Rethinking the U.S. Army Infantry Rifle Squad

Maj. Hassan Kamara, U.S. Army

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We should think of nothing in the past as sacred, except the concept of victory. The structure and organization of our Army, both operational and institutional, may change drastically, and we must be open-minded to that change.

—Gen. Mark A Milley

Discontinuities in war, military affairs, and human society since the 1940s, as well as projections about future war, sufficiently invalidate many of the foundational arguments, facts, and assumptions that generated the legacy infantry squad to justify reform. This article highlights how, and recommends an alternative for squad reform.

The U.S. Army adopted the nine-man infantry rifle squad over the twelve-man infantry rifle squad it used in World War II based on the discourse and findings of the 1946 Infantry Conference at Fort Benning, Georgia.1 Though it has evolved some, today’s infantry rifle squad still comprises nine personnel (two fire teams of four led by team leaders who are subordinate to the squad leader). Gen. Robert B. Brown concurs that the infantry squad has remained fundamentally the same over time with minor changes, writing that “despite new soldier equipment and technological advances we deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq, squads operate in the same manner their predecessors did in Vietnam and Korea.”2

Change expert John Kotter articulates the importance of evaluating and managing organizational systems, structures [such as the infantry squad], and concepts to keep up with the pace of change in today’s world. Kotter writes, “The world is now changing at a rate at which the basic systems, structures, and cultures built over the past century cannot keep up with the demands being placed on them.”3 In the case of the infantry squad, Kotter’s assertion suggests that military professionals and scholars should examine the legacy infantry squad construct for its continued relevance.

So, how relevant are the foundational arguments, facts, and assumptions that generated the infantry squad relative to developments in war, military affairs, and human society since 1946, as well as projections about future war? These developments sufficiently invalidate many of the foundational arguments, facts, and assumptions underpinning the current configuration of and employment of rifle squads to justify needed reorganization and reform.

Moreover, why focus on the rifle squad, which is only a small part of the total combat organizational construct? This article focuses on the infantry rifle squad (not the different variations for mechanized and Stryker infantry) because it is the basic foundation of the decisive force of the future. Moreover, given the changes in warfare since it was adopted, the current squad configuration is likely to experience needless problems in future operations that could be mitigated if reconfigured and readapted before employment. (Figure 1 depicts the current infantry squad configuration.)4 This disconcerting possibility is already manifesting itself as continued changes in technology and warfare have added new capabilities and equipment (e.g., drones, electronic warfare), and combat functions to the legacy squad construct.


By highlighting this concern at the foundation of the decisive force of the future, this analysis will help promote ensuing studies that will critically analyze the entire legacy force construct or order of battle of the U.S. Army (to include configurations for Stryker, mechanized, airborne, and air assault squads) to assess the degree of obsolescence based on changes in war and military affairs since they were adopted.

Sir Michael Howard’s dimensions of war (operational, technological, logistical, and social) are used as units of analysis to highlight how changes in military affairs and human society since the squad’s creation, as well as projections about future war, warrant reconsideration and change.5 This framework, in addition to encompassing the typical military dimensions (operational, logistical), compels consideration of the societal and technological dimensions of war, which are as intrinsic to war as the operational and logistical dimensions. Arguably, this framework is the best in comprehensively highlighting how changes in military affairs and society since the 1940s—as well as projections about future war—warrant institutional reevaluation and reform of the squad.

Dimensions of War

A brief discussion of the dimensions of war is necessary to frame and understand the ensuing analysis. Howard uses the dimensions of war as a framework for analyzing military strategy, but they are also adaptive, useful, force-transformation tools for holistically assessing the impact of long-term operational, logistics, societal, and technological discontinuities on warfighting organizations.

Operational dimension. From a force transformation perspective, careful planning and change implementation in the operational dimension will improve the decisive employment of forces and capabilities against an adversary. When planning and implementing change in warfighting organizations, militaries must ensure they focus on all the dimensions of war, not just the operational dimension.

Logistical dimension. When the framework is used to examine military transformation, the logistical dimension helps identify and highlight critical change considerations in logistics (supply, maintenance, medical support, etc.).

Social dimension. When applying the dimensions of war framework to force transformation, the social dimension invites focus on the interaction of warfighting organizations with societies, cultures, and environments (think overpopulation and megacities) in prosecuting and trying to conclude wars. This dimension also induces questions like, “What will be the implications for military organizations in the event of a mass conscription characteristic of conventional war?”

Technological dimension. From a force transformation perspective, the technological dimension fosters consideration and commitment to technological developments that can deliver operational superiority against potential adversaries while enabling logistics, and strategically beneficial interaction with the local population in a conflict zone. According to Howard, since the twentieth century, technology’s role “as an independent and significant dimension, could no longer be left out of account.”6

The Squad and Discontinuities in the Dimensions of War

War and military affairs have evolved considerably since 1946, presenting discontinuities that warrant reevaluation and reform of the legacy infantry squad construct. Highlighted within each of the dimensions of war, such discontinuities sufficiently challenge and (in most cases) invalidate the arguments, facts, and assumptions behind the genesis of the infantry squad.

The Squad in the Operational Dimension of War

The 1946 Infantry Conference was organized to study the Army’s experiences in World War II from the infantry’s perspective and to derive lessons that would help overcome organizational, training, and equipping challenges as well as spur innovation and institutional reform. Col. A. O. Connor concurred, and in his lecture at the conference, he stated, “The purpose of the Infantry Conference is to arrive at sound decisions regarding the solution of the infantry’s many present and future problems.”7 The conference was attended by officers and enlisted personnel from every World War II theater of operation. Attendees were organized into committees; Committee A focused mainly on equipment, while Committee B—under the leadership of Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin—focused mainly on organizational issues. Naturally, doctrine was extensively debated in both committees. The committees voted on force transformation proposals that were presented in the final conference report to the commandant of the Infantry School at the time—Maj. Gen. John Wilson “Iron Mike” O’Daniel.

Basis of the legacy squad. Committee B recommended changing the World War II twelve-man infantry rifle squad to a nine-man infantry squad based on arguments that had to do with command and control, organizational survivability, and fire and maneuver.8 The twelve-man infantry rifle squad used in World War II comprised a squad leader, an assistant squad leader, a three-man automatic rifle team (machine gunner, assistant machine gunner, and ammunition bearer), and seven riflemen, two of whom were designated as scouts (see figure 2).9 The proposed nine-man infantry squad was made up of a squad leader, two scouts, an automatic rifleman (machine gunner), an assistant gunner, and four riflemen (including one grenadier).10 The committee proposed the new squad organization because it believed that this was the maximum amount of personnel a squad leader could control in combat.


The conference defined the squad as “a group of enlisted men organized as a team: smallest tactical unit consisting of only as many men as a leader can direct easily on the field,” and based on this definition, it chose to “limit the size of the squad to the number of men one leader can personally control with voice or hand signals.”11 In its report, Committee B clearly stated that “one man under favorable conditions can control no more than eight men in the field.”12

The squad’s survivability as an organization in high-attrition combat was another factor behind the newly proposed squad, but it was secondary to command and control. The members of the Infantry Conference observed that infantry squads typically operated below full strength during World War II and sought to ensure that any change to the twelve-man infantry rifle squad had to be able to survive and retain effectiveness after some attrition. Consistent with this rationale, the committee decided on the nine-man squad as the most survivable construct that a squad leader could control with voice and hand-arm signals in combat. In other words, the conference participants mostly agreed that the proposed nine-man squad, while smaller, would still be able to support platoon maneuver after attaining some battlefield attrition.13

Additionally, based on their World War II experience, the participants at the Infantry Conference believed the smallest unit capable of organic fire and maneuver was the platoon. Proponents of the new squad—who were in the majority in Committee B—argued that during World War II “the rifle squad almost never employed tactical maneuvers in the attack, i.e. the Able, Baker, and Charley elements of scouts, base of fire, and maneuver.”14 In his lecture on infantry organization, Connor stated that “wars are won by platoons” and added that “in combat, fire and movement is a platoon job.”15 Subsequently, conference participants saw the squad as capable of fire and maneuver only at the platoon level—either establishing a base of fire to support the maneuver of other squads within the platoon, or maneuvering as a single unit while another squad provided supporting fire. Many of the conference participants, especially those in Committee B, did not believe that the squad was capable of fire and maneuver at the squad level (one fire team supporting the maneuver of the other fire team with fires). Thus, they reasoned it was unnecessary to keep the twelve-man infantry rifle squad for its greater capacity for fire and maneuver.

Discontinuities since 1946 and future concerns. Much has changed in the operational dimension since 1946 to invalidate the above arguments, facts, and assumptions for adopting the nine-man infantry squad. In terms of command and control, modern personal communication equipment available to today’s infantry soldiers makes it possible for squad leaders to communicate and direct team leaders and—if required—any member of the squad. Enabled by technology, capable team leaders, and the maturing philosophy of mission command, today’s squad leaders can maneuver more than eight men. Moreover, situational awareness tools available to soldiers under initiatives like the Warfighter Information Network–Tactical program enable combat leaders to maneuver formations far beyond hand-and-arm signal, voice, and visual range.16

Though considered immaterial at the 1946 Conference, squad-level fire and maneuver is an integral part of infantry maneuver today, and improvements in targeting by peer U.S. adversaries appear to necessitate adjustment to using the squad as the smallest primary unit of maneuver on future battlefields. The latter would require growing the squad for increased fire during maneuver, and invalidate any need to keep the squad small so it can be more maneuverable as a single monolithic element in platoon fire and maneuver.

As far as the operational dimension is concerned, the foundational arguments, facts, and assumptions for the genesis of the nine-man infantry squad are outdated and invalid. In other words, the concerns of the 1946 Infantry Conference that led to the development of the legacy squad construct have been largely invalidated by changes in war, military affairs, and human society. This calls for a thorough reevaluation of the construct and its subsequent reform.

The Squad in the Logistical Dimension of War

As mentioned previously this dimension is concerned with the recruiting, equipping, and sustainment aspects of war. From a squad transformation perspective, it focuses on manning, equipment, and sustainment.

Basis of the legacy squad. As far as squad transformation was concerned, manning and equipment were the predominant aspects of this dimension in the 1946 Infantry Conference. In terms of staffing, the integration of wartime replacements seemed to be the main logistical concern that supported the recommendation of the nine-man squad. Squad logistics in terms of sustainment (supply, maintenance, etc.) did not seem to feature in the conference dialogue, which was understandable because infantry leaders of the day had a platoon-centric outlook on small-unit operations.

Personnel at the conference seemed to lean toward the nine-man infantry squad because they reasoned it would be easier for new conscripts and replacements to understand and fight in a smaller squad. Conference participants were largely influenced by their wartime observation of the difficulty experienced by conscripted noncommissioned officers in leading the larger twelve-man rifle squads in World War II. The consensus seemed to be to keep the squad construct simple with nine personnel so the conscripts and replacements of a mass-mobilized army could quickly understand and fight the new organization in war. Gen. Omar Bradley cited this concern in his address to the conference. Bradley endorsed the recommendation for the nine-man squad, citing observations about the struggles of conscripted noncommissioned officers that had to take the role of squad leader due to high attrition. He said, “With rapid promotion due to casualties, you sometimes find yourself with people commanding squads who are having a pretty hard job commanding that large a squad.”17


Discontinuities since 1946 and future concerns. War, military affairs, and human society have sufficiently evolved with respect to this dimension to undermine the rationale for the genesis of the nine-man infantry squad. Restricting the squad to nine personnel to make it easier to integrate conscripts in the event of a mass mobilization is no longer a valid argument. In addition to hands-on field training, which is typically resource-intensive (e.g., ammunition, fuel) and therefore cannot be practiced frequently, the Army now has virtual-reality simulations it uses for training. Arguably, this cost-effective training capability enables the Army to train soldiers more effectively than it could during the World War II era, because it can give them sustained (repetitive) practice in immersive, simulated combat environments. This helps to allay the concern that the Army would be less able to train and integrate conscripts if it made the squad bigger.

The issue of squad-level resupply, though absent from the dialogue at the 1946 Infantry Conference, could grow to task the Army’s logistics infrastructure with the increased dispersion of forces—possibly down to the squad level—on future battlefields. For example, developments in sensors, targeting, and long-range precision fires by potential peer adversaries will likely induce the necessity for increased dispersion of U.S. forces on future battlefields.

The Squad in the Social Dimension of War

Mass conscription was a huge factor in America’s victory in World War II. The ranks of the U.S. Army swelled relatively quickly with citizen-soldiers who were highly inexperienced compared to regular soldiers, but who were eager to train and fight.

Basis of the legacy squad. Wartime experience with training and integrating conscripts into the active Army drove many of the 1946 Infantry Conference participants to advocate for the smaller nine-man infantry squad. Based on their own first-hand experiences, these veterans believed it would be easier to train and integrate conscripts into the new nine-man squad than the twelve-man World War II squad simply because command and control over inexperienced conscripts would be better in the smaller squad. Thus, the participants chose the nine-man squad.

Discontinuities since 1946 and future concerns. Thanks to the inherently greater capabilities for learning in the information age, the Army is arguably better able today to effectively train conscripts in the event of a mass mobilization for war than it was at America’s entry into World War II. This negates the need to keep the squad at nine personnel to better help the average conscripted citizen quickly learn how it operates. Moreover, information technology—in the form of games and media—has exposed the American population to warfighting on a far greater level than it experienced in the interwar years (the period between World War I and II). Thanks to technology, the average American youth in the twenty-first century has on average logged more time in some time type of simulated close combat (gaming, virtual reality, paintball, etc.) than his or her counterpart did during the interwar period. In his study of how “world-class” performers develop, Geoff Colvin convincingly shows through successive case studies of highly successful top performers in different fields that exceptional performance is developed through sustained or deliberate practice. This suggests that, based on the sustained or deliberate practice they gain through virtual-reality combat simulations prior to joining the Army, today’s youth may inherently be more capable trainees (in terms of technological savviness and combat instincts) than their counterparts from the World War II–Korean War era.18 This interesting development in American society may serve the nation well in the event of another mass mobilization type of war, and it is additional grounds to reconsider the 1946 rationale of limiting the infantry squad to nine personnel for the sake of rapid training and integration of conscripts.

Population growth as a driving factor. Additionally, changes in human society, particularly the growth of megacities, challenge the Infantry Conference’s decision to make the squad smaller for greater command and control. Looking ahead, the emergence and growing ubiquity of megacities worldwide mean that future wars will most likely be fought in extremely congested and restrictive urban environments. According to the U.S. Army, “it is highly likely that megacities will be the strategic key terrain in any future crisis that requires U.S. military intervention.” This is largely because factors like “population, urbanization, and resource trends contributing to the rise of megacities show no signs of abating or reversing.”19

Gen. Mark A. Milley appears to share this outlook and states that “future wars are almost certainly going to be fought mostly in cities, which has significant implications for the military.”20 This evolution in urban environments will increase attrition of personnel, equipment, and ammunition in future combat operations. The World War II battle for the German city of Aachen in October 1944 provides insight into how future urban combat against a conventional adversary in megacities could affect infantry squads. John C. McManus writes that despite the valiant efforts of the Army medics at Aachen,

Casualties were still eroding the fighting power of the rifle companies. Within a few days, most were operating at half or two-thirds strength. Each night, personnel officers fed brand-new replacements into the companies. This kept the rifle companies in operation, but they were always understrength, in constant need of reinforcements.21

At Aachen, the larger twelve-man infantry squads undoubtedly proved that their greater organizational survivability (ability to survive and retain combat effectiveness amidst attrition) was an advantage in high-attrition urban combat against a highly competent, conventional adversary. Just as in Aachen as well as other battles fought in densely urbanized terrain, in future combat against a peer adversary in a megacity, infantry squads will likely lose far more people than they did against insurgents in Iraqi cities, so they will need to be bigger to remain effective after enduring attrition. Organizational survivability will prove especially important in this regard, because the Army’s combat troop replacement system has not been stressed in such a manner since the Vietnam War over a half-century ago.

The Squad in the Technological Dimension of War

Technology should be a salient factor in the construct and operation of the future infantry squad. Technological growth and automation have increased the capacity for greater workloads while reducing the need for manpower in commerce. However, the opposite is true for the infantry rifle squad. Technology and automation seem to have increased the workload of the squad on contemporary battlefields, with more equipment for the same nine people to manage and operate in addition to legacy warfighting functions.


Basis of the legacy squad. Participants at the conference supported the recommendation for a nine-man infantry squad based on assumptions about technology. Some reasoned that contemporary and future advances in weapon systems such as improved and lighter automatic rifles and machine guns negated the need for the firepower provided by the additional three personnel of a twelve-man infantry squad. In other words, the participants believed that the better weapon systems of today would equate the firepower of a nine-man squad to that of a twelve-man squad that used older weapons, which justified their recommendation for a smaller squad. For example, in his testimony at the conference, Bradley stated that he thought the World War II squad was too large and favored the new smaller construct, stating, “With better weapons, it might be best not to have too many [riflemen] on one team.”22 As projected in 1946, squad weapons did improve and squad firepower did increase. But, due to the proliferation of similar advancements among potential adversaries, such advancements are no longer valid justification for retaining the reduced size nine-person infantry squad.

Discontinuities since 1946 and future concerns. While military technology since 1946 has helped increase the firepower of the infantry squad to what it is today, and will no doubt continue to enhance it in the future, it is no longer sufficient grounds for retaining the squad at its current manning, or reducing it. In fact, quite to the contrary, emerging military technology that will grow to enhance the capability of the squad, like armed drones and other robotics, make a strong case for increasing the number of soldiers in the infantry squad with another team of riflemen.

Grounds for Change

The highlighted discontinuities in military affairs and human society, as well as projections about future war necessitate rethinking and reforming the squad. From an operational standpoint, since command and control is now possible for a larger squad, the Army should grow the squad to increase its capacity to survive complete destruction in high-attrition combat with peer adversaries.

In terms of logistics, fighting dispersed on future battlefields to negate the effectiveness of enemy targeting will require innovative ways to resupply remote squads without overtasking the theater logistics infrastructure. Adapting the squad to leverage new technologies like drones for supply and logistics could help the Army fight dispersed and complicate targeting by the enemy in future conventional conflicts. Interestingly, in anticipation of such future developments, the Army experimented with multiple prototype unmanned aerial vehicles called Joint Tactical Autonomous Air Resupply Systems in April 2017.23

Based on changes in the social dimension of war—the growth of populations and megacities—and the real possibility of engaging in high-attrition urban combat in megacities, increasing the amount of personnel in the squad will increase its survivability for combat. Additionally, technological developments in training and an increased preservice exposure to combat in the conscript population negate the need to keep the squad small, so conscripts will find it easier to understand how it works.

From a technological perspective, adding another team to the squad could optimize it for unmanned armed reconnaissance, cyber, and electronic warfare capabilities. In concert with the blossoming philosophy of mission command, growing the squad to leverage the above technologies will better prepare it to operate dispersed from parent formations (platoon and company) on future battlefields. In future interstate conflict with a peer or near-peer adversary, Army leaders envision battlefields in which small units (most likely squads) will fight dispersed to complicate enemy targeting and fires while maintaining the ability to aggregate as needed. According to Milley, future battlefields will see heavy use of sensors, and

with sensors everywhere, the probability of being seen is very high … if you can be seen, you will be hit. So that means just to survive, our formations … will likely have to be small. They will have to move constantly. They will have to aggregate and disaggregate rapidly.24

Arguably, the most critical organic combat capability that squads will need when fighting dispersed from parent formations (platoon and company) is reconnaissance. On a sensor-laden future battlefield, the importance of locating the enemy first through reconnaissance, and rapidly leveraging fires to destroy them cannot be overstated.



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The Army should consider restoring a modified form of the scout reconnaissance team it used in World War II to make the squad more survivable for high attrition combat, better resource it to manage the increased workload of the new capabilities it is integrating (drone, cyber, and electronic warfare), and help it operate and fight dispersed from parent organizations on future battlefields. Conceptually, a three-person cyber/reconnaissance team, comprising infantrymen trained on unmanned aerial systems and robotics systems, will permanently add unmanned armed reconnaissance, cyber, and electronic warfare capabilities to the squad. This change could increase the squad’s survivability (quantitatively) as a dispersed small element on the battlefield, and empower it to fight in multiple domains [ground, close air, and cyber domains]. Moreover, the change could provide squads the capability and capacity to leverage drone and robotics technology for resupply in future dispersed combat environments. This reform will also create an open organizational architecture in the squad for the continued integration and use of rapidly evolving military robotics and drone technology.


Changes in war, military affairs, and human society since the 1940s, as well as projections about future war, sufficiently invalidate many of the foundational arguments, facts, and assumptions that generated the legacy nine-person infantry squad, and justify institutional reevaluation and reform. The current era is most opportune for this change as the institution mulls organizational changes that will better enable it to fight in multiple domains (land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace) consistent with the multi-domain battle concept.

Despite being somewhat of an institutional sacred cow, it is time to boldly reevaluate and duly reform the squad by increasing its size for optimum battlefield survivability and performance. According to Milley, “It’s better for us [the U.S. Army] to slaughter our sacred cows ourselves, rather than lose a war because we’re too hidebound to think the unthinkable.”25 Consequently, ensuing studies should not only boldly explore and examine new organizational constructs for the squad across formations (to include Stryker and mechanized infantry squads), but also for the U.S. Army’s entire order of battle (platoon through Army level). Fostering this discourse is critical to ensuring the structure and organization of the U.S. Army is optimized for conflict in spite of discontinuities in the dimensions of war.


  1. Report of Committee “B” on Tactics and Technique (Fort Benning, GA: The United States Army Infantry School, 1946), T-18, 6.
  2. Robert B. Brown, “The Infantry Squad: Decisive Force Now and in the Future,” Military Review 91, no. 6 (November-December 2011): 2, accessed 12 December 2017,
  3. John P. Kotter, Accelerate: Building Strategic Agility for a Faster-moving World (Boston: Harvard Business Review Press, 2014), vii.
  4. Army Techniques Publication 3-21.8, Infantry Platoon and Squad (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], 2016), 1-13.
  5. Michael Howard, The Causes of Wars, 2nd ed. (London: Maurice Temple Smith, 1983), 105.
  6. Ibid., 104–5.
  7. A. O. Connor, “The Infantry Conference: Lecture on Infantry Organization” (transcript, U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA, 10 June 1946) 1, accessed 11 December 2017,
  8. Report of Committee “B” on Tactics and Technique, T-18. “Survivability” is used in this article to refer to the squad’s ability to retain combat effectiveness in the face of attrition. This is consistent with the doctrinal definition of survivability in Joint Publication 4-0, Joint Logistics (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 16 October 2013), I-10: “Survivability is the capacity of an organization to prevail in spite of adverse impacts or potential threats.”
  9. Field Manual (FM) 7-10, Infantry Field Manual: Rifle Company,
    Rifle Regiment
    (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1942), 130, accessed 11 December 2017,; FM 22-5, Basic Field Manual Infantry Drill Regulations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1939), 57, accessed 11 December 2017,
  10. Report of Committee “B” on Tactics and Technique, T-18, 6.
  11. Ibid., T-18, 3.
  12. Ibid., T-18, 5.
  13. Ibid., T-18.
  14. Report of Special Committee on Organization of the Infantry Division (Fort Benning, GA: The United States Army Infantry School, 1946), 3, accessed 11 December 2017,
  15. Connor, “The Infantry Conference: Lecture on Infantry Organization,” 8.
  16. “Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T),” General Dynamics Mission Systems (website), accessed 11 August 17, Mission command is a philosophy that advocates the practice of empowering subordinates to execute missions within the intent of higher echelons using disciplined initiative.
  17. The Infantry Conference: Report of Special Committee on Organization of the Infantry Division (testimonial of Omar Bradley), 8.
  18. Geoff Colvin, Talent is Overrated: What Really Separates World-Class Performers from Everybody Else (New York: Penguin Group, 2008).
  19. Marc Harris et al., “Megacities and The United States Army: Preparing for a Complex and Uncertain Future,” Chief of Staff of the Army Strategic Studies Group, U.S. Army paper, June 2014, 5, accessed 11 December 2017,
  20. Milley, “AUSA Eisenhower Luncheon,” 12.
  21. John C. McManus, Grunts: Inside the American Infantry Combat Experience, World War II through Iraq (New York: NAL Caliber, 2011), 120.
  22. The Infantry Conference: Report of Special Committee on Organization of the Infantry Division (testimonial of Omar Bradley), 8.
  23. Monica K. Guthrie, “Amazon-style ‘Drone Delivery’ the Future of Military Resupply,” U.S. Army press release, 14 April 2017, accessed 11 December 2017,
  24. Milley, “AUSA Eisenhower Luncheon,” 15.
  25. Ibid.


Maj. Hassan Kamara, U.S. Army, is a Chief of Staff of the Army Strategic Study Group Fellow serving on the Army Future Studies group and the Army Modernization Task Force. He holds a BA in political science from Arizona State University, an MA in strategic studies from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, and an MA in acquisitions and procurement from Webster University. He is an honor graduate of the U.S. Naval War College Command and Staff Course. Kamara has commanded a Stryker infantry company at Fort Bliss, Texas, and an armor company in Kirkuk, Iraq.

March-April 2018