The Fifth Act Cover

The Fifth Act

America’s End in Afghanistan

Elliot Ackerman

Penguin Press, New York, 2022, 288 pages

Book Review published on: May 17, 2024

If you want the truth about the botched withdrawal from Afghanistan, then read The Fifth Act: America’s End in Afghanistan. Devoid of political repercussions or reputational risk, author Elliot Ackerman takes the reader on a journey spanning the two decades leading up to the botched withdrawal in late 2021. The author approaches the issues from the strategic to tactical level beginning with the misalignment of messaging from three past administrations and its effects on the warfighter, which were eerily reminiscent to those facing the United States fifty years ago. This quick read is both personal and profound, and Ackerman applies stories of his time on the ground through the first decade of the war, and eventually steps back to focus on family during the second. Ackerman’s self-imposed operational retrograde is short-lived as he finds himself drawn back a decade and once again assisting Afghan citizens fleeing persecution to gain their freedom not through diplomatic channels but through iPhones, WhatsApp, favors, and friends.

This book has value for those seeking to understand how policy and political messaging at the strategic level affects actions at the tactical. At the tactical level, the U.S. military had proven successful in capturing high-value targets, developing the Afghan National Army, and keeping the population relatively secure. However, as the author notes, without a defined framework for the conduct of the war or clear ending, the warfighter does not know what winning looks like. This kind of fog was coupled with inconsistent messaging from Washington with respect to a scheduled drawdown that led to difficulty from Afghan leadership to accept we were there to stay. The author states this approach leads to “among other things largescale corruption, a lack of commitment and accountability issues.” There are other contributing factors which led to the collapse of Afghanistan, such as inaccurate reporting, lack of regional commitment by military leaders, and intelligence estimates. However, even the author could not have anticipated the speed at which the Taliban gained control of the national capital. In other words, the United States and its allies anticipated a “decent interval” for withdrawal, but they didn’t get that. And that’s when the author’s phone started to ring while on vacation in Italy.

As soon as the announcement was made that the United States was withdrawing, the Taliban began searching for those who had supported the United States and allied forces for retribution. The author’s focus was to assist those wanted people and their families to obtain clear passage out of the country through contacts who were literally “gate keepers” at the Hamid Karzai International Airport. Using backdoor channels through a host of paramilitary, CIA operatives, politicians, friends, and former marines, Ackerman manages to coordinate the evacuation and funding of flights for some Afghans who assisted in the Global War on Terrorism, but he was unable to assist everyone. Many, he states “are still in hiding in provinces throughout the country to this day.” The failure of the United States to have a clear plan for the evacuation is understandable given the security concerns for its own forces; however, the complete lack of assistance from many levels of the United States is inexcusable. In short, as a civilian, Ackerman coordinates the evacuation for those on ground through WhatsApp, Signal, and iPhone technology when there isn’t a clear state department support plan for those in distress. This is but one example of the lack of planning and the misalignment of political messaging and resources; it isn’t a grandiose war story by any means, but it’s more like a lesson learned to prevent “another digital Dunkirk” in future conflicts.

There are lessons and insights from this book for any level of reader. For those wishing to serve on advisory committees on policy and messaging, this book offers a nice case study for the necessary alignment between civilians and military. For military strategic and operational level planners working with or for advise-and-assist brigades, the author nicely outlines the challenges of how tribal culture and warlordism must be considered when aligning forces in challenged or developing countries. And finally, for all those veterans of the Afghan war who feel animosity toward their senior leaders, guilty for their actions or inactions, or simply would like help making sense of it all, then read this book. Ackerman is just not an academic, he was also a warfighter whose insights will change one’s perspective for those who have served and for those who will serve in future conflicts.

Book Review written by: Lt. Col. Mark Larson, U.S. Army, Fort Belvoir, Virginia