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America’s enemies use guerrilla tactics to protract the war in Iraq and to erode America’s will.
Studying the past century’s insurgent wars can help us discern “best practices” common to successful COIN operations.
Task Force Baghdad’s campaign plan created the conditions to keep our soldiers safe and our homeland sound.
U.S. Army Transformation needs to focus less on its warfighting capability and more on developing a workforce that is genuinely adaptive.
In November 2005, coalition and Iraqi forces again demonstrated the flexibility and agility needed in successful COIN operations.
The Army has gained a great deal of experience in Iraq and Afghanistan about COIN operations. Here, one of the Army’s most experienced commanders details 14 lessons learned.
Beating the opposition requires COIN forces to make it worthwhile for the civilian population to support the government. How? By providing security—or taking it away.
One of the Army’s top advisers in Iraq offers a vivid description of what it is like to train Iraqi security forces.
Historians Andrade and Willbanks describe how the Civil Operations Revolutionary Development and Support (CORDS) program worked in Vietnam. A similar program might work in Iraq.
An innovative solution to the unity of effort in Vietnam, CORDS offers a blueprint for realizing the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq.
III Corps’s former commander in Iraq is “absolutely convinced that we must approach IO in a different way and turn it from a passive warfighting discipline to a very active one.”
Based on his experiences in Baghdad, Baker tells us how the 1st Armored Division’s 2BCT improvised an effective tactical IO program.
Plain speaking from an experienced ally about how to do counterinsurgency at the tactical level.
A straight-from-the-field assessment of the current advisory effort and a prescription for what it takes to succeed in Iraq.
Insurgency is a competition between human networks. We must understand that salient fact before we can develop and execute a plan to defeat the insurgents.
The combined arms maneuver battalion, partnering with indigenous security forces and living among the population it secures, should be the basic tactical unit of counterinsurgency warfare.
Tactical units living and working with the population “provide the flexibility to gather and disseminate information, influence host-nation political development, and neutralize threat activity.”
To analyze dark networks like Al-Qaeda, we need more than cultural awareness. We need ethnographic intelligence.
The methodology for IPB—intelligence preparation of the battlefield—has undergone a wholesale change since the cold war days.
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