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SEP-OCT 2004
Lieutenant Colonel Robert M. Cassidy, U.S. Army
America’s enemies use guerrilla tactics to protract the war in Iraq and to erode America’s will.
MAY-JUNE 2005
Kalev I. Sepp, Ph.D.
Studying the past century’s insurgent wars can help us discern “best practices” common to successful COIN operations.
JULY-AUG 2005
Major General Peter W. Chiarelli, U.S. Army
Major Patrick R. Michaelis, U.S. Army
Task Force Baghdad’s campaign plan created the conditions to keep our soldiers safe and our homeland sound.
NOV-DEC 2005
Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster, British Army
U.S. Army Transformation needs to focus less on its warfighting capability and more on developing a workforce that is genuinely adaptive.
Colonel James K. Greer, U.S. Army
In November 2005, coalition and Iraqi forces again demonstrated the flexibility and agility needed in successful COIN operations.
JAN-FEB 2006
Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus, U.S. Army
The Army has gained a great deal of experience in Iraq and Afghanistan about COIN operations. Here, one of the Army’s most experienced commanders details 14 lessons learned.
Montgomery McFate, Ph.D.
Andrea V. Jackson
Beating the opposition requires COIN forces to make it worthwhile for the civilian population to support the government. How? By providing security—or taking it away.
MAR-APR 2006
Brigadier General Daniel P. Bolger, U.S. Army
One of the Army’s top advisers in Iraq offers a vivid description of what it is like to train Iraqi security forces.
Dale Andrade
Lieutenant Colonel James H. Willbanks, U.S. Army, Retired, Ph.D.
Historians Andrade and Willbanks describe how the Civil Operations Revolutionary Development and Support (CORDS) program worked in Vietnam. A similar program might work in Iraq.
Major Ross Coffey, U.S. Army
An innovative solution to the unity of effort in Vietnam, CORDS offers a blueprint for realizing the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq.
MAY-JUNE 2006
Lieutenant General Thomas F. Metz, U.S. Army, et al.
III Corps’s former commander in Iraq is “absolutely convinced that we must approach IO in a different way and turn it from a passive warfighting discipline to a very active one.”
Colonel Ralph O. Baker, U.S. Army
Based on his experiences in Baghdad, Baker tells us how the 1st Armored Division’s 2BCT improvised an effective tactical IO program.
Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen, Ph.D., Australian Army
Plain speaking from an experienced ally about how to do counterinsurgency at the tactical level.
JUL-AUG 2006
Lieutenant Colonel Carl D. Grunow, U.S. Army
A straight-from-the-field assessment of the current advisory effort and a prescription for what it takes to succeed in Iraq.
Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, USMC, Retired
Insurgency is a competition between human networks. We must understand that salient fact before we can develop and execute a plan to defeat the insurgents.
Lieutenant Colonel Douglas A. Ollivant, U.S. Army
First Lieutenant Eric D. Chewning, U.S. Army
The combined arms maneuver battalion, partnering with indigenous security forces and living among the population it secures, should be the basic tactical unit of counterinsurgency warfare.
Major Paul T. Stanton, U.S. Army
Tactical units living and working with the population “provide the flexibility to gather and disseminate information, influence host-nation political development, and neutralize threat activity.”
SEP-OCT 2006
Lieutenant Colonel Fred Renzi, U.S. Army
To analyze dark networks like Al-Qaeda, we need more than cultural awareness. We need ethnographic intelligence.
Major Dan Zeytoonian, U.S. Army, et al.
The methodology for IPB—intelligence preparation of the battlefield—has undergone a wholesale change since the cold war days.
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