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Military Review

Award Article

The Military Review announces the selection of the following article from the December 1967 issue as a MILITARY REVIEW AWARD ARTICLE:

"The Indecisiveness of Modern War"
Brian Bond

Mr. Bond writes that warfare has become steadily less decisive in the sense of realizing the aims of those who have resorted to it deliberately. It has become generally harder to clinch victory by the decisive battle, and, in the sphere of grand strategy, it is most difficult for the aggressor or any of the belligerents to secure peace terms that bring more than very short-time gains.

★ ★ ★

COMING:

Colonel Sidney B. Berry, Jr., in part III of "Observations of a Brigade Commander," discusses the necessary command and control exercised by the brigade commander and the importance of the helicopter in his performance of this mission. He also gives his views on logistics, personnel, training, and the operation of a base camp in Vietnam.

Colonel Paul C. Davis, US Army, Retired, in *"Sentinel* and the Future of *SABMIS,"* suggests that a Sea-Based Antiballistic Missile Intercept System, with its advantages of forward deployment, flexibility, and a choice of floating or submersible platforms, can accommodate a variety of weapons innovations and would complement the *Sentinel* land-based defense system.

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

REPLACEMENT OPERATIONS in Vietnam

Brigadier General Earl F. Cole,
United States Army

PERHAPS nowhere in history will be found a more diversified operation for replacing battle-weary troops and casualties than in Vietnam. Many units now in Vietnam arrived aboard ships requiring 15 to 20 days to cross the Pacific from the United States. Today, as the Vietnam veteran completes his tour and returns home, his replacement arrives by jet aircraft with stewardess service, movies, and other niceties which are somewhat unusual for travel to a combat theater. It takes less than a day to travel from the west coast Oakland Army Base to Vietnam.

On arrival, which may be at any

hour, the replacement will land at one of two airfields, Bien Hoa or Camrahn Bay. Bien Hoa Airbase, located about 23 miles northeast of Saigon, takes Army passenger flights which formerly landed at Tan Son Nhut near Saigon. Close to Bien Hoa is the 90th Replacement Battalion which operates the Long Binh Replacement Facility. It is here the newcomer will reside for a day or so.

Procedures Differ

Replacement processing procedures differ considerably from those used during World War II and Korea. Programed replacements have a scheduled assignment under the unit to unit system. Unprogramed loss replacements are assigned to the United States Army, Vietnam (USARV) Transient Detachment "for further assignment." Stockage of replacements is nonexistent under the unit to unit system, although some personnel are always in a reassignment status and constitute a moving stockage group.

Continental United States (CONUS) commanders publish orders assigning Vietnam bound replacements to a CONUS overseas replacement station (ORS) at either Oakland, Fort Lewis, or Fort Dix. Included in the orders is a statement that the individual is further assigned to the USARV Transient Detachment and again further assigned to either a designated USARV unit or a replacement battalion. This procedure applies for all replacements except sergeants major, chief warrant officers (W-4's), and majors and above.

Flight Notification

When the replacement reports into the ORS, he is manifested for a specific flight to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). At this point, the ORS produces a flight notification electronic accounting machine (EAM) card containing the replacement's name, rank, service number, military occupational specialty (MOS), airport destination in Vietnam, flight number, departure date, unit of further assignment in Vietnam, and the requisition control and line item number. About 24 to 28 hours before the replacement's scheduled arrival in Vietnam, the EAM card is transceived to the replacement facility receiving the flight and the 12th Data Processing Unit (DPU) which is located adjacent to USARV Headquarters.

A listing is prepared by the 12th DPU for the replacement directorate of the USARV Adjutant General Section for confirmation of assignment or diversion of personnel on board the aircraft. The Enlisted Replacement Division reviews the requirements of subordinate USARV commands, and confirms or changes the original scheduled unit of assignment by annotating the name listing. Only diversions necessary to sustain a top combat posture for the tactical deployment of troop units are made. The annotated copy is returned to the 12th DPU where new EAM cards are prepared for the

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changes made by the Adjutant General. These cards are transceived to the replacement battalion at least 12 hours prior to flight arrival time.

At the replacement facility, each new assignment card is substituted for the original assignment card. The data is then manipulated to accomplish a number of administrative requirements:

- It is sorted by geographical destination within Vietnam and transmitted to the movements control office where transportation is requested for the number of personnel assigned to each station. At this time, commands served by motor transportation are advised to pick up their replacements at a specified date and time. Processing assignment orders in advance of the replacement's arrival permits prearranging transportation to move replacements more rapidly.

- Firm assignment EAM cards are processed through an IBM 407 accounting machine which has been programed to print special orders. A short, direct, extract order is printed for each arrivee. The order assigns each individual to a major command as prescribed by the major commander. Orders are issued to the major command headquarters or to the unit level indicated by the commander. In this way, subsequent administration is minimized.

Newly arrived soldiers complete their in-processing papers

- The data provides postal locator card service and permits early identification of mail in the replacement facility for the newly arrived replacement.

After the order is run on the machine, it is sent to the personnel processing section for hold until the replacement actually lands in Vietnam.

A soldier deplaning at Bien Hoa is

met by a team from the 90th Replacement Battalion and is told what he can expect during the next few days. After this briefing, the replacement collects his baggage—he has been authorized to carry 200 pounds overseas, but rarely carries this amount—and boards a bus. Convoys transport him from the airfield to the replacement facility.

Night convoys are escorted by armed military police jeeps to Long Binh, approximately eight miles south of Bien Hoa Airbase. Similar precautions are taken during each subsequent move until replacements reach their final unit of assignment in Vietnam. Replacements destined for the 1st and 2d Corps Zones land at Camranh Bay where replacement operations under the 22d Replacement Battalion are similar to those at Long Binh.

On arrival at a replacement facility, the newcomer is guided to a briefing area where he is informed what to expect during his brief stay there. By groups, the replacements are then escorted to a processing room where they are issued a series of cards which everyone in Vietnam must carry on his person at all times.

These include a ration card; "Standing Orders, Rogers' Rangers," which sets forth 19 basic rules drawn up by Major Robert Rogers in 1751 for the soldier to follow while in hostile country; "The Enemy in Your Hands," which establishes specific "do's" and "don't's" in the treatment of prisoners of war as set forth by the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention of 1949; and "Nine Rules," which governs each soldier's daily contact and treatment with the South Vietnamese people.

After the replacement has received these cards, a processing noncommissioned officer collects the special or-

US Army Photos

Tents have given way to single and double-story, tropical style facilities

ders and 201 files and checks the identification card of each individual for expiration date and to insure that no one under 18 is in the group. Replacements also complete emergency data slips and fill in personnel data on postal locator cards to insure that mail routing to them is accomplished accurately and quickly. After this initial processing, the new troops convert their money to military payment certificates, check the casual mail section for any mail that may have arrived for them, then go to an area where baggage has been off-loaded from the bus convoy, and, finally, proceed to a bileting area. There, they are issued bedding and assigned bunks which will be home for the next 12 to 24 hours.

Review Assignments

Almost all of the replacements will have their assignments reviewed before their arrival in RVN. Replacements whose assignments have not been finalized will, upon completion of initial processing, be reported to Headquarters, USARV, by name and MOS.

If a particular man's services are still required by his original unit of assignment, he will proceed to that unit. If the unit to which he is assigned no longer requires his skill, if he has a critical skill required elsewhere, or if a higher mission requirement exists in another unit, he will be diverted to a more pressing assignment. In this connection, as soon as the replacements have completed their initial processing, all 201 files are given to a USARV assignment team for review in connection with critical skills and screening for selected personnel whom the command wishes to contact on arrival in RVN.

The records are also reviewed to isolate personnel who:

- Are below standard in educational background.
- Require frequent supervisory controls as may be evidenced by courts-martial, civil convictions, and other revealing documents.
- Are habitual troublemakers.
- Are below minimum physical standards for assignment to a combat unit.
- Possess special talents, either of a military or civilian nature, which are especially needed by the command.

During the past year, over 80 percent of all personnel processing through the USARV replacement facilities proceeded to the original assignment shown in orders issued by a CONUS commander.

Orientation

Each replacement facility presents five to six hours of orientation on military courtesy, dress, and appearance; personal hygiene, tropical diseases, and first aid; piaster control; and the Army savings programs. Replacements view a film entitled the "Unique War," and receive an orientation lecture and a discussion of the manner in which good relations should be maintained with personnel of the host country.

Upon receipt of orders or confirmation of orders at the processing section, transportation requests are initiated for aircraft or vehicles to various points within the RVN. Normally, a replacement who arrives before 1000 will depart by 1000 the following day. Except for guard, police, rollcalls, and some details, the replacement has free time on his hands until his flight departure hour.

Unlike the replacement facilities of World War II and Korea, the USARV facilities are fast becoming fixed installations. Tents are being replaced

by single and double-story, tropical style facilities. Latrine facilities are provided at selected points along the boundaries and in close proximity to the barracks cross streets. Perimeter defenses are manned day and night.

Included in the 90th Replacement Battalion Facility at Long Binh are clubs, messhalls, a dispensary, an exchange, and post offices to accommodate 4,000 replacements or returnees, plus the permanent party. Camp Long Binh, developed from a jungle area beginning May 1966, is a large, modern camp today. When completed, it will have a chapel and service clubs added to existing facilities to serve a planned capacity of 6,000 enlisted men, 300 officers, and 200 female replacement or returnee personnel.

Similar replacement facilities exist at Camranh Bay. Although this facility is smaller, the receipt, processing, and transportation for replacements to their units of assignment are standardized throughout the country.

The United States Army, Vietnam replacement system, operated by a handful of people, is a lean, highly specialized mechanized organization which processes replacements through its facilities to an ultimate unit of assignment within 24 hours. Replacement processing and support facilities are directed to placing the "personal in personnel" at all times during the handling of each individual. Travel of replacements has never been so fast or convenient. Treatment of replacements has never before been equaled by any replacement system in the world.

Replacements we are getting are very good and highly motivated. The quality has never been equaled in the history of the United States Army.

Major General William E. DePuy

A European View



THE FUTURE OF NATO

Ferdinand O[illegible]ksche

THE condition of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization resembles that of a seriously ill patient who can be saved only by an operation which no one wants to perform for lack of courage and will. It is certainly wiser to face this fact soberly than to lull oneself into illusions. It does not help to pretend that nothing has changed in the effectiveness of the Western alliance.

Up to now, the United States has been the principal guarantor of Western Europe's security. However, her attention is diverted by the war in Vietnam and it seems that her only interest in Europe is a *détente*. The

nuclear nonproliferation treaty will, undoubtedly, undermine NATO still more since this treaty makes demands upon the nonnuclear countries which the nuclear greats would never be willing to meet. Even though one in the United States may hold a different view, Washington's efforts to conclude a nuclear nonproliferation treaty with Moscow is the decisive factor that causes resentment in many European circles and largely contributes to the rebirth of a new German nationalism.

National Consciousness

It is difficult to resist the impression that the Soviets have already succeeded in decisively loosening the solidarity of the Atlantic nations. The consciousness that is developing in Western Europe today is not a European, but a national consciousness. It is manifested in the increasing tendency of the West European governments to pursue a "flexible policy" not only among themselves, but also toward the USSR. They tend to act individually without recognizing that they can hardly be serious treaty partners for the Soviet giant. Western Europe is well on the way back to particularism which furthers its disintegration from within and, therefore, increases the danger from outside.

Ferdinand Otto Miksche, born in Austria, is a naturalized French citizen engaged in operational research in Paris. He was a member of General de Gaulle's personal staff during World War II; was a professor at the Staff College of the Portuguese Army in Lisbon; and was awarded the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Scholarship for 1960-61. The author of numerous books on military subjects, his most recent publications are The Failure of Atomic Strategy *and* 1970-1980 Capitulation Sans Guerre.

General Charles A. de Gaulle's withdrawal from NATO has drastically hastened the disintegration of the Atlantic alliance. Without France, the alliance falls into two, large, separate areas: the northwestern area comprising Norway, Denmark, the United Kingdom, the Benelux countries, and the Federal Republic of Germany; and the southeastern area embracing Italy, Greece, and Turkey.

Between the two areas there is a gap. France constitutes the geostrategic heart of western Europe without which the main front between the Baltic Sea and the Alps cannot be held militarily. This situation, for all practical purposes, makes Paris the arbitrator who decides when an aggression by the East shall be countered. However, while France can block a strategically uniform defense of Western Europe, on one hand, she is, on the other hand, not capable of guaranteeing the security of her land by her own resources.

Nuclear armament alone is not sufficient. What is the *force de frappe* to do? Who is to be deterred by it? In what crisis situation is it to be used besides the unlikely event of a nuclear attack on France?

Need Is Obvious

The necessity of a balanced defense system is obvious. In order to regain the sovereign military independence, France would have to activate, in addition to the *force de frappe*, at least 12 regular and 12 reserve divisions instead of the planned six. Furthermore, she would need a territorial and a civil defense system and maintain her own air force and navy. But no European country is in a position to afford all this. Therefore, it is also impossible for France to gain on her

own the military autonomy which she so much desires, but which can be realized only within a larger supranational framework.

France constitutes the indispensable hinterland for the defense of the Federal Republic of Germany. Without the use of the French airbases and pipelines, the execution of a large-scale airlift from the United States is almost impossible. Besides, such an operation requires the protection of the Federal Republic along the borders with East Germany through sufficiently strong shield forces. Apart from all the military and technical difficulties attending the execution of an airlift, divisions stationed in Europe are certain to be taken more seriously by the Soviets than divisions based across the Atlantic Ocean. Moscow might, with good reason, interpret any reduction or withdrawal of US troops from the Federal Republic as Washington's disinterest in Europe.

NATO Letter

General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

The Kremlin still maintains the concept that security ranks before the relaxation of tension. This must be remembered and understood when hearing Moscow's repeated proposals on the creation of nonnuclear zones, the evacuation of bases, and the withdrawal of troops from foreign countries. This means that the Soviets would withdraw only behind the Vistula River while the US forces would have to cross the Atlantic Ocean in order to return to western Europe.

The two alliance systems, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, differ geostrategically, and are also entirely different in their military structure. The Soviet troops deployed in central Europe merely represent an advance guard. The mass of reserves that can be mobilized constitutes the actual main force. The West, on the other hand, has only its 26 NATO divisions in the rear of which is a military void threatening to become larger if

the allied troops withdraw in the years to come.

In view of this situation, the idea to transform the Atlantic Pact into an instrument of relaxation—which would deprive the alliance of its true meaning—is as unrealistic as, for example, wanting to make the European Common Market a nuclear power. Many think that the Warsaw Pact is to be cut down step by step to parallel NATO. But while the United States is visibly loosening the reins in Europe, the Soviet Union has remained the dominating power in eastern Europe despite all differences of opinion. Much has changed in the Socialist camp, but with the tension that prevails between the leading class and the non-Communist masses, all governments of the Eastern bloc depend upon the assistance of the Kremlin. Despite appearances, their latitude is by no means as large as one is inclined to assume.

Integrated Armament

It is the integrated armament and not the integrated strategic planning that constitutes the strength of an alliance. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact would only be a formality, for the armed forces of East Europe would remain integrated with respect to their armament and their staffs could consult in secrecy.

All divisions of these nations have the same type of tanks—one light, two medium, and two heavy models; and one single model of submachine-gun, rifle, light and heavy machine-guns, and antitank rocket. All artillery units have Soviet weapons of uniform caliber and ammunition. It should also be noted that the Soviet armed forces are more than adequate to enable the USSR to assert herself politically in Western Europe. Moscow does not depend upon the support of her satellite countries.

In the fever of the *détente*, the West sees only what it wants to see. After nearly 20 years of fear of Soviet aggression, a psychological reaction has set in. The thesis that the USSR is no longer a threat to Europe is generally accepted without reservation and with almost no criticism. However, there is no evidence that the Soviets are sincerely willing to make serious efforts toward a settlement of the existing differences. Their behavior continues to be unyielding in problems which are the source of East-West tension, whether it is the German reunification, the Berlin problem, or the closed border. And why should Moscow show it-



Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitschrift

General of the Army Mikhail I. Kazakov, Chief of Staff of Warsaw Pact Forces

self ready for concessions when the West without asking for anything in return might sweep all obstacles off the table?

Broken porcelain cannot be glued. Even if mended, it cannot stand a bump or blow. That is how it is with NATO. What the West needs is a new alliance in keeping with the world situation. The problem to be solved is the relationship which the United States is to have with Europe. Western Europe with its 200 million people and highly developed industrial countries cannot remain forever a peripheral bridgehead of the United States in the eastern hemisphere without its own political weight. It must be able to stand on its own feet if it wants to be an equal partner of the United States. As long as Europe does not have the means necessary for the protection of its existence, it cannot become a partner of the United States.

The simple retention of the Western alliance in its present heavily marred form is not likely to meet the requirements of the coming era. Europe and the United States must be able to act separately in the field of military strategy, including the nuclear strategy. Also, in the area of overseas conflicts, including southeast Asia, a solidarity policy of all Western Powers is indispensable.

At any rate, the pursuit of a common policy with separate defense systems is easier to conceive than the pursuit of separate political courses with a joint military force. A solidarity posture of the Western Powers in questions of international politics cannot be expected as long as the present state of affairs persists. But if the current strategy of the Atlantic Pact, which is one-sidedly keyed to the United States and which makes Europe and the United States excessively dependent upon one another, were divided into two autonomous regions—Europe and America—the policy of the West would gain in flexibility.

The United States holds the key to the problem. Only she can bring about the necessary reorganization of NATO. Should the United States continue to remain a passive spectator of the disintegration of the West European solidarity, the Atlantic alliance will sooner or later fall apart.

Despite General de Gaulle's great vision of a strategically autonomous France, only a politically and militarily integrated Western Europe can regain its military independence. Its aim must be to become an equal, closely associated, and loyal partner of the United States, rather than to pursue, as a third power, a seesaw policy between Washington and Moscow. The United States faces the alternative either to accept that Europe will become a sphere of influence of the Soviet giant, or she must act to further the creation of a Europe which will ease her burden.

An American View

A New Role for NATO

Stanley L. Harrison

DESPITE a protracted preoccupation with affairs elsewhere, the attention of US foreign policy increasingly is drawn to the Nation's role in European affairs and particularly the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Indeed, the growing doubts about the conduct of relations in this area are visible across an entire spectrum of dissent. The criticisms range from those who advocate total abandonment of the Atlantic alliance to those who suggest that only sweeping changes in the structure and organization of NATO will suffice to prevent its demise. The North Atlantic Treaty constitutes the keystone of US commitment to Europe's defense. Nevertheless, some reassessment appears to be in order after virtually 20 years of existence.

Recent events suggest that, perhaps, changes should be made to meet the new environment in Europe. The contemporary perspective differs in sharp contrast to the devastation that was Europe's in the years following World War II. Morale, as well as material means, needed rebuilding. Militarily, a firm deterrent was needed to bolster the

uncertain defense efforts of the European forces. The Marshall plan provided the impetus toward restoration of the shattered economy, and NATO assured a bulwark of security that guaranteed safety in which to rebuild Europe.

"Bridge Building"

Today, there is a new environment and a new generation little inclined to dwell on a dim and painful period of the past. The success of NATO has to a degree been responsible for its problems. The European NATO members now judge the nature of the military threat to be perceptibly lessened. Generally speaking, US military planners disagree. Yet policy statements from the White House and the Department of State advocate "bridge building" and "steps" toward *détente* with the Soviet Union and thereby promise a new outlook for diplomacy in the late 1960's. This is not an unexpected development, for the world has altered considerably since the inception of NATO in 1949.

There is little doubt that promulgation of the North Atlantic Treaty constituted, for the United States, a positive contribution to a dynamic foreign policy program. The fact that its goal was containment of communism, planned in an environment of alarm and built on military need, should not overshadow the fact that the alliance embraces a wide scope of relationships within the Atlantic community.

Although the North Atlantic Treaty was established on military need for the protection of Europe, its theoretic *raison d'etre* was primarily political, at least from the viewpoint of many advocates within the United States. The Europeans held a more pragmatic appreciation of the alliance; it was the means by which the military commitment of the United States for the defense of Western Europe would be assured. The permanent military structure came into being only after the Korean outbreak, and this development dramatized the symbolic shift of NATO's emphasis. As a result, the early hopes for diplomatic and political vitality expected to derive as a direct benefit from NATO atrophied under the requirements of defense.

Foreign Policy Instrument

As an instrument of foreign policy for the United States, NATO was envisioned as a useful means to:

- Assure international stability.
- Act as a means of political leverage and impetus toward eventual European unification.
- Strengthen the United Nations and arms control.

The first two points were successful in large measure, but the latter aspects have been virtually ignored. Within Europe, politico-military needs prevailed. France welcomed NATO as a means to control German revanchism. The United Kingdom also felt NATO would prevent aggression from both Germany and the Soviet Union and hoped that NATO would provide the needed stability in Europe to assure economic and political recovery.

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The Federal Republic of Germany embraced NATO in lieu of immediate unification since it underwrote German defense and promised eventual unification. The smaller nations of Europe recognized that, within the NATO Councils, their spokesmen and national viewpoints would share in the deliberations and be accorded a role equal to that of the larger nations. These diverse motivations reached a mutuality of commitment to contribute to a going alliance.

While there have been failures of NATO's goals, notably the solution for German unification and the strengthening of the United Nations, the primary purpose of the alliance has been met—to prevent aggression from the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, NATO is entering a new phase. The emphasis within the alliance is turning to renewed interpretation of its political aspects. In the past, NATO has demonstrated the necessary properties to respond to needs, but adjustments require time. Reform or reorganization of NATO, if this occurs, will come about primarily because of the new role that Europe has assumed —that of increasingly less dependence on the United States.

European Role Recognized

This aspect, combined with the differences of their interpretation of the perception of the military threat and the deterrence posture required, will quite likely prompt changes of a political and military nature within NATO. The new role for Europe is recognized by the United States, and efforts are being made to accommodate the new relationship evolving within the Atlantic community. These beginnings toward reform are being taken within NATO itself.

Before undertaking any massive revamping of the alliance, however, a return to a basic premise for NATO appears to be in order. For example, the pursuit of peace through arms control within NATO auspices promises to be an avenue of useful endeavor.

One of the primary facets of the North Atlantic Treaty was its basic grounding as a means toward arms control and disarmament. For example, embodied in point five of the famous Vandenberg Resolution of 11 June 1948 was the advice to the President of the United States that "the sense of The Senate" was to "obtain agreement among member nations upon universal regulation and reduction of armaments under adequate and dependable guaranty against violation."

Peace Theme Emphasized

The cause of peace was, of course, to be furthered within the framework of the United Nations, and the North Atlantic Treaty was to serve this end.

During the extended ratification hearings by the Foreign Relations Committee, this theme was emphasized. Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg made specific effort to point out that the North Atlantic Treaty was not a "military alliance," but it was "in essence the precise opposite." General Omar N. Bradley, then Chief of Staff, US Army, asserted that the North Atlantic alliance primarily was a political union.

Throughout its history, however, the realities of military exigencies have predominated within the relations of the Atlantic alliance. Despite the necessary emphasis and primacy of the military aspects of the alliance, one cannot gainsay the importance that arms control can play. The late

John Foster Dulles stated that the acid test was whether the pact would result in some reduction of armaments. Unfortunately, thus far, NATO's record in this sphere is not an auspicious one.

It is manifest that NATO's value of NATO will come to play an increasingly important role. With a perceptible thawing of the cold war, the political climate will prompt the growth of arms control and disarmament cooperation in the relations among the nations of Europe. Since arms control



NATO Letter

Secretary of State Dean Acheson signs the North Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949 in the presence of Vice President Alben W. Barkley and President Harry S Truman

to the West exceeds that of a formal military alliance. In the years to come, given an increasing *détente* between East and West encouraged by "bridge-building" and related measures to further mutual accord, the political phase and disarmament is simply an obverse facet of the security-military question, both subjects will require future investigation.

Throughout its history, NATO has played only a minimal role in US arms

control policy. It was not until 1957, almost a decade after its formation, that NATO entered into any significant role pertaining to US arms control efforts. For the most part, peace-seeking efforts had been unilateral and uncoordinated within alliance auspices. Like most innovations, a crisis of sorts was the catalyst needed to invigorate action.

At that time, four NATO members —the United States, Britain, Canada, and France—were participating in the United Nations Disarmament Subcommittee talks in London with the Soviet Union. One of the US representatives precipitated apprehension among his colleagues when he undertook unilaterally to discuss preliminary steps with the Soviet delegate without advising the other participating nations. The resultant furor by the NATO allies, as well as the Germans, constituted a major factor in the failure of this effort.

Align Policy Among Partners

Moreover, it was apparent that further US attempts to negotiate directly with the Soviet Union, over the heads of her Western partners, would greatly impede future continued negotiations. This era of the negotiations for peace has been described by the US Department of State as "the intensified effort" for arms control. Hence, immediately after the London failures, the United States made a strong effort to align her disarmament policy with her NATO partners. Consequently, the arms control proposals put forward in August 1957 reflected joint agreement by the NATO partners including:

- Reduction of all types of armaments and military forces.
- Ending production of fissionable material for military purposes.
- Suspension of nuclear weapon tests.
- Adoption of protective measures against the risk of surprise attack.

To date, these proposals have constituted the most ambitious array put forth in concert by NATO, and the NATO Council has continued to enjoy the prestige of some degree of consultation in the arms control dialogue.

Thus, NATO, for virtually the first 10 years of its existence, played only a minimal role in arms control activities. Quite properly concerned with problems of Western defense, the alliance was introduced to the function of coordinating arms control efforts of the several member nations as a result of a combination of events.

Reasons for Coordination

First, there was direct evidence of allied dissatisfaction with being relegated to a secondary role by the United States in her dealings with the Soviet Union on matters of international interest. Second, the US efforts met only with frustration and disappointment since the proposed measures could only succeed if they were accepted by both East and West. Third, NATO and the United States were drawn together in their common reaction to an increasing intransigence by the Soviet Union. Whatever the reasons, however, NATO was acknowledged as a needed instrument in the future negotiations toward stability.

NATO has periodically made reference to arms control issues in the regular official communiques issued following the council meetings. After the 1957 Heads of Government meeting, the Council Communique asserted NATO's cooperative stand for "comprehensive and controlled disarma-

ment." The value of such an affirmation lies in the intrinsic show of unity evidenced through the unanimity of purpose by NATO and as a bid for world opinion. Beyond these intangibles, however, NATO's cooperative efforts for arms control serve as a unifier for the West.

But by 1961, the only evidence of NATO solidarity of purpose that could be ascertained within the NATO Council was a statement that officially "deplored the Soviet government's continued refusal to accept international controls for disarmament." This was the pattern that was to be uniform through the 1960's. The NATO Council regularly affirms alliance unanimity, but devotes the bulk of its attention to defense matters with only lipservice observance of mutual participation and cooperation in matters of arms control.

Official Policy

If NATO as a whole appears only to go through the motions of diplomatic niceties in this important aspect of foreign affairs, a good portion of the reasons why can be attributed to the practices of the United States. Officially, the policy of the United States is to maintain contact with NATO on arms control matters. For example, during the discussion preceding the nuclear test ban treaty, Secretary of State Dean Rusk stated that the proposed agreement had been discussed "in NATO over the years." However, the effectiveness of discussion in NATO is open to question, but at least the proper procedures were followed.

The NATO Council, now with predictable regularity, continues to include in its final report an affirmation of agreement of arms control platitudes. The Final Communique from the June 1967 meetings affirmed that NATO:

Ministers expressed their concern to see progress made in the field of disarmament and arms control, including steps directed towards preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. If conditions permit, a balanced reduction of forces by the East and West could be a significant step toward security in Europe. A contribution on the part of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries towards a reduction of forces would be welcomed as a gesture of peaceful intent.

These are typical of the content found in the council messages issued in the public reports of meetings. It can be said that these statements contain more form than substance; more promise than performance.

Emphasis Shifted

From one standpoint at least, the concern for mutual accord and cooperation on arms control within NATO may be of academic interest only. From the early 1960's onward, arms control and disarmament emphasis has shifted from specific application in the European sector to worldwide approaches. Hence, the centrality of NATO participation in arms control discussions may have been downgraded. Measures that apply to the European area, however, are of critical importance to our NATO allies.

Therefore, it is heartening to read that, in his 1964 address before the Overseas Press Club, Secretary of State Rusk asserted that "there is particularly close consultation within NATO on disarmament issues and questions of European security." He spelled out the procedure:

Approximately every two weeks, for example, a senior representative of one of the four Western Powers at the Geneva disarmament conference [18-nation disarmament committee or ENDC] visits Paris to brief the NATO Permanent Council on developments in the disarmament talks. And before any major United States initiative in the disarmament field is put forward at Geneva, it is subjected to close consultation with our allies to insure that it does not adversely affect their interests. . . .

Thus, it would appear that there is indeed close and constructive consultation in a broad sense. The mutual airing of views and discussion of policy should result in a useful and meaningful consensus of national views of direct benefit to the Western negotiators. This outlook suffers from the unspoken acceptance that France, from the inception of the ENDC has refused to participate in the Geneva discussions. Hence, never have 18 nations been in attendance. However, cooperation does not imply conformity.

US Policy and Practice

On the basis of past performance, it can be suggested that there has been something less than a genuine consultation by the United States with her NATO partners—or at least something less than political cooperation—with regard to arms control issues. For example, despite the US position in opposition to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, one argument advanced to the Soviet Union for acceptance of the proposed multilateral force (MLF) was that the MLF constituted a means of retarding the spread of nuclear weapons.

Secretary Rusk, however, stated that NATO members participating in the MLF scheme would enjoy an "enhanced position in disarmament negotiations because of their active and responsible role in nuclear deterrence." But the MLF, to all appearances at the present time, is a dead issue. An examination of the genesis and development of the more recent proposed nonproliferation treaty presents an interesting recounting of US arms control policy in practice.

Initial Draft Treaties

The United States presented her initial version of the nonproliferation treaty at the ENDC in Geneva in August 1965. The Soviet Union greeted the draft coldly, charging that it offered "no basis" for negotiation. But she presented no alternative of her own until the United Nations General Assembly meetings in September. By the time the ENDC had reconvened in January 1966, expectations were that the committees would pursue the arduous task of reconciling the differences in the two draft treaties. Little was accomplished, however.

Not until January 1967 was substantial progress reported. At that time, it was reported that the United States and the Soviet Union were due to resume discussions pertaining to the nonproliferation treaty and, while mutual accord had not been reached on a draft treaty, the two nations had reached general agreement during secret, bilateral talks. Only after these bilateral agreements had been reached did the United States formally submit her draft treaty to the NATO Council.

Five days after the proposal was officially presented to the NATO group, William C. Foster, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, told the Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Senate Committee on

Foreign Relations that there was general accord among the NATO allies for a nonproliferation treaty and that he anticipated no difficulty in reaching an agreement.

Nevertheless, press reports from Geneva two weeks later confirmed the expectation that France would not sign such an agreement. Moreover, there was considerable German displeasure toward the agreement as well as a feeling of resentment within NATO circles generally against the bilateral bargaining between the two superpowers. Even so, by March, Secretary Rusk testified before the same subcommittee that "many governments have not given serious thought about a Nonproliferation Treaty." Mr. Foster, Rusk noted, was handling the principal negotiations and "he has appeared in NATO from time to time" in regard to the proposed treaty.

Agreement Attained

In the wake of Mr. Foster's presentation of the treaty to the NATO Council, the subsequent dispatches indicated that in addition to the opposition from the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Belgium, and Canada, as well as India and Japan beyond NATO, joined in outspoken opposition to the proposed treaty. Despite the disputed council negotiations and heated discussions by the NATO allies, the US State Department hinted that it might go ahead without agreement from NATO. A day later, the green light was given to the United States from the NATO Council. The Germans reportedly felt that it was more an amber light, but agreement was reached officially. Many allies, however, publicly criticized the US method of "consultation" within NATO.

Subsequent developments have indicated that the Europeans are concerned that the United States values her unilateral arms control aims over the North Atlantic Treaty structure itself. These fears were prompted, in part, by a misreading of an article by Mr. Foster where he said that a cost of a nonproliferation agreement "could



US Army

Secretary of State Dean Rusk

be the erosion of alliances resulting from the high degree of US-Soviet cooperation."

European fears, led by the Germans, that increased cooperation would lead per se to a reduced US commitment are unfounded. Mr. Foster actually went to great pains to point out that "either nuclear proliferation or its successful prevention is likely to weaken alliances." This development applies to NATO, the Warsaw Pact grouping, and equally as well to all other alliances.

The obvious conclusion to be drawn from the chronology of the nonpro-

liferation treaty is that US officials failed to see the need for elaborate discussions within NATO as well as the need to keep their allies fully informed before the secret discussions with the Soviet Union were undertaken.

Results to date suggest insufficient NATO planning and coordination. This point has been made before, and the recounting of the uncertain progress of the nonproliferation treaty appears to bear out this assertion. Therefore, it seems useful to examine the ways by which NATO can be used in order to allow it to retain the necessary vitality to undertake the predominantly political role that the alliance is expected to assume in the coming years.

Arms Control in NATO

It is inappropriate here to suggest a full-scale reform or restructuring of NATO. A return of one of the basic aims of the alliance as a vehicle for arms control may suffice. Several long-range goals can be suggested, however, for future activity.

Two significant points must be recognized as basic prerequisites to any consideration of NATO adjustment. The first is that there are no purely military or purely political questions within NATO. The two facets are closely linked, overlapping and interlocking relationships that cannot be separated. This problem makes apparent the fact that there will be neither solutions in the political area that will not impinge on the military nor can solutions proposed for one problem area be expected to avoid impinging elsewhere.

The second point is, perhaps, even more pertinent. As the major partner, the United States bears the burden of making the most difficult adjustments. Invariably, virtually every proposed NATO reform compels the United States to alter her position to a greater extent than other members of the alliance. Nor, as might be expected, are the proposed calls for reform confined to Europeans. Indeed, most of the informed NATO observers within the United States have proposed an adjustment of perspective that applies directly to that Nation.

Alterations Needed

Thus, it will be necessary for the United States to undertake the task of formulating and supporting a number of needed alterations in NATO that will have a net effect of diminishing her actual power within the alliance. The choice must be made between either doing nothing and bearing passive witness to the demise of a vital alliance, or cooperating in a positive manner toward needed reform that will result in genuine partnership. But reforms need not be drastic to begin with.

Emphasis on arms control policy coordination within NATO can be effected through the creation of a strong disarmament group. By far the most expeditious method to get this type of operation underway would be through an addition to the Advisory Committee of the NATO Council. Formal recognition of this sensitive area of policy formulation would channel the present *ad hoc* methods into useful means of thoroughgoing discussion where all members enjoy access to policy proposals. Such a committee would allow the civilian representatives to discuss with candor their national concern with proposals presented by their allies in an environment that allows free and open dis-

cussion without resorting to press leaks and other dubious means to influence opinion.

Creation of an Arms Control Affairs Committee on a formal basis would complement the recent innovations that pertain to military matters. The Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee and the more select Nuclear Planning Group were created in an attempt to cope with the manifold problems of participation on a full and equal basis with planning and potential application of nuclear arms. These groups have demonstrated the usefulness of consultation on a basis of mutual participation beyond the unanimity required from the NATO Council.

For a beginning effort, arms control and disarmament policy coordination might benefit immeasurably from a similar committee consultative process. There is no need to alter radically NATO's internal structure or to attempt to create new posts in the council hierarchy. Such precipitous attempts would likely lead to inaction and discord.

Minimal Organization Changes

In the current environment of changing relationships in NATO, the shift of emphasis must be gradual. Prudence demands that far-reaching changes in organization be minimal in order to deal with present priorities. Later, after a suitable period of acceptance, it may be appropriate to consider the addition of a Deputy Secretary General or staff officials to deal with the politico-military problems of arms control.

Arms control issues must face the realities of security issues in the context of military problems. It may well be that extensive discussion of the nonproliferation treaty within a formal Arms Control Affairs Committee would have alerted the US planners to the serious misgivings within NATO and the military implications it held for the allies.

US efforts to convince her NATO allies of a genuine desire for mutual cooperation will be a delicate enterprise. Further, the task will take time combined within an environment of mutual confidence and partnership. To expect results on any other basis seems likely to yield disappointment. In the last analysis, it must be admitted that some areas of national interest will not necessarily yield to mutual accord. The needed compromise will come about only in an environment of cooperation based on mutual respect.

NATO's Future

It has been said that Western Europe remains the most important single grouping of nations with which the United States is associated. And through NATO, the United States is able to maintain effective and useful application of that interest. Both Europe and NATO give evidence of clear signs of change and that political fluidity can act as a bridge or a chasm on future policy goals for the United States.

It must be understood that arms control measures will not act in either role a fortiori. Some agreements will, in general, tend to further political and military trends now apparent; others will not. A lack of adequate and necessary consultation, however, in even the most meritorious proposal will produce an erosion of political confidence and create military tension within the alliance and beyond.

Arms control measures that are undertaken on a bilateral basis between the United States and the Soviet Union

are likely to be regarded with distrust and suspicion by the nonparticipants. Therefore, any serious arms control proposals should avoid this approach unless, of course, the United States is prepared to accept the consequences of reduced political leverage within NATO and the ties it affords to Europe. Moreover, unilateral measures on the part of the United States are also likely to engender conflicts with her European allies.

The United States and her allies have a mutual desire, it would appear, in the reduction of international tensions through the medium of NATO. Difficulties arise in attempting to translate these common goals into meaningful agreements. Future success will evolve only through an emphasis on a mutuality of interests. Arms control proposals lacking this vital ingredient, or that are too sweeping for general consensus, or of only unilateral instigation and of narrow application, are bound to fail of acceptance in the new European environment.

Again, no matter how persuasive the arguments may be to the effect that cooperation between the two major nuclear powers of the world will provide the major impetus to the ultimate arms control goal, the need for a unified and vigorous NATO community prevails. It is only within this context that arms control efforts will succeed.

In Western Europe we shall maintain in NATO an integrated common defense. But we also look forward to the time when greater security can be achieved through measures of arms control and disarmament and through other forms of practical agreement.

President Lyndon B. Johnson

An MR Digest
From *The Royal Air Forces Quarterly* (Great Britain)



THE ETHICS OF BOMBING

Air Marshal Sir Robert Saundby, *Royal Air Force, Retired*

THE SUBJECT of air bombardment is seldom discussed objectively and reasonably. It arouses all kinds of illogical antagonisms and emotional responses. Even when used against a leaking and derelict tanker aground near the Scillies, napalm bombs cause shudders of horror.

These irrational feelings are strongest among the young and the so-called progressives, and are usually directly proportional to their ignorance of the subject. When these people descend to the level of rational argument, the commonest objection to air bombardment is that it involves civilians in war, whereas they have a right to be treated as noncombatants.

Civilian populations have always, to a degree, been involved in hostilities. A glance at the history of war will suffice to make this clear.

From the earliest days of civilization, cities and towns have been besieged, bombarded, sacked, pillaged, and burned. Often their defenders, and sometimes also their civilian inhabitants, were slaughtered or driven off into slavery. Land battles are not fought in deserts but over the countryside, across farms, houses, orchards, and gardens, the property and homes of civilians who have to flee for their lives.

Conventional Warfare

It is true that, with the gradual merging of the feudal into the monarchical order in Europe in the Middle Ages, there came into being for a time a system of conventional warfare waged by standing armies of professional soldiers. During this period, the usages, forms, and ceremonies of war were taken seriously.

Generally speaking, a fairly clear distinction was drawn between combatants and noncombatants. This was comparatively easy because the ordinary people did not take sides as they cared little who won or lost the war. Usually, no religious or ideological principles were involved in those struggles for territory between the petty kings, dukes, and counts. The civilian population did its best to carry on with its normal affairs and avoid trouble.

The conventions of war were rather like a set of trade union rules, drawn up to make the profession of soldiering tolerable. Campaigns were normally conducted during only the summer months, and armies went into winter quarters to escape the trials and discomforts of frost, snow, and floods. The campaigns themselves were mainly affairs of maneuvering for position, formal sieges, and investitures, all conducted in a regular manner according to the rule book.

It was against the conventions to try to take unfair advantage by unorthodox actions. Thus, it was contrary to the usages of war to attack the base camp or baggage train of an enemy.

But even the professional soldier expected a bonus now and then in the form of loot or rapine, and there were occasions when the civilian inhabitants were plundered, ill-treated, and even slaughtered. Cities were sacked, and countrysides laid waste. But such lapses were unusual, and, on the whole, material destruction was avoided and the rights of noncombatants respected as far as was practicable.

Character of War Altered

At the end of the 18th century, a great change occurred. The French Revolution, followed by the rise to power of Napoleon Bonaparte, completely altered the whole character of war. It became the affair of the whole people, and in France the professional army, devoted to conventional warfare, was replaced by the *levée en masse*, the nation in arms. The *Grande Armée* disregarded most of the conventions, and all over Europe the professional armies of other states went down before its onslaught.

The whole system of conventional war was rapidly swept away, and all nations began to raise large conscript armies. War became far more serious and pervaded the whole life of the nation. A new and much more realistic concept of military strategy appeared.

This article was condensed from the original, published in THE ROYAL AIR FORCES QUARTERLY *(Great Britain) No. 2 Summer 1967.*

This fundamental change in the character of war made a great impression on contemporary students of military affairs, and the German General Karl von Clausewitz clothed in words the theory of war originated by Napoleon. Clausewitz believed that war had finally escaped the bonds of convention, and that, in the future, when great powers were engaged, it would allow itself to be bound by them. It was clear that in general war the distinction between combatants and noncombatants was bound to become blurred.

Alone among the countries of Europe, Britain was able, by virtue of her seapower and island situation, to avoid the creation of a large conscript army. One of her main weapons



US Army

Damage inflicted by Allied bombers on Hanover, Germany, during World War II

would be total and absolute. It would involve not only the armed forces, but the whole nation, and its sucessful prosecution would, therefore, need the support of public opinion. He insisted that war, whether one liked the idea or not, was now a violent clash between nations in arms which could never be humanized or civilized, and that, if one side attempted to do so, it was likely to be defeated.

Clausewitz had no faith in the reliability, in time of war, of any international rules or agreements since no nation facing the possibility of defeat was the sea blockade, a legal and internationally recognized method of sea warfare which aimed at starving the enemy nation into submission. Since armed forces and essential workers had to be fed and clothed, those who suffered most were the women and children, the infirm and the aged. Britain's blockade of Germany in World War I caused the death from malnutrition of far more civilians than died in all the air attacks on Britain in both World Wars.

There is abundant evidence that, more often than not, the civilian

population is deeply involved in war. However, British civilians have tended to regard themselves as privileged noncombatants. Since the Norman invasion of 1066, except for a few civil wars, all Britain's fighting has been on the high seas or in other countries.

British Seapower Protection

From the end of the 17th century to the beginning of the 20th century, British seapower completely sheltered Britons from the direct impact of war. This encouraged the view that war was exclusively the business of the armed forces which were paid to fight and risk their lives, while civilians were noncombatants who had a right to be left unmolested to go about their lawful affairs. Their part in the war, they believed, should be limited to waving goodbye to the troops; paying extra taxes; knitting cardigans, mittens, and balaclava helmets; and submitting to a few minor inconveniences.

This comfortable view was shaken by German air attacks on Britain during World War I, and completely shattered by the all-out onslaught from the air in World War II. The coming of the third dimension into war brought about great changes, and another and even more realistic concept of military strategy emerged. The conventions of war that Britons had come to believe in were annihilated.

The main focus of British indignation was against air bombardment. It is a curious thing, but condemnation and criticism of bombing began with the first occasion on which an explosive weapon was dropped from an aircraft. Four converted Swedish hand grenades were dropped by an Italian pilot on 1 November 1911 during the Italian-Turkish War in Libya. Several more grenades were dropped during the next few days.

Before long, Turkey protested against the bombing of a hospital at Ain Zara by Italian aircraft. Extensive inquiries failed to establish the existence of a hospital there, but it is possible that some Turkish military tents may have been used as a casualty clearing station. The Italians pointed out, not unreasonably, that they had shortly before bombarded the encampment at Ain Zara with 152 heavy naval shells without any protest from the Turks.

There followed in the Italian, Turkish, and neutral press a considerable discussion about the ethics of air bombardment—a discussion which has continued, more or less violently, ever since. It is astonishing that the first feeble attempt at air bombardment should have provoked an illogical protest, suggesting that a few tiny bombs were more dangerous and destructive than a large number of heavy naval shells.

Air Control System

In Iraq and Transjordan, large land forces were replaced in 1922 by small air forces, and a very successful system known as the air control of developing countries was instituted. It did not involve a direct attack on the tribesmen or their houses, but was a form of air blockade. Unlike sea blockade, however, it did not seek to achieve its aim by starvation, but by unacceptable discomfort and inconvenience.

The system proved to be so effective and so economical in money and in casualties to both sides that in 1928 it was extended to the Aden Protectorate where it was an immediate success. The North West Frontier of

India was ideally suited to this humane and efficient form of control, and, whenever it was tried there, it produced excellent results. The army, however, with its system of punitive expeditions, was too strongly entrenched and was able to frustrate all attempts to introduce the air method.

Protests in Great Britain

As might be expected, there was considerable opposition in Great Britain to the idea of air control. Its opponents had predicted that its reliance on the bomb—which they stigmatized as violent, horrible, and inhumane—would leave a legacy of hatred and ill will. This prediction proved to be the reverse of the truth. Nevertheless, the system continued to be bitterly attacked by many people who had an instinctive horror of any form of air bombardment.

During the years between the two World Wars, the alarm felt by civilians at the prospects of air bombardment led to determined efforts to outlaw or restrict it. At the League of Nations Disarmament Conference held in Geneva in 1932-34, the British Government proposed a convention to prohibit all forms of bombing from the air, to which it later added a rider permitting its use under certain conditions in developing countries. Further amendments from various sources were added to permit the attack of strictly military targets in support of land and sea operations. But the difficulty of defining what was, and what was not, a military target eventually proved insuperable.

Britain then tabled another proposal limiting the unladen weight of military aircraft to 3,000 pounds. This would have ruled out everything but the defensive fighter and the very short-range light bomber. Armies and navies of many countries welcomed this proposal, and, for a time, there seemed to be a chance that it might be accepted. But eventually, the Disarmament Conference broke up without achieving any result whatever.

At the outbreak of World War II, both Britain and France gave instructions that only strictly military targets were to be attacked. The Royal Air Force was not even allowed to attack German warships in docks or at quaysides for fear of causing casualties among civilians.

What Is a Military Target?

This again raised the question of what a military target is and how it can be defined. It is generally agreed, for example, that the man who loads or fires a field gun is a military target. So is the gun itself, and the ammunition dump that supplies it. So is the truck driver who transports ammunition from the base to the dump. So—in the last two World Wars—was the man who transported weapons, ammunition, and raw materials by sea.

But, then, are not the weapons and warlike stores on their way from the factories to the bases, and the men who transport them, also military targets? And what about the weapons under construction in the factories, and the men who make them? Are they not also military targets? And if they are not, where does one draw the line?

If they are military targets, are not the industrial areas, and the services —gas, water, and electricity—that keep industry going also military targets? Again, where can one draw the line? Or is it permissible to starve these civilian workers by blockade, or shell them if you can get at them, but not to bomb them from the air?

As World War II went on, Britain and the United States followed the German lead in attacking from the air the industrial areas, power stations, railway centers, and other essential services, and accepting the certainty of a considerable number of civilian casualties. With few exceptions, Britons warmly supported this policy during the war. As soon as the war was over, many tried to ignore the vital contribution made by the Allied bombers, and to dissociate themselves from the policy.

Britain's Bomber Command was denied the 1939-45 star or other campaign star, and given the mainly civilian defense medal instead. Its commander in chief was, in the opinion of many people, slighted, and the command's achievements were commemorated in an official history written in a singularly equivocal and lukewarm style.

In progressive circles nowadays it is fashionable to assert that the strategic bombing campaign was a mistake and a waste of valuable resources. Yet even the official history is compelled to admit that:

Strategic bombing and, also in other roles strategic bombers, made a contribution to victory that was decisive. Those who claim that the Bomber Command contribution to the war was less than this are factually in error.

The truth is that it is war itself that is wrong and immoral—or, more accurately speaking, aggressive war—for it must be right to defend one's country and oneself against attack. By this standard, the war waged by North Vietnam, backed by the Soviet Union and Communist China, against South Vietnam—fought in South Vietnamese territory, be it noted—is wrong and immoral. On the other hand, the defensive war against the attack from the north—fought by South Vietnam with backing from the United States, Australia, and New Zealand—is right and proper. No twist of argument, no sophistry, and no emotional outcry against bombing can controvert those two plain facts.

It is certainly not intended to imply that all actions, even in a just war against aggression, are necessarily permissible. The test is whether the action in question genuinely furthers the aim and main strategic concept of the war. Thus, taking revenge on civilians by mass slaughter does not help to win a war and is not permissible. But the diminution of an enemy's power to continue the war by the destruction of industrial areas, power stations, dams, railway centers, and depots is legitimate, even though such action must cause civilian casualties. It goes without saying, however, that all practicable steps, short of prejudicing the success of the operation, should be taken to minimize the risk to civilians.

A study of the ethics of bombing cannot fail to remind one that man is an illogical creature, still far more swayed by emotion than by calm reason. Man has wonderful powers of self-deception, and of the uncritical suppression of unwelcome facts; he is still capable of believing what he wants to believe, in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Indeed, there are none so blind as will not see, or so deaf as will not hear.

It is, therefore, no doubt unrealistic to hope for the general acceptance of rational views about such an emotive subject as the ethics of air bombardment.

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

WHEN considering the possible perpetrators of a nuclear attack upon the United States or upon other states of special concern to her, one thinks first of the Soviet Union, second of Communist China, and only third, if at all, of other countries. From the viewpoint of destructive capability, although not necessarily of destructive intent, this is the correct rank order of importance for the present and early future.

But while China lags behind the USSR, and other countries lag further still behind China, the gaps are not so large that the combined impact of non-European nuclear proliferation and arms control-disarmament arrangements upon American defensive capabilities can be wisely ignored. Let us, therefore, consider three representative arms control disarmament

"worlds" and discuss the advisability of accepting, modifying, or rejecting the defensive constraints they would impose upon this country.

Peaceful Nuclear Activity

Including the already acknowledged nuclear powers, about three dozen countries now engage in some type of nuclear activity. Most of it falls under the rubric of "peaceful uses." Whether any of the smaller or middle powers decide to move from peaceful to more bellicose nuclear capabilities depends upon several factors. It depends upon the availability of external assistance; upon a country's fears, will, wealth, science, technology, and raw materials; and, above all, upon its foreign policy objectives and its own perceptions of the trade off between basic security needs and other costs.

If a country decides to opt for nuclear arms, it does so because it accepts one or more of the usual arguments for proliferation and wishes to make them part and parcel of its foreign policy. These arguments, as categorized by Leonard Beaton and John Maddox, are that nuclear weapons:

- Are the only deterrent against an enemy who is himself armed with nuclear weapons.
- Are desirable replacements for conventional forces because they are more effective.
- Provide a cheaper defense and such technologies are useful to an advanced economy.
- Are an ultimate guarantee and embodiment of independence.
- Are a valuable source of prestige with allies and with the world in general.
- Are a useful guarantee against the possibility that a great power guarantor will lose his nerve in a crisis.
- Enable a country to take a more useful part in disarmament negotiations.

Delivery Vehicles

However, a nation that possesses nuclear weapons without, at the same time, having the means to deliver them on target is like a teenager who has a big, expensive car which impresses the girls in his neighborhood, but which he cannot drive because he has no money for gasoline. Without effective strategic delivery vehicles, a new nuclear power reaps only small benefits from its nuclear weapons.

Delivery capability may be consid-

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SUMMARY OF ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS

	US General and Complete Disarmament Proposal—Stage I	US Proposal for a Freeze on the Number and Characteristics of Strategic Offensive and Defensive Vehicles	Gilpatric's Long View: 1970
TYPE OF AGREEMENT	A treaty, the first stage of which would enter into force upon ratification by Soviet Union, United States, and such other states as might be agreed.	A treaty between the United States and Soviet Union and such allies as may be agreed.	A tacit arrangement based on the assumption of a continued **détente** and policies of mutual example. Retain enough power to deter Soviet Union and China. A possible and reasonable posture in 1970 for the transition from cold war to genuine peace.
CHANGES IN NUMBERS OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS	30-percent reduction in steps of 10 percent per year, over three years, for each type of weapon from a base-line set by initial declaration of inventory. Destruction or conversion to be supervised by an international disarmament organization. Replacements for accidents or attrition would be made on a one-for-one basis.	No reductions. Hold levels by categories above in accordance with initial declaration of inventory. Freeze the number of launchers. Accidents to be verified. Replacements only on a one-for-one basis.	Manned bombers to be phased out and deactivated. Only hardened, dispersed intercontinental ballistic missiles and sea-launched ballistic missiles to be retained. Interceptors and their command and control to be deactivated. Improve surveillance and early warning. Intensive R&D, test and evaluation.
PRODUCTION OF STRATEGIC VEHICLES	Production allowed in accordance with negotiated quotas to cover spares, training, maintenance of allowed vehicles. Production of new types of vehicles prohibited. Quotas and inspection for production of space boosters.	Production allowed in accordance with quotas to cover confidence and training tests, attrition of allowed vehicles. Production of major components also controlled. Production is to be balanced between quotas and usage. No production of new types of weapons.	Present **Minuteman** and **Polaris** plans would be fulfilled. Production permitted to maintain the force at the selected level. Allowance for confidence and training firing.
PRODUCTION FACILITIES	Expansion prohibited. Construction and equipping of facilities for production of new types of weapons prohibited.	Full declaration and inspection of civil and inactive facilities as well as military facilities.	Capability to expand production would be retained.
VEHICLE TESTING	Testing of new types of armament prohibited. Flight testing is allowed weapons to be limited by quota. Declaration of launchers, track of test shots. Prelaunch inspection.	All testing of completed missile prototypes halted, but subsystem testing is permitted. All testing from new types of launchers to be halted.	Inasmuch as the program is voluntary, testing to upgrade technological capability is assumed.
NUCLEAR TESTING, WEAPONS	Ban all tests in all environments. Stop fissile material production. No transfer of weapons, technology.	The current nuclear weapon test ban treaty will be continued. Combine freeze with cut-off of production of fissile material.	The current nuclear weapon test ban treaty will be continued, recognizing that China and France may not join the treaty.

erably enhanced by rocket research and space exploration. Here, a number of "third" countries are active, among them South Africa, Israel, the United Arab Republic, and Japan. Now, the third country that today embarks on peaceful space research may tomorrow use the same rockets and boosters developed for that purpose as strategic vehicles to deliver missiles against an enemy. Further, what makes dangerous any country's missile research program is the impetus it may give for an eventual decision to develop and use nuclear or chemical and biological weapons.

NATO's Fifteen Nations

The Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile, the *Scrag*

On the matter of ships, submarines, and airplanes as delivery vehicles, there are varying possibilities. A number of third countries—including Israel—have state-owned, commercial jet fleets that may possibly be convertible to effective strategic bombers. Japan, as another case in point, is today the world's largest builder of oceangoing vessels. All that she lacks to become again a respectable builder of naval vessels, submarines, and aircraft is the political decision to do so.

The production and updating of delivery vehicles is expensive—in many cases much more expensive than the weapons themselves. Knowing this, some emerging nuclear powers will, for awhile, remain content to exploit only the political, propaganda, and prestige values of their new status. But others, having decided to "go nuclear," may also decide to try to establish a strategic bombing capability to match their nuclearization. Of course, if a new nuclear state can rely on one of the great powers for its supply of strategic delivery vehicles, then the threat is serious and its military and political importance to

the other great power, or to smaller powers which that other great power wishes to protect, will increase by several orders of magnitude.

Smaller countries in the proximity of other small countries that are already "nuclearized" will be dissuaded from trying to follow suit only if they believe in the effectiveness and credibility of a great power "nuclear umbrella." But great power attachment to this concept may well be lessened by the very proliferation the concept is supposed to prevent. If Country A is nuclear and able to inflict some damage not only on its smaller neighbor Country B, but also on a great power, will that great power really shield Country B when the chips are down? Country B's lack of confidence in the great power's credibility may even extend to conventional war threats.

It is an open question whether the United States or the Soviet Union will always be inclined to furnish conventional forces and weapons support to a second country if that second country's neighbor has the capacity to escalate the war to a nuclear level. This is particularly true if that second country's actions may involve not only the troops, but also the territory of the great power.

Types of Attacks

Generally speaking, one may distinguish among four types of nuclear attacks:

- High-level attack with 400 to 1,000 weapons using "rational" targeting.
- High-level attack with 400 to 1,000 weapons using "irrational" targeting.
- Low-level attack with 40 to 100 weapons using "rational" targeting.
- Low-level attack with 40 to 100 weapons using "irrational" targeting.

Each of the three arms control "worlds" involves special considerations for US defense. Stage I of the US General and Complete Disarmament (GCD) proposal calls for three successive years. It includes both offensive and defensive weapons. This stipulation raises a question. Will the 90 percent legally left to us after the first year, the 80 percent after the second, and the 70 percent after the third leave us more vulnerable relative to third parties in view of the technological and military possibilities discussed earlier?

Third-Country Capabilities

Of the four types of attack, only the last two will even approach the capability of third countries. One can envisage the French and Chinese capability of such attacks in the early or mid-1970's. However, unless the attack is against another third country, such as China against India, it will invite retaliation and possibly escalation. Thus, a Chinese rational sea-launched ballistic missile attack on the US west coast cities would probably produce US destruction of Chinese centers, but also possibly a Soviet counterforce attack on the United States. If the Chinese were to initiate an irrational counterforce attack on the United States, the probability of Soviet intervention would decrease and the United States could retaliate with less risk of escalation.

In any case, because of habitual preoccupation with the bipolar probabilities of nuclear war, the United States has paid insufficient attention to the proliferation-induced need to relate such force structures to low-level attack strategies from third countries. It is not always understood that the kind of defense which can be

used against a third party may not necessarily be the same defense that is used against the major threat posed by the USSR. Protection against the main threat does not automatically protect against subsidiary threats such as low-flying, low-speed aircraft coming in under the radar threshold for high-flying supersonic craft.

Degree of Stability

This adds to the argument for the development and deployment of an antiballistic missile (ABM) system and for arms control arrangements that would permit such development and deployment. Such a situation would tend to stabilize the arms race and reduce threats of both high and low-level attacks. It would have a particularly stabilizing effect on nuclear proliferation.

Third countries would not be able to overcome the United States comparative advantage against them by forcing intervention of the Soviets in a catalytic war, for their possession of even a small nuclear force would leave them vulnerable to preemption by a well-defended United States. Thus, they would have to spend a great deal of time and money to develop a really respectable nuclear force on the order of the British model or of that which the French contemplate by the 1970's.

The cost to the Soviets of reallocating intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) to low-level attack missions may be offset by savings in Soviet expenditures on penetration aids and research and development in new high-level systems. The effective shelf life of ICBM's could, therefore, be extended, reducing the supply available for sale and transfer to third countries and the pressures to do so.

While the draft treaty prohibits the transfer of nuclear weapons or technology, it does not prohibit the transfer of strategic delivery vehicles from the reduced inventory of each of the great powers. Assume, for example, that the Soviet Union has a total of 100 supersonic bombers or 100 missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads upon the territory of the United States. She freely and openly declares these 100 bombers or missiles and in full compliance with the GCD treaty destroys 30 of them by the end of the third year. As presently written, nothing in the treaty would legally prevent her from then lending, selling, or simply giving away any or all of the remaining 70 delivery systems to a nuclearized third country not a party to the treaty.

Effects on Delivery Potential

Accession to the treaty by third parties would have the following impacts on the latter's delivery potential. The effect on short-range delivery capability—less than 600 miles—would be minimal other than to reduce the numbers of missiles and aircraft in this category. Medium-range capability of 600 to 1,500 miles would be sharply downgraded, affecting such countries as China, Cuba, and Australia. Intermediate-range capability of 1,500 to 4,000 miles would downgrade China, Indonesia, and the United Arab Republic. In the range above 4,000 miles, China's potential would be largely unaffected.

Under the US plan for a verified freeze of strategic vehicles, third parties not bound by either the test ban treaty or the freeze will be free to test weapons and to produce and test new delivery vehicles. Theoretically, this means that by 1972 a vigorous third party might acquire more

advanced prototypes than the United States would have because under the freeze we would be limited to "old" models.

However, an "overkill" number of old model nuclear bombs, for example, should more than make up for the possibility that a third party might produce a small number of "newer" or more "efficient" models. So long as a third party knew this and felt that our defensive weapons capability was still effective, then the potential danger to the United States under the freeze is much smaller than it would be under GCD.

As in the case of GCD, there is no legal restriction on deployment of mobile delivery systems to third parties. Thus, the US commitment to nuclear guarantees and to the defense of third parties against attack would not be degraded. Finally, third country accession to the freeze would not affect third party short, medium, or long-range delivery potential.

Gilpatric Proposal

The arrangement proposed by Roswell L. Gilpatric, former Deputy Secretary of Defense, being tacit, voluntary, and informal, given political will, would be the easiest to make and the easiest to break. Like the other arms control arrangements, it would downgrade threats from third parties, ignoring nuclear proliferation and the needs of limited war.

For example, it would require the phasing out and deactivation of manned bombers, a constraint that would have made the US air response in Vietnam impossible. It would also place no specific restrictions on deployment, and thus enhance the likelihood of weapons and vehicle transfers to third parties not involved in the Gilpatric arrangement. Should nonaligned third countries accede to the arrangement, their medium-range nuclear delivery potential, although cut in absolute numbers of aircraft and missiles, would improve relative to Sino-Soviet bloc third countries.

Basic Flaw in Plans

There is a basic conceptual flaw in the three arms control plans. At least militarily speaking, each of them assumes a bipolar rather than a multipolar world by 1972. Yet the very logic of proliferation—including the consistent history of the United States to underestimate the timing, technological prowess, and intentions of third parties—forces the conclusion that bilateral arrangements will simply not handle what is becoming more of a multilateral problem with each passing day.

There is a gap in the arrangements that allows the legal transfer of delivery vehicles to third parties. The prohibition against the transfer of weapons may actually encourage nuclear proliferation because it would inhibit the application of the "nuclear umbrella" concept to the territories of third countries facing or fearing nuclear attack by other third countries.

Smaller and middle powers not bound to the three arms control agreements would probably welcome them. If they have no warlike intentions, they would be pleased with the expected tension reduction between the United States and the Soviet Union. If they did have such intentions, they would welcome the implied reduction of the military strength of the two superpowers and would not want to take on the same restrictions. For this reason, it does not seem wise for the United States to accept either GCD or the Gilpatric plans without

the initial inclusion of China, France, and other militarily significant third parties.

The cumulative effects of nuclear proliferation may well require an increase in US defensive capabilities against the type of "unsophisticated" attack that third parties may be able to launch against us or against other countries we wish to protect. In the case of GCD, this problem could be handled by leaving a higher percentage of defensive weapons than offensive ones to each side at each stage of reduction.

Each of the arms control agreements would discourage or make expensive the development and improvement of ABM's. Yet because attack by a third party would likely be low intensity, ABM defense could be most effective. Thus, the agreements ought to be modified to permit ABM development and deployment. This would not only inhibit third party proliferation and low-intensity nuclear attacks, but it would also reduce the Soviets' present comparative advantage in launching high-intensity attacks without reducing the costs to her of launching low-intensity ones against the United States.

The most serious military threat remains the possibility of general nuclear war. Some people believe that this possibility is extremely slight and that no responsible nation would deliberately start a nuclear war that would result in mutual destruction. But, as in the past, this will be true in the future only as long as the United States maintains a credible capability to destroy any aggressor, even if subjected to a massive surprise attack. It is for this reason that it is essential for us to preserve a safe margin of nuclear superiority for as long as the threat of nuclear aggression persists.

General John P. McConnell



The Root of the Matter

Major Reginald Hargreaves, *British Army, Retired*

A HORDE of men with weapons in their hands no more constitutes an army than a heap of bricks can pass for a house. In both cases, a certain amount of raw material is available out of which expert hands can build something durable. Bricks arranged according to a planned design are cemented together to build an edifice which will stand firm in wind and weather. In the same way, a body of men can be "put together" by careful training and indoctrination so that they come to form a cohesive, fully instructed fighting force. The "cement" that welds them into a single, purposeful entity is discipline.

Discipline distinguishes an armed force from an armed rabble. Its importance in creating this transformation has been clearly recognized since the strife of primitive tribal days gave place to warfare conducted upon a sound organizational basis.

Discipline is, of course, of two kinds. There is the discipline which

is enforced upon an individual from without, through fear of the exemplary punishment that will be visited upon him following any dereliction of duty or failure to live up to the high standard demanded of him. A far higher type of discipline is that which comes from within, born of the individual's recognition of the fact that it better becomes his dignity as a man to impose certain standards and restraints on himself than to have them enforced by someone else.

Since self-discipline is largely the outcome of education and the attainment of a reasonable degree of psychological maturity, the more primitive a people, the more their military commanders must rely on the enforcement of discipline from without. It is only from the fundamentally civilized man that discipline from within can be looked for with any degree of confidence.

Assyria

Assyria, which dominated the ancient world from about 3000 to 726 B.C., was the first nation to possess a properly organized, fully integrated fighting force complete with the Sovereign's bodyguard, a baggage train, and even the equivalent of army chaplains. But it was an army which was held together by a disciplinary code enforced with a severity little short of the barbarous. Physical chastisement, the bastinado, branding, relegation to slavery, and the ever-recurrent death penalty held the troops in a merciless thrall which cowed them into observing the necessary standard of discipline required of them.

Personal Devotion

The readiness with which Greek troops followed Alexander the Great in his eight-year, 17,000-mile expedition from the shores of the Hellespont to the banks of the Ganges was rather a tribute to their personal devotion to their leader than to their innate sense of discipline. For having successfully fought and marched their way to the fabled Hyphasis, Alexander's troops flatly refused to move a step farther. This was plain mutiny, but since his subordinate leaders were clearly of the same mind as their men, the entire fabric of authority had obviously broken down. The leader's personal popularity with his followers had nearly vanished, and there was no organized disciplinary system on which to fall back. Alexander accepted the inevitable and began the long march home.

There was a marked difference in the quality of the discipline characterizing the Greek armies and that maintained in the forces raised by the Roman Republic and Empire. With the Romans, it was regarded as a positive privilege to serve in the country's armed forces. The rewards and benefits which awaited the time-expired veteran with an unblemished record added a further inducement to good behavior.

Nonetheless, like all armies, the Roman legion included a certain number of men who occasionally kicked over the traces. Since discipline was strict, any infringements of it were swiftly and remorselessly punished. Flogging

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was administered by the centurions for any serious offense; the vine, laurel, or myrtle staves, which they always carried as an emblem of rank, were laid on without restraint.

For mutiny or cowardice, the unit concerned would be subjected to decimation—one man in 10, chosen by lot, was put to death. For less serious derelictions of duty, the culprit was penalized by a temporary stoppage of pay, reduction in rank, by his bread ration being doled out to him in the form of a rye loaf rather than one of the superior wheaten variety, and his allowance of wine withheld for a stated number of days. Speaking generally, however, there was remarkably little indiscipline in the Roman Army. Pride in his own and his particular unit's military skill and all-around efficiency inspired the legionnaire to maintain a standard of self-discipline which has rarely been matched, and never exceeded, in the entire history of arms.

Medieval armies were built up on a hard core of knights, squires, and mounted servants-at-arms. To this nucleus of practiced fighting men was added, in times of emergency, a "rabble of foot" made up of spearmen, axmen, and daggermen who left their work as cattlemen and farm laborers at the King's summons to fight in their country's cause. Without training, and entirely without experience of living and working together as a fully integrated fighting formation, their general unruliness could only be curbed by the imposition of the sternest form of discipline from without.

Under England's warrior-King, Henry V, Ordinances of War, among other disciplinary measures, stated that the soldiers were to be humbly obedient to their officers and every one should perform his watch and ward for the full term on pain of having his head cut off. This was also the penalty meted out to any man who sought to desert.

When troops were on passage overseas, regulations warned both the soldiery and the mariners that:

He who kills a man on shipboard, shall be bound to the dead man and thrown into the sea: if the man be killed on shore, the slayer shall be bound to the dead body and buried with it. Anyone convicted by lawful witnesses of having drawn his knife to strike another, or who shall have drawn blood of him, shall lose his hand. If he shall have struck only with

The early Assyrian Army had a disciplinary code which bordered on the barbarous

the palm of his hand, without drawing blood, he shall be thrice ducked in the sea.

That these punishments were carried out, when called for, with exemplary dispatch is borne out by many contemporary records. Thus, when England's Edward III was hastening to cross the river Somme to reach his chosen battlefield of Crécy well ahead of his French opponents, he did not hesitate to delay his march long enough to hang 20 of his men who had been caught pillaging the Abbey of Saint Lucien near Beauvais.

The onus of maintaining discipline throughout the army rested with the King's marshal, but much of the responsibility was delegated to his deputy, the provost marshal. Having laid out the camp when the troops were in bivouac, one of the provost marshal's first tasks was to erect a gallows at the end of the open market where the sutlers had set up their booths. It served as a grim reminder not only to the more unruly among the troops, but also to anyone among the hawkers behind the stalls with extravagant ideas about putting up his prices.

Standing Army

The first organized Standing Army formed in Europe since the days of the Roman Empire was founded by Charles VII of France in 1453. Despite the fact that its personnel were subjected to long training and intensive indoctrination, the disciplinary system by which its leaders maintained order exhibited little advance on that practiced by the hired mercenaries who had become such a feature of the European battlefields since the early days of the 13th century.

Since the mercenary had taken to warfare for what he could get out of it—hence the term soldier, the man who fought for soldi, or pay—he was fined a certain proportion of his wage for lesser breaches of the disciplinary code, and forfeited his share in the next distribution of war booty. Another relatively minor punishment was known as the strappado, in which the delinquent was hung up by his thumbs so that he was poised with his toes just touching the ground.

"Trial of Long Pikes"

For more serious offenses, he underwent the "trial of the long pikes" which gave the rank and file equal jurisdiction with the officers in respect to crimes that brought disgrace on the unit as a whole. If he were found guilty, his comrades drew themselves up in two ranks, aligned with backs to north and south and facing inward. The ensigns, with the colors flying, posted themselves at the eastern end of the lane thus formed.

The culprit was then brought to the western end of the lane, and the provost marshal exhorted him to play the man and make for the colors. Then, clapping him thrice on the back in the name of the Trinity, he bade him "run the gantelope." Plunging into the lane, the doomed man was the target of every pike, sword, and halberd aimed at him as he sought to stagger on his way. The swifter he ran, the sooner came the end. As he lay gasping in the agony of death, his comrades knelt down and prayed God to rest his soul.

England's first attempt to found a standing, properly organized fighting force was the outcome of the civil war between the King and the Parliament of 1642-51. To oppose the Royalists, Thomas Fairfax and Oliver Cromwell recruited and organized the

Parliamentary "New Model" Army whose stern disciplinary code relied largely upon Puritan fanaticism for its strict observance. The vast majority of the men in the ranks had a cause in which they passionately believed, and for the sake of which they were prepared readily to subordinate themselves. Even so, provision had to be made to deal with occasional backsliders. For them, the disciplinary code knew no mercy.

Flogging

Flogging was a common form of punishment and was carried out by the newly devised "cat-o-nine-tails." One culprit who was sentenced to be lashed every three paces between the fleet prison and old palace yard, in Westminster, bore up under no less than 60,000 stripes and survived. Blasphemy was brutally punished by boring the tongue with a red-hot iron spike. This penalty remained in force until 1704.

Imprisonment in manacles, on a diet restricted to bread and water, was another form of imposing discipline. A modified form of "running the gantelope" was also employed in which the delinquent was "scourged" with musket slings and the soldiers' leather belts. Thus, the victim, although sorely bruised and battered, at least survived the ordeal.

One curious punishment peculiar to this era was known as "degradation to a common pioneer." In effect, the man whose conduct had proved consistently unsatisfactory was removed from his fighting unit and reassigned to the far less-esteemed corps of pioneers. Duties ranged from digging trenches and earthworks for the infantry and artillery to clearing up the camp litter and attending to camp sanitation. Not only was the pioneer on a lower scale of pay than that drawn by the rest of the army, but his general standing was far inferior. To be "degraded to a common pioneer" was to lose money and face.

Such desperate means of maintaining discipline were by no means peculiar to the "New Model" Army. They



The strappado, which was hanging a man by the thumbs, and the bastinado, in which a man was beaten on the soles of his feet with a stick, were considered relatively minor punishments

were in common use in Germany and particularly in France where the severity of the methods employed to maintain at least an outward show of impeccability by the Marquis de Martinet gave the dictionary a new word for strictness.

Not all Martinet's methods of enforcing discipline were indorsed by Louis XIV's War Minister, François de Louvois. He even permitted the private soldier to follow a trade in his spare time, so long as he reported punctually for parades and was in his barracks by 2000. Drunkenness was not reckoned a military crime, and

flogging was rarely awarded. But a variation of the strappado was fairly frequent. In this, the delinquent was hoisted to a beam by means of a rope fastened to his arms, which were roped behind his back, and then suddenly dropped down with a jerk. The great danger was dislocation of the shoulder joints, and it demanded an expert to administer the punishment without inflicting lasting injury.

Toward the end of the 17th century, the general adoption throughout Europe of standing regular forces permitted far more time to be devoted to the soldier's training and indoctrination. Opportunity was given to drive home to the individual soldier that the observance of a strict disciplinary code not only helps to insure victory over the enemy, but enormously enhances the fighting man's likelihood of survival. The better disciplined force not only stood a far greater chance of coming out on top, but could rely upon doing so at far less cost in death and injury.

Frederick the Great

The most brutalized methods of enforcing discipline were to be found in the forces organized by Frederick the Great of Prussia. Frederick had undergone so merciless an upbringing at the hands of his implacable father that at one moment he had sought to flee the country and find refuge in England. Betrayed by the indiscretion of an accomplice, he himself had been placed under arrest and forced to witness the execution of another of his friends who had been active in the plot to get him out of the country.

With so harsh a schooling, it was inevitable that his own hardened sensibilities should know nothing of the compassionate human understanding. To him, the men in the ranks were so many brutes to be cowed into submission and blind obedience to orders. It is, of course, impossible to confute his insistence on the fact that:

In war one thing only can be called the primary essential—discipline, iron, implacable, unremitting discipline. For discipline and only discipline can relieve the thinking mind from fear. Instead of having the energies consumed by the struggle with fear, discipline takes over the responsibility, and the energies are free for the task of beating the enemy.

"Gentleman Johnny"

A practical as well as humanly compassionate point of view was held by at least one contemporary—"Gentleman Johnny" Burgoyne—who had been given the warrant to raise the 16th Light Dragoons in 1759. In his Code of Instructions for his officers, it was quite clear that he had every intention of doing his utmost to cultivate discipline from within. It was his aim to substitute the point of honor for severity. He even urged that the men in the ranks should be treated as thinking beings. They were not to be sworn at, and an occasional joke when talking to them was strongly recommended.

The benefit from this thoroughly commendable system of maintaining discipline came with the 1762 campaign in Portugal. In his report to the British authorities, Burgoyne was at particular pains to record:

I am conscious that the chief merit of the success was due to the admirable but not uncommon valor and activity of the troops I had the honor to command.

This was the first tribute to the rank and file ever to appear in a public dispatch. It is not without sig-

nificance that, in his hour of defeat at Saratoga, his troops cheered him just as heartily as they would have done had the victory been his.

When it came to the organization of the continental forces in 1775, George Washington found it impossible to dispense entirely with the lash. The militia called out to defend

The fire ordeal on the wheel

the cause of independence were sturdy individualists to the last man, resentful of order and suspicious of military discipline since they had yet to learn the imperative need for it. As Washington himself wrote:

The militia are dismayed, intractable, and impatient to return home. Their want of discipline, and refusal of almost every kind of restraint or government, have produced an entire disregard of that order and subordination necessary to the well-being of an army.

During the bitter winter at Valley Forge, Baron Friedrich W. von Steuben labored not only to insure obedience and swift response to orders, but to insure that every man fully comprehended why such subordination, such suppression of the individual ego, was essential. It was a cardinal feature of his training method that both officers and noncommissioned officers should "support a proper authority, and at the same time do not ill treat the men through any pique or resentment."

Legitimate complaints were to be inquired into and, if substantiated, redressed, although no encouragement was to be given to "complaining on every frivolous occasion." And in the outcome "there was bestowed upon the ragged troops the greatest gift they could have received—the gift of discipline."

Literacy Essential

A certain degree of literacy is essential if the man in the ranks is to achieve that degree of mental maturity capable of recognizing that voluntary self-regulation is the best, the most respectworthy, and the most satisfying form of discipline attainable. But at the end of the 18th century, literacy was not particularly widespread among the class from which all countries recruited their rank and file.

The undisciplined hordes which had been conscripted to fight the earlier wars of the French Revolution had been kept in some type of order by fear of the guillotine which accompanied the *représentatives en mission*, attached by the civil government to every army in the field and invested with mandatory powers over them. But as Napoleon Bonaparte ruefully admitted later to his brother Joseph, "the Frenchman has never been obedient, and is still less so since the Revolution has excited him." It called for much hard work and not a little cajolery to imbue the Imperial guard with that pride in their achievements, and

in themselves which is one of the soundest progenitors of discipline.

The Duke of Wellington described his Peninsular Army as "the scum of the earth," adding as an afterthought, "but it is really wonderful that we should have made them the fine fellows they are." It was a tribute to a disciplinary system which blended strictness with a compassionate understanding of the frailty of human nature, and the strains and stresses to which active service inevitably exposes it.

The payoff came with the collapse of the Napoleonic forces in the early months of 1814. Throughout the 20-year conflict, the French civil population had been at constant loggerheads with the soldiery billeted in, or passing through, their towns and villages. Yet after the end of the war, large British columns marched for 200 or 300 miles through France to the northern ports without a single complaint to the French civic authorities of any misconduct. Self-discipline had begun to assert itself to increasingly good purpose.

Prussian Army Discipline

Early in his career, German General Gerhard von Scharnhorst had bluntly commented, "No soldiers have been so mercilessly flogged as those in the Prussian Army, and no Army has achieved less." With his rise to power, General Scharnhorst sedulously set about the modification of the old sadistic methods of enforcing discipline. In 1807, he abolished corporal punishment "as incompatible with the idea that a man was honored, and honored himself, by service in arms."

The growing sense of responsibility and self-respect in the men who formed the rank and file of the mid-19th-century forces ruled out the drastic means of enforcing discipline and penalizing its nonobservance. So far as the British fighting forces were concerned, from 1859 onward, only the more heinous of military crimes were punished with the lash. Its total abolition, under the terms of the Army Discipline Act, followed in 1881—just 10 years after it had been done away with in the US Army.

Drastic punishment, however, could not be dispensed with entirely. With numerous but largely extemporized forces, brought suddenly under a disciplinary code to which all were unaccustomed and instinctively resented, there was bound to be an unruly minority whose misconduct called for summary correction.

"Kangaroo Court"

In the British forces, the individual whose misbehavior in barracks or bivouac rendered him a nuisance to his comrades was summarily dealt with by a "kangaroo court" made up of the senior members of his troop or company. Unofficial as they might be, they were tribunals whose dictates were not to be disregarded lightly, and their influence in maintaining a high standard of discipline would be difficult to overestimate.

It was the man in the ranks himself who had come to appreciate that a high standard of personal conduct was not only essential in action against an enemy, but of overwhelming importance in time of peace if the close, communal life in barracks was to be rendered tolerable. It is such self-imposed discipline from within which engenders the priceless asset of esprit de corps which is a readiness to serve, to pull together as one man—the dynamic of all worthwhile human effort.

In the ordinary course of life, a man

has earned his right to self-respect when he prefers to discipline himself rather than suffer the indignity of being disciplined by someone else. Under the stress and strain of combat, discipline enables a man subconsciously to do right when his faculties are too numbed for him to be capable of conscious thought.

Discipline is the generating spark of morale. Morale is a state of mind, an intangible force that will move an entire group of men to give their last ounce to achieve something without counting the cost to themselves. For the serviceman, discipline is the veritable root of the matter—both in peace and war—the solid foundation upon which all the other soldierly attributes can confidently be erected.

The government asks, and has a right to ask, for obedience, because without it there would be only confusion and anarchy. Although ours is a free society where freedom of speech and other personal liberties are jealously guarded, the soldier must sacrifice—and properly so—a portion of his personal liberties so that they may be preserved for all others, including those who mock him and criticize what he is doing. The soldier, from the earliest period of our history to the present day, has seen and heard expressions of dissent about him, and though he may resent them, he knows that it is just for dissenters to express their views, and is willing to fight for their freedom to speak out.

General Creighton W. Abrams



DIVISION G3 PLANS AND OPERATIONS

Lieutenant Colonel John R. Galvin, *United States Army*
and
Major George R. Stotser, *United States Army*

OF ALL the many aspects of the fighting in Vietnam, perhaps the most significant for the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) is the comparative isolation of the unit itself —many miles from the next higher headquarters, and involved in a complicated, many-sided operation.

The division normally is spread over a wide area, with a mission that is actually a composite of several different tasks. These include everything from population and resources control to destruction of main force enemy units. Between these two extremes lie at least half a dozen other important missions. One order normally serves the division for the course of an operation that might continue for months; the original order will be modified by a series of fragmentary orders, sometimes running to three or four per day. These fragmentary orders indicate

the changes of emphasis as the division juggles its several missions and tries to come up with the best balance to fit the enemy situation and the forces available.

Shifting Emphasis

The day-to-day adjustments are the result of a running estimate which is complicated by several variables. These include weather and terrain, the civil-political situation, operations of adjacent units, the requirements of base camp security and the security of fire bases and other installations, the need to maintain peak proficiency in airmobile operations, and the necessity to coordinate with friendly forces in the area.

In the course of a few weeks of operation, the division can expect to work with other Free World forces, US units of all sizes, Vietnamese Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force units, as well as the civil and paramilitary organizations.

As a result of this constant shifting of emphasis, normal airmobile operations and planning become only the jumping off point for the activities of the G3. Only a small portion of the day-to-day requirements can be considered as routine. By far the larger number of incoming problems encompass both operations and planning. With G3 supervision, these are attacked jointly by the G3 operations and G3 plans, producing solutions from short fragmentary orders to far-reaching operations plans.

"Battle Arena" Concept

This can best be illustrated by examples of the way that new ideas are generated or old ones uncovered to meet various situations. The "battle arena" concept is one of these ideas.

In operations within both the heavily populated coastal lowlands and the very lightly populated mountain and jungle areas, the 1st Cavalry Division has learned a great deal about the local and North Vietnamese enemy. The enemy does not stay in the jungle and mountains unless he is forced there; he normally lives in the hamlets where food and shelter are readily available and where he can control the population.

This last point is by far the most important one for him. Without a firm control over large segments of the population, the enemy cannot hope to control the country and win his objectives. This is the same area in which the 1st Cavalry Division operates to gain support of the population. Therefore, most of the recent encounters with enemy regular units have been in or near the populated areas.

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The knowledge that the enemy will not stay away from the populated areas that, until recently, he has been able to control, allows us to predict with increasing accuracy what he will do next.

Enemy offensive action has always been characterized by a careful and detailed preparation of the battlefield to enhance his attack and facilitate his withdrawal. In the battle arena concept, the 1st Cavalry Division also prepares the battlefield since it can predict the places, if not the times, of enemy activity. This battlefield preparation involves:

- Categorizing all available landing zones.
- Selecting and preparing fire bases to support maneuver within and adjacent to the division operational area.
- Clearing "barrier zones" by denying to the enemy the outlying valleys and open areas through which his units must pass to enter populated areas.
- Searching out and destroying enemy fortifications.
- Maintaining day-and-night surveillance over the trail network.
- Producing pinpoint, low-level aerial photographs of every hamlet and important terrain feature.
- Planning and preparation for rapid shifting of logistic bases and airstrips to support the schemes of maneuver.
- Selecting additional signal sites to maintain reliable communications in a rapidly shifting situation.

In the battle arena concept, the division makes maximum use of its airmobile flexibility. Platoon-size units

US Army

The 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), arriving in Vietnam in August 1965, added the airmobile operation to the other unique aspects of the Vietnam war

find the enemy and are immediately reinforced by the rest of the troop, company, or battalion. The division quick-reaction force, normally the least committed battalion, is alerted for air assault into the area, and a brigade is tagged as standby to go in as control headquarters if the fight grows beyond reinforced battalion size. This concept orients on the enemy and does not waste the efforts of battalions on profitless sweeps through the area of suspected enemy locations.

Population Control

While the extensive searches and accelerated air assaults are in progress against the main enemy force, the division operates against the Viet Cong infrastructure within the populated areas. Areas presently under control of Vietnamese civil government or supported by revolutionary development teams are used as bases for spreading out in the "inkspot" method, while outlying hamlets are cordoned off and searched on a recurring but unpredictable schedule.

In coordination with local authorities, units screen military-age persons, shifting from place to place to prevent Viet Cong cadres from reestablishing control. Every infrastructure member captured in this process represents the loss of years of training and effort of the local area Viet Cong.

The battle arena concept confronts the division G3 with planning and operational requirements that were hardly anticipated when the division was formed.

The tactical operations center (TOC) is supervised by the G3 operations officer and is the clearing house for all traffic involving daily operations. The division TOC for the 1st Cavalry Division is housed in two *CH-54A Flying Crane* pods which can be lifted in minutes, complete with maps, desks, and communications equipment. Its crew includes representatives for fire support, G2, G3 air, the air liaison officer, the aviation officer, and signal and engineer representatives.

Focal Point

The division TOC is the focal point of the division, the one place where the current situation is monitored on a 24-hour basis. The shift duty officers and noncommissioned officers receive all incoming reports and requests from the subordinate units and next higher headquarters. They post the intelligence map, situation maps, and fire support maps. In addition, a dozen or so status charts are posted and kept current in anticipation of the many daily command and staff visits.

Although the command group makes all the major decisions, many minor operational decisions fall to the operations officer. He must make sure that his decisions are based on an intimate understanding of established policies and a comprehensive knowledge of past, present, and future operations and plans. Speed is essential.

In the plans section, the atmosphere is slower paced. The nature of longer range problems normally calls for an estimate involving some study of the situation and possible courses of action. But while the main difference between the two shops is the amount of time required for discussion, decision, and implementation, there is a large area in which both offices are concerned with the solution of the same problems.

Map acetate overlays of the division TOC and of G3 plans are interchangeable, a seemingly minor point. All

maps in both offices are portable so that combined plans and operations briefings can be presented anywhere. Planning acetates can be moved over to the operations maps to correlate future operations with the present friendly and enemy situation; operations acetates are "lifted" by the plans office twice daily in order to maintain a current operational picture to assist planning.

Much of the daily work is completed through a cooperative effort of the noncommissioned officers in both operations and plans, pooling assistance to meet exigencies as they occur in either office. Officer assistants often are moved between the two offices to follow the workload.

There are other areas in which plans and operations work jointly: in reconnaissance, coordination visits, briefings, war gaming, and preparation of staff papers. However, the most important joint effort is the constant reevaluation of the situation and analysis of the courses of action open to the division—the current estimate.

Army News Features

The battle arena concept utilizes airmobile flexibility for rapid reinforcement of reconnaissance elements

Operations and plans keep a running check on the decisions that need to be made both immediate and long-range. Estimates, including recommendations, encompassing these decisions are sometimes made at the regular morning or evening briefings. But most of these estimates are presented in separate short meetings in which the operations officer and plans officer present the details first to

the G3, then to the chief of staff and assistant division commander, then to the commanding general. The results of these jointly presented decisions are then published as fragmentary orders, messages, division field instructions, or verbal orders.

The planning sequence, for the most part, follows customary procedures. The commanding general's guidance normally is given at a meeting of the principal staff members. It is at these meetings that new missions and tasks for the division are formulated. These normally include messages that have come in from higher headquarters during the day, and missions derived from the current situation. Key staff members present their oral estimates, and the commanding general gives his guidance and approval to go ahead.

Following the meeting, the G3 adds his own guidance, and the plans officer drafts a mission statement and the "maneuver" section of the concept of operations. He clears these informally with the G3 operations officer, the G2, the fire support coordination commander, and others who need to see the preliminary draft as early as possible. The mission and concept are shown to the chief of staff and the assistant division commander, and revised as necessary in accordance with their comments.

At a meeting of the plans officers of the G2, G4, G5, aviation group, engineer, signal, fire support coordinator, provost marshal, G3 air, commanding officer, cavalry squadron, and the support command S3, the G2 plans discusses the enemy situation in some detail. The G3 plans presents the division mission and the general concept of the operation.

The planners at this gathering have an opportunity to coordinate before the plan is put on paper, and to discuss with the G3 operations officer the effect of the new plan on current dispositions and activities within their areas of interest. Before the meeting closes, the G3 plans officer sets a suspense for input to the plan.

The plans officer roughs out the body of the plan. While he pieces together the main paragraphs, the planners from other sections begin sending in their contributions, including applicable annexes, recommendations on details of the task organization, missions that they wish to have assigned to divisional subordinate units, administrative details, and contributions to the coordinating instructions. Work usually continues around the clock until the main plan is completed and all annexes are in.

The plan now gets a detailed examination. The G3 operations and plans officers discuss the facets of every task set forth in the plan and the effect on other current and future operations—providing, of course, that there is time. Often, the situation moves so quickly that plans become fragmentary orders and are implemented immediately.

Since there are usually several operations in various stages of planning or execution, the process repeats itself constantly. The one constant in the endless variety of orders, plans, fragmentary orders, estimates, directives, and messages is the integrated effort of G3 operations and G3 plans.



Observations of a Brigade Commander

Colonel Sidney B. Berry, Jr., *United States Army*

Part II

This is the second of a three-part article by the author who commanded the 1st Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division in Vietnam from June 1966 to February 1967. Part I appeared in January 1968.—Editor.

MOST Vietnamese roads must be cleared of mines, roadblocks, and enemy forces before convoys use them. All convoys must be secured against mining and harassing attacks by guerrillas and major ambush by main force units.

There are five phases to a road clearing and securing operation. These are to:

- Position the troops.
- Clear the road of mines, boobytraps, and roadblocks.

- Secure the route against ambush.
- Run the convoy.
- Roll up the forces.

Positioning troops along the route involves establishing fire support bases, command posts, and defensive positions which facilitate clearing and route security operations. Units are assigned sectors of the road to clear and to secure areas of operation. Troops are placed along the road. A reserve is held ready for quick commitment. Additional units are placed in areas of operation on one or both flanks of the route to guard against ambush.

Clearing Roads

Infantry, armor, and engineers are organized into road clearing teams which methodically clear the roads, shoulders, ditches, and adjacent areas of mines, boobytraps, command electrical wires, and roadblocks.

Some of the armor and infantry provide security, while other armor and infantry work with the engineers in locating and destroying mines, boobytraps, and other explosive devices. Engineers and infantrymen manning minesweepers and probing with bayonets clear the road, shoulders, and ditches. Increasingly, Viet Cong use plastic, nonmetallic mines which are virtually impossible to detect with minesweepers.

Minesweeping teams are followed by a pair of bulldozers pulling engineer rooters that plow 18-inch trenches on either side of the road, breaking or exposing most electrical wires leading to command detonated mines set in the road or along the shoulders. Tanks precede the bulldozers and rooters to set off pressure detonated mines that can seriously damage the bulldozers.

All members of the clearing team check visually for mines, boobytraps, wires, and evidence of enemy activity. They must inspect the trees along the road since the enemy places claymores and mortar and artillery rounds in trees and electrically detonates them.

When a mine or explosive device is discovered, the team destroys it with explosives. They do not attempt to disarm or remove explosive devices. An individual should never pull on a string or wire and attempt to follow it to its source, for it is inevitably boobytrapped. Instead, an armored personnel carrier or a tank rips out the wire or string, setting off attached boobytraps.

Roadblocks

Roadblocks are usually boobytrapped or they conceal mines. Tanks effectively remove brush roadblocks by firing canister rounds against them. Grappling hooks at the end of long ropes remove the debris. Bulldozers or tankdozers push earthen or laterite roadblocks aside.

Working behind the rooters and minesweeper teams, dump trucks filled with laterite or gravel fill holes in the road, while graders and bulldozers improve the surface and drainage of the road. Other engineer teams re-

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place culverts, repair bridges and stream crossings, and push vegetation back from the edge of the road.

Meanwhile, infantry and armor forces patrol on either flank of the road out to distances of at least several hundred yards, seeking signs of enemy ambush preparations.

With the exception of the rooting process, which can be done a single time along the entire route on both sides, the road clearing process is repeated each morning before the passage of the convoy. The Viet Cong is quite skilled at placing additional mines during the night or arming those already in position.

Security Against Ambush

At night, while most troops withdraw into defensive perimeters, many ambushes are set along the road and the approaches to the road. Scout dogs are useful in detecting would-be mine layers. The enemy is discouraged from mining the road by placing artillery fires with variable time fuzes over the road and ditches and by periodic overflight of armed helicopters equipped with searchlights and other night devices. A major disadvantage of placing artillery fire over the road is the additional metal put on and in the road which reduces the effectiveness of minesweepers in locating enemy mines. But none of these measures eliminates the need to clear the road methodically early each morning.

Security against ambush and attack is provided mainly by infantry and armor patrols. They patrol far to either flank of the route to intercept enemy forces before they get into a position from which they can launch an ambush. Airborne artillery observers, forward air controllers, armed helicopters, and staff officers on reconnaissance increase security by flying systematic reconnaissance and surveillance missions on either flank of the route and by employing destructive artillery fires and airstrikes on potential enemy locations and installations.

Pushing the vegetation back from the road's edge has long-term benefits. Clearing a strip 50 or 100 yards wide on either side of the road increases difficulty in mining the road, reduces the threat of ambush, and facilitates aerial observation and airmobile operations along the road. Romeplows, which are designed for the job, are the most efficient jungle clearing machines. Bulldozers are next best. Tanks and armored personnel carriers can crush vegetation and drag logs away. Infantrymen and engineers equipped with chain saws and explosives cut and blow down trees. Anything that exposes the enemy activities to daylight is a step forward and assists future operations along the road.

Because there is always too little equipment and too few troops to do all of the jobs desired, the brigade commander must establish a work priority and see that the troops adhere to it. This is particularly true for Romeplows, bulldozers, and chain saws.

Convoy Operations

The convoy moves under its own commander whose command relationship to the commander of the clearing and security forces is clearly defined. There must be one area commander, and that should be the commander of the clearing and security forces. The actions of the convoy when it comes under attack are clearly defined. Commanders, both of the convoy and route security forces, must keep close liaison and coordination with Vietnamese forces and installations along the

route in order to gain their assistance and to avoid accidental clashes between friendly forces.

Standing operating procedures govern convoy operations. The convoy commander controls from a helicopter flying over the column. Forward air controllers and airborne artillery observers constantly fly over the column. Armed fixed-wing aircraft fly column cover and armed helicopters are on call for immediate commitment. Some armor accompanies the convoy under command of the convoy commander. Engineer bulldozers and loaded dump trucks are on call along the route to repair holes in the road caused by mines.

Each vehicle in the convoy has a soldier riding shotgun. Drivers and guards wear steel helmets and armor vests. Members of the convoy are instructed to return fire only if under direct attack from a definitely identified source. Otherwise, they rely on protection by the security forces which are located on either side of the road, usually beyond the observation of those in the convoy. The convoy commander maintains his own command radio net and monitors the brigade command net.

The bulk of the infantry, armor, and engineer forces is used with the security forces. Their mission is to secure the uninterrupted passage of the convoy and to engage and destroy any enemy force that attacks the convoy.

The brigade commander spends most of his time hopping from one security position to another until the road is cleared and secured for the passage of the convoy. He then flies over the convoy and tries to anticipate the time and place of possible attack. His principal radio contacts are with commanders of the security forces and the convoy commander.

Whenever a mine is detonated underneath a vehicle or the convoy receives any fire, the brigade commander assumes that an attack is beginning on the convoy and reacts accordingly. He is prepared to employ supporting

Army News Features

Most Vietnamese roads must be cleared of mines, roadblocks, and enemy forces before convoys use them

fires immediately and to commit ready battalions into designated landing zones. Once the convoy actually comes under attack, the brigade commander's main mission is to destroy the enemy and minimize damage to the convoy. The convoy commander's job is to get the convoy out of the danger zone and to move it to its destination.

It is essential to establish communication and close coordination with Vietnamese and allied forces and installations located along the convoy's route. This is to preclude firing on

friendly units during the confusion attendant to an enemy attack on the convoy.

Withdrawing the route clearing and security forces after completion of a convoy is similar to extraction of forces from a pickup zone. There must be no letdown in alertness as combat forces on the ground are rapidly being depleted. Supporting fires must be instantly available at all times. Commanders observe and supervise the operation until their last troops have safely returned to their destination.

Hamlet Operations

Surprise is the key to success in hamlet seal-and-search operations. Capture of Viet Cong personnel, particularly members of the hamlet infrastructure, is a major aim. Given the slightest warning, the quarry quickly disappears. Thoroughness and attention to detail in planning and swiftness and split-second timing in execution must characterize this operation. This entails throwing a cordon of troops around a hamlet to seal off exit and control entry, and a thorough hamlet search and check of the inhabitants' identity and status.

Seal-and-search forces are organized into three elements:

- The seal force which puts the cordon around the hamlet.
- The airmobile force that, simultaneously with the seal, conducts aerial reconnaissance and eagle flights in a radius of one or two miles around the hamlet, capturing persons fleeing the seal area.
- The search force that searches the hamlet and checks the inhabitants.

The brigade commander, who is the over-all commander, usually retains direct command of the seal force which may consist of several battalions. He designates separate commanders for the airmobile and hamlet search forces.

Timing of the seal operation depends on the habits of the local Viet Cong. If intelligence reports indicate that the Viet Cong enter the hamlet in late afternoon and leave about midnight, the seal can be put in place just before dark. If the Viet Cong enter hamlets after dark and leave before daylight, a night seal is in order.

Psychological Aspects

The psychological aspects of the seal and search are particularly important and must be considered carefully. Depending on the purpose of the operation, the nature of the hamlet population, and the Vietnamese Government's future plans for the hamlet, the commander must establish the prevailing attitude that characterizes the operation.

If this is a hamlet whose people have a history of friendliness or neutrality toward the government, or which the government expects soon to include in a secure area, the attitude will, undoubtedly, be one of warmness and friendship. If the hamlet is one whose people have a history of supporting the Viet Cong, of mining and attacking convoys, and which will not soon be brought under government control, the attitude might be one of formal correctness, aloofness, and firmness to include a display of overwhelming force.

The commander must decide if there is to be a hamlet festival. Of what will it consist? What will be the propaganda theme of tapes, broadcasts, leaflets, posters, and speeches? How will suspects and prisoners be handled? What followup will there be to the operation?

The seal force may consist of one

or several battalions, but usually more than one. United States and Vietnamese battalions may operate together. During a daylight seal, simultaneous landing of seal forces by helicopter is the fastest method. Night placement of seal forces is usually by foot. Armor which arrives immediately after the infantry is helpful in establishing a cordon. Sometimes it is appropriate for armor to participate in the initial seal. The aim is to seal the circumference of the hamlet suddenly, completely, and unexpectedly.

Department of Defense

Armor and infantry forces patrol the flanks of roads

The seal force remains outside the hamlet, denies exit to the inhabitants, protects itself and the search force against enemy attack, and establishes a defensive perimeter that faces both inward and outward.

Coincident with the establishment of the seal around the hamlet, airborne loudspeakers are used to inform the people in the hamlet and the surrounding fields about the action and to tell them what they are to do. Those working in the fields are directed to return to the hamlet. Those in the hamlet are directed to assemble in a designated place.

Also coincident with the establishment of the hamlet seal, the airmobile force with its armed helicopters and aerial rifle squads reconnoiters the area surrounding the hamlet, lands forces to detain those whose actions are hostile or suspicious, encourages people to return to the hamlet, and returns fire when fired upon. Exploiting the initial surprise of the operation

and the enemy's hasty reaction, this force often accounts for a disproportionate share of enemy captives and casualties.

The airmobile force must strictly be controlled and cautioned not to harass or harm innocent persons. This force should fire only when fired upon



Surprise is the key to success in hamlet seal-and-search operations

and then on definite targets. Peasants and water buffalo naturally tend to run when helicopters wheel overhead. Running, in itself, does not give license to shoot. The guide for these forces should be that it is better to let suspected Viet Cong escape than to harm innocent people. The airmobile force is most effective when terrain permits the landing of soldiers to check out people on the ground.

The Vietnamese are better qualified than Americans to search a hamlet, and it is usually more appropriate for them to deal with the people. The search force should consist primarily of Vietnamese assisted by Americans. There must be an American coordinator through whom the brigade commander can direct the search.

Search Force Composition

The search force should include representatives of the province and district chiefs, national policemen, intelligence personnel, and members of the Vietnamese armed forces. US dog teams and minesweepers assist with the search; US doctors and dentists assist with the people. The entire operation should be conducted under the aegis of the government of Vietnam and be calculated to improve the government's image of strength and effectiveness.

Seal-and-search operations prove most successful when forces remain in position for several days. The search force remains in the hamlet, and the seal force conducts area domination operations in the surrounding areas. People begin to give information to the search force, and Viet Cong hiding in the hamlet have to come out for food and water.

This type of operation can profitably be coupled with other operations. A *B-52* strike can be placed in a nearby jungle base camp to drive Viet Cong into the hamlets. Road clearing and securing operations can begin with seal and search of hamlets along the road. Or a seal-and-search operation can begin the government's systematic effort to bring the hamlet under its control and to introduce revolutionary development cadres into the hamlet. The combinations are unlimited.

Another type of operation is called "area domination." This is useful to describe a military operation intended

to dominate and disrupt enemy activities in an area for a longer time than a search-and-destroy operation and for a shorter time than a clear and hold operation. It can do serious damage to the enemy and provide the government a shield behind which to move into and gain control of an area.

The purpose of an area domination operation is to damage or destroy the enemy economic and political infrastructure. This is accomplished by placing several battalions in an area critical to the Viet Cong and disrupting the enemy's use of communication routes, base camps, and recruiting and logistics bases. Assigned tactical areas of operations, the battalions establish patrol bases and conduct extensive ambushing, patrolling, eagle flights, and seals and searches of hamlets.

Aerial Observation

Intensive aerial observation and surveillance is kept over the area, and known or suspected enemy base camps are hit with airstrikes and artillery fire, followed up with infantry combat reconnaissance. Units do everything within their capability to force the enemy to move, to attack and disrupt his usual activities, and to capture his people.

While the daily results of an area domination operation rarely capture headlines, its cumulative damage to the enemy, particularly to the infrastructure and local guerrilla units, often exceeds that of pitched battles and has more lasting effects.

The decentralized nature of the area domination operation affords small-unit commanders much freedom to exercise initiative and imagination. This is an excellent training ground for leaders, units, and soldiers. When the threat of main force battalions is eliminated, US units will, undoubtedly, turn more and more to area domination operations as preliminary steps to introduction of permanent government control into areas.

Luring the Enemy

We kill more of the enemy in a shorter time and at less cost to ourselves when we lure them from the relative safety of their base camps to attack one of our units which is prepared to defend itself. This is more successful than when we search out and attack the enemy on his own ground, particularly in his jungle base camps. It is a logical tactic, therefore, to establish defensive positions and run convoys expressly designed to draw the enemy into attacking us on our terms.

While every defensive position and fire support base must always expect to be attacked and be prepared for it, units may be placed in defensive positions selected for the express purpose of attracting the enemy into moving out of his protected base camps and attacking. He thus exposes himself to destruction by supporting firepower and from the commitment of additional maneuver battalions which block his withdrawal and attack him from the rear.

To exploit fully the opportunities offered by the enemy's attack, fire support elements, designated maneuver battalions together with their transportation—usually helicopters—and commanders and staffs must be ready to react immediately in accordance with sound plans. The commander who uses a unit as a lure is obligated to create such a situation of strength, both in the defensive position itself and in the supporting firepower and

exploitation forces, that he is confident that he is not exposing the lure to unacceptable damage.

The key to attracting an attack on a convoy and exploiting it successfully is through planning, extensive reconnaissance, detailed war gaming, rapid decision making, quick employment of supporting firepower, and commitment of maneuver units.

Combined Vietnamese-United States operations offer benefits to both parties

The enemy must be made aware that a convoy is to be run. This must be done subtly. Normal advance notification to civil authorities that a thin-skinned vehicular convoy will be run at a specific time and place usually suffices to inform the Viet Cong. At the appointed time, an armor column prepared to fight replaces the announced convoy. No clearing and securing force precedes the armor force.

Key elements of planning are fire support plans and location of landing zones. Before the convoy commences its move, fire support bases are established and maneuver battalions are positioned at loading zones beside the helicopters that will lift them into action.

Maneuver units are assigned one of three roles. They are committed as:

- Road assault forces.
- Battlefield relief forces.
- Blocking forces.

The road assault force is the armor unit that moves along the road to attract the enemy's attack. It is an exceptionally deadly lure. The first infantry battalion committed after the ambush is sprung is the battlefield relief force. Landing by airmobile assault near the embattled road assault

force, the battlefield relief force's mission is to relieve pressure on the armor unit by attacking the enemy in his flank and destroying him. Additional infantry battalions are committed as blocking forces behind the enemy to block his withdrawal and assist in his destruction.

The road assault force itself should consist entirely of armored vehicles. Necessary trains and wheeled vehicles, protected by armor, follow at a safe distance. The road assault force commander flies overhead in a command and control helicopter. Also overhead are armed helicopters, airborne artillery observers, forward air controllers, fixed-wing aircraft providing column cover, and the brigade commander with his airborne command group.

Fire Support Coordination

Airstrikes and artillery fires precede the road assault force's movement, striking areas immediately adjacent to the road and as deep as 400 or 500 yards from the road. While the initial ambush force may be located in ditches and vegetation beside the road, reinforcements and supporting weapons are often located several hundred yards away. The assumption based on the enemy's past actions is that, once he has deployed his forces to conduct an ambush, he will carry on with the attack even though we bring him under fire.

Fire support coordination must be simple and easy. The road itself offers the simplest fire coordination line. The air support can strike one side of the road while the artillery fires on the other. Zones parallel to the road can be designated so that aircraft can strike in the zones immediately adjacent to the road, and artillery can fire into zones once removed from the road, or vice versa. Locating fire support bases on or near the road permits the artillery to shift its fire to either side with least interference with airstrikes.

Direction of Attack

Once the enemy attack begins, determination of the direction from which it comes is essential to the brigade commander's reaction. The enemy habitually withdraws in the same direction from which he launches his main attack, moving back upon his supporting weapons, reserve units, and his line of communications. The direction from which the main attack comes determines on which side of the road the brigade commander commits his blocking forces.

The beginning of the enemy's attack is the beginning of the brigade's opportunity to destroy him. Immediately, the road assault force commander directs his armored vehicles to close up into a tight formation which masses their firepower, and he directs massive supporting fires on the attacking enemy. The brigade commander directs supporting fires on deeper targets and areas and assesses the situation to determine where he can land the battlefield relief force and the blocking forces. Speed of execution is essential to encircle and destroy the enemy.

The road assault force commander handles the immediate fight. The brigade commander handles the expansion of the battle.

The battlefield relief force lands by airmobile assault as near as feasible to the road assault force, places one flank on the road, and attacks into the enemy's flank. The relief force thereby seeks to roll up the enemy's line, destroy him, and relieve pressure on the

road assault force. The danger is that the enemy is defending the landing zone. Therefore, the battlefield relief force commander must place heavy preparatory fires on and around his landing zone, or the road assault force commander, if able, may dispatch forces to secure the landing zone.

To assure unity of command in the fight along the road, the battlefield relief force comes under command of the road assault force commander, once the landing has been made and the relief force is ready to begin its attack. With one flank along the road to facilitate coordination with the road assault force, the relief force's attack should extend 300 to 500 yards off the road in order to sweep up all elements of the ambush force.

Landing Blocking Forces

Following the landing of the battlefield relief force, the blocking forces must be landed quickly far enough behind the ambush force to assure getting between the enemy and the area to which he plans to withdraw. Each blocking battalion makes an airmobile assault preceded by preparatory fires. Once in their landing zones, battalions move to designated blocking positions or establish patrol bases from which they send patrols to intercept the enemy's withdrawal.

When successful in attracting an enemy attack, this type of operation pays great dividends. Many of its techniques can be incorporated into regular convoy operations.

Other types of operations include combined Vietnamese-United States operations which offer benefits to both parties. US units gain new sources of information, insights into Vietnamese problems, assistance in those phases of operations better accomplished by Vietnamese than Americans, and help from native soldiers who know the ground. Vietnamese gain additional firepower and logistic support, added confidence, and opportunities to undertake operations they cannot handle alone.

Combined operations are best initiated and planned at the lowest level —between the US brigade commander and Vietnamese regimental commander, for instance—and then approval is sought from higher levels.

The US advisor plays a key role in combined operations and must always be consulted about the capabilities of the unit and commander he advises. But there is no substitute for cordial relations between commanders. Command relations must be clearly defined from the beginning to avoid misunderstandings.

It is frequently useful to colocate the United States and Vietnamese command posts and to combine planning, briefings, fire direction and coordination, and to exercise control from a combined tactical operations center. Central control and coordination of supporting fire is essential.

Eagle Flights

Eagle flights are another operation involving airmobile employment of small infantry units, usually squads or platoons, on a mission of quick reaction or short duration. They are useful for combat reconnaissance, special missions, and against small targets of opportunity. Eagle flights can be used against Viet Cong tax collection points, to pick up suspicious persons fleeing an operational area, to block small-stream lines during an operation, and to rescue crews or bodies from downed aircraft.

Commanders find it useful to des-

ignate eagle flight forces during each operation or routinely at base camps for quick exploitation of fleeting targets of opportunity.

Eagle flights normally operate within range of supporting weapons.

The commander who commits long-range reconnaissance patrols must assure them of constant, reliable communications; helicopters available to extract them at a moment's notice; and willingness and readiness to under-

Department of Defense

Destruction of base camps requires time, manpower, and explosives

Reserve forces must be ready to go to their assistance. They depend primarily on quickness and surprise to achieve their goals.

A useful capability is provided the brigade when the reconnaissance platoon of each infantry battalion trains two or three long-range reconnaissance patrols. Each patrol should consist of five or six motivated, well-trained infantrymen—a single helicopter load—capable of reconnoitering deep within enemy territory for several days without resupply. These patrols provide the brigade commander with the means of locating targets for future operations.

take a full operation to get them out of trouble, should it become necessary.

Finding base camps, often taking casualties in doing so, and then leaving them largely intact for future enemy use is a major source of frustration for soldiers. However, few units have either the time or means to destroy even a small percentage of the Viet Cong base camps they find.

Destruction of base camps requires time, manpower, equipment, and large amounts of explosives. When time permits, the job can best be done by Rome-plows, bulldozers, chain saws, shaped charges, and hundreds of pounds of TNT and plastic explosive.

When time does not permit methodical, complete destruction, the base camp should be marked for easy aerial observation by felling trees or by tanks crushing a trace around the camp. Then the base camp should be systematically opened up to observation and destroyed by a program of aerial defoliation, airstrikes with napalm and heavy bombs, and by destructive artillery fires, using heavy artillery with delay fuze.

A destruction program of this nature over a period of time will systematically reduce the jungle area available as a refuge for the enemy and inhibit his mobility which depends, to a large degree, upon the existence of a chain of base camps.

Discovery of large stores of rice in enemy base camps presents commanders with a major problem either of evacuation or destruction. Occasionally, units find rice stores of 1,000 to 1,500 tons stored in 100 and 200-pound bags or lying loose in huge storage bins. Usually, these rice caches are located in remote jungle areas where roads and trails are impassable and landing zones are nonexistent. Units usually discover these rice caches when engaged in jungle search-and-destroy operations against main force battalions when the emphasis is on finding and destroying enemy units rather than material.

US policy is to evacuate rice and to use it for the benefit of the Vietnamese people which is a sound and logical policy. Evacuation of rice usually requires security forces, cutting of a helicopter landing zone in the jungle, landing of jeeps and trailers or ¾-ton trucks to haul rice to the landing zone, manpower to handle the rice, and cargo helicopters to fly it out.

Often, it is not feasible to extract the rice. This can result from the tactical situation, limitations of time and manpower, or, frequently, from nonavailability of *CH-47 Chinook* helicopters. At such times, commanders are faced with either leaving the rice for the enemy's use or destroying the rice. When extraction is infeasible, the commander usually decides to destroy the rice, but that is easier said than done.

There are two relatively effective methods of destroying rice. One is to spread it over the ground, spray it with unignited flamethrower fuel, let the fuel soak in for about five minutes, and then spray the rice with an ignited flamethrower. This can set a fire which will smolder for hours and ultimately destroy much of the rice. An even more effective method is that of burying in the rice a 55-gallon drum of CS crystals and then detonating a 40-pound shaped charge over the drum. The explosion spreads the rice over a large area and contaminates it with CS crystals which are persistent enough to discourage the Viet Cong from using the rice until the natural elements have had a chance to destroy it.

The simplest method is that of spreading rice on the ground not more than six to 12 inches deep and hoping for rain. Even this takes time and men. Soldiers must spread bags, slit them open with bayonets or machetes, and spread the rice thinly on the ground. The rest then depends upon the natural elements.

Note: The quotation by Major General George P. Seneff which followed Part I of Colonel Berry's article, page 21 of the January issue, should have been entitled AVIATION BRIGADE to distinguish it from the Infantry Brigade of Colonel Berry's discussion.

An MR Digest
From *The Reporter*

The NLF's New Program

Denis Warner

HOW to harness Mao Tse-tung's thoughts to Aleksei N. Kosygin's military hardware and, at the same time, maintain satisfactory relations with both Peking and Moscow is a perennial dilemma for Hanoi. Criticized by Peking for its tactical heresies and its deviations from the infallible blueprint for revolutionary warfare laid down by Mao in the 1930's, Hanoi has become increasingly dependent on sophisticated Soviet weapons which were designed for a different sort of war but without which its main force efforts would collapse and its guerrillas wither away.

However temporarily, the balance has now been restored. Peking has accepted Hanoi's battle plan which leans heavily on equipment that only the Soviet Union can supply. In turn, Hanoi appears to have agreed to the hard-line Chinese attitude toward negotiations and to a new program for the National Liberation Front (NLF) based on Mao's experiences in the war against the Japanese. This is said to have been drawn up by the Central Committee of the NLF at an "extraordinary" meeting in mid-August, presumably at its headquarters in Tay Ninh Province west of Saigon.

The real issue for the Communists is whether to try to win victory by continued war and a major attempt to isolate the United States in Vietnam, or to seek peace by negotiations. Peking insists on the former; Moscow prefers the latter. For better or worse, Hanoi has accepted Peking's edict.

For many reasons, therefore, the

NLF's new program is of immense significance. It is the first public declaration of intent since it brought out its initial 10-point plan of action in 1961. It reverses the strong tendency toward what Mao, under the existing circumstances in South Vietnam, has called "left opportunism"—namely, the heavy emphasis on firm ideological control which crept in when the People's Revolutionary (Communist) Party, a component part of the NLF, gained ascendancy and led the NLF to abandon more subtle attempts to win popular support. The main task now, according to the program, is to unite the entire Vietnamese people.

Internal Difficulties

This new emphasis on persuasion reflects, in part, the NLF's anticipation of the recent elections and the creation of a constitutional government in Saigon. More significantly, it reflects the internal difficulties the NLF has encountered in recent months because of the insatiable demands of the war and Hanoi's new willingness, perhaps out of desperation, to adhere more closely to the judgments of Mao.

It is no coincidence that the publication of the program at the end of August was preceded immediately by the republication and the widespread dissemination of Lin Piao's celebrated article "Long Live the Victory of People's War!" on which it draws so heavily.

Nor was it by chance that Pham van Dong, the North Vietnamese Premier, in a speech in Hanoi in September 1967 (the day after the publication of the program), silenced North Vietnam's doves with the most hawkish speech of his career. He did this by applauding China's nuclear progress, praising her bomb, and pledging to spurn all peace overtures and to fight on to final victory.

The program says:

So long as the U.S. imperialists do not end their war of aggression, withdraw all U.S. and satellite troops from our country, and let the South Vietnamese people themselves settle the internal affairs of South Vietnam without foreign intervention, our people will resolutely fight on until total victory.

Neither Pham van Dong nor Peking could have phrased it more firmly.

Crux of Program

The crux of the program is to create conditions in which the South Vietnamese people will unite to persuade the United States to withdraw under the promise of:

. . . free general elections to elect the National Assembly in a really democratic way in accordance with the principle of equal, direct suffrage and secret ballot.

The chances are that it will never get off the ground, for the Viet Cong have lost much of their popularity and mystique in the countryside.

Unless and until the non-Communists, who are in the majority, rally together, discard their factional animosities, and start working for national unity, the NLF's discipline will remain a powerful factor in Vietnamese politics. Its chances for success in future elections would inevitably be enhanced if it could succeed in turning what it once chose to regard

This article was condensed from the original, published in THE REPORTER, *5 October 1967.*

Mr. Warner writes for THE REPORTER *from Saigon.*

as a civil war into a war between the Vietnamese people and the United States.

In the words of its new program, the NLF now stands:

. . . for uniting all social strata and classes, all nationalities, all political parties, all organizations, all religious communities, all patriotic personalities, all individuals and all patriotic

Department of State

General Nguyen Chi Thanh's death in July 1967 has not resulted in any basic change in military planning

and progressive forces, irrespective of political tendencies. [It is] prepared to invite and welcome all patriotic forces and individuals who oppose the U.S. aggressors.

There is to be a "national union democratic government," based on democratic freedoms that guarantee freedom of speech, publication, assembly, and association. There is something in the platform for almost all men—and women too. There is freedom of residence and lodging and of movement, and secrecy of correspondence. Women are promised equal pay for equal work. The right of ownership of the means of production and other property of citizens will be protected under the laws of the state.

Capitalists in industry and trade will be encouraged to help develop industry, small industry, and handicrafts. There will be land reform, of course, but the plantation owners will be encouraged to keep their estates going. There is even a *Chieu Hoi* (open arms) program for defectors, Vietnamese and American alike. Reunification with the north will be achieved step by step through peaceful means without pressure and without foreign interference.

Mailed Fist Shows

Occasionally, the mailed fist shows through the velvet glove. There are dire hints, for instance, of the punishment to be meted out to the "puppets." Inevitable references pop up to South Vietnam's accomplishment of her "internationalist duty," and the resistance to US "aggression" is, predictably, "an integral part of the revolutionary struggle of the people all over the world."

The new dependence on a united-front appeal reverses the tactics used against the French. Ho Chi-minh dissolved the Communist Party in 1945, and relied on a united-front tactic until 1951 when he revived the party, declaring it "the vanguard and general staff of the working class and the working people of Vietnam."

In essence, the new approach is a faithful copy of Lin Piao's formula for world revolution based on the experience of the Chinese Communists in the war against Japan.

Until the major intervention of US forces in the south, the NLF and its Communist core, the People's Revolu-

tionary Party, pursued largely persuasive methods in their dealings with the rural population. Terror was used, of course, but it was used with discrimination. By adopting tactics that forced the government into repressive action, they won people to their side. Recruits, for the most part, went voluntarily into the ranks of the Viet Cong. The peasants paid their taxes without too much demur.

Enlarged War

The courtesies disappeared with the bigger war. Recruits were drafted whether they wanted to fight or not. Taxes progressively became heavier, and the party cadres fell down on their jobs, often alienating the people they were supposed to woo and win.

Alarming trends in the Viet Cong were disclosed in a "top secret" document issued by the Central Office for South Vietnam, as Hanoi's central command post in the south is known. It was captured by US forces in Khanh Hoa Province in April. The following are typical of the document's comments:

Our armed forces developed considerably but still did not meet the requirements of the situation.

Only half of our regular forces fought well. The regional forces mostly did not fight well and some of them hardly fought at all, while others were so embarrassed they could not fight.

In certain areas, the combat efficiency of our guerrilla units had developed and they fought well, but in other areas that efficiency decreased or fluctuated, so that they could not fight the enemy. People's warfare was not well developed. . . .

Political activities and the party tasks were carried out well in the regular forces, but were still poor among the regional forces in certain areas.

Many party committees at various echelons failed to strengthen leadership.

Although the liberated zone was expanded, it was not yet consolidated, and no solid base was established there which could serve as a stable rear for the South.

The report predicted accurately the expansion of the US Armed Forces and was at pains to stress both the military and the political preparations that needed to be achieved to meet the threat.

General Nguyen Chi Thanh's death in July was a real blow to Hanoi. It has not resulted, however, in any basic change in military planning. General Vo Nguyen Giap, the Defense Minister, has taken over the strategic command of the war. His deputy in South Vietnam is believed by some specialists to be General Hoang Van Thai, one of the older and most interesting of the northern generals.

Loyal Leader

General Thai has always been loyal to Giap. As commander of the Communist forces in the region immediately south of the demilitarized zone, however, he was also an enthusiastic supporter of the Thanh plan. Born in Thai Binh Province in North Vietnam in 1906, he was educated at French schools in Hanoi and later at a Japanese naval college. Later, he went both to Russian and Chinese Communist military schools.

One of the founder members of the Indochina Communist Party, he fled with Giap to China in 1939. When the war against the French began, he became chief of staff of the Vietminh High Command. Toward the end of the war, he served directly under Giap

as deputy commander in chief, and thus had a major hand in the planning and execution of the battle for Dien Bien Phu.

General Thai is both a member of the Politburo and a topflight staff officer. Under his command in the demilitarized zone area, the North Vietnamese troops have come face-to-face with the US Marines in repeated major engagements. His troops have taken brutally heavy casualties, but they have also learned that, in favorable circumstances and terrain, they can fight against US forces and inflict damaging casualties too.

How to wed his military tactics to a more effective political program that eschews negotiations at this time was the subject of deep debate in which Peking, characteristically, became publicly involved. After the death of General Thanh and the meeting of Lyndon B. Johnson and Kosygin at Glassboro, Peking launched a bitter campaign, ostensibly directed against the US "imperialists" and the Soviet "revisionists" for their collusion in attempting to persuade Hanoi to make some reciprocal gesture in exchange for an end to the US bombing. It was clear enough, however, that, although the propaganda guns were pointed at Moscow and Washington, their shells were intended to burst in Hanoi.

Comments in one captured document show that Hanoi's command post in South Vietnam is not satisfied with the performance of the Viet Cong

The campaign ended abruptly on 21 July with the arrival in Peking of a North Vietnamese economic mission (which later went on to Moscow).

That a large measure of agreement on policy had been reached soon became apparent with the adoption by Pham van Dong of the Chinese position on negotiations and by the publication in the *People's Daily* and the Peking *Review* of long extracts from General Thanh's detailed analysis of the winter and spring campaigns in Vietnam.

Mao does not lightly bestow his imprimatur on the works of lesser luminaries in the field of revolutionary war, even dead ones, and especially those who have sought to embroider and improve on his own sacred writings. This was, indeed, an occasion, and it was celebrated early in August by further promises of Chinese aid, by the republication of Lin Piao's article, and by the NLF's decision to try to return to the Maoist road of persuasion it had been forced to abandon by the pressures of war.

Many of the problems confronting the NLF in trying to apply the new blueprint seem insoluble. Where are the recruits and the taxes to come from if the use of threat and force is abandoned?

To talk of isolating the Americans as the Japanese were isolated in China is all very well in theory, but the circumstances are entirely different. Only a victim of the wildest hallucinations could compare Japanese policy in China with US policy in Vietnam. As the election figures show, US policies command highly significant popular support. Nor can the NLF take comfort either from the elections or from the improving performance of the South Vietnamese Army since they were held.

Again, as many Vietnamese realize, the NLF's program is altogether too good to be true. At the same time, one may be permitted to despair of the Vietnamese politicians. The reluctance on the part of the defeated civilian candidates and their followers to accept either their defeat or the leadership of the military provides a climate of dissension that the NLF will be quick to exploit.

Instead of settling down to the business of forming a united, loyal opposition that would offer a genuine alternative to military government in four years' time, some of them are bent on the destruction of the constitution that they themselves helped to create.

If by their actions the United States could ever be made to appear to be the sole barrier to peace, standing imperialistically against a united Vietnamese opinion, the NLF would be well on the way to achieving its goals.

NEW SOVIET MILITARY SERVICE LAW

Marshal Andrei A. Grechko, *Soviet Army*

This article is a condensation of a report by Marshal Grechko, Soviet Minister of Defense, to the USSR Supreme Soviet on a new universal military service law. The new law was passed in October 1967.—Editor.

THE Soviet Government has submitted the draft of the new Law on Universal Military Service for consideration by the third session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The law now in effect was adopted in September 1939. Much has changed since then.

Demands for insuring the security of the Soviet state and preparing the population for armed defense have increased in present-day conditions.

Moreover, the technical equipment and combat potential of the Soviet Army and Navy differ substantially from what they were in 1939.

The Soviet Constitution reads: "Universal military service is a law. Military service in the ranks of the USSR Armed Forces is the honorable obligation of USSR citizens." On this basis, it is established that active military service is obligatory for all male citizens.

Servicewomen

The proposed law also provides for military service by women with medical or other specialized training. In peacetime, they can be registered for military service, taken for training sessions, and accepted as volunteers for active military service between the ages of 19 and 40.

The terms of service established by the 1939 law have been changed a number of times. In 1950, for instance, the term for privates in the ground and security troops was set at three years instead of two.

In 1955, the length of military service was reduced from four to three years for air force sergeants and soldiers and for shore defense units and border guard ships, and from five to four years for navy chief petty officers and sailors. Sailors and chief petty officers now serve four years, while soldiers and sergeants serve three years. In addition, in 1965, a one-year term of service was established for those with higher education.

Because of the increase in the general education and technical level of the young, it is proposed to reduce the term of active military service by one year and establish the following terms:

- Two years for soldiers, sergeants, and master sergeants in the army and naval air force, border guards, and security troops.
- Three years for sailors and chief petty officers on warships, vessels, and shore units and for border guard naval units.

It is proposed to preserve the one-year term of service for those with higher education since they can master military affairs and prepare to take the reserve officer examinations within this period.

Conscription Ages

There are two conscription ages in the Soviet Union—19 and 18. Whereas there were grounds for this in the 1940's, when a minority of young people graduated from secondary schools, the situation has changed. The time is nearing when all young people will receive secondary education. This makes it necessary to have a single conscription age—18—since most young men graduate from secondary school at this age and their physical development enables them to perform their military duties successfully.

The proposed law provides that conscription for active military service

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should be established for young people who are 18 on conscription day. By completing military service by age 20, and having gone through the army's school of upbringing and training, they will have more favorable conditions for continuing their education, finding jobs, and arranging their personal lives.

Conscription Schedules

According to the current law, the main conscription of citizens for active military service takes place in November and December, and for units stationed in remote areas or abroad, in June and September. The tour of duty for all servicemen is calculated from 1 January following the year of conscription. As a result of this procedure, many servicemen actually serve longer than the term established by law.

The proposed law provides that conscription of citizens for active military service takes place twice a year at equal intervals: in May to June and November to December. Such a procedure would create more favorable conditions for maintaining the troops' combat readiness at the necessary level. In addition, conscription at these times takes into account the interests of agriculture since spring plowing is finished between May and June, and harvesting is completed between November and December. The transfer of servicemen to the reserves will also be conducted twice a year.

In connection with the introduction of the new conscription procedure, provision has been made to establish a new way of calculating terms of active military service. Servicemen called up in the first half of the year (from May to June) will have their tours of duty calculated from 1 July, while those called up in November and December will serve from 1 January following the year of conscription. This procedure will eliminate the existing gap between conscription and the beginning of the term of active military service.

Introductory Training

Introductory, preconscription military training of young people in secondary and equivalent schools beginning with the fifth grade, which was established by the 1939 law, was abolished after World War II. At the same time, the increased demands made on soldiers and the reduction in the terms of military service make it necessary to train young people for service in the armed forces even before conscription.

The proposed law provides for establishing a system of introductory military training for young persons. This training must be conducted on a compulsory, planned basis for all young men of preconscription and conscription age everywhere, without interrupting their work in production or their schooling.

Introductory military training of young students is to be conducted by regular military instructors at general-education secondary schools beginning with the ninth grade, and also at vocational-technical schools.

Males who do not attend daytime schools will receive introductory military training, without interrupting their work in production, at training points set up at enterprises, institutions, organizations, and collective farms.

The interests of the troops' constant combat readiness and the strengthening of the country's defense capability require, along with introductory military instruction, the training of a

number of specialists for the army and navy from among the conscripts. In this connection, the proposed law provides for training these specialists from among young people who have reached the age of 17, at the training organizations of the Volunteer Society for Cooperation With the Armed Forces and in vocational-technical schools.

In the cities, the training of specialists for the armed forces is to be conducted without interrupting production work. The young trainees are to receive leave of five to seven days from their jobs, with average pay, to take their examinations. In rural areas, the training of such specialists can be conducted at sessions that interrupt production work during the autumn and winter periods.

Conscripts recruited for training entailing interruption of production work are to keep their jobs and posts and receive 50 percent of their average earnings.

Interavia

The Soviet *BRDM*, a reconnaissance vehicle. According to Marshal Andrei A. Grechko, current Soviet motorized infantry divisions have 16 times as many tanks and 37 times as many armored carriers and armored cars as 1939 divisions.

Under the 1939 law, no military service deferments were established for students at higher schools. Later, deferments were granted for continuation of education to all at higher schools, including evening and corre-

spondence schools. The new law envisages education deferments for those attending daytime higher schools.

This is a more expedient approach to the granting of education deferments to students at higher schools since evening and correspondence schools have longer terms of study than daytime schools and no military training is conducted in them. It should also be borne in mind that the evening and correspondence schools were created mainly for older citizens who had been unable to enter daytime schools. It would be quite legitimate for citizens to enter evening and correspondence higher schools after serving in the ranks of the armed forces.

The law now in effect does not set a maximum conscription age. It merely says that those eligible for military service can be called up for a period of five years from the time they were transferred to the reserves.

The new law establishes that persons who have received deferments or were not called up for active duty within the established time limits can be conscripted up to age 27.

The draft of the new law, in the main, preserves the existing system of active service for officers. Provision has been made to raise the maximum age for active duty from 30 to 40 for junior lieutenants and lieutenants, from 35 to 40 for senior lieutenants, from 40 to 45 for majors, and from 45 to 50 for colonels. This is aimed at reducing the transfer of officers to the reserves when they are comparatively young and efficient.

Provision has been made to settle the important question of calling up reserve officers to the armed forces. Every year the armed forces need specialists trained in civilian higher schools. In recent years, they have been called up to serve as officers in the armed forces. However, their term of service has not been defined.

The proposed law makes provision for young specialists who are officers in the reserve to be called up for active duty in peacetime for two to three years. The number of specialists subject to callup will be determined on the basis of the interests of the armed forces and the national economy.

The reserve obligation for officers, sergeants, master sergeants, soldiers, and sailors is unchanged in the new law except for certain categories of higher ranking officers.

It is proposed to reduce the reserve obligation for women registered as eligible for military service. According to the existing law, they must stay in the reserves up to the ages set for men. Taking the hardships of military service into consideration, the proposed law establishes the maximum age for women in the reserves at 50 years of age for officers and 40 years for sergeants and soldiers.

For the most part, the proposed law preserves the existing procedure for recruiting reservists for refresher training in troop units. It has been found expedient to reduce refresher training periods during the entire period in the reserves from 36 to 30 months and to reduce their number from six to four for the first age group of category I reservists, and from nine to six for the first group of category II reservists.

The proposed law provides that servicemen and the reservists who are called up for refresher training enjoy the full rights and bear all the responsibilities of citizens as stipulated by the Soviet constitution.



Interpreter--or Filter?

Colonel Wolfred K. White, *United States Army*

TODAY, hundreds of thousands of US citizens are scattered around the world aiding in the development of new nations, countering insurgency, training indigenous security forces, and deterring aggression. The material affluence of the United States and her willingness to assist the emerging nations in achieving political stability and economic self-sufficiency are being demonstrated more convincingly than ever before.

American techniques in engineering, agriculture, industry, and commerce are adaptable to many of the requirements of the new states. Economic assistance and military aid to be meaningful, however, must be accompanied by scientific and technical training programs. The major portion of this training task falls to the civilian and military advisors assigned to our missions and advisory groups abroad. In large measure, the success or failure of each program depends upon the ability of the US advisor to communicate effectively with his counterpart.

Despite the pluralistic character of American society and the "melting pot" of ethnic groups bringing a multitude of languages to North America in past decades, it is evident that little remains of our rich multilingual inheritance. The reasons for the loss of these languages are generally well

known, but the atrophy of these resources is most regrettable. At a time in our history when we have the greatest requirement for citizens capable of speaking a wide variety of foreign languages, we are discovering the difficulty of developing rapidly these required skills.

Thesis Incorrect

The argument frequently has been advanced that citizens of the United States need no language other than their mother tongue. The rationale is that the people of less powerful nations will learn English in order to communicate with the citizens of a great power. Such a thesis may have been valid during periods of isolation before World War II, but, in light of the United States present worldwide military and economic commitments, it can no longer be supported.

Within the past 20 years, there has been renewed interest in foreign language education in this country. It is unfortunate that, even today, the technical and professional skills imparted by our colleges and universities are rarely accompanied by a corresponding degree of foreign language ability on the part of the graduate. The training and education provided in the United States by the institutions of higher learning are of high caliber, but only rarely do the courses of instruction require more than a brief exposure to a foreign language. This deficiency has become increasingly apparent as we have undertaken extensive development programs in a number of foreign countries.

Undoubtedly, the lack of US advisors adequately trained in the language of the host country has frequently caused misunderstanding, impeded progress, and complicated the task of aiding the emerging nations. Certainly, professional or technical competence is the *sine qua non* for any advisory assignment, but a working knowledge of the local language, with appropriate technical vocabulary, is an invaluable asset.

"Familiarization" Courses

The Department of Defense through a number of language programs attempts to fill those positions in advisory groups and missions where knowledge of the local language is deemed essential. In some instances, "familiarization" courses of short duration are afforded personnel being assigned to overseas areas. In these courses, a basic vocabulary in the foreign language is imparted, with the expectation that the individual will use this as a base for future language building when he reaches his new duty station.

Despite these efforts at language training, most advisors arrive at their assignments in advisory groups and missions without a working knowledge of the local language. Unless his coun-

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terpart speaks English, the advisor must communicate through an interpreter.

It has been said that dentures are not a replacement for natural teeth—that they are merely a substitute for no teeth at all. The same may be said of interpreters and their employment. Nothing can replace the person-to-person exchange of ideas in a language common to both individuals. At best, the interpreter is a substitute for no communication at all.

Important Qualities

The interpreter's lot is not a happy one. His task is demanding, his responsibilities are great, and too frequently his reward is scant. The interpreter's abilities are determined by a number of factors including:

- Detailed knowledge of the formal aspects of the languages in which he is working.
- Command of the idiomatic expressions in each language.
- Technical vocabularies applicable to the interpretive situation.
- Ability to convey accurately the tone, spirit, and nuance of each speaker.
- Native intelligence.

It is infrequent that the military advisor is fortunate enough to acquire an interpreter possessing all of these qualities in adequate measure. In most instances, he is forced to settle for less—much less.

A shortcoming often encountered when using foreign nationals as interpreters is their lack of knowledge of idiomatic English expressions. Textbook knowledge is patently inadequate in coping with the ever-changing usage of a living language. This is especially true if the interpreter is expected to deal in the changing expressions of the US military profession.

Even if the advisor purges his vocabulary of "trade" expressions by substituting more widely used forms, the interpreter is still faced with the formidable array of technical terms for which no suitable English synonyms exist. Even when the interpreter grasps the meaning of the English expression, it is quite possible that he may be faced with the annoying fact that there is no corresponding term in the local language.

Science and Technology

The lack of specialized expressions in the languages of many of the emerging nations is indicative of the primitive state of their scientific and technical development. Scientific and technical vocabularies are developed in a language concomitantly with the growth of science and technology. The introduction of loan words or artificially created expressions is usually necessary to update the more primitive languages. Such action is often indicated in advisory assignments, in the interest of general understanding, and to insure uniformity of usage.

One of the most frequently expressed complaints of the advisor concerning his interpreter is the real or imagined reluctance on the part of the interpreter to convey criticism, bad tidings, or censure. "My interpreter was just too polite" is the often voiced lament of the US advisor. It is here, perhaps, that we encounter basic differences between two cultures.

Our attitudes and lack of tact and understanding of foreign customs and traditions often create hostility and prevent the development of the necessary advisor-counterpart rapport. When a personality clash develops, the

interpreter finds himself squarely in the middle. As a local national, the interpreter is in the dilemma of attempting to serve two masters, one of whom is transitory, the other a fellow citizen who may well be in a position to influence profoundly the interpreter's future well-being.

The interpreter often is in the military service of the host nation and is usually inferior in status to the advisor's counterpart, if not to the advisor himself. This condition complicates further an already complex relationship and contributes to the interpreter's reticence to speak with complete candor. Should the interpreter not attempt to tone down heated exchanges, if only in the interest of self-preservation, his courage would certainly outweigh his wit. The intelligent interpreter will attempt to encourage amicable relations between the advisor and counterpart, as well as to create a *modus vivendi* between himself and them.

In addition to the factors of military status, local customs, and nationality, the factors of social position, age, and religious beliefs may have substantial bearing on the performance of individual interpreters. In the Orient, where marked differences in social classes exist, the position of the interpreter in the class structure may profoundly influence his behavior and attitudes toward his countrymen.

In a society where reverence is shown to the aged, a youthful interpreter is often overly subservient, in the Western view, when translating exchanges between the advisor and elderly local nationals. On occasion, advisors have observed that religious

US Army

Instructional periods, where interpreters are used, require twice as much time as when the instructors and students have a common language

beliefs will sometimes cause the interpreter to refuse to translate ideas or expressions he considers to be contrary to his religion. This has been specifically noted in the case of Moslem interpreters.

Psychological Impact

Many advisors who have required interpreters believe that they would have been materially assisted in their work if they had been able to speak the local language, even to a limited extent. The advantages of linguistic ability on the part of the advisor are self-evident as a tool of his trade. Of collateral importance, however, is the psychological impact on the local nationals of the advisor's effort to speak their language. In many of the new nations, language is one of the few tangible assets, and the natives deem the foreigner's effort to speak it as a mark of respect and as recognition of their attainment of nationhood.

An obvious disadvantage in conversing through an interpreter is the great amount of time required to consummate even brief exchanges. In formal instructional situations where interpreters must be employed, it is necessary to allow twice as much time as is necessary when instructor and students have a common language. If written materials such as lesson outlines, advance sheets, and practical exercises are used, the services of qualified translators are necessary.

During the Korean War, when large numbers of South Korean military students attended service schools in the United States, the instructional departments of those institutions were relatively successful in coping with the language barrier. It is highly probable that the non-English speaking Koreans would have gained far more from these courses if the US instructors had been able to address them directly in their native tongue.

Although there are many disadvantages in the use of foreign language interpreters, it is highly likely that our advisors will have to continue to rely heavily on their services. Each advisor, therefore, must seek to employ the interpreter to maximum advantage. It is not possible to establish a *modus operandi* with universal applicability to the use of interpreters. However, certain measures can be adopted to increase the likelihood of achieving accurate translations and to minimize the more frequently encountered difficulties. A close working relationship between the advisor and his interpreter, including mutual understanding and a community of purpose, is essential to success.

Informal Conversations

The advisor initially must determine the degree to which his interpreter is proficient in spoken English. This can be ascertained by informal conversations embracing a variety of subjects. The advisor by adroit questioning should insure that the interpreter understands the underlying meaning of the English expressions and not merely the gist of the words comprising them.

It is known that some foreign interpreters are extremely reluctant to admit that their knowledge of the advisor's language is considerably less than profound. By insisting that the interpreter restate given expressions in different words, the advisor can gain some insight into the depth of his interpreter's knowledge of English. It is most important that the advisor be aware of his interpreter's limitations so that he can work to im-

prove the interpreter's English, or, failing that, to avoid expressions his interpreter is unable to handle.

Advisors comment that it is difficult to determine the accuracy with which words are being translated to the foreign language if the advisor has little or no knowledge of the local tongue. In a recent survey conducted at the US Army War College, a number of former military advisors asserted that knowledge of the local language would have enabled them to check on the performance of their interpreter. It was interesting to note in this survey that officers who were assigned to headquarters above the regimental level expressed greater confidence in their interpreter's abilities than did the advisors who had worked at the lower echelons.

In order to check the effectiveness of the interpreter's translations, the advisor, where possible, should have an American who is fluent in the local language, and whose fluency is unknown to the interpreter, monitor the interpreter's performance. If this is not possible, a native fluent in English and unknown to the interpreter can be substituted. Tests of this nature are, of course, no guarantee of a specific level of sustained performance, but they do give the advisor an insight into how the interpreter is conveying the message to the foreign listener.

If the interpreter's vocabulary is deficient in the essential technical terms and expressions, the advisor must strive to remedy this by explaining them in simplified terms. No doubt, in some instances, the advisor's patience will be taxed and his ingenuity hard pressed in insuring that his interpreter fully understands the English terms. Not infrequently, he may be forced to resort to pictures and sketches to convey his meaning.

It is a great temptation for the advisor, when he becomes aware of the frequently limited vocabulary of his interpreter, to decrease his own vocabulary accordingly. In time, the advisor should be able to enrich the interpreter's knowledge of English to the extent that a near-normal English conversation can be carried on between them. If the advisor lapses into pidgin English, his utterances lose expressiveness, spontaneity, and even essential meaning.

Although there is no substitute for the advisor being proficient in the local language, thousands of Americans abroad have used their interpreters to good advantage in the past, as still others will have to do in the future. The degree to which the interpreter will prove to be an effective bridge to understanding, rather than acting as a filter and preventing meaningful communication, will depend in considerable measure on the advisor's awareness of the capabilities and limitations of his own interpreter, and the effort he is willing to expend in molding the interpreter to suit his purposes. The success of the professionally competent advisor, who works with foreign nationals who do not understand his language, rests primarily on his own language capability, or that of his interpreter.

DIEN BIEN PHU--
Giap's Last Win?

Colonel John C. Bell, *United States Army*

VO NGUYEN GIAP, the North Vietnamese Minister of Defense and guiding spirit behind the Vietminh, Viet Cong, and People's Army of North Vietnam, earned the nickname "Tiger of Dien Bien Phu" with his decisive victory over the French in 1954.

Today, General Giap desperately needs another Dien Bien Phu. His methods won in the past, but can they now bring him Dien Bien Phu II?

He has fought the Japanese, the French, the South Vietnamese, and the Americans in Vietnam. He has borrowed from and improvised upon the techniques of earlier and contemporary commanders from Tzu Fan (576 B.C.) to Mao Tse-tung. His doctrine for revolutionary war is violent, brutal, and callous.

There is little evidence that Giap has personally engaged in much active combat—he was probably not even present at Dien Bien Phu. Rather, he has organized, planned, and directed. This absence from the battlefield may lie at the root of some of his apparent misconceptions today.

Giap summarizes and greatly illuminates his theories with this sentence: "The essential is to have a workable politico-military doctrine." He has methodically set forth three sets of three's—three stages of war, three types of operations, and three types of forces employed. His three stages derive from Mao Tse-tung through Truong Chinh, onetime Secretary of the Indochinese Communist Party and present North Vietnamese official. Truong's nomenclature and the predominant activities seen in each stage by Giap are shown in the accompanying chart.

The conditions for a revolutionary war, stage I, exist when a people are oppressed by an alien invader or by a native but non-Communist government. When a foreign power is involved, Communist calls for liberation of the country have a powerful appeal to patriotic natives, Communist or not. When the "enemy" is a local government, the appeal is based on promises of land reform, tax reform, self-rule, and democratic government. In either event, the non-Communists who cooperate later find themselves hopelessly entangled in the Communist conspiracy, or, just as bad, find they have assisted the Communist to climb to power. The non-Communists do not share this power, but soon become the victims of it.

	Truong	Giap
Stage I	Strategic defensive	Concealed mobilization and guerrilla operations
Stage II	Equilibrium	Larger but still mobile operations
Stage III	Victorious counter-offensive	Classic conventional military operations

The Communist insurgents immediately begin to establish a political base among the people—the peasants and workers—during which every feasible tool is used. Subversion, political education and indoctrination, organization, terror tactics to intimidate the

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population in general and eliminate opposition leaders, compromises of expediency with other dissatisfied elements, even though non-Communist, are all used as appropriate.

A grassroots, clandestine organization begins to form and gathers weapons for the struggle. Attacks on small

Newsweek

Vo Nguyen Giap advocates a tenacious military doctrine which will be difficult to defeat

military or internal security forces are carried out by guerrilla bands. Through these attacks they secure weapons, ammunition, explosives, communications equipment, and other usable hardware which are concealed and used for later attacks. Material assistance from abroad is sought.

The insurgent is careful not to overcommit his resources. He goes to great lengths to avoid open conflict unless the odds are greatly in his favor. This usually means that any encounter is meticulously planned and sought out by him.

The most important task of stage I is to "sell" the revolution to the masses and secure their political cooperation. Tax and other reforms are promised. At times, if the insurgents gain *de facto* control of sufficient areas, these reforms actually may be implemented as indicators of events to come.

Giap's forces use any available sanctuary during all stages. The Vietminh based some of their activities in China during the Japanese occupation of Vietnam. They mingled their forces freely with Laotian forces and on Laotian soil against the French. As a result, the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese are obviously making the maximum use today of Laos, Cambodia, and the demilitarized zone, disregarding entirely the legal, moral, and ethical implications of such acts.

Giap's Guerrilla War

Guerrilla war as defined by Giap is much the same as guerrilla war elsewhere, but, perhaps, even more limited. Forces are small and ill-equipped, composed of nonuniformed irregulars who continue work and are full-time combatants in only a small percentage of cases. Pitched battles are virtually unknown, and engagements are short in order to avoid overwhelming enemy reinforcements. Insurgent forces conduct operations to minimize their losses while inflicting steadily mounting casualties on the enemy. Virtually all have the aim of securing military hardware from the enemy but not of holding ground. If not suppressed, these forces are enlarged and expanded so as to be capable of escalating guerrilla war into mobile war after a period of time—possibly years.

In stage II, guerrilla war diminishes as mobile war and entrenched camp warfare increase in importance. The insurgents begin to assert domination over specific territories large enough so that enemy forces can enter briefly and only in force. The support provided by the people on a piecemeal, small-scale basis heretofore is now regularized through insurgent tax, tribute, and toll systems.

Rebel institutions such as schools, military camps, training centers, recruiting systems, hospitals, supply installations, and propaganda facilities are operated on an organized basis. Domination over the populations within these areas through the systematic elimination and intimidation of opposition leaders becomes complete and effective. Despite the fact that the enemy can defeat any single force concentrated against him, he is now on the strategic defensive.

Major Conditions

Giap requires three major conditions for the third, final stage of the war.

- Superiority of forces, meaning numerical superiority of armed troops and, to some extent, superiority of some key weapons.
- A favorable international situation, meaning military assistance from Communist nations abroad and their political support at the conference table.
- A situation within Vietnam, in general, and the enemy camp, in particular, favorable to his forces, meaning demoralization among the native government and political dissension within the homeland of the foreign aggressor.

Given these conditions, mobile war and "entrenched camp war" overtake guerrilla war and predominate. Guerrilla war persists on a less important, more selective basis such as terror attacks on enemy headquarters and assassinations.

Whereas the passage from stage I to stage II is almost a growth process, the shift from stage II to stage III is more dramatic and its timing is most crucial. To delay unnecessarily means useless prolongation of the war with attendant loss of morale and added costs, but to move too quickly is much worse, for this could mean total defeat. Giap's nearly fatal mistake in the anti-French war was the too-early challenge of French forces in open battles during the first half of 1951. In three battles, the Vietminh were defeated each time and Giap almost lost his position as Vietminh commander in chief. The Vietminh immediately went back to stage II—smaller battles on their own terms in scattered areas.

Final Victory

Final victory is the objective of stage III; either the overthrow of a native government or the ejection of the foreign force must be accomplished. Recognizing reality, the conditions for victory are met when matters are made unpleasant enough for the foreign nation to agree at the conference table to withdraw.

The Asian conferee at the peace table feels that the best credential he can bring is a spectacular, late-vintage victory on the battlefield. For Westerners, this is a difficult point to contest, particularly if the Asian is willing to pay a high price in casualties for this victory, as he usually is. The violent attacks launched by the Chinese and North Koreans while the conferees were at the Korean peace table

are one example of this philosophy; the Battle of Dien Bien Phu was another.

Completing Giap's triad of trios are the three types of forces employed: guerrilla units, regional troops, and regular units. Guerrilla units are the classical part-time resistance fighters who farm by day and fight by night, poorly equipped, but numerous. Regional forces, although full time, better equipped, and relatively more mobile, confine their operations to their own province. At the top of the heap are the regulars—hard core, full time, well trained and disciplined, and armed with modern weapons. The three forces coordinate closely, and the "people's army" concept is sustained through almost total involvement of the population in one of the three forces.

Prolonged War Concept

While Giap owed much of his doctrine to Mao Tse-tung and Truong Chinh, Bernard B. Fall rated Giap's best contribution to revolutionary war as "his estimate of the political-psychological shortcomings of a democratic system when faced with an inconclusive military operation," which concludes essentially that the democracy seeks a short war and is not psychologically able to stand a prolonged indecisive war.

One major advantage of the prolonged war concept is the absence of the need to make momentous decisions rapidly. Instead, lengthy periods may be devoted to gathering facts and evaluating them; the decision-making process may be deferred and drawn out to the satisfaction of all parties participating. The strategic decisions leading up to the Battle of Dien Bien Phu offer an excellent example.

In late 1953, their free zone was threatened by French concentrations in the Red River Delta and at Dien Bien Phu. The Central Committee, after lengthy debate, ordered diversionary attacks at four points in Laos and Vietnam, drawing French forces to these points and weakening French posture over-all. When the Vietminh main effort then fell on Dien Bien Phu, French reserves were lacking.

A secondary direct benefit of the prolonged war concept is the freedom to choose between "strike swiftly, win swiftly" and "strike surely, advance surely" tactics. It is probable that the slow, bloody, Dien Bien Phu victory, ground out using the "sure" concept, had a greater impact on French and world public opinion than a quicker victory would have had. The world audience was able to see a seemingly unstoppable Communist war machine power its way closer to victory daily, despite the most vigorous French efforts to reinforce and defend, whereas a quick victory might well have been written off as just another successful Communist sneak attack.

An Interim Step

But the Vietnamese Communists' victory over the French and gains at the Geneva Conference table were only an interim step toward their aim of ruling all of Vietnam. In 1957-60 they launched another war of liberation against the established government of South Vietnam. In this conflict, Giap must win his second Dien Bien Phu if the Communist aim is to be fulfilled.

In late 1964, the Viet Cong moved into stage III and ultimate victory was near when the United States committed large numbers of troops using weapons and tactics new to Giap. But despite some spectacular although lim-

ited successes against small US elements and installations, the Viet Cong have not succeeded in obtaining a victory approaching the magnitude of Dien Bien Phu, nor is it likely to. Certain major factors explain why.

Between 1945 and 1954, the Vietminh could plausibly claim their struggle was a patriotic nationalist one

tion between 1954 and 1966 which Giap does not seem to realize, although it bears on the politico-psychological area in which he deems himself expert. This one of his key three conditions for stage III does not now exist.

A second Giap condition, that of having superior forces, was reversed by the US entry of US troops. Roughly

This French fort, symbol of colonial power in Indochina, encouraged the Communist appeal to nationalism

and maximize popular support. The French, on the other hand, were divided in their support of the conflict. Giap's third condition for stage III was thus present. But the United States is not France, she is not in Vietnam for the same motives, and she cannot be conveniently substituted for France on a one-for-one basis as the current enemy.

The United States will not accept a defeat or disgraceful compromise. This is one highly significant distinc-

half of Vietnam opposes him, plus the United States. Numerically, he does not have the manpower superiority necessary to win a conventional war, and his materiel inferiority is even greater. Condition I, then, does not obtain for Giap.

Condition II, bloc military assistance and support at the conference table, is also in need of repair. Although he receives military aid from the USSR and the People's Republic of China, their widening rift has hin-

dered this program since he moved into stage III.

Therefore, it can be concluded that, although Giap has formally moved into stage III—and it must be considered that this was carefully done—the situation has now reverted to that which he visualizes as better befitting stage II. His dilemma must be painful. Does he deescalate; does he continue to seek a military decision, one which is daily more hopeless for him to achieve; or does he move for the conference table and settle for much less than he aspired to? Events in Vietnam so far indicate that he seeks a second Dien Bien Phu.

Vo Nguyen Giap was faced with new weapons and tactics when US troops arrived in force

The fundamental reason why North Vietnam has rejected US peace feelers may well be this: In the manner of Asiatic Communists, Giap is not coming to the conference table until he has a recent spectacular military victory or Dien Bien Phu II which would provide a position of strength from which to negotiate. But Dien Bien Phu II is obtainable only in a stage III, the conditions for which no longer exist.

However, Giap may have shifted his aim to a political and psychological Dien Bien Phu rather than military. In January 1966 articles in a Hanoi newspaper, he recognized US material strength, but described its weak points as:

- The United States cannot send unlimited resources to Vietnam, but must consider her commitments elsewhere.
- The more US troops sent to Vietnam, the more clearly the United States labels herself aggressor and her lackeys as countrysellers.
- The US invasion of Vietnam comes when the patriotic war, liberation forces, and liberated areas are all growing so the United States must scatter her forces and lose the initiative.
- In this politically and militarily passive posture, without an ideal, US forces cannot use their full combat power nor escape defeat.
- Although the United States came to bolster the South Vietnamese Government, the latter is decaying and will collapse when US troops are defeated.
- Peace-loving people worldwide strongly oppose US imperialists.

In contrast, the people of Vietnam, according to Giap, have these strong points:

- They have the party's correct revolutionary line.
- The people of the north and south are united against the United States and her lackeys.
- To lead the struggle, they have the experience and the concept of the invincible people's war.
- They are supported by brother Socialist countries and progressive peoples of the world.

Fallacious as this type of reasoning may sound, there is no reason to doubt that Giap believes it and will convince a substantial number of his audience. Isolated as he is today from the battlefield, he may conceivably be sufficiently uninformed or misinformed by subordinates to believe that he can defeat US forces militarily.

Giap is faced with the choice of retrogressing to stage II for an extended period or of moving for peace talks. The former would be costly in terms of Viet Cong morale and of his own personal prestige. Should he opt for the latter with an eye toward achieving his end in South Vietnam at another time, it would indicate that pragmatism has overcome his avowed determination to fight to ultimate victory.

Of the two, peace talks would seem to be less damaging internally since no matter what the true result of any truce, the Politburo could distribute its own version to its people. However, anything less than total victory would have a resounding impact on other future wars of liberation, of which the Democratic Republic of Vietnam has so loudly proclaimed itself the leader. The stakes are high.

Giap's military doctrine is a tenacious one, one that will be difficult to defeat. A continuation of the war can lead only to many more casualties and the further impoverishment of his own already backward country. From a Western viewpoint, it is clear that his best course of action is to go to the peace table soon and obtain the best terms possible in hopes of achieving his objectives later in other ways. But Giap is not a Westerner.

Subterranean Warfare

Enrique Martínez Codó

"THIS is the closest thing to the New York subway I've ever seen." Such was the impression of a US soldier upon seeing a large underground military complex discovered near Saigon.

Where and when did this type of warfare originate? This is difficult to determine because for centuries man has sought refuge underground as protection from superior forces.

Guerrilla forces resort to underground warfare both to compensate for the enemy's superiority and to conceal men and equipment while waiting for the most opportune moment to come out and fight.

World War I was a conflict where both sides fought from trenches. After the war, complex subterranean fortifications appeared everywhere. The best known was the Maginot Line. The faith in this type of fortification ended after the Nazi blitzkrieg of 1940. Technical developments caused subterranean warfare to be neglected until it was adopted later by guerrilla forces.

Ukrainian Insurgent Army

Typical of guerrilla forces which made extensive use of underground fortifications was the Ukrainian Insurgent Army **(UPA)** during its struggles with the Germans in World War II and later with the Soviets. Construction of bunkers started during 1941 for guerrilla detachments which were operating in fixed areas. Generally, the bunkers were constructed close to each other and reinforced with logs deeply buried in the ground to form a circular defense line such as around a hilltop.

Each bunker sheltered a small group of guerrillas who would fight the enemy from inside as they would in a conventional field fortification. Firing dead zones were mined to provide defense against a possible enemy surprise attack. Later, a second shelter, also revetted with logs, was constructed under the original bunkers and used for temporary lodging. This second shelter was well concealed, and often the enemy would enter the bunker unaware that the guerrillas were located in the lower level.

The Communists intensified their efforts to subdue the Ukrainians during the winter of 1945-46, causing the **UPA** to use the bunkers as hiding places rather than for cover during combat.

One Polish military commander who fought against the **UPA** in 1946 commented that the bunkers were well concealed and that their entrances were usually located inside hollowed-out tree trunks, in grassy areas, or within a pile of branches. He said that, if one section of a bunker was discovered, it was still not easy to find the other even though it was located underneath.

He mentioned one underground complex which his unit uncovered, a **UPA** hospital, which included a surgical room, two convalescent rooms, a kitchen, pantry, storage room, doctor and nurses' quarters, and a bathroom. The complex was equipped with running water brought in by a pipeline from a nearby stream.

Bunkers Under Villages

The Poles found bunkers which ran under villages. Access might be gained through a kitchen in a house, at the edge of a main road, or even in a well. In the latter, entrance was gained by going down the rope to a concealed hole near the water level, and from there a short corridor led to the bunker.

When selecting the location for the bunkers, special attention was given to accessibility. Access gained through a streambed or by a well-worn path was more suitable

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

Tunnel restored by Communist China for museum

US Army

Soldier leaves tunnel after setting an explosive charge

Army News Features

Mock village used to train Republic of Vietnam soldiers in conducting search and destroy missions

US Army

Viet Cong bunker entrance

US Army

"Tunnel Rats" display equipment found in Viet Cong tunnel

than one through soft or sandy soil where telltale tracks could result in detection.

The underground structures were ventilated by specially built conduits or pipes concealed inside tree trunks. Ventilation pipes had elbow joints which included a protective grate to prevent the enemy from slipping in explosive charges and detonating them inside the bunkers.

Gases and smoke bombs made it necessary that access tunnels be built in a step-like fashion and that hermetically sealed doors be used. These precautions created airtight compartments and protected the occupants from these agents.

Communist Chinese guerrillas also made extensive use of tunnels in their struggle with the Japanese during the occupation of China and in their fight with the Nationalist Chinese after the end of World War II. In 1964, the Communist Chinese restored more than 300 yards of tunnels for use as a museum to show the possibilities that tunnel warfare offered to guerrillas.

Tunnel warfare was used by the Vietminh in their struggle with the French in Indochina. After the cease-fire in 1954, the underground structures served as hiding places for the guerrillas and their supplies. It was from these underground structures that the Viet Cong began their reign of terror in South Vietnam soon after the cease-fire.

On a number of occasions, allied forces in South Vietnam have failed to locate the enemy during search operations. Presumably, the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese regulars have escaped detection by taking refuge in well-camouflaged underground structures in the jungle.

Many tunnel complexes of various sizes have been uncovered by allied forces in Vietnam. This has led to special training of US soldiers. Villages have been constructed at training centers which are similar to typical Vietnamese settlements. Included in the mock villages are underground positions and tunnels.

The use of tunnels has assisted guerrillas in their hit-and-run tactics. Therefore, to insure security of an area, the underground structures must be found and destroyed.

MILITARY NOTES

UNITED STATES

Proposed 'Sentinel' Sites

The first 10 geographical areas to be surveyed as possible site locations for the *Sentinel* system have been selected (MR, Jan 1968, p 98).

The *Sentinel* system—the Communist Chinese-oriented, antiballistic-missile system—is an area defense system composed of *Spartan* and *Sprint* missile batteries.

Because of the long range of the *Spartan* missile, a relatively few batteries can protect the entire country against the kind of light and relatively unsophisticated attack that the Communist Chinese may be capable of by the mid-1970's.

Initial areas to be surveyed are in the vicinity of Albany, Georgia; Chicago, Illinois; Dallas, Texas; Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota; New York City, New York; Oahu, Hawaii; Salt Lake City, Utah; Seattle, Washington; Boston, Massachusetts; and Detroit, Michigan.

These areas are not final choices, and the list is not complete. Some areas have not been selected.

Surveys will include topographic surveys, foundation explorations, and radio frequency interference measurement tests. These tests will be conducted over several months depending upon results and other factors such as weather and ground conditions.

Most of the sites being considered are located on Government-owned property.—Army News Features.

Electronically Steerable Antenna

An electronically steerable antenna, which can be air lifted for emergency use in areas such as southeast Asia, is being developed by the Air Force Systems Command.

The antenna is for use with lightweight tactical air navigation (TACAN) equipment. But unlike TACAN antennas presently in use, the new model will form and rotate the radiated pattern electronically.

The new TACAN antenna design concept should greatly improve the accuracy of navigational data transmitted to airborne aircraft. Because it lacks movings parts, the new model should operate much longer than TACAN antennas presently in the Air Force inventory.

Present TACAN antennas produce the radiated pattern by rotating very small reflectors around a central radiating element. In place of the mechanically rotating antenna, the new model will produce the radiated pattern by energizing stationary elements.

Additional advantages of the new design include lower routine maintenance and increased reliability.—US Air Force release.

Medical Shelter Tests

Army News Features

A new concept in tent design is being tested by Army scientists in the desert environment of Fort Irwin, California.

The tents are designed to be used as medical treatment centers and operating rooms in forward support areas. Portable, a tent may be pack-carried by one man who can erect it in just six minutes.

The scientists from the US Army Limited War Laboratory are testing the tents against the effects of dry heat and wind. Other tests are being planned for jungle areas.

The two tents undergoing tests are 32-pound prototypes measuring 10 by 12 by six feet high. Final development will result in a blackout-proof tent having good ventilation and weighing only 24 pounds, including poles.—Army News Features.

Helicopter Gunnery Training Expanded

The gunnery training program for helicopter gun pilots at the US Army Aviation School, Fort Rucker, Alabama, has been expanded.

Previously, officers learning to fly the *UH-1 Iroquois* helicopter gunship had only three hours of gunnery instruction, leaving the bulk of training to company commanders and seasoned gunship pilots in Vietnam.

Reshuffling existing schedules, the aviation school has expanded the gunnery training program from three hours to 12 days without extending the present 32 weeks of rotary-wing instruction.—DOD release.

Foam Material for Fuel Tanks

The safety of combat aircrews in southeast Asia may be greatly improved by the application of a new material which retards fire propagation.

Air Force engineers have successfully adapted a polyurethane foam that soon will be installed in the fuel tanks of combat aircraft in Vietnam. The new material will greatly reduce fire and explosion hazards in all Air Force aircraft.

The polyurethane foam is reticulated—composed of open cells—so that fuel will flow freely through it without being absorbed. The material resembles steel wool, but is less dense. The foam virtually prevents explosion in case of a direct hit on the tank by machinegun tracer bullets or other incendiaries. It also suppresses slosh in the tanks during flight.

The foam prevents tanks from spewing and spilling fuel spray when ruptured, thus reducing the fire hazard. This will greatly improve the aircraft's chance of surviving a crash. It also averts external flame fronts from creeping back into the fuel tanks, thus eliminating the danger of secondary fires or explosions.—US Air Force release.

'Vulcan' Air Defense System

Army News Features

Both the self-propelled and towed versions of the *Vulcan* air defense system provide a high degree of mobility against low-altitude targets. The *M61A1* automatic, six-barrel weapon, which operates on the *Gatling* gun principle, fires up to 3,000 rounds of 20-millimeter ammunition per minute.

The *Vulcan* complements the *Chaparral*—an air-to-air *Sidewinder* missile modified for the surface-to-air role—to provide field commander's with low-altitude air defense in forward battle areas.—Army News Features.

Automatic Mapper Unveiled

New automatic equipment which can produce a map from an aerial photograph in 24 hours has been unveiled by the Army Corps of Engineers. Named the Universal Automatic Map Compilation Equipment *(UNAMACE)*, the new machine replaces manual procedures which took from six to 24 months depending on the complexities and color shadings of the map.

The *UNAMACE* provides the Army with vitally needed maps faster than heretofore possible. Also, it requires only a fraction of the skilled manpower, and the maps produced have greater accuracy and consistency.—DOD release.

'Shillelagh' Issued to Tank Unit



Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corporation

The *Shillelagh*—the United States first guided missile to be fired from a gun—has gone into service with the US Army. The first units of the *Shillelagh* guided-missile system have been issued to a tank battalion at Fort Riley, Kansas.

The *Shillelagh* missile system delivered to Fort Riley is mounted as an integral part of the *Sheridan* tank.

Fort Riley will serve as one of the combat crew training centers for the *Sheridan-Shillelagh* system, "marrying" the crew to the tank-weapon system to establish combat operational capability.

In addition to being standard armament on the *General Sheridan* vehicle, it is being adapted to the Army's *M60 A1E1* main battle tank and will also be standard weaponry on the joint United States-Federal Republic of Germany main battle tank *(MBT70)*. —DOD release.

SAM-D System

Army News Features

Artist's concept of the SAM-D

SAM-D (surface-to-air missile development), the new air defense system that might be used for both battlefield and continental air defense against high-performance aircraft and short-range missiles, is now in advanced development.

Aided by high-speed digital computers, the highly mobile, all-weather system will be able to acquire, identify, track, and destroy multiple targets in the air simultaneously.

A firing unit of as few as three vehicles could be capable of operating in a battlefield environment. A complete SAM-D battery—including radars, launchers, communications, and fire-control equipment—will require approximately 12 vehicles.

The SAM-D missile can carry either a nuclear or conventional warhead, and the warhead section can be interchanged in the field.

All of the system's elements will be mounted on either tracked or wheeled vehicles to provide maximum ground mobility. The entire weapon system may also be transported in current aircraft, on seagoing vessels, or by rail.—Army News Features.

Armor Protection for Trucks

The US Army Limited War Laboratory has developed a lightweight armor kit for the Army's ¼-ton, ¾-ton, and 2½-ton trucks for protection against ambush attacks.

The armor is made of ¼-inch hard steel, and the windshield and windows of 2¼-inch glass are plastic laminated. An explosive deflecting skid plate is mounted under the cab.

To be used in Vietnam, the armor is not meant to make a tank of the vehicle but, rather, to protect soldiers from initial bursts of fire and give them time to dismount and take offensive action.—Army News Features.

Lifting Body Vehicle Designated 'X-24'

The United States newest flight research vehicle has been designated the *X-24*. It is a piloted, flatiron-shaped, wingless lifting body powered by a rocket engine. The vehicle will explore the flight envelope and speed regimes of rocket-powered, lifting body experimental aircraft as part of a joint Air Force and National Aeronautics and Space Administration lifting body program.

The *X-24* was formerly called the *SV-5P*. *X-24A* flights will investigate the flight characteristics and maneuverability of piloted lifting bodies



US Air Force

from supersonic reentry speeds at 100,000 feet down to conventional landing speeds. Data gained will help develop the technology to support a possible future requirement for a manned, lifting body reentry vehicle capable of returning from space and landing at a designated site of the pilot's choice.

Like the *X-15*, the 5,000-pound *X-24* will be air launched from a *B-52* at the Air Force Flight Test Center at Edwards Air Force Base, California. Its rocket engine will drive the odd-looking aircraft to higher altitudes and supersonic speeds before it glides to a controlled landing on Muroc Dry Lake where earlier experimental aircraft also made technological history.

The *X-24* looks like a lopsided wedge with a curved bulbous top, flat bottom, and angled vertical fins on either side. It has eight aerodynamic control surfaces—two upper and two lower flaps and four rudders, two on each of the outside vertical fins.—US Air Force release.

Officer Schools Change Ratings

US Army officer schools will establish a Commandant's List of top students instead of rating students numerically or by thirds of classes.

All Army officer schools, except the US Army War College, will use the Commandant's List which will contain the names of the men in the upper 20 percent of the class. The Commandant's List will be similar to the Dean's List in civilian colleges.

The change was approved by the Chief of Staff after recommendation by the Department of the Army Board to Review Army Officer Schools, commonly called the Haines Board.

In this new way of recognizing top students, a distinguished graduate and four honor graduates will be designated from the Commandant's List.

In another approved Haines Board recommendation, a narrative statement on the student's personal qualities and manner of performance will be required for all graduates of the Army War College.—Army News Features.

Main Battle Tank Unveiled

Army News Features

The main battle tank (*MBT70*), the most advanced armored vehicle ever developed for the US Army, was recently unveiled in Washington, D. C.

The main weapon of the *MBT70* is a 152-millimeter gun capable of firing both conventional ammunition and *Shillelagh* guided missiles. An automatic loading system eliminates the fourth crew member of the *M60* tank.

The built-in environmental control which protects the crew against radiation and chemical and biological agents also enables the *MBT70* to operate buttoned-up for a longer time than any other tank currently in operation.

Increased cross-country mobility is made possible by a unique suspension system which permits varying ground clearance from the normal to higher or unusually low silhouettes. The vehicle can also be tilted front-to-back, back-to-front, and side-to-side to remain level under all terrain conditions.

The tank's fire control system gives the *MBT70* night-fighting ability and greater first-round hit capability than previous models. This stabilized system incorporates a periscope that enables the gunner to remain on target continuously.

The tank is powered by a newly designed 1,475-horsepower diesel engine. The transmission has converter and lockup gear ranges with four forward and four reverse ranges.

The research and development of the tank has been a jointly shared project of the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany. A decision on production of the *MBT70* will be made after the results of the tests now underway have been evaluated.—Army News Features.

Communications Station in Australia

The world's second most powerful communications station has been put into operation by the Navy on Australia's North West Cape.

The 28-square-mile installation will broadcast messages to fleet units in southeast Asian waters and the Indian Ocean. The station can also communicate with submerged submarines by very low frequency radio signals.

The station was seven years in planning and building and is second only to the communications station in Cutler, Maine, which is also operated by the Navy.

The installation will be manned by 400 US military and civilian personnel and 350 Australians.—DOD release.

Navy Gun Developed

The Navy has developed a lightweight, fully automatic, 5-inch, 54-caliber gun which will eventually replace the 5-inch, 38-caliber gun now used primarily on destroyers.

The new gun weighs one-third less than the present gun and can be operated by a six-man crew stationed below decks. It has a range of 20,000 yards and fires a projectile weighing more than 50 pounds.

The gun—with a 20-round-per-minute rate of fire—will increase a destroyer's capability in engaging fast-moving air and surface targets and permit increased fire support during amphibious operations.—DOD release.

Portable Artillery Platforms

Army News Features

Portable aluminum artillery platforms weighing about 7,300 pounds have been built for use as rice-paddy fire bases. Without the platform, the soft ground would make accurate artillery fire nearly impossible. The platforms can be carried by *CH-47 Chinook* helicopters.—Army News Features.

AUSTRIA

Swedish Aircraft Studied



Interavia

Saab-105

The Austrian Air Force recently purchased 20 Swedish *Saab-105XT* jet trainers for about 10 million dollars. Indications are the Austrians will continue to buy Swedish aircraft and order the Mach 2 delta-winged *J-35 Draken* fighter. Sources say the *Draken* order could run to about 30 to 35 million dollars. The export version of the *Draken* costs about 1.2 million dollars. Competing aircraft include the US-built *F-5* and *Skyhawk*, and the French *Mirage III*.

Both the *105XT*, to be delivered in 1969, and the *Draken* would replace the Austrian Air Force's *Saab J-29 Flying Barrels*. A factor that could swing the purchase to the *Mirage III* is the Austrian endeavor to enter the European Economic Community, to which Sweden has just recently applied for membership. —*Armed Forces Management*, October 1967, © 1967.

WEST GERMANY

'Roland' Air Defense Missile

The French *AMX13* armored personnel carrier (APC) and the newest West German APC will be used as launch vehicles for the *Roland* surface-to-air missile, a German-French development. The vehicles carry identical launching and guiding devices in the revolving radar turret.—News item.

NORWAY

Swedish 'S' Tank

The Norwegian Army is evaluating the Swedish turretless *S* tank as a possible replacement for US *M48 Patton* tanks which will be phased out in the next five years.

Competing with the *S* tank is a West German *Leopard* 39-ton model. —*Armed Forces Management*, October 1967, © 1967.

JAPAN

'Nike' and 'HAWK' Missile Systems

Japan and the United States have signed agreements for the production and procurement of military equipment for Japan's self-defense forces.

The equipment includes three battalions of *HAWK* and associated missiles and supporting equipment to be produced in Japan.



US Army

Nike Hercules

Also included in the agreement is the procurement from US sources of two battalions of *Nike Hercules* ground support and auxiliary equipment; production in Japan of *Nike Hercules* missiles; and procurement from the United States of another battalion of *Nike Hercules* equipment.

The *Nike* and *HAWK* programs play an important role in the Japanese Third Defense Buildup Plan which runs through the end of Fiscal Year 1971.— DOD release.

INDIA

'Vyata' Tank

The *Vyata* (meaning victor) battle tank, which is in production in India under license from a British firm, mounts a 105-millimeter cannon. The 37-ton tank can float and is powered by the same type engine used in the *Chieftain* tank. Its turret resembles that of the *Centurion* tank (MR, Mar 1966, p 107).—News item.

FRANCE

'Kormoran' Naval Missile

The *Kormoran* missile, designated the *AS-34* and developed jointly by France and West Germany, will be tested soon, according to a French source. An improved version of the *AS-30* surface-to-air missile, the *AS-34* will be used against seaborne targets.—News item.

'Mirage V'

The newest member of the *Mirage* family is the *Mirage V* ground attack fighter. It uses the same airframe as the *Mirage III-E*, but the avionics are not as extensive. The *Mirage V* has seven attachment points for external stores, with a total carrying capacity of four tons.

Interavia

Mirage V

In the Paris airshow, the *Mirage V* was shown with 14 bombs of various sizes. Two 30-millimeter cannon are mounted in the fuselage.—News item.

CANADA

Composition of the Fleet



Canadian Forces Sentinel

HMCS *Bonaventure*

The Maritime Command's 36 warships consist of an aircraft carrier, helicopter-destroyers, destroyer escorts, submarines, and support ships. There are more than 100 auxiliaries, from research vessels to small passenger ferries.

The 20,000-ton aircraft carrier *Bonaventure* heads the Royal Canadian Navy's antisubmarine warfare team. It has an angled deck, mirror landing system, and steam catapult and carries twin-engine *CS2F-2 Tracker* aircraft and *CHSS-2 Sea King* helicopters.

There are 23 helicopter-destroyers and destroyer escorts in the fleet, 20 of them completed in the past 12 years. Two of the helicopter-destroyers had a hangar and flight deck included in their initial construction; seven others were converted to accommodate the heavy *Sea King* helicopter. All of the helicopter-destroyers have the Canadian variable depth sonar.

The HMCS *Ojibwa*, the first of three *Oberon* class submarines for the RCN, was commissioned at Chatham, England, 23 September 1965.

In January 1966, the headquarters of the integrated Maritime Command was established at Halifax, with a Pacific subcommand at Esquimalt, British Columbia.

The air elements include three squadrons equipped with *Argus* antisubmarine aircraft, one squadron of *Neptune* aircraft, one squadron of *Tracker* aircraft, and one squadron of *Sea King* antisubmarine helicopters, in addition to support forces. There are five escort squadrons of ships. About two-thirds of the maritime force is on Canada's east coast.—Canadian Military Journal.

MILITARY BOOKS

STRUGGLE FOR VICKSBURG. The Battles and Siege That Decided the Civil War. By the Staff of Civil War Times Illustrated. 66 Pages. The Stackpole Co., Harrisburg, Pa., 1967. $4.95.

BY MAJ MILTON B. HALSEY, JR., *USA*

The fall of Vicksburg, Mississippi, to Union forces under General Ulysses S. Grant, went, perhaps, virtually unheralded in the aftermath of news of another Union victory at Gettysburg on the same day. But tactically and strategically, the results of this campaign rank among the most decisive of the entire Civil War. The Confederacy was now split, and the outcome of the war was inevitable.

After outlining the strategy and maneuvering of forces by General Grant from February 1862, the editors begin their detailed description of this campaign with the landing of General Grant's forces below Vicksburg on 30 April 1863, and continue it until the surrender of the city on 4 July 1863.

The book traces the action from Fort Gibson to the Battle of Raymond; the destruction of Jackson, Mississippi; the decisive battle at Champion's Hill; and, finally, the siege of Vicksburg.

Large-scale, joint Army-Navy operations, mobile force operations behind enemy lines, riverine warfare, logistic support over long lines of communications, and siege warfare were all part of this campaign. This book provides a concise, but interesting, account of these aspects of warfare.

CONTEMPORARY MILITARY STRATEGY. By Morton H. Halperin. 156 Pages. Little, Brown & Co., Boston, Mass., 1967. $2.25 paperbound.

BY LTC BARTON M. HAYWARD, *USA*

In this short volume, Dr. Halperin, a well-known author, reviews the major issues in contemporary military strategy on a worldwide basis, although the emphasis is primarily on US policies.

Formerly an Assistant Professor of Government at Harvard University, the author is currently Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

The author covers diverse subjects and provides a clear, concise picture of the ramifications of each. These subjects include the role of force and warfare in the nuclear age; military strategy of the United States, China, and the Soviet Union; European and Asian deterrence and defense; general, limited, and revolutionary war; military research methods; and the seeming antithesis of military strategy—arms control.

Mr. Halperin's conclusions do not always match current popular ideas. For example, he notes that the Chinese Communists are not as anxious for nuclear war as many would have us believe.

The analysis of each subject is thorough and well written. This is a book for both the military and the nonmilitary reader.

PEACEFUL CONFLICT. The Non-Military Use of the Military. By Dr. Edward Bernard Glick. 223 Pages. The Stackpole Co., Harrisburg, Pa., 1967. $6.50.

BY LTC ROBERT R. DUNLAP, *USA*

Peaceful Conflict is a thorough study of military civic action, a subject of vital interest to the Armed Forces. Dr. Glick's penetrating study includes the history of military civic action; the organization and operations of US military civic action; and the involvement of the military forces of Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, the Far East, and Vietnam in improving the social and economic conditions in their respective countries.

The author discusses civic action of the armed forces of the Philippines during the Huk insurgency, and some of the projects and observations of US forces in Laos and Vietnam. The conclusion of the study is a frank consideration of the problems associated with military civic action.

FRONTIERSMEN IN BLUE. The United States Army and the Indian, 1848-1865. By Robert M. Utley. 384 Pages. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1967. $9.95.

BY LTC GEORGE M. RODGERS, *USA*

This volume is a comprehensive and interesting history of the US Army in its confrontations with the numerous Indian tribes of the West prior to the Civil War.

The author goes into great detail in describing the actual battles, large and small, between Army units and Indians. Included are maps and many excellent illustrations of Army commanders, Indians, and forts.

This is one of the most detailed accounts of this era. It is recommended for students of military and Indian history.

RUSSIA 1917: The February Revolution. By George Katkov. 489 Pages. Harper & Row, Inc., New York, 1967. $8.50.

BY LTC WILLIAM I. GORDON, *USA*

In February 1917, a quiet "liberal" revolution occurred in Russia which received the support of governments in both Europe and the United States. This "Great Bloodless Russian Revolution" was the trigger for the bloody Bolshevik Revolution that followed and led to the return of V. I. Lenin by the Germans, as part of their strategy of *Revolutionierungspolitik.*

Mr. Katkov was born in Moscow and lived in Russia until 1921. In this book, he explores the history of Russia leading up to the February Revolution, the events of the revolution itself, and the part played by German intervention in changing the course of Russian history.

The book is valuable to those individuals interested in the genesis of revolutions in general.

THE CAMPAIGNS ON THE TURKISH FRONTS. The Military History of World War I. Volume 5. By Colonel Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, United States Army, Retired, and Grace Person Hayes. 109 Pages. Franklin Watts, Inc., New York, 1967. $2.95.

BY LTC FRANCIS A. IANNI, *USA*

The entry of Turkey on the side of the Central Powers in World War I complicated the war by cutting off Russia from sources of supplies. This volume relates the bold plan by Winston S. Churchill to force a passage through the Dardanelles and the Gallipoli campaign which followed.

A sketch of these failures is followed by a recounting of the British successes on the Turkish fronts in the Middle East.

THE WAR IN THE AIR. The Military History of World War I: Volume 11. By Colonel Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, United States Army, Retired. 98 Pages. Franklin Watts, Inc., New York, 1967. $2.95.

Outlining the early debut of war in the air, this book sketches the colorful and daring pilots on both sides of the conflict, and describes the development of their weapons.

Concluding that the air war had no important influence on World War I, the author touches upon the conflict between those officers who saw no future for airpower and the theorists who grossly exaggerated the capability of the aircraft to destroy a nation's will to resist.

SUMMATION: Strategic and Combat Leadership. The Military History of World War I: Volume 12. By Colonel Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, United States Army, Retired. 94 Pages. Franklin Watts, Inc., New York, 1967. $2.95.

This volume presents an evaluation of the principal political and military leaders of World War I and their strategy. Also included is a chronology of the war and miscellaneous facts and figures on such items as shipping losses and the cost of the conflict.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE DEFENSE MARKET, 1955-1964. By William L. Baldwin. 249 Pages. Duke University Press, Durham, N. C., 1967. $8.00.

BY MAJ DENNIS S. FARLEY, *USA*

Presented in this volume is a detailed look into the "structure" of the defense market during a decade of the cold war when neither escalation nor disarmament was a significant feature. This book will be of interest to students of the military procurement and contract field.

THE SECOND WORLD WAR: A MILITARY HISTORY. From Munich to Hiroshima in One Volume. By Basil Collier. 640 Pages. William Morrow & Co., Inc., 1967. $8.95.

BY LTC ANTHONY P. DE LUCA, *USA*

This book is a concise history of World War II and its more important campaigns. Included are 67 maps, a bibliography, appendixes, and the author's source notes.

SCIENTISTS AND WAR. The Impact of Science on Military and Civil Affairs. Sir Solly Zuckerman. 177 Pages. Harper & Row, Inc., New York and Evanston, 1967. $4.95.

BY COL WALTER F. ARNOLD, *USA*

Sir Solly Zuckerman, Chief Scientific Advisor to the British Government, re-presents as a series of essays seven of his lectures given during the period 1959-66. All seven chapters are linked by the theme:

. . . . that there are major constraints to the freedom with which the goals of scientific and technological activity can be selected, and that whatever the goals that may be chosen, their achievement carries the risk of being associated with unpredictable social repercussions. . . [and] determine the tactics, then the strategy, and finally the politics of tomorrow.

The historical impact of science and technology on military and civil affairs is analyzed and discussed around contemporary issues of the scientist and the military professional, industry and defense, the nuclear era, and national costs versus scientific-technological progress. The related side issues of priorities and secrecy in basic science and the social functions of science are also expounded.

Serious students will find these essays illuminating when compared to the unfolding world in which they live.

THE RED GUARD. A Report on Mao's Revolution. By Hans Granqvist. Translated by Erik J. Friis. 159 Pages. Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, 1967. $5.95.

BY JAN S. PRYBYLA

A Far Eastern correspondent for Scandinavian news media, the author has visited Communist China on two occasions—in November-December 1964, and April-May 1966. The last visit coincided with the pre-Red Guard phase of Mao Tse-tung's Cultural Revolution.

In this book, he traces the origins, describes the development, and assesses the implications of this apocalyptic happening. His basic thesis is that the Cultural Revolution is a desperate attempt by the old-line, guerrilla-type Communist faction to impose an ascetic, superegalitarian, guerrilla communism based on "mass participation" and to destroy once and for all every vestige of "revisionism" and "economism."

To do this, Mao and his faction found it necessary to go outside the Communist Party apparatus, to call on mobs of youngsters and later Maoist workers' "Revolutionary Rebel" formations, and to appeal to the army for support. In the process, the party apparatus has been for all practical purposes destroyed, and deep rifts were created within the mass youngster, workers', and army-based movements.

The author describes the Maoist concept of life which animates the Cultural Revolution. He examines the special role of the mass young people's movement and of the army, looks at the summer 1966 disturbances in Shanghai and other places, and tries to identify the opposition.

The Red Guard adds another item to our rapidly growing library of what to make of the Chinese jigsaw puzzle. Because of the chaotic course on which Communist China is presently set, the book gives the impression of becoming obsolete under the pen, so to speak. This is unfortunate, but, perhaps, inevitable. In the meantime, the best one can do is to read it, and then read some more, and then compare, and remain mystified.

THE TEST BAN TREATY: Military, Technological, and Political Implications. By James Hubert McBride. 197 Pages. Henry Regnery Co., Chicago, Ill., 1967. $5.75.

BY MAJ JACK GOLDSTEIN, *USA*

On 5 August 1963 in Moscow, the United States signed what has been considered one of the most important treaties of this century.

In this book, Dr. McBride provides a comprehensive analysis of the impact of the treaty on the national security of the United States. Most of the information presented was derived from hearings on the treaty by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee. In addition, statements by members of the executive and legislative branches of Government add to an understanding of the treaty's military, technological, and political implications.

One chapter considers the treaty's military advantages and disadvantages to the United States. Three advantages are discussed in the light of 23 disadvantages or risks to the United States. This comparison leads the author to conclude that the three advantages can only be termed advantages if the United States is resigned to accept second place to the Soviet Union in nuclear technology.

PATTERNS OF SOVIET THOUGHT. The Origins and Development of Dialectical and Historical Materialism. By Richard T. De George. 293 Pages. The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, Mich., 1966. $6.95.

BY LTC CHARLES L. MCNEILL, *USA*

Mr. De George, a lecturer in philosophy at the University of Kansas, states the hypothesis that both historical and dialectical materialism have provided the philosophical cornerstone for Soviet thought. He advises his readers that "to understand Soviet thought is not necessarily to agree with it."

The author has included a summary of the writings of Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, and V. I. Lenin from which have evolved the fundamental basis for the current Soviet view of the world. But Mr. De George cautions his readers not to categorize the present Soviet philosophical thought as limited to or chained by the writings of Marx and Lenin. For the Soviet Communist Party, it is fairly easy to accommodate to changing conditions since classical Communist thought is adaptable and can be interpreted to fit particular events.

This book is an erudite summary of the tenets and the creed that comprise the current Soviet thought.

THE WAR IN VIETNAM. Prepared by the Staff of the Senate Republican Policy Committee. 62 Pages. Public Affairs Press, Washington, D. C., 1967. $1.00 paperbound.

BY LTC CORNELIUS J. GEARIN, JR., *USA*

A well-written partisan account of US involvement in Vietnam. The study attempts to discern weaknesses in the present administration's policies in Vietnam and to formulate a Republican position.

THE PACIFIST CONSCIENCE. Edited by Peter Mayer. 478 Pages. Henry Regnery Co., Chicago, Ill., 1966. $2.65 paperbound.

Mr. Mayer has selected 43 readings to show the variety of viewpoints and approaches in which the pacifist conscience has manifested itself since ancient times. The selections range from the writings of Lao-tzu, a sixth-century B.C. philosopher, to articles by Dr. Martin Luther King.

Included is an extensive bibliography of books on war, pacifism, nonviolence, and related studies.

STRATEGY OF ACTION. By General d'Armée André Beaufre, French Army, Retired. Translated From the French by Major General R. H. Barry. 136 Pages. Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York and Washington, D. C., 1967. $5.00.

BY LTC ROBERT G. KREBS, *USA*

The third in a series of tightly knit treatises on strategy and deterrence, *Strategy of Action* addresses principally governmental action in the field of international relationships. In this volume, General Beaufre is less concerned with the strategy of deterring conflict than with the means for its implementing the strategy. Nonetheless, his total strategy theme continues as his dominant thesis.

The author considers the terms deterrence and action as complementary. He employs and develops deterrence as the preventive, and *action* as the means for achieving this end. General Beaufre contends that ". . . deterrence is the shield which can only parry; action is the sword which can both strike and parry."

General Beaufre writes with his usual politico-military preciseness, and continues to display a broad grasp of military and world affairs.