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Operational Art and the Chaco War

 

Maj. Philip J. McCormick, U.S. Army

 

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Editor’s note: This article was originally published online in Military Review’s Spanish edition in November 2024.

 

We are captivated by those rare instances in warfare where an underdog prevails against a more powerful adversary, and even more intrigued by the factors contributing to such victories. One often-overlooked example is the Chaco War, which raged from July 1932 to June 1935, as both Paraguay and Bolivia vied for control of the Chaco region in the heart of South America. The Paraguayan army’s application of operational art was the decisive factor in its victory over the larger and better-equipped Bolivian army. This article establishes the necessary context for understanding operational art by explaining its evolution and covering key doctrinal definitions in operational art. With this baseline knowledge, the article analyzes how Paraguay adeptly used operational art during the war in stark contrast to Bolivia. Finally, and most importantly, this article provides key lessons learned on the application of operational art for contemporary military planners.

The Evolution of Operational Art

In simple terms, operational art is “the theory and practice of planning, preparing, and conducting major operations and campaigns aimed at accomplishing operational or strategic objectives in a theater.”¹ Operational art emerged in military doctrine during the interwar period between World War I and World War II with the writings of Soviet military theorists Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky, Alexander Svechin, and Georgii Isserson.

Their theories developed by observing the contrast between attritional and linear warfare of World War I with the maneuver-centric Russian Civil War (1917–1922) and Polish-Soviet War (1919–1921).² Three key concepts emerged from their work: (1) recognition of an operational level of warfare, (2) rejection of the notion of a single decisive battle to end a conflict, and (3) the concept of deep battle in the enemy’s support areas.

Events in the Chaco War on the opposite side of the globe validated these ideas a decade later. Instead of planning a single campaign, Paraguay adopted an operational-level approach, organizing a succession of multiple operations linking tactics to strategic objectives. The absence of a single decisive battle of annihilation was evident in the Chaco War by three distinct destructions of the Bolivian army prior to the war’s cessation. Finally, Paraguay’s multiple operational envelopments, which penetrated the full depths of Bolivian defenses throughout the war, also validated the theory of a deep battle. The Chaco War demonstrates Latin America’s substantial role in the formative stages of operational art.

U.S. Doctrine and Operational Art

Framing the conflict by exploring contemporary doctrine is essential for conducting a comprehensive analysis of the Chaco War. This approach sheds light on the differing operational planning of the Bolivian and Paraguayan forces. According to U.S. Army doctrine, operational art is “the cognitive approach by commanders and staff supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment to develop, strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means.”³

Using this definition, we can assess the operational-level decisions of the two primary commanders in the Chaco War: Gen. José Félix Estigarribia of the Paraguayan army and Gen. Hans Kundt, a German officer who crafted Bolivian war plans and was later called out of retirement to lead the Bolivian army from December 1932 until his removal in December 1933.

Additionally, doctrine equips us with the intellectual framework to understand operational-level planning. This article utilizes the U.S. Army’s elements of operational art to show the integration and synchronization of combat power to achieve operational objectives. These elements of operational art include end state and conditions, center of gravity, decisive points, lines of operation and lines of effort, tempo, phasing and transitions, culmination, operational reach, basing, and risk. In the subsequent analysis, this article provides examples and definitions of the elements of operational art.

Scene Setter: A Strategic Evaluation

Operational art serves as the bridge between strategy and tactics. Therefore, to analyze operational art during the Chaco War, we must evaluate the strategic positions and national objectives of Bolivia and Paraguay. Commencing with the strategic situation, the table uses the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) model to compare and assess the belligerents at the conflict’s outset.

National Objectives

Bolivia and Paraguay shared the same objective—control over the disputed Chaco region, shown in figure 1. At face value, the region did not offer much in terms of resources. The region has a harsh climate—hot, dry, and dusty—until the torrential rainy season from December to February, which turns its few roads into unpassable tracks of mud. Consequently, the region was sparsely populated only by indigenous tribes and Mennonite settlers. However, despite the inhospitable terrain, each country had distinct motivations to fight for the Chaco.

Bolivia’s primary reason for expansion into the Chaco was gaining an outlet to the sea via the Río Paraguay. Bolivia was landlocked since losing ocean access in the War of the Pacific (1879–1883). The signing of the Arica Treaty between Chile and Peru in 1929 eliminated the possibility of Bolivia regaining Pacific access.⁴ Bolivian unrestricted use of the Río Paraguay would allow it to become a regional power by exporting its mineral wealth directly, avoiding intermediaries and transit duties. Bolivian President Daniel Salamanca stated his nation’s policy when he declared, “We have a right to the littoral on the Río Paraguay.”⁵

Bolivia faced more challenging victory conditions than Paraguay. Their objective extended beyond controlling the Chaco; they sought Paraguayan acceptance of navigation rights on the Río Paraguay. Consequently, Bolivia aimed to occupy Asunción, the Paraguayan capital, and achieve political subjugation of Paraguay.

For Paraguay, the Chaco was an integral part of their nation. In the catastrophic War of the Triple Alliance (1864–1870), Paraguay lost a third of its territory. Losing the Chaco, which accounted for another third of its territory was an existential threat. Although the stakes were higher for Paraguay, their military objectives were limited to the Chaco. Paraguay’s objective of controlling the Chaco did not require a subsequent march to Bolivia’s capital, La Paz.

War Plans and Paraguay’s Realization of Operational Art

The competition over the Chaco region made armed conflict inevitable. Based on their perceived strengths and weaknesses, both nations developed initial war plans. Bolivia planned for six columns of ten thousand soldiers to advance along multiple axes toward the Río Paraguay and overwhelm Paraguayan garrisons along the way. Their objectives were the occupation of the entire Chaco region and Paraguay’s capital of Asunción.⁶ Bolivia’s plan assumed they would have time to mobilize and organize their forces, and the Paraguayan army would only offer minimal resistance.

Confirmation bias seems to have afflicted Gen. Kundt and the Bolivian general staff, causing them to selectively embrace information aligning with their preconceived notions while disregarding facts contradicting their beliefs.⁷ In contrast, a more discerning and open-minded staff would consider their army’s endurance, momentum, and protection, or what modern doctrine defines as operational reach in their planning. Operational reach is “the distance and duration across which a force can successfully employ military capabilities.”⁸

Moving a large army across the Chaco necessitated detailed planning and tremendous preparation and investment, even if the Paraguayan army offered minimum resistance. The distance between La Paz, Bolivia, and Asunción, Paraguay, exceeds 1,600 km and is roughly equivalent to the distance between Berlin and Moscow.⁹ An operational artist continuously seeks to extend operational reach. In this case, Bolivian planners could have achieved this by establishing additional depots, constructed roads, and acquired more trucks, rather than focusing solely on artillery and tanks.

The Paraguayans knew the details of the Bolivian plans. However, their initial plan acquiesced to the belief of Bolivian military superiority. Consequently, their (preoperational art) plan was to withdrawal from the Chaco and establish a defensive line along the Río Paraguay. The logic behind the initial plan was to extend Bolivian supply lines and defend along a natural terrain feature. Nevertheless, this plan was inherently pessimistic and ultimately self-defeating. It not only involved relinquishing control of the Chaco but also risked the capitulation of Asunción.

Fortunately for Paraguay, when then–Col. Estigarribia was selected as chief of the general staff, he immediately implemented a new operational design. Rather than “defend the Chaco after it had been conquered by the enemy,” Estigarribia envisioned destroying the Bolivian columns individually as they crossed the Chaco, and “break[ing] the teeth of each pincer before it closed.”¹⁰ Estigarribia correctly identified the Bolivian army as the center of gravity (COG) and consequently set out to destroy it. A COG “is the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action or will to act.”¹¹ The COG is an analytical tool for planning operations. It focuses planning efforts on identifying sources of enemy and friendly strengths and weaknesses.

Estigarribia stated, “The final aim of the war is the destruction of the enemy forces and not geographic objectives, no matter how important they may be.”¹² He then predicted the enemy weakness, or critical vulnerability, commenting, “We are about to wage a war of [lines of] communications, in which that army which succeeds in dominating the [lines of] communications of its enemy will be victorious.”¹³ The opportunity to test his hypothesis came as the simmering tensions in the Chaco unexpectedly escalated into an all-out war.

First Contact: A Lesson on Tempo

The Chaco War, which reshaped the destinies of nations, was initiated by a tactical instead of a strategic decision. The catalyst for the war was Bolivia occupying a Paraguayan outpost at Lake Pitiantuta on 15 June 1932 and Paraguay’s subsequent recapturing the outpost in July. However, the Bolivian decision to occupy the outpost came from Col. Enrique Peñaranda, who asked his higher headquarters for permission to occupy the area but conspicuously omitted the critical detail that Paraguayan forces already occupied it. A prevailing theory is that Peñaranda instigated the conflict with the belief that a war would create additional opportunities for his career advancement.¹⁴

In reprisal for Paraguay reoccupying the outpost, Bolivia escalated by seizing three additional outposts including the strategic Boquerón and its vital water wells. Due to the confusion in Bolivia’s high command, the Bolivians missed an opportunity to seize other lightly defended outposts. Sensing the disconnect between Bolivian tactical actions and policy, Estigarribia saw an opportunity to mobilize quickly and destroy the Bolivian army before it could muster its full force. At the tactical level, Peñaranda got the war he wanted, but strategically, Bolivia found itself in a conflict without adequate preparation.

Estigarribia assessed Bolivia could increase their force in the Chaco from 3,600 to 15,000 in two or three months.¹⁵ Consequently, Paraguay needed to act swiftly to achieve a localized superiority of forces. In response to this imperative, all available manpower was marshalled, from military academy cadets to political exiles. Paraguay adeptly harnessed its logistical edge and interior lines, which included the vital Río Paraguay and the sole railroad leading into the Chaco. These features were instrumental in establishing basing for future operations. A base is a strategically significant locality “from which military operations are projected or supported.”¹⁶

By September, the Paraguayans doubled their force to 7,500 soldiers and moved their newly formed corps (I Corps) into the Chaco, taking the initiative.¹⁷ This rapid assembly and movement of forces to achieve local superiority is an example of tempo. “Tempo is the relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to the enemy.”¹⁸

Exploiting their initiative, the Paraguayans surrounded the Bolivian outpost of Boquerón and commenced an attack. Paraguay’s initial attacks were repulsed with heavy losses. Rather than continuing frontal assaults, Estigarribia decided to attrit the Bolivian garrison using siege tactics.

With Bolivia’s wells running dry and increasing damage from bombardment, their situation grew bleak. Attempts to resupply the garrison through airdrops and reinforcement missions aimed at opening relief corridors proved unsuccessful. Bolivian tactical commanders pleaded for permission to withdraw from Boquerón, but the Bolivian high command refused, deeming it politically unfeasible. Throughout the war, Bolivia repeated this operational error of prioritizing military risk over political risk.

After twenty days of relentless combat, the beleaguered Bolivian garrison ultimately surrendered (see figure 2). The combination of thirst, untreated wounded, and lack of ammunition rendered the defenders combat ineffective. In the end, Bolivia lost a combined 2,200 soldiers killed and captured while Paraguay suffered around 500 killed and 1,500 wounded.¹⁹ Paraguay’s victory at Boquerón turned the tide of the war in their favor early on.

The victory resulted from Paraguay’s controlling tempo and their indirect approach—isolation instead of frontal assault to defeat the enemy. This became Paraguay’s modus operandi and included the benefits of capturing much-needed enemy equipment and preserving Paraguayan combat power for future operations. Perhaps the most consequential outcome of Boquerón was Bolivia’s thirst for a rapid redemption victory. After the defeat, Bolivia recalled Gen. Kundt to lead their army, hoping his experience from World War I was the missing piece to their future success.

The Bolivian Offensive: Missing the Decisive Points

The loss of Boquerón and subsequent defeats did not trigger a reevaluation of operational planning within the Bolivian high command. Rather, with the return of Kundt, the Bolivians doubled down on their flawed assumption of Paraguayan weakness. Consequently, Bolivia underinvested in their logistics and delayed mobilizing its population for the war effort.²⁰ Consequently, Bolivia found itself in a position where it lacked the necessary resources and means to attain their operational objective of capturing Nanawa. Capturing Nanawa would open the path to Concepción on the Río Paraguay, thereby setting conditions for a Bolivian southward advance along the Río Paraguay towards Asunción, their strategic objective.

Fatefully, Kundt overlooked the decisive point essential for successfully attacking Nanawa. A decisive point is “a geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy or contribute materially to achieving success.”²¹ The decisive point for attacking the well-entrenched Paraguayan force in Nanawa was to first isolate the garrison and deny them the critical requirements of water and ammo resupply. Nevertheless, Kundt failed to deploy sufficient manpower to control the decisive point. Believing in his army’s offensive capabilities and his World War I experience, Kundt boldly stated he could take Nanawa by noon on the first day of the attack, 20 January 1933.²² Although the Bolivians overmatched the Paraguayans in firepower, they did not have enough manpower—just six thousand—or the logistical capacity or mobility to encircle the three-thousand-strong Paraguayan defenders (see figure 3).

The first wave of Bolivian frontal attacks failed to penetrate Paraguayan defenses. Undeterred, the Bolivians continued their offensive, this time pressing the Paraguayan flanks. Despite the torrential rains and mud, one Bolivian column managed to approach Paraguayan supply lines. However, the arrival of Paraguayan reinforcements halted their progress. Unfortunately for the Bolivians, they lacked sufficient reserve forces to exploit any breaks in Paraguayan lines. Nanawa was not captured, and there were insufficient Bolivian forces remaining to lay siege. Following six days of fierce combat, the defenders at Nanawa sustained just 248 casualties, a stark contrast to the staggering toll of over two thousand Bolivian losses incurred during their relentless and unsuccessful attempts to seize the outpost.²³

After the First Battle of Nanawa, the Bolivians redirected their attacks on Paraguayan positions northwest of Nanawa. They experienced success capturing Alihuatá and Saavedra, almost encircling the Paraguayan 1st Division, but the Paraguayans retreated in good order.²⁴ Although these setbacks demoralized the Paraguayans, it did not change their operational objective—destroying Bolivia’s army. To achieve this objective, they recognized the importance of preserving their own combat power rather than holding onto relatively insignificant territory in tactically unfavorable positions.

Kundt failed to seize the opportunity presented by Bolivia’s momentum, as pushing deeper into Paraguayan support areas would threaten Nanawa’s supply lines. Instead, displaying a lack of creative thinking, he ordered a second direct assault on Nanawa. For this attack, the Bolivians brought more firepower, including tanks for South America’s first armored assault, flame throwers, and the bulk of their air force for close air support. Not learning from his previous operational errors, Kundt again overlooked controlling the decisive point of isolating Nanawa. He also did not deploy enough soldiers—only twelve thousand—to attack a now-reinforced garrison of nine thousand defenders.²⁵ The Second Battle of Nanawa commenced on 4 July 1933 with the Bolivians exploding a large subterranean mine under the Paraguayan trenches, an approach symbolic of the old World War I tactics favored by Kundt.

The Second Battle of Nanawa paralleled the first with overwhelming losses for the Bolivian attackers. In a grim repetition of the first battle, six days of fighting resulted in two thousand Bolivian and five hundred Paraguayan losses. Bolivia’s tanks performed poorly against Paraguayan trench lines—no surprise, given the lessons learned from World War I. The employment of Bolivian airpower was emblematic of their operational approach, targeting Paraguayan fortifications with minimal effects rather than interdicting Nanawa’s vulnerable supply lines.

Kundt’s reliance on frontal attacks and inability to maneuver severely attritted Bolivia’s army in two successive battles. Due to the battle’s carnage, Nanawa is known as the “South American Verdun.”²⁶ The Second Battle of Nanawa restored the operational initiative to Paraguay, whose forces would overwhelm the Bolivians with a stunning series of envelopments in the war’s next phase.

Paraguayan Offensive Campaigns: A Preview of World War II?

With Bolivia’s combat power degraded after the debacle at Nanawa, Paraguay shifted from a defensive to an offensive phase of operations. “A phase is a planning and execution tool used to divide an operation in duration or activity.”²⁷ This transition represented an evolution in the war’s character. Until this juncture, the conflict had resembled World War I’s static nature, but now it transformed into a maneuver-centric warfare akin to World War II.

The Paraguayan offensive was supported by a comprehensive line of effort (LOE) to obtain water—the essential supply to survive in the harsh climate. “A line of effort is a line linking multiple tasks using the logic of purpose rather than a geographic reference to focus efforts toward establishing a desired end state.”²⁸

The primary task for achieving their LOE was the rapid acquisition of a diverse fleet of trucks, vital for transporting troops and water. Additionally, the Paraguayans deployed specialized engineering units trained and equipped to locate and dig water wells ahead of advancing Paraguayan units.²⁹ Simultaneously, they initiated a comprehensive theater-wide water sanitation and filtration program to optimize the utilization of available water resources.³⁰

Paraguayan leadership also established a clear end state for the upcoming offensive campaign. An end state is “a set of desired future conditions the commander wants to exist when an operation ends.”³¹ Paraguay’s end state was seizing the rest of the Chaco up to the foothills of the Andes marked by the Río Parapití. Estigarribia planned for a line of operation to incrementally defeat Bolivian units while isolating Ballivián. A line of operation is “a line defining the directional orientation of a force in time and space in relation to the enemy and links the force with its base of operations and objectives.”³²

Initiating operations with diversionary attacks in mid-November, the Paraguayans planned a double envelopment against three Bolivian divisions situated near Campo Vía, north of Ballivián. In preparation for the offensive, Estigarribia organized his twenty-five thousand soldiers into three separate corps and ordered the excavation of twenty-two new wells to sustain the force, setting conditions for local superiority along a seventy-five-mile front.³³ Initiating operations with diversionary attacks in mid-November, the Paraguayans commenced their full-scale attack, penetrating Bolivian lines along multiple axes by early December (see figure 4).³⁴

At the offensive’s onset, Kundt still commanded Bolivian forces. He considered retaining terrain a measurement of military success. Consequently, he ordered his commanders to maintain positions despite being surrounded, even as aerial reconnaissance indicating an imminent full encirclement their entire support area. Kundt’s stubbornness turned to panic as entire Bolivian regiments began to surrender when they ran out of water and ammunition and a complete encirclement became inevitable. On 11 December, Kundt’s desperate radio transmission, “Obey orders … destroy equipment … break out,” came too late for Bolivia’s 4th and 7th Divisions with 7,500 soldiers surrendering at Campo Vía.³⁵ Kundt escaped with the 9th Division, but after the debacle, he was relieved of command and sent back to Europe.

Bolivia and Paraguay reached a temporary political truce on 18 December 1933, pausing hostilities until 6 January 1934. In this brief respite, General Peñaranda, the Bolivian commander who initiated the war at Lake Pitiantuta, was named Bolivia’s commander and chief of the armed forces. As Bolivia hastily rebuilt their army, Paraguay used the truce to consolidate their gains and prepare for continued offensive operations.

As hostilities resumed, Paraguay pressed forward but faced challenges from the difficult terrain and the Bolivian army. In a rare tactical victory for the Bolivians, they managed to defeat a Paraguayan corps at Cañada the Strongest in May 1934. There was potential for Bolivia to replicate this success, but they opted to retain eighteen thousand soldiers at Ballivián and refrained from committing them to maneuver or additional offensive actions against the Paraguayan forces, who were steadily advancing to encircle Ballivián.³⁶

Paraguay’s President Eusebio Ayala, growing impatient, pressed Estigarribia to directly attack Ballivián. However, Estigarribia remained resolute in his preference for an indirect approach and even offered to resign if compelled to attack directly.³⁷ Ultimately, the president relented, and Estigarribia’s persistence paid off with another Paraguayan victory north of Ballivián in El Carmen in mid-November. During this battle, the Paraguayans exploited gaps on Bolivia’s flanks and enveloped two divisions, resulting in two thousand Bolivians dead and another four thousand surrendering as their water ran out.³⁸ The staggering losses set conditions for Paraguay’s capture of Ballivián on 17 November 1934 and the removal of Bolivian President Daniel Salamanca in a military coup on 27 November 1934.

After a series of successive Paraguay victories, the Paraguayans reached their objective of the Río Parapití by January 1935. However, the Paraguayan army had reached its culmination. Culmination is “a point at which a force no longer has the capability to continue its form of operations, offense, or defense.”³⁹ Up to this point, Paraguay had an advantage in logistics. Nevertheless, their supply lines extended over 1,000 km, while Bolivia benefitted from shorter supply lines for the first time in the war. Additionally, Bolivia had forty-five thousand soldiers in the field compared to thirty thousand Paraguayans.⁴⁰ Facing these challenges, Estigarribia decided not to risk additional offensive operations or decisive battles, even though Bolivia’s lucrative oil fields were within 15 km of the front lines.⁴¹

Risk is defined as “the probability and severity of loss linked to hazards.”⁴² For Paraguay, the probability of a catastrophic loss increased as their supply lines extended, and the severity of a catastrophic loss was losing the entire war, as Paraguay lacked the means to rebuild its army. Consequently, over the next forty days, Bolivia’s offensive pushed the Paraguayans back 100 km. The Paraguayans refrained from decisive engagements, and they executed an orderly withdrawal to more defensible positions without losing any of their units.

A combination of exhaustion and international pressure ultimately compelled both sides to negotiate, with an armistice signed on 12 June 1935. For Bolivia, the war resulted in fifty thousand dead, twenty thousand captured, ten thousand deserting into Argentina, and thousands more injured. Paraguayan losses were forty thousand dead, 2,500 captured, plus thousands injured.⁴³ Despite the high cost, Paraguay secured 75 percent of the disputed Chaco region. This territorial gain marked a significant victory, especially considering Paraguay’s disadvantages during the conflict.

Conclusion and Lessons

Paraguay’s triumph in the Chaco War stems from a combination of factors: political, geographical, and informational to name a few, however, as this article proposes, the application of operational art was the decisive factor in the victory of an economically and militarily weaker Paraguay over its mightier Bolivian adversary. Rather than continue to neglect this conflict, we should study it and reapply lessons learned toward current and future military challenges. This article offers three key lessons learned with enduring value to operational art.

The first is Paraguay’s preference for using indirect defeat mechanisms, isolating Bolivian forces from sources of water with decisive operational effects. We are conditioned, especially in Western military tradition, to rely on firepower to defeat enemy formations. In the Chaco War, we observed an alternative. Planners must seek unique opportunities in their operational environment for exploiting indirect defeat mechanisms. Estigarribia’s vision of “making … the desert our ally in our endeavor to trammel [the Bolivian] advance,” exemplifies this perspective.⁴⁴

The second instructive insight pertains to Paraguay’s operational implementation of a dedicated LOE aimed at procuring the paramount resource of the conflict—water. This LOE not only shielded the Paraguayan army from a critical vulnerability but also served as a catalyst for enhanced maneuverability on the battlefield. While contemporary military doctrine often emphasizes LOEs associated with stabilization and population-centric tasks, the Chaco War offers a compelling historical illustration of connecting an LOE to achieving combat objectives and operational manuever.⁴⁵

Finally, we find an instructive example on the significance of tempo, as evidenced by Bolivia’s missed opportunity to reconstitute its army by conducting an operational pause following their initial setbacks. Contrary to conventional wisdom, tempo encompasses not only the capacity to act swiftly relative to one’s adversary but also the ability to exercise restraint and patience judiciously. If Bolivia took the time to build up a force with a 3:1 or higher combat power ratio and adequate logistics at Nanawa, a task within their military and economic means, the outcome of the war may have turned out differently.

In closing, the Chaco War provides timeless lessons in operational art. These lessons include applying of indirect defeat mechanisms, developing LOEs to raise combat power, and the nuanced understanding of tempo in military operations. As the contemporary operational environment evolves, the insights drawn from this historical conflict serve as a beacon for navigating modern military challenges.

Final Thoughts

A final critical question a student of the Chaco War must ask is, what makes an operational artist? Why did Gen. Estigarribia emerge in Paraguay instead of Bolivia? This question is extremely complicated, but this article offers three explanations. The first is education, specifically international military exchange. As a lieutenant, he studied for two years in Chile, and as a lieutenant colonel, he attended France’s prestigious École Supérieure de Guerre, studying the lessons of World War I.⁴⁶ Second was battlefield circulation. After being assigned as assistant chief of staff, he went on five multiweek tours of the Chaco region.⁴⁷ This provided him with knowledge of the terrain and the ability to visualize operations. Most significantly, it was his willingness to challenge established paradigms that set Estigarribia apart. He risked his reputation by advocating for a forward defense strategy in the Chaco, contrary to the prevailing plan of a withdrawal and a static defense along the Río Paraguay. Although initially met with resistance from the military and political establishment, he employed logic and persuasion to effect a change in mindset. Estigarribia’s ability to communicate, coupled with his operational intellect, demonstrate that a brilliant mind is truly the most decisive weapon in warfare.

 

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Notes

1. Milan Vego, “Operations Short of War and Operational Art,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 98 (3rd Quarter, 2020): 38.
2. Wilson C. Blythe, “A History of Operational Art,” Military Review 98, no. 6 (November-December 2018): 40.
3. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, Operations (U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], 31 July 2019), 2-1.
4. David H. Zook, The Conduct of the Chaco War (Bookman Associates, 1960), 53.
5. Zook, The Conduct of the Chaco War, 76.
6. José Félix Estigarribia, The Epic of the Chaco War: Marshal Estigarribia’s Memoirs of the Chaco War, 1932-1935 (University of Texas Press, 1950), 16.
7. Kendra Cherry, “13 Types of Common Cognitive Biases That Might Be Impairing Your Judgment,” Verywell Mind, 22 February 2024, https://www.verywellmind.com/cognitive-biases-distort-thinking-2794763.
8. ADP 3-0, Operations, Glossary-7.
9. Matthew Hughes, “Logistics and Chaco War: Bolivia versus Paraguay, 1932-35,” Journal of Military History 69, no. 2 (April 2005): 411–37.
10. Estigarribia, The Epic of the Chaco War, 21.
11. ADP 3-0, Operations, 2-6.
12. Estigarribia, The Epic of the Chaco War, 72.
13. Estigarribia, The Epic of the Chaco War, 42.
14. Bruce W. Farcau, “The Chaco: War for the Hell of It,” Command Magazine, no. 12 (September-October 1991), 18.
15. Zook, The Conduct of the Chaco War, 78, 84.
16. ADP 3-0, Operations, A-18.
17. Zook, The Conduct of the Chaco War, 75.
18. ADP 3-0, Operations, 2-8.
19. Zook, The Conduct of the Chaco War, 101.
20. Farcau, “The Chaco: War for the Hell of It,” 17.
21. ADP 3-0, Operations, 2-7.
22. Farcau, “The Chaco: War for the Hell of It,” 19.
23. Zook, The Conduct of the Chaco War, 132.
24. Farcau, “The Chaco: War for the Hell of It,” 20.
25. Farcau, “The Chaco: War for the Hell of It,” 21.
26. Robert L. Scheina, Latin America’s Wars: Age of the Professional Soldier 1900-2001 (Potomac Books, 2003), 97.
27. ADP 3-0, Operations, 2-9.
28. ADP 3-0, Operations, 2-8.
29. Farcau, “The Chaco: War for the Hell of It,” 21.
30. María Elena Ramírez de Rojas, La Sanidad en la Guerra del Chaco (Ministerio De Salud Pública y Bienestar Social, 2018) 12.
31. ADP 3-0, Operations, 2-6.
32. ADP 3-0, Operations, 2-7.
33. Zook, The Conduct of the Chaco War, 162.
34. Farcau, “The Chaco: War for the Hell of It,” 23.
35. Farcau, “The Chaco: War for the Hell of It,” 23.
36. Farcau, “The Chaco: War for the Hell of It,” 42.
37. Estigarribia, The Epic of the Chaco War, 168.
38. Farcau, “The Chaco: War for the Hell of It,” 43.
39. ADP 3-0, Operations, 2-10.
40. Farcau, “The Chaco: War for the Hell of It,” 44.
41. Farcau, “The Chaco: War for the Hell of It,” 44.
42. ADP 3-0, Operations, 2-11.
43. Farcau, “The Chaco: War for the Hell of It,” 44.
44. Estigarribia, The Epic of the Chaco War, 20.
45. Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Planning (U.S. GPO, 2020), IV-31.
46. Estigarribia, The Epic of the Chaco War, x, 5.
47. Estigarribia, The Epic of the Chaco War, 6.

 

 

 

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