Counter-IED Strategy in Modern War
Captain David F. Eisler, U.S. Army
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In the years since improvised explosive devices (IEDs) became
symbols of asymmetric warfare and modern military conflict, very little
has changed in the realm of counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED)
strategy. The military is always searching for better vehicles and equipment
to defeat what is, at its core, a homemade device made for a fraction of the
cost of our technological countermeasures. As a result, C-IED strategy has
primarily focused on developing new ways to mitigate the effects of an IED
blast rather than trying to prevent it from occurring. Billions of dollars have
been spent in the name of saving lives, yet the true cause of the problem
and its origins remain largely ignored, leaving out the crucial role played by
population-centric counterinsurgency operations.
The Nature of the Problem
Afghanistan, in July 2010, they faced an area of operations that had seen
constantly increasing IED activity for several years in the same spots along
Highway 1, an important maneuver corridor running from Kandahar City to
Kabul. Casualties quickly mounted as IEDs with large net explosive weights
detonated on convoys and route clearance vehicles, destroying even the largest
of their kind. The insurgents had the propaganda victory they sought by
obliterating American “tanks,” and security forces were scrambling to stop
the bleeding and maintain freedom of movement.
Initial counter-IED plans sought to facilitate the relief in place between two
Romanian battalions conducting operations along the highway. Conceived as
a means to deter enemy IED emplacement, the plan was simple—flood the
engagement areas with security forces, occupy established checkpoints, and
maintain near constant surveillance to interdict any attempted insurgent activity
on the most dangerous sections of the road. A combined arms approach
integrated route clearance platoons with organic maneuver units to patrol
the highway. Improvised explosive device activity decreased rapidly despite
insurgent attempts to exploit the seams of units’ battle spaces and emplace
IEDs in the least-patrolled and least-overwatched areas.
The mission was considered a success. The
Romanian battalions were able to conduct their
transfer of authority, and overall insurgent IED
activity on the previously lethal sections of the
road remained mostly low or ineffective, even
during the usual summer fighting surge in southern
Afghanistan. The presence of security forces along
the highway decreased in favor of operations in
other areas, and the IED threat was believed to be
mostly pacified.
Yet, the IEDs never really went away. A few
months later, in the period leading up to the provincial
elections in September, new engagement areas
were steadily appearing just outside the previously
established boundaries of the first operation. By
November, the same sections of the road had reemerged
as the most dangerous routes in the area
of operations as over 1,500 pounds of homemade
explosives detonated in the course of only a few
days. With the arrival of spring in 2011, IED activity
resumed in the same areas it had taken place
during the previous three years. Initial suppression
operations had succeeded in temporarily relieving
the pressure, but failed to address the true source
of the IED problem–the pervading influence and
support of a homegrown local insurgency.
Security and Influence
The first step for any counterinsurgent is to
secure the population against the intimidation
and influence of the insurgency. Doctrine (and
conventional wisdom) argue that the surest way
to accomplish this is by establishing a persistent
partnership with local security forces and living
among the population. Merely conducting weekly
visits and key leader engagements with local elders
and officials may provide insights into governance
and development issues, but they achieve few lasting
effects unless the people feel safe.
Because both sides of a modern asymmetric
conflict must continuously vie for the support
of the local population, the counterinsurgent can
develop a baseline security assessment of an area
by tracking reports of insurgent activity against
civilians. In this case, distinguishing between
active anti-civilian and passive anti-civilian activity
is critical. Active anti-civilian activity can
include intimidation, forced taxation, and isolation
through the emplacement of mine or IED obstacle belts that limit the population’s freedom of movement.
Clearly, counterinsurgents cannot engage in
such activity because it would lead to a complete
loss of popular support and bring a swift end to
their efforts. Insurgents, on the other hand, may
use these tactics to increase their control and influence
in a given area. Popular support need not be
given happily, but it must be at a level to ensure
that the influence of government security forces
and the people’s desire for economic and essential
services aid never outweigh their fear of insurgent
retribution or punishment. As an example, there
have been cases in which the Taliban senior leadership
replaced insurgent commanders because
they were thought to have been too harsh on local
civilians and therefore a threat to the insurgency’s
popular support.1 The most successful insurgent
commanders know to use intimidation only when
necessary to maintain their control of the people.
Consequently, areas experiencing limited insurgent
intimidation are more likely to be insurgentdominated
support zones than areas with higher
numbers of reports, especially in places with
a significant International Security Assistance
Forces (ISAF) or Afghan National Security Forces
(ANSF) presence.
In this regard, the term “freedom of influence”
is introduced in order to more precisely define
the variable that the insurgents use to control
the population. Whereas freedom of movement
describes the ability of a maneuver element to
project combat power at a chosen time, space, and
purpose, freedom of influence reflects the capability
of the insurgent or counterinsurgent to engage
with and directly affect the local population’s
attitudes, opinions, and perceptions.
In the situation described earlier, although ISAF
and ANSF security forces were able to maintain
their freedom of movement by conducting disruption
and interdiction operations along Highway 1,
the insurgents held their freedom of influence on
the population in the surrounding villages. This led to a continuously accessible support zone just
outside the operational boundaries and focus of
friendly security patrols. The early positive effects
they achieved did not translate into lasting security
gains, leaving the next rotation of units open to the
same dangers as before.
…areas experiencing limited insurgent intimidation are more likely to be insurgent-dominated…
Measuring Success
In a field replete with numbers, statistics, metrics,
and assessments, defining a true measure
of success for C-IED operations and strategy
is difficult. The standard model tends to weigh
heavily the number of IEDs found and cleared by
security forces against the number that detonate.
The underlying assumption is that an increased
percentage of IEDs found and cleared means
that insurgent forces are less effective with their
IED emplacements, and that friendly forces have
adapted to enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures
(TTPs). Further analysis looks at the rate at
which the percentage of cleared IEDs increases or
decreases, which measures how quickly friendly
forces are adapting to changes in insurgent tactics
(or, conversely, how slowly the insurgents are
changing their tactics to match the counterinsurgents’
countermeasures). Another way of looking at the problem is to assess the effectiveness of IED
detonations by determining how many IED strikes
damage vehicles or cause casualties. However,
most of these methods are better for identifying
contested areas rather than assessing a district’s
overall security because IED activity will typically
mirror any increased presence of security forces.
Additional methodologies of quantitative and
qualitative data analysis attempt to track overall
security trends at both a provincial and district
level. Unfortunately, most of these are defined in
terms of counterinsurgent activity rather than that
of the civilian population. For example, a “route
status matrix” provides commanders with a graphical
depiction of freedom of movement on primary
and secondary roads based on recent IED activity
(normally an aggregate set against ISAF and ANSF
patrols) as well as deliberate clearance operations
conducted by engineers and route clearance
platoons. However, this matrix does not consider
freedom of movement of local traffic, which could
present a vastly different picture if an insurgent has
decided not to limit the security forces’ freedom of
movement but rather to maintain his own freedom
of influence by placing obstacle belts between the
population and the roads.
A local population willing to point out the locations of explosive
materials could indicate security gains in that area…
The metric perhaps least reminiscent of classic
and modern counterinsurgency doctrine is tracking
the number of high-valued individuals (HVIs) killed
or captured in raids or direct attacks. Those classified
as HVIs are normally senior insurgent military
commanders or shadow government leaders with
influence within the Taliban. They are rarely, if
ever, low-level insurgents actually conducting the
attacks. Such individuals are considered expendable
and easily replaceable.
Yet throughout the last several years, insurgent
networks have grown increasingly larger and more
interconnected. Finding an irreplaceable leader or
personality has proven nearly impossible. Little
quantitative data exists to support the hypothesis
that HVI targeting operations have any measurable
long-term effect on levels of insurgent activity;
their operations may slow down or even cease after
they lose a key leader or explosives expert, but it is
only a matter of time before the void is filled and
operations resume. Treating the symptoms does not
cure the disease.
However, one metric may effectively measure
security gains in the Afghan counterinsurgency
conflict and modern asymmetric conflict in general,
particularly at the local or district level—IEDs
turned in or reported by civilians. In these instances,
a local national provides unsolicited information to
ISAF or ANSF forces that leads to the discovery
of an IED or its components. Care must be taken
to distinguish an unsolicited tip from that of a paid
informant or source. While an informant may provide
potentially reliable information, there have
been cases of sources intentionally emplacing
weapons or explosive materials themselves and then
leading security forces to the cache site simply to
collect a monetary reward.
The importance of an IED turned in by a civilian
comes from the direct interaction between that
person and representatives of the government,
particularly if the device is turned in to the Afghan
National Army, police, or local governance centers.
A local population willing to point out the locations of explosive materials could indicate security gains
in that area, especially if the area already has a
high level of insurgent IED activity. The more the
people feel that the government can protect them
and provide better stability than the insurgents, the
greater the stake they have in their own security
against insurgent intimidation. Similar developments
led to the beginning of the highly successful
Sunni Awakening and the Sons of Iraq program in
late 2006, as well as the onset of the Afghan Local
Police program in 2010.
The most successful C-IED operations nest
within counterinsurgency strategy and doctrine.
They do not focus on the devices themselves, but
on the population. A company-sized element that
moves into villages adjacent to a primary IED
engagement area and remains there for an extended
period, habitually interacting with the villagers and
conducting key leader engagements, should begin
to see security gains in the form of local national
tips and turn-ins. In some cases, a lack of available
maneuver units can limit combat power for such
operations, forcing commanders to attempt to cover
large areas and reducing the number of possible
engagements with the people. However, in the end,
a continuous presence somewhere is better than a
fleeting presence everywhere. As the people begin
to believe that the security will be lasting and not
just temporary, they are more likely to provide intelligence
and turn against the insurgency.2
An area with a large ISAF presence, and consequently
an increased amount of violent activity,
but with no increase in IEDs turned in is cause for
concern. Villages with a higher number of turn-ins
likely feel more connected to their government and
security forces and are more willing to take a direct
stand against the insurgency. Conversely, low turnin
areas may fear intimidation and retaliation for
assisting security forces and would rather hold their
tongue and remain isolated than fight back. In that
case, the insurgent influence in the area is probably
strong enough that the people fear the repercussions
of cooperating with the government more than they seek its protection. Special attention should
be paid to IED events within a short distance of a
village, since the people in the village likely knew
something about the device and its emplacement,
but were too afraid to say anything. These events
are far too common and must be countered by
comprehensive counterinsurgency operations.
Each explosive detonation against ISAF or
ANSF is a psychological victory for the insurgency,
demonstrating the weakness of the government
and its inability to provide security and
stability for its people. The government must
convince the people, especially their influential
community and religious leaders, that the insurgency
poses the greater threat to their villages
and people. All too often, the sporadic presence
of security forces in an area leads to a rapid spike
of activity in response, conditioning the people to
associate the government with increased violence. To actively engage the population and garner support
against the insurgency, the counterinsurgent
must overcome this mindset.
Separating the people from the influence of their
government is one of the primary objectives for
an insurgency in order to maintain its influence
over the population free from outside intervention.
Afghanistan expert Seth Jones notes that “by
threatening the population, the insurgents give
individuals a strong rationale to refuse or refrain
from cooperating with the indigenous government
and external actors.”3 Successful counterinsurgency
operations must aim to defeat this insurgent
influence.
The first step in that process is security; a population
can never have faith in its government if it
is not trusted to provide even basic protection. A
periodic presence will not suffice, since the insurgents
can (and usually do) wait until a patrol has
left the area to aggressively counter any positive
relations and reclaim their control of the people.
Only persistent security during the initial stages of
operations can set the conditions to tip the balance
of support in favor of the government and away
from the insurgents.
Separating the Insurgent, Attacking the Network
Successfully securing the population will lead
to the separation of the insurgent, as the insurgency
requires the support of the people to survive. One
of the key advances in modern counterinsurgency
has been the application of biometric and forensic
intelligence to catch an elusive enemy capable
of blending in with the population. Biometric
enrollments have become part of campaign plans,
and the addition of law enforcement personnel
and trained explosive ordnance disposal technicians
has provided units with increasingly more
information about the construction and origins of
IEDs through their detailed post-blast analysis.
Separately, biometrics and post-blast analysis
each provide invaluable intelligence unavailable
to previous generations of counterinsurgents, but
their benefits become even more evident when
combined.
Conducting independent biometric enrollments
is an excellent way to build a database of citizens
but by itself does not separate the insurgent from the population except in certain rare cases.4 Similarly,
comprehensive post-blast analysis provides
a wealth of information about IED construction
and composition, often including fingerprints and
other biometric data found at the scene of an event,
but ends short of positive identification. Although
latent fingerprints can be matched to others found
in different events, they provide little information
about the actual person emplacing or constructing
the devices.
When biometrics and post-blast analysis merge,
they have the capability to truly separate the insurgent.
Fingerprints recovered from IED materials in
one area can be linked to a specific person enrolled
somewhere else, painting a more detailed picture
of the device’s origin and defining the insurgent
network more clearly. Such success depends on
training units to treat each IED event not as an
impediment to maneuver that they need to breach or
clear, but as a legitimate crime scene with valuable
forensic evidence available to catch the perpetrator
and identify his supplier.
Education for indigenous and coalition security
forces as well as the local population is paramount
to understanding how both biometrics and postblast
analysis can be used to isolate the insurgents
from innocents, identifying those who act against
the interests of the people and the government. A
robust biometrics and forensics program should be
at the forefront of any “attack the network” strategy
because it can link explosive events to their locations
on the battlefield and potentially provide the
identity of those responsible. Developing a picture
of these low-level insurgent networks is the key to
understanding the origins of the explosive devices
and identifying the supply chains that support them.
Ultimately, the true goal of biometrics and forensics
is to develop the rule of law through the host
nation government and judicial system. Evidence
collected from explosive materials or post-blast
analysis can help convict criminals in local courts.
Warrants and arrests are the direct result of a concerted
effort by ground units in partnership with
indigenous security forces to conduct a thorough
investigation of an event rather than clearing the
scene and moving on to the next objective. The
gratification may not be as instant as catching an
insurgent in the act, but the long-term effects are
considerably more beneficial.
Despite the potential advantages of quickly
enrolling an entire population into a biometrics
database, care must be taken to ensure that indigenous
security forces take the lead in all biometrics
operations to avoid the perception of continuous
foreign intervention and the systematic cataloguing
of local citizens. More direct action on the part of
ISAF forces runs the risk of aggravating the very
population they mean to protect, while host nation
forces can build relationships with the local civilians
while conducting a legitimate census. This has
the added benefit of engaging many communities
that traditionally do not see a regular ANSF presence.
Although biometrics collection is an important
element of C-IED strategy, it should not come at
the expense of alienating the people.
Attacking the network through a concerted
evidence and biometrics collection effort is an integral
aspect of C-IED strategy, yet it must complement
rather than substitute for counterinsurgency
operations. Understanding the difference between
actively targeting insurgent nodes and indirectly
eroding their support and influence through the
population is important. While analyzing insurgent
TTP and attack methods will certainly provide
valuable information to ground units conducting
operations, it does not eliminate the source of the
threat. A constantly evolving game of spy-versusspy
only circumvents the issue, showing no signs
of ending as both insurgent and counterinsurgent
vie for the tactical upper hand.
Final Thoughts
Military strategy in Afghanistan has scarcely
changed since the early days of hunting the Taliban
in 2001. Even today, we place more emphasis
and attention on targeting operations designed to
crumble insurgent networks than on populationcentric
counterinsurgency. Improvised explosive
devices are considered a lamentable byproduct of
the insurgent’s general unwillingness to engage
in direct action. Technological advances continue
to flow into theater to guard against increasingly
sophisticated and dangerous threats that, in spite
of the new technology, continue to injure and kill
soldiers and civilians.
Both of these methods—targeting and technology—
are essentially defensive and reactive in nature.
Even operations against Taliban leaders and facilitators seek to reduce insurgent capability to conduct
attacks, their success measured in complicated
slides, graphs, and charts arranged in whatever
way best represents progress. IEDs are simply the
weapon of choice to support the insurgents’ political
cause, facilitating consolidation of power and
influence from within the population.
Although counter-IED strategy is a microcosm
of counterinsurgency, our intelligence and
operations groups sometimes treat it as a separate
function, preferring to develop new methods to
defeat the device (or its intended effects) rather
than understand it. The tools needed to effectively
neutralize IEDs as a battlefield threat will not be
found in technological systems or equipment, nor
in killing insurgent leaders, but rather in building
relationships with the people who have become
the battleground for all modern military conflicts.
Their silence speaks as loudly as the next explosion.
Notes
- Anand Gopal, “The Battle for Afghanistan—Militancy and Conflict in Kandahar,” New America Foundation, November 2010, 27.
- See for example the Canadian’s experience in Kandahar in 2009; Carl Forsberg, “The Taliban’s Campaign for Kandahar,” The Institute for the Study of War, December 2009, 52.
- Seth G. Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, RAND Counterinsurgency Study: Volume 4 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), 49-50.
- David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 1964), 82.
Captain David F. Eisler, U.S. Army, was the leader of the counter-IED cell for the 2nd Cavalry Regiment in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in Zabul, Afghanistan (OEF X-XI). He previously deployed with the regiment to Diyala, Iraq, in 2008. He holds a B.A. from Cornell University.
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