteroffensive.

Tanks and Trucks Litter Road.

"We continue the pursuit, launching fierce attacks right onto the backs of the fleeing Germans," the soviet announcement said. "Tanks, trucks, and carts litter the road to Mariupol.

LEIBER TRADED TO GIANTS; CUBS GET BOWMAN

The Chicago Cubs early this morning traded Outfielder Hank Leiber to the New York Giants for Pitcher Bob Bowman and an unannounced sum of cash. The deal was completed at the minor league baseball convention in Jacksonville, Fla. Leiber was one of three Giants sent to the Cubs after the 1938 season in exchange for Billy Jurges, Frank Demaree, and Ken O'Dea.

(Details on sports pages.)

NEWS SUMMARY of The Tribune [And Historical Scrap Book] Thursday, December 4, 1941.

WAR SITUATION.

BERNE—Russians launch offensive to end Moscow threat. Page 1.

Germans unifying European industry, says Tribune man. Page 14.

CAIRO—RAF presses war during lull in Libya fighting. Page 15.

HELSINGFORS—Finns begin to occupy Hango as Reds pull out. Page 17.

WASHINGTON.

Roosevelt war plan calls for armed force of 10 million. Page 1.

House passes drastic anti-strike bill, 252 to 136. Page 1.

White House reveals Turkey put under lend-lease aid. Page 1.

President seeks to avoid shooting war over Thailand. Page 13.

LOCAL.

Country kids prove smart as quizzes at stock show. Page 1.

Crowd of 36,000 jams stock show in day. Page 2.

Physician seized again on abortion charge. Page 8.

Deaths and obituaries. Page 26.

DOMESTIC.

Woman kills insane brother, calls it act of mercy. Page 1.

Grand Jury asks Al Smith's son be dishonored. Page 10.

SPORTS.

"Why I turned pro."—Riggs tells own story. Page 25.

Coast hoofer first to arrive for big show. Page 25.

Rosenloom proves exactly that at Page 25.

HOUSE ADOPTS DRASTIC BILL TO BLOCK STRIKES

Goes to Senate on 252-136 Vote.

BY WILLIAM STRAND.

[Chicago Tribune Press Service.]

Washington, D. C., Dec. 3.—The house of representatives, by a vote of 252 to 136, today passed sweeping anti-strike legislation designed to prevent work stoppages because of labor disputes in arms industries.

Rep. H. W. Smith.

The final vote was on a compromise measure introduced yesterday by Rep. Howard W. Smith (D., Va.). It was regarded as the most drastic of four anti-strike measures before the house.

A coalition of 123 Republicans and 129 Democrats prevailed over 108 Democrats, 25 Republicans, 3 Progressives and 1 American Labor party member in adopting the bill.

Bill's Major Provisions.

As sent to the senate, the measure:

1. Provides for a secret strike vote, supervised by the federal government, before a walkout can be ordered in any plant working on rearmament contracts.

2. Outlaws jurisdictional strikes, sympathy strikes, mass picketing, and picketing by persons not employed by the picketed firm.

3. Requires registration of labor unions with the National Labor Relations board, together with submission of detailed "and intelligible" financial statements on income and expenditures.

4. Sets up a 60 day "cooling off" period between the time of taking a strike vote and the date a strike may become effective.

5. Gives final status to the National

THE STRONGHOLD OF PEACE

Woman Slays Insane Brother as 'Mercy' Act

"YOU KNOW BETTER"

Speaking at Warm Springs, Ga., on April 20, 1940, President Roosevelt said:

"The Republicans are seeking to frighten the country

Country Kids Prove Smart as Quiz Kind

GOAL IS 10 MILLION ARMED MEN; HALF TO FIGHT IN AEF

Proposes Land Drive by July 1, 1943, to Smash Nazis; President Told of Equipment Shortage.

BY CHESLY MANLY.

[Copyright, 1941, by The Chicago Tribune.]

Washington, D. C., Dec. 3.—A confidential report prepared by the joint army and navy high command by direction of President Roosevelt calls for American expeditionary forces aggregating 5,000,000 men for a final land offensive against Germany and her satellites. It contemplates total armed forces of 10,045,658 men.

One of the few existing copies of this astounding document, which represents decisions and commitments affecting the destinies of peoples thruout the civilized world, became available to The Tribune today.

It is a blueprint for total war on a scale unprecedented in at least two oceans and three continents, Europe, Africa, and Asia.

The report expresses the considered opinion of the army and navy strategists that "Germany and her European satellites cannot be defeated by the European powers now fighting against her." Therefore, it concludes, "if our European enemies are to be defeated it will be necessary for the United States to enter the war, and to employ a part of its armed forces offensively in the eastern Atlantic and in Europe and Africa."

July 1, 1943, is fixed as the date for the beginning of the final supreme effort by American land forces to defeat the mighty German army in Europe.

A Plan for Encirclement.

In the meantime, however, increasingly active participation is prescribed for the United States, to consist of the gradual encirclement of Germany by the establishment of military bases, an American air offensive against Germany from bases in the British Isles and in the near east, and possible action by American expeditionary forces in Africa and the near east.

REVEAL TURKEY GETS LEND-LEASE GOODS SINCE MAY

BY WALTER TROHAN.

[Chicago Tribune Press Service.]

Washington, D. C., Dec. 3.—President Roosevelt today formalized lend-lease aid, which his administration has been secretly extending to Turkey since last May, by directing the lend-lease administration to look into that country's defense needs.

The President's order gave the state department a case of jitters as it wakened fears that Germany might demand that Turkey end her vacillation between the axis and Britain

In 1941, the *Chicago Daily Tribune*—an opponent of President Franklin Roosevelt's efforts to prepare the country for war—obtained from a source inside the War Plans Division details of then Lt. Col. Albert C. Wedemeyer's Victory Program. The article went into highly specific details on how the plan was to be implemented, including the assumption that Germany would defeat the Soviet Union. Secretary of War Henry Stimson called the source of the leak "wanting in loyalty and patriotism." The German embassy in Washington cabled summaries of the article to Berlin, where military planners reexamined their own policies in light of the "incontrovertible intelligence" the article provided.

describes any environment as the emergent outcome of subsystem interactions.[13] Anything can be defined as a system.[14] Systems themselves are made up of components which themselves are systems. While there is an undefined level of depth, systems theory allows for analysis of a system at a given level without accounting for subsystem dynamics.[15] In the systems theory framework, the tactical perspective is a subsystem of the strategic perspective. An operational approach is a conceptual mechanism that bridges tactical and strategic systems and ensures they are working in concert.

Just as in the real world, however, building bridges is easier said than done. The problem clearly parallels the broader conflict within military theory between tactics and strategy—how does a unit achieve organizational ends through means clearly focused on individual soldiers?

The Approach

The U.S. Army has outlined lethality and agility as the two objectives of professional development. An operational approach to professional development should, therefore, have two analogous lines of effort.[16] Developing agile and lethal organizations requires independent but

complimentary tools. The first and most familiar tool is formal and focused on lethality. The second tool is informal and focused on agility. Both lines of effort are necessary to yield a developed professional organization.

Units can use the structure of military organizations to bolster each line of effort, like suspension cables on a bridge. Figure 1 (on page 117) visualizes the structure of military organizations. Each node represents a leader and the line connecting the nodes represents a type of relationship. Military units are organized into hierarchies. The traditional view of a hierarchy looks like a pyramid with a broad base and a narrow peak.[17] Information moves up and down sequentially through the nodes. These vertical relationships are formally established through regulations that incentivize adherence. These formal relationships are the vehicles by which organizations conduct formal leader development and drive lethality.

In addition to formal vertical relationships, military organizations also have informal horizontal connections.[18] In the specific case of military organizations, the vertically aligned relationships are strong and stable due to formal relationships of authority. The system's horizontal connections are generally informal and temporary. They are established by personal connection relationships.

When visualized, the hierarchical structure may seem pyramidal; however, this visualization does not tell the full story. With a change in perspective, military organizations can be seen as networks.

Formal structures, while robust, are far from agile or resilient. Formal structures are best suited to simple environments.[19] They can process data and can be quite lethal, but they struggle to adapt in complex environments and break down in chaos. Informal networks, however, adjust to their environments and adapt to survive.[20] They thrive in complex environments and can survive in chaos. Most importantly, informal networks grow themselves. An operational approach for professional development should focus on building formal and informal networks to bridge tactical and strategic perspectives.

Maj. David Armando Zelaya, U.S. Army, earned his commission as an infantry officer from the University of Maryland, College Park, in 2009. Zelaya has published several print and online publications that include "The Paradox of Control" in Small Wars Journal, "Failure and the After Action Review" in the Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter, "Leveraging Strategic Exercises for Tactical Readiness" in *Joint Force Quarterly*, "The Input-Output Problem: Managing the Military's Big Data in the Age of AI" in War on the Rocks, and most recently, "Echoes in Time" in the Company Leader.

Professional Development as a Hybrid Network

Professional development combines the strengths of formal and informal networks to yield hybrid networks. In their book *The Starfish and the Spider*, Rod Beckstrom and Ori Brafman describe the strengths of hybrid networks. Hybrid networks adapt quickly to change but remain resilient when stressed.[21] Professional development programs can leverage the strengths of hybrid networks by buttressing informal relationships with the formal chain of command. Professional development networks bridge preestablished silos of unit tribalism reinforced by the chain of command. A professional development network, as outlined in figure 2 (on page 118), establishes informal links that transfer information across the entire organization.

Professional development should focus on building these informal networks to maximize cohesion, diversity of thought, and personal connections. Building hybrid networks is easier said than done. The key to success is to nudge a hybrid network into building itself.

In his memoir, Wedemeyer writes how his organizational environment as a young officer nudged him into becoming a professional. He was not naturally inclined to study or professionally develop while at West Point. He was initially more interested in sports and enjoying time with his peers. However, what he found was that over time, West Point's culture burrowed its way into him. By the time he commissioned, he was reading history for enjoyment and studying out of an innate hunger for professional knowledge. During the interwar period, Wedemeyer found himself stuck in the lower ranks for the better part of decade. Interestingly, that lack of upward mobility allowed him to take assignments off the beaten path to include postings in China and Germany that let him pursue the professional interests he had



(Figure by author)

Figure 1. The Military Hierarchy

developed as a cadet. Wedemeyer broadened within a profession unconcerned with individual progression. Wedemeyer's example provides a useful model from which to build.[22]

Tools of the Profession

As Wedemeyer's example demonstrates, professional development should build organizational environments that self-perpetuate and create new professionals. Successful professional development programs use the tools of the profession—reading, writing, and public speaking—to build organizations and hybrid networks. To return to the bridge analogy, these tools are like an engineer's construction equipment.

To build informal connections, professional development programs require some critical characteristics. They should be voluntary; they should not use formal authority to force participation. Coercion inhibits cohesion and limits decentralization. There is no easier way to kill interest in a professional development program than to hand soldiers a book and tell them to read it in thirty days and write a report. Instead, leaders should adopt a long-term strategic approach that fosters intrinsic interest in professional development by finding and influencing key audiences.

The strategic approach is certain nuanced and indirect, but again, it focuses on the long term holistic understanding of an organization. The key audience for any professional development program should be lower-level leaders. The reasoning is simple: junior leaders are the ones most likely to lack connections across the broader organization based on their location in the hierarchy (refer to figure 2). While higher echelon leaders are important, due to their formal positions at the narrow end of an organization, they already have cross-organizational connections with peers. Within the target audience, there is a subset of leaders that should be specifically identified. These leaders tend to be the most senior members of the most junior groups. The consummate example is the senior specialist, leader of the "E-4 Mafia." Junior soldiers respect them as informal leaders because they are relatable. Gaining their interest in professional development is critical to long-term success.

Reading, writing, and public speaking each establish connections among people in unique ways, especially with skeptical target audiences. Organizations can use these characteristics to achieve a desired effect. Importantly, they reinforce diversity of thought and cohesion.

Reading is a powerful developmental tool. Former Secretary of Defense James Mattis bluntly wrote, "If



The strength of a professional development network

Outlined below are three models that visualize the architectures of several types of organizations: the chain of command network, the informal peer network, and the professional development network. The chain of command is a centralized formal network with hierarchal structures that have strong relations between nodes. The peer network is decentralized and made up of weak informal relationships between nodes. The professional development network is a hybrid network that leverages the chain of command to provide unity of effort and shared understanding while taking advantage of the flexibility and openness of the peer network.

(Figure by author)

Figure 2. Hybrid Networks

you haven't read hundreds of books you are functionally illiterate, and you will be incompetent."[23] Reading programs can highlight diverse ideas across an organization. They are also decentralized and do not require formal structures. They can help generate shared values and increased understanding of the operational environment. Reading programs should focus on building cohesion through shared reflection. Book clubs are an effective model to get professionals reading and foster discussion across an organization.

The old adage that "the pen is mightier than the sword" rings just as true now as ever. Writing programs sustain organizational connections through time as the written word endures beyond the movement of individual personnel. Writing also encourages diversity of thought and the sharing of ideas that may not otherwise be communicated. Most importantly, writing refines thinking. There is no better way to clarify an idea than to write it out. Writing, however, tends to be an individual endeavor. Leaders can use writing competitions to help foster collaboration in a writing program.

Another great model to foster collaborative writing is the "solarium." Created during the Eisenhower administration and named after the White House solarium, the solarium gets junior leaders in front of senior leaders to brief them their ideas directly.[24] Generally, junior leaders submit information papers on their ideas prior to the event. At the event, senior decision-makers are briefed directly on each idea and pick one for implementation. In addition to improving writing, solariums also highlight the idea that junior leaders can effect change in their organizations.

Leaders often overlook the power of the spoken word in professional development programs. There is no doubt, however, that military professionals need to speak with vigor and passion when addressing soldiers. Public speaking fosters collaboration and communication skills. It can also build cohesion across an organization. Unfortunately, public speaking programs tend to require more centralization and coordination. They are also difficult to create organically. The "leader call" is a possible model that leaders can use to get soldiers speaking in public. Leader calls are informal events used to welcome new soldiers, farewell departing soldiers, and mark major organizational transitions. While they might not directly relate to the topic of professional development, they still get leaders speaking in front of others. Leaders can also combine the solarium model with a public speaking component to build connections across an organization.

With these tools, any organization can foster professional development at minimal cost. It is critical to emphasize that a leader's example is the best way to start and maintain a leader development program. Leaders need to talk about what they are reading. They need to write out their thoughts. The need to speak passionately about their profession. With time, leaders will find if they model professional development through their actions, their organizations will follow.

Conclusion

The purpose of professional development should be to build the types of organizations that will yield the next generation of Albert C. Wedemeyers. It takes a unique approach that bridges tactical and strategic perspectives to build agile and lethal organizations. Hybrid networks are the means of achieving that end. Reading, writing, and public speaking are tools organizations can leverage to build the profession and professionals. Mixing and cueing these tools allows informal bonds to extend through time and survive the turbulence created by personnel turnover. These programs need to be voluntary, broad, informal, and enjoyable to build commitment and create a hybrid network to reinforce the chain of command. With enough luck, the profession will yield the professionals needed to build bridges across turbulent waters and darkening skies. ■

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Masses of vehicles crawl slowly through heavy smog 1 December 2015 during a traffic jam in Beijing. Subsequently, the number of cars in China has expanded due to a growing economy that now enables the purchase of cars by citizens for whom cars were once out of reach. The increasing pollution caused by increasing number of cars together with that generated by new coal-fired power plants to support China's need for electricity is making air pollution and the availability of fuel among the most challenging standard-of-living issues it faces. (Photo by Imaginechina via Associated Press)

Russia's China Gamble

Strategic Implications of a Sino-Russian Energy Economy

Maj. Philip Murray, U.S. Army
Daniel Keifer

Since the trade war between the United States and China began in 2018, the president of the People's Republic of China, Xi Jinping, has directed an increase in domestic investment and self-reliance for energy sources to hedge against foreign political interference.[1] However, all indicators show Chinese reliance on foreign oil has increased, rising from 9.2 million barrels per day in 2018 to 10.1 million barrels per day in 2019.[2] Despite the public statements by Xi about more domestic self-reliance, there is clear Communist Party support to increase energy imports from Russia. In May 2021, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Xi participated in a virtual groundbreaking ceremony for a nuclear energy cooperation project to celebrate the upcoming twentieth anniversary and renewal of the Russia-China Treaty of Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation.[3] The first treaty, signed in July 2001 by Putin and General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Jiang Zemin, represented a new explicit strategic partnership between the two nations not seen since the Sino-Soviet split in 1961.[4] The treaty reinforces a commitment to China's widely touted Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence for guiding foreign policy relationships—these are specifically iterated in article one of the treaty.[5] While not specifically mentioned in the treaty, both sides employ the popular slogan "Win-Win" to characterize the nature of their partnership. Given that China and Russia have a poor track record of cooperation with one another, and both maintain an increasingly shrinking list of partners they consider allies, how realistic is it for this partnership to last into the future?

The slogan "Win-Win" justifiably generates optimism in the context of the ongoing relationship between China and Russia; they share many potential areas for mutual benefit, most of all in the energy sector. As of 2020, China is the leading consumer of hydrocarbon imports globally, and Russia is the third largest producer of hydrocarbons. Furthermore, both value economic partners who will not leverage economic sanctions for human rights violations or discreet annexations of neighboring states.[6]

Russia is increasingly finding itself with few options other than closer economic ties with Beijing. However, the same cannot be said of China, which maintains a diverse source of hydrocarbon imports globally.[7] Russia's growing reliance on Chinese capital to increase capacity in its hydrocarbon export market is making it increasingly vulnerable to global market shocks and political exploitation. Russia should be concerned by the example of China's other "Win-Win" partnerships such as Angola, which has increasingly become dependent on energy exports to China and has fallen into a sovereignty-stealing debt-trap.[8] Unless Russia makes rapid moves to diversify its economy away from hydrocarbons and expand its export markets from China, it will find itself financially and politically vulnerable to the whims of the Chinese Communist Party in the emerging multipolar global hierarchy.

China's Energy Security Strategy: China as a Leading Consumer

No other country has achieved the rapid levels of modernization, industrial growth, and poverty reduction that China has accomplished during the post-Mao period beginning in 1978.[9] Average Chinese gross domestic product (GDP) growth has been approximately 10 percent a year on average, and more than eight hundred million Chinese have been lifted from poverty (living on $1.90/day or less).[10] The major limiting factor on Chinese growth has been access to energy sources. China became energy independent in 1961 with the discovery of the *Da Qing* (Great Celebration) oil

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Daniel Keifer received an MA in global, international, and comparative history with a focus in Russian energy policy from Georgetown University. He holds a BA dual degree in Russian and history from Pennsylvania State University. He was a Fulbright Scholar in Bulgaria, and he was the recipient of the David L. Boren Fellowship to conduct field research on the politics of hydrocarbon development in Kazakhstan.

field in Manchuria but later became a net importer of hydrocarbons in 1993 when domestic consumption outstripped production.[11] Since then, China has risen to become the world's leading consumer of energy.[12]

With such a large energy demand, China must rely on foreign energy exporters for its needs. In terms of strategy, relying on foreign nations for energy resources is a huge liability, but the Chinese Communist Party has found useful ways to limit risk to its political objectives. Chinese state institutions, affiliated with the Communist Party, invest heavily in energy markets like Russia and Africa traditionally ignored by the international super-majors.[13] They also engage in commodity-backed loans (loans repaid with oil) and/or controlling share buyouts of foreign energy firms to gain reliable sources of imports. The diversity of sources and limited ties between partner nations like Russia and the West provide China a conflict-resistant source of energy imports.

The bulk of China's energy demands are for electricity generation, which is satisfied by its abundance of coal; coal comprises 58 percent of all Chinese energy consumption.[14] However important keeping the lights on for 27.5 percent of the world's manufacturing output is, coal-generated electricity has caused environmental problems such as air quality in major urban centers like Beijing.[15] China's growing middle class and elite view the pollution as a dark cloud over the nation. In the last three energy security strategies, the Chinese Communist Party has committed itself to replacing urban coal-generated electrical plants with natural gas and alternative energy electrical plants.[16] Because of the 2001 signing of the Russia-China Treaty of Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation, China has increased from the eighteenth leading consumer of liquid natural gas to the third largest consumer between 2012 and the present.[17] While exact numbers for each specific pipeline are not reported, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration's "China" analysis report, Russian and Central Asian pipeline imports comprise 38 percent of China's total natural gas consumption (about 5 percent of total Chinese energy consumption).[18] Russian pipelines are currently generating cleaner electricity in the large metropolitan centers of China like Beijing, and reliance on Russian gas to replace coal electricity is anticipated to grow.[19]

Oil and other hydrocarbon liquids comprise 20 percent of total Chinese energy consumption, second



(Figure used with permission by CEIC Data; source www.ceicdata.com | BP PLC)

China's Oil Consumption

Smoke belches from a coal-fueled power station 19 November 2015 near Datong in China's northern Shanxi Province. For decades, coal has been the backbone of Shanxi, providing livelihoods for millions of miners, while private-jet-owning bosses became notorious for their nouveau riche lifestyles. (Photo by Greg Baker, Agence France-Presse)

only to coal. In 2020, despite being the world's fifth largest producer of oil (4.931 billion barrels per day) China only maintained the capacity to satisfy 34 percent of its own oil energy demands.[20] Oil remains strategically the most important resource to the Chinese Communist Party. Not only have the Chinese middle class grown accustomed to driving vehicles (currently 27 percent of petroleum goes toward vehicle fuel), but most of China's military arsenal also runs on petroleum.[21] In March 2021, the thirteenth National People's Congress released its fourteenth Five-Year Plan (2021–2025); this is the first Chinese Communist plan that directly connects energy security strategy and the national defense security strategy.[22] The clear anxiety driving Chinese energy security strategy can be connected to potential sanctions or embargoes from the United States over the many issues of sovereignty in the South China Sea, Taiwan, and/or domestic human rights issues.[23] Russian pipeline oil (currently 15 percent of total Chinese oil imports) provides an embargo-resistant alternative source of oil that cannot be blocked by the United States financially or with military power.[24]

The initial Sino-Soviet split in 1961 occurred shortly after China achieved energy independence from the Soviet Union and was no longer subject to the Soviet's use of hydrocarbons as political leverage.[25] In a twist of irony, China now finds itself in a position of strength over Russia as a leading consumer and investor in Russian energy development. As of April 2019, China ranked as Russia's second largest export market behind only the combined economies of all of the European Union.[26] Of the $57.32 billion in Russian exports to China, 72 percent were in energy-related resources. While China generates 14 percent of all Russian export revenue and remains the second largest supplier of crude oil to China behind Saudi Arabia, Russia is only 3.3 percent of China's total import expenditure.[27]

As previously shown in the data points above, Russia represents a partnership of strategic convenience for China versus an absolute necessity for trade. While neither is fully dependent on the other at the moment, Russia has started down a path of reliance on Chinese capital that promises to be difficult to return from.

In his recent book *Klimat*, Thane Gustafson outlines the serious problems facing Russia's oil industry. Headlining this list is the depletion of oil fields inherited from the Soviet Union and a current lack of new, equivalent fields to replenish its well stock. As the older wells age, production costs climb and profit margins shrink. These issues are compounded by Arctic offshore oil deposits, which are technically challenging and costly to develop, and made worse by Russia's technological lag and a weak service industry that forces continued reliance on outside help and material inputs. Lastly, the need to develop new fields places incredible financial strain on the state, which paradoxically derives most of its revenue from the very industry that now requires support.[31] In lieu of these complications, the Russian Ministry of Energy has laid out a plan to carry the hydrocarbon industry forward for the next fifteen years.

> "Within the web of connective tissue currently binding Sino-Russian energy cooperation, the financial transactions themselves are benefiting China in a lopsided manner."

Russia's Hydrocarbon Sector: An Industry and a Country in Need

Russia's hydrocarbon sector has long stood as its primary economic engine, and rents from the oil and gas industry provide the lion's share of state revenue underwriting the federal budget. In 2019 alone, oil and gas exports made up 56 percent of total exports and accounted for 39 percent of the federal budget.[28] This disproportionate reliance on hydrocarbon exports consequently places Russia at the mercy of energy markets prone to consumer-driven fluctuations. For example, in 2020, the combination of Russia's oil-price war with Saudi Arabia and the pandemic-induced downturn in oil consumption translated into a substantial loss in state revenue; the Russian budget experienced a decrease of $20 billion, even though revenue from other economic sectors improved by about 10 percent from the previous year.[29]

These numbers illustrate the immediate downside of such an acute dependence on oil and gas rents. However, a closer look at Russia's federal budget betrays a more concerning dilemma. In the year-end budget report published by the Ministry of Finance, the existence of two separate line items for calculating the deficit—one including hydrocarbon rents and one with hydrocarbon rents removed from the equation–demonstrates that Russia is incapable of running a surplus without cash flows from the hydrocarbon sector.[30] This situation would be concerning even if Russia's oil and gas industries were experiencing healthy growth and strong profit margins, but unfortunately, that is not the case.

Looking to 2035: Arctic Goals

In June 2020, the Russian government approved the Ministry of Energy's new energy strategy titled "The Energy Strategy of the Russian Federation for the Period up to 2035" (hereinafter Energy Strategy 2035). While the document acknowledges the problems facing Russia's hydrocarbon sector, it nevertheless projects that fossil fuels will continue to dominate energy markets for the next fifteen years and reaffirms the state's ambitions of prolonging the lifespan of the hydrocarbon-rent economic model that has predominated for decades.[32] To this end, Energy Strategy 2035 sets the goal of maintaining oil output at 490–555 million tons per year.[33] However, aware of the limitations specific to the oil sector, as well as global energy policy trends emphasizing decarbonization, the new strategy calls for strong efforts to accelerate natural gas production to 860–1,000 billion cubic meters per year by 2035, amounting to a 27–47 percent increase from

2019. Moreover, special attention will be paid to the production of liquefied natural gas (LNG), with a goal of 80–140 million metric tons per year by 2035, set to meet a projected increase in global demand.[34]

Although Energy Strategy 2035 provides a clear diagnosis and list of goals, there is a noticeable lack of any substantive discussion concerning the critical aspect of funding. Therefore, to understand the trajectory of the hydrocarbon sector and to gain greater insight into the source of capital driving new development, it is important to examine Russia's ongoing efforts in the Arctic. Depletion in the West Siberian oil and gas fields has compelled Russia to turn to its Arctic reserves in order to prop up export volumes, and Energy Strategy 2035 stresses the importance of developing Russia's untapped north.[35] Thus far, the private firm Novatek has been spearheading this effort, but it is clear that much of its success is owed to readily available Chinese capital and cooperation.

Due to U.S. sanctions that strongly inhibit cooperation with Western firms and deny access to long-term loans denominated in U.S. dollars, Chinese partnership has been crucial for Novatek's success in developing the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Region.[36] For example, two loans from the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China totaling EUR 9.3 billion (~USD $11.2 billion) and RMB 9.8 billion (~USD $1.5 billion) comprised the largest source of funding for Novatek's $23 billion Yamal LNG Project.[37] Furthermore, the Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC) and China's Silk Road Fund acquired a 20 percent and 9.9 percent equity respectively in the enterprise. While the cost of CNPC's shares is unknown, the EUR 1.09 billion (~USD $1.3 billion) price that the Silk Road Fund paid for its shares allows us to estimate that CNPC paid twice

The Russian fossil fuel company Gazprom Neft is building a massive oil production center to develop the Chayandinskoye oil-rim deposit in Eastern Siberia. Scheduled to begin production in 2022, it will be at the center of a cluster of other development sites in the region. Much of the oil produced will be piped to China. (Photo courtesy of Gazprom Neft)

Russian President Vladimir Putin (*left*) and Chinese President Xi Jinping witness the groundbreaking ceremony of a bilateral nuclear energy cooperation project, the Tianwan nuclear power plant in Jiangsu Province, China, and the Xudapu nuclear power plant in Liaoning Province, China, 19 May 2021 via internet videoconference. (Photo courtesy of Xinhua)

as much.[38] With CNPC and the Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation each acquiring 10 percent stakes in Novatek's upcoming Arctic LNG 2 project, it appears that Chinese capital is set to continue expanding its role in the Russian Arctic.[39]

Win-Win?

On the surface, the emerging Sino-Russian energy partnership appears to be mutually beneficial to both parties. While Chinese involvement in the Arctic is particularly revealing, it is by no means the only example of cooperation. CNPC's thirty-year, $400 billion import contract with Gazprom, along with a twenty-five-year, $270 billion contract with Rosneft, both signed in 2014, represent a clear commitment to long-term energy trade with Russia.[40] Furthermore, Sino-Russian energy partnership opens new pathways to pursue China's stated goal of growing the technical and industrial capacity of its own service companies on a global scale. This is best illustrated by deployment of the *Nan Hai Ba Hao* oil rig to help Gazprom explore its Kara Sea holdings in 2018.[41] Beyond this, access to Russian oil and gas provides China, the world's largest single importer of hydrocarbons, with options to hedge against the U.S. Navy's ability to shut down strategic choke points such as the Straits of Malacca, staunching the flow of oil and LNG to China's industrial core.[42]

However, in comparison to China's actions, which display a certain strategic calculus aimed at improving its energy security while growing its own companies, Russia's interaction with China illustrates a process of decision-making arising from *need* and the troubles listed above. Aside from the crucial influx of Chinese capital in the Russian Arctic, the recently completed Power of Siberia pipeline that carries east Siberian gas to northeastern China further showcases China's

leverage. Coming online in December 2019, Power of Siberia is the culmination of roughly two decades of negotiations in which Russia largely acquiesced to Chinese demands. For example, China demanded that Gazprom use a new East Siberian resource base as opposed to connecting the pipeline to its west Siberian fields. This prevented Gazprom from linking China to its existing grid feeding Europe, making China the monopsonist customer for the pipeline. Further delaying completion of the project, China demanded that gas prices be linked to global oil prices, putting Russian gas at even odds with the global market and placing the burden of price downturns on Russia.[43] The willingness of Gazprom to concede these key aspects of the deal shows that the *need* to access new market share and prop up exports eclipsed deeper strategic concerns.

Lastly, within the web of connective tissue currently binding Sino-Russian energy cooperation, the financial transactions themselves are benefiting China in a lopsided manner. For example, aside from the substantial loans given to Novatek, Russia also received $31 billion from China between 2007 and 2014 in the form of energy-backed development loans.[44] For China, this has the dual benefit of enabling it to grow the international prestige of its financial institutions while also ensuring its own energy security. However, Sino-Russian energy transactions are taking on an even greater significance insofar as they facilitate China's ambition of developing the prestige and convertibility of the yuan.[45] Russia's willingness to conduct energy transactions in yuan, as illustrated by the fact that Gazprom Neft has conducted all of its business with China exclusively in yuan since 2015, is an aspect of this relationship that uniquely benefits China.[46] In 2019, Russia doubled down on its commitment to yuan-based transactions when it dumped $101 billion worth of its U.S. dollar reserves and redirected about half that amount toward acquiring yuan.[47] In this manner, Russia is serving as a key instrument in China's efforts to recycle the yuan throughout the global economy.[48] For Russia though, the long-term tradeoffs of energy-backed loans and yuan-based transactions may become increasingly negative as it leads to increased dependence on Chinese purchasing power and greater reliance on Chinese goods and services.

"The long-term tradeoffs of energy-backed loans and yuan-based transactions may become increasingly negative as it leads to increased dependence on Chinese purchasing power and greater reliance on Chinese goods and services."

China's Other "Win-Win" Partnerships: Angola's 2020 Crisis

Even though Angola is not a nuclear power or a great power like Russia, it does share some similar economic and trade relationships with China. Both share China as their largest trading partner for exports, both of which are primarily in hydrocarbon exports.[49] Angola and Russia have also both accepted massive energy development loans from China in the form of commodity-backed loans and equity shares in state companies, and for infrastructure construction.[50] Both are also more reliant on China as a market for their exports than China is reliant on their resource imports; Russian oil makes up 15 percent of total Chinese consumption and Angolan oil makes up 9 percent.[51] At the moment, Angola is much more reliant on hydrocarbon exports for its overall financial stability (90 percent of its exports), which makes it even more reliant on China as a steady consumer market for its exports to buffer against market shocks to global price indexes.[52] Angola serves as an important cautionary tale for how China's long-term "Win-Win" partnerships can end in massive power and trade imbalances.

The year 2020 was the playing out of Angola's worst-case scenario for its relationship with China. Prior to the global COVID-19 lockdowns and Saudi-Russian price collapse in 2020, Angola's public and policy guaranteed debt to China sat at 49 percent

(USD $19 billion), 70 percent of which were commodity-secured loans against oil exports.[53] In June 2020, Angola defaulted on oil payments to China; COVID-19 and the Saudi-Russian crude oil price war made delivering oil to China more expensive than cash payments for the original loan amount.[54] While China's EXIM bank has agreed to a three-year restructuring of the loan agreement, the details are yet unknown.[55] One thing is for certain though—China is in the dominant position in its relationship with Angola and is free to structure agreements any way it pleases. If Russia continues down its path toward greater borrowing from Chinese institutions and further dependency on energy exports for its state economy, a similar outcome far in the future is not impossible to imagine.

Consequences of "Good-Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation"

Signs pointing to Russia's precarious future are already surfacing as Sino-Russian energy cooperation and reliance on Chinese assistance creates trickle-down effects throughout other key economic sectors. This is especially the case with Russia's technology and service sector. For example, the increasing role of Chinese capital in building strategically sensitive technological infrastructure is a part of the broader trend in Russia. In 2012, the Russia-China Investment Fund started funneling investment capital toward the development of promising technologies and startup companies in Russia, relieving some of the burden on the overstretched federal budget, which is still the primary source of funding for scientific research in Russia.[56] Nevertheless, Russia's anemic knowledge economy is failing to keep pace with the state's needs, opening the door for Chinese tech giants to capture market share and grow China's influence within Russia.

The rapid expansion of Huawei's influence in Russia best encapsulates this phenomenon. Huawei currently dominates the Russian mobile phone market, even outcompeting global behemoths like Samsung.[57] However, Huawei's importance is now transcending basic tech consumer needs as it establishes itself as an irreplaceable partner in telecommunications infrastructure development. Faced with weak domestic tech companies and a shrinking budget, Putin turned to Huawei in 2019 to spearhead Russia's 5G rollout, with Huawei providing 5G technology to Russia's top telecommunications companies.[58] Both outside observers and some Russian international affairs specialists have noted the risk of relying on China for such a strategic element of state infrastructure and argue that Russia would better serve itself by keeping the 5G campaign in house.[59] However, Russia's budget concerns appear to be compelling the state to sacrifice strategic principles in favor of more pressing short-term needs.

As Russia's aging hydrocarbon reserves continue to generate increasingly smaller profit margins and induce costly development campaigns, it seems likely that the state will frequently be forced to weigh its own grand strategy against short-term economic demands. The troubles facing the hydrocarbon sector not only point to the likelihood of future energy-backed loans from Chinese financial institutions but also result in the diversion of federal funds away from other economic sectors that could decrease the path-dependent overreliance on hydrocarbon rents. Thus, even if Russia manages to avoid falling into a debt trap akin to the example of Angola, its hesitance to transition away from reliance on the hydrocarbon industry promises to result in more instances where Chinese companies outcompete domestic Russian firms across the economic spectrum.

The question of national sovereignty and the extent of Russia's willingness to cede influence to China should thus guide future studies of Sino-Russian energy cooperation. Understanding the limits of this partnership will have profound implications for strategists contending with a new multipolar world of renewed great-power competition. ■

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2022 General William E. DePuy

Special Topics Writing Competition

This year's theme is "Insights from Two Decades in Afghanistan"

The intent of this year's DePuy competition is to highlight from a "boots on the ground" perspective what specifically the U.S. Army should learn from its twenty-year experience in Afghanistan. Possible topics might include the following: What faulty assumptions did leaders at all levels make that should be avoided in the future? What lessons should future senior military leaders learn from Afghanistan? How did the perception of success affect operational planning and assessments of progress? To what degree was Afghanistan a failure of mission-command or counterinsurgency doctrine? Any other salient topics that might be gleaned from an individual's experience and point of view.

Cautionary note: Over the course of the next several years, the topic of U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan will likely be intensely examined, debated, and heatedly argued; primarily at the strategic level and among a host of entities both in and out of the military. In contrast, while *Military Review* (*MR*) will consider all submissions received, the DePuy contest has historically been a venue that places a premium on careful, impartial, and scholarly work in the practical pursuit of applicable lessons learned. *MR* has selected the 2022 topic specifically to take advantage of the wealth of relatively recent experience still resident in the active-duty or just-retired force for the purposes of practical learning. Consequently, the judges will be advised that preference will be given to articles where authors primarily discuss issues that outline lessons learned salient to the operational and tactical levels of conflict. Authors are advised to avoid attempting to use the contest as a forum for partisan/political-oriented assignment of credit and liability for the outcome of the Afghanistan Campaign.

Contest opens 1 January 2022 and closes 18 July 2022

1st Place	$1,000 and publication in *Military Review*
2nd Place	$750 and consideration for publication in *Military Review*
3rd Place	$500 and consideration for publication in *Military Review*

For information on how to submit an entry, please visit https://www.armyupress.army.mil/DePuy-Writing-Competition/.

Articles will be comparatively judged by a panel of senior Army leaders on how well authors have clearly identified issues requiring solutions relevant to the Army in general and/or to a significant portion of the Army; how effectively detailed and feasible solutions to the problems identified are presented; and, the level of expository skill the author demonstrates in developing a well-organized article using professional standards of grammar, usage, critical thinking, original insights, and evidence of thorough research in the sources provided.

Special operations service members conduct combat operations 8 May 2019 in support of Operation Resolute Support in Southeast Afghanistan. (Photo by Sgt. Jaerett Engeseth, U.S. Army)

The German Way of War
A Lesson in Tactical Management



Jaap Jan Brouwer, Pen and Sword Books, Barnsley, UK, 2021, 240 pages

Col. Scott Cunningham, U.S. Army, Retired

Why did the German army have a relative battlefield performance that was remarkably superior to any of the Allied opponents it fought? That is the central question of Jaap Jan Brouwer's engaging and thought-provoking book *The German Way of War: A Lesson in Tactical Management.* Brouwer provides a collection of insights and observations across the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) spectrum that help explain this significant difference in combat effectiveness.

Central to the theme of the book is the author's definition of combat effectiveness:

> *Combat effectiveness = preparation + reconnaissance + focus of effort* (Schwerpunkt) *+ cooperation of units + speed/tempo + mass (maneuver + firepower) + tenacity/relentlessness*

When looked at through this formula, it is clear that the German army was regularly able to achieve superiority in many, if not most of the components of combat effectiveness. Missing from his formula are the impacts of audacity, morale, and cohesiveness, but all are addressed elsewhere in the book.

Before units engage in combat, armies must be trained and organized. The foundation of this is soldier, leader, and unit training. Brouwer highlights the difference in training approaches. In the German army, the concept of *innere führung* (inner leadership/self-motivation) is stressed, whereas in the U.S. Army, training centers on compelling compliance, breaking down the will and individuality of the individual, and then building it back as part of a military organization through repetitive actions and drills. The German system reliably produced soldiers who were able to demonstrate initiative, adaptability, and creative problem-solving in combat. The U.S. approach ignored human nature and created soldiers and junior leaders with an inability to think and act independently, poor adaptability, a lack of aggressiveness and initiative, and a risk-avoidance mindset.

Another crucial element of German army effectiveness was its embrace of the *Auftragstaktik* leadership and command technique. More than simply a command style, Auftragstaktik was a comprehensive command culture that permeated the entire structure of the German army. This system gave the German army significant advantages in the conditions of fog/friction/chance/chaos that are common in modern war. Instead of fighting against these conditions, the German army trained its soldiers to operate effectively in them

and even exploit them. The U.S. system of the era stressed detailed planning and compliance with orders and instructions. This tended to fall apart badly under the harsh realities of combat. While the U.S. Army has more recently embraced a watered-down version of Auftragstaktik as "mission command," the adoption has been largely unsuccessful because the American version fails to capture the essence of the idea. The necessary cultural foundations that enable a true Auftragstaktik system remain unaddressed, with detailed planning, micromanagement, and risk avoidance common.

German tactical doctrine of the era was also a factor in its success. Components of this included recon pull, a focus on enemy weakness (surfaces and gaps), mobility, and a combined arms approach (the concept of "dilemma"). Most important was the focus on speed, audacity, and decisive maneuver rather than simple firepower and attrition. This is contrasted with the Allies' (especially the United States') methodical, firepower-centric approach. The emphasis in U.S. units was on detailed orchestration and contiguous operations, rarely on speed or audacity. This usually was unsuccessful against rapidly maneuvering German units. The German army maneuvered faster and more aggressively than the Allies. Even with far less firepower, it still resulted in significant battlefield superiority.

A recurring theme through the book is the attention the Germans paid to the human aspects of combat (and the Allies who almost ignored them). Psychology, mindset, and emotional factors were always taken into account. The Allies took a far more industrial approach to building and using military units. Nowhere was this more pronounced in the replacement systems, which were famously effective in the German army, and famously ineffective (almost criminally so) in the American and British armies. Overall, the morale and cohesion of German units tended to be strong and resilient (even in defeat and captivity), while the Allied units tended to be brittle, fragile, and weak in those respects.

Other aspects discussed at length include the superb German General Staff system, the German technique of forming and employing ad hoc task forces (*Kampfgruppe*), roles of commanders and noncommissioned officers, allied reliance on firepower, relentless German reconnaissance (versus an almost complete lack of it on the Allied side), the German concept of *Schwerpunkt*, and the German emphasis on learning and adapting in combat. Overall, this enabled the Germans to employ a combat system that stressed audacity, agility, tempo, and tenacity. When used operationally against the U.S. style approach of detailed planning and precise synchronization, it was usually superior. It also resulted in German army units that tended to get better in combat, while Allied units tended to decline in combat effectiveness over time.

> "The German army remains a classic case study for those involved in any of the aspects of force modernization, training, leader development, or tactical operations."

Interestingly, the author is not a professional military officer; rather, he is a Dutch management consultant. This results in a book that is not hobbled by doctrine or predetermined frameworks. While this does lead to the discussion wandering a bit and the use of unclear, nondoctrinal terms, the overall effect is positive.

While not all of the German approaches to the various DOTMLPF aspects of building or employing their army were successful, they got a significant number of them "more right" than the United States or any other Allied army of the era did. This resulted in an army that was man-for-man and unit-for-unit noticeably more effective than its opponents. For this reason, the German army remains a classic case study for those involved in any of the aspects of force modernization, training, leader development, or tactical operations. ■

Col. Scott Cunningham, U.S. Army, retired, served thirty years in the U.S. Army in a variety of armor and cavalry positions. He currently lives in Leavenworth, Kansas, and serves as a senior training advisor for Army National Guard soldiers and units.

TITLE INDEX

AUTHOR INDEX

SUBJECT INDEX

Visualization

"Seeing through the Fog: Developing Fog of War Resistant Visualization," Lt. Col. Richard A. McConnell, DM, U.S. Army, Retired; Lt. Col. Jacob A. Mong, U.S. Army, Retired; and Dawn Ptaschek (January-February): 58

Warfighting Functions

"The Case for an Information Warfighting Function," Lt. Col. Gregory M. Tomlin, PhD, U.S. Army (September-October): 89

World War II

"Admiral John S. McCain and the Triumph of Naval Air Power" (review essay), Lt. Col. John H. Modinger, PhD, U.S. Air Force, Retired (July-August): 141

"Britain's War: A New World, 1942-1947" (review essay), Mark Montesclaros (May-June): 141

"Planning to Prevent Genocide: Lemkin's Warning and Eichmann's Crimes," Lt. Col. Michael H. Hoffman, U.S. Army Reserve, Retired (November-December): 55

"The Red Ball Express: Past Lessons for Future Wars," Christopher Carey, PhD (March-April): 52



UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE® **Statement of Ownership, Management, and Circulation (All Periodicals Publications Except Requester Publications)**

1. Publication Title	2. Publication Number	3. Filing Date
MILITARY REVIEW (ENGLISH)	1 2 3 8 3 0	09/01/2021
4. Issue Frequency	5. Number of Issues Published Annually	6. Annual Subscription Price
BI MONTHLY	6	N/A

7. Complete Mailing Address of Known Office of Publication (Not printer) (Street, city, county, state, and ZIP+4®): ARMY UNIVERSITY PRESS / MILITARY REVIEW, 290 STIMSON AVENUE, BLDG 225, FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS 66027-1254. Contact Person: Miguel Severo. Telephone (Include area code): (913) 684-9338

8. Complete Mailing Address of Headquarters or General Business Office of Publisher (Not printed): SAME AS ABOVE

9. Full Names and Complete Mailing Addresses of Publisher, Editor, and Managing Editor (Do not leave blank)

Publisher (Name and complete mailing address): McDonald S. Eudy, 4509 Beech Road / Temple Hills, MD 20748-6705

Editor (Name and complete mailing address): COL JACOB BROWN, 290 STIMSON AVENUE, BLDG 225, FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS 66027-1254

Managing Editor (Name and complete mailing address): WILLIAM DARLEY - MANAGING EDITOR, 290 STIMSON AVENUE, BLDG 225, FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS 66027-1254

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Full Name	Complete Mailing Address
Publication published in accordance with Title 44 and Army Regulation 25-50.	ARMY UNIVERSITY PRESS / MILITARY REVIEW, 290 STIMSON AVENUE, BLDG 225, FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS 66027-1254

11. Known Bondholders, Mortgagees, and Other Security Holders Owning or Holding 1 Percent or More of Total Amount of Bonds, Mortgages, or Other Securities. If none, check box → ☑ None

Full Name	Complete Mailing Address
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12. Tax Status (For completion by nonprofit organizations authorized to mail at nonprofit rates) (Check one)
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☐ Has Not Changed During Preceding 12 Months
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

13. Publication Title: ARMY UNIVERSITY PRESS / MILITARY REVIEW / ENGLISH			14. Issue Date for Circulation Data Below: 06/30/2021	
15. Extent and Nature of Circulation			Average No. Copies Each Issue During Preceding 12 Months	No. Copies of Single Issue Published Nearest to Filing Date
a. Total Number of Copies (Net press run)			4136	4066
b. Paid Circulation (By Mail and Outside the Mail)	(1)	Mailed Outside-County Paid Subscriptions Stated on PS Form 3541 (Include paid distribution above nominal rate, advertiser's proof copies, and exchange copies)	994	2846
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

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a. Paid Electronic Copies	0	0
b. Total Paid Print Copies (Line 16c) + Paid Electronic Copies (Line 16a)	4136	2855
c. Total Print Distribution (Line 16f) + Paid Electronic Copies (Line 16a)	4136	4056
d. Percent Paid (Both Print & Electronic Copies) (16b divided by 16c × 100)	100%	100%

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17. Publication of Statement of Ownership

☑ If the publication is a general publication, publication of this statement is required. Will be printed in the 12/1/21 issue of this publication. ☐ Publication not required.

18. Signature and Title of Editor, Publisher, Business Manager, or Owner: Donald P. Wright, Deputy Director. Date: 09/15/2021

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

Gen. Colin Luther Powell, U.S. Army, Retired

5 April 1937–18 October 2021

Military Review and the Army University Press remember Gen. (retired) Colin Luther Powell, who died on 18 October 2021 at Walter Reed National Military Medical Center in Bethesda, Maryland, of complications from COVID-19. He was eighty-four years old. Powell was a role model for generations of officers as he attained the highest levels of military and civilian leadership.

Powell was born 5 April 1937 to Jamaican immigrants and raised in the South Bronx. He received his commission through the Reserve Officers' Training Corps in June 1958 City College of New York.

As a captain, Powell served in Vietnam as a South Vietnamese Army advisor from 1962 to 1963, where he was wounded while on patrol when he stepped on a punji stick. As a major, he served a second tour from 1968 to 1969 as an executive officer and the deputy G-3 with the 23rd (Americal) Division. During his second tour, Powell earned a Soldier's Medal for rescuing the passengers of a burning helicopter (including the division commander) that had crashed with Powell aboard.

He was soon recognized as a rising star in the Army. He was assigned as the senior military assistant to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, and he assisted Weinberger during the 1983 invasion of Grenada and the 1986 airstrike on Libya. Then Lt. Gen. Powell subsequently served as V Corps commander in 1986.

Powell served as fifteenth National Security Advisor under Ronald Reagan from November 1987 to January 1989. He was the first Black American to serve in that position. Powell continued his trailblazing when he was appointed as the first Black chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton. He served in this position from October 1989 to September 1993, during which time he oversaw the U.S. invasion of Panama and the defeat of Iraq during Operation Desert Storm. He retired from the Army in 1993.

He continued serving his country as a civilian. From January 2001 to January 2005, he served as the first Black U.S. Secretary of State under George W. Bush.

Powell wrote his autobiography, *My American Journey*, in 1995, and *It Worked for Me: Lessons in Life and Leadership* in 2012.

He is survived by his wife, Alma Powell, son Michael, and daughters Linda and Annmarie. ■

Clockwise from top left: Then Secretary of State Colin Powell convenes with others in the Presidential Emergency Operations Center in Washington, D.C., after the attacks of 11 September 2001 took place. (Photo courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration) Then Brig. Gen. Colin Powell served as the deputy commander of the Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, from August 1982 to June 1983. (Photo courtesy of the Fort Leavenworth Historian's Office) A bust of former U.S. secretary of state and former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, retired Gen. Colin Powell, was unveiled 5 September 2014 during a ceremony honoring Powell at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. It was given a place of honor in the Circle of Firsts at the Buffalo Soldier Monument. (Photo by Scott Gibson)

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PB-100-21-11/12

Headquarters, Department of the Army

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Distribution is unlimited–Distribution A

PIN: 211273-000