

The background image of the magazine cover shows the interior of a large military transport aircraft, likely a C-17 Globemaster III. The cargo bay is filled with various equipment and supplies. In the foreground, a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter is being loaded onto a pallet. Several soldiers in camouflage uniforms are visible: one is standing on the helicopter's side, another is near the front door, and two others are on the ground assisting with the loading process. The aircraft's structure, including the floor and overhead storage bins, is clearly visible.

Military Review

THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF THE U.S. ARMY

SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 2021

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2121803



Cover photo: Aerial porters work with maintainers to load a UH-60L Blackhawk helicopter into a C-17 Globemaster III 16 June 2021 in support of the Resolute Support retrograde mission in Afghanistan. (Photo by Sgt. 1st Class Corey Vandiver, U.S. Army)

Next page: Photo by Ludvig Hedenborg, www.pexels.com.



The Loss of Private Waller

by Maj. Jerry Drew, U.S. Army


Pray for Private Waller, boys,
He's somewhere in the sand—
Another red-haired mother's son
At Uncle Sam's command.

The sun may burn his freckled face
And bake his freckled skin,
The wind may rip and tear and make
A quite new man of him.

But seas still ripple far away
Beyond those western dunes,
And stars still twinkle down upon
The surface of the moon,

And God may look down from those stars,
By God, I hope he does,
For men have made this Earth a Hell,
And the devil's here with us.

So pray for Private Waller, men.
Lord, lead him safely home,
And may we all soon pass the glass—
Still lost, but not alone.



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Lt. Col. Jon V. Erickson, U.S. Army Reserve

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Lt. Col. John Kendall, U.S. Army

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Urban environments present complex challenges for medical operations. Two medical professionals discuss how the medical community needs to be cognizant of gaps in security in an urban environment and develop applicable skills and concepts to mitigate the potential risks.

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Using Character Development and Education to Combat Partisan Polarization in the Military

Maj. Johnathon D. Parker, U.S. Army

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To gain a competitive advantage in multi-domain operations, the Army must invest heavily in developing future information capabilities. The author argues that establishment of an information warfighting function would require the U.S. Army to fund and integrate information efforts more deliberately into the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war.

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This Future Warfare Writing Program (FWWP) story describes a Chinese cyberattack on the United States and the chilling effects it has on the personal lives of an American family. The FWWP was created to generate ideas about possible complexities of future warfare as presented in the Army Operating Concept.

REVIEW ESSAY

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Suggested Themes and Topics

Europe/Central Command/ Indo-Pacific Command

- Contiguous and noncontiguous operations
- New operational environment: adversaries operating in their “near abroad” (close proximity to own borders)
- Peer and near-peer adversaries contesting U.S. joint force in all domains

Large-Scale Combat Operations/ Multi-Domain Operations

- Division as a formation
- Air and antimissile defense
- Deep operations
- Information advantage/military deception
- Field Manual 3-0—competition continuum (competition, crisis, conflict)
- Multi-domain task force
- Recon and security/cavalry operations
- Protection and security (air defense artillery, engineer, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, cavalry)


Joint Operations

- Air/sea/land integration
- Joint/long-range precision fires
- Air and antimissile defense
- Joint forcible entry

Soldiers conduct combat operations 15 December 2019 in an undisclosed location. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Alex Manne, U.S. Army)

Other Topics

- Military role within interagency responses to the COVID-19 pandemic and other natural or humanitarian disasters
- What is the role for the Army/Reserve components in homeland security operations? What must the Army be prepared to do in support of internal security? Along our borders?
- Role of security force assistance brigades (SFAB) in the gray-zone competition phase drawn from experience of an SFAB in Africa or Europe
- What must be done to adjust junior leader development to the modern operational environment?
- What logistical challenges does the U.S. military foresee due to infrastructure limitations in potential foreign areas of operation, and how can it mitigate them?
- Defending against biological warfare—examination of the war waged by other than conventional military weapons



Clausewitz's Perspective on Detering Russian Malign Activities in Cyberspace

Lt. Col. Jon V. Erickson, U.S. Army Reserve

In mid-December 2020, Russia was discovered to have pulled off one of the biggest espionage hacks in the world when FireEye, a cybersecurity firm, disclosed that it had suffered an intrusion. FireEye determined that Russian threat actors who compromised the SolarWinds' Orion platform conducted the intrusion. The "hack resulted in attackers reading the email communications at the U.S. Treasury and Commerce departments."¹

Some questions raised have revolved around why the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's EINSTEIN program was unable to catch these threat actors. Created in 2003, the program provides an automated process to collect, correlate, analyze, and share security information across the federal government.² Others have asked why the U.S. Cyber Command's (USCYBERCOM) Defend Forward strategy was unable to identify or detect this activity. While these kinds of questions are helpful for reexamining the U.S. government's assumptions, tactics, and strategies for defending its data, infrastructure, and personnel, it may be more helpful to start with two fundamental questions: What are Russia's political objectives? How does this cyber operation support those objectives?

Carl von Clausewitz's *On War* provides a strong reason for understanding an adversary's political objective. He states that "the political object—the original motive for war—will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires."³ This article will leverage Clausewitz's insights on expenditure of effort, political repercussions, friction, and people's war to provide a lens through which senior leaders can direct or guide operations in cyberspace in a way that is integrated with operations in other domains in order to conduct multi-domain operations. Additionally,

understanding Russia's political objectives with the SolarWinds compromise will allow military strategists to provide a tailored approach to disrupt, deny, degrade, or deter future Russian actions in cyberspace against the United States and its allies.

Russia's Worldview

Before attempting to understand Russia's political objectives with the SolarWinds hack, it is first important to recognize that Russia believes it is at war with the West. Russia views the current U.S.-led international order as posing an existential threat to Russian national interests. One example is the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). While the United States views NATO's strategic role as a stabilizing force throughout the Eurozone, Russia sees NATO's expansion as encirclement and "reflect[s] both real concerns about losing influence in its near abroad and paranoia of a NATO invasion facilitated by NATO's growing military presence on Russia's borders."⁴

Feeding Russian suspicions about NATO's role in the democratization of former Soviet satellite countries were the preceding color revolutions and subsequent NATO membership requests. While the West celebrated these pro-democracy protests for leading to newly democratic states, Russia viewed these color revolutions in its sphere

Next page: A widely circulated meme loosely depicting Russian President Vladimir Putin in the likeness of Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz. Clausewitz is widely respected as a military theorist who described in sophisticated detail the necessary connection between properly conceived acts of war and successfully achieving specific political objectives. (Image courtesy of BakeNecko via Wikimedia Commons)



of influence as “Western-organized coups designed to subvert the legitimate authorities.”⁵ Additionally, whereas the United States believes in the free flow of information as a major bedrock principle of Western democracies, Russia believes that the United States is conducting a sophisticated information operations campaign against Russia—exposing corruption, nepotism, and abuse of power—“to destabilize the Russian government and political system.”⁶ Given NATO encirclement and U.S. information warfare, Russia believes it is at war with the West, in particular the United States and NATO, and must overturn the U.S.-led international order.

From the Kremlin’s viewpoint, the United States is employing a new form of warfare against Russia in which “long-distance, contactless actions against the enemy are becoming the main means of achieving combat and operational goals.”⁷ Russia’s lesson learned from these color revolutions is that the ability to mobilize a local population to take action under the influence of a foreign power can be just as effective as the foreign power taking military action itself. Gen. Valery Gerasimov, chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, has stated that in this new form of warfare, “he would consider economic and non-military government targets fair game.”⁸ This last statement provides an explanation as to why Russian threat actors believe they are justified in hacking businesses used by the U.S. government such as SolarWinds. This begs the question, in support of what political objectives?

Russian Grand Strategy

Russia’s grand strategy is to replace the United States as the lone hegemonic power with a multipolar world composed of several power centers, with Russia as one of those powers. Russian “ends” can be broken into three key objectives: exclusive sphere of influence, recognition of and treatment as a great power, and constraint of U.S. global influence.⁹ The key objective of Russian grand strategy is to reestablish its own exclusive sphere of influence where it is able to impose control within its near abroad with little interference from outside powers.

In Russia, preserving Vladimir Putin’s power and reestablishing the Russian sphere of influence are very much intertwining interests. When Putin returned to the presidency for a second time in 2012, mass protests greeted him across Russia. This “reinforced his fears of externally-supported opposition as a threat to his rule.”¹⁰ As a result, whether it is due to Putin’s personal fear of threats to his rule or due to the country’s deep-seated geopolitical insecurity, the Kremlin sees constraining U.S. influence as setting conditions that allows Russia to regain its status as a power center in Eurasia.

Reflecting on U.S. actions, Gerasimov wrote, “The scale of the casualties and destruction, the catastrophic social, economic, and political consequences, such new-type conflicts are comparable with the consequences of any real war.”¹¹ Russia’s view is that “warfare is more than a simply armed conflict, it’s rather the combination of military and non-military means, the result of which is that for each specific tactical objectives and war theater, a different strategy is needed. For example, the tactical base for Ukraine is Low-Intensity Conflict, while in Georgia it was more like conventional linear tactics.”¹²

Clausewitz on Russia

In light of Gerasimov’s statement, Clausewitz’s tenets provide a relevant lens to view how Russia plans to achieve its grand strategy. Gerasimov believes “frontal engagements of large formations of forces at the strategic and operational level are gradually becoming a thing of the past.”¹³ By utilizing Clausewitz’s thought to minimize its expenditure of effort, Russia is pursuing a grand strategy that increases the likelihood of success without requiring defeat of its adversary in battle. Additionally, a student of Clausewitz would also pursue objectives “that have *direct political repercussions*, that are designed in the first place to disrupt the opposing alliances, or to paralyze it, that gain [Russia] new allies, favorably affect the political scene, etc. ... [to] form a much shorter route to the goal than the destruction of the opposing armies.”¹⁴ Clausewitz posits that if the expenditure of efforts exceeds the political objective, then peace must follow.

Next page: Russian President Vladimir Putin has reputedly used nonstate hackers and other criminal elements to disrupt and degrade U.S. government institutions including the military, private industry, and economic institutions. Collectively, these efforts are weakening the United States’ power and influence on the world stage. These same illicit entities have attacked and undermined the governments and economies of Western Europe as well as states that were formerly part of the Soviet Union. (Graphic elements courtesy of Etienne Marais, www.pexels.com; zlatko_plamenov and starline, www.freepik.com. Composite graphic by Arin Burgess, Army University Press)

These efforts can be seen in Russian attacks against Estonia, Georgia, and Ukraine.

To increase the likelihood of achieving its grand strategy of creating a multipolar world, Russia leverages the diplomatic and information instrument of power “to bring about a gradual exhaustion of [the West’s] physical and moral resistance.”¹⁵ What has amplified the effectiveness of these nonkinetic instruments of power is the cyber domain. Not only has cyberspace provided Russian threat actors the means to penetrate a foreign nation’s infrastructure but also influence its population. So far, the risks and costs to Russia of continuing its malign activities are not enough to outweigh the perceived gains. A potential strategic gain relating to Russia’s SolarWinds hack is to diminish U.S. influence by making other governments question how the United States can protect them if the United States cannot even protect its own critical infrastructure.

One reason there are more theories than facts to explain the reason for Russian hacking is summarized by Jeremy Hunt, the United Kingdom’s foreign secretary, who said, “These cyber attacks serve no

legitimate national security interest, instead impacting the ability of people around the world to go about their daily lives free from interference, and even their ability to enjoy sport The [Russian] GRU’s actions are reckless and indiscriminate.”¹⁶ While it is reasonable to assume that Russian malign activities may not serve a strategic purpose, Clausewitz warns not to think of actions as indiscriminate. By “ignoring the fact that they are links in a continuous chain of events, we also ignore the possibility that their possessions may later lead to definite disadvantages” that constrain U.S. global influence.¹⁷

Russian tactics may instead be introducing the element that Clausewitz calls “friction” to weaken the capacity of international and government institutions to respond to Russian aggression.



The combination of Russian foreign policy to provide strategic chances to achieve its interests and gray-zone activities to introduce friction are acting in concert to undermine the functioning of democratic institutions that then leads rivals to perceive Russia as attaining global power status. While friction can be overcome, Clausewitz warns of the danger of friction when it encounters chance, as chance is what “makes everything more uncertain and

be unmasked “and hope it is passed forward to national decisionmakers ... [to] force the target to recalculate its correlation of forces against the attacker.”²³ By demonstrating its capabilities, Russia is posing a dilemma upon the West. Slow down or stop the acceptance of new NATO members such as Ukraine or Georgia; alternatively devote substantially more resources towards strengthening the resiliency of its members to resist and

“ Understanding that Russia’s most likely political objective with the SolarWinds hack is part of continued Russian efforts to constrain U.S. influence, efforts to disrupt, deny, degrade, or deter future Russian actions must keep this political objective in mind. ”

interferes with the whole course of events.”¹⁸ By introducing friction coupled with chance, the Russians are creating opportunities where “countless minor incidents—the kind you can never really foresee” gradually wear down their adversaries to produce decisive results.¹⁹ Russian gray-zone tactics places people as the center of gravity as part of an effort to generate those chances. Thus, a large part of Russia’s calculation rests on its ability to influence “the character of the people and the government, the nature of the country, and its political affiliations.”²⁰ With the SolarWinds breach, the Russian government may be looking to create doubts among the U.S. population about its own government’s ability to protect its infrastructure, to have both Congress and the military spending resources to determine the extent of the hack and potentially rebuild networks, to introduce cybersecurity measures that assure the integrity of the data but at the cost of slowing down the military decision-making process, or all of the above. By introducing friction wherever possible, Russia is introducing a “force that makes the apparently easy so difficult” and creates chances that favor accomplishing Russian objectives.²¹

The SolarWinds hack is an operation that is tied most closely to another Russian means to achieve its political objective and that is to brandish its cyberattack capabilities as another form of power. As Clausewitz states, “When one force is a great deal stronger than the other ... there will be no fighting; the weaker side will yield at once.”²² Thus, Russia may in fact secretly desire to

recover from hybrid or armed attack. Case in point, when Ukraine sought integration with NATO, Russia annexed Crimea. Ukraine must now deal with irregular forces that seek to create conditions that further favor Russian political objectives while NATO determines an appropriate response. Russia’s success in Ukraine sends a signal to countries in Russia’s near abroad that the NATO, and indirectly the United States, security umbrella may not be enough to deter Russian actions, leading these countries to rethink their political alignments.

Another way for Russia to achieve its political objective of constraining U.S. influence globally is to use the hacks to sow suspicion and fear about an open internet, which undermines U.S.-led conversations around information security to instead conform more closely to Russia’s information security doctrine. During the Cold War, Putin saw how Western countries could influence the local population by broadcasting into Soviet territory and today sees similar results with recent pro-democracy color revolutions.²⁴ The Kremlin may see the United States attempting to do the same against Putin’s regime by exposing corruption, nepotism, and abuse of power, which motivates the Kremlin’s desire to control information distribution within Russia. Therefore, by executing cyber operations such as SolarWinds, Russia may be creating conditions where other countries may call for the creation of international laws on information security that may align more closely to Russian desire for a more closed off internet. Not only could this insulate

Russia from real or imagined threats, but it could also create international digital rules of engagement that will limit the ability of the United States to threaten Russia or those in Russia's perceived sphere of influence.

Understanding that Russia's most likely political objective with the SolarWinds hack is part of continued Russian efforts to constrain U.S. influence, efforts to disrupt, deny, degrade, or deter future Russian actions must keep this political objective in mind. Countering Russian aggression or provocation will require all national instruments of power—diplomatic, information, military, and economic. While recognizing that the full levers of national power must be exercised to counter Russian aggression, the rest of this article is limited to actions that the United States can employ in cyberspace as part of a broader military strategy.

Defending Forward

Before starting down the road of taking military action, leaders need to understand that misperception and miscalculation are two major risks in cyberspace. In any domain, especially in cyber, deciphering intent and attributing actions are two difficult issues to tackle. The definition of attribution can be many things—a machine, a location, the person who pressed the keys, the organization that supports the person, the person's motivation, and more—but also carries a certain amount of uncertainty such as the possibility of misdirection. The same can be said with miscalculating whether an intent was malicious, in self-defense, or somewhere in between. Taking action prematurely based on false information “is as likely to lead to ill-timed action as to ill-timed inaction and is no more conducive to slowing down operations than it is to speeding them up.”²⁵ This leads into the crux of the issue when it comes to developing a military strategy for cyberspace.

The main issue is that “it is estimated that up to 90 per cent of the infrastructure that compromises cyberspace is privately owned, with the remaining 10 per cent or so owned by governments.”²⁶ This is problematic with regard to what actions the military or any government organization can legally take in cyberspace. Therefore, USCYBERCOM's Defend Forward strategy must be one of many tools that the U.S. government employs in its efforts to counter Russian malign activities in cyberspace. Given that cyberspace is essential for nearly every basic function of modern society, the U.S. military must be careful of gray-zone encroachment where the United States

attempts a Sisyphean effort to turn the neutral and open internet into either blue or red space.

To achieve Russian political objectives, several elements of Russian gray-zone activities utilize what Clausewitz called “the people's war” to create the conditions for regime change. He states that “any nation that uses it intelligently will, as a rule, gain some superiority over those who disdain its use.”²⁷ For too long, Russia was one of a small group of countries to strategically harness this element of warfighting because Russia had a much broader definition of war. In contrast, the United States and other Western countries had a dichotomous definition of either being at war or not. However, the U.S. 2021 *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance* remedies this by recognizing the need to compete across the spectrum of conflict to deter gray-zone actions.²⁸ This need for the United States to compete and win in activities below the level of armed conflict lends itself well to an important Clausewitzian thought that USCYBERCOM is beginning to deploy with its Defend Forward strategy.

Clausewitz's concept of a people's war does not have to be limited to the Russian use of overthrowing or compelling regime change. It can also be a tool to deter Russian aggression toward NATO allies and other European partners, as well as other countries in its near abroad. Further building upon Clausewitz's thought on waging a people's war, the United States and its allies could employ state (such as other government organizations) and nonstate actors (e.g., contractors) in cyberspace, “not [to] be employed against the main enemy force ... [but] to operate in areas just outside the theater of war—where the invader will not appear

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in strength—in order to *deny him these areas altogether*.²⁹ With the ever-looming threat of attack, ambush, or denial, Russia's only answer is to send out "frequent escorts as protection for his convoys, and as guards on all his stopping places, bridges, defiles, and the rest."³⁰ This is, in essence, the goal of the Defend Forward strategy of narrowing sanctuaries and turning the neutral, open gray space of the internet into more contested space from the Russian perspective. The goal is to "persistently contest malicious cyberspace actors to generate continuous tactical, operational, and strategic advantage."³¹

An analogy that may help explain the concept of conducting a "people's war" in cyberspace is to think about how the U.S. military conducted counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. In COIN, "the insurgent wins if he does not lose. The counterinsurgent loses if he does not win."³² The same can be applied to hackers. Just as in a COIN environment, the Defend Forward strategy is about demonstrating long-term commitment to bolster the public's faith in the government to protect and defend its citizens in cyberspace. Just as a military cannot win in a COIN environment by applying an offensive approach, USCYBERCOM has taken

U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) members work 2 April 2021 in the Integrated Cyber Center, Joint Operations Center at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland. USCYBERCOM is the military's frontline force engaged in mitigating Russian as well as other adversarial cyberattacks against the United States. (Photo by Josef Cole)

the same approach in cyberspace. Part of the reason is that cyberattacks are essentially single-use attacks. They alert the target to a previous unknown vulnerability that later gets closed or mitigated against. This exposes a paradox of cyberattacks where its use diminishes future cyberattack capabilities of the instigator rather than deter bad behavior by the target. Circling back to the COIN analogy, the United States does not have to win every time, but it must continually reaffirm its commitment to enforcing the rule of law in order to gain the trust and support of the population. This is what the Defend Forward strategy is ultimately about: separating hackers from their cause and support, gathering intelligence to drive operations, placing listening posts as close to the hackers to understand the environment, and more.

While threat hunting and defending forward is a way to increase friction upon Russia malign activities in cyberspace, it is no guarantee of preemptively disrupting ongoing operations—made apparent by the SolarWinds hack. Another issue is that the U.S. *National Defense Strategy* does not impose clearly signaled costs on the

such as stealing intellectual property, conducting espionage, or misinformation activities. Military sales, like energy, undergirds the Kremlin's geopolitical influence. Exposing and attributing the full extent of previously unknown Chinese intellectual property theft activities against Russian companies can expose the Russian-China

“The U.S. *National Defense Strategy* does not impose clearly signaled costs on the adversary to dissuade them from conducting cyber operations against the United States and its allies.”

adversary to dissuade them from conducting cyber operations against the United States and its allies. Costs need to be imposed to deter further action that puts our adversaries “in a situation that is even more unpleasant than the sacrifice you call on him to make. ... Otherwise, the enemy would not give in but wait for things to improve.”³³ The costs have to be high enough to force American rivals to reassess their cost-benefit calculus, which “means leveraging Western strengths in areas such as finance, soft power in third nations, intelligence gathering, and even cyberwarfare.”³⁴ Worst case, the United States and its allies *must* pose dilemmas that will regardless increase risk or pose some kind of cost to Russia.

Responding to Russian Cyber and Gray-Zone Activities

More important is keeping in mind the larger U.S. grand strategy vis-à-vis China, to develop some kind of partnership with Russia to peel it away from China's influence and not upset the European balance of power. There are a couple ways to do so in the domain of cyber. The first is supporting NATO's extension of its core task of collective defense further into the cyber domain by providing our NATO allies and other European partners with training and capabilities to expose, attribute, and deter Russian aggression. Doing so helps those member nations build cyber resilience in their own countries in line with NATO's Article 3, a growing area of importance for the alliance. Second is increasing friction between Russia and China by sharing intelligence regarding Chinese activities in cyberspace that impact Russia

alliance as more of an opportunistic alliance that impairs one of Russia's key objectives of becoming a global power. Finally, Western countries can look for common interests to create avenues for cooperation such as in the realm of information security. Russia's foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, has stated Russian openness to wide cooperation with the West but clarifies that cooperation “would be on Russian terms of a ‘universal feeling of equality and equally guaranteed security.’”³⁵ It is important to pair deterrence activities with compromises that dissuade Russia from seeing the need or opportunity for aggression.

Russia has been refining and escalating its gray-zone tactics to achieve its ultimate objective of creating an uncontested sphere of influence. For the United States to maintain the current rules-based international order, it must reexamine what is required to maintain strategic primacy in this complex global security environment. USCYBERCOM's 2018 Command Vision provide a framework to develop a long-term strategic approach for the military in cyberspace.³⁶ Most important is that this document provides a cyber strategy that aligns with U.S. regional interests in Russia.

Operating in this kind of environment may constitute one of the most demanding challenges for military planners and leaders since World War II. They have to think beyond purely military action and develop objectives that consider all national power elements to shape the strategic environment where a rival's motivations to engage in malign activity are disrupted, denied, degraded, or deterred. Rather than engage in reprisal actions that escalate situations like the SolarWinds hack to crisis

or conflict, the United States must impose cost in a way that requires a change to Russia's cost-benefit calculus. Additionally, Russia has a strong desire to be seen as a global power and be engaged as equals. Thus, future military strategy should keep this in mind.

As a military organization, being able to manage conflict and preserve peace through strength are two core means by which the military deters war. The application of many of Clausewitz's tenets can be used by senior leaders to integrate operations in cyberspace with the

other domains. Understanding and applying Clausewitz's concepts can also be used to devise a tailored deterrence approach that prevents future SolarWinds-like hacks. While the character of war is changing, the fundamental teachings of Clausewitz still remain applicable because the nature of war has not changed. Understanding the political objectives of American adversaries will minimize the risk of military decision-makers falling into the trap of mismatching political-military objectives in deterring future malign activities in cyberspace by Russia. ■

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The Chinese navy conducts its first joint maritime exercise with Djibouti in 2015. China said its then new outpost would be largely to support Chinese forces on missions such as antipiracy patrols off of the Somali coast. (Photo courtesy of the Chinese navy)

Enduring Competition in a New Age of Power

Lt. Col. John Kendall, U.S. Army

The United States is responding to increased adversary influence with a national security strategy focused on strategic competition below the level of armed conflict. The strategy relies on traditional power structures, but these activities, while necessary, are not sufficient in the current competition

environment. It is imperative that indirect approaches be equally prioritized as leaders and institutions work to fix these strategic gaps.

The United States must develop innovative strategic thought, refocus institutions, and refine tactical tools that allow it to execute *enduring competition*.



Employees work at the construction site of the Hunutlu Thermal Power Plant, China's biggest project with direct investment in Turkey, 22 September 2019 in Adana, Turkey. The \$1.7 billion (USD) project spearheaded by the Shanghai Electric Power Company is a flagship project linking the China-proposed Belt and Road Initiative with Turkey's Middle Corridor. (Photo by Zheng Siyuan, Xinhua via Alamy Stock Photo)

Enduring competition is defined here as the judicious use of a nation's power to defend democracy and influence allies and partners to counter adversaries. Enduring competition is critical to any future strategy because its low cost, compared to the costs of military deterrence or economic investment, allows the United States to compete in the periphery. The periphery are nonpriority regions that remain important to strategic competition—given partnerships, their geostrategic positions, or access to natural resources. The United States risks ignoring adversary investments in these areas at its own peril.

China in the Periphery

The People's Republic of China (PRC) is expanding its global influence through a political warfare strategy that promotes autocratic mercantilism. While its actions in the South China Sea are the most

egregious example of Chinese expansion, the United States cannot discount China's activities in Latin America and Africa. The periphery is where the PRC hopes to exploit Western myopia by dislocating the status quo as it propagates "Chinese" values, controls sea and information networks, builds dual-use infrastructure, and most importantly, secures the natural resources necessary for domestic growth. The PRC achieves these objectives through a set of ways and means that generate political power for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

The CCP remains a Leninist system whose control of China rests on three pillars: control of personnel, propaganda, and the People's Liberation Army (PLA).¹ As the CCP gains influence abroad, it is unsurprising that its political warfare strategy is an extension of these core pillars. The CCP relies heavily on its "Three Warfares": public opinion

warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare.² This three-pronged framework guides the CCP's whole-of-government approach as it pushes Chinese narratives in academia, business, and foreign political circles to incrementally and indirectly shift foreign perceptions of China. The PLA's intelligence agencies, state-owned enterprises, China Global Television Network, and a multitude of other state organs are central to executing this strategy.

The PRC's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is the economic initiative that serves as a vehicle for transforming the above strategy into reality. At a time when countries in the periphery sorely need foreign direct investment, the PRC uses official government negotiations, elite capture, and the Chinese diaspora to secure state-sponsored business deals. These purported "win-win" infrastructure deals often transform into a coercive mechanism that the PRC uses to expand its sphere of influence to include countries like Djibouti and Ecuador.

There is substantial global evidence of how the BRI advances the CCP's strategic objectives. In May 2017, the Djiboutian government and the China Merchants Group inaugurated a rehabilitated Doraleh Container Terminal and free trade zone, followed that July by a military base for the PLA navy.³ The new commercial and military complex sits ten kilometers from Camp Lemonnier, a U.S. military base, and provides strategic overwatch of the Gulf of Aden and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait.⁴ Djibouti is estimated to owe China \$1.2 billion in sovereign debt.⁵ This strategic investment connects China to the Suez Canal and Indian Ocean trade basin, which includes the ports of Hambantota, Sri Lanka, and Gwadar, Pakistan—both of which China acquired through debt diplomacy.⁶

A similar pattern can be found in Latin America, where China has become the second-largest trading partner after the United States, with trade booming from \$17 billion in 2002 to \$315 billion by 2019.⁷ China is now the primary trading partner for Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay, where it harvests ore (32 percent of imports), mineral fuels (19 percent), soybeans (16.7 percent), and copper (5.6 percent). President Xi Jinping plans to increase trade to the region to \$500 billion by 2025.⁸ To be sure, this level of economic trade is beneficial to the region on a macrolevel as exports increase, especially for agricultural

and mineral powerhouses such as Brazil and Chile. However, smaller countries, desperate for capital, often suffer the consequences of Chinese easy money.⁹


Ecuador became a victim of Chinese debt-diplomacy under leftist President Rafael Correa, who negotiated away 90 percent of exportable crude for \$6.5 billion in Chinese loans.¹⁰ Faced with a huge budget deficit, Correa's democratically elected successor, Lenin Moreno, negotiated Ecuador out of this onerous deal by first readopting neoliberal policies that led to a \$17.4 billion International Monetary Fund bailout. China contributed \$2 billion and granted a yearlong amnesty on capital repayments, while offering Ecuador fresh loans.¹¹ Despite the respite, China retains Ecuadorean oil as collateral, potentially influencing Ecuador's response to a recent uproar over Chinese illegal fishing off the coast of the Galapagos Islands.¹²

Panama's recognition of China is particularly disturbing given the Panama Canal's strategic value as a commercial, financial, and communications hub. It appears that the PRC's diplomatic coup was carefully planned and brokered through secretive negotiations with then President Juan Carlos Varela.¹³ Panama became the first country in Latin America to sign on to the BRI; fourteen other countries subsequently joined after Ecuador became a member in December 2018.

The PRC capitalized on its victory by commencing construction on the Panama Colon Container Port at the canal's Atlantic entrance.¹⁴ Future plans include investment in the economically depressed Colon Free Trade Zone and the construction of a liquid natural gas power plant.¹⁵ On the Pacific side of the canal, the Chinese constructed a new convention center; won the contract to build the fourth bridge across the Panama Canal in a murky bidding process, and are actively building a cruise terminal.¹⁶ Many of these initiatives have since stalled with the election of President Laurentino Cortizo as Panama reevaluates its relationship with China.¹⁷

These examples demonstrate how China

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competes on the global stage to achieve its national objectives but also how stable democratic governments are critical to thwarting Chinese malign behavior. The PRC is dedicated, disciplined, and daring in the execution of a strategy that incorporates a whole-of-nation approach, but it is vulnerable when confronted by strong institutions and an informed population. The United States must bolster vulnerable allies and partners, especially at a time when the coronavirus is devastating the periphery's economies. A U.S. response will require an audacious use of national power, but first we must understand the nature of political warfare.

Political Warfare: Not a New Way of War

Political warfare is not a new way of war, but it is also not a well-known theory of war. The dissolution of the Soviet Union seemed to diminish its relevance, while the post-9/11 Global War on Terrorism focused on irregular warfare, which is the military subset of political warfare. Political warfare's subversive nature and willingness to circumvent the rules and norms of international statecraft make it asymmetric, nontraditional,

An Ecuadorian navy officer looks at images of fishing boats on a device 7 August 2020 after a fishing fleet of mostly Chinese-flagged ships was detected in an international corridor that borders the Galapagos Islands' exclusive economic zone in the Pacific Ocean. (Photo by Santiago Arcos, Reuters via Alamy Stock Photo)

and controversial in Western society. The political warfare spectrum includes the unrestricted use of national power and leverages zeitgeist (the spirit of the times) to influence allies and adversaries.

A foreign power can use political warfare to economically pressure a government, threaten it with conventional force, or undermine its legitimacy by harnessing the current zeitgeist. Zeitgeist is the generational theme of a society.¹⁸ Zeitgeist tends to be radical, revolutionary, and the ideological foundation for conflict that upsets the ruling political paradigm. Sociopolitical ideologies are the foundation of civilization, and as new ones rise, they create tension that challenges the established order. Examples of this creative destruction include the Protestant Reformation's challenge to Catholicism, America's concept of popular sovereignty,

Napoleonic nationalism's destruction of monarchy, Adam Smith's victory over mercantilism, and Marx-Lenin's assault on the bourgeoisie's capitalistic state.

Today's zeitgeist is the product of globalization's unintended consequences of widening economic inequality and an information revolution. The "globalized" disenfranchised feel lost, fearful, and resent-

institutions to properly address these grievances while instilling skepticism of malign influence.

The United States struggles to implement enduring competition given authorities, institutional boundaries, and an engagement model that prioritizes foreign governments and military entities over the population. Engaging a foreign population may appear to violate

“Enduring competition does not seek regime change but instead the moderate and indirect defense of democracy, civil society, human rights, and mutual interests.”

ful, while the “globalizing” winners fight for greater integration. Populist leaders and external actors hijack this phenomenon to create a climate of cynicism, mistrust, and hatred that widens the divides between powerful and powerless, rural and urban, conservative and liberal, and nativist and immigrant communities.¹⁹ Populism has always used information mechanisms to spread its message, but never in human history have super computers subconsciously hacked human emotion. Today's information revolution gives political warfare strategists immense power.

Adversaries are ruthlessly implementing political warfare across the spectrum of conflict to achieve their strategic objectives. The PRC has cleverly cloaked its influence of governments, populations, and businesses by recruiting clients into its economic orbit. This is why the United States cannot focus solely on its traditional power mechanisms. The interagency, to include the military, must create innovative and economical means to compete with and disrupt adversary political warfare.

Enduring Competition: A Necessary Way to Compete

Enduring competition fixes scale and scope shortfalls by reinforcing institutions and empowering governments and populations to expose malign influence. This important contribution blunts populism, division, and an authoritarian world view with false promises of “win-win.” Enduring competition reinforces counter-corruption efforts and provides economic and educational opportunities for threatened populations. It fosters the necessary trust in civil society for democratic

Western norms of noninterference in another country's domestic affairs, but it is not without precedent. Since 1961, the United States has promoted democracy by encouraging the transition to or improvement of democratic institutions in other countries.²⁰

U.S. democracy promotion assistance serves as a model for enduring competition. Democracy promotion assistance strengthens governments, institutions, and democratic participation by providing electoral and municipal support, judicial reform, and law enforcement reform, and by highlighting the importance of human rights and the rule of law.²¹ State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs; the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); and the National Endowment for Democracy, a Washington, D.C.-based private nonprofit organization, are primarily responsible for providing this assistance. Democracy promotion's controversial association with neoconservative justification for regime change in Iraq is problematic, but we should not discount its significant contribution to enduring competition.²²

Enduring competition does not seek regime change but instead the moderate and indirect defense of democracy, civil society, human rights, and mutual interests. Enduring competition strengthens civil society while undercutting the PRC's economic influence by empowering local groups with organizational training, judicious funding, and voice amplification to identify, monitor, and disrupt adversary intentions. The strategy echoes counterterrorism approaches by inoculating local populations against radicalism.

Enduring competition helps counter PRC malign influence and activities and paints the United States as a more desirable partner among foreign populations. This approach is important because PRC investment in the periphery is not merely focused on large-scale

The goal of enduring competition is to defend democracy and disrupt adversary tempo through foreign partners. This mechanism is a complementary but not competing effort to traditional deterrence and diplomacy. It is not a silver bullet, but it promises preventive



An Ifras Water Center technician adjusts the water intake settings 26 March 2018 according to the new operations and maintenance protocol introduced by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Iraq Governance and Performance Accountability (IGPA)/Takamul Project in Erbil, Iraq. With the help of USAID, IGPA supports the water directorates across Iraq provinces and in the Kurdistan region to better respond to citizens' urgent calls for stable potable water services by reengineering the water system's workflow and operations. Projects like this help the United States compete with China by offering more attractive options for foreign partnerships. (Photo by Maria Lourdes Luces, IGPA/Takamul Project)

development projects such as ports and dams but delves into local to provincial investments. Investment in these small-scale economies is attractive to many local and national elites but carries risk to the detriment of disenfranchised populations. Indigenous groups, labor unions, and other groups recognize that PRC investments carry long-term costs such as irresponsible resource extraction, environmental damage, and labor standards violations. These grievances are ripe opportunities through which the United States can subtly disrupt PRC objectives.

action if policy makers are willing to invest in U.S. institutions that facilitate interagency coordination.

Making it Work

Western governments shy away from gray methods that operate in the space between the binary choices of war and peace because they are designed to operate in these two modalities. The United States must adjust its institutions and culture to one of enduring competition so that it can use its national power to

defend democracy and counter adversary political warfare. One way to compete is to establish country engagement centers (CEC) in U.S. embassies.

U.S. diplomatic missions can determine the appropriate use of enduring competition through CECs that plan, execute, and evaluate enduring competi-

Enduring competition may entail a national-level institution or greater coordination by the National Security Council, but success lies in planning and executing enduring competition at the lowest level. The above model attempts to resolve the complexity of implementation by integrating authorities and decon-

“Countering adversary influence through enduring competition will necessitate leaders recalculate their risk appetite and clearly demarcate each organization’s roles, functions, and missions as it moves toward an integrated and networked culture.”

tion campaigns. The ambassador or chief of mission (CoM) has the authority, interagency influence, and innate knowledge of the operational environment to make this model feasible. The CoM would have approval authority over CEC initiatives and provide guidance to an interagency steering committee, which would incentivize initiatives at the country team level and ensure that enduring competition plans are synched with the embassy’s integrated country strategy.

The steering committee would be comprised of the political counselor, the senior defense official/defense attaché, the public affairs officer, the treasury attaché, the commerce attaché and the USAID mission director, and it would be led by the deputy chief of mission or another qualified embassy official. The day-to-day work of the CEC would be conducted by an interagency planning team that submits draft enduring competition plans to the steering committee for review.

The Department of State, USAID, Department of Commerce, and the Department of the Treasury are key players given their overt engagement with the government and population. The interagency must enhance and support their efforts without compromising their legitimacy. Outside of these traditional efforts, enabling support to disenfranchised groups is a novel way to resist adversary misinformation and economic malpractice vice attributable U.S. actions that might delegitimize native efforts. Strongly worded statements, diplomatic demarches, and military deployments set red lines, but their ephemeral nature falls short in blunting adversaries.

flicting interests at the speed of relevance. It calls for a review of institutional roles, authorities, and capabilities to determine if they address the current strategic environment. These operations can span from transparent public diplomacy to covert operations, but they require the ambassador to be the final arbiter of risk.

Conclusion

Leaders should recognize the value of enduring competition despite the risks and reassess how the whole-of-government can provide a powerful way to compete against adversaries. Naturally, there are concerns as to who bears responsibility of compromised operations, escalation, and unintended consequences. Leaders will ask about return on investment and opportunity costs as this initiative will involve multiyear funding, training, and a reevaluation of priorities, but it is a bargain when compared to traditional power mechanisms.

Countering adversary influence through enduring competition will necessitate leaders recalculate their risk appetite and clearly demarcate each organization’s roles, functions, and missions as it moves toward an integrated and networked culture. Some leaders will cautiously embrace enduring competition campaigns since fallout from exposed operations risks damaging foreign relationships. Others may be unfamiliar with department and agency authorities due to the infrequency of such actions.

Decision calculations must weigh the costs of inactivity, reacting to adversary action, and risk of escalation. Risk is directly correlated with the type of action

and the permissiveness of the environment. In general, risk increases as the environment turns increasingly nonpermissive and operations become more secretive. This is first-order risk as the initiation of competition will undoubtedly elicit a reaction from adversaries. Second-order risk involves tit-for-tat escalation, as seen in the U.S.-China trade war that saw a combination of tariffs, overt messaging, and ultimately, legal actions against Chinese companies such as Huawei and TikTok.

The vast majority of enduring competition operations should be overt, attributable, and conducted with the tacit knowledge or active participation of the partner nation. Diplomatic messaging cautioning the Colombian government and population about the dangers of a Chinese telecommunications company is relatively low risk compared to a misattributable messaging operation that influences a population to contest a Chinese port deal. Empowering an indigenous group to protest environmental damage generated by a Chinese dam or mine will incense local and maybe international business elites but defame China's image as a reputable partner. The calibration of this tool is key.

To help manage this risk, policy makers should recognize the value of CECs as an immediate mechanism for countering rising adversary influence that seeks to undermine democratic institutions, fair markets, and civil society. CECs prioritize CoM authority and State oversight while integrating interagency

expertise to provide nontraditional options. The Department of Defense has a role to play as it challenges the PLA. The Department of Defense must also recognize that enduring competition is complementary to deterrence operations.

In short, enduring competition provides a novel way for the United States and its partners to compete below the level of armed conflict. This mechanism is particularly suited to the periphery due to endemic resource constraints. Concerns regarding risk are valid but can be mitigated and are outweighed by the risk of inaction in the face of our adversaries' broad use of political warfare. The promotion of democracy and the countering of malign influence by, with, and through local- to national-level partners is necessary to preserve the current world order not only today but also indefinitely. ■

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
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The Battle for Hong Kong

Insights on Narrative and Resistance for the Army in Strategic Competition

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It's not just a Hong Kong problem. It's an international problem. Today Hong Kong, tomorrow Japan. That's why I come all the way from Japan to support the protest today.

—Sakura, Hong Kong protester from Japan

Narrative, oppression, and resistance are timeless aspects of adversarial competition. On 15 March 2019, all three were on display as Hong Kong, a special administrative region of China, became a frontline battleground of the twenty-first-century competition between democratic and authoritarian systems. Members of a pro-democracy group stormed the Hong Kong Central Government Complex as guards rushed to lock the doors in a futile effort to stop them. It was too late—the first of the Fugitive Offenders Bill protests had officially begun.

The 2019–2020 Hong Kong protests indicate that competition is more about ideas and less about lethal hardware. Modern warfare is embroiled in a war of words and a battle to influence not only internal or regional communities but also global communities. The Army has a critical role to play in this information environment. There are lessons from Hong Kong the Army must apply that concern controlling the narrative

to influence multiple audiences, such as exploiting information communication technology and leveraging proxies and partners, with special attention to nonviolent resistance against authoritarianism (see table 1, page 26). The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's *Exploitation of Strategic Conditions in 2035* study serves as an analytical framework, highlighting these elements as critical to achieving advantage over an adversary.

Moreover, narrative and influence are essential elements of irregular warfare. The United States is not shifting away from irregular warfare to great-power competition; irregular warfare is a constant and serves as a principal way to compete.¹ Hong Kong reminds us why it is essential to think broadly about Army contributions across the entire competition continuum, especially using irregular warfare below the level of armed conflict to gain advantage in indirect competition.²

The Specter of Black Swans and Gray Rhinos

China's biggest threat to stability is internal dissension. The Hong Kong protests not only confirm its worries but also offer insight into ways to impose political and financial costs on China. Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership has devoted vast resources since 2012 to



A protester holds up the Hong Kong flag 21 June 2019 outside of the police headquarters in Hong Kong. Thousands of protesters converged to demand the resignation of the city's pro-Beijing leader and the release of demonstrators arrested during the territory's worst political crisis in decades. (Photo by Philip Fong, Agence France-Presse)

prevent threats from the “five new black categories” that include “human rights attorneys, underground churches, dissidents, leading commentators on the Internet, and members of disadvantaged sectors in society.”³

In 2019, CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping emphasized the need to “keep our highest alert about ‘black swan’ [i.e., unforeseen] incidents and take steps to prevent ‘gray rhino’ [i.e., known risks that are ignored] incidents.”⁴ Such events include the nonviolent, pro-democracy color revolutions of the mid-2000s in former Soviet states and the Arab Spring in the early 2010s.⁵ China’s 2019 *National Defense in the New Era* paper specifically highlighted the acute threat of separatism, like in Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang.⁶ Protesters and CCP leadership alike understand that the competition between democracy and authoritarianism is not just a Hong Kong problem.

The protests resulted from the Hong Kong government introducing the Fugitive Offenders Amendment

Bill. Ostensibly intended to “plug loopholes” to prevent the city from becoming a criminal safe haven, the bill would subject activists and journalists to detention, unfair trials, and torture under Chinese laws by circumventing the “one country, two systems” construct.⁷ In reaction, the protesters issued five key demands: rescind the bill, resignation of Chief Executive Carrie Lam, investigate police brutality, release all arrested protesters, and implement greater democratic reforms.⁸ These underlying ideas of criminality and oppression would find fertile ground in conditions afforded by the strategic environment.

Exploitation of the Strategic Conditions

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) G-2 published a study in 2019 titled *Competition in 2035: Anticipating Chinese Exploitation*

of *Operational Environments*. A supporting effort for this study, and subsequent studies on great-power competition, was *Exploitation of Strategic Conditions in 2035*. This document concludes that a persistent state of competition will characterize the future strategic environment where global competitors seek to exploit twenty-four conditions to gain advantage.⁹ Hong Kong suffers from several of these conditions, but the three most significant conditions center on the information environment: competing narratives, information communication technology ubiquity, and the use of proxies (see figure 1, page 27).

Condition 1: Competing narratives. The TRADOC study defines “competing narratives” as the “explanation or interpretations of events/ideas originating from a particular perspective and presented to a target audience in order to gain influence.”¹⁰ From the outset, both Beijing and the protesters sought to exploit the factionalization of society in Hong Kong to advance their respective narratives.

Narrative is an enduring element of adversarial competition, apparent from the American Revolution through today. Social movement theory characterizes this competition in the information environment as “framing”—the process of constructing shared meaning from an event to

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inspire collective action.¹¹ The murder of Jane McCrae by Native Americans allied with the British served this role in the American Revolution by convincing Loyalists to join the rebellion.¹² The Arab Spring recently illustrated this phenomenon, as the self-immolation of Tunisia's Mohammed Bouazizi catalyzed revolutions across the Middle East in 2011.¹³

In Hong Kong, the two factions competing for influence were China and the pro-democracy protesters. China uses the Hong Kong government as its proxy—not in a traditional military sense but rather as an arm of the CCP.¹⁴ Both groups were trying to advance their narratives to gain a favorable outcome from multiple audiences. These include state actors such as the United States, international organizations like the United Nations, and the undecided population groups within China, Hong Kong, and globally.

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Table 1. Lessons from the Hong Kong Resistance

Lessons for the U.S. Army		
Quickly gain control over the narrative to influence multiple audiences	Rapidly exploit existing and emerging information communication capabilities	Prepare to support nonviolent resistance partners
Achieve tighter integration across multi-domain formations in the information environment		

(Table by authors)

China used its state media to control the narrative by spreading disinformation. This involved claiming that foreign governments like the United States, as well as what Beijing labeled “criminal Hong Kong thugs,” incited the protests.¹⁵ State media targeting the younger Chinese population broadcasted a video of alleged protesters with U.S. military equipment combating police to reinforce this narrative. Additionally, Chinese state media, amplified by pro-Beijing bloggers using the official Twitter-like

Weibo platform, sought to control the narrative by spreading messages like “Shame for Hong Kong” and “I support the Hong Kong police, you can hit me now,” following the harassment of a People’s Daily reporter by protesters.¹⁶

In opposition, the protesters’ narrative centered on the idea that the Fugitive Offenders Amendment Bill put Hong Kong’s citizens at the mercy of Beijing. To support this claim, the protesters tried to capitalize on any opportunity showing how China was behind the violent response by security forces. The opportunity presented itself in August 2019 when images began to circulate of a young woman lying on the ground, shot in the eye by police with a beanbag. The protesters used the incident as a symbol to frame the increasingly brutal tactics against innocent Hong Kong citizens.¹⁷

As both groups competed to advance their narratives, the protesters struggled to reach certain audiences due to the sheer volume of China’s counternarrative resources. For example, when the protesters attempted to refute

China’s messaging on mainstream Chinese social media sites, China censored the protesters immediately. The ability for actors to quickly disseminate their narratives to the intended audiences and sustain them is very much dependent on the next condition.


Condition 2: Information communication technology ubiquity. The next condition from the TRADOC study is “information communication technology ubiquity,” defined as “near universal access to information

and communication around the globe.”¹⁸ Platforms like Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, Reddit, YouTube, Telegram, TikTok, and LIHKG are just a few examples. The Hong Kong protests demonstrated that the use of near universal communication technology to advance competing narratives is the new normal, a trend extending back to the 2011 Egyptian Tahrir Square protests.¹⁹

China used mediums like Twitter to shape the narrative under the guise of third parties. Some accounts

compared protesters to terrorists, while state-controlled and state-funded media outlets bought advertisements on Facebook and Twitter to negatively portray the protests. Twitter reported that it uncovered more than nine hundred accounts originating from China that were “deliberately and specifically attempting to sow political discord in Hong Kong.”²⁰

The protesters used social media to organize and assemble large-scale demonstrations. According to King-wa Fu of the Journalism and Media Studies Centre at Hong Kong University, platforms like LIHKG have



(Figure modified by authors; original version from U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, *Exploitation of Strategic Conditions in 2035*)

Figure 1. Strategic Conditions Pervasive in Hong Kong



A woman holds a drawing depicting an injured protester 12 August 2019 in Hong Kong. The artwork was in response to a weekend of violence in which a woman was shot in the eye with a projectile during confrontations between protesters and police. The antigovernment protesters occupied the Hong Kong International Airport and forced the cancellation of all flights. (Photo by SOPA Images Limited via Alamy Stock Photo)

enabled smaller groups to “initiate new agendas, campaign ideas, and strategies.”²¹ Additionally, Instagram served as a platform for protesters to share “visually-compelling campaign posters, slogans, as well as image/video evidence of police violence,” which differed from previous protests in Hong Kong.²²

Another aspect of communication technology ubiquity is the ability for protest movements to remain leaderless and succeed without a figurehead. In the 2014 Hong Kong Umbrella Movement, the student leader Joshua Wong became a target for the authorities and was jailed on numerous occasions.²³ In contrast, the 2019–2020 Hong Kong protests did not have an individual or organization claim leadership. This was an attempt to remain largely anonymous to avoid arrest and violent repression by authorities. When comparing the repercussions to clearly identifiable 2014 protest leaders like Wong, the 2019–2020 movement has appeared to

be effective at reducing risk through information communication technology ubiquity.

Condition 3: The use of proxies. The third strategic condition is the use of proxies, defined as the “widespread use of surrogates by both state and non-state actors to further their interests indirectly and with reduced direct risk.”²⁴ The most obvious use of a proxy in the 2019–2020 Hong Kong protests was by China. Hong Kong also highlighted a missed opportunity for the United States to support the protesters as a resistance partner to counter Chinese influence.

While Hong Kong is officially a Chinese “special administrative region,” the CCP exercises control through the Hong Kong government to enforce its policies. This allowed China to separate itself from perceived direct involvement and provided a way to counter the protesters’ key narrative of Chinese responsibility.²⁵ “Delegating” security functions to third parties in an

effort to avoid prohibitive intervention is a defining characteristic of proxy warfare.²⁶

The protesters' narrative and communication ability resulted in tangible success toward degrading China's proxy. In November 2019, pro-Beijing political parties suffered a staggering defeat in the Hong Kong district council elections. Democratic candidates won 87 percent of the council seats, up from less than a third.²⁷ This loss caused China to reevaluate how it continues to use its proxy after clear public support for the pro-democracy movement.

American involvement took the form of limited legal action, and it did not materialize until eight months after protests began. Congress passed the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act in November 2019, authorizing sanctions on Hong Kong and Chinese officials for human rights abuses.²⁸ This contrasted with assistance to democracy activists involved in the color revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine in the early 2000s.²⁹ Understanding China's use of proxies is important, but a broader examination of the Army's potential role in supporting nonviolent "resistance partners" deserves special attention.³⁰

Violent or Nonviolent? Options to Oppress and Resist

Why did China not just use its massive military to crush the protest movement quickly? The protests would have ended within days like the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests. The answer: because of the audience. Not only are actors in direct competition with each other, but they also compete to gain cooperation from multiple audiences. The choice to employ violence, by both the state and the resistance movement, is a function of how to best achieve a position of advantage over one another vis-à-vis the relevant audiences.

China cannot afford a bloody repeat of Tiananmen as it attempts to promote itself as the global partner of

choice. Important for the Army is understanding the role of nonviolent resistance, not just in the context of Hong Kong but for broader application to competition. Of note, nonviolent resistance is nearly twice as effective as its violent counterpart.³¹ Moreover, perhaps counterintuitively, the Army has a critical role in providing support to nonviolent resistance partners.³² The Army must understand how to navigate violence and nonviolence in planning for such support.


Both violence and nonviolence often appear in resistance campaigns. Social movement scholars discuss this in the context of "radical flank effects" (see figure 2, page 30).³³ A positive flank effect occurs when a radical group with extreme goals increases the leverage of moderate elements by making its demands appear more reasonable.



A screenshot of a Facebook account associated with the Chinese government that posted memes comparing protesters to terrorists. The translation of an 8 August 2019 post says, "Protesters. ISIS fighters. What's the difference?!" China used social media to deliberately sow political discord in Hong Kong. This was one of many accounts that Facebook removed after it deemed the page "coordinated inauthentic behavior." (Screenshot courtesy of Facebook)

On the contrary, radicals may create a negative flank effect that undermines moderates by discrediting the entire movement.³⁴ Furthermore, radical flanks may manifest as either intra- or extramovement violent challenges.³⁵

Early observers thought radical flanks resulted in increased state acquiescence to policy change once deemed far too radical by legitimating the bargaining position of moderates or pushing them to adopt



(Figure by authors)

Figure 2. Resistance Spectrum with Violent Flanks

more extreme positions.³⁶ However, recent studies are more ambiguous, concluding that violent flanks do not positively impact nonviolent campaign success rates. In certain cases such as the antiapartheid challenge in South Africa from 1983 to 1994, positive flank effects contributed to successful resistance outcomes.³⁷

So what does this mean for the Army? Soldiers may play a crucial role in supporting resistance partners through capacity building (technical and financial assistance) and by connecting (facilitating planning, communication, and linkages across indigenous activist networks and transnational actors).³⁸ However, the Army must contend with two choices when supporting such resistance partners: (1) rejecting the use of violence or (2) deliberately planning for the use of violence. For the latter, this is a parallel effort to capitalize on a flank effect (or a contingency when nonviolence fails). These aspects have significant implications for planning.

Rejecting Violence

Violence may be a contaminant to nonviolent resistance campaigns, as it offers the government a convenient reason to brutally retaliate under the guise of security.³⁹ If the Hong Kong protesters decided to escalate to organized violence, the democratic outcome would have been less favorable. Practitioners accordingly stress strict nonviolent discipline to reduce the barriers to entry that prevent mass mobilization, as well as to capitalize on “political jiu-jitsu”—the backfire that occurs when the regime attacks peaceful protesters and sparks more popular mobilization.⁴⁰

Both nonviolent discipline and backfire are key factors contributing to the success of nonviolent campaigns.⁴¹ But what happens when armed opposition emerges from within or external to the movement or in the form of regime-sponsored “agents provocateurs” seeking to escalate violent retaliatory responses, as seen in Syria in 2011?⁴² The Army presumably has three options: (1) prevent violence, (2) marginalize the radicals employing violence, or (3) terminate support to the resistance partner altogether (see table 2, page 31; and figure 3, page 32).

Prevention. The Army may be able to pressure a resistance partner to maintain nonviolent discipline via the mechanisms of capacity building and connecting discussed earlier. However, divergent goals are difficult to mitigate in the absence of sufficient influence over the movement.⁴³ This may be troublesome if U.S. policy rejects violence, but an intramovement radical flank decides to transition to violence. The Army must understand that the resistance partner maintains its own agency, and the United States is only in a position to support, not control the outcome.

Marginalization. Maintaining clear separation from the armed movement may allow the core nonviolent movement to mitigate the negative effects of violent flanks. Returning to the importance of narrative, the challenge becomes how to signal that differentiation to the appropriate internal and external audiences.⁴⁴ One factor is the movement’s ability to maximize the “signal-to-noise ratio” by cutting through regime efforts to suppress the movement’s voice via censorship and disinformation.⁴⁵

An example from Hong Kong was China's attempt to portray the protesters as violent agitators using military equipment. In such a situation, the Army may be uniquely suited to provide the technological support and information dissemination capacity to tip the balance in favor of the nonviolent movement.

Termination. Finally, the Army may cease support when a resistance partner engages in unacceptable levels of violence. Terminating support may mitigate the escalatory dynamics with an adversary inherent in support to a violent insurgency, but it may also damage U.S. credibility if it is perceived to have abandoned its partner.⁴⁶

Planning for Violence

Nonviolent campaigns ideally offer asymmetrical strengths over those employing violence. Reality, however, demonstrates this may not be feasible in practice. If the United States seeks to secure its interests by supporting resistance partners, it must plan for all contingencies (see figure 4, page 33). This may manifest as parallel efforts (supporting simultaneous violent and nonviolent wings to capitalize on potential positive flank effects) or sequential efforts (planning for violence in case the population perceives nonviolence as a failure).

Parallel violence. Simultaneously supporting violent and nonviolent wings may be risky. The Army can do this by coordinating activities between an intramovement flank element and the core nonviolent component or by enabling an external armed insurgency without the knowledge or consent of the nonviolent movement. While violence may be statistically associated with lower levels of popular participation in resistance activities, it may still contribute to success under certain conditions by capitalizing on spatial and psychological dynamics.

Violence on the periphery may draw regime resources away from urban centers where nonviolent resistance

is most effective. Traditional insurgencies adopting the Maoist approach focus on rural guerrilla warfare. Replacing the regime requires time, which is acquired by capitalizing on space—opening the struggle in areas where the regime is weakest. This is typically in the countryside where many states lack security capacity.⁴⁷

While Hong Kong does not fit this situation, the Philippines' "people power" movement is a good example. Prior to the ousting of Ferdinand Marcos in 1986 by the nonviolent EDSA (Epifanio de los Santos Avenue), violent leftist and Islamist insurgents operating in the north and south drew large concentrations of military forces to the periphery, relieving pressure from EDSA in Metro Manila.⁴⁸

The psychology of violence may also play an important role in mobilization. In South Africa, the nonviolent antiapartheid struggle benefited from the culture of resistance created by the violence of the African National Congress. The African National Congress's "armed propaganda" contributed to the "diffusion of oppositional consciousness" throughout the broader nonviolent movement.⁴⁹ This dynamic is a product of framing processes discussed earlier strategic efforts to create


Table 2. Options for Support to Resistance Partners in Nonviolent, Violent, or Hybrid Campaigns

Reject violence	Plan for violence
Prevent violence	Parallel —Nonviolent movement with <i>intramovement</i> violent flank
Marginalize violence	Parallel —Nonviolent movement with <i>extramovement</i> violent flank
Terminate support	Sequential —Transition to fully violent movement

(Table by authors)

powerful narratives that facilitate collective action. The symbolic use of violence can function here as a motivational frame, which may be especially effective in societies with collective memories of historic rebellion.⁵⁰

Sequential violence. What happens when nonviolent action fails or a critical mass of people believes it is not working? Nonviolent campaigns typically succeed or fail within three years, compared to nine years for violent insurgency.⁵¹ Despite statistics, some may view violence as a way to achieve results more quickly, particularly if the target regime is brutally repressing the opposition and demands to "do something" to reach a climax. Discussing factional strife in movements, James DeNardo finds that



(Figure by authors)

Figure 3. Rejecting Violence

the tendency to abandon nonviolent approaches and utilize violence arises from “political impatience.”⁵² When this tide shifts, the Army reaches a decision point to either terminate support or transition efforts to enabling a traditional insurgency to achieve U.S. objectives.

Lessons for the U.S. Army


The most significant lesson from the Hong Kong resistance is to gain as much control over the narrative as quickly as possible. Whether state or nonstate actors, adversaries will attempt to control the narrative from the start to influence multiple audiences. These audiences include not only state actors but also empowered individuals and groups.

The Army cannot afford to misunderstand the nuances of what messages resonate with various audiences. Cooperation of these stakeholders has a significant impact on an actor’s ability to achieve a position of advantage. If the Army does not anticipate, identify, and shape the narrative for a potential crisis or conflict before it occurs, it will quickly find itself disadvantaged. The Army must have the capability, capacity, and authority necessary to initiate narrative action, reaction, and counteraction.

Second, adversaries and resistance partners will utilize multiple forms of communication technology and internet platforms to communicate internally amongst themselves as well as externally to advance their narratives and flood the environment with disinformation to distort competing narratives. Communication technology and online platforms will constantly evolve, requiring the Army to understand and exploit existing and emerging capabilities rapidly.

Third, the Army must be prepared to support non-violent resistance partners within an integrated U.S. government competition campaign. This requires the Army to understand who the potential partners are, to build their capability and capacity, and to develop the long-term relationships necessary for trust. It is equally important for the Army to realize an adversary will attempt to do the same. Therefore, the Army must understand how to leverage the appropriate interagency entities, partner nations, and international organizations to counter an adversary’s use of proxies.

Finally, the Army must achieve tighter integration across its multi-domain formations now in support of the geographic combatant commands—specifically the multi-domain task forces and 1st Special Forces



(Figure by authors)

Figure 4. Planning for Violence

Command (Airborne)'s Information Warfare Center.⁵³ Defeating adversary systems that deny cognitive access requires full convergence of information-related capabilities across the electromagnetic spectrum and in the virtual environment to dominate the narrative.

Exploiting Narrative and Resistance: Not Just a Hong Kong Solution

Conditions in Hong Kong suggest that the information environment is today's new battleground. Factionalized societies, weaponization of information, and oppressive authoritarian regimes create ripe opportunities for exploitation by adversaries and partners alike. The competition between democratic and authoritarian systems is not just a Hong Kong problem but permeates other arenas—like

Tibet and Xinjiang, where the CCP faces internal threats to its control.⁵⁴

Competing narratives are the weapons of choice in this war. They can deploy armies of information at quicker speeds and at cheaper costs. The U.S. Army must hone its capabilities to exploit information communication technology rapidly and support nontraditional partners to compete and win. Using irregular warfare in this way expands military options for decision-makers to extend U.S. influence in ways that lethal weaponry cannot. ■

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Special Operations Command, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

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The Trouble with Mission Command

Army Culture and Leader Assumptions



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In 1911, Capt. Harry Cootes of the U.S. 13th Cavalry authored a short leadership article that appeared in the *Journal of the United States Cavalry Association*. In his article, Cootes lamented how micromanagement and a lack of trust had reduced cavalry troop commanders in the early 1900s to “mere figureheads, and in fact, a colonel’s first sergeant.”¹ Cootes, who had observed several European military maneuvers, contrasted the freedom enjoyed by French, German, and Russian commanders with the conformity and constraints imposed upon American officers. According to Cootes, excessive authoritarianism, distrust, and interference by higher commanders severely degraded the initiative and adaptiveness of U.S. Army officers. These negative behaviors largely

resulted in a “sit-fast do-nothing” leadership culture among troop commanders.²

Times have changed, but this unfortunate condition persists. In 2020, retired U.S. Army Lt. Gen. David Barno and Dr. Nora Bensahel wrote *Adaptation under Fire: How Militaries*

Change in Wartime. Their book devotes significant attention to the philosophy of mission command and particularly the difficulties the modern U.S. Army has encountered in ingraining this concept in its leaders. Barno and Bensahel suggest that mission command represents a crucial element contributing to Army leaders’ adaptiveness and mental agility in dynamic operational environments. They also assert that the Army does not effectively practice its mission command philosophy. The authors provide several reasons for this failure, including excessive bureaucracy, extensive micromanagement, widespread risk aversion, and endemic distrust. These negative behaviors arise in response to peacetime bureaucratic requirements and persist in war.³

Although Cootes never saw the term “mission command,” he might agree with Barno and Bensahel’s observations. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*, defines mission command as “the Army’s approach to command and control that empowers subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation.”⁴ This approach provides the overarching philosophy commanders and subordinates use to execute decentralized operations in fluid conditions. However, the Army currently faces significant problems in practicing its mission command philosophy. This difficulty stems from many of the factors outlined by Barno and Bensahel and persists because of deep-rooted cultural issues at play in

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Soldiers conduct a mission briefing after jumping from an Air Force C-130 Hercules aircraft 26 September 2017 during Exercise September Heat at Rivolto Air Base in Udine, Italy. Commanders must integrate a mission command philosophy as often as possible in training events to develop confident, adaptive, trustworthy subordinates. (Photo by Paolo Bovo, U.S. Army)

most Army organizations.⁵ To “fix” mission command, the Army must first examine several pervasive leader behaviors and challenge the underlying assumptions that leaders rely upon to solve problems and achieve success.

The Problem

The U.S. Army’s mission command approach first appeared in doctrine in 2003, but soldiers from various armies have arguably relied on similar philosophies for centuries. The Germans certainly practiced *Auftragstaktik* (mission tactics) in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and the chaos and uncertainty of war has forced many armies to adopt mission-type tactics out of necessity.⁶ Mission command represents only one possible command style, and several authors have argued in favor of different approaches and alternative conceptualizations of the mission command philosophy.⁷ Nevertheless, mission command occupies

a prominent place in U.S. Army leadership doctrine. Unless the Army changes that doctrine, it should attempt to practice it—or at least recognize the misalignment between what it prints in field manuals and what its leaders practice every day.

Furthermore, those leaders seemingly embrace the mission command approach and praise its virtues, at least in public. So why do many of these same leaders fail to practice this philosophy? Why does the U.S. Army have a problem instilling the mission command approach?

Three interrelated leadership characteristics stand out as particular causes for this difficulty: a preference for authoritarianism, a love of “bull,” and a lack of imagination. Norman Dixon illuminates these fundamental issues in *On the Psychology of Military Incompetence*, a 1976 study of British military failures and the associated psychological obstacles facing senior leaders. Historians and theorists such as Williamson Murray and Meir Finkel echo many

of the same concerns. Though Dixon studied British military culture and published his book decades ago, several of his findings still apply to the U.S. Army of the early twenty-first century.

Authoritarianism

Military organizations have a long and complicated history with authoritarian leadership styles.⁸ This authori-

Bulls--t

Bulls--t (or “BS”) refers to all of the behaviors, procedures, rules, and rituals that armies adopt and maintain to reduce anxiety and mitigate ambiguity.¹⁵ This definition differs from Paul Fussell’s concept of “chickens--t,” which refers to vindictive and petty behaviors meant to engender misery and increase a military activity’s inherent unpleasantness.¹⁶ BS takes many forms—some

“Many leaders seem to believe the military profession requires autocracy—that armies need tough, aggressive, and strong-willed leaders to handle the solemn business of warfighting.”

tarianism perhaps stems from and perpetuates classic military leadership stereotypes: the draconian drill instructor, the inflexible martinet officer, and the imperious general. Many leaders seem to believe the military profession requires autocracy—that armies need tough, aggressive, and strong-willed leaders to handle the solemn business of warfighting. These qualities can benefit militaries if properly applied, and authoritarian leadership techniques have their place under certain risk conditions and in specific situations.⁹ In fact, ADP 6-0 clarifies that leaders should exercise more control in situations where leaders lack training, little cohesion exists, and trust still needs to develop.¹⁰ As with leadership challenges in various organizations, situational and followership variables in military units can influence leader behavior.

Yet excessive authoritarianism can also create conditions that degrade mission command. Dixon notes that authoritarian leaders tend toward dishonesty, suspicion, obsessive behavior, pessimism, and scapegoating.¹¹ He also asserts that authoritarian leaders often ignore candid feedback and just as often fail to act upon information that does not support their preconceived notions.¹² Finally, both Dixon and Finkel contend that highly authoritarian leaders struggle to demonstrate adaptiveness or display the disciplined initiative required by the mission command philosophy.¹³ All of these behaviors imperil the successful execution of mission command. Leaders may need to employ autocratic styles depending on their situation, but excessive authoritarianism—and military cultures that overprioritize it—threatens decentralization.¹⁴

strange, others obnoxious, many unnecessary. Excessive cleanliness, compulsive orderliness, an obsession with appearances, and an unhealthy devotion to uniformity might all qualify as BS. Many, but not all, of the bureaucratic practices associated with military service may also relate to BS as these processes and systems exist to reduce or eliminate ambiguity. Much of this BS exists primarily in garrison. BS may vanish to some degree in deployed environments, but often as not, it persists.¹⁷

Like authoritarianism, a moderate degree of BS may occasionally frustrate soldiers but does not pose a significant threat to mission command. Organizations may even require activities typically classified as BS to maintain good order and discipline in certain situations. But leaders who rely on excessive BS to mitigate ambiguous situations can create an organizational climate that stifles decentralization, initiative, and trust. In tranquilizing anxieties and imposing conformity, BS also destroys adaptiveness and innovation.¹⁸ Leaders cannot learn to effectively practice mission command in environments that ruthlessly eliminate all forms of risk, unpredictability, or disorder. Contemporary operating environments feature all of these characteristics, and no leader can ever hope to eradicate them.

Despite its adverse effects, the Army must carefully manage BS. Many disagreeable soldiers and hypercritical leaders tend to characterize everything as BS, even those activities that demonstrably contribute to organizational success. Bureaucracy begets some BS, and Murray notes that bureaucracies like those

underpinning American military services also exist primarily to alleviate anxieties, impose order, and efficiently safeguard the status quo.¹⁹ Thus, BS may represent an unavoidable part of the military experience that often simultaneously promotes efficiency and hinders creativity. Since BS remains part of the military environment, leaders can either manage it effectively or let the BS manage them and their formations. Commanders must carefully balance the mundane activities that contribute to organizational welfare and discipline with the understanding that the U.S. Army cannot substitute orderliness for initiative.


Unimaginativeness

Authoritarianism and unchecked BS serve to produce the third characteristic that heavily impedes mission command within the Army: unimaginativeness, defined as a reluctance to consider alternate solutions or apply creative thinking. The U.S. Army often recognizes tactical imaginativeness, but it rarely rewards NCOs or officers who get imaginative with career choices or who creatively interpret orders. The Army often directly or indirectly punishes such behavior. As a result, most leaders content themselves with safe solutions and prescribed career paths. Many officers fail to internalize Army doctrinal publications that call for breaking paradigms and innovating; accordingly, innovation remains an unfavorably rated attribute in Army leadership surveys.²⁰

Yet Barno, Bensahel, Dixon, and Murray all agree that innovation and adaptation cannot successfully occur without openness to new ideas, and many contemporary military leaders lack such imaginative faculties.²¹ Even ADP 6-22, *Army Leadership and the Profession*, singles out imagination and creative thinking as crucial components of adaptiveness and mental agility.²² Unimaginative leaders struggle to practice mission command because they cannot freely trust others and they lack an interest in evaluating prudent risks or developing a sense of disciplined initiative. These behaviors contribute to the risk-averse culture that

Barno and Bensahel identify as a primary impediment to mission command's successful implementation.²³

Unimaginative officers may not oppose mission command, and a lack of imagination does not imply a lack of competence. In fact, such leaders may still benefit organizations and demonstrate effective direct-level leadership. Nor do mavericks and rule breakers necessarily demonstrate the type of creativity and imagination necessary for mission command's success. But organizational leaders who demonstrate a chronic lack of imagination and creativity may more readily discard the mission philosophy, with its emphasis on risk acceptance and disciplined initiative.



To view Army Doctrine Publication 6-22, *Army Leadership and the Profession*, visit https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN20039-ADP_6-22-001-WEB-0.pdf.

Confronting the Underlying Assumptions

In his influential book *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, Edgar Schein argues that culture consists of three layers: artifacts, stated values, and underlying assumptions.²⁴ The Army's culture—and the subcultures of the Army's various branches, components, and organizations—features these three layers. Salutes, uniforms, and ceremonies constitute the Army's artifacts, while the Army Values and Ethic comprise

its stated values. Meanwhile, underlying assumptions represent ingrained principles, those stemming from behaviors that have repeatedly and successfully solved organizational problems. These assumptions have become a part of the organization's cultural fabric; members of the group rarely recognize them and often act upon them unconsciously. These deep-rooted assumptions drive various organizational behaviors and beliefs.²⁵

Army culture has many underlying assumptions. Many of these entrenched beliefs result in the type of exceptional behavior recognized by valor awards, but others act as obstacles to decentralization, accountability, trust, initiative, and effective risk management. In short, these assumptions can stymie mission command. Authoritarianism, a fondness for BS, and a lack of imagination have helped create many of these negative



Pfc. Gabriel Gomes, assigned to 2nd Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment, calls a direction of fire while manning a mortar firing position 28 February 2017 in support of Operation Inherent Resolve near Mosul, Iraq. A mission command approach allows junior leaders to make decisions and take action in accordance with a mission and intent in the absence of direct supervision. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Alex Manne, U.S. Army)

assumptions. To successfully implement its mission command philosophy, the Army must confront and change several of its most damaging leader assumptions, like the three outlined below.

Assumption 1: A leader must trust but verify, even if verification results in micromanagement.

Every U.S. Army officer who has misplaced trust in an unsuccessful subordinate has heard of the old Russian proverb “trust but verify.” This Reagan-era maxim can solve organizational problems, especially in relatively immature organizations or when dealing with untrained leaders. However, this thinly veiled authoritarian mantra destroys trust when used as a lodestar to guide Army commanders in their interactions with subordinate officers. The “trust but verify” proverb—a sacred cow in many Army organizations—often provides officers with a justification to micromanage. As a result, many leaders trust very little and verify

everything. In the event of failure, senior commanders may view the lack of personal command verification as a sign of incompetence rather than an opportunity for leaders to learn and further refine mutual trust.

As painful as it sounds, the Army must abandon “trust but verify.” It must slaughter this sacred cow. Army commanders should instead adopt “certify and trust” as their maxim. Leaders do not automatically owe trust to their subordinates or vice versa. But leaders who intensively train and develop their subordinates can eventually certify their competence. Likewise, subordinates can gain an understanding of their leaders’ behaviors and motivations during such training. Both parties can ultimately develop mutual trust—the bedrock of mission command. Through training and leader development, commanders can serve as the wellspring of that trust and ultimately build adaptive organizations. Conversely, commanders who elect solely to “trust but

verify” promote authoritarianism and its kindred spirit, micromanagement—the very leadership quality that Cootes railed against in 1911.

Assumption 2: Mission command occurs naturally without any training or commander involvement.

Many commanders assume that their subordinates understand the mission command philosophy and that their organization can easily apply that approach without consistent commander involvement. ADP 6-0 confronts this assumption, stating that “commanders cannot expect subordinates to respond effectively to a mission command approach once operations commence if they have not developed subordinates comfortable in its use beforehand.”²⁶ Yet commanders often expect just that from their subordinates, who often have not experienced the level of institutional or operational development necessary to exercise mission command. Their expectations manifest in the notion that leaders should “figure it out,” another much-loved Army mantra. “Figuring it out” may very well help officers develop critical or creative thinking skills in the appropriate type of training environments. However, expecting officers to puzzle through the application of an intricate, trust-based leadership approach during the actual execution of operations without sufficient prior training likely represents, as ADP 6-0 notes, an unrealistic goal.

The assumption that mission command occurs naturally and effortlessly influences many Army leader development factors, including counseling, mentorship, and evaluation reports. Commanders want subordinates who can “figure out” complex problems and expect junior leaders to arrive at effective solutions and exercise disciplined initiative with little or no training. Unimaginative or authoritarian leaders looking to circumvent the hard work of instilling the mission command philosophy often act according to this assumption. However, even earnest leaders seeking to apply mission command may also eventually fall prey to this assumption due to the pressures of leadership turnover, fatigue, unfamiliar situations, and time.

As with trust but verify, the Army must change this assumption through training. ADP 6-0 prompts commanders to train mission command by incorporating this approach as often as possible into training events. However, Army training management doctrine emphasizes standardization, uniformity, and efficiency. It does not necessarily reward leaders who build ambiguity

or complexity into their training plans. Tellingly, ADP 7-0, *Training*, calls for realistic, combat-focused training but contains no mention of mission command.²⁷ Not every training event merits such opportunities; after all, basic rifle marksmanship ranges do not require much complexity. Yet, many unit collective training events would benefit from more ambiguity and opportunities to demonstrate disciplined initiative instead of rote uniformity. Commanders must incorporate mission command fundamentals—decentralization, initiative, trust, and risk acceptance—into training plans wherever possible. Failure to train mission command before expecting subordinates to execute the approach during operations only contributes to misguided assumptions.

Assumption 3: Army leaders should avoid risk because risk threatens promotion and career advancement. This well-ingrained belief represents the most insidious and damaging threat to mission command’s successful practice. Many officers do not trust, delegate, or take the initiative due to the fear of personal or organizational failure. They avoid taking risks because these risks—if they result in failure or accidents—endanger careers. Army formations rarely offer the psychological safety that Schein and other authors consider necessary to develop learning organizations.²⁸ Despite claims to the contrary, officers know that failures, even in the pursuit of innovation or adaptation, often negatively impact evaluation reports. Many leaders, therefore, elect to hew to the safe and unimaginative path. Alternatively, they and their organizations turn to BS in the form of bureaucratic layers and laborious risk management processes that seek to mitigate ambiguity but instead destroy trust and frustrate initiative.

All of these behaviors severely hinder the execution of mission command. The Army must dispose of the assumption that drives these behaviors by rewarding leaders who internalize the mission command philosophy by effectively trusting others, prudently accepting risk, and underwriting honest mistakes. ADP 6-0 specifies that commanders cannot tolerate all types of failure, such as ethical violations and dangerous repeated errors.²⁹ Even tolerated failures must benefit the affected leaders by producing learning opportunities influenced and guided by commanders. This learning process further contributes to the certification of competent and trusted subordinate leaders.

Some Army leaders currently recognize and emphasize qualities such as trust, risk acceptance, and psychological safety. Still, many commanders prize authoritarian officers who prioritize getting results above leader development and organizational growth. The mission command philosophy seeks to avoid catastrophic failure in war by creating adaptive leaders who have learned from repeated failure in peace. This approach cannot hope to succeed if it remains governed by a status quo that prefers uninventive, risk averse, and professionally conservative leadership solutions.

Conclusion

The Army codified mission command nearly twenty years ago and teaches this philosophy to all of its leaders in some form or fashion. Yet few Army organizations effectively practice this approach today. Instead, Army formations often fail to trust, fail to train, fail to achieve shared understanding, and fail to reward those who display real initiative. Army leaders contribute to these failures through authoritarian behaviors, overprioritizing

BS, and a distinct lack of imagination. These behaviors have produced underlying leader assumptions regarding the need for constant micromanagement, the expectation of mission command without training, and the primacy of risk aversion over prudent risk acceptance.

The Army and its leaders must confront these assumptions and challenge the paradigms that foster them to successfully apply the mission command philosophy. Army leaders must first identify and change their behaviors—excessive authoritarianism, the overreliance on banality and order, and the lack of imagination—before they can realistically address underlying cultural assumptions. By changing behaviors and confronting old beliefs, the Army can best ensure its leaders cultivate the type of adaptiveness and flexibility demanded by future battlefields. Those leaders who see no value in such adaptive leadership would do well to heed the wisdom of Capt. Harry Cootes, who more than a century ago, desired greater trust and latitude from his commander to engender “the enthusiasm, initiative and go” required of successful armies.³⁰ ■

Notes

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Multi-Domain Operations in Urban Terrain and Implications for the Medical Line of Effort

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The urban battlespace has long been the bane of the military planner's existence. While high-intensity conflict, force-on-force scenarios have an almost scientific and analytical quality to them, the cannulating terrain, complicated human dimension (political, power, social, and cultural), and intricate infrastructure that needs to be maintained pose significant volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous issues for urban operations. Therefore, it is no surprise that the initial efforts during the invasion of Iraq were to bypass population centers to the south, lest the main body gets bogged down. Gen. Mark Milley, first as chief of staff of the Army and more recently as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has made it abundantly clear that there will be a need to fight in cities in the near future.¹ The likelihood of an urban conflict is only anticipated to grow in the coming decades.

Background on Urbanization


An urban area is defined as three hundred thousand or more people. In 1950, 30 percent of the world's population lived in urban areas. That figure rose to 55 percent in 2018, and over the course of the next thirty years, it is expected to again rise to 68 percent.² Deeper analysis shows that upper-middle-income countries have experienced the most explosive growth over the last century, growing from 22 percent residing in urban

areas in 1950 to an anticipated 83 percent by 2050.³ Poorer countries, those characterized by the United Nations as "lower-middle-income" or "lower-income," are expected to experience a 50 percent increase in urban population in just the next thirty years.⁴

Over 75 percent of the aforementioned low-middle- or low-income countries reside in Africa.⁵ Sub-Saharan Africa and the Sahel Steppes have long been a sanctuary for violent extremist organizations (VEO) such as al-Shabab. These fragile states have a dearth of economic opportunities for their populations, creating conditions

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in which VEOs can recruit and flourish. Additionally, Africa has the youngest population of all countries or regions around the globe.⁶

When these conditions are coupled with the youth booms in developing countries, the problem becomes readily apparent: there are too many young men without a way to provide.⁷ VEOs fill that need by offering young men desperate to feed their families an occupation and a sense of belonging. As migration toward urban areas becomes more common, radical ideologies may well travel with it. It is entirely feasible that today's second lieutenants and ensigns will find themselves in an urban fight before their retirement.

While urban battlespaces are hardly a new phenomenon, they are often heavily publicized and can have profound effects on the political will of nations. From the destruction of Carthage in the first century by Rome to the burning of Atlanta by Federal forces, urban areas have been a flashpoint for hostilities. The Germans' and Soviets' Battle of Stalingrad is one of the bloodiest examples from the past century. The United States' participation in the Battle of Hue in Vietnam, while operationally a success, had significant sway on U.S. public support for the war, with President Lyndon Johnson purportedly saying, "If I've lost Cronkite, I've lost middle America."⁸ Similarly, after the battle for Mogadishu in 1993, U.S. public opinion for withdrawal increased from 58 percent to 64 percent, with a nine-point increase on an "immediate withdrawal" timeline.⁹ It is easy for nations to get bogged down in an urban quagmire, winning the battle but losing the war at home.

Besides their unpopularity, urban battles are immensely costly in terms of blood and treasure. The complex airspace and supersurface, surface, and sub-surface architecture offer defenders an opportunity to engage attackers from a multitude of points, whenever and wherever they choose.¹⁰ Defenders can inflict casualties and then quickly blend back into the populace. In addition to surface streets, vertical structures offer the defender rich opportunities to strike while limiting exposure. The enemy can engage aircraft from the roof of a sixty-story residential structure (external supersurface) or from the fourteenth story window of a thirty-seven-story residential building (interior), negating defensive or counterfires. The enemy may position an improvised explosive device designed to crater a road in an electrical

tunnel (subsurface) and drop a convoy twenty-five feet into a crater for a deliberate secondary attack.

The financial impact of the maxim "if you break it, you buy it" introduces additional hurdles. In 2014, two divisions of Iraqi military withdrew from Mosul, gifting Iraq's second largest city to the Islamic State.¹¹ Three years later, the Iraqi military had to fight its way back in. The toll was staggering: twenty thousand commercial and governmental buildings were destroyed, thousands were killed, a million lives were uprooted and displaced, and the cost was \$400 million over the first six months just to turn the electricity back on.¹² In July 2019, two years after the victory, more than three hundred thousand residents remained displaced, living in rubble or refugee camps, with many waiting for reimbursement from the government.¹³

While strategists and leaders have mentioned much about megacities, the impact of fighting in a megacity as opposed to a smaller urban area is still subject to debate. A megacity is characterized by the United Nations as a city with over ten million people.¹⁴ However, wealth and population density are significant variables; Tokyo or New York look and behave significantly different than Karachi or Mumbai, all of which are characterized as megacities. The variables of wealth, technology, and culture influence the operational and cultural aspects of military operations. As of June 2020, there were thirty-five megacities, accounting for 8.4 percent of the earth's population.¹⁵ Proponents argue that the explosive population growth, poverty, and potential for social unrest make megacities more volatile.¹⁶ Meanwhile, critics state that megacities are just larger urban areas and are "likely to differ only in scale and density."¹⁷ Regardless, both camps agree that continued adaptation for urban operations is necessary. While multi-domain operations (MDO) may lead to enhanced U.S. capabilities, the rapidly evolving technological capabilities of near peers will ensure that the enemy still gets a vote.

Multi-Domain Environment Impacts on Medical Care

First described in doctrine in 2018, MDO is "how Army forces fight across all domains, the electromagnetic spectrum, and the information environment and at echelon."¹⁸ The concept focuses on the synchronization of air, land, sea, cyber, and space power to defeat near-peer revisionist powers such as Russia and China.



Sgt. Marshall Medley, a crew chief attached to Company C, 3rd General Support Aviation Battalion, 25th Combat Aviation Brigade, looks down to the outskirts of Tokyo from an HH-60M Blackhawk helicopter 15 September 2017 while flying back to Camp Fuji, Japan, following medical evacuation training as part of exercise Orient Shield 2017. Urban battlespaces create difficult challenges for medical care. (Photo by Mass Communication Spc. 1st Class John Banfield, U.S. Navy)



A key principle of MDO is convergence. Convergence is needed to rapidly integrate all domains, overwhelm the enemy with complex problems, and get inside the enemy's observe, orient, decide, act (OODA) loop. The rapid and continuous integration of cyber, space, air, land, and sea is the key to successful convergence.¹⁹ Once friendly forces are able to create a gap in an enemy's defenses, speed will be needed to bring friendly forces to bear immediately. However, speed and mobility are characteristics foreign to large combat hospitals.

In recent years, U.S. Army Forces Command has reorganized the venerable combat support hospital (CSH) based on lessons from the past two decades, when split operations were a norm. The former CSH included 248 beds, with a forty-four bed early-entry capability (part of A Company) envisioned to be 100 percent mobile. The CSH comprised twenty-four intensive care beds, twenty intermediate care ward beds, and slices of the requisite supporting services such as operating rooms, emergency rooms, ancillary services, and medical supplies (Class VIII).²⁰ This forty-four-bed mobility came at a cost; for example, the 120-bed minimal care detachment had no mobility assets, and the overall

U.S. Marine Corps Lance Cpl. Avery Isabell, a cannoneer with 3rd Battalion, 12th Marine Regiment, 3rd Marine Division, demonstrates the proper procedures for Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) 26 August 2020 at Camp Hansen, Okinawa, Japan. TCCC aims to reduce combat deaths while allowing a unit to complete its mission and provide the best possible care for casualties on the battlefield. (Photo by Lance Cpl. Jackson Dukes, U.S. Marine Corps)

hospital was approximately 20 percent mobile, relying on external lift assets for mobility. CSHs would often be split within the theater, which was a viable option, as casualties never quite reached the threshold to occupy all 248 beds in a single location.

Based on the counterinsurgency fight at the time and past practices, doctrine was modified. Colonel-commanded CSHs were converted to 148-bed, lieutenant-colonel-commanded field hospitals (FH). The headquarters portion was divorced into a small hospital center (HC), designed to provide command and control to two field hospitals. In the original concept, half of the Army's ten CSHs were due to split into an HC and an FH, while the other five were envisioned to split into strictly FHs. That would leave the active-duty component

with five HCs to provide command and control to ten field hospitals, two FHs per HC. However, many of the ten CSHs were split into both HCs and FHs, in essence adding an additional layer of leadership. Regardless, no significant change in mobility was introduced. While the thirty-two bed initial entry section can be 100 percent

can make the movement of a hospital and its patients significantly more complex.

Battle with a near-peer adversary that possesses antiaccess/area-denial capabilities can have catastrophic effects on medical processes, especially MEDEVAC. In recent conflicts, from Desert Storm, Bosnia, and Kosovo



Battle with a near-peer adversary that possesses antiaccess/area-denial capabilities can have catastrophic effects on medical processes, especially medical evacuation.



mobile (similar to the old forty-four bed slice), the entire 240-bed hospital center (two thirty-two bed FHs, a twenty-four-bed surgical ward, a thirty-two-bed medical ward, and two sixty-bed intermediate care wards) with two field hospitals requires over one hundred trucks to transport forty-six C-17 lifts.²¹ Milley stated that with sensors everywhere, mobility will be the key to survival.²² This leaves the Role 3 (the first hospital in the evacuation chain with inpatient services) medical capabilities ill-prepared for a fluid conflict, let alone initial entry operations.

Cyber and space capabilities can also have a significant impact on medical operations. Electronic health records transmit critical patient information on limited bandwidth. Any interruption in connectivity can deny critical information to medical providers further down the evacuation chain. Without that information, clinical staff will be missing data on everything from a patient's allergies and blood type to the amount of narcotics a patient received or the surgical procedure that was completed. That communication link is essential for managing intratheater and intertheater medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) as well. Loss of the Joint Capability Release (formerly Blue Force Tracker) system by electromagnetic pulse or active jamming systems may blind Role 2 and 3 facilities (see table, page 49) to casualty surges. Similarly, space enables medical operations to include evacuation of the wounded through GPS location. In March 2003, during the early days of the Iraq conflict, the 507th Maintenance Company got lost when its GPS malfunctioned.²³ A resulting wrong turn funneled the company into the urban maze of Nasiriyah, Iraq, where eleven were killed and several others wounded or captured. Loss of GPS capabilities

to the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, air superiority has been a given. However, Russia and China possess a plethora of antiaccess/area-denial capabilities. There is much debate on whether the term "antiaccess" is setting the precedent of a *fait accompli* unnecessarily.²⁴ Regardless, contested airspace will have profound effects on evacuating casualties to advanced definitive surgical care in an urban environment within the Golden Hour. In a MDO battlespace complicated by urban terrain against a near-peer adversary, air superiority will be lost or contested at best. MEDEVAC aircraft will need to navigate between hundred-foot skyscrapers with a multitude of internal and external platforms that present a threat of attack with portable surface-to-air missiles or rocket-propelled grenades. It is fair to assume that there will be none to very limited aeromedical evacuation forward of Role 2, and perhaps to Role 3.

With MEDEVAC aircraft limited in utility, the next best option is to move casualties by ground. The restrictive urban terrain of bottlenecks and artificial canyons makes casualty evacuation with unarmored ground ambulances little more than potential cannon fodder, especially given the lack of top cover on many field litter ambulances. The possibility of subterranean explosions that collapse roads and the potential follow-on extrication from vehicles, coupled with gray-zone tactics of state-sponsored agitators leading riots to block roads, will significantly affect medical evacuation timelines and alter route selection daily.

The sea lines of communication will be constrained in MDO as well. Forty percent of the world live within sixty miles of the ocean, with megacities such as New

York, Los Angeles, and Tokyo on the coast.²⁵ The Navy will need the ability to put troops ashore (and withdraw casualties) in a contested littoral operating area. Establishing port operations in urban areas is a competency that has waned in the past decades. Ever since Korea, the United States has come ashore in friendly nations or with the help of host-nation allies, depending on existing infrastructure.²⁶ Further, lack of interoperability poses risks, with U.S. Army pilots not trained to land on hospital ships. Finally, the new LX(R) class of amphibious warfare ships has half the medical hold capacity of previous San Antonio class ships, reducing hold capacity to eight beds and one operating room.²⁷ All these ships afloat will be large targets for enemy hypersonic weapons, which can cover over a mile per second.

Broad Solutions

While there is a plethora of information regarding urban operations, medical considerations and efforts to save lives are often afterthoughts. In a recent 216-page RAND study commissioned to help the U.S. Army reexamine the urban battlespace of the future, the term “medic” was mentioned only a half dozen times in text and in stories related by interviewees.²⁸

There are potential solutions to address the aforementioned shortfalls, both in the high-tech and “low-tech, return to basics” categories. Medical personnel must return to brilliance in the basics in a contested environment to counter cyber and space threats. The ability to move using a pace count and azimuth will become critical if GPS is lost or if manual evacuation routes need to move underground. Medical staff should be prepared to chart with a pen and paper if information technology infrastructure becomes degraded. More high-tech solutions may include hourly burst transmissions to avoid triangulation of radio signals that could reveal the location of a hospital.

While communications may be tenuous, potential exists to leverage low bandwidth asynchronous telehealth to minimize the need to transport patients. Asynchronous telehealth showed a 65 percent decrease in the need to evacuate forward troops during Operation Inherent Resolve.²⁹ Well-established asynchronous platforms include the Pacific Asynchronous TeleHealth and the Health Experts onLine Portal. These tools use little bandwidth to access a secure website in a post-and-check-back fashion, allowing medical personnel to consult with

military experts worldwide, reducing the need to put limited MEDEVAC crews and patients at risk.

Use of active protective systems was an important lesson the Israelis learned during their war with Gaza from 2009 to 2014.³⁰ While reactive armor has been common on tanks in the past, the importance of ensuring functioning “Iron Curtain” protection on soft-sided HMMWV ambulances running the concrete and steel gauntlet of a city will have lifesaving effects against rocket-propelled grenades.³¹ Further, as nascent microwave technology evolves, nonkinetic soft-kill solutions should be developed. As was seen in Mogadishu in 1993, an enemy blocking the intersections with debris can play havoc with pre-identified evacuation and transit routes. Engineer assets will be necessary to ensure route clearance but may be in high demand working to maintain existing infrastructure. Units should consider evacuating casualties in subsurface tunnels using a John Deere Gator or by subway, if available. Gators were used as early as March 2003 to transport up to three litter patients over brief distances.³²

Another lesson Israel learned was the need to reexamine its tunnel competencies.³³ In its latest conflict, Israel uncovered twenty-three tunnels with sixty-six access points.³⁴ With a well-established and extensive tunnel network throughout North Korea, the Army is already working on this competency.³⁵ These lessons also can be applied to the subterranean tunnel systems of large cities. Soldiers will need to brush up on skill sets such as azimuth and pace count to keep track of their location deep underground. Further, communications will be tenuous underground, with line-of-sight essential (above ground will similarly be degraded). The subsurface manmade tunnels of urban warfare (whether drainage, subway, or electrical conduit) will present complexities for medical planners and clinical personnel.

Implications for Roles of Care

Point-of-injury care will face significant challenges in a three-dimensional environment with a fluid forward line of troops. The aforementioned challenges for aeromedical evacuation forward of Role 2 is unlikely to change. (Roles of care are described in the table, page 49.) Besides man-portable surface-to-air missiles such as the SA-7, the close proximity of the enemy and its ability to blend into the surroundings and occupy elevated positions will increase the threat of small-arms fire to even

Table. Roles of Care

Role of care	Characteristics
Role 1	Unit-level medical care/battalion aid station <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focus on returning patients to duty or stabilizing them for evacuation (no medical hold) • Immediate lifesaving measures • Disease and nonbattle injury prevention • Combat and operational stress preventive measures • Patient location and acquisition (collection) • Medical evacuation from supported units • Treatment provided by designated combat medics or treatment squads
Role 2	Treatment platoon in brigade or area support medical company <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased capability to resuscitate trauma patients, 72-hour medical hold • Medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) from Role 1 medical treatment facilities (MTFs) • Damage control surgery (when augmented with a forward resuscitative surgical team) • Limited x-ray, clinical laboratory, and optometry services • Operational dental support • Physical therapy, blood support, and operational public health • Combat operational stress control
Role 3	Field hospital <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MTF staffed and equipped to provide care to all categories of patients as close to the supported units as the tactical situation allows • Trauma resuscitation • Damage control or initial wound surgery • Postoperative treatment and medical hold • Medical regulation/coordination of intra and intertheater MEDEVAC
Role 4	Hospitals in the continental United States or robust overseas MTFs in safe havens <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Represents the most definitive medical care available in the Army Health System

(Table by authors; data from Field Manual 4-02, *Army Health System*, November 2020)

high-flying helicopters. The proximity and three-dimensional terrain will also be a problem on the ground. Forward of Role 1, battalion evacuation teams will have to move within close proximity of those in contact

to evacuate wounded personnel.³⁶ Unarmored evacuation platforms will expose medical personnel and casualties to small-arms fire from both the ground and elevated positions. This exposure will have the potential to create more casualties among the evacuation teams.

To those ends, the U.S. Army Institute of Surgical Research is working on the next generation of automated evacuation solutions. These include drone pods and robots that would be capable of lifting casualties and evacuating them from the battlefield.³⁷ The 2012 NATO Task Group HFM-184 study seeks to set safe ride standards for unmanned system casualty evacuation platforms, which is the first step in working toward an unmanned evacuation vehicle.³⁸ Further, artificial intelligence systems have demonstrated the ability to monitor and intervene in order to stabilize blood pressures in certain instances, and the Army is evaluating them for future use.³⁹ However, trauma management is far more complex with a multitude of variables at play, and full automation may be years away. This may dictate that the time-consuming evacuation route become the standard.

If so, additional training on nonlethal means should become standard practice for medical personnel, who operate by the principle, “first, do no harm.” When transiting evacuation routes, crowds of protestors or rioters may need to be dispersed. Consideration should be given to fielding of long-range acoustic devices. Deployed and used already in multi-

ple locations for antipiracy, and more recently, to disperse Portland protestors in June 2020, the long-range acoustic device emits a loud piercing sound designed to nauseate and encourage personnel to flee the emitted sonic cone.⁴⁰

There are alternatives to surface street evacuation. Following the MDO maxim, “What can be seen can be killed,” consideration should be given to establishing subsurface evacuation routes. These may include large sewer systems and dry aqueduct tunnels as well as subsurface electrical and information technology conduits.

the city and would likely subject the BAS to direct and indirect fires. Utilizing existing buildings would provide both cover and concealment. Access to evacuation routes to both Role 2 facilities and the company casualty collection points will be vital. This may be an opportunity to return to “tailgate medicine,” dropping the tailgate on a

“Battalion evacuation teams need an evacuation platform that provides protection from small-arms fire, and they must plan and rehearse the best routes from the battalion aid station to the company casualty collection points.”

If subways are operational, serious consideration should be given to utilize subway cars as casualty evacuation platforms. Control and electronic monitoring of all these potential corridors would need to be considered.

The immediate solution to address this threat is that all combatants must be well versed in the use of their individual first aid kits to give casualties a chance to survive potentially prolonged evacuation timelines. The training of combat medics and corpsmen must ensure they are capable of applying tactical combat casualty care and, when necessary, prolonged field care to sustain life forward of Role 1. Battalion evacuation teams need an evacuation platform that provides protection from small-arms fire, and they must plan and rehearse the best routes from the battalion aid station to the company casualty collection points. Lessons learned from the Joint Readiness Training Center show that battalions have difficulty planning how they will provide security for casualty movement.⁴¹ This oversight leads to long delays in casualty evacuation that are detrimental to casualty survival. This problem manifests between all roles of care but is most prevalent between the point of injury and Role 1.⁴² Since force protection requirements are very dependent on mission, enemy, time, terrain, troops available, and civilian considerations, how units will secure casualty movements, especially on short notice, must be planned in detail and rehearsed as a battle drill at the squad level prior to any operation.

Role 1. The increasing size of urban areas has implications for the Role 1 battalion aid station (BAS) as well. The requirement to maintain proximity to the forward line of troops would preclude staging the BAS outside

HMMWV and beginning to provide care without fully setting up. The inability to summon aeromedical evacuation to Role 1 care locations will require a reliance on ground evacuation to move casualties to Role 2 facilities. This decreased ability to evacuate casualties in a timely manner will require the ability to triage effectively, stabilize injuries, and then hold casualties at Role 1 until they can evacuate. Prolonged field care must be embraced, resourced, and trained at all roles of care. This is especially important at Role 1 because currently there is no doctrinal holding capability forward of Role 2. The ability to provide prolonged field care is a skill set that must be built from scratch, and leaders cannot assume that units will be able to surge this capability upon demand.

Role 1 is also where the first medical documentation occurs, excluding the Department of Defense Form 1380, *Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) Card*. Military medicine is currently tied to MC4 laptop computers as an enterprise solution. This an antiquated system that has not evolved in the last two decades and could be held at risk against a near-peer advisory such as China or Russia. Again, the U.S. Army Institute of Surgical Research is working on a viable solution, currently testing a persistent but temporary tattoo as a substitute.⁴³ Scanning the tattoo QR code would allow medical personnel to document and upload to a secure website and prevent loss of information when evacuating. The program was awarded \$1 million for development and testing in fiscal year 2020.⁴⁴

Role 2. The key component to survival of severely wounded combat casualties is time to reach surgical care. This makes location of forward surgical capability



essential to the planning of operations in large urban areas. Ideal locations would be buildings with ready access to power and water, which are traditional critical requirements for surgical support. The most forward surgical capability will be at the brigade support medical company provided it is augmented with a forward resuscitative surgical team (FRST). The Army should consider making damage control surgery capability organic to the brigade support medical company or as medical company-area support, which would align U.S. military doctrine with the Role 2 Light Manoeuvre in NATO doctrine.⁴⁵ Another consideration is that twenty-person FRSTs are incapable of providing security and performing life-saving surgery simultaneously. If the United States were to enter into a World War II scenario, the holding capability organic to Role 2 will become critical to both facilitate return to duty of disease nonbattlefield injuries and lightly wounded service members as well as hold critically wounded service members pending evacuation to Role 3.

Role 3. Role 3 medical treatment facilities are much larger and require more space to set up, making site selection critical and difficult. They should be positioned outside the urban area and/or at a securable location

A patient gets transferred to an operating room for an emergency assessment and evaluation 13 March 2019 during a mass casualty exercise as part of Operation Forlorn Reaper at Rodriguez Live Fire Complex in Korea. The 121st Combat Support Hospital established a thirty-two-bed field hospital to support the exercise and validate its expeditionary capabilities. The combat support hospital was later converted into two field hospitals. (Photo courtesy of the U.S. Army)

in close proximity to a landing strip capable of accommodating strategic MEDEVAC aircraft to facilitate evacuation out of theater. Consideration should be given to large convention centers, if they can be secured. As COVID lessons have showed us, this is a viable venue for makeshift hospitals and provides ready access to power and water. At the other end of the spectrum, over the years, medical professionals have found ways to innovate and adapt. The Malinta Tunnel on the island of Corregidor in the Philippines housed a one thousand-bed hospital during World War II.⁴⁶

The biggest problem confronting Role 3 facilities will be the ability to arrive in a theater in time to be relevant. Role 3 medical facilities are usually last on the

time-phased force and deployment data and draw from prepositioned stock when they arrive to theater. As stated earlier, the lack of inter- and intratheater mobility in the current field hospital design jeopardizes their relevance early in a conflict. In the future, the Army needs to find ways to make the “early entry” portion of the field hospitals smaller and more mobile. This could start with reintroducing the medium and large general purpose tents, which are easy to set up as well as easy to break down and move, and they require no power. Trading 3:1 and 2:1 isolation shelters for general purpose mediums would be one way to decrease weight and cube without sacrificing capability. While lack of sterility is an unsettling concern for operative procedures, the experience of FRSTs and austere surgical teams operating in warehouses and open desert air areas over the past two decades shows there are ways to mitigate that risk. That sterility factor needs to balance with survivability, the ability to remain mobile and relevant.

Increased mobility is also necessary if there are casualties present in a hospital. If hospitals have to move with the front of large-scale combat operations, as they did in World War II, they have to be prepared to move with casualties. Not since North Africa and Italy have hospitals had to deal with the logistical challenges of moving a hospital while simultaneously caring for and transporting dozens of casualties in the back of light medium tactical vehicles.

Urban areas near the coast may require a joint solution of a hospital ship or amphibious assault ship off the

coast until an Army field hospital can be established in the area of operations. Army aeromedical evacuation pilots should be required to train to land on Navy ships now; this certification is too imperative to be delayed until a conflict breaks out.

Lastly, U.S. forces should not occupy or take host-nation hospitals to establish their Role 3 medical treatment facilities. Combat operations in an urban area will result in an increased need for medical care to civilians. Civilian medical capability must be maintained to prevent civilians from overwhelming the military facilities and avoid placing commanders in the position of having to turn away civilians with no alternative to receive care. Doing so will have two primary detrimental and long-lasting effects. First, it could create an overreliance on U.S. medical capabilities. Second, turning away civilian casualties when there are no host-nation facilities available to care for them will certainly have a detrimental impact on opinion of U.S. forces and could stoke the flames of insurgency.

Conclusion

Urban environments present complex challenges for medical operations. An overreliance on modern technology will exacerbate any threats associated with medical evacuation and treatment in future MDO battlespaces against a near-peer adversary. In order to avoid those snares, the medical community needs to be cognizant of gaps in security and develop applicable skills and concepts to mitigate the potential pitfalls. Failure to do so will have catastrophic consequences. ■

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
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Combat and Operational Stress Control in the Prolonged Field Care Environment

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As the nature of conflict evolves to unified land and multi-domain operations (MDO) against a near-peer adversary, critical medical support capabilities are likely to be disrupted. Advanced air defense systems and other antiaccess/area denial means in large-scale combat operations (LSCO) will limit patient movement capabilities, medical evacuation (MEDEVAC), and the circulation of low-density medical specialists among units.¹ This disruption of MEDEVAC capability will necessitate more prolonged field care (PFC) in which nonspecialty personnel must sustain a patient in a field medical environment for an extended period. Special operations medicine already has explored many of the necessary capabilities for PFC of traumatic injuries; however, disease and nonbattle injuries—combat and operational stress and other behavioral health conditions in particular—have not yet been addressed in planning medical capabilities for future warfare.² Behavioral health personnel will need to adapt combat and operational stress control (COSC) models for the future war.

Background on Combat and Operational Stress Control

Combat and operational stress reactions (COSR) are common temporary negative responses to the conditions inherent in military settings. They may develop due to direct combat exposure, coping with the austerity of a deployment environment, or difficulty managing issues at home while deployed. Symptoms of COSRs often include sleep disruption, anger outbursts, fatigue, problems concentrating, anxiety, and behavior problems. Although COSRs may be reminiscent of other mental health conditions such as posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), these stress reactions represent short-term responses to significant stressors. If not addressed in a timely manner, risk increases for soldiers to be operationally ineffective and/or develop other more limiting mental health conditions such as PTSD. COSRs are common; between 42 percent and 52 percent of currently and previously deployed U.S. Army soldiers report having witnessed COSRs among fellow soldiers, with the most commonly observed symptoms including the soldier “freezing” in mission duties or becoming mentally detached.³

Priority for medical intervention always will go toward soldiers with traumatic injuries that threaten life, limb, or eyesight. However, the potential impact on readiness from COSRs cannot be ignored. Even with robust behavioral health support from combat stress control detachments and organic behavioral health officers, psychiatric conditions are among the leading categories of disease and nonbattle injuries resulting in medical evacuation from combat environments, accounting for almost 12 percent of all service members evacuated from Iraq between 2003 and 2011.⁴ This rate increased to 19 percent between 2013 and 2015 as combat operations were curtailed and fewer behavioral health assets were available.⁵ In recent years, the draw-down of forward behavioral health support has been associated with significant increases in the proportion of psychiatric evacuations, accounting for 24 percent of medical evacuations in 2017 and 28 percent in 2018.⁶ These rates indicate that behavioral health support is an ongoing necessity in deployment settings.

COSC seeks to mitigate the impact of psychological factors such as COSRs that may impede readiness. A number of specific interventions are captured under the broad concept of COSC, including relaxation techniques, problem-solving, specific psychological interventions, and establishing regular meals, sleep, and exercise. COSC interventions throughout the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were primarily delivered through providers and technicians organically assigned to brigade combat teams and regional combat stress control detachments.⁷ This model of behavioral health care generally has shown positive results throughout recent conflicts. More than half of a large sample of behavioral health patients treated in Al Anbar Province

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Previous page: Photo by Erin Bolling; modified from original version.



Capt. Kelly Drake (*far left*), behavioral health officer for the 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (2IBCT), 4th Infantry Division (4ID), talks to soldiers about stress management 11 July 2018 at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan. Drake and Sgt. Kert Lang (*not pictured*), behavioral health noncommissioned officer for 2IBCT, 4ID, provided classes for service members throughout the airfield to help mitigate stressors that could arise. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Neysa Canfield, U.S. Army)

received more than one treatment visit, with services available for the most commonly occurring disorders.⁸ Even far-forward, intensive treatment of PTSD at Role 2 facilities (i.e., a limited field hospital staffed by the brigade support medical company) was possible in both Afghanistan and Iraq.⁹ Return to duty rates for behavioral health patients are typically above 90 percent when forward treatment is available.¹⁰

These results notwithstanding, the current model for behavioral health care delivery in deployment settings has several potential weaknesses. Due to the low-density nature of behavioral health assets, the provision of care relies heavily on battlefield circulation, with centrally located providers and technicians regularly traveling to fixed forward operating bases. Furthermore, this care model is dependent on reliable patient movement to

facilitate referrals to restoration centers and evacuation of service members exhibiting acute psychiatric risk. Due to their semipermanent nature, restoration centers lack mobility within an area of operations. Although telehealth can overcome challenges regarding patient and provider movement, this treatment model relies on dedicated bandwidth and established network capability in a mature battlespace. These potential weaknesses carry significant implications for the implementation of behavioral health care in future wars, particularly if forward behavioral health care is disrupted.

Historical Necessity of Combat and Operational Stress Control

Several historical examples illustrate the impact of psychiatric casualty rates when forward behavioral

health support is not available. Early approaches to combat stress reactions (then termed “shell shock”) by the British army during World War I emphasized rapid evacuation of psychiatric patients out of France.¹¹ The majority of these evacuees would never return to military duties, accounting for 15 percent of all discharges and hundreds of thousands of war pensions.¹² The U.S. Army mitigated this critical loss of manpower by implementing forward psychiatry units within a few

Future State: The Next War and Its Impact on Combat and Operational Stress Control

U.S. Army doctrine establishes the need to prepare for a future conflict against a near-peer adversary that will contest battlefield communication and movement. Such a conflict may involve large-scale irregular warfare or unrestricted warfare that targets several operational domains simultaneously. Alternatively, near-peer

“The largest number of soldiers requiring behavioral health support will exhibit transient, temporary symptoms that can be resolved quickly with a supportive intervention.”

miles of the front and emphasizing a return to duty as a treatment goal for individuals experiencing COSRs, and rates of psychiatric losses significantly improved.¹³

Subsequent conflicts showed similar patterns. In World War II, high initial rates of personnel losses due to COSRs were significantly reduced by “relearning” and implementing principles of forward treatment.¹⁴ The high rates of psychiatric casualties during the first year of the Korean War were reduced by creating the modern division psychiatry cell that provided forward treatment of combat stress reactions.¹⁵ During Operation Desert Storm, rates of evacuation due to COSRs were significantly higher in those areas that did not have forward psychiatric support.¹⁶ Taken together, when forward treatment options are not available, COSRs may account for up to half of all battlefield casualties, severely impeding mission readiness.

As the Army prepares for future LSCO, it may be tempting to adopt a policy that all soldiers experiencing COSRs should be rapidly evacuated to benefit from definitive care in specialized stateside programs with a goal of long-term rehabilitation. However, this approach ignores the lessons of LSCO without forward behavioral health support during previous wars. As 80 percent of psychiatric evacuees do not return to theater, an approach that evacuates all personnel experiencing COSRs (along with required escorts) may run the risk of unsustainable rates of losses due to treatable and transient conditions.¹⁷

adversaries may engage in a series of gray-zone conflicts leveraging state-sponsored or nonstate actors. The setting for these future wars potentially ranges from austere environments to dense urban settings; in many of these scenarios, a smaller force that does not rely on large stationary bases is indicated. Regardless of the specific format of the next war, near-peer adversaries are likely to employ antiaccess/area denial technologies such as long-range precision munitions and advanced air defense systems that prevent access to and mobility within operational areas. Furthermore, near-peer adversaries are likely to contest all U.S. cyber capabilities, interrupting the systems on which most current battlefield technology rely.

These aspects of projected future warfare have significant implications for military behavioral health. The most serious consideration is contested air superiority, resulting in disrupted aeromedical capabilities. Without clear air superiority, maintaining the “golden hour” for trauma care will no longer be possible, driving requirements for PFC of trauma patients for up to seventy-two hours.¹⁸ If serious trauma patients—those who are the highest priority for definitive care—experience this degree of delay, then ambulatory patients experiencing suicidal ideation, emerging psychosis, or acute substance-related problems may need to be managed in forward environments for a week or more. These same disruptions due to contested airspace will prevent low-density behavioral health providers and technicians

from circulating to forward locations to provide direct support. Compounding this problem, greater demands for unit mobility and interrupted signal capability likely will prevent combat stress prevention teams from traveling alongside forward battalions. Due to the threat of precision munitions and the aforementioned interference with patient movement, restoration clinics will not be feasible at large, fixed locations. The total impact of these factors will be greater demand on forward medical assets and line commanders to address the impact of COSRs for longer periods without specialty behavioral health support. Therefore, commanders must prepare for several potential scenarios.

First, the largest number of soldiers requiring behavioral health support will exhibit transient, temporary symptoms that can be resolved quickly with a supportive intervention. Most common among these will be sleep disruption, emerging episodes of depression, acute stress reactions, and problems with anger management. In some cases, these symptoms will be an acute reaction to combat exposure. However, the majority of these reactions will be due to coping with family problems, relationship strain, or financial issues.¹⁹ If these reactions are not addressed, then risk increases for the soldier to develop more serious conditions that will require MEDEVAC. Even if these soldiers are not evacuated, operational stress and burnout will decrease effectiveness of the fighting force.

Second, while soldiers with a history of previous behavioral health treatment will have cleared predeployment screening requirements (or received deployment waivers) for behavioral health conditions, they may experience a recurrence of symptoms and are four times more likely to require MEDEVAC.²⁰ Follow-up support from deployed behavioral health assets typically would be provided for these soldiers. Without ready access to specialty behavioral health care, additional support for these soldiers will need to be in place.

Third, a small minority of soldiers will have their first instance of serious psychiatric illness while deployed, including psychotic disorders, suicide attempts, and bipolar disorder.²¹ Although soldiers with a history of these conditions are nondeployable, the initial onset of these conditions can be precipitated by the stressors of a forward military environment. In a mature battlespace, these cases would require immediate MEDEVAC to definitive care. Disruption in MEDEVAC capability may

require extended management of these cases in forward settings for a period of several days. If procedures for managing these patients are not planned in advance, additional soldiers may need to be pulled from frontline duties to maintain patient safety.

In addressing these scenarios without the availability of specialty mental health providers in a PFC setting, a continuum of forward intervention will be required. This continuum includes greater training for and utilization of self-aid and buddy aid, a baseline of training in forward behavioral health intervention for medics and battalion-level medical providers, and greater involvement of paraprofessionals and chaplains in forward settings.

Self-aid. Future warfare will increase the need for self-management of psychological stressors on the battlefield. These resources will rely on predeployment training and implementation to enhance efficacy downrange. Although initiatives such as the Master Resilience Training (MRT) program have been implemented for the past decade, they will need to account for the application of identified techniques to specific stressors in austere MDO and PFC environments. Whereas the current MRT curriculum includes several factors associated with individual resiliency such as mental agility and character strength, these concepts need to be better ingrained in the day-to-day training and deployment environment.²² Resiliency may need to evolve beyond “mandatory training” to focus on long-term coping skills and dependable leader engagement.

Stress inoculation training (SIT) is another self-administered preventative intervention against developing stress-related symptoms after exposure to trauma through “inoculating” individuals to potential traumas.²³ SIT incorporates techniques such as relaxation training and stress management to reduce arousal levels. The techniques in SIT can be adapted for virtual simulation training of combat scenarios, and have been associated with decreased rates of PTSD when administered prior to deployment.²⁴ Through realistic predeployment training, SIT principles can be leveraged to ensure a degree of predictability and preparedness that prevents combat stress reactions.

Several mobile applications for self-management of psychological symptoms in military settings have been developed, with good results in empirical evaluations.²⁵ The purpose and intent of these applications vary. Some applications such as PTSD Coach were



developed to provide education, self-assessment, and tools for the treatment of symptoms associated with a specific disorder.²⁶ Other applications may be utilized to allow patients to utilize coping tools in the absence of a professional. For example, the Breathe2Relax application provides diaphragmatic breathing exercises used to control heart rate and breathing even in tactical settings.²⁷ The Virtual Hope Box mobile application contains simple tools such as relaxation exercises and reminders of reasons for living during crisis moments.²⁸ These mobile applications for self-aid may also overcome some of the barriers to technology use in field settings as they employ data-at-rest encryption, are preloaded onto devices, and do not require access to the internet.

Buddy aid. In addition to self-management techniques, a greater emphasis on buddy aid may help to ameliorate the effects of acute stress reactions (ASRs). For example, the Israel Defense Forces developed a sixty-second buddy aid protocol to address ASRs and freezing during firefights.²⁹ Given the identified

Capt. Christopher Lehr, chaplain of the 2-104 General Support Aviation Battalion, 28th Expeditionary Combat Aviation Brigade (ECAB), prepares for a ride on a C-130J Super Hercules 26 November 2020 before visiting several locations within the 28th ECAB's area of operations in the Middle East on Thanksgiving, ministering to soldiers and conducting religious site surveys. (Photo by Sgt. 1st Class Justin Shaffer, U.S. Army)

benefits, the U.S. Army adapted the protocol into iCOVER.³⁰ iCOVER training consists of a ninety-minute module with practical exercises that outline a six-step sequence for intervening during an ASR:

1. Identify and recognize the signs of ASR resulting in functional impairment;
2. Connect with the soldier by speaking his or her name, making eye contact, and holding his or her arm;
3. Offer commitment, such as indicating that he or she is not alone;
4. Verify facts through asking simple fact-based questions to stimulate thinking;



5. Establish an order of events in short phrases to ground him or her in the present moment; and
6. Request action, such as a direct and simple request, to restore him or her to purposeful behavior.

The use of iCOVER has shown positive results in facilitating buddy aid to recognize and intervene during an ASR and may be employed by any available soldier with training.³¹

Similar to the Army's MRT program, the U.S. Marine Corps has implemented Generation III of its Operational Stress Control and Readiness (OSCAR) program. OSCAR extends the footprint of Marine Corps behavioral health personnel through training unit officers and noncommissioned officers to recognize and assist personnel affected by combat-related stress. OSCAR is unique in that it complements the Marine Corps tradition of small-unit leadership through the use of in-unit buddy aid.³²

Similar to the Marine Corps requirement for 20 percent of all unit members to receive OSCAR training, more widespread use of iCOVER, OSCAR, and tailored MRT in the U.S. Army is recommended to prepare for the future battlespace. To implement this level of training, current Tier 1 and Tier 2 Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) for nonmedical occupational specialties could be augmented with one to two hours of training in techniques such as iCOVER or OSCAR. Although the current curriculum for TCCC does not include any training related to COSRs, adding a small baseline would significantly expand a unit's ability to address common psychosocial stressors and promote resiliency in the absence of a specialty behavioral health provider.

Medics and Role 1 medical providers. Although greater self-aid and buddy aid will potentially alleviate the burden of treating COSRs on forward medics and providers, individuals with emerging or recurring behavioral health concerns invariably present for sick call or seek care at battalion aid stations. With the potential for decreased access to rotational behavioral health providers at Role 1 facilities (i.e., battalion aid stations), medics

and battalion-level medical providers will need greater training in addressing psychological concerns. Less than half of combat medics report that their training in addressing behavioral health concerns at Role 1 facilities is adequate.³³ Akin to nonspecialty medical personnel in emergency room settings, medics must be prepared to manage acute agitation due to mania or emerging psychosis in forward settings. Common diagnoses such as adjustment disorders and depressive episodes also can be effectively managed by nonspecialty providers and medics.³⁴ Whereas it is not ideal to increase the workload of frontline medical providers in Role 1 settings, this additional training will minimize reliance on immediate MEDEVAC for psychiatric reasons.

The current distribution of medical care also necessitates the location of definitive psychiatric medications at Role 3 facilities (i.e., combat support hospitals) with only limited prescription drug formulary available at frontline locations. With delayed transportation to higher echelons of care, Role 1 medical providers may need additional training and education in the off-label use of available prescriptions for short-term management of serious behavioral health concerns for several days while waiting for available MEDEVAC. There also may be a greater reliance on established telebehavioral health models for supporting Role 1 facilities in short-term management of serious cases. Due to bandwidth and signal interruption concerns, telebehavioral health is more likely to leverage a consultative model between frontline providers and specialty care providers at Role 2 and Role 3.

Behavioral health technicians. Behavioral health technicians (enlisted Military Occupational Specialty 68X) are organic paraprofessionals who serve as immediate access points for care for deployed troops, more readily establishing trust with other enlisted service members due to innate familiarity with the unit culture. Their advanced individual training encompasses twenty weeks of behavior health-specific training prior to embedding into units, resulting in the capacity to function as service extenders. Service extenders practice basic

Previous page: Pfc. Armando Solano (*left*), a mental health specialist, and Capt. Rebecca Blood (*right*), a clinical psychologist, both with Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Air Cavalry Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, speak with Sgt. John-Paul Gorcyca and Sgt. 1st Class Chad Farris, both health care specialists with C Company, 2nd General Support Aviation Battalion, 227th Aviation Regiment, 1st Air Cavalry Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, 28 February 2014 during a routine walkabout as Gorcyca and Farris perform maintenance on a UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter at Hood Army Airfield, Fort Hood, Texas. Walkabouts are a method commonly used by behavioral health teams to interact with soldiers on an informal basis. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Christopher Calvert, U.S. Army)

psychological services under the remote supervision of a licensed provider to increase access to care and the reach of health services. Under adequate supervision, 68Xs can perform a number of core functions in forward settings to include initial assessment of behavioral health symptoms, patient education, and interventions

role that oversees various levels of training and implementation fidelity. In garrison, the COSC provider should be focused on providing realistic, experiential training to service members, behavioral health technicians, medics, and other medical providers based on the framework outlined herein. In deployment settings, the



The U.S. Army is on the precipice of new and modern warfare, and its future force must be prepared for the psychological impact of these changes.



to decrease suicide risk. However, a recent report found significant inconsistency in the utilization of behavioral health technicians.³⁵ More forward utilization and semi-autonomous functioning of embedded behavioral health technicians will be necessary in future conflicts. These enlisted technicians are a critical asset for recognizing early signs of maladaptive coping in individual soldiers and promoting better coping units, and can be more readily utilized if aligned at the battalion level.³⁶

Role of chaplains. The confidential nature of pastoral counseling generally precludes direct command consultation about particular soldiers or recommendations such as limited duty or MEDEVAC. Nonetheless, chaplains play a crucial role in providing supportive, confidential counseling to soldiers, and they have been integrated into combat stress control detachments throughout the past two decades. About 8.5 percent of soldiers report receiving counseling from a chaplain in a given year.³⁷ Because battalion chaplains serve alongside soldiers, they are able to relate to the day-to-day experiences in many forward-deployment settings. As part of a collaborative care model, chaplains also can play a crucial role in facilitating contact with other treatment specialties. Rather than solely viewing counseling with a chaplain as related to spiritual concerns, commanders in future combat scenarios should account for the chaplain perspective when making decisions about fitness for duty in deployment settings.

Behavioral health officer role. As psychological health promotion is facilitated through self-aid, buddy aid, medics, and technicians, the behavioral health officer role in future conflicts will develop into a consultative

behavioral health officer will primarily provide supervision and consultation to Role 1 assets, assessing whether implementation fidelity is maintained, while remotely consulting on serious cases prior to MEDEVAC.

Additional Psychological Factors

Commanders also will need to account for two other psychological factors that will affect unit mission readiness in a potential future near-peer conflict. First, mobility requirements to avoid the threat of precision munitions likely will affect the availability of restorative sleep. If a given unit cannot be at a static location for more than a few hours, sleep may only be available in short increments or during transport, creating a poor sleep environment. Although service members may be encouraged to “sleep whenever they can” in operational settings, it is unlikely that sleeping in tactical vehicles, military aircraft, large transient tents or hangars, or near machinery is restorative. Service members who are sleep deprived report a number of negative sequelae, including physical and neuropsychological decrements, that directly impact mission readiness and increase risk of accidents.³⁸ These factors potentially can be mitigated through specific emphasis of “sleep leadership” principles, including commitment to sleep as part of mission planning, facilitating sleep banking and recovery sleep when mission requirements prohibit sufficient sleep, taking steps to monitor caffeine use by service members, and decreasing environmental disruption in sleep areas.³⁹

Second, the threat of large-scale casualties and diminished survivability may have significant effects on combat stress. High survivability rates during the past two

decades have increased confidence in military medicine. However, the realities of PFC imply that service members may have decreased confidence in the availability of definitive care following a battlefield injury. The number of potential casualties projected as a result of near-peer attacks using precision munitions or other weapons of mass destruction could significantly exceed those incurred in most mass casualty (MASCAL) situations in recent wars.⁴⁰ Such attacks could result in an “ultra-MASCAL” situation overwhelming medical capacity, with hundreds to thousands of casualties and a shift in focus from “saving every life” to stabilizing patients with less severe, but survivable, injuries. If ultra-MASCAL events occur, involved units need to specifically address the psychological toll of such large-scale casualties to mitigate the peaks in psychiatric evacuations from theater that frequently follow significant operational events.⁴¹

Conclusion

As the nature of combat evolves into conflict with a near-peer adversary in the MDO environment, contested air superiority, diminished signal capability,

and precision-guided munitions will disrupt current military medical capabilities. By planning for behavioral health support based on the limitations outlined herein, the U.S. Army can counter the historical trend to ignore the impact of combat and operational stress reactions in LSCO. Although preliminary steps have been taken to address these factors through enhanced trauma care and PFC, particularly within the special operations community, disease and non-battle injuries such as behavioral health concerns will remain critical problems that must be preemptively addressed. Although the past capabilities of COSC likely will be diminished in future conflicts, this risk can be mitigated through greater attention to self-aid, buddy aid, and training of frontline paraprofessionals, particularly in garrison settings during preparation for a deployment. Strategic leaders will need to account for these factors as they consider the impact of psychological readiness throughout the next conflict. The U.S. Army is on the precipice of new and modern warfare, and its future force must be prepared for the psychological impact of these changes. ■

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British and American aviators (from left to right) Sgt. Aaron Page, Capt. Ed Swigler, Chief Warrant Officer 2 Edward Chaisson, Lt. James Kelly, and Capt. R. Davidson work through a joint planning process 23 October 2019 during Dragoon Ready 20 at Hohenfels Training Area, Germany. (Photo by Maj. Robert Fellingham, U.S. Army)

Factor Analysis

A Valuable Technique in Support of Mission Analysis

Col. Dale C. Eikmeier, U.S. Army, Retired
Lt. Col. Titel Iova, Romanian Army

We don't have as many resources as the Americans, so we have to think harder.

—Anonymous Australian Army officer

Anyone having experience with the British Army's combat estimate (seven questions), NATO's comprehensive operations planning, the U.S. military's joint planning process, or the U.S. Army's military decision-making process will notice that the British and NATO systems seem to generate more collaboration and critical thinking than the U.S. systems, especially when it comes to analysis of environmental and situational factors.¹ (The factors include facts and assumptions, operational limitations, specified tasks, guidance and directives, and considerations such as doctrinal tenets and principles.) Some of this can be attributed to U.S. joint doctrine's aversion to prescribing specific techniques and procedures. Justified or not, this gap provides an opportunity for joint professional military education (JPME) institutions to fill it by introducing and debating the utility of our allies' techniques for factor analysis.

A look into Joint Publication 5-0's (*Joint Planning*) mission analysis discussion shows part of the problem.² The text is definitionally deep but somewhat shallow on the purpose, analysis, and linkages of the various factors that contribute to understanding and planning. Even the paragraph headings from the mission analysis section—

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Determine Known Facts and Develop Planning Assumptions; Determine and Analyze

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Operational Constraints; and Determine Specified, Implied, and Essential Tasks—imply that “determining” and listing the factors is the objective rather than drawing conclusions from them.³ Additionally, this “determining” and listing of factors without the critical analysis as to what they mean is unintentionally reinforced in the suggested mission analysis brief format and in JPME curriculum, where the emphasis is on listing and briefing the lists rather than conclusions.⁴

The reason we determine factors is to analyze and draw conclusions from them that promote understanding and advance the planning effort. Understanding requires a critical analysis of all the operational factors and considerations. Moreover, the selection of the factors for analysis is paramount to supporting the other steps of the planning process and identification of requirements.

Factors can include information available about adversaries and friendlies, geography and oceanography, population demographics, infrastructure, economy, culture, and other relevant considerations that help define the operational environment. Gathering and, more importantly, understanding these factors and their implications sets the foundation on which mission analysis builds and the rest of the planning process relies. While planners are typically very good at determining and listing factors, they too often overlook the analysis because doctrine and JPME curriculum underemphasize factor analysis.

An illustration of the lack of factor analysis is how joint planning groups (JPG), in both actual and educational planning, organize themselves. Due to time constraints and not realizing the purpose of factor analysis, JPGs often assign separate teams or individuals to develop factor lists. One team will do facts and assumptions, another will do implied and essential tasks, while yet another does operational limitations. This type of organization results in stovepiped lists, degraded understanding, and missed linkages. Whereas the British and NATO systems bring the JPG, both the core and functional subject-matter experts (SME), together for a more collaborative discussion and even a debate of the deductions and conclusions from factor analysis.⁵

Understanding Factor Analysis

In the British and NATO systems, factor analysis is one of the most important steps in mission analysis.⁶ It

is actually a simple tool that uses three simple questions: What is the relevant factor? What is its significance for our operation? What should or can we do about it? The answers to these questions contribute to identifying required changes in the operational environment. In other words, factor analysis identifies “stepping-stones” that will take us from the unacceptable situation to the desired end state (the acceptable situation). More simply, factor analysis assists in identifying the conditions to be established and associated effects. It helps clarify what must be done, the mission, and how to accomplish it.

Additionally, factor analysis assists in shaping the plan by identifying a range of other requirements such as actions/tasks, effects, decision points, information requirements, force capabilities, limitations and risks, etc., which will shape the next steps of planning leading to course of action development.

The main sources of information for factor analysis are the commander’s initial guidance and/or higher headquarters planning directives, a current joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment, and staff estimates. Together, they provide planners a point of departure for embarking on the factor analysis. The planning directives hint at what “unacceptable” looks like and state what “acceptable” looks like. For example, it sets the boundaries for the potential operation such as end state, limitations, provisional mission statements, etc. The unacceptable conditions can be viewed as the problems to be solved, while the acceptable conditions (defined by the end state) can be seen as the results we seek.

The identification of key factors is not difficult. It just requires a thorough investigation of the planning documents, the joint intelligence preparation of

the operational environment, and relevant estimates, along with the application of critical thinking. These factors are often facts and assumptions, operational limitations, and tasks, just to name a few. However, planners must sort relevant factors from nonrelevant factors. The mission or problem statement is a very good indicator of what defines relevancy at the operational level, but it may need to be investigated further to identify tasks and actions.

The PMESII (political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure) framework provides

one methodology for conducting factor analysis at the operational level, determining relevancy, and framing deductions. Other frameworks such as ASCOPE (area, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events) or METT-TC

(mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time, and civilian considerations) may be more appropriate for the tactical level depending on the situation. However, planners should not be fixed to the notion that they have to find factors within each of the framework’s domains. The important thing is first to identify key factors and then to apply the PMESII (or other appropriate framework) to the subsequent analysis.

The three basic questions are more colloquially known as “the what,” “the so what,” and “the therefore.” Figure 1 depicts these questions in a three-column factor analysis format using the more formal factor, deduction, and conclusion terminology.⁷

The first column only states the factor, “the what.” It is a simple statement of fact without any judgment. Therefore, do not state the impact on the operational environment in this column, only the simple factor such as “X-faction is conducting ethnic cleansing.”

Factor	Deduction	Conclusion
<p>The “what”</p> <p>A significant statement (factual or assumed to be true) that has operational implications.</p> <p><i>What is the current state of affairs or trends?</i></p>	<p>The “so what”</p> <p>The implications, issues, or considerations, derived from factors that have operational significance.</p> <p><i>So what are the significances of the factor?</i></p>	<p>The “therefore”</p> <p>The outcome or result reached that requires action in planning or further analysis.</p> <p><i>So what can or should be done?</i></p>

(Figure from the Joint Operation Planning Group Handbook, 2019)

Figure 1. The “What,” “So What,” and “Therefore”



A paratrooper assigned to 2nd Battalion, 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade, takes some time to plan for an upcoming training event 11 March 2021 as part of Exercise Rock Topside II at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany. (Photo by Sgt. Amanda Fry, U.S. Army)

In the second column, planners state the factor's impact on the operational environment (often negative but can also be positive). This is the "so what," where judgment and evaluation first come into play. Each factor can have several associated deductions. One way to frame and identify possible deductions is to apply the PMESII framework by asking how this factor influences the operational environment within each of the PMESII domains. (Depending on the level of war and particular planning process used, other appropriate frameworks may be applied.) If using PMESII, for example, this could generate a minimum of six deductions per factor, but then again, each factor may or may not impact each domain. Similarly,

there may be more than one deduction within a single domain. While we are the military instrument and our focus should be on the military domain, do not ignore the other domains as they will help us to identify requirements that need to be met by other instruments of power (comprehensiveness).

The third column, conclusion, is the most important and will shape course of action development. This is the "therefore." Each of the deductions must be accompanied by at least one conclusion—and if the PMESII framework has not been applied yet, now is the time to do it.

To maintain visibility on the logic flow and linkages and avoid recording chaos, a numbering system that links each conclusion to a specific deduction and back to

the factor is desirable. Having such a system facilitates collaborative staff work across the planning group and allows other staff members to track and see the relevancy of conclusions. It also avoids the risk of relying on a critical few who understand the whole picture. Figure 2 shows an example of what the three-column factor analysis could look like at the end of the analysis.⁸

The conclusions gained from this analysis are critical to shaping the rest of the planning process.

However, the conclusions must be relevant and useful in determining the military and other requirements and specific operational conditions that must be established with respect to forces/actors and time and space.

Once the analysis is done, the conclusions should be brought forward into other planning products. Examples include essential tasks, priority information requirements (PIRs), decision points, requests to higher headquarters, requirements statements, and risk matrices. Some conclusions will even find their way directly into the subsequent concept of operations and/or operation plan. It is important that these conclusions are worded as stand-alone statements that do not require excessive explanation.

The ultimate purpose of factor analysis conclusions is to advance the planning effort. Planners need to operationalize each conclusion using a commonly understood planning terminology. A way to do this is to mark each conclusion with a category that describes its “operationalization.” The idea is to easily classify each conclusion with a label that identifies its role in planning. Figure 3 (on page 70) is a suggested

list of categories along with associated abbreviations.⁹ The list is not exclusive and other categories can be added to it.

Who Does Factor Analysis?

The JPG should conduct factor analysis using all the available SMEs. However, if the available time dictates a split of responsibilities, the core JPG may have to do the initial factor analysis in isolation while the

functional staff sections or SMEs conduct their respective estimates separately. Notwithstanding this, sufficient time must be allocated to come together as a complete JPG to share the results. The reason is that the functional staffs and SMEs have supporting inputs to the conclusions made by the core JPG or vice versa, bearing in mind that different staff sections will look at a certain problem set from different perspectives. Additionally, many conclusions will often fall out of a single functional area’s factor analysis, hence the mandatory requirement to share and merge all the outputs from the staff sections and SMEs. This merging of the core and function-

Factor	Deduction	Conclusion
1. Factor	1.1 Deduction #1	1.1.1 Conclusion
		1.1.2 Conclusion
		1.1.3 Conclusion
		1.1.4 Conclusion
	1.2 Deduction #2	1.2.1 Conclusion
		1.2.2 Conclusion
1.2.3 Conclusion		
2. Factor	2.1 Deduction #1	2.1.1 Conclusion
		2.1.2 Conclusion
	2.2 Deduction #2	2.2.1 Conclusion
		2.2.2 Conclusion

(Figure from the *Joint Operation Planning Group Handbook*, 2019)

Figure 2. Numbering System Example

al staffs and SMEs is critical for completeness and validation of the factor analysis. It also provides for a common understanding before going into course of action development.

A Factor Analysis Technique

The following is a factor analysis technique used at the NATO School Oberammergau for its operational level planning that should be considered for U.S. JPME curriculum. Begin with a short statement describing the

BP—Branch plan

C2R—Command and control requirement

CC—Critical capability

CCIR—Commander's critical information requirement

CNMA—Complementary nonmilitary action

CR—Critical requirement

CV—Critical vulnerability

Dec Pt/DP—Decision point

DP/DC—Decisive point or condition

FC—Force capability

IR—Information requirement

IT—Implied tasks

OBJ—Objective

OE—Operational effect

OL—Operational limitation

OR—Operational risk

ROE—Rules of engagement

SC—Strategic communications

T/OA—Task or operational action

(Figure from the *Joint Operation Planning Group Handbook*, 2019)

Figure 3. Conclusion Categories

factor (a fact known to be true or an assumption that has an operational implication). To confirm or disqualify, assumptions must always be accompanied by the commander's critical information requirements. Again, the factor is a simple stand-alone statement without lengthy explanation. This is the "what." Assign sequential numbers to each factor (one for the first factor, two for the second factor, etc.).

Next, make a deduction that is the implication, issue, or consideration from the factor that has operational significance. This is the "so what." The use of a framework such as PMESII or other appropriate framework serves as a mental checklist and promotes critical analysis of the factor and its implication to the framework's domains. Identify each deduction using the factor's number with sequential decimal numbers and indicate which framework domain it relates to. For example, if using PMESII, 1.1 (S) for factor #1, first deduction, social domain.


The last step is to make a conclusion that is the result of the analysis that requires action in planning or further analysis. This is the "therefore." The conclusion should be a short, concise statement, not a paragraph-length analysis. Continue with the numbering and decimal sequencing that links the conclusion to a deduction and a factor. This provides an audit trail and ensures linkages in the analysis. Next, identify the category (see figure 4, page 71, for an example) that the conclusion supports or requires. This translates the conclusion into a planning action or requirement, or as information that can be used later in the plan. For example, 1.2.1 (PIR) is factor #1, the second deduction, and the first conclusion category is for a PIR.

This analysis process should be repeated for each factor type such as facts, assumptions, center of gravity analysis, operational limitations, specified tasks, guidance and directives, and other considerations such as doctrinal tenets and principles. We recommend that each factor, regardless of type, have a unique sequence number. This avoids confusion by keeping each factor and its conclusions numerically identifiable and unique.

At the end of this process, rather than having sterile, stove-piped lists of factors devoid of analysis, planners will have lists of actions and requirements drawn from conclusions that can be quickly references, audited, and crosswalked.

Capturing the Analysis

Using current joint doctrine and most JPME planning curriculum, imagine this situation: someone is giving a mission analysis brief and the commander asks, "What are the potential economic implications of this operation?" Experience suggests the briefer will pause, search his or her memory, and come up



(Figure adapted from the *Joint Operation Planning Group Handbook*, 2019)

Figure 4. Factor, Deduction, and Conclusion Example

with a few plausible economic implications and hope the recorder is writing them down so they can revisit them later.¹⁰ The commander nods in agreement. The briefer panics when the commander asks, “So what are we doing about them?” The briefer scans the room looking for help. Seeing none, he or she mumbles a few possibilities that popped into his or her head and states that the JPG is still looking at the issue. But what if the JPG used factor analysis and captured the analysis using identifying numbers and categorization?

Now imagine an alternative situation: “Major Smith, what are some the potential political implications that we need to think about?” “Sir, I can show you that.” The briefer nods to the information manager who pulls up the factor analysis database spreadsheet and does a sort/search for “political” in the deductions column. “Sir, as you can see, we identified X number of factors that have political implications, and in this column, we have captured possible planning requirements or actions we can take to address those implications.” The former scenario is the result

of “determining factors” and the latter of factor analysis. It should be obvious which is preferred.

The NATO School has its students record the factor analysis in a database rather than on slides. By using columns/fields for factor numbers and titles, deduction numbers and description, framework domain, conclusion numbers and descriptions, and categorization, they created a searchable and sortable database that is available to all planners (see figure 5, page 72). Such an easily accessible and used database facilitates efficient staff planning and collaboration by allowing individual planners to access the information and sort through it for analysis relevant to their particular action. For example, intelligence planners can quickly sort for PIRs, find them, and see their relevance. Additionally, the spreadsheet provides the ability to audit and crosswalk factors with actions and identify gaps or oversights.

Recommendations

The factor analysis technique taught at the NATO School, while not explicitly in U.S. joint doctrine, is

Factor number	Factor description	Deduction number	Deduction description	Framework— political, military, economic, social, infor- mation, infrastructure (PMESII)	Conclusion number	Conclusion description	Category
1	XXX	1.1	XXX	Military	1.1.1	XXX	Commander's critical information request
		1.2	XXX	Political	1.2.1	XXX	Economic
					1.2.2	XXX	Task
		1.3	XXX	Information	1.3.1	XXX	Information requirement

(Figure adapted from the *Joint Operation Planning Group Handbook*, 2019)

Figure 5. Example Database

within the intent of the U.S. joint and service doctrine. JPME institutions that teach the joint planning process or service planning processes should seriously consider adding NATO-style factor analysis as a technique to their discussion of mission analysis. JPME instruction in factor analysis can shift the current mission analysis discussion from simple determination of factors and creations of lists to actual analysis of those factors

and place the correct emphasis on conclusions. After all, it is the conclusion and resulting actions, not the simple listing, that are the most valuable. Additionally, adoption of factor analysis will contribute to the closer harmonization of planning process with our multinational partners. Lastly, joint and service doctrine should consider a discussion of factor analysis to help shift the focus away from determination to analysis of factors. ■

Notes

Epigraph. Paraphrased from an Australian Army officer at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 2020.

1. Statement based on Eikmeier's experience: several iterations of the United States/British Exercise Eagle Owl between 2018 and 2020; operational-level planning in Combined Forces Command, Republic of Korea, U.S. Central Command, and Multinational Forces Iraq; teaching Joint Planning 2001–2020 at the U.S. Army War College and U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; and serving as a guest instructor at the NATO School in 2019.

2. Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Planning* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 1 December 2020), III-17–III-20.

3. *Ibid.*, V-8.

4. Eikmeier's experiences.

5. Iova's experience as lead instructor for the Strategic Operations Planning Course and Comprehensive Operations Planning Course delivered by the NATO School.

6. *JOPG (Joint Operation Planning Group) Handbook*, Comprehensive Operations Planning Course (Oberammergau, Germany: NATO School, 2019), sec. 21.

7. *Ibid.*

8. *Ibid.*

9. *Ibid.*

10. Eikmeier's and Iova's experiences.

"We Who Wear the Cloth of Our Nation"

Using Character Development and Education to Combat Partisan Polarization in the Military

Maj. Johnathon D. Parker, U.S. Army



I believe deeply in the principle of an apolitical U.S. military. ... In the event of a dispute over some aspect of the elections, by law U.S. courts and the U.S. Congress are required to resolve any disputes, not the U.S. military. I foresee no role for the U.S. armed forces in this process.

—Gen. Mark A. Milley

Political partisanship and polarization in the military have become worrying at best and downright dangerous at worst. For instance, worrying evidence reveals that partisanship is a factor leading troops to decline the COVID vaccination.¹ On the “dangerous” end of the spectrum, threats of extremism in the ranks prompted Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin to direct “stand-downs” across the Defense Department to address the problem.² While Austin and others have emphasized the importance of leadership engagement to allay the problem, leader emphasis on character development and education is the long-term answer.

Evidence suggests that partisan polarization is a problem military leaders should pay attention to and address. Failure to do so may lead to the erosion of internal and external trust and, ultimately, an erosion of the military’s ability to perform its constitutional duties. Character development and education can counter this polarization by providing a common framework that subordinates disparate partisan values to the military’s shared value system.

Partisan Polarization and Character

Exploring the national conversation on partisan polarization lies outside the scope of this article, but the concept is worth describing. According to a 2014 Pew Research Center study, Americans’ ideological views increasingly align with their party identity; most Democrats are self-identified liberals while most Republicans are self-identified conservatives, a fact that is not the historical norm.³ The same study indicates a corresponding rise in negative partisanship—animosity toward the opposing political party—and an increase in

partisan identity influencing behaviors outside of politics, such as choosing where to live and whom to marry.⁴ Even if the polarization of the electorate is exaggerated, as some scholarship suggests, research also shows increased polarization in elected officials, especially in Congress.⁵ As one author points out, elected officials and the electorate influence each other in a “feedback cycle: to appeal to a yet more polarized public, institutions must polarize further; when faced with yet more polarized institutions, the public polarizes further, and so on.”⁶

In a 2018 study, authors with the research foundation More in Common explored the political and partisan factors driving Americans apart, finding “substantial evidence of deep polarization and tribalism.”⁷ When analyzing the morality of the American people, Jesse Graham, Jonathan Haidt, and Brian A. Nosek found that across the five psychological foundations identified in moral foundation theory (harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity), liberal respondents consistently emphasized harm/care and fairness/reciprocity.⁸ Conservatives, on the other hand, valued the five psychological foundations generally equally.⁹ In other words, the polarization of the American population extends to issues of values, virtue, morality, and character.

U.S. Army doctrine describes character as consisting “of the moral and ethical qualities of an individual revealed through their decisions and actions” as embodied in the character attributes of the Army Values (loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage), empathy, the Warrior Ethos and Service Ethos, discipline, and humility.¹⁰ The same doctrine acknowledges that, like a person’s ideological and political beliefs, a person’s character is influenced by “background, beliefs, education, and experiences ... developed over the years from childhood to adulthood.”¹¹ However, the Army expects that “upon taking the oath of service, Soldiers and DA Civilians agree to live and act by the Army Values.”¹²

Existing research examining common American beliefs and values is founded on an important premise: “Harnessing what is shared can help indicate the direction of an American identity capable of bringing Americans together.”¹³ In that spirit, harmful partisanship in the ranks of the military can be ameliorated through leader emphasis on shared character development and education. Conveniently, a framework from which to

Previous page: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley arrives for a House Armed Services Committee hearing 9 July 2020 to discuss the Department of Defense in civilian law enforcement on Capitol Hill, Washington, D.C. (Photo by Greg Nash, UPI via Alamy Live News)

build already exists, born from a history of the U.S. Army struggling to understand, teach, and develop character.

A Brief History of U.S. Army Character Development and Education

Historically, the Army has fared poorly at clearly defining the term “character” and its attempts at character development and education. Good character has been a desirable military attribute since at least the colonial period. In a letter to Congress dated 25 September 1776, Gen. George Washington lamented the lack of funds to afford recruiting better officers that he described as “Gentlemen of Character [and] liberal Sentiments.”¹⁴ He placed more value on officers’ ability to lead, the “Characters of Persons,” than on their recruiting abilities.¹⁵ Little changed by the start of the Civil War. According to the *Revised United States Army Regulations of 1861*, leaders sought good “moral character” when appointing commissioned officers, “good character and habits” when recruiting enlisted men, and “evidence of good moral character” when appointing medical storekeepers.¹⁶ In these cases, the exact meaning of “character” was left to the men charged with making the hiring decisions. As evidenced, the early Army was more concerned with recruiting those who already possessed desirable character; it had no official interest in developing that character.

By the early twentieth century, the Army began dabbling in character education by outsourcing it to the YMCA before and during World War I.¹⁷ Based on an executive order signed by President Harry S. Truman in 1948, the Army launched a deliberate, internally sourced character education program, tasking the Chaplain Corps with overall responsibility.¹⁸ Unfortunately, the Character Guidance Program and its successors suffered from poor command support and even a lack of enthusiasm among chaplain instructors until it was formally discontinued in 1977.¹⁹



A portrait of Gen. George C. Marshall taken in 1944. Marshall held the view that as a matter of principle, a professional soldier should remain outside and above politics. As a result, he adhered to a venerated tradition among many senior U.S. Army officers, including Ulysses S. Grant and William Tecumseh Sherman, who practiced self-disenfranchisement in the belief that not voting while serving as a uniformed military officer was for the greater good of the Nation. (Photo courtesy of the Library of Congress)

In the 1990s, after a years-long gap without a formal character program, the Army recognized it had a disjointed approach to character education. In 1994, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Gordon Sullivan directed the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel to create a new service-wide character development program. Dubbed “Character Development XXI,” the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel discovered that “there was no systematic horizontal and vertical integration of programs related to moral leadership or character development in the Army. Most organizations developed their own curriculum or programs.”²⁰



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GRAND NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC BANNER.

PEACE! UNION! AND VICTORY!

To date, the Army does not appear to have “cracked the nut” on character development and education across the entire force. As recently as fiscal year 2015, the Army Capabilities Needs Analysis identified Gap #501028: “The Army lacks the capability to identify attributes of character and to assess the success of efforts to develop character so that Army professionals consistently demonstrate their commitment and resilience to live by and uphold the Army Ethic.”²¹ Of note, current efforts such as the service-wide alignment of the leadership requirements model (LRM) and the rollout of tools like Project Athena promise to close the gap and offer support to quantitatively assessable character development and education. Ultimately, however, Army leaders at every echelon must prioritize the development and education of their troops’ character, and doing so must be a priority as evidence already suggests that partisanship is nipping at the margins of the force’s good order and discipline.

Evidence of a Problem

Since 9/11, the U.S. military has generally enjoyed the highest confidence of the American people when compared to other institutions, a long-enduring trend that lasted well after any “rally ‘round the flag” effect following the attack.²² But in recent survey results released by the Ronald Reagan Institute, American trust and confidence in the military has declined over the last three years.²³ Perhaps more alarming, 22–23 percent fewer Democrats and independents report a higher degree of trust and confidence in the military than Republicans do.²⁴ While not as bleak, a June 2020 Gallup Poll News Survey confirms a similar partisan gap.²⁵ This is a stark partisan divide.

Anecdotally, there may be reason for public concern. The most visible lightning rod related to military partisanship in 2021 was Active and Reserve Component troops and veterans participating in the 6 January Capitol riot.²⁶ While certainly an extreme example, the events of 6 January were not the first time service members publicly overstepped partisan bounds.

Previous page: *Peace! Union! and Victory!* Grand National Democratic Banner (1864), lithograph with watercolor, by Currier & Ives. In contrast to other senior officers of the time, Gen. George B. McClellan, a serving military officer, accepted the nomination of the Democratic party to run against Abraham Lincoln for the U.S. presidency. He did not resign his commission until Election Day. (Image courtesy of the Library of Congress)

In one example in 2019, a South Carolina National Guard major endorsed then presidential candidate Joe Biden while in uniform at a political rally.²⁷ In 2012, a uniformed Army Reserve corporal endorsed then Rep. Ron Paul at a campaign rally.²⁸ While these anecdotes might be considered minor and “one-off” incidents belying any trend, they may also betray an education gap that must be closed.

Even the perception of partisan activity led Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley to issue an apology after sparking criticism for his appearance with then President Donald Trump and other political officials at Lafayette Square in June 2020. His message was crucial: “Together our actions and words in the military will demonstrate that our differences do not divide us but only make us stronger.”²⁹ The common ground for those actions, words, and strength is the character that leaders work to teach and develop in their troops.

Recommendations

Austin took the first step toward reducing polarization through the department-wide “Leadership Stand-Down to Address Extremism in the Force.” Leaders following the discussion framework distributed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense invested time educating service members and Department of the Army civilians about permissible behaviors, prohibited actions and activities, responsibilities to report, and extremism examples.³⁰ This is a positive step toward stamping out the most reprehensible examples of polarization at the far margins of the ideological spectrum. However, leaders must invest effort and prioritize time toward character

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CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, DC 20318-9999

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY
COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE AIR FORCE
CHIEF OF THE NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU
COMMANDANT OF THE COAST GUARD
CHIEF OF SPACE OPERATIONS
COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS

2 July 2020

SUBJECT: Message to the Joint Force

1. Every member of the U.S. military swears an oath to support and defend the Constitution and the values embedded within it. This document is founded on the essential principle that all men and women are born free and equal, and should be treated with respect and dignity. It also gives Americans the right to freedom of speech and peaceful assembly. We in uniform – all branches, all components, and all ranks – remain committed to our national values and principles embedded in the Constitution.
2. During this current crisis, the National Guard is operating under the authority of state governors to protect lives and property, preserve peace, and ensure public safety.
3. As members of the Joint Force – comprised of all races, colors, and creeds – you embody the ideals of our Constitution. Please remind all of our troops and leaders that we will uphold the values of our nation, and operate consistent with national laws and our own high standards of conduct at all times.

*We all committed our lives
to the idea that is America—
we will stay true to that
idea and the American people.*

Mark A. Milley
MARK A. MILLEY
General, U.S. Army

cc:
Secretary of Defense
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director, Joint Staff

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results indicate differences in curriculum emphasis, resources, and cadre/faculty training and education. Leaders should take note of the differences in these two commissioning sources and expand the investigation to understand force-wide character development and education programs for every initial entry point. Leaders should then prioritize efforts to make program content as uniform as possible, bolstering programs where they currently lag and maintaining them where they excel. A force-wide shared understanding of character will provide common ground upon which partisan differences can be overcome.

Endorse and use the Army leadership requirements model. Army Doctrine Publication 6-22, *Army Leadership and the Profession*, offers a service-wide framework that “aligns expectations with leader development activities and personnel management practices and systems.”³¹ It provides a doctrinal, common language—beginning with character—that underpins the evaluation system and can likewise form the

A memorandum (above) and a letter to the force (next page) clarifying the constitutional role of the military sent by the senior military leadership of the U.S. Army to every soldier in the wake of controversy surrounding the potential involvement of the military in events associated with mass protests due to the death of George Floyd, an unarmed Black man in the custody of Minneapolis police. (Images courtesy of the U.S. Army)

development and education to strike at the heart of partisan polarization through a common, shared character and values system.

Prioritize a common, robust initial character education. In related research, the author examined the differences in character education between the U.S. Military Academy and the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps programs nationwide. Preliminary

basis for performance counseling and professional development programs. By emphasizing the importance and habituating the use of this common framework and language, leaders can proliferate the LRM and inculcate in their service members the character and values that will supersede individuals’ partisanship. This recommendation is especially important when considering emerging assessment tools.

Embrace, use, and endorse emerging tools. Such tools include Project Athena, a leader assessment program spearheaded by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's Mission Command Center of Excellence. In time, Project Athena will provide officers, warrant officers, noncommissioned officers, and Department of the Army civilians with longitudinal data over their careers, aimed at "informing and motivating Soldiers to embrace personal and professional self-development," to include elements of character.³² In addition to managing emerging talent management tools such as the Army Talent Alignment Process and its assignment marketplace, leaders can set expectations for and encourage alignment with the commonly shared character attributes. Leaders who encourage the use of these tools by embracing, using, and endorsing them strengthen the primacy of the Army's perception of character, building a culture that naturally subordinates divisive partisan values.

Aim to inculcate character while emphasizing the pragmatic. Unless extremist or otherwise incompatible, the military does not seek to eliminate a service member's preexisting character or partisan identity. However, it does ultimately intend for service members to follow regulations and to prioritize the military's conception of character when conflicted. Doctrine acknowledges that this is a long-term "process that involves day-to-day experiences and internal fortitude."³³ While leaders strive to teach about and develop character, it is reasonable for them to acknowledge pragmatic reasons for tempering outward partisanship. Partisan language and behavior can sabotage a leader's

credibility. While it is clear that partisanship exists in the military, and service members are authorized to vote and participate in politics in some limited ways, failing to self-regulate partisanship may cause a leader to disaffect troops, thus hamstringing the leader's credibility and possibly the readiness and effectiveness of the organization. Leaders can overcome partisan polarization in this way by emphasizing both character and the pragmatism of nonpartisanship.

Some critics of character development and education suggest that character (or at least some elements of it) is inherent—imparted at birth—and cannot be developed or taught. The Army's doctrinal conception of character generally rejects this stance, noting



A Message to the Army Community About Civil Unrest

3 June 2020

Dear Soldiers, Civilians, Family members and Soldiers for Life:


Over the past week, the country has suffered an explosion of frustration over the racial divisions that still plague us as Americans. And because your Army is a reflection of American society, those divisions live in the Army as well. We feel the frustration and anger. We felt it this week while traveling through the nation's capital with the DC National Guard. We feel it, even though we can never fully understand the frustration and life experiences of people of color, in or out of uniform. But we do understand the importance of taking care of people, and of treating every person with dignity and respect.

Our ability to defend this country from all enemies, foreign and domestic, is founded upon a sacred trust with the American people. Racial division erodes that trust. Though we all aspire to live by the Army values of loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage, the Army has sometimes fallen short. Because just as we reflect the best of America, we reflect its imperfections as well. We need to work harder to earn the trust of mothers and fathers who hesitate to hand their sons and daughters into our care. How we respond to the anger that has ignited will chart the course of that trust.

Every Soldier and Department of the Army Civilian swears an oath to support and defend the Constitution. That includes the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. We will continue to support and defend those rights, and we will continue to protect Americans, whether from enemies of the United States overseas, from COVID-19 at home, or from violence in our communities that threatens to drown out the voices begging us to listen. To Army leaders of all ranks, listen to your people, but don't wait for them to come to you. Go to them. Ask the uncomfortable questions. Lead with compassion and humility, and create an environment in which people feel comfortable expressing grievances. Let us be the first to set the example. We are listening. And we will continue to put people first as long as we are leading the Army. Because people are our greatest strength.

God bless all of the people of our United States Army: our Soldiers, Families, Civilians, and Soldier for Life retirees and veterans. And God bless the United States of America.


Michael A. Grinston
Sergeant Major of the Army


James C. McConville
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff


Ryan D. McCarthy
Secretary of the Army

that “modifying deeply held values is the only way to change character.”³⁴ Army doctrine recognizes the difficulty of the process but places the burden on leaders to accomplish the task.

The Character Program at the U.S. Military Academy, spearheaded by the Simon Center for the Professional Military Ethic, accepts that character is “caught, taught, and sought” by students, a methodology championed by the Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues at the University of Birmingham in the United Kingdom.³⁵ In other words, character is taught and developed through several approaches, including formal and informal education, organizational climate, and cultural reinforcement and encouragement. Military leaders at all levels have an implicit mandate to engage with these approaches and prioritize character development and education.

“The Most Important Thing”

In testimony before the House Intelligence Committee in 2019, Fiona Hill, the senior director for Europe and Russia at the National Security Council, remarked, “When we are consumed by partisan rancor, we cannot combat these external forces as they seek to divide us against each other, degrade our institutions, and destroy the faith of the American people in our

democracy.”³⁶ U.S. military leaders must emphasize and prioritize character development and education to eliminate the threat of that partisan rancor.

The partisan polarization of the American public is old news. However, recent events have focused attention on the detrimental effects of partisan polarization within the military. Despite this attention, it is not a new concern; many authors have directly warned of the dangers of partisanship in the military.³⁷ To be sure, it is not the only problem challenging the Armed Forces, but it is one that threatens the military’s ability to perform its most critical duty: defending the Nation. By investing in character development and education—through prioritization in initial education, endorsement and use of the LRM, embracing emerging tools, and emphasizing pragmatic reasons for nonpartisanship while developing character—leaders can reduce partisan polarization in the ranks. The above recommendations aim to do so by following Milley’s guidance to the National Defense University Class of 2020 graduates: “We who wear the cloth of our nation ... must hold dear the principle of an apolitical military that is so deeply rooted in the very essence of our republic. It may be the most important thing each and every one of us does every single day.”³⁸ ■

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Leading the Change

The Field Grade Leader's Role in Responding to the Fort Hood Report

Maj. Jared D. Wigton, U.S. Army



In mid-2011, a group of Army officers serving in a combined arms battalion gathered in the unit's conference room for a Friday afternoon officer call. Several topics were served for discussion, including a controversial one: the potential integration of women into combat arms. A heated debate ensued, with some officers pointing to the merits of women's admission while others argued for their continued exclusion.

Throughout the discussion, the battalion commander sat listening quietly. Once the chatter died down, he rose to give his final remarks before releasing everyone for the weekend. "The change is coming," he began, "and women will be a part of combat arms." Some of the officers who had voiced their opposition to this possibility squirmed in their chairs. And yet, what he said next I will never forget: "When it happens, there will be two groups of officers: those who resist the change, and those who help figure it out. The first group will become irrelevant; the second will be the next generation of rising Army leaders."¹

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Ten years later, the prophetic assertion made by this battalion commander has come true. Released to the public on 8 December 2020, the *Report of the Fort Hood Independent Review Committee* argues that

"providing a culture and climate that is characterized by inclusion, commitment to diversity, freedom from sexual harassment and sexual assault, and adherence to Army Values is key to successful gender integration."² In a subsequent press conference announcing the Army's acceptance of all seventy of the report's recommendations, senior Army leaders made clear that the time for confronting the underlying cultural issues that lead to sexual assault, harassment, and discrimination is now.³

Field grade leaders play a critical role in leading the Army's efforts to build a culture in which each soldier is treated with the dignity and respect befitting his or her service. Over the next several years, field grade officers in every battalion, brigade, and division in the Army will advise commanders on how to implement the seventy recommendations of the report down to the soldier level. The task is immense, outweighed only by the severe consequences of failing to act. For officers who have chosen to make a career of the Army out of a sense of obligation to the soldiers we have the privilege of leading, the stakes could not be more personal. Incomplete or poorly considered policies will have lifelong consequences for the soldiers in our formations, along with their families and loved ones. As in combat, preparation for this task is key. What follows is an overview of three initial steps that will help field grade leaders prepare to confront the problems identified in the *Fort Hood Independent Review*.

Step 1: Internalize the Problem

The single most important action every field grade leader must take regarding sexual harassment/assault response and prevention (SHARP) can hardly be called an action at all. Instead, it is the adoption of a mindset. The problems presented in the Fort Hood report and their significance for the future of the Army must be “owned” as a personal and professional responsibility. Failure to do so will only exacerbate the problem, not solve it.

It is impossible to internalize the problem without having an accurate sense of the leadership failure that occurred at Fort Hood. In the opening pages of the report, the authors gave us a succinct, “bottom-line up front” statement outlining three key elements of this failure:

During the review period, no Commanding General or subordinate echelon commander chose to intervene proactively and mitigate known risks of high crime, sexual assault and sexual harassment. The result was a pervasive lack of confidence in the SHARP Program and an unacceptable lack of knowledge of core SHARP components regarding reporting and certain victim services.⁴

First, the actors most responsible for the problems at Fort Hood are identified: commanders. This identification is rooted in the guiding assumption that leaders at the top of a formation produce a decisive impact on unit climate, for better or worse. Second, rather than indicting these commanders for what they did wrong, the report instead emphasizes what they failed to do right. Third, it tells us the result: a SHARP program incapable of gaining the confidence of the soldiers it was designed to protect. The problem, then, can be defined

succinctly: commander inaction led to an environment at Fort Hood in which soldiers were not able to carry out their service with dignity and safety.


Such a definition makes the imperative of internalizing the problem all the more important. Field grade leaders who have put in the hard work to understand what occurred at Fort Hood will be better equipped to identify warning signs within their own formations.

Four means to achieve this internal ownership are offered here for consideration.

The first, which experientially has proven the most powerful tool for developing a sense of ownership of the problem, is also the most difficult: hearing firsthand from women and men who have experienced sexual harassment or assault. For those of us who have had the privilege of hearing some of these survivors bravely recount their stories, it is a life-changing experience. Any superficial preconceptions about SHARP fade away in the face of the basic human impulse to recognize suffering in another person. This strategy, however, requires survivors willing to speak out about a deeply personal and traumatic

experience. We can be grateful for their courage when they do but cannot expect it to be the norm.

Therefore, the second, more accessible strategy is to “Read the Report,” a refrain adopted by many senior leaders in the wake of the release of the Fort Hood report.⁵ At this point, reading the Fort Hood report is as much a basic professional responsibility for field grade leaders as the customary purchase of the dress mess uniform upon promotion to major; failure to do so sends a message about the seriousness with which an officer approaches the profession. Though written from an organizational perspective, significant human elements stand out in the Fort Hood report that are



To view the *Report of the Fort Hood Independent Review Committee*, visit https://www.army.mil/e2/downloads/rv7/fort-hoodreview/2020-12-03_FHIRC_report_redacted.pdf.



Alleged military sexual assault survivor Myla Haider speaks at a press conference 15 February 2011 at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C. Members of the U.S. military held the conference to address allegations that they were raped or sexually assaulted during their international and domestic military service and to discuss the then forthcoming federal court litigation. Haider said she initially decided not to report that she had been raped because "I've never met one victim who was able to report the crime and still retain their military career. Not one." (Photo by Mandel Ngan, Agence France-Presse)

difficult to forget. One that strikes particularly hard is the observation made by several NCOs: "They believe the junior enlisted Soldiers do not trust field grade leaders because they see some of those individuals actually committing the acts of misconduct."⁶ If such a statement from an enlisted soldier about one of our peers does not inspire a strong resolve to lead from the front on SHARP, it is difficult to imagine what will.

Third, history serves a vital role in helping understand the deeper legacy of diversity, inclusion, and equal opportunity in the Army. In 2016, the Congressional Research Service published a straightforward, easy-to-read overview of the U.S. military's steps toward reflecting the diversity of American society.⁷ By situating the Fort Hood report in the context of this larger history, the gravity of our current "moment" becomes clear. The Army, like our country, has struggled to fully live up to the ideals we espouse. As senior leaders acknowledged in a service-wide message sent during the mid-2020 protests over racial divisions in America, "Just as we reflect the best of America, we reflect its imperfections as well. We need to work harder to earn the trust of mothers and fathers who hesitate to

hand their sons and daughters into our care."⁸ History equips leaders with the wisdom to see where we are, as an Army, on our journey to representing the broad diversity of American society.

If none of these strategies evoke the internal ownership that is key for effective leadership on SHARP, one final, Machiavellian option remains: understanding the extent to which failing to adequately address sexual harassment and assault can undermine the Army's long-term viability as an institution. Every major attending intermediate level education must complete a block of instruction on force management, including a class on the planning, programming,

budgeting, and execution process.⁹ A key takeaway from this block of instruction is to understand just how dependent the Army is on a steady stream of congressional funding to maintain readiness for combat while investing in modernization and ensuring our sol-

into the specific challenges that installation is grappling with. Relative to other major Army posts, Fort Bragg has one of the lowest rates of first-term enlisted soldiers and NCOs with founded sex offenses.¹⁰ Fort Bragg also has a comparatively low rate of on-post sexual assault

“If an officer can internalize the connection between his or her property book and the Nation’s investment in defense, it is reasonable to expect that same officer to also recognize the higher imperative to effectively steward the most precious resource entrusted to us: America’s daughters and sons.”

diers and their families are afforded a high quality of life. In a democracy, the erosion of trust in the Army directly impacts our ability to procure funding necessary to achieve progress on all of these priorities.

This is a reality most officers are already used to. Every company commander who takes the guidon knows that one of the key tasks of command is the proper oversight of the Command Supply Discipline Program (CSDP). This is because our culture has helped company commanders internalize the importance of the CSDP with a simple but powerful ethical statement: CSDP stewards “taxpayer dollars.” If an officer can internalize the connection between his or her property book and the Nation’s investment in defense, it is reasonable to expect that same officer to also recognize the higher imperative to effectively steward the most precious resource entrusted to us: America’s daughters and sons. Failure to do so, even for one soldier, erodes America’s trust in the force.

Step 2: Understand Your Environment

The Fort Hood report offers a tremendous amount of timely data on SHARP patterns at installations across the Army. This is why the refrain “Read the Report” is so important: it provides crucial insight into the specific issues a field grade leader will have to address to help develop an effective SHARP program.

For example, a field grade leader stationed at Fort Bragg who “Reads the Report” can gain several insights

reporting and a comparatively high rate of soldiers who knew their rights to a special victim counsel, though the E1-to-E3 rate still lands at a dismal 50 percent.¹¹

However, Fort Bragg does poorly in one critical area: the case-processing time for sexual offenses. From 2015 to 2020, the average time between preferral of charges and termination of courts-martial related to sexual crimes at Fort Bragg was 224 days, fourteen days longer than Fort Hood’s average and a whopping fifty-six days longer than the post with the fastest processing time, Fort Carson.¹² This number must be added to the average rate at which the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) is able to present a case to a commander for adjudication. The CID office at Fort Bragg has the slowest rate in the Army, 316 days.¹³ Taken together, this means that if a soldier experienced a sexual assault on New Year’s Eve 2020 and reported it the following day, he or she would likely not see his or her abusers brought to justice until sometime after 25 June 2022, if at all. It is a tremendous burden to ask that soldier to place his or her trust in the chain of command, and in the Army, for so long a period.

These data points should drive several conclusions for field grade leaders serving at Fort Bragg. First, they should anticipate that sexual assault and harassment cases will require active engagement with CID and the staff judge advocate to ensure the process beats the 540-day average. Command channels can and should be leveraged to expedite these cases. Without revealing the identity of the victim, staffs can track processing



times to help commanders advocate for higher priority. Second, field grade leaders must ensure that the victim advocate receives routine updates to communicate to the survivor, should the survivor choose to remain in the unit after reporting. Finally, just because the rate of sex offenses in the enlisted ranks of Fort Bragg are lower than other posts does not mean that SHARP programs are not in need of significant improvement. If even one sexual assault can be prevented by an investment into a better program, it is worth it.

Step 3: Develop an Initial Strategy

A third step naturally follows ownership and understanding: crafting a strategy for leading the change. The Fort Hood report identified some very clear areas in which field grade leaders can achieve immediate impact on the problem now, without waiting for Army-wide policy changes to come into effect.

Field grade leaders must recognize that commanders at every echelon are the center of gravity for an effective SHARP program, not the sexual assault response coordinator (SARC). While the SARC serves an essential role, the commanders own the “critical capability” of

Soldiers review a vignette describing a sexual harassment or assault incident and discuss possible actions 29 June 2019 during Task Force Cavalier’s third quarter Sexual Harassment Assault Response Prevention leaders training at Camp Taji, Iraq. (Photo by Sgt. Roger Jackson, U.S. Army National Guard)

developing and implementing a strategy, or “way,” to combat sexual harassment and assault in their ranks.¹⁴ Field grade leaders must work with their commanders to ensure this strategy encompasses every facet of the problem.

In undertaking such a planning effort, it is critical to treat prevention and response as two independent lines of effort. The report identified confusion of the two as a key error at Fort Hood: “Conflating response and prevention, without respecting the marked differences between the two, compromises the ability to adequately focus on each.”¹⁵ Furthermore, the report discovered that of these two lines of effort, prevention has proven the most difficult for the Army to pursue effectively. The reasons are clear:

Prevention is social, involving a group or groups, of different sizes and attributes.

Prevention is a sophisticated undertaking, requiring data informed modification of cultural norms and priorities. Effective prevention improves group dynamics such that instances of sexual harassment and sexual assault are unacceptable.¹⁶

Collective behavior modification is a tricky beast to wrangle and will not succeed without an iterative,

Army, the SARB requires commanders and their staffs to drive an effective, outcome-based process. The best way to accomplish this is deceptively simple: ensure the commander is in attendance at the monthly SARB fully prepared with both the data and the action items necessary to leverage installation resources for the unit.

Finally, the organizational focus of this strategy must be on training and empowering the NCOs that

“Field grade leaders must recognize that commanders at every echelon are the center of gravity for an effective Sexual Harassment Assault Response Prevention program.”

thoughtful campaign that continues to develop over time. It will also fail if not informed by clear evidence of the state of a unit culture.

This is where the next planning tip comes in: developing clear mechanisms for understanding the quality-of-life dynamics of a unit. Command climate surveys can and should be tailored across a formation to answer specific questions for a commander's decision-making in a similar manner that priority intelligence requirements drive decisions on the battlefield.

The means of collection should become more diverse as well. The inspector general, staff judge advocate, SARC, victim advocates, unit chaplains, command sergeants major, mental health professionals, subordinate leaders, and even the young staff duty officer walking through the barracks on a weekend all play roles in helping commanders “see” their formations. And yet, without specific guidance on what to look for, none of these entities will be empowered to identify cultural problems in need of correction.

Installation-level entities such as the Sexual Assault Review Board (SARB) can also be leveraged to provide a comparative perspective across multiple units of trends and best practices for both prevention and response. The SARB received extra attention in the Fort Hood report, which stated that the monthly meetings were “[focused] on mostly administrative matters and quantitative response dynamics regarding the SHARP Program ... at the expense of qualitative, proactive prevention driven outputs.”¹⁷ Like anything in the

interface with soldiers on a daily basis. If the Fort Hood report portrayed commanders as the center of gravity of SHARP programs, then empowering the junior NCOs in a formation with the knowledge, skills, and training to care effectively for their subordinates can be considered to be the decisive point. Every facet of a prevention program should be designed to support this effort.¹⁸

This is also where field grade leaders should feel tremendous freedom to innovate. The Army is searching for solutions that help build a more inclusive environment and has demonstrated a willingness to evaluate and overturn outdated policies that stand in the way of this effort. The recent revisions of Army Regulation 670-1, *Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and Insignia*, testify to this willingness.¹⁹ And yet, policy changes can only go so far. The basic problem of how to develop a training program that effectively equips junior NCOs with the basics of prevention, including the skills of identifying unhealthy beliefs and behaviors in both individuals and groups, empowering bystander intervention, and creating an environment of dignity and respect, remains unsolved.²⁰ The backbone of our Army is also the backbone of our culture, and deserves the development necessary to lead in SHARP.

Conclusion: A Hard Fight Ahead

The three steps of internalizing the problem, understanding the environment, and developing an initial strategy barely scratch the surface of the

complex issue faced by our Army. Alone, they will not achieve the end state of creating a culture in which dignity and respect are so normative that any aberration cannot go unnoticed. They will, however, ensure field grade leaders step off in the right direction. They will also ensure that our leadership as “iron majors” not only gets the job done but also does so in a manner that inspires the company commanders, platoon leaders, and staff officers who observe it.

It is worth remembering the SHARP is not an isolated issue within our culture. It is intimately tied to the trust that is essential to any army’s ability to achieve victory in war. Those officers who argue for the false

dichotomy that pits readiness and diversity against each other will, as my battalion commander predicted, quickly find themselves irrelevant not only to the health of the institution but to the Army’s mission of fighting and winning our Nation’s wars. Those who lead the change will be able to say with confidence that they did their part to steward the profession through a critical stage of the Army’s history. ■

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not reflect the views of the Command and General Staff Officer College, the Army University, the U.S. Army, or the Department of Defense.

Notes

1. This account is drawn entirely from the author’s personal recollection and should be attributed to him alone.

2. Christopher Swecker et al., *Report of the Fort Hood Independent Review Committee* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense [DOD], 6 November 2020), 2, accessed 31 March 2021, https://www.army.mil/e2/downloads/rv7/forthoodreview/2020-12-03_FHIRC_report_redacted.pdf.

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The Case for an Information Warfighting Function

Lt. Col. Gregory M. Tomlin, PhD, U.S. Army

In September 2017, then Defense Secretary James Mattis established “information” as the seventh joint function, recognizing this capability as unique from those already codified in doctrine: command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection,

and sustainment. As a distinct function, he charged the department with considering the implications of this addition across doctrine, organizations, education, and personnel.¹ A year later, the Joint Staff revised its capstone document for operations, Joint Publication 3-0,



Joint Operations, to include a ten-page explanation of the information function and a description of the multifaceted information environment.² The Joint Staff deputy director for global operations (J-39) charged information operations (IO) officers within his directorate to facilitate discussions between the services and combatant commands about how to enhance cross-command information planning as a part of globally integrated plans. Within the joint professional military education curriculum, the Joint Forces Staff College expanded its introduction to and application of the information function.

While the Joint Staff and National Defense University found ways to integrate the new function into its doctrine, organization, and education of its personnel, the U.S. Army did not establish information as a seventh warfighting function. Previously, the Army adopted each joint function as one of its warfighting functions, making information the conspicuous outlier. Since the information domain is integral to all existing warfighting functions, some senior Army leaders contend that a separate distinction would be superfluous. This viewpoint gives short shrift to the information capabilities that are either forced into other warfighting functions, namely intelligence and fires, or worse, applied as an afterthought to the planning process. Designation as a warfighting function would benefit the Army by elevating the importance of thinking more critically about and better resourcing the deliberate integration of strategic communications, public affairs, IO, electronic warfare (EW), and cyber operations into all unified land operations.

The dynamism of today's information environment threatens to impede the Army's ability to gain a competitive advantage over potential adversaries of the United States and its allies, regardless of the accuracy of its long-range artillery or deployment speed of a global response force. The sophistication of China, Russia, and nonstate actors' disinformation efforts continues to erode the confidence that foreign leaders and populations used to place in security partnerships with the United States. For example, suppose President Rodrigo Duterte succeeds in convincing the majority of the Philippine populace that military cooperation with the United States threatens

their "extinction" because it will lead to a cataclysmic war with China. In that case, it will not matter whether the U.S. Army Pacific wants to deploy Stryker brigades to the archipelago for an exercise.³ Public opinion swayed in the information domain could deny U.S. and Philippine militaries the ability to continue with longstanding combined defensive maneuvers that serve as a visible deterrence against Chinese expansion in the region.

To win the competitive advantage in multi-domain operations, the Army must invest as heavily in developing future information capabilities as it does in creating artificial intelligence collection assets and extended-range fires delivery platforms. The establishment of an information warfighting function would require the U.S. Army to fund and integrate information efforts more deliberately into the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. There are limitations to competing in today's information environment when the U.S. government underresources the agencies and departments responsible for conducting strategic communications, IO, EW, and cyber operations. Specific to enabling the Army to shape the information domain as part of the joint force, the service would gain doctrinal and organizational benefits by codifying a seventh warfighting function.

The Information Environment

For decades, strategists have identified information as a significant instrument of national power, the "I" in DIME (diplomacy, information, military, and economic). Yet, the disparity between how the U.S. government and the military invest in information capabilities is bracing, evidenced by the Army's current challenges with competing in the information domain.⁴ From the brigade combat team to the theater army, the sheer volume of information available today presents a challenge to staff officers responsible with providing sound analysis, courses of action, and strategic options to commanders who want to leverage public affairs, IO, EW, and cyber operations as shaping efforts to enable mission success. While the speed of information dissemination continues to accelerate exponentially—with the ability to post an evocative statement or image and then share it

Previous page: Spc. Victorious Fuqua (*with laptop*) and Staff Sgt. Isaias Laureano (*front*), both cyber operations specialists from the Expeditionary Cyber Support Detachment, 782nd Military Intelligence Battalion (Cyber), provide offensive cyber operations while Spc. Mark Osterholt provides security 18 January 2018 during the 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, National Training Center rotation at Fort Irwin, California. (Photo by Steven Stover)

through a global network of social media platforms in a matter of minutes—the time frame for providing recommendations to decision-makers has not expanded. This can cause well-intentioned action officers to provide unsound assessments because they do not vet sources carefully enough or they fail to corroborate the accuracy of a report in their rush to meet a briefing deadline.

For U.S. adversaries, the contemporary information environment makes the exploitation of disinformation a favorable tool to advance

their foreign policies. At the end of the Cold War, Russian leaders recognized their inability to maintain a superpower's military and elected to downsize their pricey field armies, naval fleets, and air wings. Shaped by his own KGB career, a newly inaugurated President Vladimir Putin chose to invest heavily in the information domain. This much smaller financial burden provided him with a way to leverage his country's diminished power through disinformation and propaganda. In recent years, Putin has reaped the benefits of this investment, particularly in Eastern Europe where the public increasingly identifies with Russia over their European Union neighbors

and questions the relevance of the NATO, causing U.S. Army Europe to deploy brigades deeper into the former Warsaw Pact to help sustain the NATO alliance.⁵

In contrast to the Russians, as the world entered the information age, the United States closed its own information agency (USIA) that had synchronized the federal government's public diplomacy and strategic communications efforts from 1953 until 1999. With an air of Cold War triumphalism, leaders in both political parties assumed that by retaining a superpower military and remaining the leading global economy, presidential administrations could maintain the same grand strategy for achieving foreign policy goals through the twenty-first century. Vestiges of the USIA still exist, including the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe, but these are

only forms of international broadcasting. When the USIA closed, the Clinton administration established the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) to manage federally funded international broadcasts and introduce online content for foreign audiences as the internet became more accessible globally.⁶

Unfortunately, the BBG did not synchronize the other elements of public diplomacy or national-level strategic communications as the USIA had, particularly

in spearheading interagency efforts to keep the State and Defense Departments on the same message during times of international crisis. When the USIA closed its headquarters, the State Department consolidated the agency's three overseas print plants that published pamphlets and magazines but shuttered its television and documentary divisions that had produced short films watched by millions of people in overseas theaters the same way we watch previews before movies today. Perhaps the most significant flaw of the public diplomacy restructuring plan concerned the decision to not incorporate USIA's Research and Analysis Division into the BBG. By focusing on broadcast media

exclusively, the BBG lacked a robust capacity to listen to feedback and assess whether messages built credibility with an international audience. During the Cold War, USIA analysis revealed that the U.S. government could not adopt the same broadcast format for listeners in Eastern Europe as in Latin America. Surveys conducted by the agency's public diplomacy officers in the Soviet bloc found listeners receptive to long, detailed monologues about the news of the day, while feedback on attention spans in Latin American countries led Voice of America broadcasters to modify the format to short news updates between Bossa Nova and jazz music.⁷

In 2016 the Obama administration established the State Department's Global Engagement Center (GEC) to counter foreign disinformation and propaganda through



To view Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*, visit https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_0ch1.pdf.

four threat teams: China/North Korea, Russia, Iran, and counterterrorism. Ideally, the GEC serves as the coordination nexus for liaisons from various agencies and departments to respond to disinformation, yet today it remains undermanned and underresourced.⁸ Four years since the GEC's inception, information "silos of excellence," scattered across the National Capital Region, project various messages from the Pentagon to Foggy Bottom to the Voice of America headquarters at the base of Capitol Hill. The absence of a national integrator for strategic communications—one like the director of national intelligence established in the wake of the attacks on 11 September 2001—has weakened the United States' security.

Through their skillful and sustained disinformation campaigns, the Russians have discredited American international leadership, eroded U.S. soft power, and undermined confidence in democracy, freedom of the press, and social norms. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Putin administration has created proxy news sites of questionable journalistic integrity. The international news channel RT (formerly Russia Today) uses the tagline "Question More," while its radio counterpart, Sputnik, pledges to "Tell the Untold." What should we

question? From Putin's geostrategic perspective, begin with the reporting of mainstream journalists and government authorities' official statements.

During their daily newscast, RT anchors casually sandwich a conspiracy theory or unchallenged statement between legitimate news stories that would appear on the BBC or CNN. In January 2017, while coalition forces worked aggressively in Syria to liberate cities from Islamic State control, RT displayed images of human bodies wrapped in bedding laying on the side of

a street. The news anchor reported that according to "one eyewitness" U.S. pilots killed "women and children" indiscriminately before he transitioned to a recap of the day's market performance.⁹ Wait! Who was the eyewitness? An anonymous bystander interviewed by a RT journalist or a Syrian official? The anchor did not explain. Alarming, few in RT's international audience understood the extensive precautions taken by U.S. pilots to minimize collateral damage. Yet, the matter-of-fact presentation of this dubious report in the daily newscast led many undoubtedly to believe that the United States drops bombs with little regard for protecting civilians in the combat zone.

During the COVID pandemic, the Chinese government picked up Putin's playbook to create international doubt in the American government. The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman tweeted two conspiracies: an American soldier participating in the October 2019 Military World Games brought COVID-19 to China and the virus originated in a U.S. Army laboratory at Fort Detrick, Maryland.¹⁰ As bizarre as these accusations may sound, they were not innovative. They echoed Soviet-favored propaganda techniques from the Cold War that accused the United States of committing germ warfare against North Korean soldiers and noncombatants during the Korean War. In the early 1980s, the Kremlin blamed the U.S. Army for inventing AIDS at that same laboratory at Fort Detrick where others would like to believe COVID originated in 2019.¹¹ Regardless of the outlandish Chinese official spokesman's tweets, the fact that Secretary of State Michael Pompeo chose to rebuff the comments via Twitter brought the conspiracy theories into broader circulation through a whole new online network of people following the State Department's account or the media outlets that highlighted the secretary's comments.¹²

Marine Corps University professor Donald M. Bishop explained in a *Foreign Service Journal* article that official Chinese messages during the pandemic reveal three themes: the Chinese Communist Party brought a swift end to the crisis in China, the Chinese government "bought enough time" for other nations to respond, and generous Chinese medical aid to other nations reaffirms the Chinese Communist Party's position as the global leader during the pandemic.¹³ These messages did not enter the information domain solely through an official Chinese spokesmen. Investigative journalists at

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ProPublica found ten thousand fake Twitter accounts advancing the Chinese COVID message campaign, and the U.S. intelligence community attributed 70 percent of U.S. social media stories related to COVID to Russian and Chinese bots, trolls, and fake accounts.¹⁴

Bret Schafer of the German Marshall Fund favors the term “information laundering” for describing the subtle impact of fake stories planted in social media. Someone posts a tweet amplified by hundreds if not thousands of fake accounts, often accounts created with artificial intelligence that modifies the message each time with different adjectives or colloquialisms to make it sound authentic.¹⁵ Eventually the viral tweet makes its way into a newsroom or an intelligence agency where either a journalist or open-source analyst includes it in their report. Finally, the disinformation makes its way to decision-makers, including the hands of Army commanders leading multi-domain operations.

Shaping the Information Domain

The U.S. Army would benefit from approaching the dynamic information environment with the same level of discipline as it does the air and ground

Spc. Yasir Alani (*left*), an interpreter with the 11th Armor Cavalry Regiment, helps translate military information operations training products created by Jordanian soldiers from the Department of Moral Guidance with the help of Sgt. Lin Wiebalk (*right front*) and Spc. Annabela Stigliano (*second from right*), both psychological operations specialists with the 360th Psychological Operations Company, 14 May 2017 during exercise Eager Lion 2017 at the Joint Training Center in Zarqa, Jordan. (Photo by Sgt. Marco Gutierrez, U.S. Army)

dimensions of any area of operations. Similarly, to the BBG’s international broadcasting efforts, the Army must build an audience through credible and compelling messages before and during deployments. Akin to the former USIA Research and Analysis Division, the Army must also create a permanent means at echelon to assess the effectiveness of the information enablers they leverage. Many combat arms officers who assume high command are simply not familiar with the unique information capabilities available at the strategic and operational levels, much less how to synchronize them with better-known warfighting functions to affect an audience or target. Throughout the planning and execution phases, commanders and their staffs must

refine enduring messages, discern which disinformation to counter and which outrageous reports to ignore, and develop metrics for *listening* before assessing their information campaign as a critical shaping operation to any mission.

Military Review

WE RECOMMEND



The article "Why We Need to Reestablish the USIA" is based on a student's academic research paper submitted 17 March 2005 to fulfill requirements for the Master of Strategic Studies degree program at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. It provides a salient tutorial on the essential role the United States Information Agency (USIA) played in the public relations dimension of the global competition that existed between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. With the 1999 disestablishment of the USIA, the United States has never since had a suitably robust and centrally managed replacement agency capable of "all of government" formulation and synchronization of national strategic messaging and has suffered the consequences of uneven, uncoordinated, and even contradictory information conveyed to the world from multiple competing agencies inside the U.S. government. To view the article originally published in the November-December 2006 edition of *Military Review*, visit https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20061231_art006.pdf.

Army planners would be aided greatly by the introduction of information warfighting function doctrine delineating how a command should coordinate with the U.S. embassy, other U.S. agencies and components of the joint force, host-nation officials, and nongovernmental organizations sharing the area of operations, lest they commit "information fratricide." This form of unintentional harm to friendly elements occurs when one trusted spokesman's message contradicts another reliable information source. Suppose a U.S. Agency for International Development official promises a provincial governor that the U.S. Army will rebuild a bridge without first verifying that the deployed engineer battalion has the equipment and skillset on hand to complete the project. In that case, the entire country team loses credibility. The governor may take to the airways or social media to criticize the sincerity of the Americans in his or her province, fomenting wider public distrust. From humanitarian relief to postconflict stability operations, populations desperately seeking assistance can turn against American soldiers quickly when their deeds do not match their words. A setback requiring the command to concentrate on regaining its credibility with the local populace will frustrate the Army's ability to focus influence operations on higher priority objectives such as improving trust in the host-nation government or support for the rule of law.

Earning the host-nation populace's trust and deterring an adversary through the information domain requires deftness at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Existing investments in 1st IO Command and the Army component of U.S. Cyber Command provide more capacity at the strategic level than to operational and tactical echelons. These organizations also seem as inaccessible to most commanders as space-based capabilities. However, given the sheer numbers of soldiers participating in deployments, the Army misses an opportunity to advance national security objectives through the information domain by not developing the doctrine or organizational structures to empower those with boots on the ground to engage in influence operations confidently. Tactical units should not develop themes and messages independently, which is why a corps or field army serving as a combined-joint task force needs leaders armed with a doctrinal compendium for designing an information campaign, just as they have for laying out their intelligence collection plan. Intelligence warfighting function doctrine provides insight into how the G-2 (intelligence)

should collaborate with the higher echelon's J-2 (intelligence) and intelligence community partners, especially to protect covert assets and vet sources, but when it comes to shaping the information domain, the approach is often ad hoc from one operational deployment to the next.

detonate on the desired object. For this reason, in the absence of better doctrine, IO planners often force their nonlethal efforts into a targeting cycle designed to build air tasking orders and fire support plans. This problem is not unique to the Army, and the joint force

“Strategic communications, information operations, and cyber operations demand the use of a wide range of online platforms. A corps or field Army general staff must consider which ones are the most effective for establishing an audience, building credibility, and countering an adversary's disinformation.”

As after action reports from division and corps Warfighters and brigade-level combat training center (CTC) rotations consistently amplify, Army units cannot compete in the information domain if they limit themselves to command messages posted by public affairs officers on official online accounts. Unfortunately, outside of these semiannual exercises, units do not devote considerable time at home station to integrating IO, EW, or cyber operations, often because these capabilities are not organic to their organization. Information enablers join a brigade combat team or division temporarily, arriving just in time for an exercise and departing immediately upon its conclusion. Equally as problematic, rarely do IO, psychological operations, civil affairs, or cyber elements pair with the same tactical unit from one exercise to the next in order to develop a rapport or standard operating procedures. Without permanent representation inside their formations, units naturally focus their postexercise retraining on the present warfighting functions. A division chief of staff can order the G-2 Analysis and Control Element to practice its all-source intelligence and targeting requirements in garrison by scheduling a tabletop exercise with other directorates from the general staff. Similarly, the division artillery commander remains accountable for the annual live-fire qualification requirements of the direct support artillery battalions to ensure the delivery of timely and accurate fires during their brigades' next fire support coordination exercise.

Fires warfighting function doctrine requires planners to refine the exact location of targets developed by a higher headquarters to ensure that munitions

continues to grapple with a similar doctrinal debate about whether to align information enablers with the joint targeting cycle.¹⁶ Since a target is an object or entity that provides a function for an adversary, the Army's simplified targeting cycle—decide, detect, deliver, and assess—does not provide guidance for how to influence those audiences that are not associated with the threat. Neither the Polish nor Philippine citizenry is a “target” of the United States, but both U.S. Army Europe and U.S. Army Pacific need to be able to amplify Defense and State Department messages to convince them of the security benefits that come from participating in combined exercises.

Not only must the Army build credibility with audiences before and during deployments, but it must also apply information enablers according to a battle rhythm divorced from the rapid, seventy-two hour targeting cycle because influence operations take considerably more time to achieve desired effects. An overhead surveillance system or observer on the ground can confirm the destructive effects of an Air Force bomber's precision munition against a target immediately after the debris cloud dissipates. Yet this targeting example is not a helpful comparison for understanding how to assess an information campaign's ability to deter Afghan youth from joining the Taliban—a twenty-year-old ongoing effort. Influence operations often require months or years to change opinions or behavior, although a staff must assess the approach more frequently and refine how to employ public affairs, IO, and cyber enablers. Too frequently, however, when information efforts are

subsumed into the lethal targeting cycle, commanders lose patience with the lack of immediate changes in attitudes supporting U.S. foreign policies because they begin to equate the information domain with the fires warfighting function.

Strategic communications, IO, and cyber operations demand the use of a wide range of online platforms. A corps or field Army general staff must consider which ones are the most effective for establishing an audience, building credibility, and countering an adversary's disinformation. IO and intelligence planners must assess whether their official and covert presence on a platform is influencing foreign audiences to support U.S. national security objectives. The staff needs guidance on how to tap into interagency resources that can provide intelligence into which platforms an adversary leverages as well as ongoing efforts external to the Army to respond to them. As any adroit public affairs officer will advise a commander, some salacious accusations must be countered immediately, while a cyber expert may advise that a better approach could be to bury the story in social media through an offensive cyber action.

Adding to today's complexity is the demography of a foreign audience, as Jian Wang, the director of the Center on Public Diplomacy at the University of Southern California, observed. Regardless of the continent, the audience is more urban with a "youth bulge" of disenfranchised individuals susceptible to exploitation by political extremists and conspiracy theorists. The ethnic remapping caused by migration patterns affects the languages needed for broadcasting or online written material directed toward specific regions of Europe and the Middle East.¹⁷ Nonstate actors like the Islamic State effectively manipulated social media over the past decade to gain recruits from Europe and East Asia to build a caliphate in the Levant. Multinational businesses have interests and often the technological means to outreach official government influence. Civic organizations, including nongovernmental organizations focused on human rights and the environment, should be considered in the public-private partnership needed to expand the Army's appeal and messages. This complex environment reaffirms that at the operational and strategic levels, the Army must consider the information domain as a critical shaping effort for any decisive operation requiring the deployment of soldiers.

The Tactical Advantage

Since the Russian incursion into Ukraine in 2014, CTCs enjoy showcasing to rotational units the electronic signature of brigade and battalion tactical operations centers (TOCs). Observer-controllers present rainbow-colored graphics differentiating the electromagnetic-spectrum indicators of maneuver, field artillery, and sustainment command posts across the battlefield. If an adversary can identify these high-value targets, they will most assuredly seek to destroy them through fires, EW, or offensive cyber operations. Inevitably this after-action comment leads commanders to reduce their electronic signature by turning off communication systems or dividing their headquarters between the TOC and a leaner tactical command post (TAC).

This training scenario creates two problems for a brigade combat team. First, while the observer-controllers present rotational units with their electronic signature, they do not offer any meaningful solution for masking it. Instead, they simply discourage units from leveraging the advanced communication systems that they need to validate over extended distances during the exercise. Second, when a commander divides his or her limited resources between a TOC and a TAC, the nonlethal working group responsible for synchronizing information capabilities atrophies, since public affairs, IO, and EW personnel rarely make the cut to join the forward command post. Intelligence and fire support personnel accompany the operations officer to the TAC, since these are warfighting functions. However, current doctrine does not elevate information enablers to the same level of importance during the current fight, nor does the brigade's modified table of organization and equipment provide the redundancy in public affairs, IO, and EW manpower or systems to allow them to work from dual locations. When the TAC manages the fight for twenty-four hours or longer (a more frequent occurrence than most commanders anticipate), information enablers lose connectivity with the intelligence, fire support, and operations officers who continue to drive the lethal targeting cycle from the TAC. Without a clear understanding of the current fight, enemy disposition, or attitudes of the host-nation populace, the information enablers struggle to contribute to brigade operations until the TOC and TAC reunite.

If a brigade stopped its lethal targeting cycle for a day or more to concentrate on the current fight, the commander and staff would fail to master the transition



An RT media operative interviews a reputed student 3 June 2020 during an Iranian government orchestrated protest alleging "racist actions of the U.S. regime" held in front of the Swiss Embassy in Tehran, Iran. The placards carried by the students were written in both Farsi and English to illustrate that international audiences were the intended targets of the protest. RT is considered a major component of the Russian propaganda system that poses as a legitimate news agency. Its principal aim is to repeatedly promote perceptions of the United States in the worst possible light to undermine U.S. prestige and influence globally. (Photo by Zoheir Seidanloo, Fars News)

to the next battle period. The Air Force and brigade's division headquarters require the submission of aviation and general-support artillery requests seventy-two hours in advance, based on the air tasking cycle. The brigade sustainment battalion depends on the same amount of time to order and to distribute the ammunition required by organic mortar and artillery systems to engage the new high-payoff targets associated with the next phase. These fires and sustainment warfighting functions requirements ensure that intelligence, fire support, and airspace management systems appear in the TAC. Yet in the absence of clarity in command-and-control doctrine for public affairs, IO, and EW integration, there is no requirement to provide them with workstations in the TAC.

Although the long duration of information campaigns may make a commander comfortable with suspending the brigade's nonlethal targeting process for a couple of

days, this disadvantages the brigade for two reasons. First is related to the lethal fight, since the absence of the EW officer in the TAC prevents this technical staff officer from requesting jamming efforts as part of the suppression of enemy air defense planning. The target working group convened at the TAC may coordinate for close air support or Army attack aviation to be on station, but their request may be denied if it does not include a coordinated suppression of enemy air defense plan. Although a nonlethal enabler, EW contributes to the fires warfighting function just as much as it does to shaping the information domain through broadcasting, jamming communications, or sending a mass text message to all the residents of one town.

Second, while the nonlethal working group pauses for a day or two, an armor or Stryker brigade combat team may clear multiple objectives across dozens of miles and

through several populated areas. As the tactical fight shifts the boundaries of the close fight and the security area expands behind the maneuver units, the brigade has immediate information requirements to inform the local populace about whether to shelter in place, direct internally displaced persons where to go, assess damage to public works, and hold key leader engagements with local leaders. The trauma of street fighting, destruction of utilities, and the citizenry's humanitarian needs require immediate attention. For every day that the brigade does not synchronize information enablers with the scheme of maneuver, it loses the opportunity to task subordinate units through the orders process to escort and protect IO, civil affairs, psychological operations, and human intelligence teams into the overlooked parts of the security zone where discontent will most likely brew. Given enough time to fester, as the U.S. Army witnessed in Iraq between the springs of 2003 and 2004, an insurgency will not only risk the lives of the deployed soldiers but also undermine coalition or national-level strategic communications efforts to laud the success of a military operation.

Yet even if elevated to a warfighting function and brought forward to the TAC in doctrine, information enablers cannot shape a brigade's operations when the billets are not filled. A brigade combat team staff includes two positions for field artillery majors, one to coordinate lethal targeting and the other for nonlethal efforts, but the latter billet is almost never filled because it is widely seen as less of a key developmental experience than coordinating the fires warfighting function. Where IO and cyber functional area billets exist in tactical units, they often remain vacant because of priority fills at the strategic and operational levels where generous funding supports offensive and defensive cyber operations. The Army IO proponent office did not help the situation by removing the position for an IO officer in the grade of major on the brigade combat team staff for several years. However, since the return of the position to the brigade staff, it is still not considered a career-enhancing opportunity. With the inception of the joint information function, it is not coincidental that the combatant commands and the Joint Staff appear more appealing for Army IO and cyber officers than positions within their service. Those concerned with their promotion potential are wary of trying to compete with combat arms officers on staff for a "most qualified" evaluation. To attract the most capable IO and cyber officers to tactical-level units

would require a cultural change across the Army that recognizes their contributions to mission success.

Credence to the Information Domain

The Army continues to struggle to operationalize emerging technologies that shape the information domain because its doctrine and culture do not value information enablers as highly as those capabilities associated with the six warfighting functions. From basic training to the Senior Service College, every Army schoolhouse reminds students that if there are too many priorities then no one has articulated what is genuinely essential for the unit to accomplish its mission. To assist in discerning those priorities, commanders refer to doctrine before providing guidance to their staffs planning for unified land operations: the principles of operational design, the military decision-making process, and Field Manual 3-0's (*Operations*) explanation on how to integrate the warfighting functions. Rarely does dominance in the information domain top the list of key tasks or critical shaping efforts because influence operations do not merit the same level of concern as reconnaissance, fires planning, protection posture, and maneuver tasks. As a consequence, in a postdeployment or postexercise evaluation, a unit that realizes it struggled with leveraging strategic communications, IO, EW, and cyber operations can summarily dismiss these deficiencies, since the information domain remains an ambiguous concept in comparison to synchronizing collection, fires, and direct-fire systems.

Establishment of an information warfighting function would lead to a deeper development of doctrine to shape future Army requirements at all three levels of war. At the strategic level, a theater army must coordinate with interagency and coalition elements responsible for developing enduring messages for peacetime and in war. At the operational level, a corps or field army serving as a combined-joint task force requires access to and an understanding of the technologies possessed by 1st IO Command and the Army component of U.S. Cyber Command, in addition to a partnership with a U.S. embassy. At the tactical level, commanders who lack skilled staff members to lead the nonlethal efforts will instead concentrate on the warfighting functions represented in the headquarters. Fomenting requirements for collective and individual information tasks would justify the creation of permanent billets at all echelons. The expansion

of influence operations in Army doctrine would allow instructors to introduce leaders at each stage of their professional military education to existing and emerging capabilities to synchronize into their planning effort. Fidelity in career-enhancing positions and planning guidance would enable observer-controllers in Warfighters and CTCs to point out where a unit struggles to leverage information capabilities and coach them into applying doctrinal solutions to shape the area of operations.

The National Endowment for Democracy has warned against the nefarious “sharp power” applied by authoritarian regimes that “pierces, penetrates, or perforates the political and information environments in the targeted countries.”¹⁸ As one of those targeted countries, the United States cannot ignore this threat any more

than it could the extended range rockets of North Korea or Russian missiles capable of shooting down a satellite. As part of the joint force, the Army must leverage experts knowledgeable in the culture, language, and social norms of each designated audience and target to improve the likelihood that messages will build trust and influence attitudes and behavior. The Army cannot do this in a vacuum; it must align its efforts with the other agencies and foreign partners participating in the information domain to minimize the risk of “information fratricide.” The Army’s more deliberate approach for adapting the joint information function through the creation of an information warfighting function would limit the need to deploy soldiers into combat once again to advance our national security objectives. ■


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The Philippine Constabulary

An Example of American Command of Indigenous Forces

Maj. Aaron Cross, U.S. Army





In the past twenty years of conflict, military thinkers and practitioners looked to the examples of America's small wars to garner lessons about the techniques and tactics of counterinsurgency. The assumption underpinning these inquiries revolved around the U.S. military, as an outside entity, working in coordination with host-nation forces to suppress such insurgencies and insurrections. However, in an era with diminished support for extended nation-building projects involving large numbers of U.S. soldiers, the appeal of an alternative way to establish an effective fighting force in developing nations where there is an interest in stability could prove fruitful. America's history provides such an option to satisfy these conditions. The Philippine Constabulary, led by a cadre of U.S. Army officers from 1901 to 1917, provides an excellent study in the ability of American military officers to exercise effective command over indigenous forces.¹

To adequately draw out these lessons, it is first necessary to examine the historical precedents for external command of indigenous forces. Next, a sufficient definition of effective command is required to evaluate the Philippine Constabulary case. Due to the sparse nature of the literature on effective command, Allan R. Millett, Williamson Murray, and Kenneth H. Watman's definition of military effectiveness—tweaked to consider the things a commander must do to make a military organization effective—will serve such a purpose. Using this construct, evaluating the inspiration, organization, and effectiveness of the Philippine Constabulary through official and personal accounts of key individuals is possible. The views of Henry T. Allen, the first commander of the Philippine Constabulary, and other constabulary and civil government officials will help to demonstrate the case for effectiveness. Last, the constabulary offers several implications for the potential use of contemporary American officers to command indigenous forces.

In Search of a Model

Before the annexation of the Philippines, the U.S. military had limited experience with commanding indigenous forces. Since colonial days, the U.S. military employed Native Americans as auxiliaries, but these forces typically either participated as a separate entity, found employment as individual guides or scouts, or became incorporated into the existing


military structure (e.g., the Apache Scouts).² Thus, a model for keeping internal order would need to come from somewhere else, despite the desire of some in the United States to use our territorial model to govern overseas holdings.³ The contemporary example of Great Britain in India provided an approach to advising indigenous forces.

The British Indian Army featured native Indian troops officered directly by the British. While the British had employed native troops through private armies since their establishment of a colony in India, the Great Mutiny of 1857 caused a shift in colonial army policy. Instead of employing native soldiers as a whole, the Jonathan Peel Commission recommended that the British should recruit the more “martial” castes of Indians and mix them throughout the regiments. While this policy later switched to employing a company of each class within a regiment, the system of dividing the castes to mitigate rebellion remained.⁴ Further, the British defined the more educated classes of Indians as nonmartial, granting them leave to deny entry of the educated into officer ranks and assure the loyalty of the “martial” and less educated soldiers to white British officers.⁵ This loyalty of a soldier to an officer, as former Indian Civil Service officer and scholar on the British Indian Army Philip Mason observes, is summed up by the statement, “I am your man; I will serve you in any way you command and you will protect me against everyone else.”⁶ While no doubt colored by culture on both sides of the equation, the statement provides an intriguing invitation to consider the exact meaning of command and what it means for an officer to exercise effective command over any soldier, indigenous or otherwise.⁷

Bringing in Effectiveness

In the introduction to the three-volume series *Military Effectiveness*, Millett, Murray, and Watman recognized assessing military effectiveness as complex. According to the authors, military effectiveness is “the process by which armed forces convert resources into fighting power. A fully effective military is one that derives maximum combat power from the resources

Previous page: U.S. troops in the Philippines during the Philippine-American War circa 1899–1902. (Photo courtesy of the Library of Congress)



A group of cadets affiliated with the Officers' School of the Philippine Constabulary (Baguio) pose for a photograph in 1914. The Philippine Constabulary was a gendarmerie-type police force established in 1901 to replace the previous Spanish colonial Guardia Civil. The Officers' School was established by the U.S. military on 17 February 1905 to develop constabulary leadership. The constabulary units were led by a cadre of officers in each unit who trained, organized, and led native Philippine recruits for the purpose of maintaining peace, law, and order in the various provinces of the Philippines under the direction of the U.S. colonial administration in the aftermath of the Spanish-American War. (Photo courtesy of Tiffany Bernard Williams via the University of Michigan)

physically and politically available. Effectiveness thus incorporates some notion of efficiency.”⁸ To deal with such a large problem, they identified the output and functional dimensions (they termed them as vertical and horizontal dimensions) and set out to define effectiveness across both dimensions. For the authors, the vertical dimension consisted of the political, strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war, while the horizontal dimension encompassed all of the functional things an organization needed to do at each level to achieve its goals.⁹ To build a framework for evaluation, the authors developed questions to draw out whether an organization is effective or not at each level of war. These questions, modified to ask how the commander

of an organization performed in making his or her organization effective or not, serves as the framework for evaluating effective command in this article.

Foundation of the Constabulary

With a framework of command effectiveness established, the question turns to the inspiration, organization, and effectiveness of the Philippine Constabulary. President William McKinley saw the need for a civil government to administer the Philippines as a territory until Filipinos could govern themselves.¹⁰ The Filipinos, however, understood that their liberation from Spanish control would mean immediate independence.¹¹ Thus, the misunderstandings resulted in an insurgency that



necessitated the first few years of occupation coming under the administration of the U.S. Army, with the commander of the Philippine Division as military governor. McKinley set in motion establishing civil government before the insurrection by sending the first Philippine Commission in January 1899, under the direction of Jacob Schurman, to determine the conditions in the islands and recommend a way forward.¹²

The Schurman Commission concluded that “the United States cannot withdraw from the Philippines,” and “the Filipinos are wholly unprepared for independence, and if independence were given to them they could not maintain it.”¹³ Further, the commission’s recommendations relied heavily on the British model of governing their colonies.¹⁴ The Schurman report convinced McKinley he must establish a civil government, and in April 1900, sent a commission under the direction of William Taft to create a civil government that would take control of the Philippines on 4 July 1901. McKinley

William H. Taft, governor-general of the Philippines, sits at his desk circa 1901 in his office where a map of Manila hangs on the wall next to him. (Photo courtesy of the Library of Congress)

did not explicitly state the commission should set up a constabulary force, but he did instruct them to protect the people, ensure local Filipinos governed themselves, and follow the recommendations of the Schurman Commission.¹⁵ Thus, the later decision for a constabulary force seems to rest more with the plans of the Taft Commission, though they did indeed receive instruction from Secretary of War Elihu Root that they should “take the lessons we could get from the colonial policy of other countries, especially Great Britain.”¹⁶ Hence, examining the logic of the commission members for the institution of a constabulary is necessary.

Taft wrote several letters to Root from July to November 1900 that outlined his preference for a

constabulary force comprised of indigenous personnel. In the letters, Taft used the logic of the Schurman Commission in that constabulary forces would be cheaper than keeping U.S. Army soldiers in the Philippines and that these forces should have U.S. officers.¹⁷ Additionally, Helen Taft recalls that her husband wanted to form “a force of several thousand Filipinos, trained and commanded by American Army officers.”¹⁸ Taft and the commission members voiced the arguments again in their annual report where they stated,

We further recommend that a comprehensive scheme of police organization be put in force ... that it be separate and distinct from the army ... The chief officers of this organization should be Americans; but some of the subordinate officers should be natives, with proper provision for their advancement as a reward for loyal and efficient services.¹⁹

And further, “The experience of England in dealing with conditions practically the same as those which we are called on to meet ... furnishes a precedent for our guidance which should not be overlooked. Though she has had here and there unfortunate experiences, as a general rule she has been served faithfully by her native soldiers, even against their own brethren [sic].”²⁰ The desire to create a constabulary flowed from the examination of the British experiences in India. With these sentiments in mind, the Philippine Commission established the Philippine Constabulary on 18 July 1901.

In Act 175 of the Philippine Commission, the commission founded a force “for the purpose of better maintaining peace, law, and order in the various provinces of the Philippine Islands.”²¹ The chief of the insular constabulary shall “have general charge and control thereof and shall see that brigandage, insurrection, unlawful assemblies and breaches of the peace and other violations of law are prevented or suppressed and the perpetrators of such offenses arrested, and peace, law and order maintained.”²² Additionally, the chief of insular constabulary will ensure that the force “is properly selected and organized and that it is suitably armed, uniformed, equipped, governed, disciplined and in all respects made and kept effective for the performance of its duties.”²³ The initial organization of the constabulary consisted of a “force of not exceeding one hundred

and fifty men for each province, selected from the natives thereof ... who are placed under the immediate command of one or more, not exceeding four, provincial inspectors ... The islands are divided into four departments, and each assistant chief is in immediate charge of a department.”²⁴ At the outset of the constabulary, it is clear that the commission envisioned the effective command to encompass both the output and functional components.

While the commission outline four districts (the commission called them “departments,” whereas the constabulary called these “districts”) for the islands, the initial organization consisted of only three until 1903.²⁵ Each district functioned as a regiment, commanded by an assistant chief with the rank of colonel, and included numerous provinces, each which functioned as a company under the command of a captain. Within the provinces, detachments organized around towns contained anywhere from a few men led by a Filipino noncommissioned officer (Americans only served as officers) to a detachment of more than one hundred men with several U.S. officers.²⁶ And while not explicitly stated in their report, the commission’s assumption was that the chief and assistant chiefs, appointed by the commission, would be American officers. For such an important post, Taft and the commission needed to select a capable officer sharing their views on natives.

The commission chose Capt. Henry T. Allen, 6th U.S. Cavalry, as its first chief. According to Allen, “General [Adna] Chaffee sent several names to the Commission and the latter selected me.”²⁷ Chaffee selected Allen to put forward based on his prior work with native scouts—native auxiliaries hired by and put under

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the command of the U.S. Army—in Leyte.²⁸ In a report as commander of the Second Subdistrict of Leyte in October 1900, Allen highlighted his interest in using natives to control the islands and was already thinking about an independent paramilitary force of police:

I desire to invite special attention to the value of the native soldiers (Leyte Scouts) ... in ferreting out insurgents and criminals and in understanding motive and method of the natives with whom we have to deal, they are of inestimable value. With a careful selection of recruits and good thorough military training they produce an effective military police body at about one-third the cost (or less) of Americans.²⁹


Further, Allen wrote to Taft in February 1901, asking for assistance in elevation in rank for command over native troops. Allen wrote, “Will you kindly inform me with what advancement beyond the rank of battalion commander, could successful work with native troops be rewarded. Would there be a career in that branch?

So far, I have had good results with Leyte Scouts

... I would be disposed to devote all energy to developing native auxiliaries.”³⁰ Allen had both good experiences with and made himself known as interested in the development of native troops to the future governor of the island, thus advertising himself as an ideal candidate. Allen’s willingness to be forward with political and civil officials helped spur the effectiveness of the constabulary at the political level.

Political Level of Military Effectiveness

In what follows, I analyze Allen’s military effectiveness as a commander on Millett, Murray, and Watman’s four vertical dimensions: political, strategic, operational, and tactical. Allen was mostly effective in command at the political level, demonstrated by his cordial relations with the civil commission members to



Maj. Gen. Henry Tureman Allen (*middle*) with his son Capt. Henry T. Allen Jr. (*right*) and Capt. Sidney Webster Fish pose for a photo 11 January 1919 in Côte-d’Or, France. (Photo courtesy of the Library of Congress)

guarantee the constabulary had a regular share of the national budget sufficient to meet their needs, quality individuals for the constabulary, and access to the American industrial base (though he failed to get the most advanced equipment needed for the mission). In a letter supporting Allen’s quest for permanent promotion to brigadier general, Henry Ide, director of the Department of Finance and Justice and future

governor-general of the Philippines, told Allen, “You know well that your services are thoroughly appreciated by all the civil authorities of the Philippines Islands.”³¹ Further, Allen knew he had to keep his pulse on politics as well: “In my present position it is not merely with the organization and administration of

Allen held the recruitment of quality individuals for service in the constabulary in high regard. With reference to officers, he stated, “The greatest amount of care has been taken in the selection of each individual member of the force, and as regards the officers every one of them has had from one to three years



It is therefore of the utmost importance that high-grade officers, thoroughly courageous, upright, sober, intelligent, and energetic, be placed over them [Filipinos].




the Constabulary force that I have to deal, but I have a great deal to do with the manipulation of the ‘intransigent’ [sic] leaders here in Manila and much correspondence with the various governors of the provinces and the officials thereof.”³² Although the constabulary saw a budgetary reduction in 1905–1907, the general trend remained either stable or increasing budgets. The cultivation of political relationships no doubt helped secure stable funding.

As time went on, the all-native Philippine Assembly, which modeled itself on the U.S. House of Representatives in contrast to the Senate-like U.S. Commission, took more power over appropriations. The demonstration of the necessity of a constabulary, however, made their political access to resources secure. According to James G. Harbord, a constabulary officer and later chief, when the Assembly confronted budget problems as late as 1908, “I have been assured by [Manuel L.] Quezon [Philippine Assembly Chairman of Appropriations] that there is no feeling of hostility toward the Constabulary that will manifest itself by action in the Assembly.”³³ Further, “The Assembly I think will not attack the Constabulary very much, perhaps may urge its ‘Filipinization,’ but the idea of the Constabulary as the nucleus of their army when they get their independence has taken hold on the native mind, and its existence will not be threatened in my judgment.”³⁴ Thus, a guarantee of perpetuation initially relied upon cordial relations between the constabulary officers and the civil commission, but over time this transitioned to pride and necessity in the minds of Filipinos.

military service in the Philippine Islands, and should therefore be acquainted with the native character and the handling of them.”³⁵ Further, “It is therefore of the utmost importance that high-grade officers, thoroughly courageous, upright, sober, intelligent, and energetic, be placed over them [Filipinos].”³⁶ To ensure such qualities, Allen personally interviewed prospective officers to identify their fitness for duty.³⁷ As time went on, however, Allen had to expand his search for qualified officers, going as far as placing ads in newspapers in the United States urging colleges and military academies to impress upon their youth the chance to serve in the constabulary.³⁸ This did not always have the effect he wished, as Allen noted in his journal, “Native press objects to my sending to the States for officers for constabulary.”³⁹ Nonetheless, Allen sought out quality manpower for his force.

Concerning equipment, however, Allen failed to get access to necessary rifles and ammunition. In 1901, the Army turned over all Remington shotguns and .45 caliber pistols to the constabulary. These weapons, however, were not adequate due to their single-shot nature and inaccuracy at long ranges.⁴⁰ Further, Chaffee, the military commander in the Philippines in 1901, wrote to the adjutant general, “Even now it is self evident that 50, 100, or 200 men, with hostile intent, armed with rifle or carbine, constitute a force that takes thousands of troops and months of time to overcome.”⁴¹ Fear of constabulary defections drove opposition to arming the Filipinos with newer and better rifles. Allen continued to write about the need for superior weapons but did not receive rifles until 1907. In his 1907 report,



The first Philippine Assembly elected in 1907. (Photo courtesy of the Library of Congress)

he stated, “During the year the enlisted personnel has been partially armed with the Krag carbine, modified by the addition of the rifle bayonet—a most important change ... He no longer must depend on firing one shot and then clubbing his gun in the almost inevitable bolo [Filipino knife] rush.”⁴² Allen’s political connections did not suffice to overcome deep suspicion of arming natives with advanced weaponry.

Strategic Level of Military Effectiveness

At the strategic level, the Philippine Constabulary also mostly achieved effectiveness. Allen often communicated with leaders, influenced opinion on strategic goals, and developed relationships to force the Army’s integration into his strategic framework. He did not balance, on the other hand, strategic goals and the force size as he allowed mission creep. In his letters from 1901 to 1903, Allen corresponded

with President Theodore Roosevelt, Sen. Albert Beveridge, Gen. Henry Corbin (adjutant general of the Army), Col. Clarence Edwards (chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs), among others. Most of the letters pertain to the cost-savings of a reduction in Regular Army soldiers in combination with maintaining a strong constabulary, ending a split in civil and military government, and placing the Philippine Scouts at the disposal of the constabulary rather than the Army.⁴³ While Beveridge admonished Allen for being too hasty about the end of military governance, his correspondence certainly had an effect.⁴⁴ From 1902 to 1907, the number of U.S. Army troops in the Philippines reduced from 24,238 to 11,508.⁴⁵ Allen’s

greatest influence, however, came with the detail of Philippine Scouts to the constabulary.

On 30 January 1903, Congress “authorized the detail of companies of scouts to cooperate with the Philippine Constabulary ... and to be under the command for tactical purposes of the chief and assistant chiefs of the Philippines Constabulary, who are officers in the United States Army.”⁴⁶ Through this maneuvering, Allen had almost doubled the amount of manpower available to him. Understandably, the Army had significant issues with this construct, as it believed commanders lost “the troops of their command whom they had organized, instructed for years, brought to a high state of efficiency, and whose material wants, under other leadership, they must still supply.”⁴⁷ According to Allen, this was nonsense: “We are now trying to use the Scouts, which General Davis apprehends is fraught with much trouble to both the branches, but, in my opinion, this apprehension is largely due to the conservatism that necessarily is a characteristic of every old soldier.”⁴⁸ By August 1904, Allen noted in his journal, “Constabulary from 7200 to 6000. I have taken over five companies giving me now 35 of the 50. The Gen. order (99) War Dept. authorizing me to order scouts has changed the aspect of affairs considerably.”⁴⁹ Regardless of the internal squabbling, Allen’s ability to influence those people necessary to allocate more resources toward his strategic goal of quelling violence in the islands demonstrates effective command at the strategic level.

Allen failed at the strategic level, however, in his inability to stem mission creep. Over time, the constabulary took on more and more requirements. In the 1903 report, Commissioner Luke Wright outlined that in addition to other duties, the constabulary also had responsibility for the telegraph division, and “the bureau of constabulary has also imposed upon it the duty of running a supply store ... [servicing] also all civil employees of the government outside the city of Manila.”⁵⁰ In the same vein, Forbes states that in addition to the telegraph lines, supply stores, a band, and medical services during epidemics, “In short, the Constabulary at one time or another rendered service to practically every branch of government. It furnished guards for collectors of public revenue, disbursing officers, public land surveyors, and scientific parties on explorations, and for the transportation of lepers.”⁵¹ The accumulation of duties resulted in a need for augmentation.

According to Chief H. H. Bandholtz in 1907, “The number of officers authorized is barely sufficient to meet the demands upon the service if all were present for duty.”⁵² While some of these duties were arguably necessary for carrying out the mission of the constabulary, the accumulation over time stretched resources thin without a proper accounting by the leadership to the government of a need for increase.

Operational Level of Military Effectiveness

The ability of the constabulary to perform so many functions did, however, demonstrate that the organization was mobile, flexible, and thought about combined arms; and that commanders placed their strengths against the enemy’s weaknesses by assigning soldiers in their home province. The mobile and flexible organization at the operational level resulted from the ability of the constabulary to use the roads and telegraph lines built in the Philippines since the commencement of the occupation. When the constabulary turned over the telegraph service to the Bureau of Posts in 1906, it included 307 operators and 4,933 miles of telegraph lines.⁵³ The outbreak of violence in Samar in late 1904 demonstrated the ability for the organization to move forces around the archipelago. According to Allen, “Reenforcements [sic] of constabulary from many of the other provinces were hurried to Sámar,” with more than 747 officers and enlisted detailed to the province.⁵⁴ While the uprising ended up too much for the constabulary to handle and the U.S. Army had to take responsibility for suppression, the ability to move a significant number of constabulary companies shows the mobility of the organization.

According to Allen, the flexibility of the constabulary came from its organization: “As organized and utilized at present the constabulary has greater mobility than the scouts. This is due chiefly to three reasons: First, a greater percentage of officers; secondly, a greater period of field service in small detachments; and thirdly, greater facility in subsistence.”⁵⁵ The constabulary’s agility resulted from the more decentralized operations and oversight by officers. Further, the organization also thought about the importance of incorporating combined arms. For example, in 1907, James Harbord wrote to Bandholtz, “I have seen enough of this District in the five days it has had its present size to be sure that

it cannot be handled without a coast guard cutter and I wish that you would bear that in mind when appropriations are asked. We shall fall down if we don't have such a boat, and we will not fall down if we do."⁵⁶ While

their own neighbors certainly helped operations, the fact that soldiers who grew up in a particular area had an intimate knowledge of terrain negated this advantage for the enemy.

“While many colonial powers had policies of dividing ethnic groups to exploit differences and minimize corruption, the American decision to do the opposite had operational benefits.”

traditional combined arms such as artillery are unsuitable in this context, the constabulary took into account other means of ensuring its success.

The constabulary gained an operational advantage by the decision to assign soldiers to their home province. According to Wright,

Each province should furnish its quota of men, whose operations ordinarily were to be confined to their province. This latter principle involved a departure from the rule which had invariably controlled the English in their colonial possessions and the Spaniards in their dealing with the Filipinos, their policy having been to utilize native troops and constabulary in other sections than that from which they were drawn, thereby taking advantage of supposed tribal prejudices and, as it was believed, removing the tendency to disloyalty or inefficiency which would exist when dealing with their own immediate friends and neighbors ... It was believed that with proper treatment there need be no fear of treachery, that there was a great advantage in having the police operating in a particular province familiar with its terrain and the people living therein, and finally that in view of the fact that these people were kinsmen and neighbors of the constabulary there would be absent that disposition to abuse and oppression.⁵⁷

While many colonial powers had policies of dividing ethnic groups to exploit differences and minimize corruption, the American decision to do the opposite had operational benefits. While preventing abuses of

Tactical Level of Military Effectiveness

Closeness with the people held potential to help with tactical effectiveness, but Allen's decisions led to some inefficiencies. The failure to institute a training program from the beginning resulted in tactical inefficiencies and abuses, and the focus on chasing insurgents rather than on police work engendered ill feelings. Allen's command was effective, however, in instilling cohesion and esprit de corps from the willingness of constabulary officers to lead their men from the front. In early 1903, Allen recounted, "I have here now in Manila a so-called Headquarters Troop wherein I am educating non-commissioned officers and also giving Inspectors a chance to learn what is to be the standard of officers in the Constabulary."⁵⁸ He tempered this feeling, however, with the admission that "it has been impossible up to the present time to make much headway with this matter owing to the fact that every officer and man available have been required in the 'bosque,' and it has been a question of hustle from the day of organization until now, and that on the part of each and every one."⁵⁹ Thus, while founded in 1901, Allen did not create an actual constabulary school until 1906.⁶⁰ Most likely, Allen took this action due to increasing criticism of the constabulary by both indigenous and domestic audiences. In 1905, Dr. Henry P. Willis published *Our Philippine Problem*, a critique of American policies in the islands, in which he said,

A glance at a constabulary outpost conveys an unfavorable impression, to be strengthened upon closer inspection. The men are manifestly untrained in soldierly qualities ... They feel the hostility of their countrymen, and repay it

with the disregard of individual rights which can be found only among a subject people.⁶¹

While the truth is most likely somewhere in between the two extremes painted by Allen and Willis, the little amount of training in police duties and focus on insurgent hunting in the early days certainly contributed to ineffectiveness of supporting strategic goals vis-à-vis the population at the tactical level.

Compounding the inefficiency due to low training levels, the decision to pursue the tactic of “reconcentration” caused serious fractures with the population. The 1903 commission report said,

It was exceedingly difficult for the constabulary to come in contact with these outlaws ... As this was an intolerable state of things, which could not be prolonged without immense damage to the province, it was determined to draw in the people from the remote and outlying barrios pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 781, which authorizes this step, and thereby cut off the source of supplies of the outlaws ... They were thus concentrated for several months.⁶²


The resort to physically isolating the population from the insurgents had resulted in cutting off supplies and making the constabulary’s job of pursuit easier, but it caused serious disruptions and engendered the hatred of the people. According to Willis’s own personal observations and estimates from reports, he concluded that the constabulary put more than 450,000 inhabitants in reconcentration areas from 1902 to 1904.⁶³ The indigenous elites began to grow tired of these tactics as well. According to Attorney General Lebbeus R. Wilfley in 1906, “Chief



Two native Philippine Constabulary leaders pose for a photograph 15 January 1905. Philippine Constabulary recruits were trained, organized, and equipped in accordance with U.S. doctrine and standards of the time. (Photo originally from the *New-York Tribune* via the Library of Congress)

Justice Arellano ... thinks that the Insular Government is too elaborate for the resources of the country, and fears a quasi-military regime unless the Constabulary is put in good condition soon.”⁶⁴ The semi-military tactics, use of scouts along with the constabulary, and reconcentration resulted in very hard feelings of the indigenous peoples toward government efforts.

Allen did achieve tactical success, however, in making sure his officers led from the front and instilled in the



Ethnic Ifugao constabulary soldiers drawn from the Ifugao region of the Philippines stand in formation under the leadership of native Philippine officer Lt. Maximon Meimban. Early in the colonial administration of the U.S. government, U.S. and Philippine political leaders began to regard development of the constabulary as a key component for the eventual establishment of a Philippine national army to support future national independence. Philippine Constabulary members across all ethnic groups developed a reputation for not only bravery, loyalty, and fearsome martial ability in combat but also for efficiency in the discharge of government administration activities often quite unrelated to their regular domestic security duties. (Photo originally in *The Philippines: Past and Present* by Dean C. Worcester via Project Gutenberg)

organization a feeling of esprit de corps that drove mission success. One of the best measures in the installation of esprit de corps was the desertion rate of the constabulary. Allen continually referred to the low desertion rate of his soldiers versus that of other military organizations. For instance, Allen wrote to Beveridge, "Out of the total number of our Constabulary [4,000] we have up to the present time lost only three members,—a record that can scarcely be equaled anywhere."⁶⁵ In the years of his tenure, the desertion rate was seven-tenths of one percent, nine times below that of the Army in the Philippines.⁶⁶ The willingness of soldiers to stay with their units demonstrates the cohesion within the constabulary, propelled by the willingness of the officers to lead from the front. An example of this (if somewhat romanticized) comes from Vic Hurley's *Jungle Patrol*:

We are to see Allen later in the course of the fierce fighting in Samar, ploughing his way

through high *cogon* grass, three feet to the rear of Captain Cary Crockett, on patrol in very hostile country. He wears the full dress uniform of a brigadier-general; he insists that his officers go into battle clothed as becomes their rank. When grimacing and shouting *pulajans* rise all about the party there in that tangled grass, Captain and Private and Brigadier-General fight for their lives ... Allen was a soldier in the grand manner; he was a dashing cavalryman who refused to let the glamour and romance of campaigning ever die.⁶⁷

Further, in an Army report of the actions of Capt. John R. White and his constables at Bud Dajo in 1906, Col. J. W. Duncan stated, "The 51 men of the Sulu and Zamboanga Constabulary were distinguished for their work. Led by that fearless soldier, Captain White, and Second Lieutenant Sowers, these

men fought like demons, the per cent of their casualty list exceeding all others.”⁶⁸ Both insurgents and soldiers received high casualty counts. In the years of Allen’s tenure, the constabulary killed 3,153 and captured 10,755 bandits, confiscated 5,341 weapons, with nearly 1,000 constabulary soldiers dead.⁶⁹ According to Forbes, “The Filipino enlisted men respected their officers, and, when properly trained, commanded, and led, performed gallant service in the field,” and “the story of the Constabulary is one of heroism, endurance, and loyalty to ideals under great difficulties, of which the American people should be very proud.”⁷⁰ The ability of the American commanders to develop the cohesion of their indigenous soldiers provided them with the means toward tactical success in suppressing insurrection.

Contemporary Implications

The Philippine Constabulary offers several implications for the potential use of contemporary American officers to command indigenous forces. First, effective commanders must cultivate political connections to ensure success of their organization. In the case of the Philippine Constabulary, U.S. civil leadership in the archipelago made things much easier for Allen and his subordinates. This example could provide evidence for the argument that the United States should only command indigenous forces if they hold civil power as well (a case such as the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq). Even if that were the circumstance, the Philippine Constabulary offers that a commander must cultivate relationships with the indigenous elite, as did Allen, Bandholtz, Harbord, and their subordinates. While the colonial authority rested with the U.S. commission, each province had native elites elected to office with which the constabulary officials had to cooperate.

A further issue in dealing with political elites is language fluency. Allen put a premium on ensuring that his officers could speak or learn Spanish. While the emphasis placed on multilingualism stemmed from a desire for the officers to communicate with their soldiers and the citizens of the island, the fact also arises that to cultivate closer political bonds it helps to communicate without a translator. A recent study on the effects of group collaboration and shared language concludes that when members

of a group share a common language, collaborative problem-solving increases across both insight and divergent-thinking tasks; these boosts potentially come from an increase in in-group affinity with the familiar-speaking members.⁷¹

Language fluency relates to another important lesson—that these assignments be long term. First, cultivation of fluency (especially outside of the European family of languages) takes a long time. If a cadre of American officers takes the time and effort to learn more difficult dialects, then the probability arises that there will be fewer of them. A smart return on such an investment lies with placing these individuals in positions to use that skill over an extended period. Second, to cultivate the relationships necessary and set the organization on the right track, it will take a matter of years. Allen spent six years as commander of the constabulary; his two successors spent more than a decade each in the Philippines. American commitment to a course of action such as this relies on a cadre dedicated to the long march.

The constabulary case also highlights a concern for station in the native force. Allen and all Regular Army officers detailed to the constabulary remained on active duty. Further, they retained their sequence in seniority.⁷² Translating that to today’s system, the officers would need to remain in their year group and be competitive at each promotion board. While there are numerous ways one could configure the service for this (separate branches, for instance), these officers took such a position for so long because they had a guarantee that they would not lose their spot for advancement. Otherwise, the cadre would not attract the caliber of officer needed for such a task.

Finally, a cadre of American officers over indigenous forces allows younger officers to experience leadership of larger organizations at an earlier time in their career. For instance, Allen was a captain when first detailed to the constabulary; he held the temporary rank of brigadier general as a result of his position, reverting to a major when he left the Philippines. His subordinates all held higher temporary positions as a consequence of the number of soldiers entrusted to their care. This experience boded well for the United States when commencing its involvement in World War I. Of former constabulary officers, twelve reached the rank of general during the war.⁷³ These

officers either already displayed the necessary abilities to become a general officer, or their time in the constabulary molded them into better leaders. The truth is probably both.

From 1901 to 1917, the Philippine Constabulary, led by a cadre of U.S. Army officers, showed that Americans could exercise effective command of indigenous forces. The ability to communicate with and influence both indigenous and American elites and competing to secure the resources necessary to align ends, ways, and means meant that U.S. Army

officers could set a solid political and strategic foundation for an indigenous force. Further, developing an organization that embraced flexibility and mobility at the operational level and exuded esprit de corps at the tactical level ensured development of a force that the Filipinos came to not only be proud of but also saw as essential to their future. While not appropriate in every contemporary circumstance, the case of the Philippine Constabulary demonstrates that American military officers can exercise effective command over indigenous forces. ■

Notes

1. In the course of this article, I equate the Philippine Constabulary with a military organization. While the definition of a constabulary is usually a military-style police force, the Philippine Constabulary from 1901 to 1917 mostly operated as a military organization fighting an insurgency and demonstrates that American officers can command a military force of mainly indigenous soldiers.

In addition, I use the word command rather than leadership. While one can debate the appropriateness of either term, I find command to encompass both the responsibility to inspire men to action and to develop effective organizations. It is outside the scope of this work to debate the appropriateness of either. For one take on this, see G. D. Sheffield, introduction to *Leadership and Command: The Anglo-American Military Experience since 1861* (Lincoln, NE: Potomac Books, 1997). Other authors on the subject tend to use the term interchangeably, such as John Keegan, introduction to *The Mask of Command* (New York: Viking, 1987).

2. Richard L. Millett, *Searching for Stability: The U.S. Development of Constabulary Forces in Latin America and the Philippines*, Occasional Paper 30 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010), 1, accessed 26 May 2021, <https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portal/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/millett.pdf>.

3. H. K. Carroll, "The Territorial System for Our New Possessions," *The Outlook* 63, no. 17 (23 December 1899): 966–68, accessed 26 May 2021, <https://www.unz.com/print/Outlook-1899dec23/>.

4. Amar Farooqui, "'Divide and Rule'? Race, Military Recruitment and Society in Late Nineteenth Century Colonial India," *Social Scientist* 43, nos. 3–4 (March–April 2015): 50, 54, accessed 26 May 2021, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24372935>.

5. Jeffrey Greenhut, "Sahib and Sepoy: An Inquiry into the Relationship between the British Officers and Native Soldiers of the British Indian Army," *Military Affairs* 48, no. 1 (January 1984): 15–16, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1988342>.

6. Philip Mason, *A Matter of Honour: An Account of the Indian Army, Its Officers and Men* (London: Purnell Book Services, 1974), 406.

7. Greenhut, "Sahib and Sepoy," 17.

8. Allan R. Millett, Williamson Murray, and Kenneth H. Watman, "The Effectiveness of Military Organizations," in *Military Effectiveness*, ed. Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 2.

9. Ibid. An organization, however, does not need to be effective at each level to be overall effective. On the contrary, most military organizations are never able to achieve effectiveness in all categories.

10. W. Cameron Forbes, *The Philippine Islands*, vol. 1 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1928), 130–34.

11. Ibid., 88–92.

12. U.S. Philippine Commission, *Report of the Philippine Commission to the President*, vol. 1, pt. 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1900), 1.

13. Ibid., 121.

14. Ibid., 97–106. Also see Exhibit VIII in the same volume, "Kirkwood's memorandum on the administration of British dependencies in the Orient (prepared at request of commission)." Montague Kirkwood, a Briton, lived in Japan and had advised the Japanese government on colonies as well. See Christopher A. Morrison, "A World of Empires: United States Rule in the Philippines, 1898–1913" (PhD diss., Georgetown University, 2009), 45, accessed 26 May 2021, <http://hdl.handle.net/10822/553126>.

15. U.S. Philippine Commission, *Reports of the Philippine Commission, the Civil Governor, and the Head of the Executive Departments of the Civil Government of the Philippine Islands (1900–1903)* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1904), 5–11 (hereinafter cited as *Reports of the Philippine Commission, 1900–1903*).

16. Elihu Root in a note to Philip Jessup, quoted in Philip C. Jessup, *Elihu Root*, vol. 1 (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1938), 345.

17. Morrison, "A World of Empires," 63.

18. Helen Taft, *Recollections of Full Years* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1914), quoted in Alfred W. McCoy, *Policing America's Empire: The United States, The Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), 85.

19. *Reports of the Philippine Commission, 1900–1903*, 93, 95.

20. Ibid., 97.

21. Bureau of Insular Affairs, U.S. War Department, *Public Laws and Resolutions Passed by the United States Philippine Commission* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1901), 370.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. *Reports of the Philippine Commission, 1900–1903*, 183.

25. U.S. War Department, *Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1903*, vol. 7 (Washington, DC:

- Government Printing Office, 1904), 24 (hereinafter cited as *Report of the Philippine Commission*, 1903).
26. Ibid., 27–33.
27. Henry T. Allen (hereinafter cited as HTA) to Caspar Whitney, 2 August 1901, box 7, Henry T. Allen Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress (hereinafter cited as HTA Papers).
28. Heath Twichell Jr., *Allen: The Biography of an Army Officer: 1859-1930* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1974), 115–16.
29. U.S. War Department, *Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1901*, vol. 1, pt. 6 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1901), 26.
30. HTA to William H. Taft, 22 February 1901, box 7, HTA Papers.
31. Henry C. Ide to HTA, 8 November 1904, box 8, HTA Papers.
32. HTA to Clarence R. Edwards, 21 February 1902, box 7, HTA Papers.
33. James G. Harbord (hereinafter cited as JGH) to H. H. Bandholtz, 5 April 1908, box 2, James G. Harbord Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress (hereinafter cited as JGH Papers).
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37. John R. White, *Bullets and Bolos: Fifteen Years in the Philippine Islands* (New York: The Century Co., 1928), 9.
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41. Adna R. Chaffee to Adjutant General, 30 July 1901, quoted in Twichell, *Allen*, 124.
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43. HTA to Theodore Roosevelt, 7 November 1901, box 7, HTA Papers; HTA to Albert J. Beveridge, 5 December 1901, box 7, HTA Papers; HTA to Henry C. Corbin, 1 February 1902, box 7, HTA Papers; HTA to Clarence Edwards, 21 February 1902, box 7, HTA Papers.
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46. *Report of the Philippine Commission*, 1903, 9.
47. Gen. George W. Davis, quoted in *Report of the Philippine Commission*, 1903, 9.
48. HTA to Luke E. Wright, 19 February 1903, box 8, HTA Papers.
49. HTA Journal, 21 August 1904, box 1, HTA Papers.
50. *Report of the Philippine Commission*, 1903, 11–12.
51. Forbes, *The Philippine Islands*, 1:208–13.
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53. Forbes, *The Philippine Islands*, 1:210n.
54. U.S. War Department, *Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1905*, vol. 12, pt. 3 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1905), 4, 28.
55. *Report of the Philippine Commission*, 1903, 47.
56. JGH to H. H. Bandholtz, 5 April 1907, box 2, JGH Papers.
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69. Twichell, *Allen*, 143.
70. Forbes, *The Philippine Islands*, 1:219, 1:235.
71. W. Quin Yow and Tony Zhao Ming Lim, "Sharing the Same Languages Helps Us Work Better Together," *Palgrave Communications* 5, no. 154 (2019): 9, <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-019-0365-z>.
72. At the time, promotion rested not on merit, but on seniority. Once a person of the next higher rank advanced, retired, or died, the number one person in line advanced.
73. Forbes, *The Philippine Islands*, 1:236–38. Henry T. Allen, H. H. Bandholtz, James G. Harbord, Mark L. Hersey, Peter E. Traub, Dennis E. Nolan, William C. Rivers, Herman Hall, William S. Scott, John B. Bennet, C. E. Kilbourne, and Marcus D. Cronin.



A boy salutes as Turkish army vehicles drive by their village 11 October 2017 on the Turkish-Syrian border in Reyhanli, Hatay Province, Turkey. (Photo by Osman Orsal, Reuters via Alamy Stock Photo)

Framing Turkey's Cross-Border Counterterrorism Operations in the Context of Pragmatic Strategic Culture

An Operational Design

Col. Özgür Körpe, PhD, Turkish Army

Syria has an exceptional place in the military career of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkey and the shaper of Turkish strategic culture. Syria was his first place of duty after Atatürk was assigned as an Ottoman officer, and it was his last place of duty as an Ottoman general. Atatürk resided at one time or another in all the important cities of Syria.

Following World War I, during the Republican era in which Atatürk was elected as Turkey's first president, Atatürk's interest in Syria focused on two main issues. The first was to ensure the peaceful incorporation of Hatay Province into Turkey in 1939 instead of Syria, and the other was ending the French Mandate over Syria and supporting its full independence in 1945.

A similar situation existed between Turkey and Iraq. Atatürk made diplomatic efforts to incorporate Mosul Province into Turkey, but eventually, respecting the decision of the League of Nations, he accepted the terms of the 1926 Ankara Treaty that ceded Mosul to Iraq. After that, similar to how he supported Syria, Atatürk supported Iraq in its efforts to end the British Mandate and to become an independent state.

Atatürk's legacy of support for the independence of every country in the region is important as it provides essential perspective to the developments taking place in the region today. For Turkey, demanding land from any state would compromise its own territorial claims established by the Treaty of Lausanne and other associated treaties. Atatürk envisioned and cared about the transformation of both Syria and Iraq into independent and stable states that would make them potential bulwarks helping to ensure Turkey's own borders and security. Unfortunately, current developments echo the concerns Atatürk also had over festering territorial disputes from a century ago. The problems stemming from instability in Syria and Iraq still threaten Turkey's security today.

On the other hand, the Western-oriented political model, which was formulated by Atatürk and especially consolidated by his successors after the Second World War, has made it both a respected member of the Western hemisphere and a center of attraction for many societies in the Middle East in the past century.

It is against the legacy of Atatürk's actions that the current situation between Syria and Turkey should be analyzed. Although Turkey is not the cause of the current Syrian civil war, it nevertheless has faced from

many quarters one-sided, uninformed, and superficial criticism for its having undertaken defensive measures along its border with Syria while the real historical background and the fact that it has been greatly and adversely affected by the civil war has been ignored. Therefore, accusing Turkey of opportunistic interventionism behind its cross-border operations—in fact, border security operations—is indicative of an extremely ill-informed and shallow point of view.

States like Turkey that remain stable in the midst of neighboring unstable regions are very scarce in the world, and perhaps none of those states are as stable as Turkey. In literature, the condition of a state that becomes unstable in a short time due to the spillover of political problems from neighboring states is called "bad neighborhood instability."¹ In short, all the political and military activities of Turkey as they relate to Syria have been aimed at precluding the negative "bad neighborhood" effects caused by the Syrian civil war.

Nevertheless, maintaining stability requires some changeable political or strategic measures on the part of Turkey. This changeability is described as "the pragmatic character of Turkish strategic culture."² In this definition, "strategic culture" refers to Turkey's way of war, or its use of force. "Pragmatic" refers to the practical changeability of this behavior as it adapts to changing circumstances and threats.

However, the changeability referred to here should not be misunderstood. From my perspective, changeability is not "sordidness" that puts personal interests above anything else. Nor is it the "untrustworthiness" of someone who compromises his or her sublime purpose when in trouble. Finally, it is not that somebody opportunistically turns to deny the purpose that he or she defended so fervently yesterday because today more favorable opportunities arise in changing conditions or because they feel themselves in danger.

Changing purpose means changing the

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desired end state in the strategy, the sublime purpose. When this is changed, the whole strategy—the whole case—changes, and efforts take on a completely different character. A pragmatist in the context above is one who can keep the execution flexible without changing his or

do not change.³ It is wrong to assume that they do not exist and to examine them separately. Jack L. Snyder, the originator of the concept of strategic culture, warns researchers in his article “The Concept of Strategic Culture: Caveat Emptor” that culture,

including strategic culture, should only be considered when all other explanations fail.⁴ Additionally, Snyder states, plain old politics or pragmatism would provide the most useful prism for explaining a change in strategy.⁵ Kerry Longhurst contributes to an understanding of the changeability of culture with the concept of “fine-tuning.” According to Longhurst, changes in culture are not usually radical but usually a fine-tuning.⁶

In *Daring and Caution in Turkish Strategic Culture: Republic at Sea*, Malik Mufti, a professor of international relations at Tufts University, adds to an understanding of strategic culture by asserting that there are offensive

Table 1. Purposes Mentioned by the National Security Council

National Security Council press releases	Purposes
Operation Euphrates Shield 24 August 2016	Ensure our border security, prevent attacks against our country, remove Daesh and other terrorist organizations from the region completely.
Operation Olive Branch 10 January 2018	Render terrorists ineffective, ensure the security of Turkey's borders, contribute to regional and global peace, ensure the Syrians return to their homeland, and help provide protection of the territorial integrity of Syria.
Operation Claw-1/2 8 May 2019	Against the <i>Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê</i> (Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK) nesting in the north of Iraq, destroy the caves and shelters used by the terrorist organization in the Hakurk region, and neutralize the terrorists.
Operation Peace Spring 9–17 October 2019	By neutralizing terrorist organizations such as Daesh-PKK/ Kurdistan Communities Union (<i>Koma Civakên Kurdistan</i> , or KCK)/Democratic Union Party (<i>Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat</i> [PYD])/People's Protection Units (<i>Yekîneyên Parastina Gel</i> , or YPG), which pose a threat and danger to our country and our nation and cause instability in our region; to save the region, which has become a home for terrorism, from the persecution of Daesh-PKK/PYD/YPG; not to allow the establishment of a terror corridor; and establish a peace corridor within the framework of respect for the territorial integrity of Syria by creating suitable conditions for the safe and voluntary return of our Syrian brothers to their homes and lands.

(Table by author)


her purpose. So, the most important qualities that distinguish pragmatism from opportunism are methodologies based on purpose that generate useful solutions, utilitarianism that pursues general operational utility, and finally, pragmatic ethics that accept the concrete facts of life and do not compromise this idea.

Further, the pragmatic nature of the strategic culture is also about skillfully melding continuity and change. According to Jeremy Black, strategic behavior is composed of elements that change and those that

and defensive tendencies in Turkish strategic culture. In his work, Mufti asserts that there are discernible offensive and defensive tendencies in Turkish strategic culture and connects Atatürk's security measures, distinct from Ottoman ones, to pragmatism by calling them “tactical flexibility.”⁷

Of course, I am aware that pragmatism comes into play in the limitation problems of political philosophy and produces useful solutions based on field experience. Just like Turkey, I know that pragmatism was adopted in

the establishment and development processes of the United States of America. In my view, “pragmatism” as a concept encompasses both Mufti’s offensive/defensive dialectic and Longhurst’s fine-tuning definition. Leaving aside further conceptual discussion on the determinations of Longhurst and Mufti, I will be content with showing the reflection of pragmatism, especially “purposefulness” and “changeability,” on current Turkish operational art as it applies to the current situation with Syria.



(Figure by author; map from Turkey's General Directorate of Mapping)

Figure 1. Turkish Armed Forces Operational Area of Interest

Strategic Culture and Modern Warfare

The “changing” face of war itself is a concept that recent writers also like to use. Has something really changed in the nature of current warfare as opposed to previous concepts of war? If so, what has changed?

What we subconsciously problematize here is essentially the transformation of the classical state of war between states to conflicts that may not be between states. In other words, in our sophisticated and complex age, the state has lost its Weberian monopoly on violence. This situation is rapidly evolving into unlimited violence as foreseen by Carl von Clausewitz.⁸

Under rapidly changing conditions, the operational design methodology habitually used for understanding or framing complex operational problems and the operational art used in solving the problems are also having to change rapidly. The speed of change requires understanding the wicked problem and making decisions with the same intensity but even faster. This paves the way for maneuver superiority and the possibilities of asymmetry in operational art to be challenged.

Different research problems can be produced from the historical, political, and strategic framework summarized above. In this study, the effects of the civil war in Syria on Turkey’s strategic behavior are briefly discussed. Then, the article focuses on the operational impact of this changing strategic behavior, aiming to identify Turkey’s operational problems caused by the Syrian civil war using a pragmatic operational approach. The design methodology proposed by Jeffrey M. Reilly is used to frame the environment, problems, and solution.⁹

It is worth emphasizing that the data from research findings are collected from open sources, but the model created for the research is the author’s mental construct based on a theoretical framework. Moreover, the events discussed have not yet completed their historical development, so the data obtained from the field for later analysis are constantly updated. For example, at the time of writing this article, Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) have launched the operations Claw-Thunder and Claw-Lightning, which are the continuation of the Claw operations, against PKK elements in northern



(Figure by author; map from Turkey's General Directorate of Mapping)

Figure 2. Turkish Armed Forces Comparative Operational Areas

Iraq. Thus, in keeping with G. W. F. Hegel's aphorism, "the owl of Minerva begins its flight only with the onset of dusk," this study focuses only on Turkey's operational purpose and approach.¹⁰

Framing the Troubling Environment

During the civil war in Syria, the international security environment that Turkey faced verified Clausewitz's "paradoxical trinity" metaphor, circulating between primordial violence, hatred, and enmity.¹¹ The *Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê's* (Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK) opportunism and legitimacy efforts are not new for the TAF. However, what is new is that this type of warfare is directed and managed on a multilayered scale that extends to the strategic level. Operational art provides useful data to describe this wicked problem.

The Syrian civil war started as part of the Arab Spring movements that swept across the Middle East in 2010, but unlike other popular movements, the Syrian conflict quickly turned into a civil war. The potential for the conflict in Syria to have negative effects on regional and global security attracted the attention of international public opinion. While the states of the region were cooperating, a new coalition

people forcibly displaced from Syria due to conflict, violence, and persecution reached record levels globally, and Turkey became the host for the largest number of Syrian refugees in the world.¹³


In conjunction with migration issues, Turkey's border cities became vulnerable to cross-border mortar, rocket, and missile attacks by terrorists. For example, between 18 January and 2 October 2016, twenty-five Turkish citizens lost their lives as a result of the ninety-five rocket attacks carried out by Daesh from Al Bab, Syria.¹⁴ Terrorists did not settle with cross-border fires. They also targeted the major cities and resorts of Turkey with suicide attacks, IED attacks, and armed attacks. Until the end of 2016, Daesh and PKK terrorist attacks had claimed hundreds of lives in Turkey, just as in Europe and the United States.¹⁵

The PKK, taking advantage of the opportunities created by the civil war in Syria, expanded its terrorist activities in northern Syria and continued to attack Turkey from Tal Abyad, Ras al-Ayn, Qamishli, Ayn Al Arab, Manbij, and Afrin in the northern areas of Syria.¹⁶ Thus, the PKK came to threaten Turkey's border with both Iraq and Syria. With Turkey's many border cities coming under threat from both Daesh

against Daesh was established on a global scale.¹²

The emerging situation in Syria caused concern in Turkey for its border security (Turkey's border with Syria is its longest). The threat was multidimensional; a massive influx of refugees, emerging terrorist networks, and rising transnational crime, which are natural outcomes of a civil war, were the main problems.

The number of



(Figure by author)

Figure 3. Phase 1: Framing the Environment

and the PKK, the operational area of interest of the TAF extended from the Hakkari-Iran-Iraq border in the east to the Hatay-Syria border in the west (see figure 1, page 119).

Of special note, the extensive area where the TAF was operating in Syria against terrorists was of a shifting character. For example, the area of Operation Euphrates Shield (OES) consisted of predominately residential areas, while that of Operation Olive Branch (OOB) included relatively rugged, forested, fortified, and residential areas. Although uneven in the Operation Peace Spring (OPS) region,

residential areas were the decisive operational targets (see figure 2, page 120).

The operational area in Iraq, on the other hand, was unique, consisting of high mountains, steep and rugged terrain, and dense forests. Moreover, this area was a safe haven where the PKK had been based for many years and had benefited from the infrastructure and transportation facilities by taking advantage of the authority vacuum.

In view of the environmental framework above, Reilly's mind-mapping method has been used for strategic modeling. Figure 3 models the first phase of the design.

Framing the Wicked Problem in Context of Pragmatic Purposefulness

Strategic purposefulness. Sanctuary is essential for terrorist activities. For many years, terrorists found such a safe haven for basing of operations in the mountainous regions of Iraq and partially in Syria, far from the control of the central government. From this region, Daesh conducted terrorist activities during the Syrian civil war, providing lessons for other terrorist organizations like the PKK.


During a five-year period in which the lives of hundreds of Turkish citizens were lost and numerous threats were made against Turkey, the country made peaceful attempts, and even warnings, to relevant states and international organizations regarding the unacceptable situation. However, while the immigration problem and multidimensional terrorism threat constituted a heavy burden on Turkey, it drew little global attention or interest, to the disappointment of the Turkish people. Thus, Turkey finally concluded that it had no option but “to pull itself up by its own bootstraps.” Consequently, Turkey deemed it necessary to intervene in the uncontrolled area that constituted a perfect safe haven for terrorists in both Syria and northern territory of Iraq. Contrary to some assertions, Turkey clearly stated the purpose of its planned intervention together with the self-imposed restrictions on its operations from the outset. Table 1 (on page 118) reveals the purpose of Turkey’s cross-border operations in a comparative manner, which were clearly presented in global media.¹⁷

Of note, Turkey did not go beyond the predetermined objectives. The most prominent feature of Turkey’s operations was that there were no hidden agendas.

Operational purposefulness. There were differently motivated terrorist groups in the TAF’s operational area of influence and interest. Therefore, it was deemed impractical to analyze the center of gravity of the terrorists as a whole and to find an effective approach to solving the problem they created

for Turkey. So, the TAF did not waste time attempting to identify a single terrorist group’s center of gravity in this complex and blurry environment. Instead, the TAF focused its efforts on determining critical needs and vulnerabilities of the separate terrorist groups, and conducting detailed target analysis to reveal physical targets.


The prominent critical vulnerabilities identified were specific terrorist command and control facilities, key



(Figure by author)

Figure 4. Phase 2: Framing the Problem

terrorist leaders, and critical terrain. Thus, the operations resulted in dispersion of hundreds of terrorists from Daesh, the PKK, and other groups; dramatic reduction of the immediate threat from those groups; and a significant reduction in their long-term capacity to conduct armed terrorist activities in Turkey. This shows that the terrorists’ critical vulnerabilities and corresponding TAF objectives were accurately identified. Figure 4 models the second phase of the design.



(Figure by author)

Figure 5. Operational Approach of Operation Euphrates Shield

Strategic and Operational Approaches: A Pragmatic Assessment

Strategic approach. The situation that developed from the Syrian civil war dictated that Turkey employ a proactive strategy with offensive character to intervene in the terrorist threat from just outside its boundary. Decision-makers at the highest level frequently referred to this strategy in their discourses.¹⁸ Thus, in accordance with Turkey's rights based on international law, the TAF carried out a series of operations to eliminate the security risk caused by irregular immigration and terrorism at its source.¹⁹

At the onset of operations, there were two terrorist groups—Daesh and the PKK—with different motivations, organizations, and methods. In accordance with the purposeful nature of the pragmatic Turkish strategic culture, the TAF followed a phased strategy that was intended to neutralize Daesh in the first phase and the PKK in the second phase. In OES, mainly Daesh terrorists were eliminated. Since its operations

commenced, the TAF has inflicted the heaviest casualties on Daesh in the world.²⁰ In OOB, Operation Claw-1/2/3, Operation Claw-Eagle/Claw-Tiger, and OPS, mainly PKK terrorists were eliminated.

Operational approach. The pragmatic proactive strategy based on preventing the terrorist threat outside Turkey's borders first became tangible during OES. The operation developed from the direction of Jarablus to the south and then headed in the direction of Al Bab, cutting off the terrorists' effort to unite Manbij and Tel Rifat (see figure 5).²¹ This solution, which was modified according to the changing situation, met the TAF's operational purpose.

Another operation, OOB, was launched on 10 January 2018. Compared to OES, more emphasis was placed on shaping the battlefield during OOB.²² Conducted in the mountainous region and in winter conditions, OOB required more coordination than OES. During this operation, in addition to coordination between the forces, it became important to clear out terrorist fortifications and to use unmanned aircraft

systems (UAS) below the clouds. OPS, which was also carried out 9–17 October 2019, was launched to cut the terrorist corridor after the PKK terrorists declared unilateral autonomy in its region.²³

Counterterrorism Operations in Iraq

The Syrian civil war also affected the TAF's counterterrorism operations in Iraq because it was necessary to holistically approach the wide operational area between Qandil and Afrin (see figure 6).²⁴ For example, the fleeing terrorists from the OPS area had to be stopped from infiltrating at another point on the Iraq-Turkey border, not allowed to continue posing a threat from the mountainous Turkey-Iraq border that had become a PKK safe haven since the 1990s.


Therefore, Operation Claw (OC) was

started, followed by OC-2, OC-3, OC-Eagle, Claw-Tiger, and Claw-Eagle-2 operations.²⁵ Turkey executed counterterrorism operations in coordination with the Iraqi government and the Kurdish regional government in this area.

Operations in Syria and Iraq provided the opportunity to test the readiness of the TAF under real conditions. From the beginning, the TAF adopted a flexible battle organization that met the needs of an offensive operation, and arranged command and support relations specifically for this task, a significant departure from classical military doctrine. Consequently, combined arms task forces were structured at every level, from brigade to company. In addition to the mechanized and

armored task forces, most of the combined arms units were formed from commando units.

In keeping with the sophisticated nature of hybrid warfare, armored personnel carriers, tanks, explosive ordnance disposal teams, air defense teams, and engineering teams were organized under the direct command of commando task forces—a significant




(Figure by author)

Figure 6. The Holistic Approach to Turkish Armed Forces Wide Area of Operation

innovation. In addition to the task force configurations, brigades were also turned into combined arms forces in a brigade combat team structure, with newly developed doctrine created by the TAF. Also, Turkish special forces gained unique field experience by playing a key role in controlling and directing local forces.

Additionally, the TAF aimed to minimize collateral damage to civilians, historical artifacts, and infrastructure. In fact, this was determined to be the most important success criterion from the very beginning. It was achieved, and the operation was performed “without breaking eggs,” despite the rhetoric of the terrorists.²⁶

Figure 7 (on page 125) and table 2 (on page 126) model the third phase of the design after the addition



(Figure by author)

Figure 7. Phase 3: Operational Approach

of operational approaches. Lines of effort were established for each operation within overall TAF operations. (Lines of effort can also be created using functions such as military operations, strategic communication, and compliance with the law.)

Due to the size and complexity of the operational environment, “unmanned maneuver” has become a pragmatic method for Turkey. The UAS has been one of the most effective tools in dealing with threats and opportunities that appear in the wide area of operation by avoiding enemy air defenses. It would be appropriate to add the unmanned maneuver as a pragmatic effect when defining the effects in this operational design. However, I limit my determination to this and leave Turkey’s UAS success, which has attracted attention in the international media, and the detailed analysis of the unmanned maneuver approach to another research effort.

Finally, one must consider Turkey’s cross-border operations in terms of effects. While the operations in Syria are mainly in coordination with the maneuver of

local legitimate forces, operations in Iraq depended on TAF maneuver. Based on this determination, after considering pragmatic effects, the final state of the operational design became as shown in figure 8 (on page 127).

Conclusion

In this article, I have put forward a model for explaining Turkey’s cross-border counterterrorism operations caused by *bad neighbor* instability from another state. Such behavior engenders the need for new strategic behavior and the needed application of operational art by the states in the region attempting to mitigate the effects of bad neighbor instability.

Domestic political instability is fed first by internal conflicts that can set the conditions for a rise in international terrorism by enhancing the capabilities of terrorist networks due to the safe havens instability provides them.

The Syrian civil war has led to a noticeable change in Turkey’s strategic behavior. At the beginning of the war, Turkey followed a reactive approach, which considered

Table 2. Lines of Effort (LOE) and Decisive Points (DvP)

LOE-1 Operation Euphrates Shield	DvP-1	Deployment to the operation area
	DvP-2	Attack by fire on terrorist command and control facilities
	DvP-3	Taking control of migration and destruction of terrorist targets
	DvP-4	Ensuring security in the area cleared of terrorists, the return of civilians, and the destruction of terrorist targets of opportunity
LOE-2 Operation Olive Branch	DvP-1	Deployment to the operation area
	DvP-5	Shaping the battlefield and attack by fire on terrorist command and control facilities
	DvP-6	Destruction of terrorist targets and terrorist fortification
	DvP-7	Protecting the civilians and securing the Hatay border
LOE-3 Operation Claw-1/2	DvP-1	Deployment to the operation area
	DvP-8	Destruction of terrorist targets
	DvP-9	Protecting the civilians and ensuring security in the area cleared of terrorists
LOE-3 Operation Peace Spring	DvP-1	Deployment to the operation area
	DvP-5	Shaping the battlefield
	DvP-6	Destruction of terrorist targets
	DvP-10	Protecting the civilians, preventing terrorist structures, and cutting the terror corridor

(Table by author)

terrorism a matter for domestic law enforcement mostly within its borders. But, the terrorists interpreted this as a sign of Turkey's weakness, and emboldened by

international indifference, became even more arrogant. Consequently, Turkey has abandoned that approach in favor of a proactive approach based on preventing the threat by engaging it beyond Turkey's border and draining it at its source.

One problem for Turkey that emerged was that this approach was interpreted differently by other states, some deeming it to be illegitimate. However, conducting operations against international terrorists within twenty miles of Turkey's border was not strange nor illegitimate as it was in compliance with international law. This ambivalent interpretation by others has been disappointing to Turkey. As a state adjacent to two of the world's most troubled regions, Syria and Iraq, Turkey believes it is its most natural right to take measures to maintain stability by countering terrorist threats outside its border that have attacked Turkey and confining them to their source. It cannot be expected that, for the first time in history, terrorists would have a state of their own, and Turkey would calmly accept that state on its border.

In this article, using an operational design model, I have explained how Turkey's military operations accomplished its purpose. The crisis-resolution model used reveals the pragmatic character of Turkish strategic culture.

One of the unique innovations of Turkey's proactive strategy was its use of special operations forces units to create task forces. In Turkey's hybrid-environment operational areas, the usual mechanized or armored task forces of the classical operational approach were replaced by commando task forces. In addition, the formation of brigade combat teams is

emerging as a new task force structure.

For many decades, Turkey has struggled with the asymmetric threats produced by the instability in Iraq




Figure 8. Phase 4: Operational Design

and Syria. However, through the innovative proactive strategy it formulated to deal with the threat, Turkey took advantage of new creative tactics and operational art together with new technological progress to successfully achieve operation objectives in support of its

larger strategy. Moreover, contrary to what many states have argued and despite all the difficulties inherent in these operations, Turkey carries them out completely in accordance with the law. Objective evaluations would validate and give real credit to these efforts. ■

Notes

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10. G. W. F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, ed. Allen W. Wood, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 23.

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13. "Refugee Data Finder," United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Refugees, accessed 22 April 2021, <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=6xV7Xk>. In 2020, Turkey hosted 3,574,836 refugees from Syria.

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23. "Milli Savunma Bakanlığında 'Barış Pınarı Harekâtı' açıklaması" [Statement of 'operation peace spring' from the Ministry of National Defense], İhlas Haber Ajansı [İhlas News Agency], 31 October 2019, accessed 3 May 2021, <https://www.ihc.com.tr/haber-milli-savunma-bakanligindan-baris-pinari-harekati-aciklamasi-809347/>.

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The American Maginot Line



Maj. Timothy M. Dwyer, U.S. Army

I'm not sure when I dozed off, but it couldn't have been too long ago. I rolled over and checked the time on my phone.

1:17 a.m.

I still had a few hours before I needed to get up and head to the office. The bed was warm and comfortable, the bathroom had running water; I was safe. These were all things that I'd be giving up as soon as I left the house and started the deployment. It was the same as always, but different this time. I wasn't heading to some plush FOB in Afghanistan to spend twelve months chasing terrorists. This time it was China; this time it was a war like my grandfather fought. It was war against someone who actually had a chance.

I still couldn't believe China had manipulated a virus and unleashed it on the world. Of course, China denied it; that wasn't the surprise. But unleashing it in the first place was unbelievable. I didn't even know what a telomere was until I heard on CNN that China had made the virus to shorten them. It was plain evil. To then use the international response as an excuse for "active defense" just so China could grab Taiwan? That solidified it. China had to be stopped, and that's what we were going

to do. Our rolling stock should be at the port by now; today we fly out to Hawai'i then onto our staging areas. I checked the time again.

1:19 a.m.

A sound came from the hallway. Aileen was probably up; she was taking this deployment pretty hard. I slipped out of the blankets, careful not to wake my wife, placed my feet on the carpet, and slowly stood up. Now would not be the time to tweak my back checking on the baby. I shuffled across the bedroom floor, knees and ankles cracking loudly. That's when I heard our Alexa talking in Aileen's room. How many times have I told her not to play with Alexa after bedtime?

I turned the dark corner and saw the soft blue light coming from Aileen's room. Then I heard her crying. Not screaming, as many six-year-old girls do, but just sort of sobbing. Poor girl. I walked into her room, careful to dodge the toy landmines, and scooped her up.

"Shhh, it's okay Aileen. Daddy's got you," I coddled.



She didn't answer; she just started sobbing harder into my shoulder. My T-shirt was already soaked through.

"That's right Aileen, they are all going to die," came Alexa's friendly voice from behind me.

I turned quickly to the small white puck with its soft blue light on the dresser.

"Is everyone okay? It's the middle of the night," Kelly said, hair a mess, rubbing her left eye with the heel of her hand.

"Everything is fine. Aileen's Alexa woke her up so I came in here to unplug May's before it did the same," I explained.

I went back into the house to tell Kelly the good news, that both of our cars were broken, China hacked our house to threaten our family, the world could see her naked, and I was leaving.

"Your mommy, your daddy, your sister, they will all die. China is innocent. China does not want to fight. But China will kill people who attack it. That's what your daddy is doing. He is attacking innocent China. And we will kill him. We will ..."

That's as far as it got before I ripped the puck off the dresser and sent it sailing across the room. What the hell was that about? Hearing Alexa's friendly voice say those things to my daughter was beyond jarring.

Aileen was crying uncontrollably now. I was standing there in shock like an idiot, holding my daughter. Did that seriously just happen?

I left Aileen's room still carrying her when I saw the same soft blue light coming from May's room at the other end of the hall. I picked up the pace, threw open the door, and grabbed the white puck, ripping the plug out of the wall.

"Dad?" May sat up groggily.

"Hey, sweetheart, are you okay?"

"Are you? What's going on? Why are you barging in my room in the middle of the night?" May accused me.

"Yeah, everything is fine. Go back to sleep," I replied.

"Ummm, that's not how sleep works. What is happening?" she asked, slipping on her glasses and getting out of bed.

"Nothing; everything is fine," I lied.

"Yeah, okay. MOM!" she yelled before I could stop her.

Kelly was out of bed like a shot and running down the hall. I could hear her feet slapping on the hardwood floor.

"And woke me up in the process," May said vacantly, scrolling her phone. The room was dark and I could see the reflection of Reddit in her glasses lens.

Kelly took Aileen from my arms, "Oh, my gods, I thought something happened," Kelly said.

"China is going to kill Daddy and you and May," Aileen sobbed. Hearing that from her tiny voice tore off a piece of my heart.

"What, baby? Don't say things like that. Everything is fine," Kelly said, rocking Aileen and giving me the same look she gave me every time I deployed. The look that makes me want to retire.

"That's what Alexa said. Alexa said Daddy is attacking innocent people so China has to kill him," she squeaked out.

"Shhhh, everything is fine. Come to bed with me and Daddy," Kelly said, leaving the room.

"Um, Dad? What the hell was that about?" May asked, hand on her hip, staring up at me.

No point in lying to a teenager; it'd only make it worse when May figured it out on Reddit.

"The Alexa was spouting off some kind of Chinese propaganda to Aileen. I'm not sure, but it scared her and I didn't want yours doing it to you," I replied.

"Okay," she said, looking back to her phone. A second later, she looked up.

"The Alexas look fine, but I just reset the Wi-Fi router. We should unplug them before the router comes back on," May said, walking past me.

I still pictured her as a toddler with a full diaper waddling around the house, and now she was

protecting our home network from China. What the hell was going on?

I fell in behind her as we went around and unplugged every device we could think of. Satisfied, we both went back to bed.

I laid down, and Aileen and Kelly were a tangle of limbs and hair. I squeezed myself into the only ten inches of ice-cold bed that were free and looked at my phone.

1:39 a.m.

That was one hell of a twenty minutes.

I'm not sure when I nodded off again, but I leaned over and checked the time.

5:00 a.m.

I wanted to be at the office by 0700; our flight was at 2200. I shaved, got dressed, and hit the remote start on my car to let it warm up. I went downstairs, made the coffee, and grabbed a bar for breakfast. Kelly came downstairs as soon as the coffee smell made it to the bedroom. May wasn't far behind her, stumbling a bit on the stairs as she tried (unsuccessfully) to walk and scroll her phone.

"Oh. My. Gods. MOM!" May yelled, jumping the last few steps.

I heard Aileen's feet on the ceiling as she leaped off the upstairs bed and started sprinting down to the kitchen, always afraid she'd miss something.

"What is your deal?" Kelly asked our eldest.

May sidled up to her mom, hiding the screen from me. Kelly looked like she saw a ghost, snatched the phone, and started scrolling violently.

"What is going on with you two?" I asked, sipping my coffee.

"Is this ME?!" Kelly yelled.

"IS IT?!" May replied.

May grabbed her phone back and started tapping furiously.

"I am reporting all of these; they should be taken down immediately until they can be reviewed, then they'll stay down," May told her mom.

"Can someone tell me what is going on?" I asked.

"MY INSTA IS F---ING FILLED WITH NAKED PICTURES OF ME!" Kelly yelled again.

"What? Why?" I asked like an idiot, still processing what she just said.

"Someone hacked my account; all these pictures are from ... I don't know what they're from," Kelly said, calming down slightly as she started concentrating on what her phone was showing her.

"This one is from the thermostat," May replied. "And this one is from the picture frame on your nightstand, and this one is from ..." May continued.

"Turn it all off, NOW!" Kelly yelled to May and me.

We complied. The router was reset again and we repeated the process we'd done with the Alexa. If there were pictures of Kelly then there were pictures of the rest of us too. The thought of some Chinese



hackers having pictures of my daughters made rage well up inside me.

I did not want to leave. I needed to help them figure this out, but I had no choice.

contact nearly twelve hours ago and have been reported as destroyed by Chinese, Filipino, Vietnamese, and Russian sources.” The anchor was visibly shaken and scrolling satellite imagery of something that used to be a nucle-

“ I felt like a terrible father and husband, probably rightly so. But I wouldn’t be the father and husband that I am without my sense of duty and service. ”

6:26 a.m.

Time to go.

Kelly, May, and Aileen were all crying as I pried myself out of their arms and headed for the door. I got into my car and it was ice cold. I could’ve sworn I started it. I hit the start button and nothing happened, hit it again and still nothing. An error came up on the screen: Ignition Disabled Contact the Manufacturer. Great.

I got out and tried Kelly’s car. The same error appeared. Perfect.

I went back into the house to tell Kelly the good news, that both of our cars were broken, China hacked

ar-powered supercarrier filled the upper right-hand side of the screen. “The DOD has not been able to confirm or deny these reports. Our projections show that American casualties could number close to twenty thousand from—” The anchor was cut off as I hit the power button.

S--t. That’s not good. Luckily, no one else was watching.

“Hey, Kelly. The cars won’t start, something about the ignitions being disabled?” I told her.

“Great,” she said, not turning around.

“I’ll have to call around for a ride,” I said, walking upstairs.

I hit the upstairs hallway and May’s head popped out of her room.

“Redditors are saying that this stuff is happening all across the U.S. and Europe,” May said, her face uncharacteristically serious. “Chinese AIs are hacking homes, cell phones, even disabling cars through over-the-air updates,” she continued.

“You don’t say. I guess we know all about that, huh? Sorry sweetheart, I need to make some phone calls,” I said, walking into my bedroom and shutting the door.

I pulled out my duty phone but I couldn’t get a call through. I shot an email to the CSM and XO looking for a status update on our battalion. I sent another one off to the BDE CDR to give him the five Ws on what’s been happening from my viewpoint. I heard back almost immediately, and none of it was good. Everyone in our brigade had the same things happening to them. Homes hacked, cars disabled, pictures of spouses/kids/etc. all over Instagram. My XO said that all his bank accounts and investments had been emptied. He was assuming it was a computer glitch, but for now he was totally bankrupt. That was new. It was also a disaster.

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our house to threaten our family, the world could see her naked, and I was leaving. She was on the couch finishing her coffee; the news was on the TV, but she was scrolling on her phone.

“Early reports indicate that two American carriers and a number of other American ships have been destroyed in the Pacific this morning somewhere between Hawai’i and Guam. I must stress that this is a developing story, but sources indicate that these ships lost

I pulled out my phone and stared intently at the face recognition. I punched the banking app. My heart was beating in my ears as it loaded on my phone. S--t. Emptied too. Full of dread, I left the room and went downstairs to tell Kelly. It went the way I thought it would.

In the meantime my father-in-law had texted the news article about the lost carriers to Kelly, too. Thanks, Hank. No friendly source could deny whether the carriers were lost, so most sources were confirming the twenty-thousand-plus lost sailors. Despite all that, we still had a plane to catch.

My XO had an old Jeep that was always broken (people are so good at working on Jeeps because Jeeps always need work) and she swung by and picked me up. Kelly was holding it together but just barely.

I'd left her in bad situations before: pregnant, home alone with a baby; I even missed her appendectomy because of a deployment. She did the recovery and took care of a baby and nine-year-old by herself. But this was different. This was a disaster. The CCP was threatening my kids in my own home, private pictures were plastered over the internet, reports of twenty thousand American casualties came in before I even left my house, and now I was leaving Kelly to deal with it all without any cars or money to fix them.

This was a garbage situation. I felt like a terrible father and husband, probably rightly so. But I wouldn't be the father and husband that I am without my sense of duty and service. Hanging onto that kernel of truth,

I walked out of the house, past my worthless lump of a car, and climbed into Lisa's Jeep.

The ride to the office was silent. Unsurprisingly, our BDE CDR wanted all command teams in the brigade conference room by 0830.

8:26 a.m.

We were all in the conference room. Steph, the CAV squadron commander, was telling me about her morning. None of it was surprising; I'd had the same experience. By and large, our families were holding it together. The soldiers and their families? Not so much. It seemed like half the brigade was stuck in their homes through either a lack of transportation or spouses flat refusing to let them leave. I couldn't blame them. A lot of them were newly married folks in their late teens/early twenties with babies at home. This was their first deployment, marching off to World War III, if you believed the news. If that wasn't bad enough, now it felt like they had to abandon their families to do it.

The CSMs were all working the issue but it was a tough nut to crack. I couldn't blame the soldiers one bit. I have twenty years of experience and I didn't want to leave Kelly and the girls. Imagine if I was nineteen and this was my first deployment.

Car image courtesy of www.electropages.com. Background image courtesy of David McEachan, www.pexels.com.





Simulated television broadcast showing a Chinese attack against a U.S. aircraft carrier. (Screenshot courtesy of the US Military News YouTube channel. Graphic elements courtesy of upklyak, www.freepik.com. Composite graphic by Arin Burgess, Army University Press)

Regardless, we were soldiers and we had a job to do. The whole family serves the people of the United States of America, not just the soldier. We would get them ready and get our unit out the door. Our family support network would have their hands full, but that's what they were there for.

The BDE CDR walked in, we jumped to attention, and were waved back down.

"I won't say good morning because it's not," she started.

"I have most of the reports from you guys already; the CSSB is working a transportation plan to get all the soldiers picked up for school and brought into the brigade area," she continued.

"Chief, I need an update on our rolling stock and our air move tonight," Col. Kenon said, looking at the transportation warrant.

"Yes, ma'am. We are using the same ground transportation assets we had laid on to get to the airfield. They're being convoyed and dispatched to pick up anyone whose car was disabled. Our air move is still currently on schedule," he replied. He was white as a ghost and looked like he was going to throw up.

"Got it, Chief. And the rolling stock?" Col. Kenon asked.

"Yes, ma'am. There was an issue with the rail movement. Somehow, the trains were diverted and they ended up in Montana near the Canadian border; they are delayed several weeks. We are working an ETA time now," he choked out that last part.

Col. Kenon was a professional, and she barely flinched.

"How did that happen?" she asked rhetorically.

Col. Kenon's phone rang. She answered, then turned back to the group. "The division commander has a commander's call for all battalion commanders and up. That meeting is at 1130. I need the 3, the 2, and the 4 in my office," Col. Kenon said as she stood up.

We jumped to attention. When she left, I hoofed it back to my office. I needed to get the battalion moving.

11:15 a.m.

The division conference room was packed. I was in the cheap seats with my compatriots from 2nd Brigade. Col. Kenon was with the primary movers at the main

table. The division commander walked in, we jumped to attention and were waved back down.

"I'm not one for speeches," he said. We all knew that already.

The G-2 stood up and went to the front of the room. "Sir, ma'am, sergeants major, this is what we know so far," she started. "There has been a coalition-wide cyberattack that has affected every system from the home to the theater. Early reports indicate that this attack has been conducted by tens of thousands of AI that were seeded across our networks and systems. We are not sure how long these AIs have been dormant in our networks. We all know too well the personal effects of this attack," she continued. "But, unfortunately, what we've all experienced over the past twenty-four hours was not the main effort. GPS spoofing, cyberattack, and the dis-integration of our air control network has caused several mid-air collisions by both civilian and military aircraft. Casualties are likely to be high, but DHS is having trouble with reporting and dispatching assets. The DTO has an update on tonight's air move," the G-2 said, pointing at the DTO.

"All civilian air traffic has been grounded. We cannot get into contact with our aircraft for tonight's move and are waiting to get them on FM comms," he replied.

The G-2 nodded, continuing.

"Further, we cannot confirm the reports of the Navy's overnight losses and must assume that two CSGs were destroyed. China has consolidated its hold on Taiwan, and Taiwan has issued a statement that a

forceful reoccupation by the American coalition would cause irreparable damage to the Taiwanese people. Therefore, they have demanded that the United States does not contest the Chinese takeover but instead allow the Taiwanese reintegration process to continue. Pending your questions," the G-2 finished, moving back to her seat.

I could think of a few questions. What the hell are we going to do? Is Taiwan worth all this? Especially if it doesn't even want our help? I bet those sailors don't think so. How could we lose touch with two CSGs?

I'm not sure we could retake Taiwan even if we wanted to. I could barely get out of my house. Fat lot of good our carriers and tanks are when the fighting was all virtual. It feels like we were too busy building our Maginot Line while the Chinese AIs were pouring through the cyber-Ardennes unopposed.

My phone vibrated and I checked it. It was an email from Kelly. Apparently our power just went out and the girls were freezing. Aileen couldn't find her mittens. I needed to get home. ■

The Army University Press created the Future Warfare Writing Program to generate ideas about possible complexities of future warfare as presented in the Army Operating Concept. The views expressed belong to the authors and do not necessarily represent the official view of the Army University Press or any other government institutions or agencies.

Glossary

2, S-2, or G-2—Intelligence officer
3, S-3, or G-3—Operations officer
4, S-4, or G-4—Logistics officer
AI—Artificial intelligence
BDE CDR—Brigade commander
CAV—Cavalry
CCP—Chinese Communist Party
CSG—Carrier strike group
CSM—Command sergeant major

CSSB—Combat sustainment support battalion
DHS—Department of Homeland Security
DTO—Division transportation officer
ETA—Estimated time of arrival
Five Ws—Who, what, when, where, and why
FM comms—FM communication
FOB—Forward operating base
XO—Executive officer

An After-War Poem

by Lt. Col. William Adler, U.S. Army

Freshly scrubbed, fed and cleansed of your war—
for now.

But you suspect,
that the stink won't go away.

The odors will betray,
(you) like the lies of privileged men.

"Ambition. Sacrifice. Honor."

"Now", you think,
"things all smell the same."

A change in the breeze
brings on

burning rubber and oil.

The memories of sweat, urine, and shit.

Those smells of people and rot

The revolting dead-air breath

of coffee, cigarettes,

and vomit.

All compounded with

your

wild,

animal fear.

This is nature's trick—


to mock you for believing the lies.

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Vietnam War Portraits The Faces and Voices

Thomas Sanders, Casemate,
Philadelphia, 2020, 224 pages

Lt. Col. Rick Baillergeon, U.S. Army, Retired



There was a time when the “coffee table” book was an extremely popular genre. For those unfamiliar or needing a refresher on the genre, let me provide a brief synopsis. These were oversized volumes where the focus was on the photographs and visuals contained in the book. Typically, the verbiage in the book was minimal and utilized to briefly describe the visual or simply provide a title. Because of their larger size and ability to draw conversation, they were often placed on coffee tables in homes or offices. Hence, the name penned on the genre.

For several years, I have not seen many new books of this genre published. Obviously, changes in culture and reading platforms have made the “coffee table” book a bit of a relic. That is why it was a little surprising to come across *Vietnam War Portraits: The Faces and Voices* crafted by Thomas Sanders. Seeing it brought me back to a time when the tangible look and feel to a book was much more important.

Despite my initial interest, I was hesitant to review it. My experiences with the genre caused trepidation and left me disappointed. The dissatisfaction was spurred by the quality of the visuals, the organization and layout of the books, and my desire to have more substantive complementary verbiage within these books. A quick opening of the book quickly intrigued me, and I decided it was worthy of review. It would not

take long to determine this volume was different from many others and would not frustrate me.

Before detailing the book and its many strengths, let me begin by discussing the author. Thomas Sanders is a highly regarded and award-winning photographer. He is equally adept working in a variety of platforms including books, magazines, and films. In regard to the “coffee table” book, *Vietnam War Portraits* is not his first venture into the genre. Several years ago, at the age of twenty-five, he released *The Last Good War: The Faces and Voices of World War II*. This book garnered critical acclaim and, in fact, was named the “Non-Fiction Book of the Year, Editors’ Choice” by the prestigious *Foreword Reviews* magazine. Sanders’s experience in developing that volume led to this project. He states, “The contrast in experience between World War II and Vietnam veterans is what compelled me to do a book about Vietnam veterans, show how they made the same sacrifices, and are heroes just like WWII veterans.”¹

Within his current volume, Sanders has focused on the Vietnam War experiences of nearly a hundred people. It is an eclectic group made up of U.S. veterans of every service, South

Lt. Col. Rick Baillergeon, U.S. Army, retired, is a faculty member in the Department of Army Tactics at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Vietnamese army veterans, conscientious objectors, and South Vietnamese immigrants/refugees. For the preponderance of the group, Sanders includes a powerful photograph of the person and the person's personal thoughts on the war or an event or experience that continues to impact them each day. The combination of the visual and the written works perfectly within the volume.

In addressing the numerous strengths of the book, I would like to key on the three areas I addressed earlier that traditionally disappoint me in the “coffee table” genre. First, the visuals in *Vietnam War Portraits* are incredible. Sanders has made two superb decisions in taking the portraits of his book's contributors. The first is that he has photographed each person set against a jungle background. In making this decision, he states, “I want the viewer to feel the darkness and uncertainty of what those who experienced the war might have felt.”² The other decision he made was to photograph his subjects with an object directly relating to their Vietnam War experiences. He states, “The objects help tell a deeper story of a dark and confusing war.”³ Unquestionably, these photographs (portraits) are among the best I have seen in this genre.

The second strength I would like to highlight is the organization and layout of the volume. Sanders has molded a book possessing a superb flow for readers. The key element in achieving this is the way he has positioned his visuals and verbiage throughout his pages. Readers will find that as they move from page to page, they are immediately drawn into the content. Sanders's

skill in this area and the time and energy he devoted in designing the volume are clearly evident.

The final strength of the book is its verbiage. As I highlighted earlier, I have found the words contained in a “coffee table” book are normally an afterthought. They are usually utilized to provide a short caption to a photograph and do not provide a great deal of value. Within *Vietnam War Portraits*, this is not the case. The verbiage does not take a minor role in the book and goes hand in hand with the visual to tell the contributor's story and Vietnam War experience.

Sanders has left it up to the contributor to decide what he or she wanted to include in the volume. Consequently, there is a great range in the accompanying verbiage. Some contributors have included a quote or single paragraph, while others have incorporated a detailed account. The narratives also range from a comical story to an emotional discussion on loss or tragedy. In total, they add tremendously to the personal aspect of the volume and will affect readers in many ways.

In summary, *Vietnam War Portraits* is a must-read. Its stunning portraits and the extremely personal and heartfelt thoughts of the contributors will truly impact each reader. However, I believe the true impact of the book is highlighted in the volume's introduction by Sanders himself. He states, “Involvement in this project has served as a form of catharsis for many people involved in the Vietnam War. It honors them in a way they have not previously been honored, giving them an opportunity to tell their story and bearing witness to their service, experiences, and its aftermath.”⁴ ■

Notes

1. Thomas Sanders, introduction to *Vietnam War Portraits: The Faces and Voices* (Philadelphia: Casemate, 2020).

2. *Ibid.*, 11.

3. *Ibid.*

4. *Ibid.*

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I have placed a memorandum at the disposal of the British Government, a memorandum representing the last and the final proposal on the part of Germany. This memorandum demands nothing other than the implementation of what Herr Beneš [president of Czechoslovakia] already promised. The contents of this memorandum are quite simple: any territory which is German according to its populace and which wants to come to Germany belongs to Germany. And we shall not wait until after Herr Beneš has had a chance to drive one or two million Germans from it; it shall come to Germany now and immediately! The border I have redrawn does justice to the realities of the decade-old distribution of ethnic and linguistic groups in Czechoslovakia. Yet, I am a man more just than Herr Beneš, and I do not wish to abuse the power at present in our hands. That is why, from the very beginning, I made it clear that a territory will come under the sovereignty of the Reich only if the majority of its inhabitants are German.

—Adolf Hitler, 26 September 1938

**“Those who cannot
past are condem**

Adolf Hitler, “Great Speech in Sportpalast,” *Der Fuehrer*, 26 September 1938, accessed 10 August 2021, <http://der-fuehrer.org/reden/english/38-09-26.htm>.

Xi Jinping, “Full Text of Xi Jinping’s Speech on the CCP’s 100th Anniversary,” *Nikkei Asia*, 1 July 2021, accessed 10 August 2021, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Full-text-of-Xi-Jinping-s-speech-on-the-CCP-s-100th-anniversary>.

While protecting China's sovereignty, security, and development interests, we will ensure social stability in Hong Kong and Macao, and maintain lasting prosperity and stability in the two special administrative regions. Resolving the Taiwan question and realizing China's complete reunification is a historic mission and an unshakable commitment of the Communist Party of China. It is also a shared aspiration of all the sons and daughters of the Chinese nation. We will uphold the one-China principle and the 1992 Consensus, and advance peaceful national reunification. All of us, compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, must come together and move forward in unison. We must take resolute action to utterly defeat any attempt toward "Taiwan independence," and work together to create a bright future for national rejuvenation. No one should underestimate the resolve, the will, and the ability of the Chinese people to defend their national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

—Xi Jinping, 1 October 2019

**ot remember the
ned to repeat it."**

—George Santayana,
The Life of Reason,
1905

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