Battlefield Now: Emerging Threats and Technologies

Part 1

By Retired Command Sgt. Maj. Dr. Robert Nelson, Retired Sgt. Maj. Robert Shawlinski, Retired Sgt. Maj. James Perdue, Sgt. Maj. Benjamin Pingel, Retired Sgt. Maj. Cregg Cannon, Sgt. Maj. Fabio Lusiani, Italian Army, Retired Sgt. Maj. Jesus Gonzalez, Retired Sgt. Maj. Vernon Yates

Sergeants Major Academy

February 6, 2026

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The multi-domain battlefield is a complex and dynamic operational environment (OE) undergoing a profound transformation driven by rapid advancements in technology, pervasive surveillance, and escalating ethical challenges.

From littoral zones to cyberspace, modern warfare is shaped by disruptive innovations like autonomous drones, hypersonic aircraft, human augmentation, weaponized social media, and transparent battlespaces.

These developments, coupled with the return of high-casualty attrition warfare, challenge traditional military doctrines and ethical frameworks, requiring adaptive strategies, robust countermeasures, and international cooperation to maintain strategic superiority.

NCOs play a critical role in determining how the Army overcomes multidomain battlefield challenges. As you read, consider what you’d do if you were faced with these multi-domain challenges during your next deployment. It’s essential to consider what actions leaders must take to succeed in this battlespace, as the challenges aren’t waiting for the next deployment, they’re here now.

Drones and Littoral Space Challenges

By Retired Sgt. Maj. Robert Shawlinski

Rapidly evolving drone technology has reshaped military operations, particularly in littoral zones, coastal regions vital for maritime sustainment, and amphibious operations.

These areas, characterized by complex geography, shallow waters, dense maritime traffic, and congested electromagnetic environments, pose unique challenges. Adversaries in this environment are increasingly deploying autonomous drone swarms and artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled underwater vehicles capable of sophisticated communication, coordination, and targeting.

These advancements threaten traditional naval dominance, as evidenced in conflicts like the Russo-Ukrainian War and Red Sea tensions, where low-cost and advanced drones, including AI-equipped smart drones, underwater reconnaissance drones, and "super swarms," proved extremely effective and difficult to counter (Forum Staff, 2024).

Smart drones (human out-of-the-loop, or human on-the-loop) enhance precision and situational awareness but are vulnerable to electronic warfare and cyberattacks (Wolfe, 2019).

Autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) extend naval operations into previously inaccessible domains, offering intelligence and offensive capabilities but they face challenges in underwater communication, detection, and security (InsideFPV, 2025).

Countering these threats requires a multi-layered defense strategy, integrating kinetic interceptors, directed-energy weapons, and soft-kill systems like RF jammers (Khawaja et al., 2022). Strategic alignment of counter-drone innovations is essential to avoid redundancy and optimize resources.

Nuclear Torpedoes in the Littoral Battlespace

By Retired Sgt. Maj. James Perdue

Nuclear bombs are no longer restricted to bomber or missile delivery. Nuclear armed torpedoes represent a new and formidable threat in littoral warfare, blending tactical utility with strategic deterrence (Siu, 2022; Kaur, 2023).

Capable of delivering devastating underwater attacks, these weapons endanger naval and amphibious forces operating near shorelines and in the deep. Their effects, shock waves, water column displacement, and radioactive fallout, threaten both military and civilian infrastructure, disrupting sea lines of communication and complicating evacuation efforts (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2023; Glasstone & Dolan, 1977).

Strategically, nuclear torpedoes enhance adversarial anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities, restricting U.S. amphibious operations and requiring integrated planning across joint force components (Clark et al., 2018).

Commanders must incorporate nuclear response policies, escalation management, and deterrence signaling into contingency plans to preserve freedom of maneuver.

Ground forces operating in contaminated environments need enhanced decontamination protocols and protective measures (Kristensen & Norris, 2018). As nuclear torpedoes blur the line between conventional and strategic weapons, they demand flexible, survivable, and technologically adaptive force structures to rethink traditional littoral warfare paradigms (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2020; Siu, 2022).

Hypersonic Aircraft in the Air Warfighting Domain

By Retired Sgt. Maj. James Perdue

Hypersonic technology, capable of exceeding Mach 5, five times the speed of sound, is revolutionizing air warfare by offering unmatched speed, range, and maneuverability (Thibert, 2024).

These systems enable rapid global strikes and enhanced missile survivability in contested environments, outpacing current air defense systems (Besser & Göge, 2017). Their unpredictable, nonlinear flight paths make detection and interception challenging, rendering them ideal for penetrating fortified defenses and delivering precise strikes from standoff distances (Esposito, 2021).

However, hypersonic weapons compress decision-making timelines, increasing the risk of misjudgments and unintended escalation. This requires updated doctrines, improved command-and-control (C2) systems, and potential arms control agreements.

As global powers like China and Russia develop hypersonic capabilities, the U.S. must prioritize innovation to maintain strategic balance (White, 2025). Hypersonic systems are redefining air combat, merging speed, survivability, and precision to reshape global deterrence and strategic competition.

Loitering Munitions

By Sgt. Maj. Benjamin Pingel

Loitering munitions, often called kamikaze or suicide drones, are unmanned aerial systems designed to loiter (drift) over target areas before executing precise strikes.

Their strategic significance surged during conflicts like the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, the Russo-Ukrainian War, and Israel-Hamas hostilities (Deveraux, 2022; Melville & Freebairn, 2024).

Modern loitering munitions vary widely in range, endurance, and warhead types, with systems like Israel’s Harop, which is capable of loitering for up to nine hours, overwhelming air defenses, and targeting ground assets effectively (Melville & Freebairn, 2024).

These munitions, often man-portable and deployable by small units, challenge assumptions about deep strike capabilities, armor survivability, and traditional indirect-fire systems (Deveraux, 2022).

Their integration of autonomous functions raises ethical concerns, particularly regarding human targeting and civilian risks (Atherton, 2021). Countermeasures, like advanced radar, electronic warfare tactics (e.g., GPS spoofing, frequency jamming), and decoys, are critical as these systems proliferate among state and non-state actors (Melville & Freebairn, 2024). International regulation, such as mandating human-in-the-loop control, is urgently needed to mitigate indiscriminate harm (Atherton, 2021).

Adaptive Camouflage

By Retired Sgt. Maj. Cregg Cannon

Adaptive camouflage is a type of camouflage that changes based on its surroundings. BAE Systems developed its version of this technology under its ADAPTIV system, an adaptive camouflage that enhances survivability and enables forces to evade infrared technology (Adaptiv, n.d.).

Unlike traditional camouflage, ADAPTIV uses lightweight hexagonal pixels powered by vehicle systems to mask or disguise thermal signatures, making armored vehicles blend into the terrain or appear as smaller civilian vehicles. This technology reduces detection range and enhances friend or foe (IFF) identification capabilities (Mraz, 2011).

Mounted on ballistic plates, approximately 450 metal pixels per vehicle side are controlled via a semiconductor-based heating and cooling system. An onboard library allows crews to program signatures for wooded, desert, or urban environments (Adaptiv, n.d.).

In contested OEs, where enemies use advanced sensors and long-range fires, adaptive camouflage provides a critical survivability advantage, enabling forces to engage without compromising their position during day or night operations (Department of the Army, 2025a; Department of the Army, 2025b).

Exoskeletons, Genetic Engineering, and Cyborgs

By Sgt. Maj. Fabio Lusiani, Italian Army

Advancements in exoskeletons, genetic engineering, and cyborg technologies are transforming warfare by enhancing Soldier performance across all domains. Exoskeletons, such as the U.S. TALOS suit, boost mobility, endurance, and strength, allowing Soldiers to carry heavier loads and sustain prolonged operations (McLeary, 2019).

Near-peer competitors like China and Russia are developing similar systems, escalating the global race for human augmentation (Mittal, 2025; McDermott, 2020).

Genetic engineering uses tools like Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats (CRISPR-Cas9), enable DNA modifications to enhance physical and cognitive abilities, such as endurance, strength, and disease resistance (Doudna & Sternberg, 2017; Shah, 2019).

Cyborg technologies integrate electronic components into the human body, improving intelligence gathering and combat efficiency through neural implants and sensory enhancements (Ritharson, 2023; Emanuel et al., 2019; Kania, 2020).

However, becoming a cyborg is not as unstoppable as it sounds, since these technologies introduce vulnerabilities to cyberattacks and raise ethical concerns about coercion, autonomy, and long-term societal impacts (Abed et al., 2023; Henschke, 2017; National Human Genome Research Institute, 2017). To address these challenges, military doctrine must incorporate robust cybersecurity, international regulations, and ethical oversight (Snyder & Heitzenrater, 2024; Henschke, 2017).

Counter-technologies like electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons and adaptive training programs are essential to neutralize adversary enhancements (Abed et al., 2023).

Collaborating with allies to monitor and regulate these technologies will help maintain strategic superiority in an increasingly complex battlefield (Corbett & Danoy, 2025; Billing et al., 2021).

Human Bio Enhancements

By Retired Sgt. Maj. Jesus Gonzalez

Human bioaugmentation, historically used to enhance performance, is evolving with modern “smart drugs” or nootropics (Sutherland, 2024). These supplements, including vitamin B12, guarana, and salt mixtures, enhance alertness, energy, and cognitive function, offering alternatives to illegal substances (Davidson, n.d.).

Special Operations Forces (SOF) are exploring performance-enhancing supplements/drugs (PES/Ds) to extend resilience in combat, despite ethical dilemmas (Wigger & Oelschlager, 2017).

Adversaries, like China, are reportedly advancing genetic enhancements to create “super soldiers” with superior cognitive and physical abilities (Morgan, 2020).

The U.S. must reconsider ethical and medical implications to remain competitive, balancing risks with the need to counter near-peer threats. Continued research and policy development are critical to responsibly integrating bio-enhancements into military operations.

Non-State Actors: Deepfakes and Additive Manufacturing

By Retired Sgt. Maj. Vernon Yates

Non-state actors (NSAs), as well as conventional enemies, have been exploiting accessible technologies like AI-generated deepfakes and additive manufacturing to disrupt military and political environments.

Deepfakes, mimicking authentic communications, spread disinformation and sow confusion, like the fabricated video of Ukraine’s president urging surrender (Department of Homeland Security, 2022; Kreps, 2021). Detection remains challenging, requiring advanced authentication tools and heightened public awareness (Kreps & Li, 2022).

Additive manufacturing, including 3D and 4D printing, enables NSAs to produce untraceable weapon components, such as improvised explosive device (IED) parts that change shape for effective smuggling and detection avoidance (Department of Homeland Security, 2022).

These dual-use technologies are commercial availability, complicating countermeasures, and necessitating coordinated intergovernmental and interagency efforts between governments, industry, and civil society to enhance detection, attribution, and regulation.

Authors’ Note

This article provides a cursory analysis of emerging threats, technologies, and ethical dilemmas, while glossing over their implications across multiple domains and offering insights into how the U.S. will fight both now and in the future. The purpose of this piece is to spark curiosity and encourage NCOs to dig deeper and research some of these topics. The original contributions contained in this project have been significantly summarized. The full submissions may be obtained by emailing the authors directly through the “.army.mil” Global Address List.

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