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The U.S. Army in an Increasingly Borderless War

Challenge of Planning for Security in a Competition with China in Africa

 

Lt. Col. Felipe Galvão Franco Honorato, Brazilian Army

 

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Africa’s strategic centrality has evolved from a peripheral concern to a core consideration in U.S. national security strategy. The continent, projected to surpass 2.5 billion people by 2050, holds a wealth of critical minerals, including cobalt, lithium, and rare earth elements, that are essential to emerging defense technologies and digital systems.¹ Its economic growth and demographic expansion make it a central battleground in global competition. From a military standpoint, Africa’s geography offers strategic advantages that few regions can match. Ports, maritime corridors, and forward operating sites across the Gulf of Guinea, the Red Sea, and East Africa directly impact U.S. global mobility and force projection. China’s first overseas military base in Djibouti, situated adjacent to the United States’ Camp Lemonnier, enhances Beijing’s regional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities and power projection. The 2022 National Defense Strategy identified the protection of strategic access as essential to integrated deterrence, particularly in regions where Chinese and U.S. interests intersect.²

The U.S. Army faces a growing challenge in planning for security in a world where threats transcend traditional borders, identities, and economies. In Africa, China expands its influence through infrastructure, diplomacy, and digital control. This article focuses on how these dynamics challenge the Army’s ability to plan and operate effectively. It argues that the Army must adapt its planning approaches to confront the realities of borderless competition, engage successfully in multicultural environments, and address the impacts of global economic interdependence on military operations.

Persistent instability further complicates the strategic environment. In regions like the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, weak governance enables terrorist organizations such as al-Shabaab and Islamic State affiliates to grow unchecked. These nonstate actors exploit porous borders and fragile institutions, creating vacuums that external powers are eager to fill. According to the U.S. Africa Command’s 2024 posture statement, the U.S. Army plays an important role in training and advising partner forces to address these threats while also helping to build resilience in vulnerable states.³ At the same time, the most pressing threat may not be terrorism but influence competition. China promotes infrastructure development through the Belt and Road Initiative, often under terms that promote debt dependency and marginalize democratic norms. Besides that, Russia also supplies coercive support to authoritarian regimes through paramilitary actors like the Wagner Group. The U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa warns that this dual influence undermines liberal governance and challenges U.S. credibility in the region.⁴

As Newsweek reports, a 17 percent reduction in U.S. forces and reorientation toward homeland defense has left gaps readily exploited by China and Russia and has the U.S. military repositioning its concentrated remaining forces in Niger, Somalia, and Djibouti.⁵ This shift underscores the need for the Army to update its planning models. Access to Africa’s mineral supply chains presents another strategic vulnerability. These resources fuel both commercial markets and defense systems, from battery cells to guided munitions. China’s investments in mining infrastructure across central and southern Africa have raised concerns about potential coercion or supply manipulation. The National Security Strategy placed the protection of resilient supply chains at the heart of U.S. economic security and strategic freedom of action.⁶ Reports from the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Congressional Research Service reinforce the urgency of securing alternative access routes and diversifying sourcing.⁷

Africa’s demographic momentum and market potential will shape the next generation of international alliances. With a rising labor force and consumer class, Africa will exert increasing influence in global institutions and economic forums. If the U.S. Army fails to maintain a presence and offer compelling partnerships, competitors will define the terms of engagement. The Belfer Center emphasizes that countering China in Africa requires not just whole-of-government strategies but an Army posture capable of shaping environments, influencing narratives, and sustaining long-term cooperation.⁸ In this context, Africa becomes not just an area of interest but a proving ground for U.S. Army innovation. The continent presents an opportunity to revise doctrine and develop a planning model that incorporates cultural intelligence, economic factors, and nontraditional threat vectors.⁹

Borderless Competition: China’s Infrastructure, Data, and Security Projects

China’s strategy in Africa increasingly leverages borderless tools of influence. Through the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing finances and constructs deep-sea ports, airports, and railways across the continent.¹⁰ One example is the port of Lekki in Nigeria, where Chinese state-owned firms control both construction and long-term management. These investments secure long-term access and give China commercial and potential military footholds. As noted in the National Defense Strategy, these footholds can limit U.S. strategic flexibility in future contingency planning.¹¹ Beyond physical infrastructure, Chinese influence extends through long-term debt agreements and economic leverage. Countries like Angola and Zambia rely heavily on Chinese loans tied to infrastructure projects, sometimes using natural resources as collateral.¹² This financial model creates dependency, giving China significant bargaining power. For the U.S. Army, such dependencies can erode host-nation willingness to cooperate or grant access during a crisis or military operation.

Digital networks present another key front in this competition. Huawei and ZTE have built much of Africa’s telecom infrastructure, including 4G and emerging 5G networks. Senegal, Ethiopia, and Kenya have all partnered with Huawei for national internet backbones. This technology often includes “smart city” surveillance platforms. In 2018, the African Union discovered its China-built headquarters was transmitting data nightly to servers in Shanghai.¹³ These systems compromise U.S. and allied communications and intelligence operations across the continent. Chinese companies also dominate the fiber-optic cable market. Undersea and terrestrial cables funded by Chinese firms connect strategic hubs and government buildings. Cameroon’s National Broadband Network and Nigeria’s Galaxy Backbone both rely on Chinese contractors.¹⁴ These physical pathways for data give Beijing opportunities to intercept, monitor, or disrupt information flows, posing a serious operational risk to U.S. and allied activities in Africa.¹⁵

China’s economic approach is matched by aggressive cultural and media engagement. Confucius Institutes offer scholarships and language programs, while Chinese media outlets train African journalists. In Kenya and South Africa, Xinhua and China Global Television Network have become major sources of news content.¹⁶ This influence shapes public narratives and reduces the appeal of U.S. democratic values. In contested information environments, the U.S. Army struggles to assert its message amid growing Chinese narrative dominance. Beijing’s diplomatic engagements often reinforce authoritarian norms. During high-level forums like the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, China frames development through a lens of noninterference and state-led progress.¹⁷ This appeals to regimes wary of Western conditionality. U.S. Army operations that support democratic governance and human rights may face greater resistance in environments aligned ideologically with China’s approach.

The dual-use nature of many Chinese projects presents a unique planning dilemma. Civilian ports can host military vessels; commercial airports can facilitate rapid troop deployments. For example, the port of Doraleh in Djibouti, initially a commercial port, now supports a permanent People’s Liberation Army Navy base.¹⁸ Similar patterns are emerging in Tanzania and Namibia, where Chinese firms have built or expanded strategic infrastructure with unclear operational restrictions (see figure 1). These blurred lines force U.S. planners to reassess assumptions about threat landscapes. China’s growing control over Africa’s logistics and digital networks challenges the U.S. Army’s freedom of action. In a future conflict or humanitarian response, reliance on infrastructure under Chinese influence could delay or compromise operations. The National Security Strategy highlighted the importance of resilient, trusted global supply chains and access routes.¹⁹ Then, strategic denial is no longer theoretical; it is becoming structurally embedded.

Chinese influence also hampers coalition building and partner force development. When African militaries rely on Chinese training or equipment, interoperability with U.S. forces declines. In Sudan and Zimbabwe, military officers train in China and adopt doctrine aligned with the People’s Liberation Army’s principles.²⁰ This divergence complicates joint exercises, logistics coordination, and strategic alignment. The Army’s capacity to operate with African partners weakens as China becomes the preferred security partner. Disinformation campaigns and social media manipulation further entrench China’s position. Bots and coordinated content amplify anti-Western narratives and discredit U.S. initiatives. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Chinese narratives in Africa emphasized Beijing’s support and portrayed Western disengagement.²¹ The Army’s ability to counter misinformation is constrained when partners rely on Chinese platforms or distrust U.S. messaging due to perception gaps.

China’s expansion into the African education sector is another subtle vector of influence with long-term impact, showing no boundaries. As of 2024, there are over sixty Confucius Institutes across Africa, providing Chinese language and cultural training to tens of thousands of students.²² Many African elites have received higher education in China, often on full government scholarships. Moreover, graduates of Chinese universities often enter local government or media positions with favorable views of Beijing’s governance model. For Army planners, this growing class of China-aligned leaders suggests a future operational environment where influence may be structurally biased against U.S. engagement. The defense implications of China’s health diplomacy in Africa are similarly relevant (see figure 2). During the COVID-19 pandemic, China donated millions of vaccine doses to African countries and promoted its efforts through well-organized state media campaigns.²³ These medical outreach programs reinforced political messaging and built dependence, shaping perceptions of Chinese leadership.

To counter these threats, the U.S. Army must update its approach to influence and partner engagement. One recommendation is the formation of theater-based influence coordination elements. These would integrate information operations (IO), psychological operations, public affairs, and civil affairs into a unified planning cell. Guided by Field Manual (FM) 3-13, Information Operations, such teams could monitor narrative trends, counter disinformation, and shape messaging in real time.²⁴ Public affairs operations must also evolve. FM 3-61, Public Affairs Operations, emphasizes proactive, transparent engagement with partner audiences.²⁵ Army public affairs officers should work alongside local media outlets and civil society leaders to amplify credible voices. Partnering with African journalists to debunk false narratives and explain U.S. missions can rebuild trust. Success in information environments depends not only on technology, but on legitimacy and authenticity.

Civil affairs teams play a distinct role in this competition. FM 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations, highlights their ability to engage communities, assess civil vulnerabilities, and build networks of cooperation.²⁶ In Africa, civil affairs personnel can work with local governments and nongovernmental organizations to address grievances and deliver services, undermining China’s promise of nontransparent development aid. These activities create conditions for sustainable influence and long-term partnerships. Operational planning must also factor in contested logistics. Army Techniques Publication 4-94, Theater Sustainment Command, recommends identifying alternate supply routes and access points.²⁷ Army logisticians should map dependencies on Chinese-built infrastructure and develop bypass strategies. Contingency planning must include scenarios in which primary ports or communications are unavailable due to adversary control.

Exercises and war games offer platforms for testing new strategies. Programs like African Lion, Flintlock, and Cutlass Express simulate regional crisis responses.²⁸ These events should incorporate scenarios involving contested influence, infrastructure denial, and cyber intrusion from Chinese-linked systems. Integrating IO and civil affairs into these exercises builds readiness for the hybrid threats that characterize today’s operational environment.²⁹ Strategic messaging and presence in Africa also require overcoming institutional gaps in local knowledge. Despite operating on the continent for decades, the U.S. Army lacks a sustained, continent-wide capability for information collection and influence assessment. The Center for Strategic and International Studies recommends reflections on it.

Then, the Army’s ability to compete in Africa depends on understanding and adapting to borderless threats. China’s influence is not limited to conventional power; it shapes ports, cables, currencies, and conversations. U.S. Army planning must integrate these domains and move beyond episodic presence. Doctrine, partnerships, and narratives are now critical weapons in the competition for influence on the continent. Resourcing remains a decisive constraint in this competition. A 2023 Government Accountability Office report cited inconsistent funding and partner engagement continuity as recurring challenges.³⁰ Without long-term commitments and funding stability, U.S. influence may lose ground regardless of doctrinal innovation. The Army must advocate sustained investment and whole-of-government synchronization to succeed in this contested environment.

Operating Effectively in Multicultural Environments

Africa’s sociopolitical fabric is shaped by an enduring legacy of colonization, compounded by deep ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity. Many African states contain dozens of distinct ethnic groups, often divided by artificial borders drawn during European colonial rule. This fragmentation frequently undermines national unity and challenges outside actors seeking to engage across communities. For U.S. Army planners, this cultural complexity requires not only tactical awareness but also strategic empathy. The U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa stresses that building partnerships in such environments demands consistent and culturally informed presence.³¹ Partnerships forged without understanding local identities often fail or inadvertently exacerbate tensions.

Recent events have highlighted the costs of misunderstanding multicultural dynamics. In 2025, U.S. presidential commentary framed South African border violence as potential “genocide,” prompting diplomatic tension.³² The violence stemmed from local criminal networks, economic grievances, and border control issues and not state-sponsored ethnic cleansing.³³ Such mischaracterizations damage credibility and strain bilateral military cooperation. The incident highlights the importance of cultural literacy at every level of U.S. engagement. As observed in the Center for Army Lessons Learned publication on partner engagements, cultural misinterpretation can alter mission outcomes, erode trust, and reduce force protection.³⁴

Religious diversity further complicates the operational environment. In countries like Nigeria, Mali, and Ethiopia, overlapping Christian, Muslim, and traditional beliefs shape local allegiances and perceptions of legitimacy. When U.S. personnel operate without recognizing these religious dynamics, partner relations can fail. China, by contrast, often avoids ideological narratives and instead offers infrastructure or training aligned with local customs. This “noninterference” approach is seen as more respectful by some African leaders. According to the RAND Corporation, China’s quiet diplomacy often outperforms the values-based messaging traditionally used by the U.S. Army.³⁵ The implication for planners is clear: understanding cultural drivers is critical to building trust and operational access.

Postconflict reconciliation efforts also reveal the importance of culturally informed military engagement. In Rwanda, Liberia, and South Sudan, military efforts that lacked local legitimacy collapsed into renewed violence. Conversely, peacekeeping efforts supported by culturally attuned advisors, such as those deployed by Economic Community of West African States in Gambia, have succeeded in preventing conflict escalation. For the U.S. Army, these cases illustrate the need to blend civil affairs, cultural expertise, and host-nation partnership strategies. Army Techniques Publication 3-57.60, Civil Affairs Planning, highlights the value of cultural context in shaping civil-military operations.³⁶ Yet this planning often occurs too late in the deployment cycle, when rapport-building has already failed.

The Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Program offers a promising solution to this capability gap. FAOs possess regional fluency, language skills, and cultural familiarity developed through years of in-country experience. They often serve in embassies or joint commands, but their integration as advisors into tactical units remains inconsistent. Expanding FAO roles into brigade- and division-level staff teams would ensure continuous cultural insight during planning and execution. As emphasized in FM 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations, such advisors should contribute to the commander’s common operational picture.³⁷ Embedding FAOs and cultural analysts in unit staffs can elevate the quality of plans and partner interactions.

China’s ability to offer localized development and security assistance gives it a comparative advantage. For instance, Chinese road projects in Ethiopia and vocational training centers in Zambia are often tailored to regional needs. The success of these projects relies on consistent presence and deep understanding of community structures. The U.S. Army’s more transient approach, rotational deployments, and episodic exercises limit cultural familiarity. A U.S. Army Command and General Staff College elective module on African operational environments recommends persistent cultural immersion and region-specific professional military education (PME) as a corrective.³⁸ Officers who understand the local context are better positioned to influence decision-makers and anticipate risks before they escalate.

Language remains a significant barrier to effective engagement. Despite decades of engagement, relatively few U.S. Army personnel speak Swahili, Hausa, Amharic, or other widely spoken African languages. In contrast, Chinese advisors are often trained in local dialects and maintain long-term placements. This linguistic gap affects everything from intelligence collection to rapport with community leaders. Center for Army Lessons Learned’s handbook on cultural understanding suggests that language-trained personnel increase the accuracy of information gathering and reduce the risk of misunderstanding host-nation intentions.³⁹ Therefore, the Army must prioritize language incentives for key regions and develop African language modules within the Defense Language Institute curriculum.

To institutionalize multicultural competence, the Army must also revisit PME. While schools like the Command and General Staff College and the School of Advanced Military Studies offer electives about Africa, these remain optional and inconsistently integrated. Mandatory cultural immersion modules, drawing on real case studies from U.S. Africa Command and FAO reports, would prepare leaders for operational realities. PME must evolve to reflect this operational environment, especially as China continues to exploit local disillusionment with Western promises.⁴⁰

Cultural support teams (CST) offer another scalable approach. Inspired by the female engagement teams used in Afghanistan, CSTs could include regionally trained cultural advisors, civil affairs specialists, and IO planners.⁴¹ Deployed with brigades or task forces, these teams would assess societal dynamics, facilitate engagements, and advise commanders on cultural risks. CSTs could also support key leader engagements and serve as liaisons with religious or tribal authorities. Their presence would complement FAO and civil affairs activities, creating a cultural operating framework integrated from planning through postdeployment assessment.

Institutional continuity remains essential for lasting influence. Short-term advisors and intermittent cultural liaisons cannot build deep trust in environments where community memory runs long. The Army should invest in rotational programs that maintain consistent faces in key regions, ensuring that partner forces and communities recognize and respect returning personnel.⁴² This “continuity of presence” is one of the most important, yet often overlooked, contributors to successful military diplomacy. Without it, even well-intentioned efforts are perceived as opportunistic or disconnected from local priorities.

At last, operating effectively in multicultural environments requires more than cultural awareness. It demands doctrinal integration, sustained presence, and institutional humility. The Army must learn not only how to engage but also how to listen, adapt, and evolve with its partners. Expanding FAO assignments, embedding cultural advisors, and investing in PME and CSTs are concrete steps toward that goal. As emphasized by the U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa, building trusted relationships is not a side mission; it is central to achieving long-term strategic success on the continent.⁴³

The Impacts of Global Economic Interdependence

The U.S. Army operates in an era where military power intersects with the global economy in unprecedented ways. In Africa, economic interdependence shapes both security risks and opportunities. While traditional planning has focused on terrain and adversary capabilities, today’s operations require equal attention to infrastructure finance, commercial logistics, and economic governance. Chinese economic activities in Africa often integrate civilian infrastructure with state power projection.⁴⁴ However, beyond Beijing’s influence, it is the very architecture of economic globalization that now imposes constraints on Army operations. A failure to anticipate the effects of interconnected financial systems and resource markets may compromise U.S. force readiness and responsiveness in the region.

Trade corridors represent one of the clearest cases of strategic risk stemming from economic entanglement. African regions that depend heavily on a single corridor or port for imports and exports become operational chokepoints.⁴⁵ If a multinational commercial carrier halts service due to insurance, legal, or logistical concerns, Army supply chains may be interrupted with limited alternatives. Lomé Port in Togo, for instance, is a critical gateway for West Africa and has faced rising pressure due to increased cargo volume and infrastructure constraints. Delays and congestion at such ports can undermine timely logistics in crisis scenarios. Army planners must assess not just access, but the resilience and reliability of civilian economic infrastructure in partner states. This analysis should be incorporated into operational planning tools.

Currency volatility poses a significant yet often overlooked threat to military operations. Many African nations peg their currencies to the U.S. dollar or euro, or rely on financial support from the International Monetary Fund, an organization that provides financial assistance and advice to member countries facing economic difficulties. During financial crises, rapid currency devaluation can diminish the purchasing power of host nations, disrupt compensation for partner forces, and incite social unrest. For instance, in 2023, Ghana experienced inflation rates exceeding 50 percent, leading to widespread protests in Accra and demands for the resignation of the central bank governor.⁴⁶ To mitigate such risks, integrating economic forecasting into mission intelligence preparation is crucial for enhancing force protection and contingency planning. Army economic terrain teams should collaborate with Treasury Department attachés and U.S. Agency for International Development economic officers to develop predictive indicators and strategies.

Illicit financial flows are a growing concern for military operations. Smuggling networks that traffic in gold, weapons, and timber often help fund armed groups and terrorist organizations. For example, a 2022 United Nations report highlighted that illegal mining in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo generated millions of dollars for militias.⁴⁷ These networks take advantage of weak customs controls and digital banking tools to hide transactions. To counter these threats, U.S. Army civil affairs and intelligence personnel need better training in financial intelligence and economic crime. Military planning should include these illicit economies as key factors that support instability and hybrid threats, improving the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment.⁴⁸

Public procurement and investment governance have equally significant impacts. Countries with weak contract oversight or opaque investment frameworks may unwittingly expose military infrastructure to foreign control or corruption. In several West African nations, military barracks and airfields were constructed under public-private partnerships with limited review, creating long-term legal and political uncertainty over access rights.⁴⁹ Army legal support teams should be equipped to assess infrastructure ownership, legal jurisdiction, and contract terms before establishing operational dependencies. This calls for closer coordination with Army judge advocate general personnel trained in international investment law.

Regional economic integration efforts around the world, including in Africa, introduce added complexity to military operations. In Africa, initiatives like the African Continental Free Trade Area aim to harmonize trade regulations, tariffs, and customs procedures across more than fifty countries.⁵⁰ While these agreements are valuable for boosting commerce, they can also limit the flexibility of bilateral defense arrangements or delay rapid military movement during emergencies. Globally, similar dynamics exist in other economic blocs such as the European Union and Association of Southeast Asian Nations, where collective trade or border rules can override individual national decisions. For the U.S. Army, this means operational access may be conditioned by regional trade frameworks rather than direct partner consent. Component commands must develop planners who understand how economic harmonization influences host-nation decision-making and operational permissions in crisis scenarios.

Energy dependency presents another domain of risk. African power grids are becoming more interconnected across borders, but they remain fragile, underregulated, and vulnerable to disruption. For example, Ethiopia’s hydroelectric projects such as the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam have triggered diplomatic friction with downstream countries like Egypt and Sudan.⁵¹ In an operational crisis, a U.S. military compound reliant on local power infrastructure could experience sudden outages or even targeted sabotage. FM 3-34, Engineer Operations, provides guidance on power generation for base camps and recommends infrastructure assessments to ensure mission resilience.⁵² However, it does not directly address dependencies on civilian grids in fragile or contested host nations. Therefore, Army engineers and sustainment officers should prioritize self-sufficient energy systems and integrate host-nation grid reliability indicators into mission planning, particularly in regions where energy disputes or infrastructure fragility may impact operational continuity.

Telecommunications liberalization has also created mixed outcomes. On the one hand, mobile networks enhance command and control and enable rapid communication with local stakeholders. On the other, the privatization of these networks often places critical nodes under non-U.S. influence. In multiple African states, mobile payment systems have become primary financial instruments with transactions now exceeding traditional banking. If a crisis disrupts these networks or a hostile actor gains leverage over them, U.S. operations that depend on digital communication with local contractors or civilians could falter. FM 6-02, Signal Support to Operations, should direct planners to evaluate digital economic systems as part of communications preparation.⁵³

To mitigate these vulnerabilities, the Army should establish economic operating environment cells in each theater army and corps-level staff. These cells would be staffed with economic analysts, logisticians, and interagency liaisons who map commercial dependencies, forecast risks, and integrate findings into operational courses of action. Their work would feed directly into the military decision-making process and campaign plan development.⁵⁴ Economic operating environment cells should also engage with regional development banks, chambers of commerce, and humanitarian logistics networks to ensure shared situational awareness. It would describe the individual augmentations by specialty (e.g., language, economics, assessment), focusing on economic considerations.

PME must reflect this shift in operational reality. Current coursework focuses heavily on political-military strategy but gives limited attention to economic shaping or development finance. PME institutions should incorporate modules on infrastructure finance, economic indicators, and supply chain security. Electives could include simulations involving economic disruptions such as currency collapse, food shortages, or port shutdowns. Collaboration with civilian universities or think tanks like the Brookings Institution or the African Center for Economic Transformation would ensure academic rigor.⁵⁵

The Army should also advocate for the development of predictive tools that integrate economic data into planning systems. Using open-source economic indicators, combined with proprietary data from industry partners, such tools could model the impact of inflation, credit shocks, or logistics failures on mission execution. These capabilities would support both steady-state operations and crisis response.⁵⁶ The U.S. Army Transformation and Training Command and Army Applications Laboratory could collaborate with civilian data science firms to prototype such tools under the Small Business Innovation Research Program.⁵⁷

Global economic interdependence demands a reconceptualization of battlespace. It is no longer sufficient to analyze terrain and enemy disposition alone. Economic factors from financial systems to labor markets shape the conditions in which military operations unfold. In Africa, where external investment and fragile economies intersect, the Army must become fluent in the language of development, infrastructure, and commerce. By institutionalizing economic terrain analysis, embedding interdisciplinary expertise, and updating doctrine, the Army can achieve a more adaptive and resilient posture in an interconnected world.

Conclusion

The rapid evolution of Chinese influence across Africa through infrastructure development, digital connectivity, and media engagement underscores the borderless nature of modern strategic competition. As demonstrated, China exploits dual-use projects, digital surveillance networks, and cultural tools to establish long-term influence that complicates U.S. Army planning and operational freedom. These activities reshape the environment without traditional military confrontation, demanding that the Army integrate influence detection, narrative shaping, and infrastructure analysis into future campaigns. The implication is clear: enduring success will require the Army to anticipate and counter not only military threats but also systemic influences embedded in civilian domains.

Considering the multicultural complexity, it poses a critical operational challenge across Africa. Ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity shapes how local populations interpret foreign presence, form alliances, and evaluate legitimacy. The Army’s effectiveness depends on its ability to understand and operate within these diverse contexts. Programs like the FAO initiative, cultural immersion training, and embedded advisors are vital to improving the Army’s strategic empathy and planning. Without these measures, well-intentioned engagements risk failure due to cultural friction or miscommunication. As the Army faces increasing exposure to multicultural environments, its institutional ability to listen, adapt, and build trust becomes a decisive factor in mission success.

Economic interdependence was revealed as a core strategic variable with growing relevance to military planning. Global supply chains, infrastructure finance, energy dependencies, and illicit trade now intersect directly with military operations. Economic shocks in host nations, misaligned infrastructure governance, and digital financial systems can constrain Army mobility, readiness, and security. These realities necessitate new capabilities within the operational and tactical levels of war staff. By embedding economic analysts, strengthening partnerships with civilian agencies, and revising doctrine to include economic terrain, the Army can navigate an environment influenced as much by commerce and regulation as by adversaries. A more economically literate force will be better prepared to maintain strategic access and stability in fragile regions.

Finally, future military planning must reflect the interconnected world in which the Army operates. Borderless influence, multicultural complexity, and economic interdependence are no longer peripheral considerations; they are central elements of the operational environment. The Army must adapt not only through doctrine but also through the cultivation of new skill sets, partnerships, and planning frameworks. Africa presents a unique testing ground for this transformation. As competitors expand their influence through nonmilitary means, the Army’s ability to adapt will determine whether it can remain a credible and capable force in this contested terrain. Strategic success will depend not just on presence but on relevance.

 

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Notes

1. African Development Bank Group, African Economic Outlook 2025: Making Africa’s Capital Work Better for Africa’s Development (African Development Bank Group, 2025), 115, https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/african-economic-outlook-2025.
2. Department of Defense (DOD), National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (DOD, October 2022), https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF.
3. To Receive Testimony on the Posture of United States Central Command and United States Africa Command in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2025 and the Future Years Defense Program, Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 118th Cong. (7 March 2024) (statement of Gen. Michael E. Langley, U.S. Marine Corps Commander, U.S. Africa Command), https://www.africom.mil/document/35430/usafricom-fy25-posture-statement-iso-sasc-hearing-7-mar-24pdf.
4. White House, U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa (White House, August 2022), https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/U.S.-Strategy-Toward-Sub-Saharan-Africa-FINAL.pdf.
5. Amir Daftari, “US Military Pullback in Africa Opens Door for China and Russia,” Newsweek, 8 April 2025, https://www.newsweek.com/us-military-pullback-africa-china-russia-2076998.
6. White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (White House, October 2022), https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf.
7. “Securing Critical Mineral Supply Chains in Africa,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), accessed 4 December 2025, https://www.csis.org/programs/critical-minerals-security-program; Emma Kaboli, Critical Minerals and Materials for Selected Energy Technologies (Congressional Research Service, 2025), https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48149/R48149.5.pdf.
8. James McDonnell, Cooperation, Competition, or Both? Options for U.S. Land Forces vis-à-vis Chinese Interests in Africa (Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, June 2020), https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/cooperation-competition-or-both-options-us-land-forces-vis-vis-chinese-interests-africa.
9. McDonnell, Cooperation, Competition, or Both?
10. James McBride et al., China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative (Council on Foreign Relations, 2 February 2023), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative.
11. John Hurley et al., “Examining the Debt Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a Policy Perspective” (Center for Global Development, 4 March 2018), https://www.cgdev.org/publication/examining-debt-implications-belt-and-road-initiative-policy-perspective.
12. DOD, National Defense Strategy.
13. Maggie Fick, “African Union Accuses China of Hacking Headquarters,” Financial Times, 29 January 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/c26a9214-04f2-11e8-9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5.
14. “China Eximbank Provides $100 Million Preferential Buyer’s Credit for Phase 1 of the Nigeria National Information and Communication Technology Infrastructure Backbone Project (NICTIB),” AidData, accessed 4 December 2025, https://china.aiddata.org/projects/30340.
15. Brice R. Mbodiam, “Cameroon Is Connected to Neighboring Countries Through Some 12,000 KM of Optical Fiber (Judith Yah Sunday),” Business in Cameroon, 30 August 2021, https://www.businessincameroon.com/public-management/3008-11836-cameroon-is-connected-to-neighboring-countries-through-some-12-000-km-of-optical-fiber-judith-yah-sunday.
16. Herman Wasserman and Dani Madrid-Morales, “How Influential Are Chinese Media in Africa? An Audience Analysis in Kenya and South Africa,” International Journal of Communication 12 (2018): 5922–43, https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/7809/2355.
17. “Home,” Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, accessed 4 December 2025, http://www.focac.org/eng.
18. Paul Nantulya, “Mapping China’s Strategic Port Development in Africa,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 10 March 2025, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/china-port-development-africa/.
19. White House, National Security Strategy.
20. Paul Nantulya, “The Growing Militarization of China’s Africa Policy,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2 December 2024, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/militarization-china-africa-policy/.
21. ADF Staff, “China Ramps Up Efforts to Control Media Narrative in Africa,” Africa Defense Forum, 18 January 2022, https://adf-magazine.com/2022/01/china-ramps-up-efforts-to-control-media-narrative-in-africa/.
22. Adams Bodomo et al., “Confucius Institutes and the Promotion of Chinese Language and Culture: A Case Study,” in New Silk Road Narratives: Local Perspectives on Chinese Presence along the Belt and Road Initiative, ed. Jamila Adeli and Linda Ammann (Heidelberg Asian Studies Publishing, 2024), 179–92, https://www.doi.org/10.11588/hasp.1370.c19725.
23. Carrie B. Dolan et al., “China’s Health Funding in Africa: The Untold Story,” PLOS Global Public Health 3, no. 6 (2023): e0001637, https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10306200/.
24. Field Manual (FM) 3-13, Information Operations (U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], October 2022).
25. FM 3-61, Public Affairs Operations (U.S. GPO, March 2024).
26. FM 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations (U.S. GPO, July 2021).
27. Army Technique Publication (ATP) 4-94, Theater Sustainment Command (U.S. GPO, August 2020).
28. African Lion is U.S. Africa Command’s largest annual multinational exercise, led by U.S. Army Africa, which focuses on improving interoperability, readiness, and collective defense through combined arms training and command post exercises. Flintlock is a U.S. Africa Command-sponsored special operations exercise that enhances partner-nation capacity in counterterrorism, irregular warfare, and crisis response. Cutlass Express is a maritime security exercise led by U.S. Naval Forces Africa that strengthens regional cooperation in maritime domain awareness and coordinated responses to illicit trafficking and maritime crises across the East African littoral and western Indian Ocean.
29. Benjamin Jensen and Divya Ramjee, “Beyond Bullets and Bombs: The Rising Tide of Information War in International Affairs,” CSIS, 20 December 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/beyond-bullets-and-bombs-rising-tide-information-war-international-affairs.
30. U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Building Partner Capacity: DOD and State Should Strengthen Planning for Train and Equip Projects, GAO-23-105842 (U.S. GAO, August 2023), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-23-105842.pdf.
31. “Fact Sheet: U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa,” White House, 8 August 2022, https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/08/08/fact-sheet-u-s-strategy-toward-sub-saharan-africa/.
32. Zeke Miller, “Trump Orders Freeze of Aid to South Africa, Citing Country’s Land Expropriation Law,” Associated Press News, 7 February 2025, https://apnews.com/article/1be10eb4e443682501f2d7bc5aa0b893.
33. Ezeji Chiji Longinus, “The Role of South Africa Border Management Authority in Tackling Border Crime: Evaluating Security Networks and Evidence-Based Policing Approaches,” International Journal of Business Ecosystem & Strategy 6, no. 4 (2024): 393–407, https://www.bussecon.com/ojs/index.php/ijbes/article/view/545/324.
34. Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Partners and Allies Guide to U.S. Combat Training Centers: Lessons and Best Practices for Success (CALL, January 2023), https://api.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/2023/01/31/e747aebc/22-05.pdf.
35. Lloyd Thrall, China’s Expanding African Relations: Implications for U.S. National Security (RAND Corporation, 22 April 2015), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR905.html.
36. ATP 3-57.60, Civil Affairs Planning (U.S. GPO, May 2024).
37. FM 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations (U.S. GPO, May 2022).
38. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) Circular 350-1, Academic Year 2024–2025 Catalog (CGSC, 2024), https://armyuniversity.edu/cgsc/files/CGSC_Circular_350-1-AY_2025_3.pdf.
39. CALL, Partners and Allies Guide to U.S. Combat Training Centers.
40. Paul W. Mayberry et al., Making the Grade: Integration of Joint Professional Military Education and Talent Management in Developing Joint Officers (RAND Corporation, 26 May 2021), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA473-1.html.
41. Rosellen Roche et al., “The Unseen Patriot: Female Cultural Support Team Members and Combat Definition,” Journal of Veterans Studies 7, no. 1 (2021): 271–79. https://journal-veterans-studies.org/articles/10.21061/jvs.v7i1.285.
42. Tim Bettis, “America’s Strategy Is Outrunning Its Force: Why the Military’s Diplomatic Corps Is in Dire Need of Reform,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, 15 July 2022, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3111125/americas-strategy-is-outrunning-its-force-why-the-militarys-diplomatic-corps-is/.
43. White House, U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa.
44. Marta Kepe et al., Great-Power Competition and Conflict in Africa (RAND Corporation, 13 July 2023), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA969-2.html.
45. Amelia Vance, “Corridors of Power: The Global Struggle Over Trade Networks—OpEd,” Eurasia Review, 23 May 2025, https://www.eurasiareview.com/23052025-corridors-of-power-the-global-struggle-over-trade-networks-oped/.
46. Rédaction Africanews, “Ghana: Opposition Led Demonstration Denounces Economic Crisis,” Africanews, updated 13 August 2024, https://www.africanews.com/2023/10/03/ghana-opposition-led-demonstration-denounces-economic-crisis/.
47. “Letter Dated 27 December 2024 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” S/2024/969 (United Nations Security Council, 27 December 2024), https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/373/37/pdf/n2437337.pdf.
48. Joint Publication 2-0, Joint Intelligence (U.S. GPO, 5 July 2024), xxi. Joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) is defined as “the analytical process joint intelligence organizations use to produce intelligence assessments, estimates, and other intelligence products in support of the JFC’s decision-making process.”
49. Julien Joy et al., The Missing Element: Addressing Corruption Through Security Sector Reform in West Africa, ed. Natalie Hogg et al. (Transparency International UK, 2021), https://ti-defence.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/SSR_in_WA_ENG_Report_v1.2.pdf.
50. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), The African Continental Free Trade Area and Demand for Transport Infrastructure and Services (UNECA, 2022), https://repository.uneca.org/handle/10855/47596.
51. Yohannes Woldemariam and Genevieve Donnellon-May, “The Politics of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam,” Climate Diplomacy, 2 February 2024, https://climate-diplomacy.org/magazine/conflict/politics-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam.
52. FM 3-34, Engineer Operations (U.S. GPO, December 2020).
53. FM 6-02, Signal Support to Operations (U.S. GPO, September 2019).
54. FM 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations.
55. Édouard Ngirente, “Africa’s Moment: Seizing the Opportunity for Transformation,” Brookings Institution, 8 April 2025, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/africas-moment-seizing-the-opportunity-for-transformation/.
56. Army Applications Laboratory, Performance Report 2025 (Army Applications Laboratory, 2025), https://aal.mil/assets/files/pdf/aal-performance-report-2025.pdf.
57. “Real-Time Analytics for Engineer Reconnaissance,” U.S. Army Small Business Innovation Research and Small Business Technology Transfer Program, 14 June 2023, https://armysbir.army.mil/topics/real-time-analytics-engineer-reconnaissance/.

 

 

 

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January-February 2026