Reader II

Special Edition


COIN Reader1

Military Review
Special Edition


Table of Contents

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America’s Frontier Wars: Lessons for Asymmetric Conflicts

Congressman Ike Skelton

Congressman Ike Skelton suggests how to overcome the threat of asymmetrical warfare by examining yesteryear’s battles to develop strategies and tactics for tomorrow’s conflicts.

Developing a National Counterinsurgency Capability for the War on Terror

John Hillen, Ph.D.

The Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, Dr. Hillen calls for a COIN strategic framework that incorporates all the instruments of national power.

Phase IV Operations: Where Wars are Really Won

Lieutenant Colonel Conrad C. Crane, U.S. Army, Retired, Ph.D

The United States has rarely accomplished long-term policy goals after any conflict without an extended U.S. military presence to ensure proper results from the peace.

Linking Doctrine to Action: A New COIN Center-of-Gravity Analysis

Colonel Peter R. Mansoor, U.S. Army
Major Mark S. Ulrich, U.S. Army

A new tool from the Army/Marine Counterinsurgency (COIN) Center can help bridge the gap between COIN doctrine and real results on the ground.

Using Occam’s Razor to Connect the Dots: The Ba’ath Party and the Insurgency in Tal Afar

Captain Travis Patriquin, U.S. Army

Long ago, Saddam Hussein positioned loyal Ba’athists in Tal Afar to neutralize political and ethnic enclaves, and they now support the insurgent forces in the city.

Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-Philippines and the Indirect Approach

Colonel Gregory Wilson, U.S. Army

Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines offers a template for how to succeed in counterinsurgency.

A Model Counterinsurgency: Uribe’s Colombia (2002–2006) versus FARC

Thomas A. Marks, Ph.D

The former pupil has eclipsed its teacher. Under President Uribe and a dynamic cast of military reformers, Colombia has now neutralized its longstanding insurgency.

Anbar Awakens: The Tipping Point

Major Niel Smith, U.S. Army
Colonel Sean MacFarland, U.S. Army

The “Anbar Awakening”—what some have called the “Gettysburg of Iraq”—resulted from the careful application of multiple lines of operation, among them the deliberate cultivation of local leaders.


Addendum: Anbar Awakens

Colonel Sean MacFarland, U.S. Army

A major player in the Anbar Awakening recalls how joint-force cooperation led to the turnaround in Ramadi.

Commander’s Assessment: South Baghdad

Lieutenant Colonel Ross A. Brown, U.S. Army

A former squadron commander discusses his unit’s year in Iraq and lists his 11 commandants for winning the COIN war in South Baghdad.

Fighting “The Other War”: Counterinsurgency Strategy in Afghanistan, 2003–2005

Lieutenant General David W. Barno, U.S. Army, Retired

The former commander of Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan offers his assessment of operations in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban.

Combating a Modern Insurgency: Combined Task Force Devil in Afghanistan

Colonel (P) Patrick Donahue, U.S. Army
Lieutenant Colonel Michael Fenzel, U.S. Army

Two principals describe how Combined Task Force Devil employed a balanced strategy of kinetic, non-kinetic, and political actions to quiet eastern Afghanistan during OIF VI.

HUMINT-Centric Operations: Developing Actionable Intelligence in the Urban Counterinsurgency Environment

Colonel Ralph O. Baker, U.S. Army

In a companion piece to an earlier article on information operations, a successful BCT commander describes how he revamped his intelligence approach for COIN.

Human Terrain Mapping: A Critical First Step to Winning the COIN Fight

Lieutenant Colonel Jack Marr, U.S. Army
Major John Cushing, U.S. Army
Major Brandon Garner, U.S. Army
Captain Richard Thompson, U.S. Army

Human terrain mapping offers a systematic method to obtain the information Soldiers need to succeed in counterinsurgency.

Paper and COIN: Exploiting the Enemy’s Documents

Major Vernie Liebl, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired

We are ignoring a valuable source of intelligence by failing to search documents, hard drives, and other exploitable detritus found in the course of operations.

Everything Old is New Again: Task Force Phantom in the Iraq War

Lieutenant Colonel Robert P. Whalen Jr., U.S. Army

Using cold war doctrine, long-range surveillance (LRS) companies are meeting an urgent, enduring need in Iraq.

A Synchronized Approach to Population Control

Brigadier General Joseph Anderson, U.S. Army
Colonel Gary Volesky, U.S. Army

Population control measures are an important part of the current plan to stabilize Baghdad.

The Art and Aggravation of Vetting in Post-Conflict Environments

Sean McFate

Creating a professional indigenous security force depends on the competent vetting of candidates for that force.

Iraq: The Social Context of IEDs

Montgomery McFate, J.D., Ph.D

To defeat the insurgents who employ improvised explosive devices, commanders should focus less on the bomb than on the bomb maker.

Iraq: Tribal Engagement Lessons Learned

Lieutenant Colonel Michael Eisenstadt, U.S. Army Reserve

As the “Anbar Awakening” suggests, tribal engagement could be a key to success in Iraq. MR presents a useful primer on the subject.

Money as a Force Multiplier in COIN

Lieutenant Colonel Leonard J. DeFrancisci, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve

During the second battle of Fallujah, civil affairs teams in Marine Regimental Combat Team 1 wielded money to shape the battlespace.

Stabilizing Influence: Micro-Financial Services Capability

James E. Shircliffe Jr.

Micro-financial services that offer very small loans and savings accounts to the less affluent should be part of all U.S. stability operations.

From Enduring Strife to Enduring Peace in the Philippines

Major Gary J. Morea, U.S. Army

Islamic separatists in the Mindanao island group are slowly being assimilated back into Philippine society through a process of amnesty, reintegration, and reconciliation.

Protection of Arts and Antiquities during Wartime: Examining the Past and Preparing for the Future

Major James B. Cogbill, U.S. Army

Well before D-Day, America planned to protect European art and cultural treasures. Failure to do the same in Iraq suggests we need a permanent DOD structure to ensure we don’t repeat our mistake.

Multi-National Force-Iraq Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance

General David H. Petraeus, U.S. Army

General Petraeus talks on the essential tasks necessary for successful COIN.


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