75th Anniversary Edition

1922 - 1997


Military Review 75th Anniversary 1997

Military Review
75th Anniversary


Table of Contents

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General Dennis J. Reimer

Introduction to this historic 75th anniversary edition of Military Review


From the Editor

Military Review

Letter from the editor


The Army and Society

The Army and Society introduction


Selective Service—1948

Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall

At World War II’s end, the US Army quickly drew down from a high of some 14 million men to less than 1 million by 1948. Then Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall wrote this lead article for the October 1948 edition of Military Review, outlining the structure and standards for the Selective Service System that would be the Army’s manpower source through the Vietnam era. Royall’s comments on discipline being based on the “willing obedience of the informed soldier” and on the need to provide “character guidance” to make the soldier “a better citizen” are worth recalling as one reads the other articles in this section.


ROTC: An Academic Focus

Major George A. Joulwan, US Army

Then Major George A. Joulwan recounts his experiences as an associate professor of military science at Loyola University during the Vietnam era in this article from the January 1971 edition of Military Review. The Army’s application of “Track C” to its Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) program in 1970 was a reasoned response to calls for change, some of which equated “change” with abolishing ROTC from campus.


The Army and Society

Lieutenant Colonel Frederic J. Brown, US Army

As Vietnam began to wind down, the US Army and its role in society was debated on several planes, not the least of which was the end of the draft in 1973 and the institution of the “All–Volunteer Force” concept. Then Lieutenant Colonel Frederic J. Brown Jr. assessed the debate from the perspective of a student at the National War College in this lead article for the March 1972 edition of Military Review.


A Careful Look at Defense Manpower

General Bruce Palmer Jr., US Army, Retired
Curtis W. Tarr

The Army’s transition to an All-Volunteer Force in the mid-1970s was not easy. Congress tasked the Defense Manpower Commission in 1974 to look at the future of a force made up of volunteers rather than draftees. This article, published in the September 1976 edition of Military Review, contains a host of findings and recommendations, some of which were acted upon, some with which we still struggle today and some of which, while now no longer an issue, could easily resurface in the future.


The American Volunteer Soldier: Will He Fight?

Colonel Charles W. Brown, US Army
Charles C. Moskos Jr.

This article appeared in the June 1976 edition of Military Review and reports the results of a survey conducted by the authors of the All-Volunteer Force. The findings concerning soldier values, the importance of education to the force and the improvement in performance and attitude of an informed soldier will come as no surprise to today’s reader. The conclusion that the volunteer soldier would fight if called upon would be proved in Grenada, Panama and, once again, on the Arabian Peninsula.


Serving the People—The Need for Military Power

General Fred C. Weyand, US Army, Retired
Lieutenant Colonel Harry G. Summers Jr., US Army

This December 1976 Military Review article was published in the wake of Vietnam and congressional passage of the 1973 War Powers Act and examines the relationship between the American people and their military. Retired Army Chief of Staff General Fred C. Weyand and then Lieutenant Colonel Harry G. Summers Jr. emphasize the importance of the nation’s military honestly and openly communicating its needs and the rationale for those needs to the American people—the state the military serves.


Values and the American Soldier

Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh Jr.

Then Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh Jr. contributed the following article to open the November 1986 edition of Military Review. The secretary addresses “values,” the Army theme for 1986, and perhaps explains why the All-Volunteer Force was ultimately the success it is today.



Leadership introduction


Leadership for the 21st Century: Empowerment, Environment and the Golden Rule

General Dennis J. Reimer, US Army

This January-February 1996 lead article is one of three Army Chief of Staff General Dennis J. Reimer has written for Military Review. His command philosophy is simple: Leaders should do “what is legally and morally right;” create an environment tolerant of mistakes and free of the zero-defects mentality, where soldiers can achieve their potential; and live by the “Golden Rule,” which puts caring, respect and fairness for soldiers first.


Leadership, Versatility and All That Jazz

General Gordon R. Sullivan, US Army

Army Chief of Staff General Gordon R. Sullivan wrote several articles for Military Review. This article on leadership presents a unique comparison of General Matthew B. Ridgway and jazz musician Dave Brubeck in addressing professional competency, team building, operational versatility and improvisational genius as necessary leadership elements for our 21st-century Army.


Leadership: A Return to Basics

General Edward C. Meyer, US Army

The late 1970s and early 1980s were trying times for the US Army as it struggled to recover from Vietnam and establish a credible All-Volunteer Force. During these years, Army senior leaders tried various leadership theories and slogans. By 1980, however, they returned to more traditional leadership methods. In this July 1980 lead article, then Army Chief of Staff General Edward C. “Shy” Meyer reflects this shift as he distinguishes between leadership and management. While acknowledging a place for management in the Army, Meyer clearly stipulates the primacy of leadership in soldiering.


Leader Development and Command and Control

Lieutenant General Leonard P. Wishart Ill, US Army

When this 1990 article was written, the US Army had already made some major advancements in training and leader development with the National Training Center, 6 years old in 1990; the Center for Army Lessons Learned, 5 years old; and the Battle Command Training Program, 4 years old. With the world drastically changing in 1990 after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Lieutenant General Leonard P. Wishart III says in this article that more leadership training and more command and control (C2) improvement are vital for dealing with future military operations. Since 1990, the Army has established its battle labs program and begun other initiatives to work on C2 issues for today and the 21st century.



General John W. Foss, US Army

In May 1990, the same month this article was published, Mikhail Gorbachev won the Nobel Peace Prize, Boris Yeltsin became the Russian Federation president and the dissolution of the Soviet Union was becoming a clear possibility. Three months after this article appeared, Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait. General Foss’s comments are very relevant in light of how quickly the politico-military situation can change.


Some Thoughts on Leadership

Major General Alexander M. Patch, US Army

Major General Alexander M. Patch wrote this December 1943 article primarily to educate junior officers about leadership. Fancy equipment won’t win wars, Patch says, but strong leadership-which is based on character-and disciplined soldiers will. When Patch penned this piece, the United States was building its Armed Forces to fight a well-disciplined German army whose morale was high. Here, Patch gives emerging leaders some basic and timeless tips on how to handle troops and, ultimately, march toward victory.


Notes on Leadership for the 1980s

Major General Walter F. Ulmer Jr., US Army

In this July 1980 article, then Major General Walter F. Ulmer Jr., 3d Armored Division commander, expresses concern about the Army’s organizational climate and its impact on leadership effectiveness. He calls for a return to basics-discipline, rewards for excellence, strong physical training-at a time when Operation Desert One, the US attempt to rescue the hostages in Iran, failed, embarrassing the United States and its Armed Forces. In Ulmer’s opinion, a healthy organization and sound leadership reinforce each other to the benefit of all.


Education and Training

Education and Training introduction


Training and the Army of the 1990s

General Carl E. Vuono, US Army

This article by then Army Chief of Staff General Carl E. Vuono was prepared on the eve of Operation Desert Storm. Vuono’s commitment to training readiness, even in the midst of mandated downsizing and calls for additional cost-saving measures such as “tiered readiness,” comes across clearly, emphatically and, considering the success of Desert Storm and a host of other diverse and complex missions, very convincingly.


Training: Preparation for Combat

General William R. Richardson, US Army

The revolution in American military doctrine introduced by AirLand Battle spawned a need for corresponding revolutions in both combined arms and joint training. In this June 1986 article, General William R. Richardson, then US Army Training and Doctrine Command commander, challenged the Army’s leaders to accept the new training responsibilities inherent in the acceptance of AirLand Battle doctrine.


Educating and Training for Theater Warfare

Colonel L.D. Holder, US Army

Written at the conclusion of then Colonel L.D. Holder’s tenure as the director of the School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and on the eve of Operation Desert Storm, this article assesses the implementation of the concept of “operational art” to date, presents a training philosophy for institutionalizing “operational art” across the services and prescribes a training regimen to achieve that goal. Interestingly, a disclaimer accompanied the article when it first ran in September 1990: “The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the Department of Defense or any other government office or agency.”


JPME: Are We There Yet?

Congressman Ike Skelton

In the lead article for the May 1992 edition of Military Review, Congressman Ike Skelton reviews the implementation of recommendations made by the House Armed Services Committee Panel on Military Education concerning joint professional military education. Skelton re-emphasizes the need for joint education for today’s military officers.


Operational Art

Operations introduction


Doctrine for Joint Operations in a Combined Environment: A Necessity

General Robert W RisCassi, US Army

In this wide-ranging treatise on applying operational art to joint and combined operations, General Robert W. RisCassi provides a modern blueprint for doctrine, command and control, training and logistics for future coalition forces. This article, published in Military Review’s June 1993 edition just before RisCassi’s retirement in July 1993, was also published in the summer 1993 issue of Joint Force Quarterly.


A CINC’s View of Operational Art

General Crosbie E. Saint, US Army

In September 1990, just as the crisis with Iraq was beginning, General Crosbie E. Saint, US Army, Europe and Seventh Army commander in chief, gave Military Review this frank analysis of an army group commander’s role. His observations and recommendations for the “fighters, integrators and shapers” in their practice of operational art is as valid today as it was on the eve of Desert Storm.


Major Problems Confronting a Theater Commander in Combined Operations

General Jacob L. Devers, Commanding General, Army Ground Forces

In this lead article for the October 1947 edition of Military Review, General Jacob L. Devers identifies the political, economic and military-doctrinal, logistic and human—difficulties of combined command from the World War II experience and offers insights for resolving them. Because his candid observations are as relevant today as they were then, Military Review regularly receives requests for reprints of this article.


Isolation of the Battlefield by Air Power

General Henry H. Arnold

In this lead article of the July 1944 issue of Military Review, General Henry H. “Hap” Arnold clearly articulates the principles associated with the Army’s doctrinal “deep battle” concept at that time. The tactical air force priorities he outlines are virtually identical to those employed by air component commanders today. This article clearly demonstrates why Arnold, the first General of the Air Force, is considered the founder of our modern-day US Air Force.


Doctrinal Development—AirLand Battle

Doctrinal Development—AirLand Battle introduction


Some Doctrinal Questions for the United States Army

William S. Lind

In a US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Historical Monograph Series publication titled “From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine 1973-1982 (June 1984),” author John L. Romjue describes William S. Lind, then a legislative aide to Senator Gary Hart, as “an early dissenting voice” to the “active defense” doctrine in the July 1976 US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations. Lind’s article below was received by Military Review on 7 July 1976. In October 1976, Armed Forces Journal ran an article by a “John Patrick” titled “Banned At Fort Monroe, Or The Article The Army Doesn’t Want You To Read” along with a non-attributed response by TRADOC. Patrick’s article took TRADOC to task concerning alleged attempts to suppress Lind’s article. The published TRADOC response notes that: “On 19 July, a member of the staff and faculty, USACGSC [US Army Command and General Staff College], discussed publication of Lind’s article in Military Review with TRADOC Commander General William E. DePuy. General DePuy’s guidance was that it would not serve any useful purpose to have the article published in the Military Review in advance of the FM’s distribution to the field.” Military Review records show that Lind was sent a check for $50 in December 1976, a practice common at the time, and the article was printed in the March 1977 edition. General Donn A. Starry, generally considered the father of AirLand Battle doctrine, would not assume command of TRADOC until July 1977, and the new FM 100-5 espousing AirLand Battle would not be issued until August 1982. Although Lind’s criticisms were largely discounted by Romjue in his monograph, most, if not all, were addressed and rectified by the revised FM 100-5 of 1982.


Firepower, Attrition, Maneuver— US Army Operations Doctrine: A Challenge for the 1980s and Beyond

Colonel Wayne A. Downing, US Army

Then Colonel Wayne A. Downing was a student at the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, from 1979 to 1980 when he wrote this article. Like other forward thinkers during the late 1970s, he came to the conclusion that the US Army’s attrition doctrine was bankrupt. He contributed this article to Military Review to argue for abandoning attrition warfare in favor of maneuver warfare as an operating style. The article appeared in the January 1981 edition, and as a result, Downing was consulted during the composition of the 1986 version of US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations.


Extending the Battlefield

General Donn A. Starry, US Army

General Donn A. Starry made the following comments on the genesis of this March 1981 article and AirLand Battle: “The ultimate lesson of `Active Defense’ and the 1976 edition of FM [US Army Field Manual] 100-5 [Operations] is that it is virtually impossible to substantively rewrite doctrine satisfactorily in a matter of three years, e.g., 1973 to 1976. As principal author of the defense and offense chapters of the 1976 book, [I must say that] when it was done, I was not happy with what got written. Corollary is the fact that the 1976 book was not written at Leavenworth. Though he had stacked the staff at Leavenworth to do the writing, General [William E.] DePuy soon realized it would not be possible to think it all through and write anything worthwhile expeditiously. That conviction was the genesis of the now famous [Fort] A.P. Hill doctrine writing sessions. Indeed, much of the 1976 book was drafted at Fort Knox. . . . So AirLand Battle grew out of concept development at Knox as we struggled with Active Defense. For a very long time, AirLand Battle was a briefing—a bunch of slides I used to talk about war. . . . As suggested, it changed-frequently. [It] changed based on comments, observations and questions from audiences ranging from Congressional hearings to lectures at war and staff colleges in this country, in the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, France and Israel.


How to Change an Army

Colonel Huba Wass de Czege, US Army

In this November 1984 article for Military Review, then Colonel Huba Wass de Czege, lead author for the 1982 version of US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, and the founding director of the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, discusses the basis for change and a methodology for its rational implementation. The article reconfirms the need for SAMS, which was about a year old, and also outlines the need for the Center for Army Lessons Learned, which would not be formally established at Fort Leavenworth until August 1985. Brigadier General Wass de Czege, now retired, adds, “While I make a pitch for SAMS in the article, the issue is how to manage change, and that problem is with us in spades today. The article is still relevant. We are still `tinkering’ our way into the future. The 1993 FM 100-5 took a step backward in evolving a sound theoretical basis for evolution into the future.”


FM 100-5: The Airland Battle in 1986

General William R. Richardson, US Army

The publication of US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, in August 1982 launched AirLand Battle as the Army’s doctrine of the future. Such a revolutionary change, however, was not automatically accepted by everyone and caused some consternation and debate among our NATO allies as well as the Army’s sister services. In this March 1986 article, General William R. Richardson outlines the 1986 modifications to the 1982 FM 100-5, noting that “the unmistakable conclusion remains that the 1982 edition of FM 100-5 was on target.”


Full-Dimensional Operations: A Doctrine for an Era of Change

General Frederick M. Franks Jr., US Army

The 1993 version of US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, was distributed on the Army’s 218th birthday. General Frederick M. Franks Jr. notes in this December 1993 article that the new manual “goes beyond AirLand Battle to full-dimension operations.” The new manual did not dilute or supplant AirLand Battle doctrine; it simply adjusted the doctrine for the times. Doctrine cannot be static. As Franks points out, it must be adapted as necessary to meet threat, technology and national strategy changes, as well as to take into account lessons learned and warfare’s changing nature.



Strategy introduction


Defining Military Strategy

Colonel Mhur F Lykke Jr., US Army, Retired

Colonel Arthur F. Lykke Jr.’s pragmatic definition of military strategy is as current today as it was when his article led the May 1989 issue of Military Review. Lykke’s model remains the basis for military strategy instruction at the US Army War College. Interestingly, our records show that Military Review rejected this same article in March 1981. According to Lykke, the editors felt an article on strategy would be inappropriate for students at the Army’s senior tactical school.


Why Aren’t Americans Better at Strategy?

Steven Metz

This article followed Colonel Arthur F. Lykke Jr.’s article in the May 1989 edition of Military Review, which was devoted to strategy. Here, Steven Metz outlines the difficulties of defining a coherent national security strategy in a democracy where consensus and the need for short-term results often seem to outweigh long-term interests. Such a situation is especially difficult for the military profession, which remains responsible for developing and executing a coherent national military strategy. Metz’s frank views were accompanied with the standard Department of Defense disclaimer, noting that “the views expressed in this article are those of the author” and did not reflect establishment thinking.


Western Defense Planning

Captain B.H. Liddel Hart, British Army, Retired

Captain B.H. Liddell Hart’s lead article in the June 1956 issue of Military Review gives a concrete example of the difficulties of developing a coherent military strategy, as outlined in the preceding two articles. In view of the existing “mutual assured destruction” strategy at the dawn of the nuclear age, Liddell Hart’s proposal for “graduated action” as a military strategy for a young NATO also prophetically foreshadowed the Kennedy Doctrine of “flexible response.”


Strategic Underpinnings of a Future Force

Congressman Richard B. Cheney
Major (P) Thomas N. Harvey, US Army

This article, published in the October 1986 issue of Military Review, foreshadowed several changes that would be made in the US Department of Defense (DOD) over the next 10 years—many of them under Congressman Richard B. “Dick” Cheney after he became defense secretary on 21 March 1989. Some of these changes include: DOD’s increased emphasis on joint doctrine, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) chairman’s increased power in acquisitions, the creation of the JCS vice chairman position, the founding of the Army Acquisition Corps, our success in Operation Desert Storm, the development of the force-projection Army and our current emphasis on information age warfare. The authors even seem to predict Secretary of Defense Les Aspin’s “bottom-up” review and our subsequent national military strategy of being prepared for two major regional contingencies. The article also foreshadows the House Armed Services Committee’s name change to House National Security Committee.


The President’s Responsibility

President Harry S. Truman

In 1947, President Harry S. Truman signed the bill that established today’s Department of Defense. Truman’s intent, as he states in this article written for the September 1962 issue of Military Review, was to create an organization that would be responsive to the president as commander in chief. His tone is reminiscent of one of his most famous quotes: “The buck stops here.” This article was solicited by Military Review and introduced two following articles: “The President as Commander in Chief” by Francis H. Heller, an associate dean at the University of Kansas College of Liberal Arts and Sciences; and “Our Modern Military Establishment” by then retired General J. Lawton Collins. Collins’ piece was described by the editor as being based on an article for Union Worthies, a publication of Union College, Schenectady, New York.


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