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Balancing Competing Realities

The Central Asian Republics’ Reaction to Russia’s Ukraine Invasion

 

Edward A. Lynch, PhD
Corabeth R. Pierce

 

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Since the end of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan in 2021, the United States has largely absented itself from Central Asia. This is ill-advised. The region remains important to U.S. national interests. It could well become the focus of confrontation between the United States and either China or Russia (or both). Central Asia contains extensive energy resources and straddles the Caspian Sea region, which has just become important to the United States with the recent peace deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the reservation of the Zangezur Corridor for the exclusive use of the United States.

In addition, the Central Asian republics (CAR) are the subject of intense diplomatic pressure from Russia and China to expand their relations with the two Asian superpowers and exclude the United States from the region. Their foreign relations are also of great interest to both Iran and Türkiye. These two aspiring global players often have goals and interests at odds with those of the United States and they look to Central Asia as a place where they might advance those interests. Iran, for example, purchases drones from Tajikistan. The region bears watching by U.S. policymakers.

At the start of this decade, Russian President Vladimir Putin made a concerted effort to downplay his country’s ties with Europe and begin a “turn to the East.”¹ The policy was designed to create a Eurasian security zone that would rival, and perhaps supersede, the NATO alliance. However, Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, which launched the largest and deadliest war in Europe since World War II, has largely derailed Putin’s diplomatic offensive in Asia. Evidence for this was revealed at the Fifth Central Asian Conference in March 2025. One report states, “While participants from Russia spoke of ideologies and cultural differences between the West and the ‘global South,’ Central Asian representatives wanted to talk about the hard realities of security and economics.”²

Putin’s stated intention of rebuilding the Soviet Union by annexing part or all of the fourteen non-Russian republics to emerge from the communist giant’s dissolution made responding to the Ukraine crisis particularly crucial to those non-Russian successor states, especially the five CARs (see the map). The Central Asian nations, however, found their range of possible responses severely limited. To varying degrees, all five nations depend upon reasonably smooth relations with Russia for their economic and political well-being. Russia is a major trading partner with all five CARs, but it is also an omnipresent threat, given the enormous power differential between Russia and any one of its Central Asian neighbors.

At the same time, the CARs also face pressure from both the United States and the People’s Republic of China. During the Biden administration, the United States insisted the Central Asian republics show solidarity with Ukraine and condemn the Russian invasion in the strongest possible terms and then follow up by joining the sanctions regime Biden was constructing. China, for its part, pressed for a milder response, based on its complex relationship with Russia and on China’s desire for peace and stability in those parts of Asia central to the country’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).³

The extensive literature on the position of smaller and weaker states in the international community focuses on the limited choices available to meet their foreign policy objectives.⁴ Unless unusually wealthy, weaker states face considerable difficulties in meeting their security challenges. The challenge for small states is all the greater when stronger states are nearby, when the leadership of neighboring powers is demonstrably aggressive, and when the small states possess assets (such as natural resources or strategic locations) that the more powerful nations desire. Small nations are even more challenged when sharing a region with two mutually antagonistic great powers, such as the small oil-rich nations of the Gulf region in the Middle East who find themselves between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This is almost the exact status of the CARs, depending on how well Russia and China are getting along at any given moment.

The dilemmas faced by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan in responding to Russia’s ongoing military actions in Ukraine are illustrative of the dangers and difficulties faced by smaller, weaker nations when they willingly or unwillingly play a part on the world stage. This article examines the foreign policy options of small states and applies those options to the reactions of the CARs to the Ukrainian crisis.

Global strategic theorist Nicholas Spykman contended that a small state “does not live because of its strength but because nobody wants its territory or because its preservation as a buffer state or as a weight in the balance of power is of interest to a stronger nation. When the balance disappears, the small state usually disappears with it.”⁵ As one expert puts it, weak states “necessarily adopt one of two approaches: either the state comes under the wing of a great power in a ‘bandwagoning’ relationship in order to protect itself against local threats; or it enters into alliances with other states to take on the threats posed by a stronger power, a strategy known as ‘balancing.’”⁶ Either way, small states largely lose control of their own destiny.

With the end of the Cold War, however, small states found their choices expanded as an American-dominated, rules-based regime emerged. The United States became the world’s sole superpower, outwardly committed to international law and the peaceful settlement of disputes. American dominance, however, did not eliminate aggressive behavior. After Russia annexed portions of Georgia in 2008 with no significant negative repercussions, aggression toward the CARs became a distinct possibility. At the same time, the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan meant vastly increased American attention to Central Asia. Assertive Chinese diplomacy in Central Asia began even before the BRI. In a relatively short time, the CARs had to cope with three major powers determined to pursue their own goals in the region.

Weak states like the CARs must make constant shifts in their foreign policy to counter the constantly shifting interests of the more powerful states. Navigating these dangerous waters requires vigilance, agility, and constant adjustments along a variety of power vectors. The breakdown of the rules-based regime has been accompanied by an almost ferocious quest for resources, trade opportunities, and strategic positioning. With a major international crisis involving a neighboring superpower, such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine, adroit foreign policy making takes on even greater urgency.

Since February 2022, the CARs have acted within a limited range of options. They are allies of Russia but struggle to maintain a neutral stance on Ukraine. They must not be seen as too close to Russia, since this identification could mean Western sanctions. At the same time, if Russia is victorious, it could prompt Putin to dream of a “greater Russia” through the invasion of other former Soviet republics. Conversely, the possibility of even more dire consequences should Putin be humiliated cannot be discounted.⁷ While dealing with this unpleasant reality, the CARs also face pressure from China to join the BRI and from the United States to condemn Putin for the invasion of Ukraine.

Central Asia Responds to War

Limited room to maneuver. Kazakhstan, with the highest Russian population of the five CARs, has long feared becoming the next target of Russia’s military focus. After the 2014 Crimean crisis, some experts speculated that Kazakhstan might become the next target of Russian attacks.⁸ Putin’s claim that persecuted Russian speakers in Ukraine needed rescuing was particularly ominous for Kazakhstan. The country’s commercial and financial relationships with Russia are extensive and one-sided in Russia’s favor. The trade turnover between Russia and Kazakhstan reached $28 billion in 2024. Shipments from Russia to Kazakhstan increased by 4.9 percent. Over the past four years, mutual trade between the two countries has increased 1.5 times.⁹ This imbalance demonstrates how completely Kazakhstan relies on Russian trade, Russian goods, and a healthy Russian economy.

Kyrgyzstan has a similarly complex relationship with Moscow. The country’s trade and financial systems are tightly bound with Russia’s, but Kyrgyz leaders realize there is no future as a genuinely independent country if this situation continues. Russia has not always been a reliable or cooperative patron. When interethnic clashes broke out in southern Kyrgyzstan in 2010, Putin refused to get involved despite treaty obligations. Russia also did not take any significant steps to forestall the 2021 and 2022 border clashes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In response, Kyrgyzstan refused to host an annual Collective Security Treaty Organization military exercise in 2022.¹⁰

Although Tajikistan is culturally and linguistically closer to Iran than Russia, its economy features the highest degree of dependence on the Russian economy of all the CARs. More than one-fifth of all currency in Tajikistan comes from Russia, received through the exports of goods, services, and investments.¹¹ Additionally, one-third of Tajikistan’s imports come from Russia. Tajikistan is dependent on remittances from one million Tajik expats working in Russia. The Asian Development Bank noted that during the first five months of 2022, remittances from Russia to Tajikistan have declined by 10 percent compared to the same period in 2021.¹² These remittances account for over 30 percent of Tajikistan’s GDP.¹³ As a result, for nine months of 2022, the growth of the Tajik economy slowed from 8.9 percent to 7.8 percent compared to the same period of 2021.¹⁴ The volume of capital investments decreased by 20 percent, and a reduction in the production of flour, aluminum, and cement also occurred.¹⁵

Turkmenistan is the most economically and diplomatically isolated of the Central Asian Republics. Turkmen officials describe the country’s foreign policy as one of “permanent neutrality.”¹⁶ Like the other CARs, however, Turkmenistan’s economy is closely linked to Russia’s. It was Soviet geologists and engineers who discovered and exploited the country’s rich oil and natural gas resources, making the former Soviet republic an integral part of the Soviet energy system. Soviet trade officials managed exports of Turkmen oil and gas to nations outside the USSR.¹⁷ In November 2022, Russian authorities began talking about a potential “Triple Gas Union” that would include Russia, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. Turkmenistan was not invited to participate, even though it produces as much natural gas as Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan combined.¹⁸

Of all the CARs, Uzbekistan has the least room to maneuver, given the broad, deep economic ties it shares with Russia. At a press conference in September 2023, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin said simply, “Russia occupies first place in foreign trade with Uzbekistan.”¹⁹ Officials at the meeting listed fifteen areas of cooperation. They noted that mutual trade increased 25 percent from 2022 to 2023. Almost three thousand enterprises with Russian capital operate in this Central Asian Republic. Russia is sponsoring the creation of a natural gas processing complex near one Uzbek gas field and is investing in the development of at least two new fields.²⁰

In September 2022, the Office of the President of Uzbekistan released a statement titled “Bilateral Relations Between Russia and Uzbekistan Reached the Level of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.” The release stated, “The [2022] Samarkand Declaration stipulates the development of cooperation in many specific areas: political, trade, economic, nuclear energy, transport, cultural, humanitarian and other fields. In total, the legal framework between Uzbekistan and Russia includes more than 350 documents.”²¹ Even three years into the war in Ukraine, mutual trade still increased by over 5 percent, with the largest growth in the agricultural sector.²²

Thus, as the Russian tanks rolled into Ukraine, none of the CARs found themselves in a position to alienate Putin by responding forcefully, and negatively, to the invasion. At the same time, Putin is likely to interpret silence and inaction as acquiescence. Since none of the CARs has any reason to believe that either China or the United States will come to their aid if opposition to the Ukraine invasion leads to reprisals from Russia, their responses were understandably muted and tentative.

Responses to the Russian invasion. For Kazakhstan, there was no easy way to separate themselves from Russia, or even to forthrightly condemn Russian aggression, without risk of becoming the next Ukraine. Even mild actions by Kazakhstan were risky. In a United Nations resolution adopted in October 2022, there was a demand that Russia “immediately, completely, and unconditionally withdraw” from Ukraine.²³ Thirty-five nations abstained. Notably, Kazakhstan was one of them. While the abstention may not seem like a particularly courageous response, it still brought some peril because it signaled Kazakhstan is definitively not in favor of Russia’s position in Ukraine.

Upon the onset of the war in Ukraine, Kazakhstan’s embassy in Kyiv evacuated its citizens and closed its consulate. Once Kazakh citizens had been evacuated, Kazakhstan immediately looked for alternative trading partners. The country’s commercial and financial relationships with Russia were still extensive and one-sided in Russia’s favor. As noted, imports from Russia accounted for nearly half of Kazakhstan’s trade in 2021. When the United States and others imposed sanctions on Russia, for all intents and purposes, it also sanctioned Kazakhstan.

The economic and financial impact of the invasion on Kyrgyzstan has been severe. Western-imposed economic sanctions on Russian firms and government entities have hurt enterprises in Kyrgyzstan more than in Russia itself.²⁴ The country has sought World Bank funding to assist small and medium businesses overcome the shock of the sanctions regime.²⁵ At the same time, the sanctions have provided an opportunity for Kyrgyzstan. Since the invasion, the number of firms in Kyrgyzstan doing import-export business with Russia has grown. Senior U.S. officials allege that sanctioned weapons and other goods, from drones to rifle scopes, arrive in Kyrgyzstan and are shipped overland to Russia. Even U.S.-made computer chips and lasers have made their way to Russia via Kyrgyzstan.²⁶ German exports to Kyrgyzstan, for example, have surged nearly 1,000 percent since the start of the Ukraine conflict. Such enormous increases in illicit trade have meant large profits for Kyrgyz businessmen but have also resulted in the United States and others extending the sanctions to include firms in Kyrgyzstan.²⁷

Kyrgyzstan has also witnessed a flood of refugees from Russia, made up largely of those protesting the war or eager to avoid being drafted to fight in it. Those arriving in Kyrgyzstan are, for the most part, highly educated and skilled.²⁸ While Kyrgyz officials may welcome an influx of talented newcomers eager to make a new life in Central Asia, each Russian who crosses the border and takes up residence adds to Kyrgyzstan’s Russian population and draws more unwelcome attention from Putin.

Kyrgyzstan has responded to the Ukraine crisis and its complex status with Russia by pursuing a foreign policy that seeks safety by adding even more complexity. The country has sought to expand and deepen its ties with the world’s two other superpowers and with regional powers such as Türkiye while not burning any bridges with Russia. At times, this balancing has imposed potential costs such as trading dependence on Russia for dependence on China and actual costs such as being included in the U.S. sanctions regime.

Just before the war, Tajikistan and Ukraine were in serious talks aimed at increasing trade and cooperation. At the end of 2021, Tajik Ambassador to Ukraine Davlatali Nazirzoda met with Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister Dmitri Senik in Kyiv. The two officials discussed the resumption of direct air service between Dushanbe and Kyiv.²⁹ By August 2023, Foreign Minister Sirodjiddin Muhriddin was telling reporters Tajikistan was actively working to strengthen trade and economic ties with Russia. He added that the current situation “should not have a negative impact on political relations between Tajikistan and Russia. Our relations with strategic partners, including Russia, do not depend on external circumstances. We are developing these relations consistently, logically, exclusively taking into account the national interests of our country.”³⁰

One of the more urgent and vexing issues for Tajikistan has been the status of Tajiks trapped in Ukraine at the start of the war. Thousands fled to Poland, Moldova, or Russia itself. In many cases, these Tajiks became stateless, either because their passports were still being held by their Russian employers, or because they had been forced to fight for Russia. Thousands of Tajiks received Russian citizenship for the improved employment opportunities it brings. As the war with Ukraine became prolonged, Russia drafted many of these new Russian citizens into its armed forces and sent them to Ukraine. Tajikistan has strict laws against taking part in a war to which Tajikistan is not a party. Russia has also put pressure on Tajikistan to promise that Ukraine would not get access to about one hundred U.S. military aircraft, mostly helicopters, that Afghan pilots flew to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan during the final chaotic days in Kabul in August 2021.³¹

Turkmenistan’s first response to the Russian invasion was no response at all. As other CARs abstained on the UN resolution condemning Russia, Turkmenistan did not vote at all.³² In April, Turkmen President Berdimuhamedow issued a press release calling for “stepped up interaction with Russia at the governmental level and continuing efforts to promote direct contacts between business communities.”³³ In June, Turkmenistan’s largest communications operator said that “it was working to organize a backup broadcast to restore two Russian television channels.”³⁴

The Western sanctions imposed on Russia are an opportunity for Turkmenistan. Sanctions on Russia disrupted travel at many Russian border crossings and forced China and the European Union (EU) to seek alternate routes into Russia. Turkmen authorities immediately recognized an opportunity and the country reopened its borders soon after the invasion.³⁵ Some press accounts describe Turkmenistan’s role as a sanctions-evading partner of Russia, delivering aircraft parts from Western firms to Russia.³⁶ By the end of 2022, months into the war, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development reported that Turkmenistan’s real GDP was likely to grow by 7 percent in 2022 and by an additional 6 percent in 2023.³⁷ The country welcomed thousands of Russian-speaking businesspeople seeking to evade international sanctions on Russia by relocating to Turkmenistan.³⁸

Turkmenistan has also helped Russia with military manpower, albeit indirectly. It has allowed Wagner, a private Russian military concern, to recruit convicts from Turkmen prisons.³⁹ At the same time, sanctions on Russia and the uncertainty of trade following the invasion have significantly increased the cost of basic foodstuffs such as bread and cooking oil in Turkmenistan. The nation has also imposed strict rationing.⁴⁰

As noted, Uzbekistan has the most to lose from a break with Russia over the invasion of Ukraine. Thus, the country has been cautious and balanced in its response. Like its neighbors, Uzbekistan abstained from the UN resolution condemning the invasion. The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry has pointedly reminded the world that the country supports the territorial integrity of Ukraine and does not recognize the independence of Luhansk or Donetsk, the two Ukrainian provinces Putin wishes to annex. Uzbekistan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdulaziz Kamilov insists his country would like to see Crimea restored to Ukraine. At the same time, Uzbekistan voted against a UN General Assembly resolution excluding Russia from the UN Human Rights Council.⁴¹

Uzbekistan has sought to placate Russia by allowing only limited and brief antiwar protests in Tashkent and other Uzbek cities. (Protests of any kind require government permission.) However, it has displayed the blue and yellow Ukrainian flag at government buildings, and at the same time, the country has cracked down on displays of the letter Z, which has become a symbol of prowar sentiment in Russia. Uzbekistan has also taken a firm stance against Uzbeks joining the fighting in Ukraine. In some cases, returning soldiers have been imprisoned. The collection of relief supplies has been permitted, especially as the war in Ukraine has dragged on and images of suffering Ukrainians have become inescapable.⁴²

Other Options for Central Asian Nations

Outside powers have sought to take advantage of the diplomatic and economic upheaval in Central Asia. The superpowers’ interest has, in some cases, meant potential advantages for the CARs. For example, Central Asian leaders perceive opportunities in expanding overland trade links through the vast region. One expert noted that while the EU closed its land borders to Russian trade, “for every kilometer of border Russia has had closed to the West, it has 4.5 kilometers to replace it in the East.”⁴³ Land routes have the advantage of being almost impervious to American economic sanctions since the bulk of America’s enforcement power is on the world’s oceans. Trade between Tajikistan and Kazakhstan has significantly increased over the past two years, with the exchange of goods surpassing $1 billion.⁴⁴ Kazakhstan has become Tajikistan’s most important trading partner after Russia. This increase comes even though Tajikistan and Kazakhstan do not share a border.⁴⁵

China, already heavily involved in Central Asia through its BRI, took advantage of the disastrous U.S. pullout from Afghanistan to offer to build a military base near the Tajik-Afghan border.⁴⁶ Tajikistan signed an agreement with China’s Dong Ying Heli Investment and Development Company to construct an oil refinery in the Fez Danghara in 2014. Construction of the oil refinery with a reported annual capacity to process 1.2 million tons of oil commenced the same year. As elsewhere in the BRI corridors, reality has not matched promise. Only two small oil refineries with a total capacity of 150,000 tons operate in Tajikistan, and they are not operating at full capacity.⁴⁷

China has also exploited Kyrgyzstan’s efforts to balance its dependence on Russia by offering closer ties to the People’s Republic. Among other gestures, Kyrgyzstan has allowed China to open twenty-two Confucius Centers to promote the Chinese language and extend the reach of Chinese cultural outreach.⁴⁸ Such soft-power initiatives are especially important in Kyrgyzstan, which borders the fractious Chinese region of Xinjiang, home to tens of thousands of restive Uyghur citizens.⁴⁹

Chinese President Xi Jinping has pledged support for Kyrgyzstan against Russian threats.⁵⁰ Xi followed up this pledge with more specific promises of billions of dollars in financing and assistance to the CARs as part of a larger security and defense plan for the region. Significantly, Xi made the pledge in Xian, the historic terminus of the Silk Road.⁵¹ Just weeks after the war started, Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe visited Turkmenistan. Wei stressed the importance of resisting Western-imposed sanctions on Russia and its trading partners. An independent Russian expert said China was offering the help to “ensure the stability of Chinese initiatives in Ashgabat, ranging from oil and gas transit to infrastructure and economic development.”⁵² The Turkmen president signed a series of partnership agreements while attending meetings in China in January 2023. Xi also hosted a summit with all the Central Asia presidents in May of that same year.

Iran also sees opportunities for closer relations in the region, especially with Tajikistan. The Islamic Republic focuses on the linguistic and cultural affinity between the two Persian-language countries.⁵³ As early as 2005, Tajik President Emomali Rahmon declared, “The real question should be what steps must be undertaken to make the partnership between Dushanbe and Tehran even more fruitful.”⁵⁴ At the same time, Rahmon believes Tajikistan has more reason to fear Iran-sponsored radical Islam than reason to welcome the limited options Iran might have to offer. Consequently, Tajikistan’s partnership with Iran has been limited to relatively innocuous matters like pressing for Iran’s membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Tajik officials have requested Iranian support for the country’s ongoing border dispute with Uzbekistan, an issue in which Iranian officials have little interest.

Kyrgyzstan has looked in many directions for economic and diplomatic options. The country helped launch the Russian-dominated Eurasian Economic Union. While still a member of that union, Kyrgyzstan has accepted massive assistance from China and signed agreements to begin or continue other BRI infrastructure projects in Kyrgyzstan.⁵⁵ Kyrgyz officials are eager to hasten the construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway, which will provide an alternate trade route between China and Europe via Central Asia, bypassing Russia completely. Kyrgyzstan’s president boasted, “The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway will link us to the Asia-Pacific countries, paving the way for new economic activities.”⁵⁶

The United States has some links with the CARs, though they are not as strong as China’s. For example, Tajikistan provided refueling facilities at Dushanbe airport to American and coalition aircraft during Operation Enduring Freedom. Emblematic of the balancing act Tajikistan has to perform, the country provided a permanent base to Russia’s 201st Motorized Infantry Division in October 2004 while simultaneously hosting U.S. military aircraft. This base is also located in Dushanbe.⁵⁷

Kyrgyzstan made the most significant commitment to assisting the United States after the attack of September 11. The country opened the Manas Air Force Base to U.S. and allied forces and permitted overflights by military aircraft. American officials noted the crucial nature of Kyrgyzstan’s assistance in the war in Afghanistan. But Kyrgyzstan also opened the Kant Air Force Base to the Russians two years later.⁵⁸ Under pressure from Russia, Kyrgyzstan closed Manas to American personnel in 2014. The United States is urging Kyrgyzstan to sign a new bilateral cooperation agreement.⁵⁹ Kyrgyz officials, for their part, stalled the agreement repeatedly, even going to the lengths of inviting U.S. Central Command Gen. Michael Erik Kurilla to the former U.S. base at Manas and then not sending anyone to the airport to meet him.⁶⁰

The American overtures have caused considerable worry. In March 2023, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken met with the foreign ministers of all five CARs, reassuring his counterparts that the U.S. administration is aware of their awkward relationship with Russia. Kyrgyzstan’s president stated baldly that signing a new agreement with the United States “would be perceived in Moscow as a ‘stab in the back and they would be right.’”⁶¹ The most likely form of retaliation would be making life more difficult for Kyrgyz migrant workers in Russia. At the same time, CARs have doubts about the depth and seriousness of the American commitment, especially after the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan.

A Kyrgyz expert noted the CARs need to see a larger-scale U.S. economic investment in the region to “illustrate that the U.S. is fully present.”⁶² A September 2022 congressional hearing in Washington unveiled U.S. priorities in the region, all of which are clearly designed to benefit the CARs and attract them into the U.S. orbit. A top State Department official said the United States wishes to be a “reliable partner” that will “support the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence” of the CARs.⁶³ America will also work to counter China, strengthen counterterrorism efforts, and “encourage pathways that reduce the region’s economic dependence on Russia and China.”⁶⁴

The U.S.-led sanctions regime has also prompted Russia to turn toward Asian oil and gas markets and to make oil-gas swap agreements with Iran with hopes that the deal would mean sales of 20 billion cubic meters to Iran.⁶⁵ An Iranian academic pointed out, “Since Iran and Russia do not have a common land border, gas must be swapped from two routes, namely Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in Central Asia and Azerbaijan in the Caucasus.”⁶⁶ Turkmen officials have also promoted the potential of a planned north-south corridor through Iran.

Turkmenistan’s relationship with Türkiye has also gotten closer. Disruption of natural gas supplies to Europe from Russia prompted Turkish President Tayyip Erdoğan to make his country the main transit point for Turkmen gas coming to Europe. The Turkish parliament speaker visited Ashgabat in November 2022 to discuss the matter. He called Turkish-Turkmen cooperation a promising partnership and added, “All relevant organizations are ready to work together, especially for the transportation of Turkmenistan’s natural gas to Türkiye and to Western markets via Türkiye.”⁶⁷

In February 2025, Turkmenistan announced a major sale of natural gas to Türkiye. Perhaps in response, Mustafa Şentop, the speaker of the Turkish Parliament, offered Turkmenistan membership in the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic-Speaking Countries one month later.⁶⁸ One expert insisted the move was part of a larger Turkish effort to increase its visibility and ties in the region while Russia (and much of the rest of the world) is distracted by the war in Ukraine. Turkmenistan already had observer status in the Organization of Turkic States.⁶⁹

Aware of the restiveness in Central Asia since the Ukraine operation began, Putin himself visited all five CARs in March 2023.⁷⁰ Even two years after the sanctions were imposed, the Russian supply of drones and U.S.-made computer chips was increasing as China and the CARs, especially Kyrgyzstan, cooperated to circumvent the sanctions regime. Kyrgyz officials hope the underground cooperation will divert Putin’s attention away from Kyrgyzstan as a potential target, should he succeed in annexing parts of Ukraine.⁷¹ Its fellow CARs walk a similarly dangerous tightrope with similar hopes of diverting Russia’s attention elsewhere.

Conclusion

Few nations in the world have the security and foreign policy challenges the CARs face every day. Relatively weak and poor, they face pressures from not one, but three superpowers, all of which have goals for the region that threaten the CARs’ autonomy and independence. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has brought these challenges into stark relief. To varying degrees, all five Central Asian nations are economically dependent on Russia. Some, like Kazakhstan, have long, porous borders and Russian populations that Putin can use as an excuse for even greater pressure, including the threat of invasion.

At the same time, the United States exerted its own pressure on the CARs to join in global economic sanctions to punish Russia for the Ukraine invasion. China has its own interest in the region, coveting the CARs hydrocarbon resources and looking to extend Chinese influence through the BRI. Other nations, such as Iran and Türkiye, use cultural and/or linguistic links to assert their own presence in Central Asia. Even the geographically distant EU believes the CARs’ diplomatic predicament represents an opportunity to extend EU influence.

The CARs have responded to this immense set of challenges by adopting classic small-state responses in their dealings with richer, more powerful nations and coalitions. The Central Asian nations have walked a tightrope diplomatically, avoiding provocative condemnations of Russia’s invasion while endeavoring to let the world know the CARs do not approve of the invasion and are not supporting the Russian war effort. In some cases, the CARs are harboring Russians who are hoping to avoid conscription. At the same time, Kyrgyzstan and others are relabeling and reexporting sanctioned goods to Russia, including weapons.

To balance the Russian threat, the CARs are also making diplomatic overtures to the Americans and Chinese. Leaders in Central Asia are fully aware of the dangers of embracing any superpower, especially a neighboring superpower like China, but they find themselves with few more attractive choices. Given the CARs’ dependence on oil and gas exports, isolationism is an option that only Turkmenistan has chosen. Closer relations with medium-sized powers Iran and Türkiye provide a modicum of additional room to maneuver. The necessity to balance one set of threats with another while trying to assert some foreign policy independence will continue to challenge the former Soviet republics of Central Asia long after the war in Ukraine has ended.

Support for the research for this article came from the Hollins University Summer Undergraduate Research Fellows program.

 

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Notes

1. Timofel Bordachev, “Russia’s Turn to the East: Between Choice and Necessity,” Russia Matters, 1 September 2022, https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/russias-turn-east-between-choice-and-necessity; see also Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, 11 October 2011, https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/.
2. Kseniya Kirillova, “Russia Alienates Central Asia,” Europe’s Edge, Center for European Policy Analysis, 12 May 2025, https://cepa.org/article/russia-alienates-central-asia/.
3. See for example, Edward A. Lynch, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative in East Africa: Finding Success in Failure?,” Military Review 103, no. 3 (May-June 2023): 110–23.
4. See, for example, Amry Vandenbosch, “The Small States in International Politics and Organization,” Journal of Politics 26, no. 2 (1964): 293–312; Michael Maass, Small States in World Politics: The Story of Small State Survival, 1648–2016 (Manchester University Press, 2017); Robert O. Keohane, “Lilliputians’ Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics,” in Small States in International Relations, ed. Christine Ingebritsen et al. (University of Washington Press, 2012).
5. Nicholas J. Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power (Transaction Publishers, 2008), 20.
6. Marwan Kabalan, “Actors, Structures and Qatari Foreign Policy,” Al-Muntaqa 2, no. 2 (2019): 61.
7. “Tajikistan-Kazakhstan Relations and Regional Integration in Central Asia,” Hasht-e-Subh Daily, 22 May 2023, https://8am.media/eng/tajikistan-kazakhstan-relations-and-regional-integration-in-central-asia/.
8. Adam Dixon, “Why Kazakhstan May Be Vladimir Putin’s Next Target,” Real Clear World, 8 January 2026, https://www.realclearworld.com/2026/01/08/why_kazakhstan_may_be_vladimir_putins_next_target_1157639.html.
9. “The Trade Turnover Between Russia and Kazakhstan in 2024 Amounted to $28 Billion,” AK&M, 9 January 2026, https://www.akm.ru/eng/news/the-trade-turnover-between-russia-and-kazakhstan-in-2024-amounted-to-28-billion/.
10. Kyrgyzstan did agree to resume joint exercises in 2023. See Nargis Kassenova, “Central Asia’s Balancing Act,” Asia Policy 18, no. 2 (2023): 21–23.
11. Bahmanyor Nadirov and Payrav Chorshanbiev, “Vulnerable Economy: How Dependent Tajikistan Is on Russia and Other Countries,” Asia-Plus, 20 May 2022, https://asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/economic/20220520/vulnerable-economy-how-dependent-tajikistan-is-on-russia-and-other-countries.
12. “How the War in Ukraine Affects Tajikistan,” Asia-Plus, 29 December 2022, https://asiaplustj.info/en/node/320488.
13. “Russia-Ukraine Make Economic Hit on Tajikistan,” Asia-Plus, 2 March 2022, https://asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/economic/20220302/russia-ukraine-crisis-make-economic-hit-on-tajikistan.
14. “Q&A with ADB Chief Economist Albert Park,” Asia-Plus, 9 December 2022, https://asiaplustj.info/en/node/319747.
15. “Q&A with ADB Chief Economist Albert Park.”
16. “Turkmenistan Legislates Permanent Neutrality,” Jamestown, 2 January 1996, https://jamestown.org/turkmenistan-legislates-permanent-neutrality/.
17. “The Triple Gas Union,” News Central Asia, 15 February 2023, https://www.newscentralasia.net/2023/02/15/the-triple-gas-union/.
18. “The Triple Gas Union,” News Central Asia.
19. Utkir Alimov, “Uzbekistan-Russia: Towards Development of All-Round Cooperation,” Kabar, 27 May 2024, https://en.archive.kabar.kg/news/uzbekistan-russia-towards-development-of-all-round-cooperation/.
20. “Uzbekistan-Russia: Overview of Trade and Economic Cooperation,” News Central Asia, 20 September 2023, https://www.newscentralasia.net/2023/09/20/uzbekistan-russia-overview-of-trade-and-economic-cooperation/.
21. President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, “Bilateral Relations between Uzbekistan and Russia Reach the Level of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,” news release, 15 September 2022, https://president.uz/en/lists/view/5535.
22. “Russia, Uzbekistan: 2025 Trade and Investment Update,” Russia’s Pivot to Asia, 12 March 2025, https://russiaspivottoasia.com/russia-uzbekistan-2025-trade-investment-update/.
23. Letter Dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2024/136, “Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 12 October 2022” (United Nations General Assembly, 13 October 2022), https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/a_res_es_11_4.pdf.
24. “European Development Bank Sees Economic Fallout Coming Up in Central Asia,” Uzbekistan Newsline, 7 April 2022, https://newslineuz.com/article/1058534/.
25. “53% of Surveyed Firms in Tajikistan Face Increasing Production Costs Since Russian-Ukrainian Conflict,” Asia-Plus, 1 August 2022, https://www.asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/economic/20220801/53-of-surveyed-firms-in-tajikistan-face-increasing-production-costs-since-russian-ukrainian-conflict-starts.
26. Joby Warrick, “In Central Asia, Russia Circumvents Sanctions on Tech,” Washington Post, 18 July 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/07/18/russia-sanctions-weapons-china-drones/.
27. Anastasiia Marushevska, “Israel-Hamas, Ukraine Wars vs. the Free World,” USA Today, 22 October 2023, https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/voices/2023/10/22/israel-hamas-ukraine-war-not-isolated/71218960007/.
28. Andrew Higgins, “Russians Fleeing the Draft Find an Unlikely Haven,” New York Times, updated 9 October 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/05/world/asia/russians-fleeing-draft-kyrgyzstan-putin.html.
29. “Tajikistan, Ukraine Discuss Resumption of Direct Air Service Between Their Capitals,” Asia-Plus, 4 January 2022, https://www.asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/politics/20220104/tajikistan-ukraine-discuss-resumption-of-direct-air-service-between-their-capitals.
30. “The Head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan Said How Tajikistan’s Relations with Russia Will Be Built,” Asia-Plus, 15 August 2023, https://asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/politics/20230815/the-head-of-the-ministry-of-foreign-affairs-of-the-republic-of-tajikistan-said-how-tajikistans-relations-with-russia-will-be-built.
31. “OSCE Secretary-General Arrives in Tajikistan to Participate in Dushanbe Water Conference,” Asia-Plus, 7 June 2022, https://www.asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/politics/20220607/osce-secretary-general-arrives-in-tajikistan-to-participate-in-dushanbe-water-confernece.
32. “The United Nations General Assembly Adopts Resolution Urging Russia to Withdraw Troops from Ukraine,” Asia-Plus, 24 February 2023, https://old.asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/politics/20230224/the-united-nations-general-assembly-adopts-resolution-urging-russia-to-withdraw-troops-from-ukraine.
33. “Kazakhstan Not Planning to Join Sanctions Pressure on Russia,” Interfax: Central Asia and Caucasus Business Weekly, 12 April 2022, https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/77965/.
34. “What Happened to Russian TV Satellite Signals in Tajikistan?,” Asia-Plus, 1 June 2022, https://www.asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/society/20220601/what-happened-to-russian-tv-satellite-signals-in-tajikistan.
35. “Ashgabat Conference on International Transport and Transit Corridors Highlighted the Role of Turkmenistan in the Eurasian Connectivity,” News Central Asia, 19 July 2022, https://www.newscentralasia.net/2022/07/19/ashgabat-conference-on-international-transport-and-transit-corridors-highlighted-the-role-of-turkmenistan-in-the-eurasian-connectivity/.
36. Daniel Boffey et al., “British Firms Among Companies to Have Exported Aircraft Parts That Reached Russia,” Guardian, 20 February 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2025/feb/20/british-firms-among-those-that-exported-aircraft-parts-which-reached-russia.
37. “Central Asia Remains Resilient to Global Geopolitical Tensions,” News Central Asia, 29 September 2022, https://www.newscentralasia.net/2022/09/29/central-asia-remains-resilient-to-global-geopolitical-tensions/.
38. “Central Asia Remains Resilient to Global Geopolitical Tensions,” News Central Asia.
39. “Russian Soft Power in Central Asia Reportedly Dissipating,” Asia-Plus, 26 December 2022, https://asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/politics/20221226/russian-soft-power-in-central-asia-reportedly-dissipating.
40. “Russian-Ukrainian Conflict Exacerbating Food Price Volatility in Central Asia,” Asia-Plus, 14 June 2022, https://asiaplustj.info/en/node/313049.
41. Farkhod Tolipov, “Uzbekistan Between Ukraine and Russia: The Curse of Positioning,” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 31 May 2022, https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13719-uzkebistan-between-ukraine-and-russia-the-curse-of-positioning.html.
42. Paul Stronski, “The Common Theme in Central Asia’s Response to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 30 March 2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2022/03/the-common-theme-in-central-asias-response-to-russias-invasion-of-ukraine?lang=en.
43. “Russian Belt and Road Heads Towards Asia,” Silkroute News, 21 April 2022, https://silkroute.news/article/1061591/.
44. Sadi Vorisov, “Tajikistan-Kazakhstan Relations and Regional Integration in Central Asia,” Hasht-e-Subh Daily, 22 May 2023, https://8am.media/eng/tajikistan-kazakhstan-relations-and-regional-integration-in-central-asia/.
45. Vorisov, “Tajikistan-Kazakhstan Relations and Regional Integration in Central Asia.”
46. Pauline Jones, “Russia’s War Against Ukraine and the Future of Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy,” Journal of International Affairs 75, no. 2 (2022): 103, https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/content/russias-war-against-ukraine-and-future-kazakhstans-foreign-policy.
47. “Large Oil Refinery Expected to Be Introduced into Operation in Danghara Next Month DUSHANBE, August,” Asia Plus, 8 August 2016, https://asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/economic/20160808/large-oil-refinery-expected-be-introduced-operation-danghara-next-month-dushanbe-august.
48. “China and Russia Vie for Soft Power Influence in Central Asia,” Daryo, 1 July 2024, https://daryo.uz/en/2024/06/30/china-and-russia-vie-for-soft-power-influence-in-central-asia/.
49. Keith Bradsher, “In the ‘Great Game’ of Central Asia, China’s Leader Seeks the Advantage,” New York Times, 16 September 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/16/world/asia/china-xi-central-asia.html.
50. Andrew Higgins, “A Distracted Russia Is Losing Its Grip on Its Old Soviet Sphere,” New York Times, updated 10 October 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/08/world/asia/russia-putin-soviet.html.
51. Meaghan Tobin, “China Sends a Subtle Message to Central Asia: Rely on Us, Not Russia,” Washington Post, 20 May 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/05/19/china-central-asia-russia-summit/.
52. “China Shifts Focus to Central Asia,” Uzbekistan Newsline, 29 April 2022, https://newslineuz.com/article/1063026/.
53. Hamid Ahmadi, “Iran and Tajikistan: How Culture and Civilization Fade in the Shadow of Politics and the Political,” Iran and the Caucasus 23, no. 1 (2019): 107.
54. Kirill Nourzhanov, “Omnibalancing in Tajikistan’s Foreign Policy: Security-Driven Discourses of Alignment with Iran,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 14, no. 3 (2012): 363–81, https://doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2012.720784.
55. Jones, “Russia’s War Against Ukraine and the Future of Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy,” 102.
56. Keith Zhai and Thomas Grove, “Russia’s Vladimir Putin Says China’s Xi Jinping Raised Concerns on Ukraine War,” Wall Street Journal, 15 September 2022.
57. Qamar Fatima and Sumera Zafar, “New Great Game: Players, Interests, Strategies and Central Asia,” South Asian Studies 29, no. 2 (2014): 650.
58. Fatima and Zafar, “New Great Game,” 649.
59. Higgins, “A Distracted Russia Is Losing Its Grip on Its Old Soviet Sphere.”
60. Karoun Demirjian, “U.S. Works to Scale Up Intelligence Networks in Central Asia,” Washington Post, 21 June 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/06/21/us-central-asia-counterterrorism/.
61. Higgins, “A Distracted Russia Is Losing Its Grip on Its Old Soviet Sphere.” Moscow can also make more subtle threats. When Kyrgyzstan announced plans to switch from the Cyrillic to the Roman alphabet, Russia raised doubts about the suitability of Kyrgyz milk exports for the Russian market. See Ryan Dubé, “Ecuador Agreed to Help Source Arms for Ukraine. Then Russia Rejected its Bananas,” Wall Street Journal, 20 February 2024.
62. Demirjian, “U.S. Works to Scale Up Intelligence Networks in Central Asia.”
63. “United States Wants to Step Up Its Rivalry with China and Russia for Geopolitical Sway in Central Asia,” News Central Asia, 16 September 2022, https://www.newscentralasia.net/2022/09/16/united-states-wants-to-step-up-its-rivalry-with-china-and-russia-for-geopolitical-sway-in-central-asia/.
64. “United States Wants to Step Up Its Rivalry with China and Russia.”
65. “Oil and Gas Swap Arrangements with Caspian Countries Are Part of Iran’s Strategy,” News Central Asia, 30 January 2023, https://www.newscentralasia.net/2023/01/30/oil-and-gas-swap-arrangements-with-caspian-countries-are-part-of-irans-strategy/.
66. “Oil and Gas Swap Arrangements with Caspian Countries.”
67. “Türkiye Stands Ready to Transit Turkmen Gas to Europe,” News Central Asia, 19 November 2022, https://www.newscentralasia.net/2022/11/19/turkiye-stands-ready-to-transit-turkmen-gas-to-europe/.
68. “Türkiye Invites Turkmenistan to Join Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic Speaking Countries,” Turkmenportal, 27 February 2025, https://turkmenportal.com/en/news/88370-turkiye-invites-turkmenistan-to-join-parliamentary-assembly-of-turkic-speaking-countries---.
69. “Turkmenistan’s New Status in Turkic States Significant Development,” Daily Sabah, 17 November 2021, https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/turkmenistans-new-status-in-turkic-states-significant-development.
70. Edward Wong and Andrew Higgins, “Blinken Finds Receptive Leaders in Central Asia, Where Russia Seeks Aid,” New York Times, 28 February 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/28/world/asia/blinken-russia.html.
71. Clarence Leong and Lisa Lin, “Russia’s Backdoor for Battlefield Goods from China: Central Asia,” Wall Street Journal, 4 March 2024.

 

 

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