Lt. Col. Graham Williams, U.S. Army
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It would be an understatement to say that we’re in a disruptive period of time with technology. I think it’s going to disrupt everything we do
—Gen. James Rainey, Commanding General, U.S. Army Futures Command
The Time Is 0100/Execution Plus 21
I was woken up by a dim red light in my face.
“Hey, who’s this again?”
“Lt. Col. Bagby, deputy commander for second brigade,” I informed the NCO who was blinding me.
In a whisper, he replied, “Roger, sir. The next push forward will be at 0200. After that, who knows when we can move you to the front. Meet me outside one hour prior with your personal gear. Ensure there are no bright lights, no loud noises, and—“
I cut him off. “I got it. I’m tracking the procedures. See you then.” I sat up and put my head in my hands, annoyed because it was taking so long to link up with my unit, but I understood.
“Hey, sir,” a voice next to me whispered. “I came from second brigade. Are you the incoming deputy commander?”
I was assigned as the brigade deputy commander forward. Years ago, the Army realized that in the technologically advanced, logistically challenged, and contested electromagnetic environment for brigade combat teams, the commander needed a deputy with an array of backgrounds who needed to be forward deployed with the headquarters. In the rear, divisions were merging rear detachments into a consolidated battalion with a strong leader who was able to chapter, terminate service, and send soldiers to their next duty stations. As a result of this conflict, and coupled with low enlistment rates, there were rare exceptions of individuals not coming forward. Units needed everyone they could take.
“I am,” I reluctantly replied. “You headin’ in, or …?”
“Nah, heading home. Class 3 operational security (OPSEC) violation.”
I replied, “Well, OPSEC is no joke, it—”
He cut me off, “Yeah, I was dumb and made a stupid choice. Well, good luck, and always remember the Big Three.”
“I got it. Thanks.”
I knew the Big Three. It was the division commander’s guidance he had harped on for quite some time: unnecessary chatter will get you killed, unauthorized communication will get your buddy killed, and any unconcealed or uncamouflaged movement in the open will get all of us killed.
While I waited, I spent some time reflecting about the current environment of the Army. I thought about my previous twenty years and marveled at how things had changed, especially for this conflict.
Over many decades, the Army studied its adversaries just as it had studied us in previous engagements. During a critical time in its development, Army leadership realized it needed a fundamental shift in how it operated. They threw out the book and developed a significant shift in doctrine and tactics. This shift was influenced by low recruitment rates and ever-increasing technological advances with adversaries who could easily match our capabilities. The tempo of operations slowed down, and the focus shifted to setting the conditions at specific advantage points. Instead of headquarters attempting to dominate multiple domains concurrently, a phased approach emerged, whereby conditions were established one domain at a time to support maneuver. Conflict shifted to manpower and equipment preservation due to the amount of money and resources dedicated to each. Less important were the rapid advances of infantry elements against enemy armored columns.
The Brigade Main Command Post
Sometime later, we arrived at the brigade main command post. Or I thought we had. I saw and heard nothing as I followed the NCO into the woods. We were given a small, dedicated movement window, whereby electronic warfare obfuscation resources in and around the area of operations helped mask movements of personnel and equipment. These movements were usually under the cover of darkness.
As we were walking, the NCO stopped and let off a short infrared flash, which was returned with two flashes. The return flashes came from the ground near the base of a tree. We continued moving. As we walked past the position, I tried to adjust my eye piece and noticed a well-concealed fighting position in the ground.
The NCO stopped, took a knee, and began whispering, “Okay, so at the end of that tree line is a field. On the other side of the field, at the far edge, is an old farm. In and around the old farm is the brigade’s main command post Bravo. I will have someone take you over there when we are able to. Down this draw to our left is the brigade’s main command post Alpha. I’ll show you. Follow me.”
We walked down a heavily vegetated draw. As we approached, I couldn’t hear any signs of life. There was not the familiar hum of generators, no idling vehicles, and no one moving about. I could barely make out the presence of the command post. I noticed everything was covered in the ultralightweight camouflage screening that is undetectable from adversary multispectral sensors. Although they were effective, they were also incredibly expensive.
“Where are the vehicles and all the equipment?”
The NCO replied, “Only necessary items up front. Around the two command posts are mission critical items that can be dug in, concealed, or camouflaged. The remaining vehicles and equipment are further back and are on call during a movement window or if we go on an offensive.”
The NCO stopped and sent another infrared flash; we approached a black mass that turned out to be a maze of heavy nets and foliage. Finally, I emerged in an entryway with a green light in my face.
“Identification, please.”
I handed my identification to the sentry who went inside the tent flaps and came back a few minutes later. “He is vetted and approved for entry. Right through here please,” he said, as he held the flaps open.
The flaps opened into a dark tent. At the far side was a small light that illuminated a fieldstone doorway with a slightly ajar heavy metal door. There was little to no light or noise emitted from the inside. Soldiers whispered to each other from field desks and cargo boxes they used as workstations.
The NCO moved toward the bunker doorway and said, “This way, sir.” As we entered the opening, we descended an old rusty staircase with water dripping off the walls and there was a trace amount of light coming from the bottom of the stairwell.
The NCO informed me, “This is an old Soviet bunker from way back. Or maybe German … who knows. Down here is the operations part of the command post. I’ll take you to the brigade commander. The biggest pain about this place is using the bathroom. Make sure you never leave without your identification. Oh, and always remember the Big Three. A few rules to live by …”
Inside the bunker was the remainder of the brigade’s main command post. It was dimly lit with red and green lights with little movement around the room. In the center was a makeshift table with the staff scurrying about preparing to start a meeting. On the table was a large map with layers of acetate taped around it. There were no projector screens or large display monitors. Everything looked temporary and as if it was easy to load for a fast exfiltration.
A hand reached out. “Hey, sir, I’m the brigade executive officer, Gary. We are about to begin an update. I’ll introduce you to everyone shortly.”
I nodded.
The colonel stood up slowly, wheeled around, and stretched out his hand. “Glad you could finally come forward. For now, just listen and we can discuss after. Again, welcome.”
The Commander’s Update Brief
Everyone gathered around a small field table and the brigade executive officer leaned forward and touched a small black speaker puck on the table. As he did, it turned from red to green. He began, “All right, sir and team, we will begin the battlefield and commanders’ update for this evening. On the CENTRIX comms link, we have the local national partner force and advisor and main command post bravo with the sergeant major. Additionally, per your request, sir, we have representatives from the battalions listening in. I will remind everyone that we have a short comms window which includes this update and a comms blast that will arrive at the battalion command post shortly. So, to expedite this meeting, and in case of a compromise or indicators of compromise, our agenda goes from what the commander needs to hear in order of importance. The briefing order will be command and control, protection, logistics, intelligence, maneuver, fires, and so on. Sir, over to you for opening comments.”
The colonel leaned forward. “First, I want to welcome our new deputy commander who just arrived. He is an engineer and has experience in an array of units and a master’s degree in computer science. He will be a good addition to the team. Second is that we need to maximize the comms blasts for the protection of both you and us. I will have more comments at the end. Also, I want to hear about time first.”
The S-3 shot up. “Roger, sir. Today is execution plus twenty-three, and the current time is 0400. We are in phase two of the operation awaiting conditions set for phase three, which is still on order. We just received, and are currently transmitting, in comms blast number one of two for today. I am tracking the next blast will come at 0800 which is four hours from now. Additionally, as a reminder, the main command posts Alpha and Bravo have been in their current position for twenty-two hours. Our next proposed jump is templated for eight to ten hours from now. Pending any questions.”
The brigade commander stared at the maps and acetate layers in front of him. “Roger, let’s go to command and control next.”
From across the bunker a major turned away from a tablet and faced the audience. “Sorry, sir, I was just verifying a few things in the comms blast from division. For command and control, as the S-3 stated, no change to comms blasts timeline. As a reminder, these are intermittent, unpredictable and infrequent. Only interrupted urgent messages from division or to the battalions are allowed to break that window.
“No change to the PACE plan and CENTRIX is fully operational to division. We are currently gathering the high frequency radio checks from the battalions during the comms window and will have that report shortly. The subsequent comms blasts will include administrative encrypted messages, personal correspondences to the soldiers, and subsequent security encryption keys.”
The colonel piped up. “Let’s talk satellite link and I want to know immediately if we do not have contact from all of the battalions during this blast.”
The communication officer responded. “Sir, due to the constant threat of cyber penetration on the base terminals, division has requested support to harden the satellite terminals. This should come quickly since they can access them from a remote link from the states. Oh, and we ensured all of the communication PACE items are deconflicted with the emplaced SIRENS.”
OPSEC was mandatory training that no one took seriously and went by the wayside as units struggled to keep up the pace of garrison operations. This conflict changed all that.
The colonel looked over to another major standing in the background. “While we are on the topic, let’s talk SIRENS again. Protection is next.”
The major pushed forward and flipped some acetate overlays on the map on the table. “Sir, as a reminder, we have three SIRENS within our AO that were emplaced when the division cavalry swept through the area of operations three days ago. Their locations are marked in red.”
The colonel turned around toward me. “Jim, are you tracking what the SIRENS are?”
I replied, “I have heard of the concept but have not seen them in use, sir.”
The protection officer looked toward me. “So, these SIREN variants are solar powered radio frequency electronic intelligence emitters that use artificial intelligence that introduce fake traffic to flood the area. This includes traffic to crowd out electronic signatures in our area of operations.”
The colonel interrupted, “Yeah and they are expensive and there are not a lot of them. That is why we have them near the companies to help protect them. They are designed to be set it and forget it, but we all know how that goes. Please continue.”
The protection officer continued, “Sir, you had asked about engineering and dig assets for the battalion command posts. Unfortunately, we do not have any dedicated blade time since they are a critical asset. Division is hesitant to push them forward.”
Looking frustrated, the colonel placed his head in his hands.
Before I came to the front, I was aware of the issue with engineer assets. Engineer capabilities such as bridging and dig assets were constantly the bill payer for Army downsizing. For years we operated under the assumption that the brigades would be too mobile to require these capabilities, and it would be easy to contract local national assets. Little did we anticipate that our tactics would change. Especially now as units sat in a prolonged defensive posture under imminent threat from drone strikes and long-range artillery.
Sensing the colonel’s frustration but unable to overcome the urge to speak, the protection officer said, “A few more things, sir. There is no change to the protected asset list. The TITAN is number one and the modular-acquisition cueing and effector counter UAS is number two. Intel will talk more about the TITAN.”
“Putting on my OPSEC hat,” he said flippantly, “I have a lot more guidance from division that we will disseminate to the units.”
OPSEC rapidly became the division commander’s number one priority. It was a significant shift in how the Army operated. In the past, OPSEC was mandatory training that no one took seriously and went by the wayside as units struggled to keep up the pace of garrison operations. This conflict changed all that. It started when the Army public affairs openly announced that we were mobilizing. The division’s webpage was instantly defaced and subsequently taken offline.
Gray and Blackhat hackers were easily able to gain access to the units’ portal pages that became a repository for continuity and information. The units rarely operated off secure terminals, so almost all the mobilization plans were on unclassified enclaves. The desire for planners to operate on a classified medium was minimal due to the lack of available tablets. The result was a significant breach of these systems and hackers using the information against the division on social media platforms. Additionally, some of the senior members had social media accounts that were hacked. Hacktivists flooded these accounts with unsavory information that embarrassed the units. Having had enough, and frustrated with the distraction during mobilization, the division commander developed an unpopular communication blackout program. He was quoted as saying, “For years we openly announce each play we make … not anymore.”
The division commander’s rabid insistence on OPSEC didn’t end there. He was a veteran of operating in Poland years ago and understood the importance of countermeasures, protecting critical information, and masking movement and communications while deployed. He developed the “Big Three” and put out a message that any unauthorized personal correspondence while mobilized would have legal implications.
The colonel broke the silence. “One of my biggest concerns is sustainment.”
I perked up.
He continued, “If we are asked to conduct an offensive, I don’t believe we can sustain momentum for more than two days or thirty kilometers. With the brigade logistics node being so far back and out of range from artillery, where are we at with forward cache placement?”
A voice on the comms puck chimed in. “Sir, sustainment here. The forward cache placement has been slow due to the lack of movement windows. I have an assessment of where the battalions are at supply wise. Also, we projected forward forage sites for things such as water and fuel. Honestly, what is slowing us down is not being able to use large convoys for pushes forward.”
“Understood. Send your overlays to the deputy commander and link up with him on the next comms window,” the colonel instructed.
I nodded in agreement.
“INTEL, you’re up,” The executive officer pointed at the intelligence officer.
“Just a few intel updates, sir. First is tactical intelligence targeting access node ground station, or TITAN as we commonly refer to it. Its current location is here between the first and second battalions,” he said as he pointed to the map.
“We are having varying success with signals intelligence collection with the TITAN, and with a lack of airborne intelligence collection assets airborne, there is not a lot to analyze. Additionally, our analysts have not been trained on maintenance of the system with regards to the computers and sensors. There is one civilian contractor who does this for the brigade, but he is not allowed to come forward due to safety reasons. The bottom line is if a system within the guts of the TITAN becomes nonoperational, there is little we can do to fix it, and the system would have to be evacuated to the rear. However, each company has a terrestrial layer systems manpack and operator from the electronic warfare company. So as enemy assets move closer to the defensive positions, they should pick up indicators and warning.”
The intelligence officer continued, “As for recent enemy events, north of our AO is the local national defense force in a similar defensive posture as us. At dusk yesterday, they noticed a sharp spike then a drop in signals intelligence collection. Concurrently, local nationals began moving toward the defensive lines with what I assess as either a diversion or a reconnaissance element. Then, the report states that three to four smaller drones were heard moving rapidly over the positions. Then there was about a platoon’s worth of motorcycles and ATVs we observed circling their perimeter. The headquarters soon lost contact with their subordinate units. Shortly after, a weaponized Lancet drone discovered a company headquarters and detonated over the top of it. We are not sure of the casualties currently. I assess that they thought the company headquarters was the battalion headquarters. We conducted some predictive analysis to see if this sort of enemy action could happen in our AO. As of right now, it does not seem likely with a twenty-two percent prediction rate.”
The intelligence warrant officer interjected, “A few things to highlight as well, sir. We assess that this is the preliminary stages of future operations and that this iteration did not use long-range artillery to preserve this asset for future use. Additionally, the local national defense force does not have the equipment or the protection mindset that we have in our defensive posture.”
The brigade commander cut him off. He tapped on the comms puck to speak, “For the advisor on the line, who is the local national representative?”
A voice chimed in from the line, “Hey, sir, Rob here. We have their brigade executive officer on the line.”
“Why is the commander not on?” inquired the colonel.
The advisor exclaimed, “Well, sir, he is still going through our vetting process and so we cannot allow him into our command post.”
The colonel seemed frustrated. “How the hell and I supposed to work with him if our vetting process doesn’t allow him to work with us? This defies logic and he, more than anyone, probably knows what happened up north yesterday! Can you translate to their XO?”
“Roger, sir,” the advisor hesitantly replied.
The colonel asked, “What’s the limiting factor for the dismounted terrestrial layer systems manpacks?”
The intelligence officer replied, “Range, sir. They are limited to line of sight and when the companies are dug in, they extend even less.”
“Let’s wrap this up since our comms window is closing. Maneuver, give me the highlights.”
A major sitting next to the colonel spoke up. “Sir, no change to operations in the last twelve hours. Prior to this update, first battalion conducted their relocation after the OPSEC breach that potentially cued enemy forces to their location. They have dug into their new location. No change to the status of aviation and tasks to maneuver units.
“Right now, we are getting portions of the division’s order and accompanying instruction messages that have the next phase of the operation, which is the on order for us to attack. As for the staff here, this next phase, if called upon, is a little different than what we are used to. Just think of it as the division setting the conditions in the noncontiguous brigade area of operations. They do this by owning one domain at a time to set the conditions. Once we transition to the offense, and achieve our goals, we immediately switch back to a defensive posture.
“No change to planning priorities for the first reserve sir. We conducted some predictive scenario analysis and saw that losing communications with an adjacent unit as a likely scenario. Therefore, we developed a plan to have a second reserve, comprised of scouts, to locate and maintain communications with adjacent units if they don’t respond during the communication window.”
“Fires, you’re next,” the colonel barked. We sensed his desire to end the update.
“Sir, only a few updates. The remaining 120-millimeter mortar section from second battalion finally made it to the position area for artillery. There are six artillery positions in our AO for when offensive operations kick off. They are templated on your overlay. Currently, only one battery of long-range artillery is in position to support the brigade. The remainder are out of range in a concealed staging area waiting to scoot and shoot. More specifically, they will set up, engage enemy targets, and move to a covered and concealed position. Division also integrated the local national artillery elements into their planning, and we have one forward artillery firing point that could potentially support our AO if required. But this depends on communication limitations between us and them.”
“All right, here is my guidance from this update,” the colonel said, looking at a note card he had been scribbling on during the briefing.
“S-3, intel, and fires. I want you all to work on a course of action for when a battalion is engaged in a similar manner to that INTEL briefed. What is our action to support the battalions? Include with this a risk assessment of sending the reserve or a similar element to engage and protect their defensive flanks. Each battalion has critical assets within their defensive AOs that they protect. This leads me to my next point.
“Protection. I want you, maneuver, and fires to develop a common operational picture of our AO to include the critical assets we are protecting. Again, I need to see the risk associated with actions to protect these systems.”
He continued, “S-3. I want you, command and control, and the deputy commander to find out what cyber defense support we have dedicated to protecting our command-and-control equipment. This includes fires and acquisition systems and the TITAN. My guess is that probing attack will be followed up by information dominance attacks. The enemy’s goal will be to disrupt our command-and-control systems and follow this up with long-range artillery fire.
“Lastly, team. We need to determine and assess what our common operating system will be to disseminate to the battalions. As for right now we are old school using acetate that we deliver when we have a movement window. Is it too risky to send via digital means? As for now, I want to use the remainder of the comms window to engage the battalion commanders. Let me know what questions you have.”
The staff was silent, and the meeting broke up.
----
A while later, after talking to the colonel and some of the staff, I took in the environment of the main command post Alpha. It was different than some of the older officers and NCOs were used to. There were no frills and no unnecessary electrical equipment that would drain electrical resources. Personnel manning the command post slept where they worked and were becoming comfortable with being uncomfortable. Everything was carefully thought through. Communication systems were simple and light, and the infrastructure was easily broken down and rapidly packed away. Our power generation was advanced. We utilized a combination of low-noise generators that used solar panels during the day and a litany of fuel types. Briefing methods were simple and tailored to the commander. All these things were necessary for survivability.
I sat studying the map and acetate layers when an officer approached the table with a frantic look on his face.
“Sir, there is an urgent message from division,” he stated.
I was shocked. I replied, “Outside of the comms window?”
“Yes, sir. They want to speak to you or the commander right now,” he replied.
I rushed over to the tablet and connected the link. On the other end was a colonel from the division staff.
The voice was cracking at first due to a bad link but then started to clear up. “This is Col. Brady, the G-3 operations officer. We have a validated report that there is an incoming probing attack within your AO templated within the next twelve hours. Take all necessary survivability precautions. Report outside of the comms window and update ONLY if events are per the commander’s critical information requirements. If not, wait until the next comms window. The assessment is coming through now. Acknowledge, over.”
“Roger, sir, acknowledged,” I replied, and the link terminated.
I began reading the assessment as it came through. I quickly instructed the officer to wake the commander.
FLASH TRAFFIC
MESSAGE TYPE: URGENT
Destination: COMMAND POST ALPHA, 1ST BRIGADE.
COMMENT: BE ADVISED, POSSIBLE ENEMY PROBING ATTACK WITHIN YOUR AO EXPECTED WITHIN THE NEXT 12 HOURS. ATTACK IS PREDICTED TO INVOLVE KAMIKAZE DRONE, DISMOUNTED MANEUVER ELEMENTS, AND MOBILE ENEMY STRIKE ELEMENTS. ENEMY ATTACK PURPOSE AND STAGING AREAS ARE UNKNOWN. TAKE ALL NECESSARY PROTECTION ACTIONS AND REPORT USING CCIR 2.1. BREAKING OF COMMUNICATION WINDOW IS AUTHORIZED FOR CCIR REPORTING AND FIRE SUPPORT. ACKNOWLEDGE. END COMMUNICATIONS.
The Time Is 0445/Execution Plus 23
To be continued …
Note 
Lt. Col. Graham Williams, U.S. Army, is a former infantry officer turned cyber officer who works as a J-35 planner in the Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber (Army). His assignments include the 101st Airborne Division, 10th Mountain Division, and the 4th Infantry Division. He also worked as a J-35 planner at U.S. Cyber Command.
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