Howgate Publishing’s novel compilation, Multidomain Operations: The Pursuit of Battlefield Dominance in the 21st Century, provides a timely and ambitious anthology that explores and dissects the US Army’s primary operating concept with a critical, yet constructive, analytical framework. Edited by proven warfare theorists Amos C. Fox and Franz-Stefan Gady, an impressive assemblage of military professionals, security studies academics, and experts on international relations collectively provide a comprehensive examination of the controversial concept. In keeping with its mandate, the book explores three primary questions: How did the Army come to adopt multidomain operations (MDO)? How well does the concept apply to trends in contemporary warfare? And, finally, which reforms may be required to make it credible and viable?
The book’s most important value lies in its remarkable diversity of perspectives distributed over four distinctive sections. Part I introduces readers to the intellectual origins of MDO. Dr. J. P. Clark, a professor at the US Army War College, provides the initial chapter to explain how the Russian threat, antiaccess/area denial concerns, and institutional dynamics shaped the conception of the operational concept. His analysis clarifies why MDO emerged, in many ways, as a more as a bureaucratically driven response to evolving strategic anxieties than a truly novel revolutionary idea. Lt. Col. Jesse Skates, US Army, follows with a broader critique that situates MDO among other service concepts and articulates challenges with transitioning industrial age approaches to the requirements of information age warfare.
Part II transitions from conceptual history to more practical considerations. William Murray, another Army lieutenant colonel, argues that the Army’s brigade combat team structure has struggled to transition MDO theory into concrete operational practice, providing a critique that will resonate with many Army leaders who served operational tours during and after the Global War on Terrorism. His assessment that the institution has failed to modernize technique, doctrine, and sustainment is both provocative and persuasive. Contributors Bryan Quinn and Robert Rose, both serving Army majors, also deliver hard critiques of tactical deficiencies and bureaucratic dynamics that impeded adoption of the concept. Collectively, while citing historical insights, these chapters underscore the idea that the Army’s vision for revolutionary change has fallen far short of expectations.
Part III brings scholarly rigor to the discussion. While Dr. Heather Venable, a professor at Air University, questions whether MDO has become too expansive and “jargon-laden” to offer meaningful clarity, Dr. Amos Fox of Arizona State University challenges the concept’s overly optimistic assumptions about dominance and precision strike amidst the unforgiving realities of attritional warfare. Dr. Jeffrey Meiser, a professor at the University of Portland, then questions the “theory of success” that undermines the concept’s strategic value by leading to an unbalancing of ends, ways, and means. Finally, military theorists Franz-Stefan Gady and Michael Kofman explore how trends in the war in Ukraine have challenged unsupported notions of Western military superiority. They conclude that MDO doctrine underestimates attrition and overestimates maneuver in ways that undermine its potential to deliver the promised decisive battlefield victory.
The final section, featuring international perspectives from South America, East Asia, and Europe, reinforces the commitment by Fox and Gady to analyzing MDO not as an Army-only concern but as a concept to be interpreted, adapted, accommodated, and even sidelined by partners and allies. These chapters, which include distinctive maritime perspectives, reveal both the promise and limitations of MDO as a model for unifying and synchronizing coalition and allied efforts. In this sense, the non-American contributors offer a balanced synthesis—neither dismissing MDO outright nor uncritically accepting it as settled orthodoxy. Instead, they sharpen, contextualize, and align the concept with the strategic and operational contexts of their specific regions. The resulting recommendations outline pragmatic steps toward creating a more credible and interoperable operating framework that can better enable US military engagement.
Given its wide-ranging theoretical, practical, and international perspectives, this edited volume stands as the most comprehensive and critical examination of MDO available today. For practitioners and academics alike, the carefully selected compilation provides a valuable resource for understanding both the potential for success and the probabilities of setbacks as the US Army evolves and refines its operational concept. In that regard, the study reinforces a timeless truth that remains essential for organizational success: military institutions must continually test their ideas against the hardest realities and be open to the most biting critiques or risk failure in the crucible of combat. As stated by theorist Frank Hoffman in the book’s preface, this kind of self-reflection remains critical for ensuring that “the emperor’s proverbial wardrobe is fit for purpose.”