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Royal Canadian Mounted Police Constabulary Operations in the Eastern Arctic

Implications for Arctic Security

 

Cpl. Mark Southern, Royal Canadian Mounted Police

 

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A constabulary is a special purpose military or paramilitary force that acts as an instrument of civil control; its basic mission of creating and maintaining order is carried out via a wide variety of activities ranging from investigative and socially oriented police work and quasi-military patrolling to intelligence collection, psychological operations, and civil affairs. Constabulary operations often play an integral role in the prosecution of a “small war,” made different from a “big war” by virtue of ongoing diplomacy, a lower scale of combat and tactics, and a limited degree of both objectives and means.¹ Small wars are often referred to as “military operations other than war” (MOOTW), a suitable name for constabulary operations given that such operations serve not only a military function but civil control functions as well—ranging from patrolling and the providing of humanitarian assistance to intelligence collection and psychological operations—and have their own unique characteristics and requirements.² The ultimate objective of constabulary operations is to create stability where none previously existed and to encourage social organization and order consistent with long-term stability.³

The hybrid nature of modern conflict has also blurred the distinction between “warrior” and “organized criminal,” and a growing “gray zone”—the space between the military world and the policing world—has resulted.⁴ Under the small-war umbrella, this has created the demand for “stability policing,” which may serve to bridge the gap between both worlds by fostering peace and maintaining order, establishing or reestablishing civil administrative functions, and encouraging cooperation between civil and military organizations.⁵ As the world continues to move away from unipolarity toward a more balanced playing field wherein multiple players possess nuclear capabilities, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) having to engage in a large-scale, multination conflict is far less likely a scenario than having to undertake a constabulary/stability policing operation, a MOOTW, or a peace support operation, as powerful nations try to avoid outright military engagements.

Moscow’s interests in the Arctic were made clear as early as 2007 when a Russian flag was planted on the ocean floor near the North Pole, an act even that even then was viewed as a preemptive claim on the area’s vast natural resources.⁶ Against the backdrop of devolving international security, shattered peace frameworks, and Russian revanchism, there is a reasonable likelihood that the Arctic is set to face its most challenging era, and the emerging gray zone may help prioritize the stability policing operation and make it an important option in the tool box of NATO strategists.⁷

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) has undertaken a long-term constabulary operation on the Canadian Prairies and in the Arctic for over a century. One hundred and fifty recruits were sent west from Ontario in 1873 in response to attacks on indigenous peoples by American whisky traders in Cypress Hills, Saskatchewan, and double that number a year later made the “March West,” setting up posts and detachments and making inroads with indigenous tribes across the Prairies.⁸ In 1896, an increased foreign presence due the Klondike gold rush resulted in the RCMP expanding operations into the Yukon, and in the early 1900s, operations were expanded into Hudson’s Bay and the Arctic.⁹

The purpose of this article is to demonstrate the constabulary operational success of the RCMP in the eastern Arctic in the early twentieth century and to provide recommendations as to how the Canadian security establishment might learn from and adapt this constabulary model to twenty-first-century threats.

Eastern Arctic Patrol Case Study

The end of the nineteenth and start of the twentieth centuries brought geopolitical uncertainty to the halls of Canadian parliament. The United Kingdom divested its interest in the Arctic islands in 1880, transferring title to a John A. MacDonald government that saw little initial value in administering the region.¹⁰ This changed in 1900 when Norwegian explorers planted their flag on Axel Heiberg Island and claimed a swath of newly discovered Arctic territory for Oslo.¹¹ Threats of additional Norwegian expeditions were coupled with tensions between Ottawa and Washington over the 1903 Alaska Boundary Dispute, and when added to threats of Danish incursions into the Arctic in the 1920s, demonstrated to the Canadian government that theoretical- or paper-based claims to the vast area encompassing Canada’s northern territories and Arctic region were far less reliable than a force of occupation.¹²

To that end, starting the 1920s, Ottawa built six RCMP detachments in the eastern Arctic Archipelago—Pond Inlet, Pangnirtung, and Lake Harbour (now Kimmirut) on Baffin Island, Craig Harbour and the Bache Peninsula on Ellesmere Island, and Dundas Harbour on Devon Island—and sent small teams of “Mounties” into these extremely remote areas to engage with the indigenous Inuit, stabilize the region, and assert Canadian sovereignty.¹³ Figure 1 illustrates Canada’s Arctic Archipelago, while figure 2 illustrates the locations of the RCMP Eastern Arctic Patrol (EAP) detachments.¹⁴

The RCMP had already accrued a substantial amount of experience in cold-weather operations by the turn of the twentieth century, having spent the previous thirty years working in the Yukon and western Northwest Territories, and as a result had established and cultivated important relationships with the Inuit.¹⁵ Such experience would prove invaluable in the eastern Arctic.

The Pond Inlet detachment at the north end of Baffin Island was the first EAP detachment to be stood up. The Canadian government was aware trade in animal furs and exploitation for mineral wealth in the eastern Arctic were already prevalent in 1921; therefore, the Pond Inlet detachment was established near a Hudson’s Bay Company trading post for “extending the administrative jurisdiction of the Dominion to these regions.”¹⁶ Staff Sgt. A. H. Joy, highly experienced in northern travel, was tasked as the government’s first representative in the region and was granted considerable powers as a result, his authorities as a police officer being extended to include those of justice of the peace, coroner, special customs officer, and postmaster.¹⁷ The establishment of postal offices throughout the Arctic created infrastructure and a degree of administrative political stability and allowed for the Canadian flag to be planted.¹⁸ Joy’s influence was soon tested, as later that year he was tasked with investigating the murder of a white trader by Inuit hunters.¹⁹ He traveled by dogsled for two weeks to Cape Crawford, the site of the investigation, exhumed the body and conducted an autopsy, finding two bullet wounds and other evidence sufficient to lay homicide charges.²⁰ He transported the body back to the Pond Inlet detachment, held an inquest with a jury appointed by himself, and issued warrants for three Inuit.²¹ He then presided over a trial for which he had been responsible for collecting the accused and witnesses, and handed down verdicts of guilt.²² Joy’s actions and professionalism undoubtedly served to impress upon the Inuit the range of authority possessed by the RCMP and to create stability amongst the population. It is important to note that Joy accomplished these feats alone, yet despite this fact, his supervisors observed that not only were the documents pertaining to the investigation and trial “complete in every detail,” but further that “the proceedings before this court were as regular as any taken in the Dominion.”²³ In recognition of his solo efforts, more men were sent to Pond Inlet to assist Joy.²⁴

By 1922, the Pond Inlet detachment was operable, and materials and men were sent farther north on the Canadian Coast Guard vessel Arctic to establish the detachment at Craig Harbour—also in 1922—at the southern tip of Ellesmere Island, with Inspector C. E. Wilcox placed in command.²⁵ Wilcox would go on to command all RCMP troops posted in the eastern Arctic for several years.

Wasting no time, the RCMP EAP members soon set to work establishing links with the Inuit and conducting what can only be described as extreme patrols. At Pond Inlet, Joy sent Cpl. McInnes, Constable (Cst.) McGregor, and three Inuit guides on a roughly two-month, 1,000 km round trip to the Hecla and Fury Strait.²⁶ During this time, they encountered sporadic families of Inuit who were instructed to report to Pond Inlet as soon as practicable for census purposes and provided basic medical assistance when needed.²⁷

At Craig Harbour, Wilcox and his small detachment of men were completely isolated from the outside world for twelve months, during which time he reported that they experienced

a period of 109 days of darkness and intense cold … and during January the wind blew for 21 days without a break … during a period of 304 days the wind blew strongly for 221 days, frequently compelling the men to remain indoors for days at a time. The coldest temperature recorded was 51 degrees below zero in March, during which month the temperature averaged 35 degrees below.²⁸

RCMP reports from this period are replete with descriptions of poor weather not much different from Wilcox’s above noted, demonstrating that the EAP members lived and operated in some of the most vicious climatic and environmental conditions the planet has to offer. During this severe weather, Wilcox nevertheless maintained a patrol regimen of 120 km distance from the detachment; however, due to a then scarcity of sled dogs throughout the Arctic, these Craig Harbour patrols were conducted on foot.²⁹ Despite these sufferings, it was noted that “discipline was excellent, and the men cheerful throughout.”³⁰

1923 saw a “considerable extension” of RCMP duties in the Arctic, with more materials and men being shipped north.³¹ In September of that year, Wilcox departed Ellesmere Island on the Arctic and moved south of Pond Inlet to the southern coast of Baffin Island where he established the Pangnirtung detachment.³² During that year, he and his men ran patrols covering more than 3,000 km by dogsled and more than 800 km by whaleboat.³³ These patrols were conducted for tactical purposes as well as humanitarian—during the winter, Wilcox sent men out to supply Inuit clans short on food and to provide medical aid and comfort to sick natives.³⁴

In 1924, the Dundas Harbour detachment was stood up on Devon Island, with Cst. E. Anstead placed in charge.³⁵ That year, Joy undertook a forty-seven-day, 1,000 km patrol from Pond Inlet to examine the feasibility of establishing communications between detachments, while Cst. H. P. Friel undertook a patrol of approximately 900 km in just over one month.³⁶ While no lengthy patrols were undertaken from Pangnirtung or Dundas Harbour that year, Wilcox sailed on the Arctic to Godhavn, then the administrative center of Greenland, where “courtesies were exchanged with the Governor and other officials,” demonstrating the importance of diplomatic skills in small war/constabulary operations.³⁷

In 1925, Wilcox took another lengthy boat patrol up the Greenland coast from Craig Harbour, stopping at the Bache Peninsula to examine the practicality of standing up a detachment there and engaging further with Danish government officials in Greenland.³⁸ That year’s weather precluded the running of lengthy patrols from Pond Inlet; however, local patrols were run to supply Inuit low on food.³⁹ So too at Pangnirtung, where the weather prevented anything but short patrols by dogsled to outlying Inuit villages.⁴⁰ Detachment commander Sgt. J. E. F. Wight did manage to escort Hudson’s Bay Company staff in setting up a trading post and visited multiple Inuit families.⁴¹ At Dundas Harbour, the weather prevented anything but patrols of 250 km, and a shortage of game and fur clothing kept the detachment members at the post for the majority of the year.⁴² Most patrols saw the RCMP members sleeping in igloos while in Inuit villages, while the natives cared for their dogs and tended to their sleds, demonstrating that by this time, amicable relations and a degree of mutual respect had been established between the EAP and the target population, no doubt enabled by the previous experiences accrued in the Yukon and Northwest Territories.⁴³

The most significant event of the year, and arguably of the entire life of the EAP, was a Craig Harbour patrol undertaken by Cpl. T. R. Michelson. Michelson, who had been placed in charge when Wilcox departed, undertook a series of patrols to Fram, Grise, Havn, and Starnes fiords that covered more than 11,000 km in totality.⁴⁴ Accompanied by four Inuit guides and fifty-four dogs on five sleds, Michelson’s role was primarily medical as he stopped at whatever Inuit hamlets he could, checking and reporting on their general state of health.⁴⁵ Michelson was on one occasion required to provide medical assistance to a pregnant Inuit woman suffering from haemorrhaging, and throughout his journeys, part of his general duties included instructing Inuit in maintaining standards of cleanliness.⁴⁶ The medical component of the EAP cannot be overlooked. At nearly every village they visited on their patrols, RCMP members were faced with pregnancies, dog bites, rotten teeth, and gunshot wounds.⁴⁷ The necessity for RCMP members to provide and perform medical assistance was such that incoming members were required to attend an Edmonton hospital prior to a northern posting where they were given a two-week course in not only basic first aid but also childbirthing and dentistry.⁴⁸

One of the most important RCMP roles in the eastern Arctic was the monitoring and reporting of game conditions. Caribou and fox populations were closely monitored, licenses were issued to trappers as were bounties for wolf hunters, and in their capacity as police, the RCMP enforced the Migratory Birds Convention Act and the Northwest Game Act, illustrating that the RCMP recognized the importance of northern game to the Inuit.⁴⁹ Michelson saw as much on his patrols. He comments on the abundance of game in his reports, and demonstrating the regard with which the Inuit held the RCMP, he notes also that the Mounties were always made welcome, and the respect engendered by their patrols was tangible.⁵⁰ The care demonstrated by the RCMP as an organization and by the EAP members individually to ensure the Inuit were cared for undoubtedly did serve as a superior tool for winning their “hearts and minds.” Tactical considerations were also addressed on Michelson’s patrols as he established caches of bear meat throughout Ellesmere Island for future patrols.⁵¹

In 1926, the detachment at Bache Peninsula was stood up with Joy in command.⁵² It was observed that the native population there was “in need of supervision and assistance,” and here too the RCMP noted that the Bache Peninsula teemed with game including seal, walrus, and duck.⁵³ Wilcox wintered at Pond Inlet, where local dogsled patrols were run from the detachment totalling 3,000 km to deliver rations to destitute Inuit.⁵⁴ Wilcox himself made a 1,400 km patrol to the Hudson’s Bay Company post at Clyde River on the eastern edge of Baffin Island—on the way, he provided medical assistance where he could to several natives, including the administering of laxatives and Dover powder (a medicine used to treat cold and fever) and the application of poultices to wounds, as well as checking for game.⁵⁵ While Wilcox was at Pond Inlet, Joy was transferred to Craig Harbour, where he too noted the severity of the winter.⁵⁶ Conditions were so bad that hunting excursions needed to be sent out to kill caribou for the RCMP members and to search for dog food.⁵⁷ Joy made a forty-day, 1,500 km patrol across Ellesmere Island, establishing caches of supplies for future patrols and noting the movements of muskox herds.⁵⁸

At Pangnirtung, Wight made boat patrols to deliver supplies to iced-in Inuit families and noted that “many minor ailments and accidents have been attended to by members of the detachment.”⁵⁹ Wight and Cst. T. H. Tredgold undertook a 2,000 km patrol to Lake Harbour through country unknown to their Inuit guides to investigate the murder of a native.⁶⁰ The gravity of this patrol is evidenced by the fact that little meat could be found for the dog teams, resulting in the RCMP members feeding their clothing to the dogs and killing and skinning several animals to replace the lost items.⁶¹ At Dundas Harbour, Anstead described the winter as having been extremely poor, and when the winter passed and tides began affecting ice floes, two members were nearly carried away into the open ocean as they ran their sled teams over ocean ice in an attempt to find a short cut.⁶²

1927 saw the closing of the Craig Harbour detachment because the newly opened detachment at the Bache Peninsula was more conveniently located for reaching Axel Heiberg Island west of Ellesmere.⁶³ This was replaced by the opening of the detachment at Lake Harbour on southern Baffin Island, which it was anticipated would “bring us into touch with a considerable (Inuit) population, and with fur trading operations.”⁶⁴ Wilcox wintered at Pond Inlet once again, from which newly promoted Cpl. Friel undertook a patrol of over 1,400 km “made for the purpose of inquiring as to the health and condition of the natives, investigating reports of insanity … collect expired game animal licenses, take census, and do vital statistics, encourage the extermination of wolves and the conservation of caribou,” again truly demonstrating the value of the EAP Mounties to the Inuit population.⁶⁵ Wilcox made diplomatic trips to Greenland once more, where he made arrangements for Danish authorities to provide several Inuit for services at the EAP detachments.⁶⁶ The Arctic had been decommissioned by this point, replaced by the Canadian Coast Guard vessel Beothic. After the meeting with the Danish, Wilcox reported that “the usual courtesies were exchanged … Governor and Mrs. Rosendahl and Dr. and Miss Porslid dined on the ship,” illustrating the warming diplomatic relations.⁶⁷

Friel was soon given command of the Pangnirtung detachment subsequent to Wight being transferred to the new detachment at Lake Harbour, where an outbreak of chickenpox caused significant suffering amongst the Inuit.⁶⁸ Friel and several constables undertook a census of the Inuit population on Baffin Island, conducted several “local” patrols totalling over 1,400 km by boat and just shy of 6,000 km by dogsled, and established multiple caches of dog food and other supplies.⁶⁹ The longest patrol of the year was undertaken by Friel, who, accompanied by a doctor, covered 2,000 km in fifty-one days over “new ground,” conducting status checks of wildlife and game, holding complaint tribunals, collecting expired game licenses, and monitoring both the wolf and caribou populations while the doctor attended to medical issues.⁷⁰

At Dundas Harbour, the weather kept anything but short local patrols from being run, although members took great pains to monitor the game conditions to busy their time, fill caches of walrus meat for the dog teams, and accompany the Inuit on whale and narwhal hunts.⁷¹ At the Bache Peninsula, Joy conducted a 3,400 km patrol to Axel Heiberg, Sverdup, King Christian, Cornwall, and Graham Islands, monitoring muskox and caribou populations, checking the health of the natives, and establishing caches of bear meat.⁷²

The increasing strategic value of the North was recognized by Ottawa during this time frame, and a series of wireless stations were built throughout the eastern Arctic.⁷³ The importance of the EAP members to this initiative was evidenced by the fact that RCMP officers were selected to serve as advisors to these wireless stations, adding to their already fulsome duties.⁷⁴

In 1928, Wilcox again wintered at Pond Inlet, undertaking another 1,400 km patrol over a forty-five-day period, this time to the Hecla and Fury Strait, Foxe Basin, Melville Island, and Igloolik Island.⁷⁵ By this point in the EAP, relations were clearly excellent between the Inuit and RCMP. When Wilcox arrived at a native hamlet, Inuit men insisted on erecting his igloo, and their wives and daughters prepared lamps with whale oil.⁷⁶ At Pangnirtung, newly arrived Sgt. O. G. Petty was placed in command, and he immediately set up two hunting camps close to the detachment “with the dual purpose of obtaining (dog) feed, and keeping the men occupied during the dark days,” noting that “the exercise hardens the men for the long patrols in the later part of winter.”⁷⁷ Although the detachment members spent most of their time providing assistance to other government departments, Petty observed that the “preventative work done by the patrols cannot be exaggerated.”⁷⁸ These patrols succeeded in strengthening relations between the natives and RCMP. Petty noted that the small gifts of tea, flour, biscuits, sugar, and tobacco made by the policemen “seems to put a new heart into the people,” and that “the natives look forward to the arrival of the patrol[s] with pleasure.”⁷⁹

That same year, Joy was commissioned to the rank of inspector and given overall command of the EAP, with Wilcox rotating out to Ottawa.⁸⁰ Consequently, Anstead was promoted to corporal and given command of the Bache Peninsula, while Cst. W. Urquhart was placed in command of the Dundas Harbour detachment.⁸¹ At Dundas Harbour, Urquhart reported a quiet year, largely because of the inability to conduct lengthy patrols due to the breaking off of bergs from the ice shelf.⁸² In spite of this impediment, the detachment still managed to undertake 1,000 km of patrolling.⁸³ At the Bache Peninsula detachment, Anstead had Cst. G. T. Makinson and an Inuit guide conducted a six-week patrol covering 1,100 km through areas “not marked on the maps” to the now unused detachment at Craig Harbour.⁸⁴ Anstead had intended for this patrol to continue over Jones Sound to Dundas Harbour on Devon Island; however, due to a break suffered by the guide from a sled falling on his legs, they remained at Craig until healthy and then returned to the Bache detachment.⁸⁵

At Lake Harbour, Wight also reported a quiet year, with patrols totaling no more than 800 km, due primarily to the detachment members engagement in the construction of the detachment’s buildings, although several local patrols were undertaken, Inuit villages were visited, and several Inuit families visited the detachment itself.⁸⁶

Much more could be gleaned from RCMP reports from this period. The above summaries, however, serve to illustrate the early stages of the EAP’s life cycle at the six eastern Arctic detachments and the lengths to which capable operators could go when pushed. The EAP would survive as an RCMP entity until 1968, as would warm relations with the Inuit. As much as the EAP was established to ensure Ottawa that Canadians had not only set foot but successfully operated in the Arctic, this relational aspect cannot be overlooked.⁸⁷ Indeed, memoirs from this time period show a clear admiration by the RCMP for the Inuit, something quite uncommon in RCMP-aboriginal relations.⁸⁸ The EAP members were key in establishing this relationship. Not only did many EAP members learn to communicate in the Inuit native language, Inuktitut, but after 1936, many Inuit also began employment with the EAP as special constables.⁸⁹

After World War II, however, and with the start of the Cold War, a militarization of the Arctic began in conjunction with North American Aerospace Defense Command growth, which resulted in joint Arctic weather stations being built as well as U.S. military posts being constructed as part of the Distant Early Warning Line.⁹⁰ This in turn resulted in the “urbanization” of many Inuit as they began to drift and settle near the newly constructed facilities, and as the introduction of family allowances took root and the fox fur market crashed, the Inuit’s relationship with the state would eventually become more dependent.⁹¹ Their traditional economy would soon be at risk of collapse, and many Inuit had to be sent to southern hospitals from the mere sociocultural shock of losing their old way of life.⁹² All of this, it should be noted—from the resettlement of natives close to U.S. facilities through the lost culture, to state dependence of their former wards—was decried and resisted by the RCMP.⁹³

Relevance to the Current Security Environment

Since planting a flag in the Arctic seabed in 2007, Russia’s interests in the Arctic have only increased. In 2015, Moscow attempted to claim 1.2 million square kilometers of ice shelf as its own, recognizing the untapped natural resource wealth the Arctic is believed to contain, and since then, it has significantly militarized its northern sea route and Arctic maritime zone.⁹⁴ In terms of economic development and maintaining access to the North Atlantic and European Arctic waterways, but most importantly ensuring second-strike capabilities for its ballistic missile submarines against U.S. and NATO threats, the Arctic is of vital importance to the Kremlin.⁹⁵ Any strategist debating Russian intentions need only consider that Moscow now controls more than half the Arctic coastline and has built more than fifty bases throughout that space.⁹⁶ Canada has none, and Ottawa is unprepared to face any military challenge to its sovereignty in the Arctic; it will have to rely on the auspices and goodwill of Washington to prevent any aggression or incursions into its Arctic territories. Concerningly, however, the United States has only six bases throughout its Arctic space, and five are outside the Arctic Circle.⁹⁷

Having recognized the Russian threat to the Arctic as formidable, the Canadian government’s response thus far has been to recommend that Canada continue to rely on the United States for adequate air space defense, as well as earmarking $6.7 billion for Arctic security—but with only a meager $420 million of that being allocated to the Canadian Armed Forces and the lion’s share of $6 billion going toward Arctic radar installations.⁹⁸ A similar announcement of $2.67 billion to build a network of northern military hubs—which would cover only locations in Iqaluit in Nunavut, and Yellowknife and Inuvik in the Northwest Territories, far from any coastline—appears equally insufficient to deal with modern Russian hybrid threats, as these bases will serve as forward operating bases capable only of supporting air operations and for storing equipment.⁹⁹

No doubt attributable to the potential risks of involving or triggering retaliatory action by the United States, experts hold that the risk of an outright Russian invasion of Canada’s Arctic regions is far less likely than a smaller, unconventional, or hybrid approach, practiced by Moscow to reasonable degrees of success in Ukraine to date, and that any Russian activities in the Arctic would be intended to distract NATO war planners from a larger general conflict.¹⁰⁰ Such tactics are likely to include gray-zone actions including cyber and misinformation campaigns, dual-use marine scientific research, and critical infrastructure interference, as well as low-level military activities conducted in an unprofessional manner that disregards international law or custom and the jamming of global positioning systems; it is in these areas that a new EAP might provide some benefit to war planners.¹⁰¹

The RCMP was ideally suited to the eastern Arctic stability mission given the force’s paramilitary structure and decades of experience with indigenous peoples and traders.¹⁰² Their structure as a paramilitary organization was based on the Royal Irish Constabulary, an organization that combined military and policing functions to stabilize and maintain order among a hostile population, and that paramilitary tradition persists, with the force engaged in all levels of local, provincial, and federal policing, including national security, and with members posted in every province and territory including the Arctic.¹⁰³ Admittedly, small teams of police officers on dogsleds will not be able to prevent Russian aggression in the Arctic, but given the dearth of military presence there, reestablishing a mobile, cross-land constabulary operation might yield benefits disproportionate to the costs of standing up a much larger operation. In the hybrid gray zone, employing a paramilitary force such as the RCMP addresses the overlap between the military and policing worlds. Given that the RCMP maintains a permanent presence at thirteen detachments in the Yukon, eighteen in the Northwest Territories, and twenty-five in Nunavut, including Pond Inlet, Pangnirtung, and Kimmirut (formerly Lake Harbour), the RCMP is integrated into Arctic communities to a degree that greatly surpasses that of any other North American government, nonprofit, or private entity.¹⁰⁴ Being closely integrated into those communities, interacting with Inuit on a daily basis, enforcing Canadian law, establishing order, and creating stability affords the RCMP with an ability to potentially counter any cyber-driven disinformation campaigns, and reestablishing a new EAP would serve as a link between communities in the event of a cyber-related shutdown of communications.

Given that Canada’s Arctic encompasses mountain ranges and vast sweeps of tundra, glaciers and ice fields, as well as grasslands, forests, and swamps, an intimate knowledge of such vast terrain extremes is imperative to deal with or counter Russian dual-purpose research or critical infrastructure interference.¹⁰⁵ A modernized EAP might provide a discreet, eyes-on surveillance capability, and an ability to move overland for long distance, alone or in small teams, would in turn provide leverageable information or data to Canadian Armed Forces war planners. Low-level military activities such as unplanned flights and the like would be outside the scope of a new EAP, but the true strength of the model lies in its ability to influence interpersonal relationships with the indigenous Inuit.

Conclusion

Although the RCMP patrols described above were not conducted under the confines of a war per se—whether a large one or a small one—they nonetheless show how long-range patrolling and building close working and personal relationships with indigenous populations can achieve what any other constabulary operation might hope to achieve, namely stability, which in turn galvanizes support for the constabulary forces. If the metric for success in a constabulary operation is the development of social order and earning the respect of the target population, and if fair treatment and competent patrolling are added into the mix, then this article has shown that the RCMP constabulary operation in the eastern Arctic must be viewed as a victory.¹⁰⁶

Russia is unmistakably pivoting to the Arctic, and as climate change spurs the melting of sea ice and new shipping lanes are opened, the likely outcome will be more people, more vessels, and a heightened interest in Canada’s far-northern mineral and energy deposits.¹⁰⁷ Canada is unprepared to defend its Arctic sovereignty, and in the absence of direct U.S. military assistance, it will have to come up with innovative ideas for defending its northern territories. Norwegian researchers have stated that the RCMP Eastern Arctic Patrol might serve as a model for how to do so.¹⁰⁸

Admittedly, reinstituting the EAP, with its lengthy and arduous distances, would be no easy task. The last RCMP dogsled patrol was conducted in 1969, and since then, the requisite skills have nearly died out.¹⁰⁹ Willing RCMP officers would need to be identified and retrained in the use of the long-distance sled, as would many Inuit should they desire to be utilized as guides once more; however, a large lost opportunity will occur if relations with the indigenous people of the region are not harnessed in a national security capacity, particularly given the era of strategic competition in which the world now exists. RCMP officers, living and working in the same communities as the Inuit, would be far better placed and suited to exploiting this relationship. Standing up dogsled patrols in the Arctic will not prevent Russian incursions, but an ability to cover ground, remain concealed, and act as “eyes and ears” would provide a level and degree of intelligence that might otherwise have gone overlooked.

 

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Notes

1. U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940), 1; Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power (Basic Books, 2002), xx, xviii.
2. Dean Havron et al., Constabulary Capabilities for Low-Level Conflict (Human Sciences Research Inc., April 1969), iii, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/AD0851728.pdf.
3. Havron et al., Constabulary Capabilities for Low-Level Conflict.
4. Giuseppe De Magistris, “A Proposal for a NATO High-Readiness Constabulary Force,” Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units Magazine, no. 2 (2023): 44–49, https://anyflip.com/wnmbd/zdec.
5. Emrah Ozdemir, “An Irregular Use of Military Force: Stability Policing Operations,” Irregular Warfare Initiative, 9 November 2023, https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/an-irregular-use-of-military-force-stability-policing-operations/.
6. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, “Russia Plants Flag Staking Claim to Arctic Region,” CBC News, 2 August 2007, https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/russia-plants-flag-staking-claim-to-arctic-region-1.679445.
7. Elizabeth Buchanan, “Russia’s Gains in the Great Arctic Race,” War on the Rocks, 4 May 2023, https://warontherocks.com/2023/05/russias-gains-in-the-great-arctic-race/.
8. “RCMP Origin Story,” Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), updated 6 March 2025, https://rcmp.ca/en/history-rcmp/rcmp-origin-story.
9. RCMP, “RCMP Origin Story.”
10. Peter Schledermann, “The Muskox Patrol: High Arctic Sovereignty Revisited,” Arctic 56, no. 1 (March 2003): 101–6.
11. Schledermann, “The Muskox Patrol.”
12. David Judd, “Canada’s Norther Policy: Retrospect and Prospect,” The Polar Record 14, no. 92 (January 1969): 594, https://www.doi.org/10.1017/S0032247400064871.
13. Ryan Shackleton, “‘Not Just Givers of Welfare’: The Changing Role of the RCMP in the Baffin Region, 1920–1970,” The Northern Review 36 (Fall 2012): 6, https://thenorthernreview.ca/index.php/nr/article/view/256/258; The Canadian Encyclopedia, “Eastern Arctic Patrol,” by Season Osborne, 10 June 2024, https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/eastern-arctic-patrol.
14. “Map of North America,” Nations Online Project, accessed 26 November 2025, https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/north_america_map2.htm. The detachment names and locations were added by author.
15. RCMP, “RCMP Origin Story.”
16. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police for the Year Ended September 30, 1921, sessional paper no. 28 (Government of Canada, 14 February 1922), 20, https://archive.org/details/1922v58i8p28_1635/page/20/mode/2up.
17. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1921, 20–21.
18. Jon C. Rogowski et al., “Political Infrastructure and Economic Development: Evidence from Postal Systems,” American Journal of Political Science 66, no. 4 (October 2022): 15, https://bpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/voices.uchicago.edu/dist/2/3167/files/2022/01/infrastructure_development.pdf.
19. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1921, 33.
20. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1921, 33.
21. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1921, 34.
22. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1921, 34.
23. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1921, 35.
24. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1921, 35.
25. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police for the Year Ended September 30, 1922, sessional paper no. 21 (Government of Canada, January 1923), 21, https://archive.org/details/1923v59i5p21_1673/mode/2up.
26. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police for the Year Ended September 30, 1923, sessional paper no. 21 (Government of Canada, January 1924), 35, https://archive.org/details/1924v60i4p21_1714/page/34/mode/2up.
27. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1923, 35.
28. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1923, 35.
29. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1923, 35.
30. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1923, 35.
31. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1923, 34.
32. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1923, 34.
33. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police for the Year Ended September 30, 1924, sessional paper no. 21 (Government of Canada, 20 January 1925), 37, https://archive.org/details/1925v61i4p21_1767/page/n1/mode/2up.
34. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1924, 37.
35. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1924, 36.
36. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1924, 38, 60.
37. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1924, 36.
38. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police for the Year Ended September 30, 1925 (Government of Canada, 25 January 1926), 41, 42, https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/lbrr/archives/rcmp-rrcmp-1925-eng.pdf.
39. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1925, 43–44.
40. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1925, 43.
41. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1925, 43.
42. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1925, 44.
43. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1925, 60.
44. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1925, 44.
45. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1925, 44.
46. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1925, 44–46.
47. Shackleton, “Not Just Givers of Welfare,” 9.
48. Shackleton, “Not Just Givers of Welfare,” 9.
49. Shackleton, “Not Just Givers of Welfare,” 9; Migratory Birds Convention Act, 1994, S.C. 1994, c. 22, https://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/M-7.01/FullText.html. This act superseded the original act, which was passed in 1917. The Northwest Game Act of 1917 was a legislative document enacted to provide regulations with regard to the protection of wild animals and of birds and their eggs, and to the issue of game licenses. It morphed into the Canadian Wildlife Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. W-9, https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/w-9/FullText.html.
50. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1925, 44–45.
51. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1925, 54.
52. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police for the Year Ended September 30, 1926 (Government of Canada, 1927), 43, https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/lbrr/archives/rcmp-rrcmp-1926-eng.pdf.
53. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1926, 43.
54. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1926, 44.
55. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1926, 45–46.
56. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1926, 58.
57. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1926, 58.
58. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1926, 63–65.
59. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1926, 47.
60. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1926, 50–52.
61. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1926, 53.
62. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1926, 57–58.
63. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police for the Year Ended September 30, 1927 (Government of Canada, 1928), 48, https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/lbrr/archives/rcmp-rrcmp-1927-eng.pdf.
64. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1927, 48.
65. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1927, 74.
66. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1927, 49.
67. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1927, 49.
68. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1927, 68.
69. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1927, 69.
70. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1927, 69.
71. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1927, 61.
72. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1927, 52–58.
73. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1927, 50.
74. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1927, 50.
75. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police for the Year Ended September 30, 1928 (Government of Canada, 1929), 73, https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/lbrr/archives/rcmp-rrcmp-1928-eng.pdf.
76. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1928, 73.
77. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1928, 77.
78. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1928, 77.
79. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1928, 78, 80.
80. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1928, 63.
81. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1928, 64, 71.
82. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1928, 64, 71.
83. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1928, 64, 71.
84. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1928, 66.
85. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1928, 66.
86. RCMP, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1928, 82, 83.
87. Schledermann, “The Muskox Patrol,” 104.
88. William Morrison, Showing the Flag (UBC Press, 1985), 152–61.
89. Schledermann, “The Muskox Patrol,” 103; Shelagh Grant, Arctic Justice: On Trial for Murder, Pond Inlet, 1923 (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002), 232.
90. Shackleton, “Not Just Givers of Welfare,”12.
91. Shackleton, “Not Just Givers of Welfare,”12.
92. Shackleton, “Not Just Givers of Welfare,”12.
93. Shackleton, “Not Just Givers of Welfare,”12.
94. Vladimir Isachenkov, “Russia Submits Claim for Vast Arctic Seabed Territories at UN,” CBC News, 4 August 2015, https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/russia-submits-claim-for-vast-arctic-seabed-territories-at-un-1.3178447; Bohdan Utsymenko, “Putin’s Arctic Ambitions: Putin Eyes Natural Resources and Shipping Routes,” UkraineAlert (blog), Atlantic Council, 9 April 2025, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/putins-arctic-ambitions-russia-eyes-natural-resources-and-shipping-routes/.
95. Eugene Rumer et al., Russia in the Arctic: A Critical Examination (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 29 March 2021), 6, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2021/03/russia-in-the-arctica-critical-examination?lang=en.
96. Rumer et al., Russia in the Arctic, 6.
97. Rumer et al., Russia in the Arctic, 6.
98. Tony Dean et al., Arctic Security Under Threat: Urgent Needs in a Changing Geopolitical and Environmental Landscape (The Senate of Canada, June 2023), 10, 36, https://sencanada.ca/content/sen/committee/441/SECD/reports/2023-06-28_SECD_ArcticReport_e.pdf; Arty Sarkisian “Carney Announces $6.7B in Arctic Military, Infrastructure Spending During Iqaluit Visit,” Nunatsiaq News, 18 March 2025, https://nunatsiaq.com/stories/article/carney-outlines-6-7b-in-arctic-military-infrastructure-spending-during-iqaluit-visit/.
99. Liny Lamberink, “Feds Announce Locations of 3 Northern Military Hubs,” CBC, 6 March 2025, https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/northern-military-hubs-funding-increased-1.7476382.
100. P. Whitney Lackenbauer, “A Russian Ukraine-like Invasion of the Canadian Arctic?,” North American and Arctic Defense Security Network, 28 June 2024, https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/24jun28-Russia-Invasion-Canadian-Arctic-PWL.pdf; Sonke Marahrens and Josef Schröfl, “The Russian-Ukraine Conflict from a Hybrid Warfare Cognitive Perspective,” Defence Horizon Journal, 25 April 2024, https://tdhj.org/blog/post/russia-ukraine-hybrid-cognitive-warfare/.
101. Lackenbauer, “A Russian Ukraine-like Invasion of the Canadian Arctic?”; Murray Brewster, “Pentagon Warns of Potential Russian Action in the Arctic – Including Jamming GPS Satellites,” CBC News, 25 July 2024, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/pentagon-russia-arctic-gps-jamming-1.7274182.
102. Shackleton, “Not Just Givers of Welfare,” 6.
103. Shackleton, “Not Just Givers of Welfare,” 6; Chris Madsen, “Time to Drop the Mounted: Reimagining a Royal Canadian Gendarmerie,” International Journal of Police Science and Management 26, no. 2 (June 2024): 196–97, https://doi.org/10.1177/1461355723121864.
104. “Yukon RCMP,” RCMP, updated 5 April 2025, https://rcmp.ca/en/yukon/detachments#wb-cont; “Northwest Territories RCMP,” RCMP, updated 15 May 2025, https://rcmp.ca/en/nwt/detachments#wb-cont; “Nunavut RCMP,” RCMP, updated 5 April 2025, https://rcmp.ca/en/nunavut/detachments#wb-cont.
105. Dustin Edward Lawrence, Mobility in the Arctic: Applying Lessons from the Past to the New Operational Environment (North American and Arctic and Defense Security Network, 2024), 11, https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/NAADSN_Arctic_Mobility_Lawrence.pdf.
106. Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace, 165.
107. Jim Bronskill, “Arctic a ‘Vulnerable Destination’ for Foreign Adversaries, CSIS Warns,” Global News, 5 March 2025, https://globalnews.ca/news/11066770/canada-arctic-foreign-adversaries-csis/.
108. Gustav Smedal, Acquisition of Sovereignty Over Polar Areas (Dybwad, 1931), 35.
109. “RCMP in the North,” RCMP, updated 10 March 2025, https://rcmp.ca/en/history-rcmp/rcmp-north.

 

 

 

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January-February 2026