Publishing Disclaimer: In all of its publications and products, Military Review presents professional information. However, the views expressed therein are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Army University, the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. government.

---

 

Fixing Where Soldiers Sleep

Why the Barracks Task Force Is Necessary—and What It Must Deliver

 

1st. Lt. Tyler W. O’Quinn, U.S. Army

 

Download the PDF

 

The day soldiers stop bringing you their problems is the day you have stopped leading them.

—Gen. Colin Powell

For junior enlisted soldiers in the U.S. Army and their counterparts in the other services, the barracks are more than just another building on a military base: it is home, and across the joint force, that home is in crisis. From mold and pest infestations to failing plumbing and deferred maintenance, this crisis has reached a breaking point. It is not merely a facilities problem; it is an institutional failure years in the making, leaving the Department of War (DoW) no choice but to act.¹ In a formal announcement via social media on 9 October 2025, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth declared that these substandard conditions are “a constant source of stress and frustration” and that “every member of our Joint Force deserves clean, comfortable, and safe housing.”² Hegseth directed the under secretary of war for acquisition and sustainment to create a barracks task force (BTF) to be led by Dale Marks, the assistant secretary of war for energy, installations, and environment.³ As a junior enlisted soldier turned commissioned officer who now leads soldiers, I have seen firsthand how quickly poor living conditions can erode trust, discipline, and readiness. This problem is not new.

This crisis has been documented for years, dating back to at least 2002, when the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO; then the General Accounting Office) reported that barracks facilities at several basic training locations were, to varying degrees, “in need of significant repair, although some barracks were in better condition than others” with the Army having the most issues of the services.⁴ The 2002 GAO report noted that the “most prevalent problems” included “a lack of or inadequate heating and air conditioning, inadequate ventilation (particularly in bathing areas), and plumbing-related (e.g., leaks and clogged drains) deficiencies.”⁵ Twenty-one years later, the GAO’s 2023 report showed that these issues persist and continue to threaten morale and readiness, even affecting service members’ decision on whether to stay in uniform or to pursue another career outside the military, something the DoW was not tracking.⁶ These findings underscore that the conditions prompting the BTF were neither recent nor isolated—they were systemic and persistent.

Additional signs of this crisis have emerged in recent years, with the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps ordering servicewide inspections of their inventories within the past five years alone. The Army ordered one after then–Sgt. Maj. of the Army Michael Grinston visited the Smoke Bomb Hill Barracks at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in 2022. It led to a $90 million project to demolish and rebuild the barracks complex.⁷ In early 2025, Navy Secretary John Phelan was left “appalled” after visiting Palau Hall Barracks in Guam and ordered a Navy-wide review of the Navy’s inventory.⁸ The Marine Corps likewise ordered its own review in 2025 as part of preparing for its “Barracks 2030” initiative.⁹ However, even these major interventions did not reach service members who felt their concerns were going unheard.

In addition to these servicewide reviews, the most prevalent sign of this crisis is on social media, where service members have posted about the conditions they face. In one such instance, a soldier’s air conditioning was fixed at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, only after they posted about it online.¹⁰ This is Gen. Colin Powell’s warning made manifest: the day soldiers stop bringing their leaders their problems is the day the leaders no longer lead their soldiers.¹¹ Social media pages like U.S. Army W.T.F! Moments, with its 1.6 million Facebook followers, have become the twenty-first-century “watercooler” and a source of day-to-day events for service members past and present.¹² This crisis led former Army sergeant Rob Evans to create a mobile app called Hots&Cots, which allows service members to post reviews about their barracks and dining facilities.¹³ Taken together, these events left the DoW little choice but to establish the BTF to address the problem.

The BTF’s creation is necessary because the Army—and the DoW as a whole—has lacked a unified, enforceable system to oversee barracks conditions, resulting in decades of inconsistent standards, uneven accountability, and a culture that often failed to prioritize soldiers’ living conditions. Addressing this problem will require more than a one-time inspection or a surge of funding; it needs, as Hegseth mentioned, a department-wide framework that establishes clear responsibilities, standardizes oversight, and empowers leaders at every echelon to act decisively when issues arise.¹⁴ Success must be measured by eliminating substandard housing; ensuring predictable, protected funding for maintenance and modernization; and feedback systems that yield timely, substantive results rather than forcing soldiers to seek help through public forums. Ultimately, the BTF represents a long-overdue but essential step toward restoring confidence in the ability—and obligation—of both the Army and the DoW to care for our people.

The Problem: Conditions, Oversight Gaps, and Sobering Data

In its 2002 report, the GAO noted that the average age of barracks facilities for basic training ranged from twenty to forty-three years across the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force.¹⁵ It further reported that, before 2000, the DoW had “no readiness reporting system in place for its defense installations and facilities.”¹⁶ In fiscal year 2000, the department “reported to Congress for the first time on installation readiness as an integral element of its overall Defense Readiness Reporting System,” through a classification system known as a “C” rating, which had four ratings from C-1 (indicates minor issues) to C-4 (indicates significant deficiencies).¹⁷ The 2002 report showed that the Army had the worst overall collective rating for basic training barracks across five installations, with four receiving a C-3 rating and one receiving a C-4 rating. Common issues ranged from poor heating and air conditioning to poor ventilation, mold, plumbing issues, and roof leaks.¹⁸

Fast forward to the GAO’s 2023 report, and investigators reported the same issues that were found over twenty years earlier:

1. some barracks failed to meet minimum DoW standards and posed a health risk;
2. investigators observed varying amounts of mold and/or mildew growth in barracks in both occupied rooms and vacant rooms;
3. inadequate, inoperable, or nonexistent heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems, with some service members commenting on the effects that extremely high temperatures have on sleep; and
4. insufficient physical security from broken locks on windows and doors, lack of camera coverage, with two reported instances of squatters at two visited installations.¹⁹

Investigators also reported in 2023 that at four of the ten installations visited, residents described how the conditions contributed to a crime-favorable environment, with some service members expressing concerns about the risk for sexual assault.²⁰

These conditions are not just documented in detail by the GAO; independent studies by the RAND Corporation and the DoW Office of Inspector General (DoW IG) have shown that the underlying problems stem from systemic gaps in oversight, data collection, and resource allocation, for both the Army and the DoW as a whole. In its 2020 report, Improving the Allocation and Execution of Army Facility Sustainment Funding, RAND begins its summation noting, “The U.S. Army has been willing to accept risk in facility sustainment to maintain warfighting readiness,” which led to increased dependency on “sustainment, restoration, and modernization (SRM) funding to address […] facility requirements.”²¹ RAND recommended that the Directorate of Public Works offices across installations be given greater staffing flexibility, that unit-level accountability for facility damage be strengthened, and that installations be given greater opportunities to share best practices.²² Over the long term, RAND emphasized modernizing key data systems like the General Fund Enterprise Business System and fully integrating them with BUILDER Sustainment Management System (which assists civil engineers, technicians, and managers in when, where, and how to maintain building infrastructure best), improving long-range modeling for deferred maintenance, and adopting analytical tools like the Mission Dependency Index to better connect facility conditions to readiness.²³ At the installation level, RAND encouraged practices that increase efficiency, diversify funding sources, and connect preventive maintenance to condition assessments to support long-term sustainment planning.²⁴

In RAND’s 2024 report, How Do Alternative Strategies for Army Installation Unaccompanied Housing Compare?, the authors noted that the Army had set a goal for fiscal year 2029 that all unaccompanied soldiers living in permanent party housing will reside in “quality housing,” defined as individual “private sleeping rooms, no more than two soldiers sharing a bathroom, and a building facility condition index (FCI) at or above 80.”²⁵ As of 2023, however, the Army faced “a 15-percent deficit in available barracks bed space,” a shortfall tied to prolonged strains on operations and maintenance funding and limited military construction (MILCON) investments for barracks.²⁶ RAND concluded that it would take years beyond existing Army plans to raise the barracks inventory to desired standards, and that no strategy examined—including intergovernmental support agreements or other efficiency measures—was cost-effective enough to achieve the Army’s quality goals with current resources.²⁷

A central barrier to addressing these deficits is the inconsistent quality of the data the Army uses to inform sustainment and modernization decisions. RAND recommended improving data accuracy and integration across systems, including the Real Property Planning and Analysis System, the Enterprise Military Housing System, the Installation Status Report, and BUILDER.²⁸ The report emphasized that unreliable or incomplete information limits the Army’s ability to prioritize maintenance, direct sustainment, restoration, and modernization funding, and develop long-range MILCON strategies.²⁹ To reduce costs and improve facility conditions, RAND also recommended consolidating the barracks inventory “where possible.”³⁰ This would lower sustainment requirements and reduce the number of buildings needing significant investment. Additionally, the authors highlighted alternative housing options, including adjustments to room-assignment policies, selective privatization, intergovernmental service agreements with state and local governments, leasing structures, and expanded use of underutilized privatized family housing, that could alleviate overcrowding and reduce the need for additional MILCON funding.³¹ Some options would require legislative authority to authorize the Army or other services to offer soldiers less-than-full Basic Allowance for Housing, particularly for multibedroom homes.³²

RAND also incorporated soldier feedback on what makes the barracks livable. Overall satisfaction ranged from 2.4 to 2.8 on a five-point scale, with soldiers consistently rating the social and relational aspects of barracks life as necessary.³³ Features related to socializing in one’s room, module, or common areas, or to maintaining nonmilitary relationships within the barracks were among the lowest-scoring elements.³⁴ Citing a separate study, RAND noted that barracks designs that encourage socialization correlate with improved social health indicators and higher reenlistment rates.³⁵ Soldiers living in older, more socially oriented barracks layouts were more likely to reenlist than those housed in newer, more isolated designs.³⁶ Taken together, RAND’s findings suggest that improving barracks conditions will require better data integration, targeted use of alternative housing and privatization strategies, consolidation of the barracks inventory, and deliberate incorporation of design features that support social connection, well-being, and retention.³⁷

The DoW IG’s findings closely parallel those of RAND and the GAO, highlighting persistent weaknesses in inspection processes, documentation, oversight of unaccompanied housing, and enforcement of policy and standards. The DoW IG reported in November 2024 that, although officials had taken steps to comply with section 3044 of the fiscal year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act, none of the required actions were fully implemented.³⁸ The report identified several systemic deficiencies: a lack of clear direction for identifying and remediating hazards in military housing; incomplete or insufficient execution of statutory requirements; instances of unaccompanied government-owned and government-controlled (GO-GC) housing that were poorly maintained and failed to meet minimum adequacy standards; and evidence that officials had not consistently prioritized safe and adequate living conditions in GO-GC unaccompanied housing.³⁹ These findings reinforce the broader pattern of fragmented oversight and inconsistent execution across the Army and DoW’s housing enterprise, including the barracks and family housing. However, perhaps the clearest sign of the state of the barracks does not come from an external agency but rather from the soldiers themselves.

The Army’s first-ever Tenant Satisfaction Survey (TSS) for unaccompanied housing offered the clearest picture yet of how soldiers themselves view barracks conditions. More than half of all surveyed buildings were rated “poor” or below, and even the best-scoring facilities fell short of what soldiers should expect from safe, functional living quarters (see table).⁴⁰ At specific installations, dissatisfaction was especially pronounced, with Fort Bragg (56 percent) and Okinawa Torii (59 percent) recording the lowest satisfaction scores in the Army.⁴¹

These TSS results echoed the GAO’s 2023 findings, which noted that officials at roughly half of the installations visited admitted that barracks routinely lost out to other “mission-critical” facilities when funding was prioritized.⁴² Together, the survey and the audit data reveal a consequential but straightforward reality: when soldiers see their living conditions deteriorate while other facilities receive priority funding, trust in the system erodes. The TSS, therefore, represents more than customer feedback—it is a readiness indicator reflecting whether the Army’s commitment to its people is visible where they live. Yet, the TSS itself underscores a deeper problem: the lack of consistent, long-term data on barracks conditions. The absence of such information is not proof of a lack of crisis—it is part of the crisis itself.

The assessments from the GAO, DoW IG, and RAND Corporation all converge on a consistent diagnosis. With each report, the situation was approached with a different mandate and methodology, all of which identified recurring weaknesses in policy enforcement, inspection rigor, data reliability, and oversight structures. In aggregate, the findings indicate that the existing policy structure at the DoW and military department-levels have not produced consistent compliance, oversight, or maintenance outcomes sufficient to ensure acceptable living conditions for service members in unaccompanied housing.⁴³ Past interventions—whether inspections, funding surges, or isolated initiatives—failed to produce lasting improvements because they did not address the root causes of the systemic structural gaps. These persistent deficiencies underscore why the BTF’s establishment was not only appropriate but also critical to preserving lethality and readiness, and why its success will depend on confronting the underlying institutional problems that have allowed substandard conditions to persist for decades.

The Way Forward: A Leader’s Perspective and a Junior Officer’s View of What Must Change

Leaders closest to soldiers—team and squad leaders, platoon sergeants and platoon leaders, company commanders, and company-grade officers who previously served as junior enlisted soldiers—bring a unique vantage point to the barracks crisis. Their daily proximity to soldiers living in aging facilities gives them an unfiltered view of how substandard housing conditions erode trust, discipline, and readiness. These leaders routinely observe barracks conditions shape far more than comfort; they influence whether soldiers believe the institution, represented by their chains of command, takes their welfare seriously. When living environments are marked by chronic maintenance issues, inconsistent standards, or slow responses to hazards, junior leaders see the consequences in morale, retention attitudes, and the relationship among soldiers and their chain of command. Their perspective reinforces a central theme evident across the GAO, RAND, and DoW IG findings: quality of life is inseparable from readiness, and barracks conditions are a foundational leadership responsibility.

But the barracks are more than just a responsibility of leaders and the institution. They are where new soldiers are transformed from civilians to warfighters. They are taught hospital corners, how to organize their storage lockers, how to keep the sleeping bays clean, and so much more. Here, their drill sergeants instill that institutional foundation of good order and discipline, standards, accountability, and professionalism. These are items that soldiers are expected to retain and carry with them as they move from basic and advanced training to their first units of assignment across the United States and the world. But if they go from clean, essentially new barracks facilities, like the ones I attended at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, to a post-World War I barracks building at Schofield Barracks, that leaves a distinct impression that cannot be unseen. But this crisis has presented Army junior officers (JO) with an opportunity to help the Army begin to fix this barracks crisis and help deliver the standard of living that our soldiers, present and future, deserve.⁴⁴

The Army Junior Officer Counsel (AJOC), formally chartered in April 2025, is composed of JOs from across the Army’s components—the Regular Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard.⁴⁵ AJOC has emerged as an essential venue for synthesizing these frontline observations, not just on the barracks crisis but on other matters of concern for JOs across the force, into actionable recommendations by being an officially sanctioned feedback pipeline from the figurative ground floor of the Army to Headquarters, Department of the Army. Here, JOs have discussed the same issues previously mentioned from systemic ambiguity—unclear responsibilities, inconsistent inspection regimes, and the absence of enforceable standards that apply across the Army. The AJOC concluded that the first significant step toward resolving this crisis is the need for a single, comprehensive regulation governing unaccompanied housing. This new regulation would establish clear habitability criteria. In line with DoW standards, it would prescribe inspection requirements and standards, define maintenance timelines across the Army, and delineate accountability for identifying and correcting deficiencies. AJOC JOs understand that without this foundational first step, even the most well-intentioned efforts by commanders and policymakers within the Army and DoW will continue to be undermined by the fragmented system that has plagued warfighters for too long; however, one key concern remains.

The concern raised within AJOC discussing the barracks crisis is the potential risk associated with expanded privatization of unaccompanied housing. Although RAND identified selective privatization as one of several alternative strategies, the experience of privatized family housing across the DoW in the preceding five years demonstrates that privatization without strong oversight and enforceable performance standards can introduce new vulnerabilities. Numerous lawsuits filed by military families—for example, Fort Hood, Texas, in 2020; Fort Jackson, South Carolina, in 2024; and Naval Air Station Key West, Florida, in 2025—have alleged mold, water intrusion, sewage leakage, poor maintenance, and unsafe living conditions in privatized homes, conditions in some cases for years before being addressed.⁴⁶ Balfour Beatty Communities (BBC), one of those companies currently being sued in Florida, previously pleaded guilty to “one count of major fraud against the United States” and was sentenced to $33.6 million in criminal fines and an additional $31.8 million in restitution as part of a plea agreement.⁴⁷ BBC also “entered a False Claims Act settlement […] to resolve its civil liability for $35.2 million.”⁴⁸ According to the U.S. Department of Justice, BBC employees over a six-year period (from 2013 to 2019), altered entries in property management software, destroyed and falsified resident comment cards, and submitted incentive fee requests falsely certifying that performance objectives had been met. In reality, those objectives—many tied directly to maintenance timelines and resident satisfaction—were not achieved. The fraud resulted in “lengthy and unnecessary delays in the resolution of maintenance issues to the detriment of servicemembers and their families,” while simultaneously providing service branches with an “inaccurate assessment of the state” of housing conditions.⁴⁹ In total, the financial liability in this specific instance that was resolved in 2022 would total approximately $100.6 million: enough to cover the previously mentioned Smoke Bomb Hill Barracks project, with plenty left over. This is something the BTF must consider as part of their recommendations to Hegseth, and that services must keep in mind when developing their housing plans based on the BTF’s findings and recommendations.

If it is determined that barracks privatization is the path forward, Pentagon-level leaders must ensure that robust safeguards are in place: clear habitability standards, strict contract enforcement, transparent grievance processes, and continuous oversight to prevent recurring problems. This is especially true given that the vast majority, if not all, unaccompanied junior enlisted soldiers must live in the barracks unless specific criteria are met, and they are most likely not in a position when they join to afford an attorney to bring civil suits against major corporations.

From this perspective, the BTF represents an opportunity to address problems that have persisted for decades. To succeed, the BTF must

1. establish a department-wide framework that eliminates department-wide inconsistency as requested by Hegseth;
2. identify successful and cost-effective modernization lines of effort for all data systems to enable reliable information to be accessible to all necessary stakeholders (leaders, policymakers, contractors, etc.);
3. synchronize funding structures that ensure predictable support for sustainment and modernization rather than relying upon episodic responses to crises;
4. identify ways to enable the barracks residential population to have access to feedback channels that yield timely results, demonstrating that the DoW places their welfare at the same or greater level of importance alongside readiness and lethality; and
5. work with the private industry—should that route be taken—to avoid situations like those mentioned with on-base family housing. This would include private corporate partners, the DoW, and the military departments implementing policies that, in practice, are virtually identical to the Army-required commanders’ open-door policy, which can be found in Army Regulation 600-20, Army Command Policy.⁵⁰

The reason for including such a provision governing the relationship among service members, their families, the chain of command, and the management company would be to prevent the issues surrounding nondisclosure agreements (NDA) with management companies experienced by service members with families when settling disputes over “mold, infestations, and other dangerous living conditions in their on-base homes.”⁵¹ According to Patricia Kime, from 2019 to approximately 2023, ninety-eight military families were asked by housing management companies to sign NDAs as part of a settlement involving substandard housing conditions.⁵² The use of NDAs in these cases came to light in a response to a congressional inquiry from five U.S. senators. One military spouse, Breanna Bragg, described the settlement terms offered to her family as “hush money,” and her family rejected the settlement offer.⁵³ Kime reported that “fewer than five cases” involving an NDA were in compliance with laws governing their use.⁵⁴ Officials from two of the three companies named by Kime, BBC and Liberty Military Housing defended their use of NDAs as legally permissible and in limited in scope. Liberty Military Housing stated that “no resident has ever been asked or required to sign [an] NDA in connection with entering into, continuing, or terminating a lease.”⁵⁵ Similarly, BBC stated that NDAs are used only in settlement and release agreements “pending/threatened litigation,” and that such agreements receive written from the approval of the Office of the Secretary of War, and that BBC complies with all legal requirements governing NDA usage.⁵⁶ The Michaels Organization did not respond to a request for comment from Military.com.⁵⁷

Senior enlisted leaders from all of the services faced questions regarding NDAs during a hearing from the U.S. Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Personnel on 11 February 2026. Senior Enlisted Advisor to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff David Isom, responding to Sen. Elizabeth Warren, said, “I think service members should always have access to their commanders to be able to report the problems, ma’am.”⁵⁸ Warren, when questioning Sgt. Maj. of the Army Michael Weimer, asked whether housing operators should be permitted to condition repairs on residents signing agreements restricting disclosure to their chain of command or congressional oversight bodies. Weimer responded that they “should not be able to do” so, which is a sentiment expressed in brief answers from the senior enlisted leaders from the Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Space Force.⁵⁹

Based on my own training, knowledge, and experiences from my own service, single service members who live in the barracks are not in any position to be engaged in a dispute with a housing management company involving hazardous living conditions. Unlike civilian tenants, they are subject to orders, training, cycles, and potential deployment and cannot simply vacate or withhold their participation. When housing conditions deteriorate into conditions as described by the GAO in 2002 and 2023, the resulting dispute is not merely a maintenance issue; it becomes an administratively complex and operationally constrained conflict in which the service member has limited time, leverage, financial means, and legal capacity to pursue redress.⁶⁰ If privatization of the barracks is the course of action taken by the DoW, then involvement from the chain of command becomes essential. Additionally, JOs across the DoW underscore the importance of incorporating service member-driven design principles into future modernization efforts, recognizing that privacy, dignity, and opportunities for social connection materially influence morale, cohesion, and reenlistment decisions.

Ultimately, the path forward requires more than policy changes; it requires visible, sustained leadership engagement to signal that barracks conditions are a priority worthy of institutional focus. JOs have already demonstrated their commitment by addressing these challenges through AJOC and daily leadership of the soldiers who live in these buildings. The BTF now provides the first significant Pentagon-level structure to act on these insights. Still, its success will depend on whether senior leaders in the Army and other services give this issue the persistent attention necessary to overcome decades of systemic shortfalls. That broader question—of institutional visibility, prioritization, and leadership presence—frames the next key issue in understanding the barracks crisis.

The Contest of Perception: Leadership Visibility in an Information Age

In a modern fighting force, leadership does not operate only through position, authority, or proximity; it also operates through presence in the information environment. Soldiers today have far more access to information than their predecessors twenty-plus years ago. They form their understanding of leadership priorities not only from official speeches or installation visits, but also from what leaders say—or do not say—across the platforms where soldiers spend their time when not training or on mission. In this environment, perception often becomes reality. When soldiers see persistent silence on issues that affect their daily lives, they naturally assume those issues are not a priority, even when work is occurring behind the scenes and is to their benefit.

This dynamic is evident in the barracks. Soldiers have grown increasingly willing to highlight poor conditions online—sometimes bluntly, sometimes humorously, and sometimes with justified frustration. They turn to digital platforms because the information environment is immediate, unfiltered, and often the only place where their concerns prompt a response. When a malfunctioning HVAC system, mold-infested room or shower, or a broken door lock receives attention only after images circulate on social media, it reinforces the perception that the Army, and perhaps the other services as well, only responds quickly to public embarrassment rather than to internal reporting channels. In such cases, the issue is not that leaders are inactive, but that soldiers rarely see visible acknowledgement or timely communication that their concerns are understood and addressed.

The evolving role of social media in this space is no longer hypothetical; it is now institutional. In one example, Army soldiers interested in the Green to Gold Active-Duty Option Program’s active-duty option are encouraged to visit the official website and the Facebook group “Green To Gold Active Duty Option (G2G ADO).”⁶¹ Here, potential applicants and program alumni collaborate to answer applicants’ questions, provide application updates, and share other important information relevant to this highly sought-after program. Another clear illustration is the success of Hots&Cots, which has moved from another voice to a recognized participant in quality-of-life discussions—including its founder, Rob Evans, meeting with Secretary of the Army Daniel Driscoll in July 2025 and serving on the BTF itself.⁶² This progression underscores a broader truth: when soldiers perceive official channels as slow, opaque, or unresponsive, they will turn to platforms they believe will amplify their voices. And when those platforms become more effective at generating action than traditional mechanisms, their legitimacy grows accordingly.

However, this does not imply that senior leaders as a group are disengaged; instead, in the absence of visible communication, soldiers and their other service counterparts fill the void with their own interpretations. Various services have adapted to this reality, with senior Navy and Marine Corps officials publicly acknowledging housing shortfalls and outlining their improvement plans.⁶³ Visibility in the information environment has become a leadership tool in its own right—not just for recruitment—but also an opportunity to validate conditions, shape expectations, and reinforce that quality-of-life issues such as barracks conditions are central to readiness and to the moral obligations of command.

The Army now stands at a critical moment in this perception contest. Junior leaders across the force have shown a willingness to engage directly with soldiers, advocate for improved conditions, and support institutional reforms through venues such as AJOC. Their efforts and the creation of the BTF demonstrate momentum. What remains essential is the sustained, visible reinforcement from senior leadership that barracks conditions merit continuous, unambiguous attention. Leadership in today’s information age requires presence—not only in conference rooms, assembly halls, and installation visits but also in the spaces where soldiers seek assurance that their concerns matter. The Army can overcome this perception challenge but only if it chooses to engage deliberately, consistently, and transparently.

Conclusion

The evidence is unambiguous: barracks conditions across the Army and DoW have fallen short of what warfighters deserve and what readiness and lethality demand, and the consequences of this neglect has been accumulating for far too long. The GAO, RAND, and the DoW IG have shown on multiple occasions that the problem is not just aging infrastructure but also the absence of unified standards, consistent oversight, accurate data, and predictable investment. These weaknesses have allowed substandard living conditions to persist in plain sight, eroding trust and signaling to soldiers and their families—however unintentionally—that their daily environment is negotiable. The creation of the BTF marks the DoW’s serious institutional effort to confront these realities head-on and build a system that has long been needed.

It is also essential to recognize the senior leaders who have brought much-needed visibility to this issue at the military department and senior Pentagon levels. Driscoll signaled early in his tenure that soldiers and their families had “endured unacceptable housing conditions,” noting that despite the adversity, they continue to hold the line.⁶⁴ Hegseth likewise underscored the importance of standards, accountability, and readiness.⁶⁵ Their early emphasis on standards and “no more business as usual,” especially from Driscoll, has helped shape the conditions for institutional momentum and contributed directly and indirectly to the establishment of the BTF.⁶⁶

Yet no task force, however well-structured, can succeed without visible, sustained leadership engagement, especially in the spaces where soldiers now voice their concerns. Leaders at every echelon encourage soldiers to speak up, offer candid feedback, and identify problems before they become crises.⁶⁷ Such calls can and will ring hollow in the absence of deliberate efforts to seek out that feedback, to meet soldiers where they already are, and to demonstrate through communication and action that these concerns matter. Soldiers increasingly conclude that the information environment—and silence, whether intended or not—creates the perception that their frustrations go unheard or are disregarded. In this contest of perception, absence communicates just as clearly as presence.

Accountability must therefore accompany policy. Leaders, no matter the echelon, uniformed or civilian, cannot rely solely on formal systems or episodic inspections; they must actively cultivate a culture in which barracks conditions are monitored with the same seriousness as any other readiness factor. This includes responding to deficiencies promptly, enforcing standards consistently, strengthening maintenance logistics to meet demand, and ensuring that ambiguous responsibilities or unclear reporting channels do not obscure the truth. Soldiers notice when accountability is selective, delayed, or inconsistently applied. They also notice when leaders take ownership, communicate openly, and demonstrate through word and action that quality of life is not an afterthought but a foundational obligation of leadership.

This article is offered in that spirit—as part of the feedback leaders routinely ask for and, at times, appear uncertain where to find. Junior leaders across the force see the effects of inadequate barracks conditions every day, and they understand how deeply these issues shape trust, morale, and the fabric of our formations. Their insights, combined with the work of organizations like AJOC, reflect a commitment to strengthening the institution from the bottom up, aligning with the principle that leadership is a responsibility shared at every level.

The path ahead of us will not be quick or straightforward. The problems that created the current crisis developed over many years and will require sustained focus, resources, and cultural change to resolve. But the BTF represents the most significant step the DoW has taken toward that future—an acknowledgement that the status quo is unacceptable and meaningful reform is necessary and possible. If the DoW matches structural reform with visible leadership presence and unwavering accountability, it can restore trust, strengthen readiness, and ensure that where warfighters live reflect the standards of the profession they serve, in service to our Nation. In the immortal words of General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Let’s go.”⁶⁸

The views and opinions expressed in this article are the author’s and do not represent those of his commander, nor do they represent the official policy or position of the U.S. Department of the Army, the U.S. Department of War, or the U.S. government.

---

Notes

• Epigraph. Colin Powell, My American Journey (Random House, 1995), 73.

1. Exec. Order No. 14347, 90 Fed. Reg. 173 (5 September 2025), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-09-10/pdf/2025-17508.pdf. Following the authorization of the department’s formal secondary name under Executive Order 14347, the Department of Defense has adopted the historical name of the Department of Waras its primary public-facing designation. Throughout this article, the department and applicable leadership will be referred to as the department or secretary of war (as appropriate) when discussing organizational, policy, or institutional matters. However, for purposes of accuracy in citation and fidelity to the titles of statutes, reports, and official publications, all references and endnotes will retain the contemporary legal name “Department of Defense (DoD)” or “secretary of defense” unless otherwise specified.

2. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth (@secwar), “Every Member of Our Joint Force Deserves Clean, Comfortable and Safe Housing,” Instagram video, 9 October 2025, https://www.instagram.com/p/DPmxIEJEljA/.
3. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth (@SecWar), “Implementation Memorandum for Barracks Task Force,” X (formerly Twitter), 9 October 2025, https://x.com/SecWar/status/1976386024994750535; “Honorable Dale R. Marks,” Office of the Assistant Secretary of War for Energy, Installations, and Environment, accessed 11 February 2026, https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/leadership/dale-marks.html.
4. Barry Holman, Defense Infrastructure: Most Recruit Training Barracks Have Significant Deficiencies, GAO-02-786 (U.S. Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2002), 1, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-02-786.pdf.
5. Holman, Defense Infrastructure: Most Recruit Training Barracks Have Significant Deficiencies, 1.
6. Elizabeth Field et al., Military Barracks: Poor Living Conditions Undermine Quality of Life and Readiness, GAO-23-105797 (U.S. GAO, 2023), 43–44, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-23-105797.pdf.
7. Tom Vanden Brook, “Hazardous Mold Outbreak Triggers Army Order to Inspect All Barracks, Offices,” USA Today, 10 October 2022, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2022/10/10/hazardous-mold-triggers-army-inspect-barracks/8119474001/; “Teamwork: Smoke Bomb Hill Barracks Renovations Completed,” U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Savannah District, 15 December 2023, https://www.sas.usace.army.mil/Media/News-Stories/Article/3619448/teamwork-smoke-bomb-hill-barracks-renovations-completed/.
8. Drew Lawrence, “Navy Orders Forcewide Housing Inspections After Secretary ‘Appalled’ by Guam Barracks Conditions,” Military.com, 31 May 2025, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2025/05/30/navy-orders-forcewide-housing-inspections-after-secretary-appalled-guam-barracks-conditions.html.
9. Drew Lawrence, “Marine Corps Orders Servicewide Barracks Inspection Amid Improvement Efforts, Reports of Squalid Conditions,” Military.com, 7 February 2024, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2024/02/07/marine-corps-orders-servicewide-barracks-inspection-amid-improvement-efforts-reports-of-squalid.html.
10. Jeff Schogol, “Army Fixes Barracks Issue, After Soldier Turns to Social Media,” Task & Purpose, 26 February 2025, https://taskandpurpose.com/news/army-barracks-air-conditioning.
11. Powell, My American Journey, 73.
12. U.S. Army W.T.F! Moments (@usawtfm), Facebook, accessed 11 February 2026, https://www.facebook.com/usawtfm.
13. Patty Nieberg, “Army Veteran Lauches ‘Hots&Cots,’ a Yelp for Enlisted Life,” Task & Purpose, 22 November 2023, https://taskandpurpose.com/military-life/former-soldier-created-app-review-facilities/.
14. Hegseth, “Every Member of Our Joint Force Deserves Clean, Comfortable and Safe Housing.”
15. Holman, Defense Infrastructure, 4.
16. Holman, Defense Infrastructure, 5.
17. Holman, Defense Infrastructure, 5–6.
18. Holman, Defense Infrastructure, 6–7.
19. Field et al., Military Barracks, 25.
20. Field et al., Military Barracks,18–26.
21. Ellen Pint et al., Allocation and Execution of Army Facility Sustainment Funding, RR-3240-A (RAND Corporation, 2020), xiii, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR3240.html.
22. Pint et al., Allocation and Execution of Army Facility Sustainment Funding, 69–70.
23. U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center, “BUILDER™ Sustainment Management System,” U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 3 December 2012, https://www.erdc.usace.army.mil/Media/Fact-Sheets/Fact-Sheet-Article-View/Article/476728/builder-sustainment-management-system/.
24. Pint et al., Allocation and Execution of Army Facility Sustainment Funding, xvi–xvii.
25. Pint et al., Allocation and Execution of Army Facility Sustainment Funding, 1.
26. Pint et al., Allocation and Execution of Army Facility Sustainment Funding, 1.
27. Ellen Pint et al., How Do Alternative Strategies for Army Installation Unaccompanied Housing Compare?, RR-A2161-1 (RAND Corporation, 2024), iv, 1, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2161-1.html.
28. Pint, Alternative Strategies for Army Installation, 47.
29. Pint, Alternative Strategies for Army Installation, 21–23.
30. Pint, Alternative Strategies for Army Installation, 47.
31. Pint, Alternative Strategies for Army Installation, 10–11.
32. Pint, Alternative Strategies for Army Installation, iv–v, 11.
33. Cristina Delgado-Howard, “Better Barracks for Single Soldiers: An Exploratory Study of Unaccompanied Personnel Housing at Fort Hood, TX” (master’s thesis, State University of New York at Buffalo, 2018), cited in Pint, Alternative Strategies for Army Installation, 41.
34. Delgado-Howard, “Better Barracks for Single Soldiers,” 41.
35. Sean-Michael Tone Kelly, “Suicide in the Barracks: Architecture and Social Connection in Military Housing” (PhD diss., University of Oregon, June 2020), cited in Pint, Alternative Strategies for Army Installation, 42–43.
36. Pint, Alternative Strategies for Army Installation, 41–42.
37. Pint, Alternative Strategies for Army Installation, 47–48.
38. “Mission and Strategic Plan,” U.S. Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, accessed 11 February 2026, https://www.dodig.mil/Mission-and-Strategic-Plan/; Randolph Stone, Evaluation of the DoD’s Health, Safety, and Environmental Hazard Identification and Remediation in Military Housing, DODIG-2025-045 (U.S. Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, 2024), i, https://media.defense.gov/2024/Nov/20/2003590858/-1/-1/1/DODIG-2025-045_REDACTED%20SECURE.PDF.
39. Stone, DoD’s Health, Safety, and Environmental Hazard Identification and Remediation, 7, 10, 34–38.
40. CEL & Associates Inc., Summary of FY25 Tenant Satisfaction Results for Headquarters Department of the Army Unaccompanied Housing (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2025), https://www.armyresilience.army.mil/qualityoflife/pdf/FY25_Tenant_Satisfaction_Survey_Unaccompanied_Housing.pdf.
41. CEL & Associates, Summary of FY25 Tenant Satisfaction Results, 2, 4, 9, 12.
42. Field et al., Military Barracks, 48–49, 91.
43. Field et al., Military Barracks; Pint, Alternative Strategies of Army Installation; Pint et al., Allocation and Execution of Army Facility Sustainment Funding; Stone, DoD’s Health, Safety, and Environmental Hazard Identification and Remediation.
44. The term “junior officers” refers to officers and warrant officers in the ranks of second and first lieutenant, captain, warrant officer 1, and chief warrant officer 2.
45. U.S. Army Public Affairs, “Army Junior Officer Counsel Drives Change from the Ground Floor,” U.S. Army, 2 April 2025, https://www.army.mil/article/284352/army_junior_officer_counsel_drives_change_from_the_ground_floor; U.S. Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, memorandum, “Army Junior Officer Counsel Program,” 21 April 2025 (unpublished internal memorandum).
46. Patricia Kime, “Fort Hood Families Sue, Claiming Life-Threatening Mold in On-Base Housing,” Military.com, 17 June 2020, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2020/06/17/fort-hood-families-sue-claiming-life-threatening-mold-base-housing.html; Riley Ceder, “Family Alleges Sewage Leak in Military Housing Sickened 4-Year-Old,” Army Times, 27 November 2024, https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2024/11/27/family-alleges-sewage-leak-in-military-housing-sickened-4-year-old/; Karen Jowers, “Families Sue over ‘Appalling’ Conditions in Florida Military Housing,” Military Times, 16 April 2025, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2025/04/16/families-sue-over-appalling-conditions-in-florida-military-housing/.
47. Office of Public Affairs, “Justice Department Announces Global Resolution of Criminal and Civil Investigations with Privatized Military Housing Contractor for Defrauding U.S. Military,” U.S. Department of Justice, 22 December 2021, https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-global-resolution-criminal-and-civil-investigations-privatized; Jowers, “Families Sue over ‘Appalling’ Conditions in Florida Military Housing.”
48. Office of Public Affairs, “Justice Department Announces Global Resolution of Criminal and Civil Investigations”; United States v. Balfour Beatty Communities LLC, No. 21-CR-742 (D.C.C., 12 January 2022), https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/61640624/united-states-v-balfour-beatty-communities-llc/.
49. Office of Public Affairs, “Justice Department Announces Global Resolution of Criminal and Civil Investigations.”
50. “Soldiers are responsible for ensuring that the commander is made aware of problems that affect discipline, morale, and mission effectiveness; [the] policy allows members of the command to present facts, concerns, and problems of a personal or professional nature or other issues that the Soldier has been unable to resolve.” Army Regulation 600-20, Army Command Policy (Government Publishing Office, 2025), 8, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN43057-AR_600-20-001-WEB-2.pdf.
51. Patricia Kime, “98 Military Families Silenced by Nondisclosure Agreements with Private Base Housing Companies,” Military.com, 30 March 2023, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2023/03/30/98-military-families-silenced-nondisclosure-agreements-private-base-housing-companies.html.
52. Kime, “98 Families Silenced.”
53. Kime, “98 Families Silenced.”
54. Kime, “98 Families Silenced.”
55. Kime, “98 Families Silenced.”
56. Kime, “98 Families Silenced.”
57. Kime, “98 Families Silenced.”
58. Jeff Schogol, “Senator Grills Senior Enlisted Leaders About Privatized Housing NDAs,” Task & Purpose, 12 February 2026, https://taskandpurpose.com/news/military-housing-hearing/.
59. Schogol, “Senator Grills Senior Enlisted Leaders.”
60. Holman, Defense Infrastructure: Most Recruit Training Barracks Have Significant Deficiencies; Field et al., Military Barracks.
61. “Green to Gold,” Army ROTC, accessed 11 February 2026, https://armyrotc.army.mil/green-to-gold/; “Green To Gold Active Duty Option (G2G ADO),” Facebook, accessed 11 February 2026, https://www.facebook.com/groups/1816129791962379.
62. Hots&Cots (@hotsandcots), “It HAPPENED! Today, Hots&Cots Met with the @secarmy to discuss the Hots&Cots app and quality of life issues. ...,” Facebook, 7 July 2025, https://www.facebook.com/hotsandcots/posts/pfbid0DNgKAXfKX4rTJw6Tce4ns7VEsiPCVQwaRVrcqs2YNdQGKqW1AmpptMeFAkUx51ejl?rdid=wOcZdb0rqcFnr6Q5#; Hots&Cots (@hots&cots), “BREAKING NEWS: Well, it happened! Hots&Cots is officially in on the conversation for the Barracks Task Force,” Facebook video, 9 October 2025, https://www.facebook.com/reel/1099333808857207.
63. Carlos Ruiz, “Marines, We’re Getting after the #barracks! This Is Just the Beginning. #Marines #barrackslife,” Instagram video, 24 January 2024, https://www.instagram.com/usmcsgtmaj/reel/C2fwuGNOHR9/; The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (@USNavyCNO), “Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Daryl Caudle reviewed barracks at US Naval Base Guam to ensure progress is being made toward delivering safe, modern housing for all Sailors. …,” Facebook video, 19 November 2025, https://www.facebook.com/watch/?ref=saved&v=1787184348608066.
64. Daniel Driscoll, “My Share of the Task,” U.S. Army, 28 February 2025, https://www.army.mil/article/283429/26th_secretary_of_the_army_my_share_of_the_task.
65. Pete Hegseth, “Secretary Hegseth’s Message to the Force,” U.S. Department of War, 25 January 2025, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/4040940/secretary-hegseths-message-to-the-force/.
66. Joe Byerly, host, From the Green Notebook, podcast, episode 149, “No More Business as Usual: Secretary Dan Driscoll on Fighting for the Force,” 12 June 2025, https://fromthegreennotebook.com/2025/06/12/ep-149-no-more-business-as-usual-secretary-dan-driscoll-on-fighting-for-the-force/.
67. Todd South, “Army Leaders Want Soldiers to Write About the Issues Facing the Force,” Army Times, 4 December 2023, https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2023/12/04/army-leaders-want-soldiers-to-write-about-the-issues-facing-the-force/; Joe Byerly, host, From the Green Notebook, podcast, episode 139, “Write It Down: General George on Reflection, Reading, and Readiness,” 21 March 2025, https://fromthegreennotebook.com/2025/03/21/ep-139-write-it-down-general-george-on-reflection-reading-and-readiness/.
68. Stephen Ambrose, “When Ike Said ‘Okay. Let’s Go,’” American Heritage 49, no. 3 (June 1998), https://www.americanheritage.com/when-ike-said-okay-lets-go.

 

 

 

Back to Top

March-April 2026