Demonstrating Rapid Reinforcement of NATO

Return of Forces to Germany (REFORGER)

 

Gregory Fontenot

 

This is a preview chapter from Lariat Advance: Insights from the Cold War for the Twenty-First Century, which Army University Press plans to release digitally in June 2026. In this contribution to the anthology, Col. (Retired) Gregory Fontenot consolidates academic historical rigor with his own military experiences as a young leader in America's Cold War Army. He provides a crucial history of the joint and combined exercise with European allies designed to reassure the German people of the US intention to participate in NATO ground defense and deter the Soviet Union. Between 1969 and 1993, Return of Forces to Germany (REFORGER) involved Allied forces, special operations troops, and significant support from the West German government. Memoir meets military history in Colonel Fontenot's compelling narrative of an army in practice and preparation. Lariat Advance, edited by Col. (Retired) Greg Fontenot, Brig. Gen. (Retired) James "Pat" O'Neal, and Col. (Retired) Mike Shaler, provides contemporary lessons from influential US Army leaders who helped transform the US Army following the war in Vietnam. That transformation is not unlike the one that must occur in the contemporary force.

Introduced in 1969, Return of Forces to Germany (REFORGER) was a joint and combined exercise with European allies that demonstrated America's intention to participate in the NATO ground defense and to deter the Soviet Union. REFORGER also practiced strategic and tactical mobility of committed forces that would demonstrate to Europe and the Soviet Union alike that defending Europe was not only possible but that the United Sates and NATO could and would do just that. With REFORGER, the United States visibly confirmed its NATO commitments and worked to address several issues:

* The US strategy of massive retaliation was not sufficiently credible to deter Soviet adventurism.

* Interest was growing to reduce US Treasury costs with maintaining a large force in Europe.

* The Federal Republic of Germany was evolving from an occupied power to a major independent contributor to alliance defense.

* The Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries were becoming more threatening, as evidenced by the 1956 Soviet occupation of Hungary, the 1961 Berlin Crisis, and the dramatic 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, which produced growing unease within the alliance.

The evolution of this thinking was impeded by the US war in Vietnam, then accelerated by the realization that the US military's ability to fight a continental land war had eroded.

REFORGER grew to involve allied forces, special operations troops, and always-significant support from the West German government. From 1969 to 1993, German citizens tolerated thousands of foreign troops maneuvering across their land and causing "maneuver damage," a euphemism for tanks and other equipment tearing up their fields, roads, and towns. The largest REFORGER occurred in 1988 when 125,000 soldiers participated in Field Training Exercise (FTX) Certain Challenge.¹

Both civilians and soldiers lost their lives in REFORGER-related accidents - unsurprising when thousands of soldiers and airmen take the field in hundreds of armored vehicles and aircraft. One of the most tragic occurred on 13 October 1973, when a US Air Force fighter-bomber crashed into the back of an M-113 armored personnel carrier - killing both crew members in the plane as well as two soldiers and the farmer who owned the field where the accident occurred. Considering the inconvenience and actual danger created by these exercises, the patience displayed by the great majority of Germans deserves respect.²

Recognizing the Value of REFORGER Based on Personal Experience

The Army graduated my Armor Officer basic course at Fort Knox on the afternoon of 3 September 1971, Friday of Labor Day weekend. Assigned to the 1st Battalion 63rd Armor Regiment (1-63 AR) at Fort Riley, Kansas, I left immediately after graduation for Manhattan, Kansas, and the small apartment I would share with my wife, arriving about three in the morning Saturday. A few days later, I arrived in Germany to play a miniscule role in REFORGER III and FTX Certain Forge.³

There I began my education in strategic deployment and multi-echelon field exercises. REFORGER III was the first of six in which I participated. My last was REFORGER 88, the largest ever held. That year V Corps played the role of Blue or NATO forces against VII Corps, which was the Orange or aggressor forces. Each corps fielded two US divisions and a German Panzer division. The 4th Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (CMBG) served with VII Corps, and German Territorial Command South supported river crossing operations on the Rhine. Some 125,000 troops went through their paces for two weeks along with American, Canadian, French, and German air force units.⁴

During the early days of REFORGER, and for many that followed, 1-63 AR only approached full strength during REFORGER preparation and execution. As a consequence, my role during REFORGER III was rare - an extra lieutenant assigned as "assistant" battalion motor officer (BMO), a job not found on the US Army's table of organization and equipment but one that afforded a great learning experience in Germany.

I flew to Germany like most of the troops on a C-141 Starlifter aircraft from Forbes Air Force Base in Topeka, Kansas, to Rhein-Main Air Force Base near Frankfurt, Germany. From there our unit was bussed to various Prepositioning of Materiel Configured in Unit Sets (POMCUS) sites where individuals would draw their equipment. Other flights landed at Ramstein Air Force Base and Echterdingen Airport near Stuttgart. During this era, most POMCUS sites were in the German state of Rhineland-Palatinate in the corridor running roughly from Kaiserslautern to Pirmasens, though later sites were established elsewhere.⁵

Getting to Germany by C-141 challenged not only the Military Airlift Command but also the 1st Infantry Division and the garrison staff at Fort Riley who were responsible for deploying the division. Each soldier wore or carried gear and had packed two footlockers (duffel bags eventually replaced footlockers) in accordance with an explicit packing list. Each was stenciled with the soldier's name, unit, and a red ball with TAT [To Accompany Troops] stenciled on it. Given that each C-141 carried 106 troops, 212 footlockers, and other light dunnage, the transport requirement was not insignificant. On arrival, only those soldiers absolutely required to draw equipment went directly to POMCUS sites. Others moved to initial assembly areas.

US Army Europe (USAREUR) was responsible for reception, staging, and onward movement of arriving soldiers. Reception included getting those troops who would draw equipment and their baggage to POMCUS sites. Although most featured climate-controlled warehouses, POMCUS equipment was stored a variety of places and under a variety of conditions. Everything needed was available at POMCUS sites, from tanks to ambulances and generators. There was a lot to do on site: batteries were stored separately and had to be installed, engines needed to be started, precombat checks completed, and basic issue items inventoried.

Generally, the standard for POMCUS required that a unit draw, prepare, and inventory a battalion-sized formation in six hours. Brig. Gen. Stan Cherrie recalled, "There was a stop watch on everything that you did."⁶ Afterward, the units moved to initial unit assembly areas, associated with the planned FTX, where they staged for onward movement. In the staging areas, units assembled, fueled equipment, and prepared for onward movement to the exercise area. USAREUR support command logistics units, movement control centers, and military police, handled staging and supported preparation for onward movement.⁷

Reception and staging for REFORGER III began on 27 September 1971 as the first units arrived and concluded on 4 October when units began moving into their initial unit assembly areas near Heilbronn and Karlsruhe. Bavaria enjoyed glorious weather that fall. The nights were cold but the days clear and sunny. Thanks to mild weather, troops did rather less maneuver damage than usual. Staging concluded when the units were prepared to move onward to the exercise area east of Munich, some 200 miles away. In these FTX assembly areas, the 1st Infantry Division, including 1-63 Armor, joined VII Corps, which served as the Blue Force. The two brigades of the 1st ID and the 4th Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group composed the combat units of the Blue Force. The opposing Orange Force included the German 35th Panzer Brigade and the 1st Brigade 1st Armored Division. Both sides had artillery and other combat support and service support units.⁸

Getting to the assembly areas was not an easy process. Riding in the trail vehicle in the 1-63 AR maintenance platoon convoy, which included everything from shop vans to wreckers towing broken-down vehicles, I experienced first-hand just how challenging disciplined convoy movement could be. Part of the convoy made the correct exit from the autobahn and part missed it. I was with the part that missed the exit. Those of us who missed that turn learned that the four-lane autobahn ended abruptly on a two-lane street in the old University Town of Heidelberg. I caught up and got the mess turned around with no more than a bent tow bar; the Germans were, justly, not amused.

When our vehicles finally made it to the assembly area, I heard from the battalion commander at some length about missing the turn. I had hidden from the German police, but they made their irritation known to the US authorities and could easily identify our unit from the bumper markings on our vehicles if we got off track again. The old man said his piece and sent me away. I knew that I was forgiven by the tone of his voice but had learned an important lesson in convoy discipline.

The battalion motor officer and I, his trusty assistant, had only the radios in our two jeeps to control a lengthy convoy. Traffic control points would have helped, but so would maintaining planned intervals. The motor officer should have alerted me that he was nearing the turn so I could run the length of the convoy to assure all vehicles were closed up before executing. Finally, the battalion motor officer could have issued strip maps so the troops knew where to turn. In any case, I learned from that experience and over time became quite good at running convoys.

I learned even more when I replaced our liaison officer (LNO) to brigade - likely dismissed because he had trouble finding the brigade each time the unit moved. The morning the exercise began, I inherited my predecessor's roll of maps and the grid coordinates to the 1st Brigade command post with no instructions except to get there immediately. After I arrived, the brigade executive officer came out of the command post looking for the LNO from 1-63 AR. Then he patiently explained that my purpose was not only to act as a courier but also to know what the battalion was up to and how it intended to carry out orders. My ignorance of the battalion's intentions was profound. In any case, I survived. I learned what the battalion meant to do and actually "liaised" during Certain Forge, the field exercise associated with REFORGER III. Certain Forge ran from 11 October through 15 October 1971 in the terrain corridor from Ingolstadt to Amberg, Germany. Ironically, our simulated fight began just east of Ulm, the same location where Napoleon outflanked the Austrian Army in 1805. While Napoleon went on to his great victory at Austerlitz, our "battle" concluded in the Grafenwohr training area.⁹

At "Graf," we test-fired POMCUS weapons and prepared to return equipment to storage. Thus, REFORGER practiced deploying, operating, and exercising prepositioned equipment - helping to ensure that stored equipment was rotated and maintained. Maintenance of POMCUS equipment proved rewarding since repair parts were available. At Fort Riley, tanks and other vehicles remained inoperable for months at a time for the lack of repair parts. This phase ended on 31 October. The last troops began leaving Germany via Rhine Main on 13 November.¹⁰

I learned a lot during my first REFORGER but had a great deal more to learn about why REFORGER existed and just how it applied to the 1st Infantry Division's part in the NATO General Defense Plan. Most of this learning came later. What I discovered in the fall of 1971 was plenty for a rookie second lieutenant. During my first tour at Fort Riley, I made REFORGER twice more. I did two REFORGERS in 1973 - first as a tank platoon leader and then as a tank company executive officer. Later, while stationed in the 3rd Armored Division in Germany, I commanded a tank company and maneuvered it in REFORGER 77. Subsequently, I served as 1st Infantry Division plans officer in REFORGER 86 and as the executive officer of 1st Brigade 1st Infantry Division in REFORGER 88.

As the 1st Infantry Division plans officer, I came to understand fully perhaps the most important benefit of REFORGER for Army units and joint forces. REFORGER enabled the joint forces to exercise emergency deployment from CONUS to Europe. Crunching the numbers with Military Airlift Command proved onerous but essential both for getting it right and understanding what it took to move a division. That year the National Guard 32nd Separate Infantry Brigade shipped all its equipment to Germany. Attached to the 1st ID, the 32nd demonstrated that a Guard brigade could mobilize and deploy strategically, albeit with warning. I worked closely with the 32nd and learned lessons on working with the National Guard that served me well.¹¹ Moreover, within limitations of weather and maneuver rights, once deployed, REFORGER enabled the Army in Europe to maneuver large forces in Germany's compartmented terrain. REFORGER permitted learning at echelons ranging from platoon to service component, joint and combined command, as well as exercising strategic air and sea lift components of the armed forces. Finally, REFORGER demonstrated America's commitment to NATO and supported readiness to deploy forces worldwide.

Long Thrust and Big Lift as Prologue

President John F. Kennedy ran for election in 1960 in part on a defense platform of "Flexible Response," a rejection of the Eisenhower administration policy of massive retaliation that posited maximum nuclear response to a Soviet attack. The 1961 Berlin Crisis alarmed the United States and NATO and uncovered serious issues in plans for defending western Europe. In A Military History of the Cold War; 1962-1991, soldier historian Jonathan House argued that readiness issues in the reserves revealed during the Berlin Crisis and the subsequent 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis led Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, with the support of Congress, to reduce the number of National Guard and Army Reserve divisions from thirty-seven to twenty-one. Eight National Guard Divisions and thirteen Army Reserve divisions remained. The reserve divisions gave up any combat role, House commented, and instead would focus on "training draftees in the event of mobilization."¹² McNamara believed that fewer, better resourced units would prove more effective than the low readiness that had been an issue during the early months of the Kennedy administration.¹³

In the spring of 1961, a simmering crisis over Berlin produced strong reactions among the NATO allies. In a private 4 June 1961 meeting, Soviet Premier Nikita Khruschev delivered what President Kennedy perceived as an ultimatum to remove US troops from Berlin. Kennedy and his advisors immediately considered how to respond, including reinforcing Europe with stateside units. On 9 June 1961, General Thomas D. White, US Air Force chief of staff, wrote a memorandum to Secretary McNamara entitled "Berlin Deterrent." White shared the opinions of the service chiefs regarding deterrent options, including to mobilize reserves and move units to Europe.¹⁴

The crisis worsened in August when East Germany began building a wall around Berlin to stem the outflow of its citizens to West Germany. In September, President Kennedy received Congressional approval to mobilize 148,000 reservists, including two Army National Guard divisions, the 32nd Infantry and the 49th Armored. To hasten reinforcement from CONUS, the US Army Europe commander in chief ordered in October 1961 that personnel and equipment for CONUS-based 2nd Armored Division (AD) and 4th Infantry Division (ID) as well as ten combat support units should be prepositioned in Europe.¹⁵

If required, 2nd AD and 4th ID would join five other US divisions, two Seventh Army corps that were forward-based in Europe. Twelve German, four British, two Belgian, and three Dutch divisions plus a Canadian brigade group rounded out the NATO order of battle in western Europe. Greek and Turkish units along with reserve formations raised the total NATO order of battle to sixty active and thirty reserve divisions.¹⁶

The Soviet Order of Battle varied between 140 and 175 divisions during the 1960s and 1970s.¹⁷ That daunting number was offset somewhat in that Soviet divisions were manned and equipped in tiers. Category three divisions were manned and equipped at very low levels. Soviet satellite armies fielded another fifty-six divisions. By 1984, the Soviets had 230 divisions. Demonstrating the means to reinforce Europe quickly was a necessary component to deterring the Soviet Union.¹⁸ The US Department of Defense conducted a series of exercises to prepare in case a major reinforcing effort would be required. This Long Thrust operation, one of ten conducted from late 1961 through the fall of 1964, was intended to test the prepositioning concept.

Long Thrust revealed the efficacy of the concept as well as problems. Each exercise deployed a body of troops, some of whom returned after a few weeks and others who remained in theater for three months or more. Long Thrust II in January through February 1962 was typical of the effort to anticipate what a Big Lift of 2nd AD or 4th ID would require. The Military Air Transport Service (MATS) moved three 4th ID battle groups from McChord Air Force Base to Rhein-Main Airforce base near Frankfurt. MATS flew 5,431 troops and 194 tons of cargo using 104 C-135B aircraft. The three battle groups deployed forward using equipment stored at various West Germany sites then concluded their redeployment on 16 February 1962.¹⁹

The original exercise regime for equipment required that each vehicle move "one space forward and return" biweekly.²⁰ Space limitations in the storage sites drove the process rather than any grand plan. Exercising equipment properly meant using it for long enough to demonstrate readiness or produce failure. Significant maintenance failures occurred during Long Thrust exercises, arguably due to inadequate operation and a shortage of repair parts. During preparation for Big Lift, crews spot-checked 690 uncorrected deficiencies and learned about two-thirds had been delayed for indefinite periods because parts were not available.²¹

Exercise Big Lift, conducted in 1963, reinforced the benefits of prepositioned equipment. The Military Airlift Command moved some 14,000 2nd AD troops from Fort Hood to Germany in 63 hours. Big Lift demonstrated the United States could respond to provocation, an important assurance to NATO given heightened tension with the Warsaw Pact.²²

Without theater logistics infrastructure in place, reinforcing units arriving from CONUS could not be effectively sustained. The "Study of the Prepositioning Concept Prior to BIG LIFT," concluded: "An adequate amount of support materiel, the type and quantities to be determined by study, would be necessary to allow rapid response envisioned in the concept."²³ Supporting rapid reinforcement of NATO depended on having the means, including manpower, to maintain stored equipment.²⁴

The Long Thrust exercises provided data to quantify the problem and determine maintenance requirements, resulting in solutions that would enable Preposition of Materiel Configured in Unit Sets, or POMCUS. Operation Big Lift would provide the proof of principle.

In the weeks preceding Big Lift, some 700 mechanics and drivers augmented the preposition storage sites and logged 619,000 man-hours to prepare equipment. Originally, logistics and maintenance detachments from the two reinforcing divisions were responsible to maintain stored equipment; however, there were too few soldiers assigned, facilities were inadequate, and parts were not available. Subsequently, Seventh Army assumed the responsibility and established units to maintain stored equipment. In June 1963, Seventh Army Support Command activated three discrete maintenance groups: two in Germany - the Infantry Maintenance Group at Spinelli Barracks, Mannheim, and an Armored Maintenance Group at Kleber Kaserne near Kaiserslautern - and the Combat Support Maintenance Group organized at Chenevieres, France.²⁵

During Operation Big Lift, which took place October-November 1963, the US Army used more than 200 flights to move 15,000 soldiers and 500 tons of equipment, simulating "a US response to a Warsaw Pact incursion into Central Europe."²⁶ The Military Air Transport Service demonstrated that it could do what was asked, despite the fact that much of the equipment 2nd AD drew was obsolescent or obsolete. General Paul Freeman Jr., US Army Europe commander, referred to the exercise as the "Big Hoax." In the years following the 1963 operation, the Army worked to improve its posture - in spite of competition with a hot war in Vietnam. By 1970, the system was well-developed, with nine battalions storing equipment. The capacity grew so that in the early 80s, four heavy divisions worth of equipment were in storage. The Army's new organization, named Combat Equipment Group Europe, benefitted from well-developed procedures for storing, maintaining, and issuing equipment.²⁷

REFORGER: Reducing Risk at Least Cost

REFORGER became a necessity because the United States simply could not afford to sustain five combat divisions and a cast of supporting units in Europe. Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatrick noted that the benefits of Big Lift included the ability "to make useful reductions in its [US] heavy overseas military expenditures without diminishing its effective military strength."²⁸ The Germans were thoroughly alarmed. Gilpatrick walked back the notion of removing US troops from Germany but set the expectation that the United States might do that.²⁹

Eventually what the Germans feared came to pass. Defense expenditures in Europe and the cost of the war in Vietnam, coupled with the costs of Great Society programs, ramped up the national debt during President Lyndon Johnson's administration. Accordingly, in 1968, the Army withdrew about 28,000 soldiers with 24th ID, 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, and some combat support units. To maintain its commitment to Europe, the United States agreed to return these forces to Germany each year for training, leading to the REFORGER - Return of Forces to Germany - acronym.³⁰

Although expanding POMCUS and running-large scale multi-echelon exercises each year brought other costs, REFORGER was cheaper than forward-basing 28,000 soldiers and their families. Additionally, the exercise had genuine benefits, ranging from air crew training to improved mobilization and war planning. For that reason, REFORGER continued through 1993.

Generally, REFORGER occurred in the late fall or winter. For the first REFORGER in 1969, the supporting Carbide Ice field training exercise took place from 29 January through 4 February. Carbide Ice involved some 17, 000 US troops from the 24th ID and 3rd ID operating in mud and ice. By REFORGER V in 1973, the supporting field training exercise grew to 51,000 troops. The size of the exercises varied but remained around 40,000 to 50,000 troops; at least two divisions and supporting arms participated, with one of the divisions and support units deploying from the United States. Participation by other NATO forces became the norm. German units routinely joined in, as did the 4th CMBG. In REFORGER 1980, the bulk of 2nd AD deployed to NATO's Northern Army Group area, reflecting NATO decisions to bolster its northern flank The units maneuvered with British forces in exercise Spearpoint 80. In REFORGER 1985, even tiny Luxemburg provided a light infantry battalion to the Blue Force.³¹

The largest REFORGER exercises occurred during the 1980s, combined with significant participation by NATO allies. In REFORGER 1982, the US Army's III Corps led the Orange force against Blue led by V and VII Corps. Some 72,500 troops maneuvered. German, Belgian, and Luxemburg troops along with the ubiquitous 4th CMBG joined in. NATO allies played a large role in Exercise Certain Strike as part of REFORGER 1987, with US III Corps as the Blue Force Headquarters. That force included 1st Cavalry Division (CD), three brigades from 2nd AD, 6th Cavalry Brigade (AH 64), 1st German Panzergrenadier Brigade, and the 3rd German Panzer Brigade. Orange forces included 4th Netherlands Division, 43rd Netherlands Mechanized Infantry Brigade, 4th UK Armoured Brigade, and a Belgian brigade. I Belgian Corps, I German Corps, I UK Corps, I Netherlands Corps, US 4th ID, and several artillery brigades participated at command post level. Exercising with NATO forces had multiple benefits, especially developing interoperability, building trust, and exercising at scale.³²

The Army used REFORGER for more than returning REFORGER units (units earmarked to reinforce Europe such as 1st ID, successor to the 24th ID, 2nd AD and 4th ID). In REFORGER 1976, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) shipped the bulk of its helicopter fleet and participated in two exercises, one in the US V Corps area (included as a player for the first time), and one in the VII Corps area. In REFORGER 1982 1,200 3rd Brigade 82nd Airborne Division paratroopers jumped into the maneuver area.³³

Special forces and psychological warfare units premiered special operations participation in exercise Certain Trek in 1975. In REFORGER 1976, a Ranger battalion - 1st Battalion 75th Infantry Regiment (Ranger) - participated. Medical units participated from the outset, playing an increasing role in subsequent years. In REFORGER 1984, the 332nd General Hospital (US Army Reserve) deployed. Deploying a general hospital is a big project, as such large facilities are designed to provide long-term care. The Army National Guard debuted in REFORGER 1979, and their role increased as well. In REFORGER 1986, the 32nd Separate Infantry Brigade deployed with its equipment. This experiment along with others proved useful during Desert Storm and in later years.³⁴

Did Useful Training Occur?

Opinions differed about the value of REFORGER field training exercises. Lt. Gen. Ron Watts participated in REFORGER at several echelons of command, from CONUS and Europe - as a mechanized infantry battalion commander then later First Infantry Division commanding general. As commander of a heavy brigade at Fort Hood, he rotated battalions forward to reinforce USAREUR. Later as VII Corps commanding general, he was on "the receiving end of REFORGER units."³⁵ Watts described REFORGER as a great training opportunity:

* Helped develop a "sense of purpose" focus on training for a specific emergency/wartime mission.

* Allowed leaders at all levels to apply space, time, and distance factors while moving various size formations over terrain. Learning that events do not happen immediately is difficult to duplicate in home station training.

* Forced leaders to appreciate and address all factors related to operations - and pay as much attention to logistics as they did to tactical operations.

* Gave units an opportunity to move over the German countryside; a learning experience they would not have at home station training.³⁶

Lt. Gen. Don Holder, who deployed 1st Squadron 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) from Fort Bliss in both 1982 and 1983, shared a similar view of REFORGER's training value. As G-3 Operations of 2nd AD at Fort Hood, he planned the division's participation in REFORGER 1987 and commanded 2nd ACR in REFORGER 1988. Holder found that deploying from CONUS was more difficult and took more preparation time than moving out of Kasernes in Germany. But troops deploying from the US also had advantages. Holder's cavalry squadron succeeded against Europe-based units in 1983 "in part because we could train for maneuver at Fort Bliss with far fewer restrictions than USAREUR units had to observe."³⁷

Although few questioned the benefit of training at the division echelon, not everyone agreed regarding training value at the lower echelons. Brig. Gen. Bill Mullen, who participated in three REFORGERS, commented that the FTXs had "great value for logistics and coordination" but "wasn't particularly valuable" for maneuver troops.³⁸ Col. Bob Killebrew, who participated in REFORGER II and III 1970 and 1971, recalled that the weather during REFORGER II was uncooperative so his mechanized infantry company "mostly drove down the German highways in column."³⁹ REFORGER 1986 became known as the Ice REFORGER. The weather was so bad that after the 1st ID finally reached its assembly areas, the troops sat in the snow while only command posts exercised.⁴⁰

At the brigade, division, and corps echelons, three things made the FTX valuable. First, units received the same kinds of reports they would in combat or a command post exercise. Second and more important, these echelons had to manage movement of large bodies of troops in compartmented terrain often through medieval villages. Finally, the FTX stressed logistics. Support units had to keep fuel, food, and repair parts moving on a scale that could not be replicated in garrison.

Limitations on REFORGER FTXs, however, reduced the training benefit. Chief among the limitations was that there was - and still is - no means to simulate combat operations at the scale necessary. Although Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) became available in the 1980s, there were too few to mount them on the hundreds to thousands of combat vehicles that took part in the REFORGER FTXs. Allied formations would have first required training to use them, even if the necessary number of MILES kits existed. Moreover, no system existed then or now to effectively integrate air power, field, or anti-aircraft artillery.

Accordingly, umpires or controllers adjudicated combat results. To that end, detailed rules were developed to produce reasonable combat outcomes. On 1 August 1977, VII Corps published Regulation 350-7 "Field Exercise Umpiring Directive." The 157-page directive was pithy but no easy read. It included detailed tables on how to determine direct fire and indirect fire outcomes as well as reducing obstacles and just about anything else that might occur in combat, including managing prisoners of war.⁴¹

Despite all the rules and effort to account for every possibility, the directive also spelled out that controller/umpires should apply "sound tactical principles" and "professional judgment" to adjudicate outcomes, including arbitrating outcomes in the face of angry player unit commanders. Worse still, sometimes controllers had to intervene to mitigate outright cheating or gaming the administrative pauses in the exercise. The VII Corps authors understood this problem, directing that units "play the game" and abide by outcomes decided upon.⁴²

Still with all its limitations, the FTXs certainly provided training benefit for small unit leaders and up. Although benefits for a loader on a tank crew are harder to see, even loaders learned how to live in the field, watching for air threats, and other lessons. If foul weather limited maneuver, training benefit waned accordingly. On balance, the FTX helped demonstrate intent and, therefore, contributed to deterrence. This alone made the FTX valuable.

REFORGER also afforded opportunities to train and/or test other vital capabilities. During one REFORGER, Holder's squadron drew its basic load of ammunition - tons of ammunition, including hundreds of tank rounds as well as missiles for helicopters. In 1988, Lt. Col. Lynn Rolf's 1-34 AR drew its equipment while in MOPP 4 (Mission-Oriented Protective Posture-4), which required the soldiers to wear full chemical suits, masks, gloves, and boots in the warm September weather. Wearing chemical gear during the draw was physically and mentally challenging.⁴³

Implications for the Contemporary Force

The Army and the joint force particularly appreciated REFORGER's value during Operation Desert Shield. Army units deploying from both the United States and Germany had shared the experience of deploying at scale during REFORGER, though Desert Shield dwarfed the scale of anything done during the FTX. In So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast, US Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) historians James K. Matthews and Cora J. Holt detail the challenge of moving some 500,000 passengers (mostly service members), equipment, cargo, and petroleum products to Saudi Arabia during Desert Shield/Desert Storm. They describe how TRANSCOM achieved this amazing feat using all available strategic airlift as well as 252 aircraft from the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, or just under half of the fleet.⁴⁴ During the 1990 Desert Shield deployments, TRANSCOM had thirteen afloat prepositioning vessels, twelve prepositioning ships, and eight fast sea lift vessels assigned to the Maritime Sea Lift Command. The Maritime Administration activated the ninety-six Ready Reserve Force ships to support the deployment. Despite these resources, still more vessels had to be chartered.⁴⁵

The 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) and other Fort Riley units moved 15,180 soldiers from Fort Riley, Kansas, on 110 aircraft. Fifty-one C-141 transports and twenty-eight Boeing 747 airliners accounted for just over half the airplanes used. Canadian airline pilot Joe Oakley described the stream of airliners as so dense that he thought you could across the Atlantic on them.⁴⁶ During the REFORGER 87 exercise, some 6,000 pieces equipment from Fort Riley headed to the port of Beaumont, Texas, on 34 trains composed of 1,900 US Army cars. Equipment and dunnage amounted to 66,000 short tons. At the port, soldiers and stevedores loaded thirteen ships that then sailed for southwest Asia.⁴⁷

No one expects another effort on the scale of Desert Shield/Desert Storm, but such an effort cannot be ruled out, especially considering US security interests in Europe and the US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). Being unable to mount such an operation would have its own costs. The Department of Defense, TRANSCOM, and the Department of Transportation's Maritime Administration understand what might be required. Although current heel-to-toe rotations of Army brigades help maintain training and support deterrence worldwide, these are far smaller than most REFORGER exercises. For example, the May 2023 Griffin Shock exercise featured a single US heavy brigade deploying from Germany to Poland in less than a week. The United States has the capacity to support current operations, but the means to operate at larger scale is less certain. Exercises that rotate units to Poland and elsewhere in NATO clearly help prepare units to deploy but do not demonstrate the ability to scale up readily.⁴⁸

In his 5 March 2025 obligatory statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee, TRANSCOM commander General Randall Reed reported the Ready Reserve Force had forty-six Roll-on/Roll-off ships, fourteen of which were more than fifty years old.⁴⁹ The Ready Reserve Force bears the burden of strategic surface lift for the Military Sealift Command. The force subsequently acquired two more vessels and expects to acquire as many as ten more in Fiscal Year 2026.⁵⁰ But, as the TRANSCOM commander put it, "capacity will remain constrained because thirty ships are scheduled to retire between 2026 and 2034. "⁵¹ This is not a new problem, and it will not go away.

The US Civil Reserve Air Fleet retains 533 aircraft, but few have the lift capacity of the Boeing 747s which are declining in numbers as they are retired. US Air Force lift assets include 52 C-5s, 223 C-17s, and 271 C-130 aircraft.⁵² These amount to half of what was available in the 1990s. Air Force capacity is in decline, with only the C-130 still in production. Current capacity seems adequate but may not be adequate in the future.⁵³

Given these very real limitations, conducting exercises approaching the scale of REFORGER would seem prudent as the means of testing strategic lift; reassuring allies by bringing larger forces into Europe, the Pacific, and elsewhere; and assuring that the US Army can mount movement at the scale of two or more divisions. The Defender Europe exercises maintain the capability but not necessarily the needed capacity. With fewer forward-based forces, strategic lift needs to be a high priority.

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Notes

1. Tankograd Publishing, n.d., https://www.tankograd.com/cms/website.php?id=/en/REFORGER-88-Certain-Challenge.html. In addition to the troops, 15,000 vehicles were on German roads and fields.
2. Gregory Fontenot, The 1st Infantry Division and the US Army Transformed; Road to Victory in Desert Storm 1970-1971 (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2017), 20.
3. There is distinction between REFORGER and its associated field training exercise (FTX). REFORGER includes the deployment process, drawing equipment, post-FTX gunnery, and finally returning equipment to storage.
4. Walter Böhm, REFORGER, Vehicles of the US Army during Exercises, "Return of Forces to Germany" (Erlangen, DE: Tankograd Publishing, 2008), part 3, 25.
5. Böhm, 21.
6. Brig. Gen. (Retired) Stan Cherrie in discussion with the author, 11 February 2014.
7. Cherrie; and Ed Aymar, "Caring for POMCUS, a Continuous Job," Fort Riley Post, 6 October 1981. Standards for draw varied over time based on equipment. The point was to get out of the site as quickly as possible.
8. Böhm, REFORGER part 1, 21.
9. Böhm, part 1, 21; and David H. Zook, Jr. and Robin Higham, A Short History of Warfare (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1966), 155.
10. Böhm, part 1, 21.
11. Böhm, part 3, 2.
12. Jonathan M. House, A Military History of the Cold War; 1962-1991 (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2012), 4.
13. House, 4.
14. General Thomas D. White, Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, "Temporary Reinforcement as a Berlin Deterrent," June 1961, 1. See https://ng.wi.gov/news/21112 as well as https://www.texasmilitaryforcesmuseum.org/49ad/49division.htm. Dr. Donald A. Carter, "The U.S. Military Response to the 1960-1962 Berlian Crisis," n.d., 1, https://www.archives.gov/files/research/foreign-policy/cold-war/1961-berlin-crisis/overview/us-military-response.pdf.
15. Ralph A. Hafner and Carl F. Blozon, "Study of Prepositioning Concept Prior to Big Lift," Research Analysis Corporation, McLean, VA, April 1965, 1. For details on 32nd Infantry Division and mobilization totals, see https://ng.wi.gov/news/21112. For details on 49th Armored Division, see https://www.texasmilitaryforcesmuseum.org/49ad/49division.htm.
16. House, A Military History of the Cold War, 4.
17. Regarding the number of Soviet Divisions in 1970, see C. N. Trueman, "The Soviet Army," The History Learning Site, 25 May 2015, https://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/cold-war/the-soviet-army/.
18. "Some Soviet and Warsaw Pact Military Facts and Figures," NATO Archives, 13 February 1981, https://archives.nato.int/uploads/r/null/1/3/137737/0226_Some_Soviet_and_Warsaw_Pact_Military_Facts_and_Figures_1980_ENG.pdf, 7.
19. Hafner and Blozon, "Study of Prepositioning Concept Prior to Big Lift," 3; and JCS Memorandum for Major General C. V. Clifton, Situation Report LONG THRUST II A, DJSM, 9 January 1962, 1.
20. Hafner and Blozon, 5.
21. Hafner and Blozon, 5.
22. Hafner and Blozon, 5.
23. Hafner and Blozon, 2.
24. Hafner and Blozon, 2.
25. Hafner and Blozon, 5.
26. Douglas I. Bell, "Just Add Soldiers: Army Prepositioned Stocks and Agile Force Projection," US Army Heritage and Education Center, US Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 6. Bell's work is essential reading for those seeking to understand the genuine benefit of POMCUS - and, by extension, REFORGER - ultimately shown in Operations Desert Shield and Storm, https://issuu.com/chacr_camberley/docs/in-depth_briefing_us_army_force_projection. See also GAO Report B-256845, 11 August 1994. During the rapid downsizing following the end of the Cold War, Combat Equipment Group Europe, had trouble maintaining equipment in storage.
27. Bell, 6.
28. Allan R. Scholin, "Big Lift, Boon, Boondoggle or Bust," Air Force, December 1963, 33. See also Andrew Feickert and Kathleen J. McInnis, "Defender Europe 20 Military Exercise, Historical (REFORGER) Exercises, and U. S. Force Posture in Europe," Congressional Research Service, 14 January 2020, 1-3, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/if/if11407.
29. Scholin, 33.
30. Bell, "Just Add Soldiers," 6-7. Bell does not address expenditures associated with President Johnson's domestic agenda, but those expenditures certainly added the need to reduce the gold flow. See also Feickert and McInnis, "Defender Europe 20 Military Exercise, 1.
31. Böhm, REFORGER, part 1, 26, part 2, 11 and 56.
32. Böhm, part 2, 26, part 3, 15.
33. Böhm, part 1, 43, 47.
34. Böhm, part 1, 28, 34, 43, part 2, 46, part 3, 2.
35. Lt. Gen. (Retired) Ron Watts, email message to author, 24 May 2023.
36. Watts.
37. Lt. Gen. (Retired) Ron Watts, email message to author, 16 May 2023.
38. Fontenot, The 1st Infantry Division and the US Army Transformed, 15.
39. Fontenot, 15.
40. Fontenot, 15.
41. Headquarters VII Corps, VII Corps Reg 350-7, "Field Exercise Umpiring Directive," 1 August 1977, see table of contents and Annexes A-O.
42. Headquarters VII Corps, 3. The author can attest to the fact that player units did not always "play the game."
43. Leonard D. Holder, email message to author, 16 May 2023, 15.
44. James K. Matthews and Cora J. Holt, So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast: United States Transportation and Strategic Deployment for Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2002), 12. See also Tables II-1-II-3.
45. Mathews and Holt, 44 and Table III-5, 118-23.
46. Fontenot, The 1st Infantry Division and the US Army Transformed, 114-15.
47. Fontenot, 114-15.
48. Adrian Bonenberger, "Griffin Shock Sends 'Clear Message' on NATO Strength Amid War in Ukraine," Military.Com, 1 June 2023, 1, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2023/06/01/armys-v-corps-shows-it-could-deploy-brigade-poland-days.html.
49. "Statement of General Randall Reed, United States Air Force Commander, United States Transportation Command Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the State of the Command," 5 March 2025, https://www.ustranscom.mil/cmd/docs/Gen.%20Reed%20Written%20Statement%20to%20SASC%20March%205,%202025%20(as%20prepared).pdf.
50. "Statement of General Randall Reed;" Military Sealift Command, "Ship Inventory," accessed 13 August 2025, https://www.msc.usff.navy.mil/ships/ships-inventory; and US Department of Transportation Maritime Administration, "The Ready Reserve Force (RRF)," 30 June 2025, https://www.maritime.dot.gov/national-defense-reserve-fleet/ndrf/maritime-administration's-ready-reserve-force.
51. "Statement of General Randall Reed."
52. "Civil Reserve Air Fleet Fact Sheet," US Air Force, July 2014, https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104583/civil-reserve-air-fleet/. This site does not provide an inventory of aircraft committed by the various airlines. See also "Air Force Under Pressure as Airlift Capacity Falls," National Defense (3 June 22), https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2022/6/3/air-force-under-pressure-as-airlift-capacity-falls.
53. Defender Europe 2024 demonstrated the means but at a low scale. Defender Europe 2024 brought several units to Sweden, including an artillery battalion. For details, see "DEFENDER 24 Strengthens Transatlantic Cooperation," US Army News, 8 May 2024, https://www.army.mil/article/276111/defender_24_strengthens_transatlantic_cooperation.

 

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