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Security Cooperation

A Model Against Transnational Threats

 

Col. David Esteban Diaz Janampa, Peruvian Army

 

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Today, the armed forces in the world have new roles, which correspond precisely to new threats, and that is why the majority of the armies in the world are just looking at the way to confront these new threats, which are mostly transnational in nature. Therefore, they cannot be confronted by a government alone; there has to be a coordinated and joint effort.

—Gen. José Huerta, Former Peruvian Minister of Defense

The twenty-first-century international security environment has become more complex and unpredictable because of transnational threats that generate significant security crises, threatening worldwide stability and human security. In this context, in 2025, the US government increased its military presence in the Western Hemisphere with the deployment of the Iwo Jima Amphibious Group and the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit to the US Southern Command area of responsibility in an offensive aimed at confronting drug trafficking networks and other related threats.¹ However, these threats remain as malign actors work together to find vulnerabilities in national security systems. Now more than ever, as Huerta alluded to, it is imperative to provide an adaptive and planned approach to capacity development through security cooperation, particularly in the face of illicit economies such as illegal mining, which generate instability and ungovernability in the affected areas. The solution requires security cooperation to move past military actions because it needs to tackle the root causes of the problem, but this method has proven insufficient in numerous instances.

In Peru’s case, the security cooperation with the United States began in 1952, and since then, the countries have worked together to respond to shared challenges in the Western Hemisphere.² Yet a critical question remains: How significant has security cooperation between Peru and the United States truly been? The response is far from simple as the history of these ties is marked not only by Washington’s influence and constraints but also by Peru’s own political instability and its tradition of strategic neutrality. Some view this relationship as purely practical—strategic access for the United States and Peru benefiting from US assistance. However, reality undoubtedly demonstrates that the nature of current threats calls for moving away from a transactional approach toward a more strategic model.

Long-term success from cooperative initiatives requires the countries to develop a unified worldwide perspective that follows global progress. In this sense, the Building Defense Forces Primer (BDFP) approach from 2025 serves as a useful framework for building capabilities according to the US Army’s Leadership and Command Department at the War College. This model emphasizes the need to coordinate the military dimension with civilian governance and strategic autonomy without compromising national sovereignty. With that perspective, this article argues that Peru should strengthen security cooperation with the United States by adopting the BDFP approach to address transnational threats through three fundamental pillars: legitimacy in military results, interagency effectiveness, and institutional sustainability. Therefore, the argument will be unfolded in four stages: first, the context of security cooperation between both countries is presented; second, the challenges and legacy of that cooperation are examined; third, the BDFP reference framework is introduced; and finally, a bilateral model is proposed to improve security cooperation.

Context of Security Cooperation

Security cooperation, which Peru calls international cooperation in security and defense, serves as a fundamental instrument for handling worldwide security issues that include great power rivalries, regional instability, and transnational threats. Major powers, including the United States, China, and Russia, employ security cooperation to build alliances that help them prevail against their competitors.³ The main security threats in the Western Hemisphere stem from transnational criminal organizations (TCO), which require unified security cooperation for their effective deterrence.⁴ In this regard, the US Southern Command focuses on building military and institutional strength of partner nations to maintain regional stability. The security initiatives aim to protect US interests and protect US allies from the destructive impacts of instability.⁵ For this reason, the US strategy for the region focuses on a comprehensive method that unites security measures with democratic governance and economic development as fundamental elements for stability.⁶ The combination of these factors demonstrates why security cooperation needs a results-driven strategy for the entire hemisphere.

Within this region, the strategic partnership between Peru and the United States is essential to combat Peru’s multiple security risks. The activities of TCOs in Peru include narcotics and human trafficking, weapons smuggling, financial crimes, and cybercrime, which create institutional instability, promote corruption, and induce illegal economic activities.⁷ Among these threats, illegal mining stands as the most dangerous criminal activity in Peru. Suspicious transactions linked to this practice exceeded $8.2 billion between 2013 and 2023, making it the leading source of illegal money in Peru.⁸ The Peruvian government dedicated $21.3 million for illegal mining control in 2024, but the allocated funds are not enough to match the extent of the problem.⁹ Additionally, the criminal activities led to worsening security conditions in Peru, which simultaneously damaged both economic stability and social unity.¹⁰ The state institutions of Peru lack sufficient capacity to handle security threats on their own because these challenges have become too large and complex.

The current security imbalance has led the government to depend more heavily on military forces. The police force’s failure to stop TCO operations during 2024 resulted in multiple emergency state declarations throughout Peru (see figure 1).¹¹ Subsequently, the Peruvian Congress passed Supreme Resolution No. 32214 during 2025 to enable US military forces to enhance the operational capabilities of the Peruvian Armed Forces and National Police.¹² In other words, the government made a major decision to achieve concrete outcomes through its partnership with the United States. The success of this cooperation depends on resolving existing security challenges that have influenced Peru–US security relations for many years.

Challenges and Legacies

The main focus of security cooperation between Peru and the United States has been military-to-military relations, which continue today through the State Partnership Program (SPP) with the West Virginia National Guard. Since its establishment in Peru in 1996, this program enables training on essential subjects including humanitarian support, cyber defense, and noncommissioned officer professional growth.¹³ The program conducted aeromedical operations and COVID-19 pandemic response as well as peacekeeping mission development during 2021. Additionally, in the same year, the US embassy in Lima established permanent representation to demonstrate the essential nature of this bilateral relationship.¹⁴ Regardless of these achievements, the cooperative activities face restrictions because Peru lacks a unified strategic plan that would further connect government sectors and level coordination efforts.

This challenge is demonstrated at the institutional level by the Peruvian Army and Air Force having different priorities and the lack of consistent multiyear planning that prevents successful security cooperation. In this situation, the security force assistance program offers a complete solution for security activity planning, execution, and assessment through international cooperation.¹⁵ Security force assistance brigades (SFAB) received authorization through the National Defense Authorization Act of 2017, which also provided funding for their establishment in 2018.¹⁶ Since then, security force assistance has proven successful in building partner force capabilities in Ukraine and Mongolia while enhancing their interoperability, interagency cooperation, and professional development.¹⁷ In the case of Peru, the 1st SFAB started improving Peru’s military capabilities in 2023, and US special operation forces were deployed in 2025 to fight TCOs because of their proven track record in dealing with drug trafficking and illegal mining and corruption.¹⁸ However, the organization has concentrated its efforts initially on building conventional military capabilities and providing limited support to special operations forces (see the table).¹⁹ The situation demands a shift toward developing a structured and strategic security cooperation model.

This model is needed due to the long history of partnership in the region. For instance, the United States provided Peru with $1.5 billion in military and police funding between 2000 and 2017 to establish it as their third-largest recipient in South America.²⁰ Moreover, the United States trained more than thirteen thousand Peruvian military personnel to fight drug trafficking and remaining subversive groups during this period.²¹ Furthermore, the United States built seventeen regional emergency operations centers throughout the country by 2021.²² Although the United States has not been a primary weapons supplier in recent times, Peru continues to play a vital role in the region through its involvement in multinational exercises such as Amazon Log-17.²³ The combination of these elements demonstrates Peru’s essential position as a key ally for Washington’s South American strategy.

The Peruvian Army encounters an important challenge in transforming the International Military Education and Training program and other security cooperative programs into sustainable institutional capabilities.²⁴ This difficulty arises because the Peruvian Army fails to achieve organizational consolidation; these programs are fragmented and interrupted, prioritizing individual opportunities over building institutional capabilities, which hinders their ability to develop strategic and operational thinking and modernize doctrine. In other words, the integration of efforts between different decision-making levels remains essential to achieve lasting capabilities because it enables the alignment of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policies (DOTMLPF-P). This gap is highlighted in Peru’s military procurement, where the United States is fifth in Peru’s arms supply rankings from 2017 to 2021 behind South Korea, Spain, Italy, and New Zealand.²⁵ The United States has provided Peru with important capabilities through their partnership, yet Peru needs to enhance interorganizational collaboration to convert individual achievements into enduring results that serve national goals. From this perspective, the Building Defense Forces Primer provides a guide that articulates this process of cooperation, balancing legitimacy, effectiveness, and sustainability.

Building Defense Forces Primer: The Foundation for Security Cooperation

The BDFP, created by the US Army War College, serves as a basic framework to assist nations in developing and enhancing their defense capabilities. The document stresses that military capabilities need to extend beyond physical resources and combat tactics; they require institutional frameworks that unite force structure with readiness and modernization.²⁶ Moreover, the equilibrium between national sovereignty and security cooperation requires popular support, political determination, and military flexibility, according to Carl von Clausewitz’s principles.²⁷ In this regard, the BDFP states that defense leaders and managers should move beyond their traditional administrative work to become strategic architects who transform systems and direct resources toward achievable targets. The document identifies “churn” as a major risk as it causes organizations to concentrate on immediate needs instead of developing lasting capabilities because of the fast-paced nature of their operational environment.²⁸ In this sense, Peru requires a security cooperation that breaks through organizational resistance to tackle current institutional and operational requirements and future needs in the face of rising transnational threats and geopolitical tensions.

The experience in Latin America offers illustrative and useful examples about security cooperation with the United States. Renitha Hapsari et al. explain that US security partnerships with Mexico and Colombia provide essential knowledge about successful drug combat methods and public acceptance.²⁹ However, the Mexican drug war became more violent when cartels split into smaller groups because of military intervention, and Colombian coca production increased during the same period. Notably, a Colombian success story emerged through US Agency for International Development programs that combined peace agreements with socioeconomic development initiatives to fight inequality, create job opportunities, and establish a “legal work culture.” In contrast, the Mexican government cut ties with the United States because they viewed extensive US involvement as an invasion of their national sovereignty. This demonstrates how foreign aid programs can fail to achieve their goals when recipient countries face internal issues like corruption and poor governance, which reduce both effectiveness and public trust in foreign assistance. Thus, security cooperation achieves its best results and maintains legitimacy through socioeconomic development programs that replace military force and respect national sovereignty while operating within systems of transparent governance.

These experiences demonstrate that the defense sector needs to establish a continuous improvement culture as the BDFP recommends because this approach will enhance readiness and adaptability to enduring complex security threats.³⁰ The security cooperation between Peru and the United States needs to implement three essential pillars (see figure 2): legitimate military results, effective interagency collaboration, and sustainable institutional development under leadership that handles resources and sets strategic directions for long-term objectives.

Achieving legitimacy through military results. Security cooperation effectiveness depends on military power but also needs legitimate military achievements to build trust between governments and the support of their publics. The US security cooperation programs work to establish good governance alongside rule of law, human rights protection, and military forces under civilian authority.³¹ However, the misuse of military capabilities by partner governments remains possible when they perform acts of unconscionable repression against civilians or make reckless decisions that boost resistance and harm the mission.³² Ultimately, while the United States provides military professional development, it cannot replace political determination for essential institutional changes or address existing governance problems.

Security cooperation between the United States and Peru depends on the military achievements of Peru to maintain legitimacy. For example, in Colombia, the success of bilateral agreements and support depends on the armed forces’ ability to execute sustainable operations that follow legal and institutional guidelines.³³ In this regard, the Peruvian military demonstrated two contrasting examples of security cooperation during its fight against terrorism between 1980 and 1999 and its humanitarian aid work during the 2017 coastal El Niño disaster.³⁴ At the same time, the United Nations peacekeeping missions in Haiti and the Golan Heights and the ongoing Central African Republic deployment have established Peru’s armed forces as responsible and professional, which strengthens US commitment to long-term partnership through the SPP.³⁵ In other words, the legitimacy should extend beyond operational success because it requires both domestic public trust and international recognition, which stems from consistent actions that match official statements. Moreover, security cooperation needs state institutions to work together as a team to achieve unified results against international threats through interagency success.

Interagency effectiveness. National security goals require all government organizations to work together in unity. The United States needs external stakeholders to participate in mission analysis from the start to get the best possible results. For this reason, both combatant commanders and joint force commanders are encouraged to establish liaison officers in other organizations of interest and cultivate personal relationships that facilitate interorganizational cooperation. In this regard, the joint interagency coordination groups and Joint Interagency Task Force-South in Central America show that continuous interagency planning not only converts resources and capabilities into enduring results but also addresses bureaucratic challenges.³⁶ Security cooperation needs to move past military aspects because it needs state agency and civilian actor coordination to produce sustainable and acceptable results. Furthermore, this integration promotes sustainability, which ensures the achievements transcend political circumstances.

In the case of Peru, the national security objectives need complete cooperation between all government institutions to achieve success. The Ministry of the Interior oversees homeland security but the National Citizen Security Plan 2019–2023 evaluation showed major noncompliance because institutions failed to achieve effective horizontal and vertical coordination between institutions.³⁷ Furthermore, Peru’s broader national security vulnerabilities stem from the lack of synergy among actors within the International Cooperation framework.³⁸ As César Jordán Palomino, director of International Cooperation of Peru, noted,

Non-reimbursable technical cooperation is the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as humanitarian cooperation, which is established in cases of disasters, then reimbursable financial cooperation, loans, the responsibility of the Ministry of Economy and Finance, and cooperation in security and defense, which is handled by the Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Defense respectively.³⁹

The Secretariat of National Security and Defense, authorized as a new ministry in 2024, functions as a key entity to create strategic security cooperation frameworks and improve interagency coordination.⁴⁰ The Foreign Affairs and Interior Ministries should follow this direction to create sustainable security results through coordinated efforts that extend beyond military operations by uniting state and civilian actors into a results-driven security system.

Promoting institutional sustainability. Defense institutions need two essential elements to achieve long-term sustainability: internal capacity growth and successful international partnership development. The US Defense Institutional Building program supports this objective by enhancing partner nations’ institutional capabilities through ministerial-level improvements in strategic planning, resource management, equipment acquisition, personnel management, operational concepts, and transparency.⁴¹ In this sense, the Peruvian Army took an essential step forward in 2024 when it published Technical Manual 3-3.1.1, Cooperación Internacional para la Seguridad (International Cooperation for Security), which serves to enhance capacity development through international partnerships.⁴² However, the professional military education and International Military Education and Training initiatives need complete integration with all capacity-building activities to achieve complete development. In other words, the defense sector needs to maintain robust regulatory systems that protect security cooperation programs for these reforms to persist. Consequently, Peru needs to establish a security cooperation framework that merges domestic objectives with worldwide defense systems to achieve sustainable results. Peru should connect all its vital reforms with international cooperation to achieve lasting institutional transformations.

Toward a Model for Security Cooperation

The United States requires a systematic development process for security cooperation that will create legitimate authority, efficient interagency coordination, and sustainable institutional stability. In this regard, the Peru needs to start by conducting an unbiased evaluation of its current strengths and weaknesses before it can move forward to transform its challenges into unified strategic goals, test solutions through pilot programs, and expand successful results across the country while maintaining ongoing evaluation systems. A five-stage process (see figure 3) enables bilateral cooperation to become a permanent tool for fighting transnational threats.

Diagnosis and establishment of the baseline. The first requirement involves understanding how Peru operates within its strategic environment when dealing with the United States. The rising great power competition, TCO expansion, and institutional instability require Peru to develop an enhanced security cooperation framework. The current operational capabilities of the armed forces, National Police, and civilian agencies need to be documented to identify existing gaps in combatting drug trafficking, illegal mining, human trafficking, and cybercrime. For example, the US Army’s assessment, monitoring, and evaluation framework considers DOTMLPF-P to identify needs and measure the progress of capabilities.⁴³ In addition, the legacy of bilateral cooperation, such as the SPP with the West Virginia National Guard or the arrival of the 1st SFAB, can identify lessons learned and limitations. The assessment will function as an unbiased standard to direct upcoming choices, and it will terminate specific projects and prevent unnecessary project duplication.

Strategic design and capability prioritization. The second stage uses the gathered data to transform challenges into specific targets for strategic partnership development. Under the BDFP approach, Peru and the United States must prioritize capabilities across three pillars: legitimacy in military results, interagency effectiveness, and institutional sustainability. Moreover, the process needs to establish specific critical domains that include operations against TCOs, border security, cyber defense, and humanitarian aid and determine which institutions will handle these responsibilities. Additionally, the development of specific success indicators and a joint strategic plan that extends past military-to-military relations to include civilian agencies forms the core of this stage. Like Plan Colombia, the design must integrate security with development and governance, ensuring coherence between military and political objectives.⁴⁴

Piloting and capacity building. The third stage demands the execution of pilot programs across vital areas of the nation that experience cross-border threats that endanger both government stability and social cohesion. The interventions will enable the assessment of coordination systems between the armed forces, police, ministries, and international actors under US technical guidance. Also, the pilot programs need to provide training for both tactical and operational skills, human rights education, instruction on resource management, interagency planning, and civilian oversight systems. Thus, the method will confirm existing best practices while building national organization trust to gain public and international support for operations.

National implementation and scaling. Following the success of the pilot programs, the process must move to a national implementation phase. The goal is to establish permanent systems that incorporate knowledge gained from operational protocols, interministerial agreements, and legal frameworks that enable bilateral cooperation. Furthermore, the integration of coordination mechanisms within the National Security and Defense Council, along with the active participation of the Secretariat of National Security and Defense, is essential to ensure that cooperation is not confined to the defense sector. Additionally, scaling up must include multiyear budget allocation for sustained operations, avoiding exclusive dependence on external funds and fostering financial co-responsibility.

Institutional evaluation, adjustment, and sustainability. The last stage focuses on maintaining the achieved progress from being lost in the future. To this end, inspired by the US military’s defense institution building model, a monitoring and evaluation system is required that measures not only the tactical effectiveness of operations but also the legitimacy of the results and the institutional capacity created.⁴⁵ Moreover, periodic reports should identify achievements, gaps, and areas for improvement, incorporating both technical assessments and citizen perceptions. In addition, the implementation of institutional sustainability needs military organizations to create shared doctrine and improve professional education and regulatory systems that protect partnership operations from political turbulence and governmental shifts. In this way, both countries seek to establish a lasting system that will achieve effective international threat management through legal compliance.

Other considerations. The United States and Peru have operational advantages from deeper cooperation, yet Peru maintains caution because of its cultural resistance to foreign involvement, its need to stay neutral regarding China’s expanding regional influence, and its domestic political instability. Nonetheless, security cooperation needs to proceed without any restrictions stemming from these issues. To address this, the proposal creates a partnership system that enables countries to maintain their independence by building their own domestic capabilities. Consequently, the implementation of structured security cooperation in Peru will enhance its ability to operate independently from foreign powers while fighting transnational threats. Moreover, security sector vulnerabilities emerge because of undertrained forces and insufficient interagency training, of which drug trafficking and organized crime take advantage. Therefore, the professionalization of the security sector together with interagency capacity development creates institutional resilience that safeguards against political instability.

Conclusion

The complete assessment of US–Peru security cooperation demands a comprehensive analysis of all available opportunities together with existing limitations. On the one hand, the military-to-military programs delivered better training, technical assistance, and improved operational compatibility; on the other hand, they failed to create enduring strategic results. Security cooperation has evolved into an essential tool that nations must implement to fight transnational threats. Moreover, the Building Defense Forces Primer approach provides a strategic path that combines valid military achievements with interagency teamwork and enduring institutional development. At the same time, security requires complete integration between different ministries, international partners, and the national citizens. Looking ahead, the future of Peru depends on establishing a strategic partnership with the United States to achieve common objectives through experimental programs, and furthermore, to maintain enduring results through ongoing evaluation.

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Notes

• Epigraph. José Huerta, “Interview with the Minister of Defense, José Huerta,” trans. by author, Face to Face, Channel 7, posted 8 December 2018 by Ministerio de Defensa del Perú, YouTube, 3:10, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0q6htNpDCwo.

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2. Office of the Historian, “Editorial Note,” Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. IV, 1952–1954, The American Republics (Department of State, 1983), doc. 671, accessed 3 March 2026, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/d671.
3. Michael J. Mazarr et al., Security Cooperation in a Strategic Competition (RAND Corporation, 2022), 1, http://www.rand.org/t/RRA650-1.
4. Jaime Cubides-Cárdenas et al., “Regional Cooperation against Transnational Organized Crime: Challenges and Opportunities in the Western Hemisphere,” Frontiers in Political Science 7 (2025): 1657969, 2, https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2025.1657969.
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7. Institute of Criminology and Studies on Violence, Threats to State Security in Peru: Analysis of the General Situation [in Spanish] (Institute of Criminology and Studies on Violence, 2022), 15, https://www.prosegurresearch.com/dam/jcr:b9bf205b-a862-47c6-a104-e804569c386b/Visiones-Peru.pdf; Fabrizio Tealdo Zazzali, ed., Cybercrime in Peru: Strategies and Challenges for the State [in Spanish], Ombudsman’s Report No. 001-2023-DP/ADHPD (Ombudsman’s Office, May 2023), 7, https://www.defensoria.gob.pe/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/INFORME-DEF-001-2023-DP-ADHPD-Ciberdelincuencia.pdf; Government of Peru, National Strategic Development Plan to 2050 (Government of Peru, 2023), 233, https://cdn.www.gob.pe/uploads/document/file/5133337/Peru%20-%20Plan%20Estrategico%20de%20Desarrollo%20Nacional%20al%202050.pdf?v=1694719008.
8. Government of Peru, XXV Forum of the Future Report: Current Situation and Future Outlook of Mining in Peru [in Spanish] (National Directorate of Foresight and Strategic Studies, 2024), 55, https://cdn.www.gob.pe/uploads/document/file/7432568/6332235-reporte-del-xxv-fdf-situacion-actual-y-perspectiva-futura-de-la-mineria-en-el-peru.pdf; Pablo de La Flor, “Illegal Mining Is the Main Illicit Economy and Surpasses Drug Trafficking [in Spanish],” Poderosa, 2024, https://www.poderosa.com.pe/noticias/pablo-de-la-flor-la-mineria-ilegal-es-la-principal-economia-ilicita-y-supera-al-narcotrafico.
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11. Various emergency decrees, published in El Peruano, September 2025, accessed 3 March 2026, https://diariooficial.elperuano.pe/normas.
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19. El Peruano, various emergency decrees.
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24. Pyatakov and Kodzoev, “US ‘Outposts’ in Latin America,” 524.
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26. Brian Cole, “Clausewitz’s Wondrous Yet Paradoxical Trinity: The Nature of War as a Complex Adaptive System,” Joint Force Quarterly 96 (1st Quarter, 2020): 48, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/2076059/clausewitzs-wondrous-yet-paradoxical-trinity-the-nature-of-war-as-a-complex-ada/.
27. DCLM, Building Defense Forces, 158.
28. Renitha Hapsari et al., “Comparative Analysis of the United States’ War on Drugs Policy in Mexico and Colombia: Failure and Success Factors,” WIMAYA 2, no. 1 (2021): 7–15.
29. DCLM, Building Defense Forces, 158.
30. Sharif Calfee et al., “Security Cooperation, Security Assistance, and Building Partner Capacity: Enhancing Interagency Collaboration,” Joint Force Quarterly 61 (2nd Quarter, 2011): 102–7.
31. U.S.–Mexico Security Cooperation: An Overview of the Merida Initiative, 2008–Present: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 113th Cong., 1st sess. (23 May 2013) (testimony of Steven Dudley, director, InSight Crime), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA07/20130523/100907/HHRG-113-FA07-Wstate-DudleyS-20130523.pdf.
32. Gabriel Marcella, Plan Colombia: The Strategic and Operational Imperatives (monograph, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2001), 11–18, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/115/.
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34. Government of Peru, “Atención rápida a los afectados por el Niño Costero fue un reto cumplido en 2017” [Providing rapid assistance to those affected by El Niño Costero was a challenge met in 2017], ReliefWeb, 31 December 2017, https://reliefweb.int/report/peru/atenci-n-r-pida-afectados-por-el-ni-o-costero-fue-un-reto-cumplido-en-2017.
35. Wilder Alejandro Sánchez, “Misiones Singularmente Complicadas: El Rol del Perú en las Operaciones de Paz de las Naciones Unidas” [Uniquely complicated missions: Peru’s role in United Nations peacekeeping operations], Perspectivas 2 (July 2014): 7–19, https://wjpcenter.org/es/document/singularly-complicated-missions-perus-role-in-united-nations-peacekeeping-operations/; Edwin Wriston, “WVNG Helps Prepare Peru Military for Peacekeeping Mission,” National Guard, 8 June 2021, https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article-View/Article/2650252/wvng-helps-prepare-peru-military-for-peacekeeping-mission/.
36. Troy Edgar, host, Americtocracy with Troy Edgar, podcast, “JIATF-S Director, USCG Rear Admiral Mark Fedor on Fighting Transnational Organized Crime,” Joint Interagency Task Force South, 2 November 2023, 00:26:00–00:31:15, https://www.jiatfs.southcom.mil/News/News-Article-View/Article/3576824/jiatf-s-director-uscg-rear-admiral-mark-fedor-on-fighting-transnational-organiz/; Evan Munsing and Christopher J. Lamb, “Joint Interagency Task Force–South: The Best Known, Least Understood Interagency Success,” INSS Strategic Perspectives 38 (National Defense University Press, 2011), 61–70, https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/inss-strategic-perspectives/38.
37. Ministry of the Interior, Proposal for the National Citizen Security Plan 2019–2023 [in Spanish] (Government of Peru, October 2018), 40, https://cdn.www.gob.pe/uploads/document/file/238246/Propuesta.PlanNacionalSeguridadCiudadana.2019-2023.pdf.
38. Supreme Decree No. 005-2021-DE that approves the National Multisectoral Policy on Security and National Defense to 2030 [in Spanish], 23 July 2021, El Peruano, 35.
39. “En Vivo: Grupo de Trabajo de Cooperación Internacional APEC Legislativo | 13 de Noviembre del 2024,” trans. by author, posted 13 November 2024 by Congress of the Republic of Peru, YouTube, 37 min., https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xdwQM-59oac.
40. “SEDENA: Conozca a la nueva secretaria de Seguridad y Defensa Nacional” [SEDENA: Meet the new secretary of national security and defense], El Peruano, 1 October 2024, https://elperuano.pe/noticia/254433-sedena-conozca-a-la-nueva-secretaria-de-seguridad-y-defensa-nacional.
41. “Institutional Capacity Building,” Defense Security Cooperation Agency, accessed March 31, 2026, https://www.dsca.mil/Programs/Institutional-Capacity-Building.
42. Technical Manual 3-3.1.1, Cooperación Internacional para la Seguridad [International cooperation for security] (Peruvian Army, 2024), 21.
43. Angela O’Mahony et al., Assessing, Monitoring, and Evaluating Army Security Cooperation: A Framework for Implementation (RAND Corporation, 2018), 51, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2165.html.
44. Marcella, Plan Colombia.
45. Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Newsletter 18-08, Defense Institution Building: Perspectives on Ministerial Advising (CALL, January 2018), https://api.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/2023/01/19/b4e02bf2/18-08-defense-institution-building-newsletter-jan-18-public.pdf.

 

 

 

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May-June 2026