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Congressman Ike Skelton suggests how to overcome the threat of asymmetrical warfare by examining yesteryear’s battles to develop strategies and tactics for tomorrow’s conflicts.
The Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, Dr. Hillen calls for a COIN strategic framework that incorporates all the instruments of national power.
The United States has rarely accomplished long-term policy goals after any conflict without an extended U.S. military presence to ensure proper results from the peace.
A new tool from the Army/Marine Counterinsurgency (COIN) Center can help bridge the gap between COIN doctrine and real results on the ground.
Long ago, Saddam Hussein positioned loyal Ba’athists in Tal Afar to neutralize political and ethnic enclaves, and they now support the insurgent forces in the city.
Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines offers a template for how to succeed in counterinsurgency.
The former pupil has eclipsed its teacher. Under President Uribe and a dynamic cast of military reformers, Colombia has now neutralized its longstanding insurgency.
The “Anbar Awakening”—what some have called the “Gettysburg of Iraq”—resulted from the careful application of multiple lines of operation, among them the deliberate cultivation of local leaders.
A major player in the Anbar Awakening recalls how joint-force cooperation led to the turnaround in Ramadi.
A former squadron commander discusses his unit’s year in Iraq and lists his 11 commandants for winning the COIN war in South Baghdad.
The former commander of Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan offers his assessment of operations in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban.
Two principals describe how Combined Task Force Devil employed a balanced strategy of kinetic, non-kinetic, and political actions to quiet eastern Afghanistan during OIF VI.
In a companion piece to an earlier article on information operations, a successful BCT commander describes how he revamped his intelligence approach for COIN.
Human terrain mapping offers a systematic method to obtain the information Soldiers need to succeed in counterinsurgency.
We are ignoring a valuable source of intelligence by failing to search documents, hard drives, and other exploitable detritus found in the course of operations.
Using cold war doctrine, long-range surveillance (LRS) companies are meeting an urgent, enduring need in Iraq.
Population control measures are an important part of the current plan to stabilize Baghdad.
Creating a professional indigenous security force depends on the competent vetting of candidates for that force.
To defeat the insurgents who employ improvised explosive devices, commanders should focus less on the bomb than on the bomb maker.
As the “Anbar Awakening” suggests, tribal engagement could be a key to success in Iraq. MR presents a useful primer on the subject.
During the second battle of Fallujah, civil affairs teams in Marine Regimental Combat Team 1 wielded money to shape the battlespace.
Micro-financial services that offer very small loans and savings accounts to the less affluent should be part of all U.S. stability operations.
Islamic separatists in the Mindanao island group are slowly being assimilated back into Philippine society through a process of amnesty, reintegration, and reconciliation.
Well before D-Day, America planned to protect European art and cultural treasures. Failure to do the same in Iraq suggests we need a permanent DOD structure to ensure we don’t repeat our mistake.
General Petraeus talks on the essential tasks necessary for successful COIN.
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